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Bonum est homini ut eum veritas vincat volentem, quia malum est homini ut eum veritas vancat
invitum. Nam ipsa vincat necesse est, sive negantium sive confitentum.
S. AUG. EPIST. CCXXXVIII. AD. PASCENT.

VOLUME II.

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THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW.

Vol. II.—JANUARY, 1877.—No. 5.

THE LIBERALISTIC VIEW OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL QUESTION.

Lecture on The Public School Question, as Understood by the Liberal American Citizen. By Francis E. Abbot. Boston, 1876.

TWO lectures on the Public School question were delivered last February (1876) in Boston Horticultural Hall, the first by the illustrious Bishop McQuaid in support of the rights and liberties of all American citizens in the matter of education, the second by a Mr. Francis E. Abbot, who appeared before the public a week later as the champion of what is usually styled the *liberal* theory, viz., of a theory which ignores parental rights, and tends to transform the state into a Moloch, to which the children of the people ought to be sacrificed.

That a bishop of the Catholic Church should undertake to speak aloud in favor of public rights and popular liberties, is not a new thing, and was to be expected; nor is it surprising that his opponent, who is a man of the liberalistic school, should endeavor to stifle both right and liberty; for the history of modern times and a sad experience have taught us that liberalism is not synonymous with liberality, but rather with despotism. In the present case, what surprises us is, that a man who respects himself could have come forward before an intelligent audience with an array of reckless and blundering assertions, as Mr. Abbot did, without considering that what he was going to say had been most thoroughly refuted, just a week before, in the same hall, by the eminent lecturer who had preceded him. The fact, however, of his venturing

to engage in the arduous task, admits of an excellent explanation. He knew that there was in Boston, as well as elsewhere, a class of thinkers who can gobble down absurdities, relish sophistry, and applaud everything that opposes the Catholic Church on any subject whatever, and especially on education. He knew, also, that he was not alone, but acted as the representative of the freethinkers of the country, who would back him up, whether right or wrong, for the triumph of the cause which they are pledged to support. So he boldly undertook to deliver his lecture on *The Public School Question as Understood by the Liberal American Citizen*. This lecture embodies all the specious arguments of the self-styled liberals; but, unfortunately for the lecturer, it shows only one thing, viz., that the Catholic view of the school question is irrefutable, whilst the secularistic view has no ground on which to stand, except sophistry, declamation, and misrepresentation.

Who is this Mr. Abbot who ventures to join issue with a Catholic bishop? Mr. Francis E. Abbot is the editor of "*The Index*, a weekly (Masonic) paper devoted to free and rational religion," as we read in an advertisement printed at the end of his lecture. Its programme is as follows:

"*The Index* aims to increase general intelligence with respect to religion; to foster a nobler spirit and quicken a higher purpose both in society and in the individual; to substitute knowledge for ignorance, right for wrong, truth for superstition, freedom for slavery, character for creed, catholicity for bigotry, love for hate, humanitarianism for sectarianism, devotion to universal ends for absorption in selfish schemes; in brief, to hasten the day when free religion shall take the place of dogmatism and ecclesiasticism throughout the world, and when the welfare of humanity here and now shall be the aim of all private and public activities. In addition to its general objects, the practical object to which *The Index* is specially devoted, is THE ORGANIZATION OF THE LIBERALS OF THE COUNTRY for the purpose of securing the more complete and consistent secularization of the political and educational institutions of the United States."

This programme helps us to understand why Mr. Abbot thought it his bounden duty to come forward with his lecture on the public school question. Americans, according to this American sage, are ignorant, superstitious, degraded; they know not right from wrong, nor freedom from slavery; they have no character, no love, no noble spirit, but only creed, hatred, and selfish schemes. Hence it was the duty of Mr. Abbot "to substitute knowledge for ignorance, right for wrong, truth for superstition;" for he is anxious "to hasten the day when free religion," that is, Freemasonry, "shall take the place of dogmatism and ecclesiasticism throughout the world."

Such are the ideas, and such the objects, of the man whose lecture we propose to analyze.

THE EXORDIUM.—The lecture begins thus:

"It is my duty this afternoon to speak to you about the 'public school question as viewed by the liberal American citizen,' terms which I understand to indicate merely the point of view occupied by those who look at this question in the light of well-recognized American principles, and with reference to the interests of the whole people and their self-chosen government, as distinguished from the point of view occupied by those who look at it in the light of other than American principles and with reference to the interests of a party, a sect, or a church."

In these few lines we find two false assertions. First, it may be a convenient thing and a clever rhetorical trick, before an American audience, to speak highly of "American principles;" but what are these? We know of American policy, of American views, and of American fashions; but we do not think that there can be any strictly American principles. Principles are dictates of reason confirmed by the experience of ages; they are a common property and an inheritance, not a product of American ingenuity. Principles are old, and America is still young. America may invent, as she does, new mechanical contrivances and other useful and excellent things, but we do not see that she has yet patented any new principle. Still less can we admit that the *liberal* American citizens of the stamp of Mr. Abbot have any specially American principles of their own, for we know that their liberalism is a virtual denial of the popular principles on the maintenance of which the order, peace, and prosperity of this free country ultimately depend. Hence it is that Mr. Abbot and his liberal friends of *The Index* consider the American people as ignorant, wrong, superstitious, for they know that our people are not yet ready to adopt these pretended "American" principles. Unless Mr. Abbot can prove that the American people hold un-American principles, we are obliged to conclude that Mr. Abbot's principles, as opposed to those of the people, are themselves un-American.

It is a well-known fact that the first settlers of this country brought over from their old land, and planted in this soil, the principles of *Christian* civilization. Their schools were religious, and they continued to be intensely so even after the Revolution. In these later years, every new accession of population from Europe has contributed to strengthen the religious feelings of the country. The country is Christian. Freethinkers, as compared with the rest of the citizens, are a ridiculous minority. It is true that they make much noise, and pretend to represent American thought, but the people do not indorse them, and look upon them as unprincipled men, roguish politicians, the tools of Satan, and the leprosy of American society. The mass of American citizens is even now, with few exceptions, as much Christian in religion as it is republican in government. As Christians, our citizens intend to

educate their children in their religious faith; as republicans, they will not allow the public servants of the state freely to invade their rights and curtail their liberties. These, if any, are the recognized American principles. It is therefore the merest nonsense to speak of "well-recognized American principles" in connection with the odious and un-American thesis that Mr. Abbot undertakes to defend. He would have shown a greater love of truth, and would have been more readily believed, had he told his hearers that his view of public education was connected, not with American principles, but with the Bismarckian schemes and with the infamous machinations of secret societies.

What he adds about fostering "the interests of the whole people and their self-chosen government," is a puerility, if not an impertinence. Our people are able to protect their own interests without the kind help of Mr. Abbot or other self-appointed tutors. To assume the contrary is to insinuate that the American people are incapable of living and thriving under a republican form of government, and that the sooner they give themselves a master the better. Our citizens, thanks to God, have no need of a master; but if they had, we have reason to believe that neither Mr. Abbot nor any of his free religionists would be consulted on the subject. "Free religion," as understood by free religionists, is a monstrosity; it may suit mere politicians or blind materialists, but it does not suit the popular taste, it does not supply the popular wants, and it destroys the very foundation of all civil and human society. Our citizens are not at all anxious "to hasten the day when the welfare of humanity *here and now* shall be the aim of all private and public activities," for they know that when that day comes, that is, when all thought of a better hereafter has vanished, the country will be a den of thieves, a sink of filth, and a lair of ferocious beasts ready to tear to pieces and devour one another.

Mr. Abbot assumes, in the second place, that those who oppose the godless schools "look at the question in the light of other than American principles, and with reference to the interests of a party, a sect, or a church." This is not only a false assumption, but also a mean and malicious calumny. The orator to whom Mr. Abbot strives to reply, declared in the most explicit and unmistakable terms, that Catholics "ask no favor, no privilege, no special prerogative, no right that they do not concede to others;" in other words, "they seek equal rights for all, favors for none." Now, is it fair in the face of such a declaration to assert that Catholics appeal to the interests of a party, a sect, or a church? Do we not concede the same rights to all parties, all sects, all so-called churches, without exception? Let us repeat it in the ears of honest Mr. Abbot: "We seek equal rights for all, favors for none."

On the other hand, who is it that looks on the public school question "in the light of other than American principles," but he who strives to monopolize the public schools for the benefit of free-thinkers? Who is it that "seeks the interests of a party and of a sect" (though not of a church), but Mr. Abbot, who labors so earnestly in his *Index* for the triumph of Freemasonry? It is the secularist, therefore, not the Catholic, that countenances un-American notions, and seeks the interest of a despotic sect.

He continues:

"There is a sectional, and there is also a national aspect of every great public issue. There is a partisan, ecclesiastical, and sectarian view of the school question, and also a universal, secular, and strictly non-sectarian view of it. It is the latter view alone that I hold, and I shall try to represent faithfully this afternoon all who hold it. That they are only a portion, though a very large portion of the entire population of the country, I of course admit; but that they look at this question in the light of their own interests as a party, and not in that of the equal interests of each and every inhabitant of the land, I emphatically deny."

We need hardly remark that this denial is as absurd as it pretends to be emphatic. The infidel schools may indeed serve the interests of a few infidel parents, but will they *equally* serve the interests of those who have a faith?

Here Mr. Abbot again assumes that the Catholic view of the school question is "partisan" and "sectarian," whilst he pretends that the secularist view is "universal" and "strictly unsectarian." This is mere twaddle. Every one knows that the word "*sect*" comes from the Latin *secta*, which is derived from *seco* (to cut off), or, as others teach, from *sector* (to follow): hence the word "sectarian" applies to the followers of any peculiar religious or irreligious system invented by individual thinkers in opposition to the common doctrines of the true and divinely instituted universal Church. Calvinists, therefore, Lutherans, Unitarians, Presbyterians, and all those who have wilfully separated from the universal Church, are sectaries. Free religionists, too, and the members of all Masonic societies, whatever their name, are sectaries, as they are cut off from the universal Church. But to say that we Catholics are sectaries, is to forget that catholicity means universality, and that there is a difference between the living branches of a tree and the dry sticks which are consigned to the fire. Catholicity and sectarianism are so incompatible, that all sects hate catholicity, though they are often friendly to one another.

As to the Catholic view of the public school question being "partisan," we need not answer again. The few words we have already quoted from Bishop McQuaid's lecture show that Mr. Abbot has no right to taunt us with such a charge. All partisan views are exclusive. Are our views exclusive? Quite the contrary. We seek "equal rights for all, favors for none." Not so

with the secularists. Mr. Abbot of course wants us to believe that the secularistic view of the public school question is neither partisan nor sectarian ; but unfortunately we cannot believe against evidence. Is it not manifest, that the free religionists are a "sect," and that they look at the public school question in the light of their own interests as a party, and not in that of the equal interests of each and every inhabitant of the land? The thing is so evident, that no "emphatic denial" can make it doubtful.

And now, what does our lecturer mean, when he says that the secularistic view of the public school question is "universal?" Surely, he does not mean that such a view is universally received ; for he himself confesses that only a portion of the entire population of the country holds it. He adds, indeed, that the secularists are "a very large portion" of our population ; but this is not true, and, were it true, it would not justify the epithet "universal." What then is the real meaning of this epithet? It is clearly this, that the secularists intend to bring down *the whole country* to their low moral and intellectual level, without the least regard for the good of society, the duties of conscience, and the rights and liberties of the various religious denominations to which the mass of the people belong. This pretended universality of unbelief is nothing but the universal degradation of the American people, the universal disregard of our religious convictions, the universal supremacy of Freemasonry, the universal bondage of Christian families, the universal interference of the State with the sacred rights of individual conscience. This is what every thoughtful man understands to be the aim of the secularistic sect. Can Mr. Abbot reconcile this with "American principles?"

But our lecturer denies that the secularists are a sect. He says:

"In other words, I maintain, contrary to the plausible and ingenious misrepresentations sometimes put forward, that the secular party to this school question is not a *sect*, and cannot be justly so considered from the mere fact of its not embracing the whole population. If that fact alone were decisive, then unsectarianism is an impossibility so long as a difference of opinion exists among men. But what really makes a party partisan or sectarian, is the selfish endeavor to sacrifice the interests of the whole people to their own interests as a mere part of the people ; while if any party aims honestly at securing the interests of the whole people by rendering equal and exact justice to every individual, it is a strictly non-partisan and non-sectarian party. For instance, the Republican party, whatever its subsequent sins, was an organized national and non-partisan party during the War of the Rebellion, because it aimed at the true interests of the whole nation, including the very South which was in rebellion ; and to-day the great body of honest men, who are opposed to the army of corruptionists in politics, is an unorganized national and non-partisan party, because it aims at establishing politics on the basis of common honesty, which is really the equal interest of all. Precisely in the same manner, I maintain that the secular party on the school question is a strictly non-sectarian party, and not a sect at all, because it aims solely to settle this question on the basis of that equal justice, which is the common and supreme interest of all mankind."

This would be all exceedingly good, if it were true that the secular party "aims solely to settle the question on the basis of equal justice to all." If the lecturer had proved this proposition (which he has not attempted to do), his argument would be conclusive; for every one must admit the general principle that "if any party aims honestly at securing the interests of the whole people by rendering equal and exact justice to every individual, it is a strictly non-partisan and non-sectarian party." But is it true that the secularists and the free religionists aim solely to settle the question on the basis of equal justice to all? Quite the reverse. The secularists aim at settling the question on the basis of *equal injustice* to all who have any Christian convictions, that is, to all who are not free-religionists like themselves. They aim at crushing the interests of all religious denominations in the matter of Christian education, and they aim to apply the money extorted from us to the moral ruin of our children and to the general propagation of paganism. This is what Mr. Abbot with truly Masonic cheek calls "equal justice to all."

We may ask him, would it be "equal justice to all," if the public schools were all to be placed under the exclusive control of the Roman Catholic Church? Would you think it just to have all the citizens taxed, that the boys and girls of opposite denominations may be educated by nuns, by Christian Brothers, by priests, and by Jesuits? We suppose that such a system of public schools would not please you. And yet it is quite certain, that nuns, Christian Brothers, priests, and Jesuits are the best instructors and educators in the country; and accordingly, you free religionists, who boast so much of your great love of the country, should have no objection against this kind of instruction. The pupils educated by us compare favorably with those of other institutions; they are, to say the least, as well instructed, while their moral faculties are much better trained, and their evil propensities more effectually checked and smothered by the help of Christian instruction, the example of their teachers, and the practice of religious duties. Why then, should you, Mr. Abbot, and your friends, object to such a good education being extended to all the children of the country? You would answer, that such an education, however good, is objectionable on the ground of the injustice done to the non-catholic families by applying the money exacted from them to the enforcement of a system through which their children cannot receive the education they desire. But we reply, that whether the education be exclusively Catholic, or whether it be exclusively godless, the injustice is as great, or rather it is much greater in the case of godless than of Catholic education. A moment's consideration suffices to see the truth of this remark. For Catholic

education, while forming better men, teaches much that is still admitted by most of the Christian sects, whereas godless education saps the foundation of public morality, and implicitly condemns the tenets of every Christian sect. From this it must be evident that if it would be unjust to put the public schools under the exclusive control of the Roman Catholics, it is even more unjust to put them under the exclusive control of the free religion party. Between the Roman Catholics and the rest of the country there is only partial dissent, whilst between the free religionists and the rest of the country there is total dissent and irreconcilable opposition. And thus it is plain that the secularistic or free religionist party, while cajoling the country with the big words of "common interests" and "equal justice to all," do really disregard all notion of justice, and aim at promoting their own sectarian interests alone.

We beg to remark here, that what Mr. Abbot falsely says concerning the secularistic view of the school question, can be said with perfect truth of the Roman Catholic view of the same question. We will use his own words: "*We maintain, contrary to the by no means plausible and still less ingenious misrepresentations hypocritically put forward by the secular party, that the Roman Catholics are not a 'sect,' and cannot be justly so considered from the mere fact of their not embracing the whole population. . . . What really makes a party partisan or sectarian, is the selfish endeavor to sacrifice the interests of the whole people to their own interests as a mere part of the people; while if any party aims honestly at securing the interests of the whole people by rendering equal and exact justice to every individual, it is a strictly non-partisan and non-sectarian party. Hence the Catholic party, in the school question, is a strictly non-sectarian party, and not a sect at all, because it aims solely to settle the question on the basis of that equal justice, which is the common and supreme interest of all mankind.*"

To this reasoning Mr. Abbot cannot take exception. He cannot say that we aim at sacrificing the interests of the whole country to our own interests; for our solution of the public school question implies that every denomination shall enjoy equal freedom and equal facilities for the protection and advancement of its special interests. Nor can he say, that it is the interest of all mankind to be educated without religion; for religion is not only a duty of all mankind, but a necessity for all political and domestic society. We need religious education, were it only as a means for checking the growth of scoundrelism in the country, as experience shows that it cannot be checked by godless education. Nothing therefore remains but to conclude, that the interests of the people are much

better served by the adoption of the Catholic view, than they ever can be by that of the free religionist or infidel sect.

Whether the Republican party during the War of the Rebellion was or was not a "non-partisan party," there is no need of ascertaining. As to "the great body of honest men who are opposed to the army of corruptionists in politics," we willingly concede that, as a whole, they are not a partisan party, in so far at least as they aim at establishing politics "on the basis of common honesty." But Mr. Abbot, while mentioning the army of corruptionists *in politics*, should have remembered that there is also an army of corruptionists *in education*, and that the great body of honest men who are opposed to this latter, deserve the respect and the sympathy of all good citizens, and should never be called "sectarians," as he calls them; for it is manifest that they aim at establishing public education "on the basis of equal justice," which is really the equal interest of all mankind.

Mr. Abbot will doubtless deny that the free religionists we have just alluded to, strive to corrupt public education. He seems to think that the more completely religion is excluded from the public schools, the better and purer will the education be. Does he not even tell us very plainly, in the programme which we have given above, that Christianity is ignorance, superstition, bigotry, and sectarianism, and that unbelief is knowledge, truth, freedom, character, love, catholicism? It is on these extravagant notions that he bases his conclusion against religious education. But mankind does not listen to this new doctrine, though some fools admire it. All really honest men and all true statesmen condemn such a doctrine as tending to the utter destruction of civil society. "Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity," says our often-quoted George Washington, "religion and morality are indisputable supports. In vain would that man claim the attribute of patriotism, who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them. . . . Reason and experience forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle." It is, therefore, a recognized truth, to which no one who consults the history of nations can demur, that the banishment of religion from the public schools is the bane of national education, and that the free religionist clique, in whose name Mr. Abbot speaks, constitutes an army of corruptionists in arrant conspiracy against the country.

It has been said, and we have heard it a hundred times from honest people, that the different and opposite religious doctrines which prevail in this country, necessarily require the public educa-

tion to be carried on independently of all religious views, that it may thereby suit the common needs of all without hurting any religious opinion. This view looks less radical than that of Mr. Abbot, as it does not pretend to be founded on *a priori* principles, but merely on grounds of practical necessity. Hence a great number of honest men, as we have just remarked, have been led to believe that such a view offered the only practical solution of the public school question. Unsuspicious people are easily deceived by cunning schemers; which sufficiently accounts for the silent acquiescence of good and religious men in the irreligious system. Yet it was not difficult to understand that the alleged necessity was only a cover to hide the iniquity of the scheme. Had the leaders of the infidel party manifested at once in its naked ugliness their plan of unchristianizing the country, they would have excited general horror, indignation, and execration. They therefore acted with caution; and they did what skilful generals do when they have to fight against superior numbers. They lay in ambush under the tree of liberty, and proclaimed, that respect for popular liberties would not permit either the children of the Jew to be brought up under Christian tuition, or the children belonging to any Christian denomination to be spoiled by the teachings of a different denomination. What then should be done? The plain conclusion, they argued, ought to be, that the public schools, which are destined to the instruction of all our children, cannot, consistently with the religious liberty of our citizens, adopt the religious doctrines of any denomination, but must remain altogether neutral with respect to them, and therefore must banish all religious practices, books, etc., and renounce all standards of religious belief. This is the silly argument by which the infidel party won to its cause a number of unreflecting men.

But the problem of public education admitted of two solutions at least, the one negative, the other positive, that is, the one aiming at *levelling down*, and the other at *levelling up*. The infidel party ignored this latter solution, which would have really met the wants of all denominations, and clung exclusively to the former one, on the plea that their negative system suited the common needs of the country without hurting any religious opinion. The truth is, however, that the godless schools *do not suit* the common needs of the country, and *hurt* more or less sensibly all religious persuasions. The country needs to have its children brought up in religious practices, with religious principles, amid religious examples, under the influence of religious motives, that they may imbibe a salutary respect for the Divine law, and a salutary fear of the Divine judgment, and that they may not hereafter be the shame of their families and the scourge of the country. It is useless to

reply that religious education can be secured by the Sunday-school and by domestic exertions. A sad experience has shown that the private efforts of good parents towards religious education are generally thwarted, warped, and nullified by the evil influence of the infidel schools. Let the public school system of the free religionists do its unwholesome work ten or twelve years longer, and we venture to predict that the United States of America will become a huge mass of corruption.

On the other hand, all religious persuasions have an undoubted right to complain, as they do, of the godlessness of the public school system. Whoever believes in God, in an immortal soul, in a future life, has a right to hate a system by which his children are virtually taught to disregard religion. This hatred is in the very nature of things. No one who believes, is willing to pay taxes for fostering unbelief. We admit that a number of Protestants, whose religious convictions are more or less indefinite, do not much feel (because they little apprehend) the evils of such a system; but these are not standard Protestants. Their clergy have often declared, either in educational conventions, or in public addresses, that they cannot be satisfied with the arrangements of the infidel schools. We know even of Protestants who send their children, both male and female, to the Catholic schools, rather than to allow them to imbibe the poisonous influences of the godless system.

Yet it is the Catholic families that feel the most bitterly the iniquity of the same system. The Catholic religion is not, like the Protestant, a mere opinion, or an indefinite persuasion based on private judgment and open to compromise; it is a firm faith in revealed truth, a faith as reasonable in its motives as it is certain in its object, a faith which is more precious to us than all the literary and scientific learning of the godless institutions, a faith which demands of the believer the practice of good works, the hatred of sin, the subjection of the flesh to the spirit, and the constant use of those means which God has provided, through the Church, for the achievement of such a noble and difficult task. The good education of a Catholic boy requires, therefore, a care of which secularists have no idea; it requires the employment of means which the secularists have determined to proscribe. This Catholic education, besides the development of the mind, comprises the formation of the heart and the acquisition of virtuous habits, and this must be secured by the help of good examples, good companions, innocence of life, respect to religion, and encouragement to devotional practices. But it is as clear as noonday that a system which, like that of our public schools, excludes all religious ideas, can do nothing of the kind; it tends, on the contrary, to frustrate the efforts of Catholic parents in the work of education,

by giving to the children the practical example of religious indifference, which is sure to bear, sooner or later, its usual fruit of infidelity, knavery, and debauchery. This more than suffices to show that Mr. Abbot is not serious when he speaks of "equal justice to all" in the present system of public schools. Indeed, it must be evident to all, that a system which discards religion from education does not deal "equal justice" to those who cling to religion, and to those who have no religion at all.

But let us proceed. The lecturer adds:

"What I have to say on the school question, therefore, will be said in the interest of no part of the people, but of the whole people; for, unlike some others, I belong to no party or sect which has interests separated from, or hostile to, the interests of the whole people."

We reply, it is not true that Mr. Abbot is going to speak "in the interest of the whole people," and it is not true that he "belongs to no party or sect which has interests separated from, or hostile to, the interests of the whole people." Mr. Abbot is going to defend the godless system of public schools, how then can he honestly believe that he is going to speak in the interest of the whole people? Is he not aware, that all religious denominations are deeply interested in religious education, and that the whole country feels a pressing need of increased religious activity to protect herself against impending evils, by forming a generation of good and conscientious citizens?

Mr. Abbot seems to say that he belongs to no party or sect. This assertion coming, as it does, from a man who is so well known in Boston and elsewhere, is rather amusing; it certainly can deceive none but simpletons. For is not Mr. Abbot known as the editor of *The Index*, "a weekly paper devoted to free and rational religion," that is, to Freemasonry? How, then, can he say that he belongs to no party or sect, or that the sect to which he belongs has no interests separated from, or hostile to, the interests of the whole people? Orators are sometimes tempted to indulge in specious lies, but when lies are palpable it is silly to yield to the temptation. And now we have done with the exordium of Mr. Abbot's lecture. We might have left it out altogether, as it contains but empty words, but we thought that an analysis of it would help our readers in forming at once a pretty just idea of the general tone of the lecture which we have undertaken to refute.

THE CATHOLIC PROTEST.—After such an exordium, Mr. Abbot introduces his subject in the following words:

"But how comes there to be any school question at all? The public school system was established, and has been sustained, by the people itself, solely for the purpose of supplying a universal want, namely, the education of the people's children. Nothing

human is perfect, and the school system is not perfect; but it was honestly founded for the good of the whole people, not of a party or sect, and can be improved. Why is there to-day a 'school question' to be settled?"

We must remind Mr. Abbot (for he seems to have forgotten it) that the first public schools of our country were not free religionist but denominational. Religious instruction was common, and the Bible stood supreme. Up to the close of the first quarter of this century the clergy (Protestant) were almost invariably represented in the school boards. They examined the teachers, inspected the schools, prescribed the text-books, etc., and this they did in each town or school society of New England, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the other States settled by New England emigrants. Such schools were indeed "honestly founded" by those Protestant communities, "for the good" of their children as they understood it. But about that time the leaders of the infidel party stepped forward with a new plan of education. "In order to get their system of schools adopted," says Mr. O. A. Brownson, who was one of their agents, "they proposed to organize the whole Union secretly, very much on the plan of the Carbonari of Europe. The members of this secret society were to avail themselves of all the means in their power, each in his own locality, to form public opinion in favor of education by the State at the public expense, and to get such men elected to the Legislature as would be likely to favor their purposes. This secret organization commenced in the State of New York, and was to extend over the whole Union." The reader who wants more details regarding this secret plot, may read the very instructive book of Rev. Michael Müller on *Public School Education*, ch. iii. The members of this organization pretended that the system then existing did not work well enough, that the standard of education was lowering, and that the condition of the schools was not up to the demands of the time. The *American Encyclopædia* tells us that "the attention of philanthropic men (*Freemasons*) in all parts of the country was directed to the subject, and in 1817 (*which was the first centennial of Freemasonry*) commenced what has been not improperly termed a revival (*secularization*) of education, which is still exerting its influence for good (*and for evil too*) throughout the country." By the establishment of "public school societies" and of "*improved* school organizations," by the creation of educational journals destined to manipulate public opinion, and by other means, the secularists obtained partial successes, gave to their party a stronger organization, and extended their influence in many States, though not without occasional struggles with what they called the religious prejudices of the clergy and the superstition of the people. Thus gathering every year new strength and new importance, they resolved to conquer

the whole country by a combined effort, to supersede all "sectarian" systems of education, to ignore Christianity, to paganize the new generation, and thus to smother, so far as it lay in them, the last spark of religious fire still lingering in the popular institutions of the country. Thanks to the intrigues of unscrupulous men, the connivance of a rotten administration, the supineness or inattention of a distracted people, and the culpable imbecility of those whose duty it was to stand foremost *pro aris et focis* against the invading foe, the godless sect won an easy victory, and loudly proclaimed that henceforward the public schools, so far as it depended on them, would cease to have anything "sectarian" about them. This is how things have been brought down to their present condition, and this is what Mr. Abbot misrepresents as a system "established by the people." We wish he had informed his audience that Freemasons, in this country as well as in Europe, by the word "people" usually understand themselves and their adherents. But the wily orator could not, of course, make himself guilty of such an imprudent act of sincerity.

Thus it is not true that the godlessness of the public schools was established by the people. Is it true, at least, that it was "sustained by the people," as Mr. Abbot affirms? The people indeed, could not help to pay the taxes which were applied to the support of such a system; but this can hardly be interpreted as an approval of the system itself. Nor can the large number of children who frequent the godless schools be considered as a proof that the people are satisfied with them. Where no choice is left, parents must make the best of it, even against their will. Mr. Abbot might as well pretend that the American people was delighted to be plundered by the infamous clique which has ruled and ruined the country in these late years; for the people have submitted to it. The like has happened in regard to the infidel school system. Most of our people, that is, all good and Christian families, have tolerated this system with bitter resignation, just as they have tolerated all sorts of defalcations, embezzlements, and other scandalous practices, for which they had no remedy at hand. This is, we think, the only manner in which a very great number of American families "sustained" the secularistic system of public education.

To the interrogation "Why is there to-day a school question to be settled?" we answer very plainly: Because the public schools have been monopolized in the interest of a sect, to the injury of all religious denominations in the country. Mr. Abbot answers the same interrogation fairly enough in the following words:

"Since the year 1840, when the Roman Catholic Church, under the lead of Archbishop Hughes, began its attack on the public school system, there has been a persistent and determined protest against this system, on the ground that it is unjust and oppressive

to the Catholic conscience. Whatever the grounds of this complaint, its earnestness and sincerity are unquestionable, in view of the fact that the Catholics of the country have voluntarily taxed themselves sufficiently to establish and sustain a great system of Catholic parochial schools, for the education of their children under the sole control of the Catholic priesthood, and that now about four hundred thousand children are receiving instruction in them, to the total neglect and disuse of the public schools. A protest manifestly so sincere, urged in the sacred name of conscience, deserves to receive the most respectful and dispassionate consideration of the majority. If the protest is a reasonable one, and if the public school system really infringes the undeniable rights even of a single citizen, reform and redress are the only right course to be adopted; and if not, the fact of even an unreasonable protest on the part of so large and so rapidly increasing a portion of the people, is cause for grave disquietude in the minds of all intelligent patriots. The school question thus raised is complicated still further by the fact that the great body of non-Catholics who heartily support the public school system, are themselves divided as to the relation it ought to bear to religion, one part holding that the schools should have a distinctively Protestant Christian character, the other part holding that they should be wholly colorless or neutral with respect to religious beliefs. The former maintain an intermediate position between the positions of the Catholic and the secular or liberal parties, and are in fact attempting to reconcile irreconcilable principles. But their consistency or inconsistency does not affect the main question of the support or abolition of the State school system. Protestants and Liberals are nearly unanimous in supporting it, and differ only on the question whether the schools supported by the State shall be wholly or partially secular. But the protest of the Catholic Church strikes at the very foundation of the State schools; it denies the right of the State to educate at all, and claims the whole field of education as part of the domain of the Church itself. Let us then concentrate our attention for the present on the Catholic protest, and consider without passion and without prejudice, how far this protest is grounded in justice and in truth."

Thus the Catholics, who form "so large and so rapidly increasing a portion of the people," that is, twelve or thirteen millions of American citizens, earnestly and persistently protest against the public school system as now managed for the exclusive interest of unbelief. Another "great body," to wit, Protestants of all kinds, whose number may be safely assumed to reach at least twenty-five millions, hold that our public schools "ought to have a Christian character." These two great bodies evidently constitute the quasi-totality of our population. Therefore those who call themselves "liberals," "free religionists," "freethinkers," or "secularists," and who wish the public schools to be "neutral with respect to religious beliefs," are only a small minority, and though they have succeeded, by organized efforts, in imposing their godless system upon the people, they do not in fact represent the American thought of education. Had these free religionists respected the rights and the feelings of the Christian millions, as they were obliged, no school question would have arisen, except in so far as the bigotry of some Protestant declaimers might have resisted, and retarded for a time, the full admission of the Catholic claim. Whence it follows, that the present school question did not originate in the Catholic protest, but was pressed upon us by the infidel party, which turned to its exclusive interests an institution designed for the interests of the whole people.

That the Catholics have protested against the new system, is true of course ; but they were not the only ones that protested ; nor was their protest intended to shelter the rights of Catholicity alone, but those also of all other Christian families in the country. All denominations are interested in religious education, and all feel more or less keenly the injustice of the victory won by the unchristian party. That the Catholics should feel it more sensibly, and resent it more deeply than other denominations, is a great credit to them, and was to be expected, for reasons which we have already touched upon.

Mr. Abbot very wisely remarks that those Protestants who with respect to the school question, maintain an intermediate position between the positions of the Catholic and of the secular parties, "are in fact attempting to reconcile irreconcilable principles." This is a great truth. Do you hear it, you gentlemen of the Protestant Churches? It is not a Catholic that drives you out of the field of controversy in such an unceremonious manner ; it is Mr. Abbot himself ; it is one of those very infidels with whom you conspired against Catholic education. He declares to you, that the public schools shall not have that "distinctively Protestant Christian character," which your alliance with the unbelievers was intended to shelter. It was therefore a mistaken policy on your part to separate from the Catholic body in the great struggle for Christian education. Your claims are now ridiculed by your former allies, the liberals ; and you richly deserve it. Had you joined with us in the cause of equal justice to all Christian denominations, your claims would not now be disregarded, and the country, in all probability, would have been saved from the curse of godless schools.

The protest of the Catholic Church, adds Mr. Abbot, "strikes at the very foundation of State schools ; it denies the right of the State to educate at all, and claims the whole field of education as part of the domain of the Church itself." These words need explanation. That the Church alone has a right to teach revealed religion, we think, Mr. Abbot himself must readily admit. The State has certainly received no mission to teach religion ; it needs religion ; it must respect religion ; but it is not the depositary of God's revelation to man ; nor has it been intrusted with its interpretation. On the other hand, the State cannot prosper without justice, honesty, and morality, and therefore without encouraging the cultivation of religious principles and the exercise of religious duties. The State, therefore, is in continual need of the Church. This conclusion, though it may have little weight with Mr. Abbot and his supporters, is extremely weighty, as all historians, philosophers, and statesmen of all times and countries agree. And since it is in the

work of education that the seeds of public honesty and morality are to be sown, it is in this same work of education that the State is more especially bound to respect the rights, and second the efforts of the Church. We say "of the Church" in the singular, both because Mr. Abbot does so himself, and because we think that no man of sense will admit that there can be in the world more than *one* true Church of God.

Nevertheless, the Church does not claim "as part of her domain," the education of all the children of the country. She claims only the education of her own, and leaves to each different denomination the whole care of their religious interests. She respects the honest convictions of those who have been taught to differ from her doctrine; and, though she is certain of her divine truth (which is by no means the case with any other denomination), yet she does not claim, as our free religionists do, the right of depriving them of that manner of education which they conscientiously consider as good.

That the State "has no right to educate at all," is not a *special* doctrine of the Catholic Church. The State has the right, and the duty, to encourage good education; but its right to educate is but a Masonic invention; and were the State to make a law requiring all public schools to teach the Christian catechism, freethinkers would be the first to deny that the State, in this free country, has a right to do so. But we will argue in the following manner: Either the State is competent to educate, or it is not. If it is not competent, common sense compels us to deny that it has any right to educate at all. If it is competent, then, since good education cannot be divorced from religion, the State must teach religion. But this no American State can do, not only because no State has any right on religious matters, but also because the multiplicity of religious systems prevailing in the country makes it impossible to satisfy the claims of one system, without violating the equal rights of all the other systems. This impossibility of a uniform State system of education is so manifest, that it has been laid down as an incontrovertible principle by the advocates of godless schools.

The only manner of building up a good and efficient system of State education (if any such were possible), would be to support the educational rights of each denomination by a just apportionment of the public school fund among them all, in proportion to the number of pupils educated in each institution. Then would the State education be worthy of its name, inasmuch as the word "State" would no longer mean a score or two of domineering politicians, but the inhabitants themselves of the State, who alone, in a free republic, are entitled to call themselves properly "the State."

If Mr. Abbot takes the word "State" in this last sense, his remark about the Church "denying the right of State education" is

altogether preposterous ; for the Church has never denied the right of all citizens to educate their children according to the dictates of their conscience. But if he understands the word as meaning a small body of political men, who have succeeded in securing, by hook or by crook, a place in our assemblies, then not only the Catholic Church, but every one who has not lost all idea of human dignity, will most emphatically deny that such men have any right whatever to meddle with our liberties concerning education, or to decide for us which kind of education is the best. Much less are such men authorized to foster a general system of public schools that must ignore religion, and from which, as experience has already shown, the country can expect nothing but a generation of men without principles and without conscience. Still less have they the right to levy taxes on the citizens for the furtherance of a scheme which all honest and enlightened citizens dislike and condemn, as being radically at variance with the best interests of the country. Such taxes are not only unjust, they are supremely anti-political and anti-social. No true statesman would ever sanction them.

MINOR OBJECTIONS.—Our lecturer, after noticing the protest of the Catholic conscience against the present system of public schools, continues thus :

“ On the minor objections urged by the Catholic Church against the public school system, I shall touch very lightly, reserving my chief attention for the one great and central principle of its protest. It is charged, for instance, that the public school system, as compared with the Catholic parochial school system, is unduly expensive, and the merit of superior economy is pleaded for the latter. This may be true to some extent, and is easily explained when the two kinds of education imparted are compared as to their intrinsic value.”

This is a simple evasion. For what is the intrinsic value of an education without religion ?

“ Economy is not always secured by buying cheap articles ; and the cheapness of Catholic education is no argument in its favor, when its character is considered in the light of certain Catholic admissions which might easily be quoted.”

We do not know to what “ Catholic admissions ” the lecturer is here alluding. Catholics admit that, owing to the unfairness of the existing educational legislation, they labor under some disadvantages, that their means are still insufficient, and their efforts crowned with only partial success. But when did they admit that their standard of education is not immensely superior “ in intrinsic value ” to that of the godless schools ? We defy Mr. Abbot to quote any such “ Catholic admissions.”

"But," he continues, "that the universal adoption of the voluntary denominational system, supplanting the public schools with church schools established by each sect in its own sectarian interest, could possibly reduce the total cost of education on the whole, is incredible. The cost of so many sets of schools would greatly exceed the cost of our present school system, if the same number of children should be educated with the same degree of thoroughness as now."

We think that Mr. Abbot's calculation must be wrong. It is a notorious fact, that State institutions are, as a general rule, more costly than private institutions of the same kind, standard, and efficiency. State money is held cheap, to say the least; harpies find a way to it, while an army of hungry leeches beset it, eagerly intent to feed on it to the best of their ability. The expenditure of the State schools is enormous, and it is not always fully warranted even when it is fully accounted for, which is not always the case. The Commissioner of Education in his report for the year 1872 complained that "few of the States and Territories can give a full and fair account" of their educational receipts and expenses. Nine out of them "cannot tell the amount derived from taxation for school purposes." Seven "can show no total income for school purposes from any source." And as regards expenditure, eleven States and Territories "cannot give any details," and twelve "cannot give the total amount expended." (Page xv.) This gives an idea of how State money can be, and is, handled in this country. The annual cost of our public schools is now *eighty millions of dollars* at least. How is this money spent? "For the management of the godless public schools," says Fr. Muller, "there is a costly array of 'commissioners,' and 'inspectors,' and 'trustees,' and 'superintendents,' and 'secretaries of boards,' and 'central officers,' all in league with 'contractors,' to make 'a good thing' so called, out of the plan. We now have contractors for buildings and repairs, contractors for furniture, contractors for books, contractors for furnaces, contractors for fuel, contractors even for pianos, and all making money out of it. The 'boards' that give the contracts do not make any money by way of commissions, do they? Ah! you know full well that hundreds of thousands of dollars are annually spent or squandered in running these public schools, and which are recommended in a particular manner for their *economy!*" (Pages 171, 172.) We maintain that, if justice were done to us, we Catholics, with the portion of the school fund to which we are entitled, would soon be able not only to educate all our children in the primary schools, but also to found a number of high literary institutions, and perhaps even a couple of magnificent universities. Our portion of the school fund would be about twenty millions of dollars, as we are about one-quarter of the whole population of the United States. If Mr. Abbot and his associates are willing to try us, let them come forward, and help us to obtain justice. It will

be for us, when we are on an equal footing with our adversaries, to show that our literary, scientific, and religious education has nothing to fear from a comparison with that of the godless system. We need not say more on this point, as we believe that this division of the school fund will never be consented to by the Liberals, whilst we ourselves hold that the public school question admits of a better and more radical solution.

Mr. Abbot continues :

"Again, the gradual expansion of the common school system by the establishment of State high schools, normal schools, and universities, is dwelt upon as a great evil, which will ultimately involve the destruction of denominational institutions of the corresponding grade. Perhaps no higher encomium in the eyes of every enlightened friend of education, who knows the worthlessness of most denominational colleges, could be passed upon our present system. Whoever is competent to compare Cornell University and Michigan University with sectarian colleges that could easily be named, will see that this objection is of the nature of a boomerang, and returns to damage the unskilful launcher of it. It would be foreign to my present subject to discuss the equity of sustaining high schools, normal schools, and universities, as State institutions, since we are now concerned only with the elementary public schools as such; but I would enter a general denial of the assumption that the lower grades of State schools are inequitable, because of the supposed inherent tendency of the system to expand into higher institutions of learning. Certainly a very strong argument can be made, on grounds of a thoroughly democratic character, in defence of that tendency, if it exists."

This answer does not meet the objection. We do not object to the gradual expansion of a lower into a higher education. We are not indifferent to the highest development of art, literature, and science, and we wish that America may soon emulate the old nations of Europe in all kinds of useful and ennobling studies. What we object to is the gradual expansion of infidelity, apostasy, paganism, and lawlessness, through the influence of hypocritical societies, which labor to cheat the American people, to pervert the American youth, and to corrupt the spirit of American institutions. It is all very well for Mr. Abbot to speak of high schools, normal schools, and universities as *State* institutions; but it is evident, that such institutions, if arising from the expansion of the present public school system, and animated by the same spirit, would not be *State* institutions, except in this sense, that the State, that is, *the citizens*, would *pay* for them, whilst *Freemasons* would *control* them for their own profit and for our ruin. This may seem good to Mr. Abbot, but the country has already suffered too much from these pretended "friends of education" not to desire to get rid of their influence; and thoughtful Americans are not at all anxious to see their pecuniary contributions applied to the further corruption of their children and to the further propagation of the Masonic fraternity.

These "enlightened friends of education" look upon the destruc-

tion of denominational institutions as a very desirable thing; that is, they would, if possible, deprive the American people of all religious education. To conceal the monstrosity of the attempt, they first allege the odious and baseless charge that what we do is "worthless;" then, to show this "worthlessness" of denominational education, they bring the ridiculous proof that our colleges cannot bear comparison with their universities. What! Is then all education worthless which is not a university education, or, must all colleges be universities? If so, then all the public schools which are not universities must be as worthless as our colleges. And yet the infidel party boasts of them. The truth is, that denominational colleges are not, and do not pretend to be, universities, though some of them give very thorough instruction in many useful branches of knowledge; and the only reason why Mr. Abbot casts discredit upon them, is their having a religious character calculated to retard the triumph of his sectarian friends. Let him therefore beware of his "boomerang" method of dealing with religious institutions, lest he may wound himself with his own weapon.

A third minor objection against the public school system is thus proposed and answered by our lecturer :

"Again, the argument that the secular education given in the common schools not only does not tend to diminish crime, as is claimed by their friends, but, on the contrary, does tend directly to foster immorality, both in teachers and pupils, was urged on this platform last Sunday by Bishop McQuaid. But statistics of unquestionable accuracy are against him on the former point, as any one may learn from the *Report of the Committee on Education of the New York City Council of Political Reform on Compulsory Education*, published in 1873; while, on the latter point, it is sufficient to say that moral abuses tend to creep into every great institution, and that infinitely worse stories are told, on authority at least as good, of the immorality practiced in Roman Catholic convents, nunneries, monasteries, and so forth, than have been told of American public schools. This is a very dangerous argument for Roman Catholics to use; it will hurt their own church a great deal more than it can possibly hurt the public school system; but it is one which I have little inclination to go into, and one which will certainly draw upon the Catholic Church a host of assailants, if the Church is incautious enough to give them an opportunity."

A host of assailants! We thank Mr. Abbot for the kind warning, though we think that we needed no warning at all, as the "host of assailants" has been at work all along these past years under our very eyes. But, when the Church will have been "incautious enough" to unmask her enemies, when their pompous self-glorification will be silenced by the forthcoming evidence of facts, when the mendacity of their stories, and of their statistics, too, come to be known throughout the country, then, of course, all the Liberals, who, in their affected liberality, are watching the opportunity of assailing the Church, will know that the opportunity has been offered at last, and "a host of assailants," greater and stronger than ever, will fall upon us. We may well be sure of this. But, after all, this foe is not very

formidable ; and we are ready to fight it. Know Nothings assailed us when we were fewer and weaker than we are now ; and although they resorted to such arms as our decent free religionists should and would be loath to handle, they were crushed by the American law and by the American people. What kind of weapons our new assailants will use against us we do not exactly know. Lies may be successful for a time ; but sooner or later truth triumphs, the liar smarts under the scourge of ignominy, and his reckless dishonesty becomes an object of universal disgust. Reason is not a weapon that Mr. Abbot's friends can wield against us ; for they have always been beaten by us in the field of argumentation. Declamation is apparently a better weapon in their hands, as they excel in its management ; but it is almost a worn-out article in this country. We are not ignorant that Mr. Abbot's men may have a hundred other means of annoying us ; for they, and their accomplices, are just now preponderant in our legislature, in the magistracy, and in the general and municipal administrations. But when they have done us all the harm they can, our right will still be as good as ever, and our position will even be relatively better. Legal persecution is a double-edged tool ; it disgraces the persecutors, while it purifies, strengthens, and ennobles the victims. Prince Bismarck, that model of liberalistic equity, exhausted all the resources of legal persecution against the German Catholics ; but found at last, to his great disappointment, that his infamous politics had only ruined his own reputation, and made his name execrable to all Europe no less than to the German population. He himself confesses, that no man in the world is so heartily and universally hated as he is. Mr. Abbot and his "host of assailants" are not likely to be permitted to do in a free country what Prince Bismarck has been able to do in the German States ; but were they allowed to do it, one thing is certain, the wrong done to any class of American citizens will ultimately recoil on the heads of the wrong-doers. The Church, therefore, will continue, notwithstanding Mr. Abbot's interested warnings, to tell the truth with regard to the immoral tendency of the godless system of education. "Cautiousness" she leaves to those who need it to conceal their snares. She has nothing to conceal.

We sincerely pity Mr. Abbot, who, while exhorting the Church to be cautious, reveals to us his own lack of cautiousness. In the first place, he considers the objection drawn from the immoral tendency of the public school system as one of the "minor" objections ; whereby he most imprudently betrays the fact, that morality with his party is only a thing of "minor" importance. This he will deny, for he will say that his reason for considering the objection a "minor" one is, that he cannot see the immoral tendency

of the system. But we shall soon show that this pretended blindness is a mere evasion. In the second place, to meet the same serious and undeniable charge, that the public school system, as it is now, is calculated to foster general depravity, he alleges a local statistic, which in the case has no value whatever, as it does not take into account those innumerable moral offences, which have not been brought before the local authorities, and it ignores, therefore, the awfully increasing corruption which desolates a thousand once happy homes. Cautiousness required a prudent silence rather than such a puny attempt at evading the point in question. In the third place, though it is true, that "moral abuses tend to creep into every great institution," yet no man who respects himself and desires to be respected would have uttered the stupid lie, that "infinitely worse stories are told, on authority at least as good, of the immorality practiced in Roman Catholic convents, nunneries, monasteries, and so forth, than have ever been told of American public schools." We need not utter a word in reply to this truly infamous slander. The holiness and purity of our religious communities are the admiration of the world, and one of the highest glories of the Church. Every one knows that convents, nunneries, and monasteries are responsible for their doings to such ecclesiastical superiors as would not for a moment tolerate even the seeds and the suspicion of immorality, and who would visit any scandalous member of a religious community with immediate expulsion. Every one knows also, how much a large portion of our daily press would be delighted, if it could gather a little dirt from our convents and throw it at us, even on the mere authority of an anonymous reporter, a Maria Monk, or an Edith O'Gorman. How does it happen that convent scandals do not enter into the daily statistics of crime, and are not seen reported in those very papers which usually teem with scandal and crime? It required the beastly courage and the stolid malignity of a free religionist lecturer to slabber with his foul drivel a whole class of deserving persons, whose life of innocence and of sacrifice defies the most searching criticism, and commands the respect of the whole country. Shame upon him! In the fourth place, to threaten the Roman Catholics with disclosures which "will be very dangerous to the Church," when such pretended disclosures have been forthcoming unceasingly from all Protestant and infidel books, lectures, papers, and magazines, without proving in the least dangerous to the Church, is to make a strange and preposterous menace. We have already said that the Church is not afraid of disclosures.

Mr. Abbot continues :

"The wholesale charges brought by Catholic writers against the public schools with respect to their so-called immoral tendencies will not always be suffered to go unchal-

lenged. Whatever truth there is in them should be made manifest ; whoever is guilty should be exposed and punished, but wholesale insinuations against the teachers and the pupils of the public schools will call out at last a species of reply not very agreeable to those who have indulged in this mode of warfare."

This menace we do not deserve. The Catholic writers do not make "wholesale insinuations against the teachers and the pupils of the public schools." We respect the persons ; we condemn only the infidel system under which such persons are compelled to work. The teachers may be honorable, and the pupils well meaning ; but men and women, boys and girls especially, have passions against which they cannot prevail without the help of religious principles and of religious aspirations. Hence the system which banishes religion from the public schools, is essentially an immoral system, and those are "guilty" and "should be exposed," who recommend it to the American people. Is it not so, Mr. Abbot ?

He adds :

"No argument against the justice of taxing the whole community for the support of public schools can be drawn from any such local and incidental abuses as were referred to last Sunday. Whether actual or invented, they are neither part nor product of the public school system as such ; and I pass them by, not simply because they are irrelevant, but also because if the debate is diverted to a discussion of the relative moral influence on society of the public school system, and of the Roman Catholic Church, the latter will have all it can do to defend its own principle of ecclesiastical celibacy, and the historical record of its effects on public morality."

On these words, which show the lecturer's embarrassment and his desire to evade the question, we make only two short remarks. First, the evils referred to by Bishop McQuaid (and not by him only, but also by a great number of Protestant gentlemen of the pulpit and of the press) are *actual*, not "invented." They are not "abuses" affecting a good system, but the *natural fruit* of a bad system ; they are not "irrelevant," but pregnant with deplorable consequences ; they are not merely "local" or "incidental," but *universal* and *inevitable*. This is a plain fact, nor can it be otherwise so long as the influence of religion is not brought to bear on education. Hence Mr. Abbot's tergiversation on this head is worse than useless.

Secondly, the Catholic Church has no need of defending her "principle of ecclesiastical celibacy," for this principle has been abundantly defended and triumphantly vindicated in past centuries against adversaries more formidable than Mr. Abbot. The celibacy in question may be incomprehensible to the carnal, the dissolute, and the free religionist ; but it does not on that account cease to be excellent both in itself and in its effects with regard to public morality, as reason, experience, and "the historical record" uniformly show. Of course, Mr. Abbot, as a stranger to the duties

of ecclesiastical life, has no personal ground for shuddering at the thought of a hated celibacy ; and, as a stranger to the Church, he has no business to attack what he does not understand, or to blame those who *freely* choose and cherish a manner of life so conformable to that of which our Saviour and his Apostles gave the salutary example. But to assume, as he does, that the Catholic Church would "have all it can do" to defend her principle, is to display a great ignorance of history ; and to make the ecclesiastical celibacy a pretext for ignoring the need of religion in public education, is to confess one's impotence to meet the difficulties of a false position.

THE CATHOLIC CONSCIENCE.—After such a superficial and unsatisfactory treatment of "minor" objections, the lecturer proceeds as follows :

"It is not these minor and subsidiary objections to the system of State schools, their alleged expensiveness, their tendency to supplement themselves with public high schools and colleges, or the insinuation of their necessary immoral influence (which, if the insinuation could be sustained by proof, would be anything but a minor objection), that constitute the real strength of the Catholic protest against the public school system. Its strength lies in the claim that the *Catholic conscience* is violated and oppressed by this system. This is a claim which demands the most patient, serious, and candid attention of every just man. No matter whether the claim of an aggrieved conscience is made by a great party or by an obscure and unsupported individual, it is a claim which commands instant and reverential heed ; and no institution can be solidly built or stable, which rests on disregard of one man's outraged conscience. Unless the foundations of the school system are laid on the rock of absolute equity and impartial justice, it is built upon the sand, and must fall ; and the examination of the soundness of its foundations cannot be postponed, if only a solitary voice is raised in solemn protest against it."

How beautifully these words sound. It would seem as if Mr. Abbot were decidedly on our own side, so perfectly does he recognize and express the rational ground of our demands. He even tries to correct, in a parenthesis, the blunder committed a little before, where he had considered the immoral tendency of godless schools as a "minor" objection, and he confesses, that if we can make it good, the objection must be considered a very serious one. Unfortunately, this loud acknowledgment of a just principle is made to serve a mean purpose, for it is nothing more than a rhetorical precaution by which the lecturer strives to delude his audience into the belief that he is really anxious to have justice done to all, at the very moment he is going to attack justice with a plausible sophism. His pompous profession in favor of the rights of conscience is, like quack advertising, mainly intended to cover the worthlessness of the article offered to the public. How he will manage to draw a wrong consequence from so good a principle, we shall see presently. But we wish first to notice that the ground of the discussion is much wider than our lecturer makes it.

The Catholic conscience condemns, of course, the public school system as now enforced, but other denominations, too, have a conscience, and this conscience, also, should be taken into account. Why, then, is the discussion reduced by the lecturer to the objections of the *Catholic* conscience alone? Mr. Abbot, it is true, undertook only to answer the arguments of a Catholic bishop, but he might have taken notice that the Catholic bishop, though insisting mainly on the Catholic view, as was but natural, had also brought forward some very good Protestant authorities coinciding in the same view, and especially a protest of the Methodist Episcopal Church, in which it was said: "We do not hesitate to avow that we regard the education of the young as one of the leading functions of the Church, and one that she cannot abdicate in favor of the State without infidelity to her trust and irreparable damage to society." Should not the conscience of these Methodists, who are so numerous, be respected in this country as much as that of the Catholics? Moreover, it is not religious conscience alone, but also the great interests of our natural rights and common liberty that are concerned in the question of education. Hence not only the Catholics and other Christians, but even those whose conscience may be dead to all religious feelings, can reasonably object to the State school system as a usurpation of pre-existing individual rights and a confiscation of American liberty in educational matters. These incidental remarks might be further developed, but we must now see how our lecturer continues his argumentation.

After having laid down the principle that "the claims of an aggrieved conscience command instant and reverential heed," he, oddly enough, proceeds as follows:

"Nevertheless, it does not follow that every protest made in the name of conscience must be obeyed or yielded to, even if made in most absolute and unquestioned sincerity. Conscience itself is under law; it is bound to be reasonable. So far as the individual is concerned, his private conscience, whether in fact reasonable or not, must be obeyed, for it is to him the expression and measure of his moral reason, beyond which or above which he cannot go. But so far as his claims on other men are concerned, his individual conscience is not, and cannot be, the ultimate law of their conduct. They, too, have consciences as sacred to them as his to him, and the one common law of reason is binding on all alike. Hence the Catholic's claim of an injured and wronged conscience is not of itself a sufficient warrant for the immediate abandonment of the school system; he must first prove it to be a just and reasonable conscience. Uninstructed and perverted consciences are altogether too common in this world—foolish and wrong things are too often demanded or done in conscience's name—to make it either wise or right to give up a great public institution of proved beneficence, or to surrender the necessary conditions of its existence, the very first moment that it is challenged."

This is mere cavil and tergiversation. If our conscience is the rule of our actions, we are right in demanding what our conscience dictates to us to demand. That others, too, have their consciences,

as sacred to them as ours is to us, we certainly admit. But that there is a conflict between our conscience and the consciences of others with regard to our educational claims, as Mr. Abbot assumes, is false and absurd. We are Catholics and citizens: as Catholics, our conscience demands of us the education of *our own* children in the fear of the Lord: as citizens, our conscience requires us to defend the conscientious claims of *our fellow-citizens* concerning the religious education of *their own* children. Now, is there any conscience which demands that we shall not educate our children in our own religion, or a conscience which demands that money shall be extorted from us for an education which profits none but unbelievers? If such a conscience existed, would it not be proper, before obeying it, to wait till it first proves itself to be "a just and reasonable conscience?"

Again, when we conscientiously contend that each denomination in the country must be free to educate their own children according to their own conscience, and must not be robbed of their money for the triumph of a false education, which is fatal to the interests of all denominations alike, are we not in fact defending the consciences of all as much as our own? Where is, then, the conflict of the Catholic conscience with the consciences of others? How hollow is, therefore, Mr. Abbot's argument, and how absurd! No one can fail to see that our conscience and the consciences of all other denominations are the same. We all want religious instruction; we all feel that our cause is the cause of the people; and we all complain that we are swindled, under pretence of education, by men who are incompetent, and even unwilling, to give good education. Perhaps Mr. Abbot, who as a free religionist has peculiar notions of his own, imagines that swindlers may have a conscience which commands cheating and plundering. If this is his notion of "a just and reasonable conscience," we will concede that the conscience of his friends and associates may be in conflict with the Catholic conscience. But then, it would not be necessary for us "to prove that our conscience is just and reasonable;" it would be more proper to bring our despoilers before a police court, there to have their consciences fairly examined, and to receive the sentence they deserve.

Mr. Abbot, in the passage now under consideration, commits another blunder. He makes a transition from the Catholic individual conscience to the conscience of the Catholic community at large. An individual may be unreasonable, therefore he concludes the general conscience of the Catholic body may be unreasonable, and accordingly its reasonableness requires proof. The argument might easily be retorted, as every one sees, but we will simply remark that the transition from an individual to a community is

illogical. Bishop McQuaid did not urge an individual claim; he did not speak in the name of an individual, but in the name of millions of individuals, whose conscience, unlike that of their oppressors, can give a satisfactory account of itself, and has given it, whenever challenged, in this very land as well as in the rest of the world. To disregard this conscience because individuals are sometimes unreasonable, is the most shameful of fallacies.

The lecturer commits a third blunder when he pretends that we advance unreasonable claims on other men who have consciences as sacred as ours. It is on this assumption that he bases the distinction he makes between a conscience which must be obeyed and a conscience which may be disregarded. But what did and do we claim? Did we ever claim that Mr. Abbot or his friends must be compelled to pay taxes for the Catholic schools? Had we done so, we would have acted unreasonably, though we would only have acted as he and his friends act with respect to us. But we are not so mean; we have merely asked, and we still ask, not as a favor, but as a right, that since the public schools have been monopolized by freethinkers, freethinkers should support them entirely with their own moneys, and should cease from thrusting their grasping hands into our pockets. This we have a right to demand, and not we Catholics only; for the Episcopalians, the Presbyterians, and all other Christian organizations in the country are perfectly justified to advance a similar claim, it being evidently unjust that any denomination of believers should be compelled to pay the expenses of a partisan institution notoriously hostile to their beliefs.

Who is it, then, that advances unreasonable claims "on other men and on their sacred consciences" but Mr. Abbot and his secularists, who claim the right of taxing the whole Christian people for the furtherance of their antichristian schemes? And yet they pretend that, in claiming such a right, they obey "a just and reasonable conscience!" Why, men without religion can scarcely have a conscience which they feel bound to obey. Had they consciences, they would strike their breasts, and hide their faces for shame.

Mr. Abbot goes on in the following style:

"Despite his infallible standard of right and wrong, the Pope's *ex cathedra* deliverances, the Roman Catholic in this country must waive his divine authority of Pope and Church, and consent to plead his case before the bar of the universal reason of mankind. This Bishop McQuaid did last Sunday; from this platform he addressed his plea to the public intelligence of the country, just as if no Pope had ever sat on the throne of the Vatican; and he never once quoted the authority of his infallible sovereign as a supreme confirmation of his own words. The Catholic Church itself, Pope and all, must do the same; it protests against the school system, and addresses the protest to the general intelligence of the country, and by the verdict of this intelligence the pro-

test must stand or fall. Therefore I say, that the Catholic claim of an outraged conscience, with the tacit but evidently implied sanction of Bishop McQuaid and every other Catholic who consents to reason his case before the public, must be judged by the laws of reason; and if it is adjudged to be unreasonable, such Catholics cannot without tergiversation repudiate the legitimacy of the verdict they have invoked and thereby sanctioned in advance."

We are of opinion that Bishop McQuaid addressed himself to those who needed to be enlightened, rather than to the "intelligence" of the country. In fact the intelligence of the country had no need of his lecture to be convinced of the reasonableness of the Catholic claim; that is a question already settled in our favor by the best statesmen of America since the time when equal rights were conceded to all denominations. Bishop McQuaid addressed himself to the prejudiced, the bigoted, and the misinformed; he addressed himself to that same class of citizens to which Mr. Abbot weekly addresses his *Index*; a paper whose aim is "to substitute knowledge for ignorance, right for wrong, truth for superstition, freedom for slavery, character for creed." Surely Mr. Abbot will not contend that such a class represents the "intelligence of the country."

Whether Mr. Abbot himself and his associates belong to the intelligence of the country, our readers will decide; to us it seems that they belong to another class. However, as there may be shrewdness without prudence, and talent without learning, so there may be intelligence without wisdom; and in this sense we are willing to admit that the infidel party can boast of some intelligent men. But intelligence without wisdom is a curse rather than a blessing; and America is already experiencing the baneful effects of the system which cultivates the former at the expense of the latter. Hence it is not to Mr. Abbot and his party that we look for a just decision of any important question. On the other hand, no new decision is needed concerning the question in which we are now engaged; for, as we have already stated, intelligent and wise American statesmen, not in the least biassed by "the Pope's *ex cathedra* deliverances," but acting "just as if no Pope had ever sat on the throne of the Vatican," and consulting merely "the laws of reason," have long ago given their verdict against our present adversaries, and their verdict is this: *The Catholic conscience and the consciences of all other citizens have an equal natural and constitutional right not to be outraged. Therefore, a school system which is an outrage to millions of American consciences, is a violation of right, and a disgrace to the country.*

PANTHEISTIC THEORIES OF SOUL.

Ψυχή AND Πνεῦμα.

THE object of this brief essay is to offer a contribution to the history of early human thought on a subject most solemn, most interesting, and most mysterious,—the immortality of the soul. It is right to make a plain avowal at the outset, that nothing is further from the writer's wish or intention, than to impugn or to throw any indirect doubts on the truth of the theological dogma, which must be upheld by arguments of a wholly distinct nature.¹ In dealing with a doctrine which appears to have been held by all nations in all ages, we are entitled to take not the theological but the purely historical side; to contemplate it under an aspect quite different from that of divine authority, and to account, if we can, on independent grounds, for the acceptance of a belief so remote from, if not so contrary to, all human experiences.²

We therefore leave entirely out of the question, as not bearing on our argument, the inherent probability that a doctrine, which presents itself to us as the common inheritance of the whole human race, may be, though maintained by some on false and even grossly superstitious grounds, the corruption of a truth received from primal tradition, or implanted as an unerring instinct in our very nature. Like the existence of God, or of a moral sense of good and evil, which is seldom wholly extinct in the most degraded races, the conviction that the soul does not perish with the body *may* have less to do with processes of reasoning than with intuition. Nevertheless, it is obvious that we cannot altogether exclude reason when we attempt to investigate the conclusions of the great thinkers of antiquity. Nor must we be surprised to find that materialistic fancies had much to do with those convictions. It is precisely these which are the subject of our present inquiry. We are examining that general theory of soul which was arrived at by the Greeks and Romans especially, from whom so large a share has descended to us in all our habits of thought. Investigators of

¹ For instance, the justice of God, the law of retribution, of which we have so many and such clear analogies on earth, the *reductio ad absurdum* of the Divine government if no future state exists, the conscience of man and his innate sense of responsibility, etc.

² On a topic which may seem uninviting to some readers, it has been thought advisable to limit quotations from the ancient authors to the smallest number that appeared necessary for illustration. The whole subject has been contracted and epitomized from the vast mass of doctrine that has come down to us. But it is believed that all the principal doctrines respecting the soul, and the reasons for them, have been at least touched upon in the present paper.

truth will not fear to pursue it, under whatever aspect it may present itself to their view.

They believed then that life or soul—which two things, it will be seen, they either identified or confounded¹—survived the mortal body which it had inhabited and animated, and passed into other states or forms of existence. The links in the chain of reasoning, from the æsthetic conceptions of prehistoric man to the subtle refinements of Plato and Aristotle, are apparently complete. And we shall feel surprised, on examining them, to find how little they will stand the test, we will not say of common sense, but certainly of scientific inquiry. Commencing from notions which were physically false, they built up theories which fail to satisfy any one who brings to bear upon them the knowledge of modern times. The reader of Lucretius is often struck by the combined ingenuity of his reasoning and the unsoundness of his data.

There can be no doubt that, to the Greek mind, *ψυχή* conveyed the notion of the source and cause of all spontaneous motion in its most extended sense. The famous passage in the *Phædrus* of Plato,² defining it as ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, “the source of motion,” includes in the term *life*, volition, the movement of the heavenly bodies, the impulses of mind and passion, the growth of everything organic, as well as the intelligent faculty both in gods and men, and even in creatures. Their acceptance of the word *soul* was, therefore, very different from our conception of it.³ The vegetative life of a cabbage was, with Aristotle, not less *ψυχή* than the intelligent reasonings of his own mind.⁴ We cannot wonder that Aristotle nowhere entertains the idea of *responsibility* as affecting the destiny of the soul, or that the Greek language itself is singularly deficient in terms expressing the abstract notion of *sin*. Neither he nor Plato, much as they praise virtue and justice, and often as Plato speaks of the evil effects of misdeeds and injustice on the soul, ever approached to the doctrine that “the wages of sin is death,”⁵ or contemplated the *loss* of the soul in any other light than as the extinction of the faculty of intelligence, φρόνησις. Nevertheless, the doctrines of a judgment and of retribution (τίσις) in the other world

¹ See, for instance, Plato, *Phædo*, p. 105, D; Lucretius, iii., 396–407.

² P. 245, D; compare Aristot., *De Anima*, i., 2, init.

³ The etymology of *soul* is obscure. It has been traced to a Celtic divinity of light, called *Sul*, who is mentioned on several of the Roman inscriptions found at Bath (the *Aqua Solis*, perhaps by a corruption, through assimilation, from *Aqua Sulis*).

⁴ He makes τὸ φρονεῖν a part of *ψυχή* in *Eth. Nic.*, i., ch. 13.

⁵ From the comparatively few and slight allusions to the immortality of the soul, and the after-state of existence in the Old Testament, it seems clear that the Jews were more immediately concerned with God's dealings with man in this life. With the doctrine of the Resurrection, and the reunion of soul and body, the preparation for the life hereafter, in other words, the care of the soul, became the primary object of the early Christians.

were early inculcated in the schools of Orpheus and Pythagoras, more than five centuries before the Christian era. But the thinkers of antiquity, who claimed no divine revelation on this subject,¹ spoke and taught about the soul, its essence and its destiny, with a freedom and a speculative interest far exceeding that of those who accept the doctrine of the immortality of the soul as a revealed truth. By religious men generally all investigations as to the nature and existence of the soul are rather shunned than encouraged, as tending to freethinking, and as implying latent doubts if a life hereafter is a reality. But to the ancient philosopher, unfettered by a creed, and under no sense of *obligation* to believe, speculations on the essence of the soul were a perfectly legitimate ground for him to occupy. Hence Plato and Aristotle, followed by Cicero in the *Tusculan Disputations*, the first as an idealist, the second as a physicist, and Democritus and Epicurus, followed by Lucretius, as materialists, took the keenest interest in theories respecting the nature of the soul; whether it was an emanation from the Divine Mind, or a *ἀρμονία*, i. e., a sympathetic and mutually supporting condition of mind and body, or an *ἐντελέχεια*, an acting and efficient principle residing within us;² or whether, like the Homeric *εἰδωλα*, shadowy and unsubstantial and scarcely animate forms, it pined for the bodily vigor and the sensuous enjoyments it had left,³ or more abstracted and idealized, enjoyed pure *φρόνησις*, or intellectuality only when liberated from them. Others, arguing from the supposed passage of the sun under the world, speculated on an Elysium below, or cool and verdant islands (the "Isles of the Blest") on the confines of the world in the far west, where the Sun-god seemed to descend and have closer converse with beings on earth.⁴ The havoc made by volcanic fires and their outbreak from the depths of the earth suggested the material hell of fire and torture on which Plato speculates on physical principles in the *Phædo*.⁵ Some

¹ That is, beyond a general and rather vague reverence for Orpheus and Musæus as *inspired* to be the interpreters between the gods and man.

² "Quædam continuata motio et perennis," Cic. *Tusc.*, i., § 22.

³ On this view, which very widely prevailed in the early world, and still does prevail among lower races, we can readily explain the offerings (both sacrifices and costly possessions) made to the tombs of heroes and chieftains. To propitiate a spirit which was believed to be capable of harm to the living, many horrible rites (including the Indian suttees, which are of great antiquity), were performed. With good reason Lucretius exclaims (i., 101), "Tantum Religio potuit suadere malorum."

⁴ Hom. *Od.*, iv., 563. Virg. *Æn.*, vi., 641, "solemque suum, sua sidera norunt."

⁵ P. 113, B. It is thus he explains the existence of the infernal river *Pyriphlegethon*. From the above doctrines two practices became familiar to the early Christians, viz., the prayer for *light* for departed souls, and the use of the term "Gates of Hell" (*Αἵμας πύλαι*, occurring in Homer and the Greek tragic writers as well as in the New Testament), to express a material prison from which there is no escape. It is very remarkable that the Greeks, in common, we believe, with the whole Aryan race, had no notion

again, more inclined to mystic views, inculcated not only a judgment and a penal state, but long periods of probation in a triple life,¹ after which the soul might return to its God, and be absorbed in a blissful contemplation of the beatific vision, τὸ θεῖον μιννοῖδες,² a doctrine approaching very closely to, if not actually identical with, Christian teaching. Another school indulged in speculations more akin to those of Anaxagoras and the Ionic philosophers, and debated whether the soul, after leaving the body, was dispersed in air, and so became extinct as a separate and individual essence, or merely returned in its animated state, to rejoin the divine all-pervading ether from which it had emanated. The upholders of *metempsychosis* (the transmigration of souls³) believed that the soul passed through long cycles of human and bestial existence before its final absorption into the divinity. All these were moot points with the schools of Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Epicurus. Materialism was the basis of them all, and the many opinions cited by Aristotle in the second chapter of his first book *De Anima* (where blood, air, fire, water—even the motes dancing in a sunbeam—all have their advocates as the ἀρχαὶ or component principles of ψυχῇ), only show how mere guesses on subjects beyond their ken amused and occupied the minds of philosophers.⁴

It must be confessed, in contrast with ancient times, that people now trouble themselves very little with speculations on the nature and essence of soul. To think about it at all is probably the care of the few. We occupy the position of believers (as we persuade ourselves) rather than inquirers; we are content with the assumed fact that the soul is imperishable, though how far even this is a rational belief or an innate conviction, and not a mere traditional sentiment or educational opinion, must be, to those who look impartially at the general action of mankind, in itself a subject of a rather anxious inquiry. Do men, living as they live, believe in a soul, or do they merely acquiesce in a dogma which they can neither prove nor disprove?

Nor does it occur to many perhaps to wonder, that however illogical and incoherent are the popularly conceived notions about

of a personal Devil as a power of Evil. The *Theogony* of Hesiod contains many remarkable traditions respecting the prison-house of the souls in the nether world. Milton's conceptions, in his *Paradise Lost*, are perfectly pagan.

¹ Pind. Ol., ii., 68; Plato, *Phædr.*, p. 249, A.

² Plat. *Symp.*, p. 211, E.

³ When once the soul was believed, as the etymology of ψυχῇ implied, to consist of air, the notion easily followed that any human being or animal might draw, with its first breath, the seeds, as it were, of an invisible soul dispersed in the atmosphere.

⁴ The student of this subject will do well to refer to Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.*, i., §§ 19–20, and especially to the third book of Lucretius.

soul, ghosts, spirits, angels, and demons, nay, even about heaven¹ and hell, and however made up, as some of them unquestionably are, of mixed materialism and pantheism, they are so easily and so uninquiringly acquiesced in. The fact is, to speculate at all on what the soul is, as an essence, or its destiny and the place of its abode, is manifestly vain and useless. Science, it is plain, ignores it altogether. Not, indeed, that it presumes to deny the possibility of its existence; but simply that it takes no cognizance of it, as a subject lying beyond human ken, and because it has no data to found any reasoning upon. But modern science would not, like the early thinkers, identify vitality with soul, or confound the merely vegetative with the responsible, the reasoning, and the intelligent. They made no real distinction between the *ψυχή* of man and of animals, in respect of what we now understand by an immortal existence. The only difference was, that man had reason, *λόγος*, which however was but the guiding principle of impulse, *ἐπιθυμία*, and in no way constituted of itself a title to a life hereafter.² But they clearly distinguished *mind* from *soul*, *i. e.*, will and intelligence from vitality.³ Now, with respect to physical life, science at the present day hardly hesitates to pronounce, approximately at least, what vitality *is*, though it does not pretend to account for either its origin or its existence, and still more is it powerless to produce it. A condition of matter capable of forming and energizing vital cells, and endowed with, or possessing, the special function of preserving and perpetuating the particular organism, is evidently not *soul* in the metaphysical and theological sense. On this point modern thought and Greek thought seem widely to diverge. Whatever we may think about *life*, we must be content to admit that no

¹ The idea of heaven as a residence of the blest in the bright sky, does not prominently appear in Greek thought, and the first definite speculation about it is that in Plato's *Phædo*, p. 109, seq. The very primitive ideas of a firmament, or solid floor (the *ἔδος ἀσφαλὲς* of Hesiod, *Theog.*, 128), as a vault of heaven, of the residence of the gods on a bright mountain called Olympus, and of mortals having been carried up to the sky to live with the gods, have but little in common with the Christian hope of happiness in some other world or sphere of existence.

² Cic., *Tusc. Disp.*, i., § 80, "In bestiis animi sunt rationis expertes." Animals therefore had *animus* but not *mens* or *ratio*.

³ With the Greeks *νοῦς*, with the Romans *animus* were the *mental*, while *ψυχή* and *ánima* were the *vital* principle. Thus *νοῦς* and *animus* are included in *ψυχή* and *ánima*, as parts or manifestations of it (Lucret., iii., 136, 167, etc.). The division of *ψυχή* into the *λογικόν* and the *λογικὸν ἔχον*, and the subdivisions of each are well known to the readers of Aristotle's *Ethics* (i., 13). Plato's fondness for abstractions predisposed him to accept the congenial pantheistic doctrine, as taught by Anaxagoras, of *νοῦς* and *ψυχή* pervading and animating as a subtle principle (something like our magnetism or electricity), all created matter. In fact, the law of electricity, like the law of gravitation, was only just missed by the intelligent and acute Greek philosophers. They felt that *life* was a state or condition of matter; but their inquiries were chiefly directed to the cause and origin of *motion* (the various kinds of *κίνησις*).

living being has, or possibly can have, the slightest conception of what his *soul* really is; yet we all take for granted that such a principle resides in us; and we equally assume that it does not exist in animals. We conclude too, that if the soul has any separate existence, it must be immortal; for we do not speculate as Plato does in the *Phædo*, on the possible modes and causes of its destruction, much less on its outlasting a certain number of human lives, and then becoming worn out and perishing by a natural decay.

The ancient thinkers, accordingly as they inclined to the physical or the metaphysical conception, took very different ideas of the state of the soul in another existence. The former, and doubtless the earliest, was that which pervades the Homeric poems, and appears to be adopted even by Aristotle, as the more probable,¹ viz., the materialistic notion of *εἴδωλα καμίντων*, shades half body and half spirit, in a feeble state of semi-vitality, and semi-consciousness.² They were bloodless, and it was only by quaffing blood at the tombs which they still haunted on earth, that they regained for a time the powers of motion and speech.³ The general notion of these ghosts or spirits was, that though the solid body had been consumed on the funeral pyre, an unsubstantial and outline form of it remained as the habitation of the soul, but if any one attempted to grasp or embrace it, it had no more reality than a dream. The soul itself could not be consumed, and therefore it escaped from the fire and flitted away into space.⁴

The other, which we may call the Platonic conception of the soul, was entirely different. The *ψυχή* of Plato was an isolated and intensified intelligence, existing somewhere in space apart from the body. It was a principle in reasoning man which had to undergo a discipline on earth, a gradual process of assimilation to the Divine mind, *ὁμοίωσις θεῷ*, a training to become just and holy,⁵ and the one grand object and aspiration of which was to leave this earth pure and undefiled, *καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι*.⁶ It was to get rid of all purely phenomenal perceptions, and all mortal longings and propensities; it was to shun the life of mere enjoyment, to employ itself solely on abstract truth, and to prepare itself by the ascetic and contemplative life, the *βίως θεωρητικὴ*, for the state in store for it after this transient existence.

¹ Eth. Nic., i., ch. xi. See Cic. Tusc. Disp., i., § 37.

² Pl. xxiii., 103.

Ὡ πόποι, ἥ βρά τις ἔστί καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδας δόμοισιν
Ψυχὴ καὶ ἱδωλόν, ἄταρ φρένες οὐκ ἐνι πάμπαν.

³ Thus the ghosts in *Od.*, xi., 147, 390, etc., cannot address Ulysses till they have drunk blood.

⁴ Propertius, iv., 7, 2, "Luridaque evictos effugit umbra rogos." *Hom. Od.*, xi., 222, *ψυχὴ δ' ἄερ' ἀνείρεος ἀνοσπᾶμένη πεπύρηται*.

⁵ *Plat. Theæt.*, p. 176, B.

⁶ *Plat. Phæd.*, pp. 65-7.

It is evident, that this is the Christian idea of the soul's destiny. And it is a question of profound interest, to what extent such a view, magnificent and almost perfect as it seems to be, is really due to Platonism, and how far Plato (or Socrates) had been enlightened to feel and declare the truth. His arguments in the *Phædo* to demonstrate the immortality of the soul on logical principles, are admitted to be a failure. He endeavored to bring within the province of reason a subject which is confessedly beyond and above it. But there can be no question that the doctrines of the *Phædo*, though really unsound, exercised an enormous influence on all future ages. It is equally a mistake not to recognize this, and uncandid not to acknowledge it.

Aristotle's reasonings about the soul, on the other hand, are mainly physical. It is as the cause and mainspring of life and action, that he discusses it; not as having an immortal destiny, or as an ethereal emanation with which the gross human body was in constant antagonism. Indeed, the materialism of popular notions about the soul, even in these days of science and inquiry, is very remarkable, and tends to show that in matters in which tangible data are unattainable, man's belief is far more traditional than reasoning. For instance, the received stories about ghosts generally turn on the muscular, *i. e.*, the material, power of walking, talking, pointing, beckoning, or some purely bodily act. Yet a ghost is defined to be a spirit, or a disembodied soul, or some inexplicable "wraith" or "double" of that human frame, which we know to have been deprived of all motive power, and to lie mouldering in the grave. We are constantly told, too, in these days of "spiritual manifestations," that "spirits" perform acts which only material bodies can ordinarily do. And when these are called "manifestations of force," it is not explained how *mere* force (*e. g.*, magnetism or electricity), apart from mind and brain-power, can exercise volition. We often hear in sermons, and read in religious books, or see in pictures, the most horrible accounts of the tortures of the wicked in hell. Precisely the same ideas are current on this subject among ordinarily educated persons, as would be suggested by a shocking description of human beings having their material bodies consumed in some great fire. They are absolutely identical with the sufferings of the damned in the sixth book of the *Æneid*. Compare also Plato, *Gorg.*, p. 525, C. The truth is, reason is never applied to subjects supposed to lie beyond reason's province, and hence conclusions positively nonsensical and opposed to reason, are accepted by many, from a vague fear of questioning the details of a traditional belief, which perhaps has nothing to commend it beyond the fact that it has come down to us from very ancient faiths, finds some apparent recognition in the probably figurative

language of Scripture, and has a sort of sanction from the vague ideas about the soul and its immortality that prevail under some form or other among all nations. "We are carried away by idle stories," says Euripides,¹ "because we have no experience of another life, and because what there is in the world below has not been revealed to us."

It appears, however, to the writer to be the duty of all who love truth to show the baselessness of opinions which are at once derogatory to the goodness of a beneficent Creator, and a source of disquiet to those who entertain them.² As the lives of the lowest savages are often made miserable by a constant dread of sorcery, or evil eye, or some unseen malignant agency, which they try to avert by some silly or cruel expedient, so those higher minds which cannot contemplate a future without the aid and adjunct of the gross mortal body and its sensibilities, are not less the victims of a degrading superstition.

Of all the notions about the soul none are so directly materialistic as the representations common in paintings and sculptures of the Middle Ages, in which the soul is seen issuing in the form of a naked infant from the mouth of a dying person, or conveyed to heaven by angels, or tortured by demons in hell, or contended for by groups of good and bad spirits, or even being weighed in a scale.³ We may well wonder that such notions were so long and so widely accepted by devout and intelligent minds.

In truth, the ordinary and popular notions about the soul have no coherency, and rest upon no logical basis. They are framed to suit the natural emotions of fear and hope with regard to the unseen, but they are so framed that our entire conception is derived from the phenomena of human life. It is on this principle, and on no other, that heaven is supposed to be above and hell below the earth. The brightness of the one and the darkness of the other form the ground of a belief much older than Christianity, which, in some degree, seems to sanction it, but which, in fact, took up the prevailing opinions on these subjects and made no attempt to change them.

It has been said that the existence of the soul must be inferred from the plain impossibility of permanently working any system of

¹ Hippol., 197.

² We have heard sermons on purgatory which we listened to with sorrow, and we have known young minds very unfavorably affected by these spiritual terrors, which represent the Almighty as either powerless to prevent or willing to permit worse than pagan atrocities. (See further, editorial note, immediately preceding Book Notices.)

³ This is a very ancient and purely pagan idea. Æschylus wrote a tragedy called *ἑρκερῆς*, in which the souls of Achilles and Memnon were weighed against each other by Jupiter in a pair of scales. We read of the balancing of fates in Il., viii., 72, and xxii., 212.

ethics formed with exclusive reference to the present life; and if there is a soul at all, it must be immortal, for otherwise it would not, as by the very hypothesis it must, essentially differ from the nature of the body.¹ With regard to the first position, it may be replied, that the sole basis of Aristotle's moral teaching, which was good and virtuous in its way, was happiness on earth and not happiness hereafter. He had no clear view, and probably no faith, in our continued existence in another world. Moral responsibility, or obedience to a divine law, he ignores, except so far as it means compliance with natural religion for our own good; and with regard to the second position, the immortality of the soul, the early Greeks did not assert it except on the pantheistic grounds of the imperishableness of the animating principle, *ψυχή*, which, as we shall see, they identified with air. Hence, we can understand the surprise expressed by an auditor of Plato's, who had undertaken to demonstrate the doctrine dialectically.² One of the arguments, a subtle rather than a sound one, is given in the tenth book of the Republic.³ "Have you not learned," I asked, "that our soul is immortal and never dies?" He looked at me, and said in amazement, "*No, really, I have not*; but can *you* maintain this proposition?" "Yes, as I am an honest man," I replied; "and I think you could also; it is quite easy to do it." The argument, stated in a compendious form, is as follows:

"A thing is destroyed only by a peculiar malady of its own, as iron by rust, wood by dry-rot; but rust does not destroy wood, nor dry-rot iron. But, if a thing is liable to a peculiar disease, which can only injure, but not destroy it, then that thing is imperishable, since no other evil is likely to destroy it if this cannot. Now injustice and intemperance do injure the soul, but they do not destroy it as they can the body. A direct cause of destruction differs from a remote one, as bad food may destroy the body indirectly by inducing some fatal disease. But the soul itself cannot be destroyed by bodily ailments, such as fever, or by violence, unless they make the soul more unjust or unholy. Therefore, the soul is immortal."

This is merely a specimen of the Platonic reasoning. It is, of course, impossible in a brief space to discuss the series of arguments in the *Phædo*. They, in fact, prove nothing, and leave the question just where it was before, and where to mortal intelligence it must ever be. It appears to us that the doctrine of the soul's immortality was a natural and even necessary deduction from Pantheism. Of course, it does not follow (as we have already re-

¹ Lucretius regards the soul as made of atoms as well as the body, and thence argues that both alike are perishable, iii., 417, etc.

² Plato himself probably received the doctrine from the Hierophants, with whom he conversed during his stay in Egypt. Struck by its novelty, its plausibility, and its deeply important and long chain of consequences, he embraced it with the ardor of an enthusiast. But the *Phædo* is the only work of his in which the argument of immortality is fully developed.

³ Pp. 608-10.

marked), that because Pantheists held it, therefore it could not in itself be true. There is, as Plato teaches, an *ὀρθὴ δόξα ἀνευ λόγου*, a right and true view, even when one does not give the right account of his grounds for holding it.¹ But the very number and diversity of the arguments employed by Plato in proving the doctrine show that he did not regard Pantheistic opinions as the sole ground and basis of it.

In those primitive times, when ideas were derived mainly from sensuous perceptions, a notion prevailed that all things, living and dead, were composed of four *elements*, or simple principles, *στοιχεῖα*, viz., earth, air, fire, and water. These were matters of actual observation. In animals, for instance, the flesh mouldered to *earth*, the vital warmth represented *fire*, the blood and other fluids, *water*, the breath, *air*, or rather, air, warmth, and moisture in combination. To all the elements, *i. e.*, to matter, the Pantheists attributed Divinity. The pervading and regulating mind (the *Νοῦς* of Anaxagoras), was conceived as a subtle ether, or *soul*, permeating all matter and distinct from mere intelligence. Nevertheless it so far was endowed with volition, that streams flowed and winds blew, the fire warmed, the sun, stars, and planets moved, or seemed to move, from some inherent faculty rather than from motion imparted from without. Another interpretation of the observed facts was sought in the law of *ἀνάγκη*, necessity; these things moved because they must.² The coarser and heavier matters, earth and water, they regarded as a residue, the effect of subsidence;³ the lighter, air and fire, by their own buoyancy rising to the top, according to Ovid's well-known lines:⁴

"Flamma petit altum, propior locus æra cepit,
Sederunt medio terra fretumque solo."

The highest of all, the *αἰθήρ*, or luminous air, was regarded as a vast magazine of perpetual heat and light, the *food* of the sun and stars and waxing moon, the source of all lightning and falling stars, and the bright abode of the gods. Hence it was *δῖος αἰθήρ*, and distinguished from *αἴθρ*, the denser mists of earth.⁵ From *αἰθήρ*, as all warmth, so all life, mind, and intelligence were thought to emanate. It was *σεμνότατος*, the most holy and worshipful of the

¹ Thæætet, p. 202.

² Plato, Republic, x., p. 616, C. The doctrine was probably Pythagorean; we find it in Æschylus, Prom. Vinc., 523-6, who makes Zeus himself unable to resist fate and necessity.

³ *ὑπερτάτη* or *ὑπερτασία*.

⁴ Fast., i., 109.

⁵ Æsch., Prom., 88, Plat. Phædo, p. 110; Lucret., v., 498, "inde mare, inde æēr, inde æther ignifer ipse." Anaximenes, in saying that God was air (Cic. de Nat. Deor., i., § 26), appears not to have distinguished *αἴθρ* from *αἰθήρ*. Zeno and Cleanthes, the Stoics, said that God was ether, Ibid., §§ 36-7.

elements, and *βιοθρέμμων πάντων*, the supporter of life in all organic things.¹ Since from it every creature derived its life.

"Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas."²

In other words of the same poet,³

"Igneus est ollis vigor et cœlestis origo Seminibus."

Fire, therefore, required to be brought down in its simple and uncompounded state for man's use; and this is what Prometheus is fabled to have done⁴ against the will of the gods, who regarded it as their own special prerogative.

Now vitality in animals was manifested by warmth and breath, *i.e.*, fire and air. Both phenomena ceased with death; but the cessation of breath was a more sudden and more sensible cause or result of death than the departure of warmth. Therefore, life was rather air than fire. The last gasp, or sigh, was not unnaturally regarded as the actual departure from the body of its vivifying influence, the air.⁵ The death-agony was interpreted as a forcible tearing away, a withdrawal or expulsion of the *ψυχὴ*, or *anima*, from every part of the mortal frame, even from the extremities of the limbs; for in proportion as the union was intimate, so the dissolution was violent.⁶ Hence Lucretius speculates on life being a concentrated molecular force, which at death makes its exit, more or less, completely from the body; sometimes leaving behind it little particles of vitality, which, in their turn, become the vitalizing principle of the worms and maggots which succeed as possessors of the carcass.⁷ When Virgil tells us the absurd story of the grubs of bees being created from the putrefying body of a heifer,⁸ he repeats this idea precisely. The grubs are produced, because particles of *anima*, that is, of vital air, are left in the body, the creature having been killed by blows,⁹ and its mouth and nostrils having been sewn up, so as to include the "breath of life." Not very different is the

¹ Aristoph., *Nub.* 570.

² Virg. *Georg.* iv., 224.

³ *Æn.* vi, 730. Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.*, i., § 27: "Pythagoras censuit animum esse per naturam rerum omnem intentum et commeantem, ex quo nostri animi carperentur."

⁴ He was said to have brought it from heaven, concealed in the pith of a dry fennel-stalk (*νάρθηξ*), a story, derived from the producing of fire by the friction of a piece of hard, dry wood upon another. The legend is expanded by Plato (*Philebus*, p. 29, A), to account for *νοῦς*; and reason in man, as an emanation from the same celestial source.

⁵ Lucretius, iii., 232:

"Tenuis enim quæquam moribundos deserit aura
Mixa vapore; vapor porro trahit æra secum,
Nec calor est quisquam, cui non sit mixtus et ær."

⁶ Lucretius, iii., 587 seq.

⁷ *Ibid.*, iii., 720.

⁸ *Georgic*, iv., 300, seq.

⁹ *Plagus perempto*. This was done from the notion that life or soul would make its escape through a fierce wound. See Hom. *Il.*, xiv., 518: *ψυχὴ δὲ κατ' ὀστέμην ὤτειλ' ἰσσυρ' ἰπειρομένη*. The heifer's hide was to be left whole (*integra pellis*) for the same purpose, to keep in the life, which they fancied could be detached from the vital organs, so as to render the body helpless.

speculation of Plato, that the soul becomes so imbruted with the body that it departs with sufficient of the corporeal essence adhering to it, to become visible to the eye like smoke or dust; and that hence dim forms of the departed are seen hovering over tombs,¹ the ghosts of those who have not practiced in life a complete isolation of the mental from the bodily faculties and desires, but have devoted too much thought and care to the pleasures of the senses.

The inference from all the disquisitions and theories of the ancient philosophers on *soul*, *ψυχή*, as well as from the names for it, *animus* (*anima*), allied to *ἀνεμος*, *ψυχή* (from *ψύχειν*, "to cool by fanning"), *πνεῦμα*, *spiritus*, is this, that they regarded it as *air*. Now, on the Pantheistic view, not only was the air divine, but it was pervaded by the divine mind, emanations from which gave the reasoning and prescient faculty implanted in human and even in animal bodies. Thus Cicero says:² "Divinatio naturalis referenda est ad naturam Deorum, a qua, ut doctissimis sapientissimisque placuit, haustos animos et libatos habemus; quumque omnia completa et referta sint aeterno sensu et mente divina, necesse est cognatione divinorum animorum animos humanos commoveri." Thus Virgil says that some attributed to the intelligent rooks, the *corvi*, a kind of heavenly mind and foreknowledge, and also to bees.³ The fear expressed by Cebes in the *Phædo*,⁴ lest the soul on departing should be dispersed in space like smoke or a puff of wind, turns entirely on this idea of the nature of soul, which was evidently a very primitive one. The air pervaded space, and space was pervaded by the divine mind; but the soul was air, and therefore the soul was both divine and eternal.

Our familiar use of the word *expire*, to part with the last breath, shows how natural is the idea that life ceases only with the departure of that which has been its cause and support. To conceive the muscular action of the chest and lungs becoming enfeebled, and therefore to explain their inability to inhale and exhale by the failing action of the brain and heart, was too scientific for the primitive mind, which reasoned only from æsthetic effects.⁵ If the air that appeared to be parted with at the last gasp could have been *seen* to be annihilated, as fire is seen to be put out, or moisture to be dried up, it may be doubted if the immortality of *ψυχή* would have been inferred at all. But air departing to air, and mixing with it

¹ *Phædo*, p. 81, D.

² *De Div.*, i., § 110.

³ *Georgic.*, i., 416; iv., 220. "Esse apibus partem divinæ mentis et haustus Ætherios dixere."

⁴ Page 70, A. Similarly Lucretius, iii., 505: "Cur eadem" (*i. e.*, mind and soul), "credis sine corpore in aere aperto Cum validis ventis ætatem degere posse."

⁵ *Cic. Tusc. Disp.*, i., § 40: "Quæ quum constant, perspicuum debet esse, animos, quum e corpore excesserint, sive illi sint animales, id est, spirabiles, sive ignei, in sublime ferri."

again, could not be regarded as perishable. If there is any element that can be conceived to be eternal, it is the air.

The next step in this primitive reasoning was a not less easy and natural one. As a portion of animating air (life or soul) entered each body at birth, so it continued, even when separated, to be the particular life of the individual. Hence the immortality of the soul was extended to the mind and memory¹ of each person, as a part of his *ψυχή*. Mind was eternal; but *mens cujusque est quisque*, it is his *mind* that really makes the individual.

Other speculations followed in the same train of thought, some of which are of the highest interest. It was felt that the soul could not rejoin its pure kindred *ἀιθήρ* with the foulness of mortality yet adhering to it. It must be purified; and fire was regarded as the element whose special province it was to consume and destroy all stains; "omnia purgat edax ignis," as Ovid has it. In a celebrated passage Virgil² describes the processes by which the disembodied souls are purged from their mortal stains. Some of them are hung up to be aired, much as we should treat fouled clothes; others are washed in water; others are scorched in the fire. But the soul was the life, and life is sentient; it could not, therefore, pass through the fire, especially with any remnants of mortality cleaving to it, without a feeling of pain. Hence the process came to be regarded as *penal*, and as something to be suffered after death.³ Although such a view is wonderfully coincident with the Catholic doctrine of purgatory, it yet essentially differs in this, that the purgation was regarded as materialistic, and had no direct relation to retribution for sin. The notion of *satisfaction* does indeed appear in some of the details of the myths concerning a final judgment in the *Gorgias* and *Republic* of Plato;⁴ but it appears to have

¹ One of Plato's arguments for the soul's immortality is that all knowledge is a recollection or reminiscence of what the soul knew in a former state of existence.

² *Æn.*, vi., 724. Compare *Phædo*, p. 114.

³ *Æn.*, vi., 739:

"Ergo exercentur poenis, veterumque malorum
Supplicia expendunt."

Æn., 743:

"Quisque suos patimur manes."

Compare the words of the ghost in *Hamlet*:

"I am thy father's spirit,
Doomed for a certain term to walk the night,
And for the day confined to fast in fires,
Till the foul crimes done in my days of nature
Are burnt and purged away."

Plato *Gorg.*, p. 525, C., *οὐδὲν τὸ ἀπαράμιτον τὰ μέγιστα καὶ δόνησθαι καὶ φοβεύεσθαι τὴν αἰωνιότητα τῶν δαιμόνων*, where the *eternity* of hell's torments is asserted.

⁴ Pp., 525, A, and 615, B. From the Pythagorean law: "The Doer must suffer," *δράσαντι παθεῖν* (which *Æschylus* calls "a very ancient saying," *πρὸ πολλοῦ μῦθος*, in *Choeph.*, 306), naturally followed a doctrine of *reus*, and the idea of a debt to be paid hereafter. See *Eurip. Helen.*, 1013-1016.

occupied a subordinate place in the theology of the Greeks. Their ideas rather dwelt on a judge and a sentence, than on any process of expiation and recovery.¹

That space itself, and the worlds that it contained, were pervaded by mind, was, as we have remarked, a general opinion. It is repeatedly asserted, even by the Roman poets :

"Principio cœlum et terras camposque liquentes,
Lucentemque globum lunæ, Titaniaque astra,
Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus
Mens agitat molem et magno se corpore miscet."²

And this all-pervading mind was believed to be the source of animal life and instinct on earth. So far, the early thinkers were rather pantheists than mere materialists; they did not know enough about the *brain* in its healthy and morbid conditions to regard it the cause, or centre, or instrument of intelligence as well as of feeling. From universal mind came both the mind and the life of individuals :

"Inde hominum pecudumque genus vitæque volantum,
Et quæ marmoreo fert monstra sub æquore pontus."³

The air, in fact, literally swarmed with *minds*, which had animated mortal bodies in all past time, had been given back by them at their decease, and were ever ready to be taken up by and into newly created organisms. "Plenus aër est immortalium animorum, in quibus tanquam insignitæ notæ veritatis apparent," says Cicero.⁴ A difficulty here presented itself to the early thinkers, which pervades especially the arguments in the *Phædo* of Plato, and was strongly, not to say very powerfully, urged by Epicurus, who may be called the *Hume* of antiquity. How could *mere* minds or spirits, apart from matter, retain their intelligence? "Aperta simplexque mens nulla re adjuncta qua sentire possit, fugere intelligentiæ nostræ vim et notionem videtur."⁵ Still, when once these floating and

¹ Yet Plato says in the *Gorgias* (p. 525, B), that "those who have committed curable (*i. e.*, venial) sins are *benefited* by pains and suffering, both in this world and in Hades." See also *Phædo*, p. 113, D.

² *Æn.* vi., 724. So Cicero, *De Div.*, i., § 17 :

"Principio ætherio flammatus Jupiter igni
Vertitur et totum collustrat lumine mundum,
Menteque divina cælum terrasque petissit,
Quas penitus sensus hominum vitasque retentat.
Ætheris æterni septa atque inclusa cavernis."

³ *Æn.*, vi., 728.

⁴ *De Div.*, i., § 64. Plato even says (*Republ.*, p. 611, A), that the number of living souls must ever be the same; for, if they are immortal none can perish, and if they are multiplied, it must be from some mortal source; and in this latter case everything eventually would become immortal. Lucretius applies the same reasoning to prove that his *atoms* are imperishable, and can neither increase nor decrease in number.

⁵ *De Nat. Deor.*, i., § 27. So Lucretius, iii., 800: "Quippe etenim mortale æterno jungere, et una Consentire putare et fungi mutua posse, Desipere est."

immaterial *animulæ* were again taken into a body, the mental faculty would be at all events renewed. On this supposition turns the whole doctrine of *metempsychosis*. The life taken in by an animal might previously have inhabited a human body, and conversely.

"Errat, et illinc

Huc venit, hinc illuc, et quoslibet occupat artus

Spiritus, eque feris humana in corpora transit,

Inque feras noster, nec tempore deperit ullo."¹

Of course, if breath was life, and air was divine, it followed *ipso facto* that the soul was immortal. Air existed always and everywhere, and immortality and divinity were correlative ideas.

Soul, however, *per se*, as an *ousia* or essence, ever was, as it still is, a problem of which no solution can be given. The following passage from Aristotle² illustrates the bewilderment to which thinkers were reduced:

"Some say the soul is mingled with the universe; whence, perhaps, Thales thought that everything was full of gods. This, however, involves some doubts. How is it that the soul by *residing* in the air or the fire does not constitute a living creature, but yet does so in bodies mixed up with other elements, and seems even to be improved when in them? Or again, one might fairly inquire *why* the soul that is in the air is better, as being more immortal, than that in living creatures? Both of these propositions involve a paradox, for to call fire or air a living animal seems somewhat unreasonable, and to say it is *not* animal, if it contains soul, is also strange."

Such, then, is the history of a doctrine, as traced from the early reasoners, which is still fondly and sentimentally embraced by many, that the air teems with good and bad spirits, ever hovering round us, and even able, as the "Spiritualists" tell us, to perform acts when summoned to do so, and to communicate knowledge in some mysterious and supernatural way.³ It is at once the doctrine of guardian and ministering angels, which it is hard to distinguish from the *δαίμόνια* of Plato⁴ and the Hesiodic notion⁵ of disembodied beings, the observers and the guardians of man, walking unseen over the earth, *ἡέρα ἐσσάμενοι πάντῃ ψοιτῶντες ἐπ' αἶαν*.

Passing on rapidly from this necessarily very imperfect sketch, we arrive at a subject full of profound interest,—the doctrine of *παρθενογένεσις*, or birth without the male, by the mere influence of *πνεῦμα*, *ἐπίπνυια*, or spirit, in a word, of spontaneous generation through air.

This is intimately allied to the view already explained, that all life (*ψυχή*) was air; but that creatures could be impregnated or

¹ Ovid, *Met.*, xv., 165.

² *De Anima*, lib. i., ad fin.

³ Without giving any opinion for or against the truth of "spiritual manifestations," we may just remark that both the belief and the practice of it are identical with the narrative in the Eleventh Book of Homer's *Odyssey*.

⁴ *Sympos.*, p. 202, E, *πάν τὸ δαίμόνιον μεταξὺ ἡμερῶν τε καὶ θνητῶν*, etc.

⁵ *Op. et. Di.* 238.

made to produce young by breathing certain vitalized air was evidently an advance upon it.

It was observed that a bird would produce an egg, though a barren one, without the male. It was called *ανεμιατον*, "born of wind."¹ Thus, in the *Birds* of Aristophanes,² generation or creation out of nothing is expressed by this figure:

*Ερέβους δ' ἐν ἀπείρῳσι χόλποις
τίττει πρώτιστον ὑπηνέμον Νύξ ἡ μελανόπτερος ὤν.*

The first appearance of life, therefore, was attributed to the impregnating influence of air stirring in the dark regions of chaos. This is very like the language of Scripture, "And the Spirit of God moved on the face of the waters,"³ as if ocean life, undoubtedly the first that existed on this planet, had been first imparted in this way. Still more remarkable is the ancient Egyptian doctrine recorded by Æschylus,⁴ and which some will regard not so much as a coincidence as a forecasting of the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. The virgin Io is said to have become pregnant with Epaphus without contact with the male, but by the *ἐπιπνοια* or "over-breathing" of Zeus, and elsewhere⁵ by the mere magic touch of his hand. In the sixteenth book of the *Iliad*,⁶ the immortal steeds of Achilles are described as born to the mare Swiftfoot (*Ποδάργη*) by the west wind. This might be thought a mere allegory to describe the speed of the horses, but there can be no doubt that the ancients believed in a real conception from wind. Virgil repeats the idea of the *west* wind being specially prolific, and he describes the mares as standing with their heads in that direction and inhaling the mountain breeze:

"Ore omnes versæ in zephyrum stant rupibus altis,
Exceptantque leves auras, et sæpe sine ullis
Conjugiis *vento gravida*, mirabile dictu,
Saxa per et scopulos et depressas convalles
Diffugiunt, non Eure tuos neque solis ad ortus,
In Boream Caurumque."⁷

The poet takes the range of the winds from north to south *by the west*, but he specially exempts those on the east. The reason

¹ This, of course, is the origin of our familiar term, "a wind egg." ² 695.

³ Gen. i. 2. Aristotle (*De Anima*, i., ch. v.) quotes a dictum of Orpheus, or the *Ὀρφικὰ ἱμα*, to the effect that life enters by respiration, *τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ θλου εἰσέναι ἀναπνεύοντων φερομένην ἐκ τῶν ἀνέμων*. To which Aristotle objects, that this does not suit the case of non-breathing plants and animals. Here his science seems to have been somewhat at fault.

⁴ Suppl., 18.

⁵ Prom. Vinc., 849, *ἐπαφῶν διαρβεί χειρὶ καὶ θιγὼν μόνον*. Compare St. Luke, i. 35: *Πνεῦμα Ἅγιον ἐπελεύσεται ἐπὶ σέ, καὶ δύναμις ὑψίστου ἐπισκιάσει σοί.*

⁶ 149-151.

⁷ Georg., iii., 272.

is evident; the north was the cool and refreshing, the east and southeast were the parching and blighting winds; the west, the wind of Spring, when all nature seemed to revive under its influence. Hence, in a very poetical passage in Ovid,¹ the goddess Flora is said to have been carried off as his not unwilling bride by Zephyrus; and Orithyia was in the same way made the sport of the more boisterous Boreas.² The north wind was believed to have a beneficial effect on vegetation. "Those fruit trees which are not forward," says Aristophanes,³ "want rain, and the *north wind to blow on them*" (ἐπιπνεῦσαι αὐτοῖς). In the *Medea* of Euripides,⁴ the goddess Cypris (Venus) is said "to draw moisture from the fair-flowing Cephissus, and to breathe over the country gentle and fragrant airs." Here, too, we have the idea of life being imparted by wind. It is the goddess of love and of prolific union which breathes them, and spreads the misty vapors instinct with life over the land. In a remarkable passage of Theocritus' directions are given that the lower part of the sheafs should be turned by the reapers to the north or the west wind; "for thus," he says, "the ear gains in bulk." Where it is to be observed that the very same winds are mentioned which Virgil names as possessing a fertilizing property. Even after the corn was cut, the ear was thought to be improved by these winds blowing through and along the stalks.

Another extraordinary notion connected with air was the possibility of a human form or *wraith* being made out of it, with all the appearances of a real person, while nevertheless that real person was elsewhere at the time.⁵ Thus, Apollo makes an airy form (ἑίδωλον) to imitate Æneas, and for the Greeks and Trojans to contend about, while the real Æneas is in the Trojan citadel.⁶ Euripides has followed a story (said to have been invented by Stesichorus, who had been struck with blindness for disparaging the character of Helen), that it was not the real Helen who went to Troy with Paris, but her "double," a semblance of her, or "dummy," created by Hera out of air.⁷ Again, in Pindar we read that Ixion had for his bride, instead of the goddess Hera, to the possession of whose hand he had presumptuously aspired, a sham Hera made of the air.⁸ When the same goddess, Hera (herself a representa-

¹ Fast., v., 201.

² Propertius, iii., 26, 51. Plato, Phædr., p. 229, B.

³ Vesp., 265. Hence in Homer (Il., xi., 256) a strong lance is ἀνεμοτροφή, "wind-nourished."

⁴ 835.

⁵ Id., x., 46.

⁶ Modern superstitions about a person's *double* and "second sight" are connected with this.

⁷ Il., v., 449.

⁸ Eur. Hel., 34.

⁹ Pyth., ii., 35, νεφέλη παραλίγαστο, ψεύδεις γλαυκὸς μετέωρον.

tive of the air, or sky, in mythology), is jealous of the birth of the infant Dionysus to her faithless spouse from Semele, he deceives her by a substitute made of air being placed in her hands as a hostage for his future fidelity, the real Dionysus being handed over to the nymphs to be educated.¹

These details may appear uninteresting, and the narrative of them somewhat pedantic, but they are important as showing how universal was the belief of the close connection between *air* and *vitality*.

Of course, the tenuity and dispersive property of air gave rise to many an anxious doubt whether, once dismissed from the body, the soul could continue to exist. The grosser materialists, like Lucretius, alleged this as a positive proof that it could not. The idealists, like Plato, with whom soul was in great measure an abstraction, saw in the air theory a proof, rather of the subtlety, purity, divinity, imperishable nature, of soul. We cannot deny to Lucretius the credit of being a very shrewd thinker, nor can we deny that the difficulty he raises as to when and how, whether at the moment of coming into the world, or with the first faint motion of the yet unborn embryo, the soul joins the body and insinuates itself into it from without, is a real and a grave difficulty.²

We have avoided, as we stated at the outset, the appearance of mixing up these pagan speculations about the soul with Christian doctrine. And yet it seems very pertinent to remark that the minds of the first Christians were perfectly prepared, from their familiarity with the above views, and from their belief of the capability of air to assume visible forms, to attribute to *πνεῦμα* a reality and a sacredness which mere science has no conception of. We read that when Jesus was coming out of the Jordan, baptized by St. John, he saw the Spirit descending upon Him like a dove.³ In the Acts, the descent of the Spirit upon the assembled Apostles is described as "a sound from heaven as of a violent current of wind."⁴ Again, Jesus *breathed*⁵ on the Disciples, saying, "Receive the Holy Spirit." The miraculous walking on the sea, and the apparition of Jesus, "when the doors were shut,"⁶ appear to have been explained and accepted as the properties of a spiritual rather than of a material body.

It may reasonably be maintained, that the *Phædo* of Plato, inconsequent as it is as an argument for the immortality of the soul,

¹ Eurip. Bacch., 292.

² Lucret., iii., 777.

³ St. Mark i. 10, εἶδε—καὶ πνεῦμα ὡσεὶ περισσὸν καταβαῖνον ἐν αὐτῷ.

⁴ Ch. ii., 2, ἤχος ὡσεὶ φερόμενης πνοῆς βίας.

⁵ John xx. 22, καὶ πνέοι εἰπὼν ἰσχύοντες, etc. In this sense the Romans used the phrase *afflari numine*, Æn., vi., 50.

⁶ John xx. 19.

exercised a perceptible influence on the early Christian mind. It is vain to deny that the current ideas about the soul, as indeed about heaven and hell, are essentially Platonic. Subjects, so far removed from human experience, naturally take the direction which tradition and the sanction of great names have given them. Independent thinkers, always rare, are few indeed on a topic so mysterious and yet so momentous.

To attribute to the soul, thus impalpable and immaterial, memory and self-consciousness, with all their moral consequences, was a great step in advance, though one not strictly logical. Hence arose the triple division of the reasoning part of man into Mind, Spirit, and Soul. The *νοῦς*, or intellect proper, the Latin *animus* and *mens*, must, like memory, be regarded as inseparable from nerve and brain, *i. e.*, from bodily organization. No one now doubts, for instance, that an idiot has an imperfectly organized brain, though we do not know *how* it is physically deficient, nor that a clever man differs from a stupid man in the superior development of the organ of thought. Dreams also are easily explained as the energies of a living brain, but whether it alone, or in combination with some other faculty, constitutes the will, and suggests and originates thoughts, ideas, and aspirations, is more than we can say. No argument for the existence of a soul, based on the phenomena of dreams, is of any real weight.

"To sleep, perchance to dream, aye, there's the rub,
For in that sleep of death what dreams may come,
When we have shuffled off this mortal coil,
Must make us pause."¹

The same must be said of memory, or the faculty of recalling former impressions. Plato vainly attempts to build a theory upon this, when he contends that the acquisition of knowledge is only a recalling (*ἀνάμνησις*) of the sensations and experiences in a former and perhaps higher state of existence.²

A considerable portion of Plato's varied speculations on the nature of soul consists in the assertions of its infinite preciousness, and the danger of its deterioration by vices, especially by injustice. The explanation of this is not difficult. The one great end and use and function of *ψυχή* in man, here and hereafter, was *φρόνησις*, the intellectual enjoyment of the faculty of pure thought, of which truth or its synonym, the Divine Nature, *τὸ θεῖον*, was the subject-matter.³ The indulgence of the bodily was the impairing of the

¹ Shakspeare, in Hamlet's soliloquy.

² Phædo, pp. 73 B—E 76 C, Meno, p. 81 C, 86 A, where the immortality of the soul is inferred from its faculty of recalling a knowledge which lies, as it were, dormant within it.

³ Phædo, p. 68 A, 84 B, *τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμεῖται*.

spiritual, which was obfuscated, defiled, incapacitated by sensuality and the continuous pursuit of pleasure. Therefore the soul that has been brutalized by gross vice will never attain to perfect intelligence, *τελεία φρόνησις*.

The instinctive dread of *nililism*, or in theological language, the fear of a man losing his own soul, was partly due to the risk of losing *φρόνησις*, partly to the innate love of existence in any form.¹ And yet the dreariness of an enfeebled existence in the other world, apart from any notions of a penal state, was regarded by the ante-Platonic thinkers at least, as a terrible contrast with the enjoyment of a vigorous life under the bright sun. "I would rather," says Ajax in the *Odyssey*,² "be a serf on a farm than a king of all the dead." The higher philosophy, however, as we have explained, took into account the mental far more than the bodily part of man in contemplating the conditions of the after-life.

These views of the ethereal nature of the soul and the gross earthly nature of the body and its pleasures, suggested the duty and necessity of asceticism as a process of detaching, by a voluntary mortification, the soul from its converse with the body. Observing the fact, that any excess in diet tends to confuse the thoughts and dim the brightness of the intellect, the followers of Pythagoras came to the conclusion—a very erroneous one, as modern science teaches—that the more the body was starved, punished, and denied its natural cravings, the more clear and keen would the intellect become.³ The ancients, in fact, knew very little about brain-power and the nervous system. They did not, therefore, understand that if the body becomes debilitated the mental faculties, or what they regarded as the soul, will suffer. Yet there were some who thought that the vital principle (*ψυχή*) resided in the brain, as others found it in the movement of the blood,⁴ which was also the Jewish theory of life.

As a fact, the punishing of the body to any excess with a view to improve and isolate the mind proves, by its effects, not that the mind is independent of the body, but the very contrary, the inseparable connection and dependence of the one upon the other.

According to the hopes and aspirations for a better, or the fears for a worse life in another state, men labored to show that the soul was immortal, or, with Epicurus and the atomists, that it perished

¹ Cicero discusses this point in *Tusc. Disp.*, i., §§ 12-14.

² xi., 489.

³ Aristophanes, *Nub.*, 103, and Theocritus, *Id.*, xiv., 5, ridicule the pale-faced ascetics, who were said *Πηθαγορίζειν* and *ἀθανατίζειν*, and went about barefooted, like monks of the more severe orders. Socrates himself, though he could enjoy a dinner and drink more than most (*Plat. Symp.*, p. 176 C, 223 C) often went without shoes, and made a parade of his abstinence and poverty.

⁴ *Phædo*, p. 96 B.

with the body. Lucretius, the exponent of the materialistic creed, exults in the thought that he has liberated mankind from the most degrading fears and superstitions, by demonstrating that the soul is composed only of more subtle atoms than the body.

He treats everywhere with ridicule the doctrine of a soul surviving the body, and continuing to exist in another state. He regards the accounts of tortures and sufferings to be undergone in Hades as mere fables.¹

Cerberus et Furiae jam vero et lucis egestas,
Tartarus horridos eructans fancibus aestus,
Hi neque sunt usquam nec possunt esse profecto.

Even if, he says, there is a resurrection of the body, the history of our former lives can in no way affect us, since there has been a break in the continuity of self, an interruption between the former man and the new existence.²

The great passage at the end of the tenth book of the *Republic*, as well as that in the *Gorgias*,³ of Plato, may be called a *locus classicus* for the Platonic doctrine of Soul, and of a future judgment and penal purgation. The former concludes⁴ with a brief but very interesting account of the plain of Lethe and the waters of the river *Ἀμειλῆς* (Care-naught), of which all the souls that have passed out of a former state of existence are compelled to drink before entering on the new life. In this perhaps we may recognize the Indian and Buddhistic doctrine of annihilation,⁵ or a total insensibility and indifference to all external impressions. As they speak of different degrees of this state, and of "perfect Nirvāna," it seems obvious to compare it with the *Lethe* of the Greek mythology, from which the souls "*Securos latices et longa oblivia potant*."⁶

Buddha, like Epicurus, is said to have been an atheist. Yet he was the founder of a religion, or rather of a religious philosophy, which at the present day numbers more followers than the religion of Christ. Plato was, if anything, a pantheist,⁷ and Aristotle seems to have been of no religion at all. The expediences of the present life were the only moral law he appears to recognize. Strange

¹ iii., 1011. Ibid., 830, "Nil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinet hilum. Quandoquidem natura animi mortalis habetur."

² "Interrupta semel cum sit repentina nostri," iii., 851. See Virg. *Æn.*, vi., 720, "iterum ad tarda reverti corpora."

³ Chaps. 79-82.

⁴ P. 621.

⁵ In Prof. Max Müller's *Chips from a German Workshop*, vol. i., essay xi., there is an interesting account of the state which the Buddhists call "Nirvāna." He describes it as a state in which nothing but self, or perhaps self-consciousness, is attained.

⁶ *Æn.*, vi., 715.

⁷ His *θεός* and *τὸ θεῖον* do not prove him to have been a monotheist. With him they were rather abstractions, i. e., he saw "godness" in the universe, rather than God.

that godless philosophers should have written so much and speculated so deeply on the nature and existence of Soul; and more strange still, that their speculations should have exercised such an extraordinary influence over human thought in every succeeding age!"

THE BISMARCK OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

Polemique sur le Pape Clement XIV. Lettres au Père Augustin Theiner.
Liège, 1853.

Defense de Clement XIV. et Réponse à l'Abbé Gioberti. Par J. Cretineau Joly. Paris: Mellier Frères, Libraire Religieuse, 1847.

BRIGHTLY broke the morning of All Saints on the city of Lisbon in 1755. The Portuguese capital was enjoying a holiday, and Portuguese devotion had lighted a thousand candles on the high altar of St. Paul's patriarchal church, and before the shrine of the national patron, Santo Antonio. The churches were full of worshippers and mockers; the nobles of King Joseph's court were there, and vine-dressers from Estremadura and the agents of the English manufacturing companies, and swarthy creoles from Goa and the Malabar coast. The epistle of the feast had been sung by the Sub-Deacon of the Mass; the veil had been lifted by the hand of St. John from the Holy of Holies, and the twelve tribes of Israel with the mark of God on their foreheads stood revealed to the eye of faith. God had set His mark on Lisbon too, and thirty thousand souls were to stand before His judgment throne before the sun went down. The commemoration of All Souls was to be anticipated by a day. The earth yawned, and while the shriek, "misericordia meu Dios," went up to heaven, a hecatomb of victims sank into the jaws of the gaping abyss. The bed of the Tagus heaved and shook off the sleeping waters, and from the broken fountains of the deep a deluge poured over the city. The miracle of the prophet Eliseus was renewed, and the anchors of the ships in the harbor floated for a moment on the tossing waves. Lisbon was prostrate, and over the ruins a mighty conflagration, kindled by countless lights in the churches and by bands of escaped criminals, swept all night, like the flames of the last judgment over the ruined

¹ St. Augustine, the chief exponent of the doctrine of Purgatory, must have been well acquainted with the Platonic myths and allegories.

world. The disaster that opened the earth beneath the feet of the inhabitants of Lisbon opened the hand and heart of charity. Among the ruins of churches and convents were offered sacrifices of mercy far more acceptable to God than ever the blood that streamed on the altars when the Temple stood erect in its pride of place. Human sympathy and divine love looked more human and more divine, when side by side they labored as gravediggers among the marble tombs, or bestowed their tribute of tears and treasure on the thousands that had been made widows, and orphans, and beggars, by the earthquake, the flood, and the fire.

There were two men conspicuous among these heroes of charity, two men whose feet never wearied in their daily journeys through the wreck of the city, whose ears and hands were open to every tale of misery and prayer for relief. One was a tall, athletic, handsome noble, a little past his prime, with bright piercing eyes and kingly brow; the other was an octogenarian priest, with silver hair, and a spiritual face wrinkled with age and toil, and tanned by the climate of Brazil. The noble was Don Sebastian Joseph Carvalho Melho, Count of Oeyras and Marquis of Pombal, the priest was Gabriel de Malagrida of the Society of Jesus; one was the minister of Joseph Emmanuel I., King of Portugal, the other of Christ, King of kings.

Pombal's energy and zeal in the disastrous days of November, 1755, equalled those of his Jesuit assistant and future victim, Malagrida. It may have been piety, or pity, or policy, or a combination of the three, that turned the minister of state into a minister of charity, but let us in truth and justice give him the glory of his good deeds and raise one untarnished monument, on the ruins of Lisbon, to the memory of the man, who descended to the grave with the curses of a nation whom he had oppressed and the prayers of the Church which he had persecuted. His own house bravely stood the shock of the earthquake, and the partiality of his sovereign and friends accepted the fact as a proof that Pombal was the favorite of heaven and his works the works of God. "Then deify prostitution, Sire," exclaimed the cynical Count of Obidos, "for all the dens of the *Rua Lujá* have been as fortunate as Pombal's house." Carvalho was born in 1699 at Louva, a little town near Coimbra. His ancestors were a fiery-tempered marauding clan, who harried the country and laughed at the law. There was no help in Portugal for their victims, so they carried their appeal to heaven. On every Sunday, the parish priest recited, after the High Mass, three *Paters* for the deliverance of the villagers of the Oeyras from the fury of the Carvalhos.

Sebastian Joseph inherited the recklessness of right and the poverty of his family. He shed more blood with the weapons of cal-

umny and statecraft than all his freebooting progenitors had done with pistol or stiletto. A student, and then a soldier, he got disgusted with both school and camp, and became a courtier. He had a commanding presence, great talents, greater daring, and no principle, and with these strands woven into one thread, he flattered himself he could traverse the labyrinth of diplomacy as profitably and as gloriously as any man in Europe. He aspired to be the Carolingian majordomo of the Portuguese Merovingians, to be to John V. and Emmanuel I. what Richelieu had been to Louis XIII. of France, and Calderon to Philip IV. of Spain. Nor was his ambition greater than his abilities or success. The grandees opposed his advancement and refused to recognize his claims to nobility, but he soon overtopped the proudest heads in Portugal, and necks that were too stiff to bow to him were given over to the cord and the axe. Yet he waited long before Fortune showered her favors on him. King John V. did not love him, and the minister, Peter de Molto, honored the yet obscure minister with his distrust and hatred.

Carvalho attached himself to the service of the Queen Consort, Mary Ann, of Austria, and she, through friendship for his wife, her countrywoman, the Countess of Daun of Vienna, became his patron. The king, however, would not listen to her suit in his favor, and the would-be premier must needs abide his time. It came at length; John V. died, and on the high tide of the new sovereign's favor, the bark of Carvalho's fortune floated out boldly and gallantly on the sea of politics. Joseph Emmanuel became, on the 31st of July, 1750, his Most Faithful Majesty of Portugal. The Queen Mother was all-powerful and made her client Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The weak, suspicious, and voluptuous Joseph was soon caught in the meshes of ministerial intrigue. The royal puppet acted, but Carvalho pulled the strings. The king had the name and the honors of royalty, the secretary its reality. The affection of Queen Mary for the Countess blinded her to the faults of that lady's husband. Carvalho had to keep himself on his good behavior during the life of the amiable, yet too-confiding princess, and wear a lamb's face over a fox's brain and a wolf's heart. Mary Ann died in 1754, and Carvalho buried his mask and sheep's clothing in her grave. For twenty-three years he ruled Portugal. He was made Count Oeyras and Marquis of Pombal, the constant recipient of royal smiles and royal ducats, and the possessor of absolute power. Let us take a rapid glance at the state of Portugal, when its evil fate consigned it to the keeping of the Marquis de Pombal.

At the close of the fifteenth century, the illegitimate Burgundian line occupied the throne of Portugal. She was then in the heyday of her glory. The Cape of Good Hope had been discovered by Diaz in 1482, and doubled sixteen years after by Vasco de Gama.

Spain had discovered a world in the West, Portugal was mistress of the East. Her great viceroys, Almeida and Albuquerque, had carried her flag over Southern Hindostan and Ceylon, and it waved in undisputed sovereignty on the Indian Ocean, from Babelmandel to the Straits of Malacca. The riches of the East were raining into her lap in showers of pearl and gold, long before an Indian fugitive had discovered the mines of Potosi, or Cortez had rifled the halls of the Montezumas. The power of Venice, Genoa, and the Hanse towns was gone; Lisbon was the commercial capital of Western Europe. There was a Portuguese colony on the coast of Guinea, and Portuguese greed and daring more effectually excluded the competition in the negro and ivory trade of powerful rivals than the poisonous fevers of that ill-omened shore. John II., Emmanuel the Great, John III., and Sebastian, were the heroes of the fiery Burgundian race, and their names are still fondly cherished as mementos of a nation's glory, short-lived in its day and now gone forever. The bloody battle of Alcassar, fought in 1578, against the Moors in Africa, deprived Portugal of her dominion and her king. Sebastian was never seen after that disastrous day. The story of his reign ends on that battle-field, but like the Cid and King Arthur, his life has been immortalized in song. The royal line became extinct; patriotism died in the hearts of the people. Coldblooded tyranny and bigotry, such as the world has rarely seen, were enthroned in the palace of the magnificent Burgundian kings. Philip II. of Spain became, by conquest, King of Portugal. From 1580 to 1640 poor Portugal was linked in chains of iron to the huge, overgrown, and already decaying monarchy of Spain—corpse was tied to corpse. The Dutch pounced upon the Portuguese possessions in the East and conquered half of Brazil. The trade of Lisbon was ruined, her markets deserted, her colonists driven from Guinea, the last life-drops were oozing from Portugal's heart, beneath the talons of the Black Eagle of the Spanish Hapsburgs. The outraged nobility made a despairing effort. The example of William of Orange and the Netherlands was before them, to prove that a total eclipse was not impossible in the monarchy that boasted that the sun never set within her borders. The nobles placed on the throne the Duke of Braganza, under the title of John IV., and proclaimed their country's independence on the 1st of December, 1640. A quarter of a century of desultory warfare succeeded. Portugal made good by her sword, and the friendship of the European powers, the just claims of natural right. In 1668 she again took her place in the family of nations, and the House of Braganza became as royal as that of the Bourbons or the Stuarts. But the hopes of the Portuguese patriots soon died. They had shaken off the military yoke of Spain to put on their necks

the commercial yoke of England. Under the first Braganza king, a treaty of commerce had been made with England, and in 1703, the two nations were brought into closer unity by the diplomacy of the English ambassador at Lisbon, Mr. Methuen. Great Britain was promised a share in the newly discovered gold mines of Brazil, and she was not slow in availing herself of the commercial advantages thus secured to obtain a strong political foothold in the Peninsula. His Most Faithful Majesty became a dependent on the Cabinet of St. James. English commerce was transforming the Tagus into another Thames, and English manners were the glass of fashion in the saloons of Lisbon. The effete monarchy had better have died at once. The Portuguese race had degenerated; it was cumbering the land, and the great people of destiny, the Anglo-Saxon race, threatened to sweep it into the ocean. The nobility was beneath the level of that of France in the latter days of the old *régime*; it was composed of little nobodies, with empty heads and licentious hearts. The kings of the Braganza line were pigmies in all regal qualities beside their Burgundian ancestors. In a word, Portugal was politically in as bad a state as Italy has ever been. When the luxurious æsthetic civilization of the Romanic races of Southern Europe decays, corruption, like that of a luscious fruit in tropical climes, is quick and loathsome. These nations lack the stamina, the nerve, the backbone of the Northman and the mountaineer. Children of the sun, they bask in light and song and knightly deeds, but shiver to death in storms of national disaster. Their fiery hearts make them the creatures of impulse; their warm, imaginative brain is impatient of the cool deliberations of reason, a stranger to the wise slowness in resolve which has made the Saxon and the Norman races the soldiers and the statesmen of the world.

Such was the political state of Portugal when Pombal began his administration. In religion the country was Catholic. The Patriarchate of Lisbon was the rival in wealth, in ecclesiastical and political power, of the Archbishopric of Toledo, in the palmy days of Spain. Its jurisdiction extended to the colonies; the Patriarch's word was law in Goa and in Lisbon; the patronage of the Indian benefices was in his hands; his power was equal to that of the Patriarch of Constantinople under the Byzantine Emperors. His influence declined with the monarchy, and in the seventeenth century, when the Congregation of the Propaganda was established by Pope Urban VIII., the management of the ecclesiastical affairs of Hindostan was transferred, in great part, from Lisbon to Rome. The Patriarchate soon became an honorary title, its holder only the first bishop of a third-rate kingdom.

Besides the traditionary faith of the people and their devotion to

the See of Peter, there was one great element of vitality in the Portuguese Church. John II. of the Burgundian House was the first sovereign who patronized the Society of Jesus. The Portuguese ambassador in Rome requested from St. Ignatius, the general, missionaries for the Indian possessions of his master. The world knows the result. King John has the glory of having introduced St. Francis Xavier to his splendid career. The Spanish Jesuit won more realms for the crown of Portugal than the discoveries of Da Gama and the victories of Albuquerque. He traversed Hindostan from the coast of Malabar to that of Coromandel, and over the three thousand isles of the Empire of Japan, fell the shadows of the cross and the Portuguese flag.

One of the companions who were to accompany him to India, Simon Rodriguez, was detained by royal command at the court of Lisbon. He became the favorite preacher and confessor of the nobility. He shunned the dangerous honors that wooed him; they pursued and overtook him. His commanding talents won respect; his priestly and religious virtues made him loved. The ermine and the purple sought the companionship of the black robe; plumed and jewelled hats were veiled to his birettum. Rodriguez became a general favorite. The pure austerity of his life and teaching was always admired, sometimes followed by the nobles of King John's court. Thus began the intercourse of the Jesuits with Portugal and their influence in the councils of its kings. The confessors of the royal family were chosen from the days of King John II. to those of Pombal, from amongst the children of St. Ignatius, and for two hundred years the Jesuits had control of the spiritual interests of the Portuguese colonies.

By what right, it may be asked, do religious bodies take part in politics? They belong to heaven, politics to earth; to serve an earthly king is to neglect Heaven's King. You cannot serve two masters, God and Mammon. How could Rodriguez, or any other Jesuit, be both at once the Minister of the King of Portugal and the King of Angels? To such questions we reply, that princes, like other men, have or ought to have consciences. A Catholic prince, if he wishes to practice his religion, must have a keeper of the royal conscience, as well as of the Great Seal. The law of confession applies to him as to the beggar at his palace gate. His political acts are moral acts, good or bad, before the tribunal of his conscience and of God. The royal confessor reads the secrets of state, because he reads his penitent's conscience. His duty as a father, a judge, a physician, a teacher, confers on him a jurisdiction over the political morals of his spiritual child, as well as over his social morals. The prince, if not an autocrat, is bound equally by the laws of his country and the positive laws of God. To levy

unconstitutional taxes, or an unjust war, is not only treason against his people, but treason against God. All acts without exception, political included, are amenable to the inspection and judgment of the priest, as confessor. The minister of penance must, at times, interfere in politics, or betray his sacred trust. Such interference on the part of a royal confessor is unavoidably frequent. The less, however, the priest has to do with politics, outside of the tribunal of conscience, the better for himself and the laity. The respect he owes to his sacred character should keep him aloof from active participation in the intrigues of courts and the cabals of party. He transcends the limits of priestly power and priestly decorum, when he attempts to invest his private opinions with the sacredness of sacramental decisions, and to prop the sophisms of a tottering party with ponderous folios of canon law.

The kings of Portugal went to confession, the Jesuits were their confessors ; the Jesuits, by a logical process clear to every Catholic mind, acquired political influence. They may have aimed at times, in some European courts, at becoming ministers of state, at ruling in the royal council, as well as in the sanctuary of the royal chapel. Such men knew not of what spirit they were ; St. Ignatius would never have acknowledged them as the legitimate offspring of his order.

The Jesuits could not have maintained their post for two hundred years in the Braganza court and escaped the assaults of envious, and in some cases, of patriotic tongues. Never has the pure lustre of the Society's fame as a body been tarnished, but it would have been a miracle, if for two hundred years, all the successors of Rodriguez at Lisbon had been as prudent as St. Ignatius, or as humble as St. Francis Borgia. It is no reproach to their memory to say that they were men. If Homer sometimes sleeps, the devoted priest, the unworldly religious may occasionally slip with the tongue. Zeal is a restive animal ; it needs the strong bit of prudence. Its overflow may stream through the grating of the confessional, and abandoning its natural channel in the sacrament, flood the council chamber. It is not impossible, nay, very probable, that some Portuguese Jesuits used their influence for political purposes. Those purposes were, without exception, honorable, but not always expedient, adapted to the needs of a theocratic state, but not of a Christian monarchy. When churchmen turn statesmen, a double danger arises to society ; either the state will be ruled as a theocracy, or the Church administered as a mere civil polity. Both alternatives are heresies in logic and theology. The State or the secular order is not theocratic since the abrogation of the Jewish law ; the Church is a divine as well as a human kingdom. It were desirable perhaps that all governments were theocratic, that the subordination of the civil to the,

spiritual were universal and absolute. The case is not so. Secular society, since the Reformation, insists on its independence as secular. It is subordinate, because the sphere in which it moves is subordinate, but in that sphere it is self-dependent. The State insists in civil matters on its freedom from ecclesiastical control, from ecclesiastical interference. That interference may be suggested by the purest motives, but as a fact, the State resents it as an impudence. "You will not allow me into the sanctuary," says the State to the Church; "why then do you seek to usurp a place in my legislature or judiciary? In purely spiritual matters, I am your child and subject; in those that are mixed, in which the interests of both of us are concerned, we must take counsel together, the chair of honor and authority being reserved for you; but in interests purely civil, the only jurisdiction you can rightly exercise over me, is through my individual members in the sacrament of penance. But in the face of the world and of God, in my own domain, I stand on my own rights and will defend them to the death."

Public opinion from the middle of the eighteenth century, the period of which we write, set with a steady tide against the employment of churchmen in state affairs. The opinion we admit had its root in a pernicious error. The Reformation was working itself out to its logical conclusions. The naturalists of the last century, under the different names of encyclopedists, illuminés, philosophers, etc., asserted not only the distinction and separation between Church and State, but the absolute irresponsibility of the latter. In truth, it was only the civil element of society that they admitted. The spiritual, the sacerdotal, went by the board, because the teachers of the new doctrine were either Atheists or Deists. Here was the error. Starting from this false premise, they waged an indiscriminate war against the priesthood, and against the Jesuits, as the flower of the priesthood. We have all heard a hundred times the couplet of Diderot,—

"Et des boyaux du dernier prêtre
Serrez le cou du dernier roi."

It is an epitome of the revolutionary gospel done into verse. Not only was the priesthood excluded from politics, a measure which the honor and the interest of the Church called for, but from the sanctuary. The altar and the minister, the shrine and the worshipper, were alike doomed. Religion was a superstition of the past, a myth of mediæval darkness.

The Revolution, in its outstart, saw itself face to face with the Jesuits. A dark, black phalanx arose before it, mighty in number, firm as an ocean-imbedded rock. There were clear, swift-throbbing brains beneath the black caps, and fiery hearts beneath the black

habits of St. Ignatius. They could die; they could not be conquered. The world was their battle-field; the trophies of their victories over the world were in the Church of the Gesu at Rome. Paraguay and China, Canada and Japan, were red with their blood and wet with their tears. They were all-potent at Rome; they knew the cabinet secrets of Europe, and thousands hung upon their words in the halls of the universities. They were astronomers and poets, historians and musicians, chemists and theologians, preachers, professors, confessors, diplomatists, and, more powerful than all, men of God, ready to battle for God, and to die for God and His Church. They were in truth the right arm of the Church, the Janizaries and Zouaves of the Pope, attached to his See with enthusiastic devotion and romantic love. They were to the Pontiff, what the Scottish Archer Guard was to the French kings, from St. Louis to the Regent, Philip of Orleans. The papacy was the defensive, the divinely passive element of the Church; the Jesuits, the aggressive, the propagandist. "Down with the Society!" was of necessity one of the great shibboleths of the infidelity of the age. If individual members were guilty of indiscretions in commerce and politics, their faults were fathered on the Society; the Society must be destroyed. The throne and the altar could be overturned only on the ruins of the Society. From the days of Port Royal to the days of the National Convention, European history, the fate of Christian Europe, hung on the issue of the duel between the Jesuits and the Philosophers. The Society fell, fell with honor, with its face to the foe, its flag unsullied and bloody, clutched in the death-grip of the last of its Generals, Lorenzo de Ricci. The Revolution triumphed, and celebrated its triumph in an orgie of blood.

Carvalho, Marquis of Pombal, prime minister of Joseph Emmanuel of Portugal, was a representative man of his age. His creed consisted of one article, "I believe in England, political and ecclesiastical." He had studied the British constitution during an embassy to England under the preceding reign. He fell in love with it, as did Guizot, as did Montalembert. It is a masterpiece, and well would it have fared with England's fair fame, if her practice had always conformed to the theory of her matchless constitution. But in the enthusiasm of his admiration, Carvalho forgot that Portugal is not England. Greater statesmen than he have fallen into a like mistake. England, with her king, lords, and commons, that triple blending and counterpoise of all the elements of human government, was great and happy, because she was England. Her constitution had grown with her growth and strengthened with her strength. It suited the genius of the people, because they were Anglo-Saxons; and the Anglo-Saxons were from the time that the

light of history breaks upon them, in the gloom of the German forests, a liberty-loving and law-abiding people. The Southern or Romanic races have become hopelessly degenerate; they are the representatives of those tribes into whose veins a too large infusion of Roman blood was introduced. And that blood, at the time of the Barbarian conquests, was the green, poisonous blood of a putrescent corpse.

Carvalho wished to anglicize his country. The thought was that of a patriot, its execution betokened a fool or a despot. No man can blame his project, no lover of liberty, no respecter of rights, can approve his deeds. We defy an educated Portuguese, or Italian, to contemplate the state of his country a hundred years ago, to contemplate it now, and to repress the swellings of bitter sorrow and of burning anger. Voluptuous courts ruled by crowned fools and debauchees, a prime minister orientally despotic, a demoralized people, half conspirators, half slaves, the beauty of the Church, the Immaculate Spouse of God, hidden by the foul garment of political leprosy cast over her shackled limbs, as they were dragged along in lingering agony, chained to the wheels of the royal chariot. God knows that the Church was not responsible for this deep disgrace, this crushing misery. What could she do? Her spirit was free but her mouth was gagged, and manacles clanked in harsh, grinding dissonance upon her stately form. What wonder that when the crash came, she went down for awhile with the rotten thrones to which she was chained. The pure blood of her virgin breast flowed over the ruins of society, and, like the blood of Christ, it sanctified and saved, and from the crimson sea the spirit of Christian liberty emerged. For God's sake, let us be done with the suicidal folly of saddling the Church with the imbecility and tyranny of Hapsburgian or Bourbon, Braganzian or Stuart! Admit the fact, the damning evidence of which is written on every page of European history, that the Southern nations are politically demoralized. Italian lazzaroni and Portuguese and Spanish matadors can save their souls. We know it, we rejoice at it, for are they not our brethren in faith and charity? The Church is a soul-saving institution. Her kingdom is not of this earth. With politics, with progress in science and art, she has no concern, except as they help or impede the fulfilment of her mission. Her children may be clothed in rags; what matters it to her, if their souls are clothed with Christ. Her children may be ignorant of worldly lore, unskilled in worldly pursuits; what matters it to her, if they know their catechism, and are skilled in the exercises of a Christian life? Blame her for the backwardness of Romanic civilization, when you blame the American Constitution for not making all Congressmen observe the Decalogue.

Portugal was ruined ; the fault was partly that of the government, partly that of the national character. The errors of the last of the Burgundian line, the tyranny of the Spanish rule, the inefficiency of the House of Braganza, would singly have ruined a greater state than Portugal. Combined they crushed the hapless Lusitanian peninsula to the dust. Then, as we have said, we must look at the character of the people. We are firm believers in the mission of races ; deny it and you ignore history. The Hebrews, the Greeks, and the Romans, were the representative tribes of the ancient world ; the Anglo-Saxon, or more properly the Saxon-Norman, the main branch of the great Teutonic family, is the representative of the new civilization. It was not in the Persian to do what the Greek did ; the Gods had not given to Carthage the mission that they gave to Rome. When Greek civilization crossed the Hellespont with Alexander of Macedon, it was marching in splendid triumph to its funeral pyre. Asia was not Hellenized, but Greece was Mediized—Japhetic arms triumphed over Semitic voluptuousness, but Semitic voluptuousness triumphed over the intellect of the son of Japhet. The successors of Alexander became Persian satraps ; the warrior was metamorphosed into the despot, the camp into the harem. So ended the mission of Greece. Her literature and her corruption were bequeathed to Rome, and the Romanic races have inherited both. The genius of empire went out of the family, as a legacy to the soldiers of Hermann, the Teuton.

The task that Carvalho undertook was hopeless. First let him blot out two hundred years of Portuguese history, then let him create a new heart and a new brain in his people. Till then, a Portuguese constitution on the English plan were a Utopian dream. Do we despair then, the reader may ask, of the regeneration of a fallen race ? Is the resurrection of a nation in our own day a dream as fair and false as the resurrection of Portugal a century ago ? Terrible are the throes of a new nation's birth, and hateful crimes of every form against God and man hover with foul wings over the cradle of infant liberty. What is it but another phase of the daily phenomenon of good and evil in deadly contest ? Every wheat-field has it tares, every fisher's net its draught of useless spawn. Sin clings to the new-born nation, as to the new-born babe. Both come into the world children of wrath, with the brand of iniquity on their foreheads. Then comes the baptism of heaven, and the soul of the Christian child and the soul of the Christian state, are spotless and free, with the freedom wherewith Christ has made them free.

France is born again, and have not the odds against her restoration to the vacant throne in the hierarchy of nations been fully as great as those against the Portugal of 1754 ? There are sudden changes in the history of nations beyond the calculation of all

human forethought, and opposed to the evidence of all the precedents of the past. The dry bones of a dead race, mighty in its day, lie white and ghastly on the field before us. The spirit of God breathes, and the voice of God speaks, and the bones arise and join, and the flesh covers them, and the nation lives. These political resurrections occur at rare intervals in the chronicles of the world. They are miracles, and when we see them, we cry out, "The finger of God is here!" So might it have been with Portugal; so was it not. So may it be with Italy; let us hope that so will it be.

But reason and experience combine to teach us, that in the ordinary course of human events, no nation can be free until it has been educated for freedom. Loosen suddenly the bonds of despotism from a nation of slaves, and let liberty, in radiant youth and beauty, offer herself to their embraces; they turn on her and tear her, and before a horror-stricken world, the hideous farce is played of licentious anarchy, flaunting in the bloody robes of slaughtered freedom. The English colonies in America were taught, by their two centuries of battle with forest land and Indian, the stern lesson of self-reliance. Their antecedents in the mother country were republican. Deniers of the divine right of Tudor and Stuart to tyrannize; deniers of the divine right of a man-made Church to dictate to conscience, they came to the new world exiles of freedom, bearing with them all the elements of liberal government. Their severance from England was not a violent break with the past; no violent bending of national habit from the direction of its natural growth. The colonies fell from the parent state, as the luscious over-ripe fruit falls from the parent tree. Not so with Portugal. Nothing in Portuguese character or Portuguese habit warranted a statesman in attempting to transform the swarthy Lusitanian fig-consumer and wine-drinker, into the jolly red-faced English beef-eater and porter-drinker. It would require ages of schooling to Anglicize Portugal or any country of the Romanic race. Slow and unpromising at first would be the growth of the seed of English-sown institutions in its soil, and faint the hope of ever seeing it aught else than a puny, sickly tree. You must train the child for its future profession; you must educate the nation for liberty. And as on the tougher, slower-working brain of middle life or age it is harder to imprint the lessons of science or art than on the tender, pliant brain of youth, so for a nation grown gray in slavery or anarchy, with limbs either stiffened and corroded with chains, or unused through long and unbridled license to any yoke, it is hard, we may say impossible, to teach it to mark the vaguely defined boundary line between the domains of freedom and those of despotism or lawlessness. The past presents us with scarcely an instance in which the task has been accomplished.

Carvalho's faith, we have said, was, "I believe in England, in State, and Church." He determined to nationalize the Church of Portugal, to make the Patriarch of Lisbon another Archbishop of Canterbury, and himself another Thomas Cromwell. He was to be the lay Vicar-General of the Portuguese Henry VIII. To break with Rome and destroy the Jesuits were the two cardinal points of his ecclesiastical policy. Let us see how he fared. To use and then destroy the Society was his plan. On the accession of Joseph to the throne in 1750, Carvalho won the confidence of Father Moreira, the royal confessor, and not only his, but that of all the Jesuits in Portugal. The executioner fawned upon his unsuspecting victims. He stood high in the esteem of the Society; he was its friend, its patron; one of his sons had been clothed with the habit of the Order; in protecting it, he protected the spiritual mother of his own child. Moreira's influence secured the aspiring courtier the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. He was on the highroad to power. He became Marquis de Pombal and Prime Minister of Portugal. He had reached his goal; he was on the top of the ladder; he kicked away the rounds by which he had mounted, and none more readily than the Jesuits.

Joseph I. was as suspicious as effete princes are wont to be. Pombal knew it, and played upon the monarch's fears. He hinted to him that his brother Don Pedro, was intriguing against the throne, and that the Jesuits were the soul of the intrigue. Did Don Joseph relax from the cares of state in the pleasures of literature, Don Sebastian Carvalho put in his way the thousand and one libels against the Society that were fluttering over Europe. The wily minister mysteriously enjoined an inviolate silence on the royal student. These books, he said, were the revelations of iniquities as great as those of the Templars; they contained the secrets of the Freemasons and Rosicrucians of the Church. Who knows but that the dagger or poison might be the reward of the master and pupil if discovered by the Jesuits in such occult studies! A Dominican's knife had once reached the heart of a French king. Might not some fanatical disciple of Loyola vie, in murderous skill, with the disciple of Dominic, as he had already tilted with him in many a fierce theological tournament? "Stolen waters are sweet." The king was pleased with his books; fear and hate of the Society succeeded in his heart to curiosity and suspicion. Lampoons in verse and prose, historic lies, romantic lies against the Jesuits were scattered broadcast over Portugal. The dragon's teeth were sown; Pombal waited to see the armed ministers of his vengeance spring from the ground. The mine was dug, the train laid, the slow match burning.

Ballister and Fonseca were the first fathers honored with exile.

The first was accused of attacking in the pulpit one of the pet schemes of Pombal; the second had in conversation censured, as ruinous to the country, one of the minister's financial projects. Then came the earthquake, and a splendid exhibition of the devotion of the Jesuits to the dead and the living. For awhile, they rode on the high tide of popular favor, and Pombal had to defer his vengeance. The two exiles were recalled, and one of the heroes of the calamity, Gabriel de Malagrida, was rewarded with the confidence of the monarch. Joseph was penitent for his suspicions of the Society, and betook himself, as Louis XI. of France was wont to do, to one of the refuges of a little mind and a cold heart, fantastic piety. The danger was over, and the royal heart ceased quaking at the end of the earthquake. Pombal resumed his ascendancy, and Malagrida was banished. The minister adhered to the line which he had from the beginning marked out for himself in regard to the Society. He believed in the adage, give a dog a bad name and then hang him. Calumny, he knew, was the shortest road to exile, the prison, and the scaffold. He determined to make himself master of the Jesuits' fame; he would soon become master of their property and persons. With the daring of the old Roman, he carried the war into Africa; he attacked the Society in its South American stronghold.

The Reductions of Paraguay were the glory of the Society and the wonder of the world. The Jesuit was all in all to the simple children of nature; they revered him as their priest, obeyed him as their ruler, loved him as their father. The golden age had returned; there was an Eden on the savannas around Cape Horn. A Portuguese serpent entered the garden and Paradise was lost.

Paraguay belonged, at this time, to Spain. The Portuguese governor of Rio Janeiro, Gomez D'Andrada, thought to make his fortune and fame by negotiating an exchange between the two crowns. The Portuguese colony of Del San Sacramento, on the Rio de la Plata, was fair and fertile; Spanish Uruguay and Paraguay were bleak and sterile, but rumor said that veins of gold throbbed beneath their barren breasts. And rumor said more, that the Jesuits were the genii of the mines, which they jealously guarded from mortal gaze. The transfer was effected; Spain got a rich district; Portugal a barren El Dorado. The mines were to be worked; the neophytes of the Jesuits were in the way; they might give trouble, if their golden domain were invaded; they were to be sent out of the country. The evictions of Donegal and the Scottish Highlands were anticipated. We have seen in our day whole clans swept from the soil to make way for sheep. British peers may claim the merit of effective execution; the originality of the design is not theirs; they must bow to the superior fertility of

Spanish and Portuguese genius. D'Andrada did not want sheep-walks but gold diggings; he decreed, with the consent of the Cabinet, that thirty thousand human beings, as so much rubbish, should be cleared from the surface of the gold-laden soil. The Reductions were to be broken up, the guileless neophytes sent adrift upon the world.

A shudder of fear, a hoarse murmur of indignation ran through the tribes. A nation was outraged. The Indians were Christians, but they were men, they were patriots; they could believe in no gospel that taught them it was a sin to love liberty more than life. They thought the heart's blood was not too dear a price for some thousand miles of barren land. That barren land was the Indian country. He had tilled it in the sweat of his brow; he was ready to till it with the sweat of a gashed bosom. There were rumors of resistance, and D'Andrada began to fear that he had disturbed a hornet's nest. All eyes were turned to the Jesuits; they were the only bridge that could span the yawning gulf between the natives and their conquerors. The Indians called on them for protection, for support. Scylla and Charybdis yawned on either side. The trembling hands of the miserable neophytes clung to the black robes of their fathers; the half sorrowful, half reproachful gaze of their dark eyes sank into those fathers' hearts. On the other hand appeared the frown and menace of Portuguese diplomacy and the destruction of the Society. The feelings of the fathers were of necessity with their children, their judgment precluded the hope of successful resistance. The Indians might struggle for awhile, but their struggle would end in extermination. To oppose the Crown would bring ruin on the Society, and it could not save the Reductions.

The path of duty was plain, though painful; to console the broken hearts they could not heal, to teach patience when they could not counsel resistance. Devoted to the last, the faithful neophyte bowed and said, "My father, I follow thee." The Jesuit took his hand and led him from his home, and mingled his tears with his. The work was done, and done in peace, by the Jesuits, loyal alike to their flock and their king. But they had compassionated the fate of the exiles; they had condemned in thought and feeling the policy and mildness of Portuguese legislation. They were disguised traitors, and merited the traitor's fate. Before being destroyed, they were to be deprived of the solace of their neophytes' affection. The agents of the government fomented the suspicions which some of the Indians began to entertain of the disinterestedness of their spiritual teachers. Calumny was found as potent in the forests of the New World as in the saloons of Europe. From suspicion to hatred, from hatred to war, the prog-

ress is rapid in the Indian heart. Some of the tribes refused to submit to the peaceful counsels of the Black Robes. They took up arms against the Portuguese gold-seekers. The Reductions were destroyed, the tribes scattered, the Jesuits expelled. The slow fever of corruption set in. The money, and liquor, and immorality of the taskmasters completed the demoralization of the slaves. If the Indians of South America were not swept into the ocean, as they have been on the northern part of the continent, their fate was perhaps more melancholy. The hidalgos and cavaliers of the Old World intermarried, in large numbers, with the natives, and their offspring have perpetuated the fused vices with scarcely a single virtue of the Indian and European. A deadly blight rests on lands fair as any the sun shines upon. Mexico and South America will remain hideous caricatures of government until a sceptre is stretched over them from across the ocean, or the "race of manifest destiny" pushes its conquests to the Horn.

The coast was now clear, and D'Andrada set to work. To his disappointment and disgust, he found that the bowels of the earth were as destitute of gold as its surface was of inhabitants. Science came to his aid, but its light, like the light of his dreams, expired in the dark caverns of a barren soil. He invoked the Jesuits, but, unfortunately for the adventurer, they had not the philosopher's stone; they could not change sand into gold dust, nor rocks into bullion. In the agony of his shame and sorrow, D'Andrada confessed to Pombal, the would-be Vicar-general of Portugal, the ruin of his schemes, the injury that he had unwittingly done to his country in trading away the land of San Sacramento for mines which existed only in his own brain.

Pombal was not done with Paraguay yet. His acts, like those of a celebrated personage of our own day, cast their shadows before, and the shadow was a pamphlet: *An Account of the Republic, which the Jesuits of the Provinces of Portugal have established in the Colonies, and of the War which they have there excited against the Armies of the Crowns of Spain and Portugal*. Such was the title of the interesting novel to which Pombal put his name—European fame for the patron, European infamy for the actors in the romance were the expected results of this literary enterprise. The Jesuits, the pamphlet stated, were the tyrants of the New World; they had attempted, not long before, to unite the colonies of South America into one sovereign empire, under the sceptre of a lay-brother, who was to be, by the grace of God and the favor of the Society of Jesus, Nicholas I. The Jesuits were ambitious; the Jesuits were covetous; the Jesuits violated the canons of the Church; the Jesuits were conspirators; the Jesuits were enemies to God and the king. These were the variations of the grand theme: "The Jesuits must be de-

stroyed." Pombal scattered his book over the Peninsula as lavishly as Mr. Borrow did his bibles a century later. It was read in Lisbon; it was burnt by the public executioner in Madrid.

Ferdinand VI. and Charles III. of Spain were informed by Don Levalos, governor of Paraguay, of glaring contradictions between the facts in America and the book in Portugal. The governor had gone out from Spain breathing vengeance against the Emperor Nicholas. He found that he had not begun his reign, and that there was little prospect of his doing so before the Greek kalends. He discovered no Jesuit empire, but a stupendous Portuguese lie. He found, in the words of a report of his proceedings, drawn up in 1815 by Francisco Gutierrez de la Huerta, a submissive people and loyal missionaries; he found conquests made for religion and the state by the mildness and charity and holy lives of the disciples of St. Ignatius. Levalos attempted, but in vain, to bring back the palmy days of Paraguay. Its golden age ceased with the gold digging of Gomez D'Andrada, never to return. The neophytes were not what they had been ten years before. Portuguese traders had robbed them of their country and innocence together, had driven them alike from their God and their home.

Pombal had expected war to the knife with the Society when he struck at the missions of South America. He was surprised and delighted to find the Jesuits the tractable ministers of his iniquitous policy. He attributed to cowardice a line of conduct which prudence and duty had prescribed. His hopes of success culminated; he wielded a weapon which his adversaries could not use, falsehood. His campaign in the New World had closed triumphantly, and he resolved to transfer the war to Europe.

Benedict XIV. was now Pope. As Cardinal Lambertini he had acquired a European name. He was a cosmopolite, for even when young in years, he was a venerable highpriest in the hierarchy of letters, and the domain of literature is the world. Never did a swifter or more brilliant career than his fall to the lot of a Monsignore of the Pontifical court. His native city, Bologna, sent him as the worthiest representative of her academic renown to the schools of Rome. He swept the lecture halls of all their prizes, and made himself the oracle of canon law in the home of ecclesiastical jurists. The sparkle of his wit, the gracefulness of his carriage, his constant good humor, the unaffected modesty with which he wore his blushing honors thick upon him, made him the idol of the saloons. Lambertini was small in stature, but great in mind. He became a Monsignore and a Cardinal, but he was little Lambertini still, with the thoughts of a sage and the playful heart of a child. When he became cardinal, he was sent as archbishop to his native town Bologna. He was at home by a double title, as a pre-

ate and a son. He ruled without effort, because he ruled by love. Society had claims on him, study had claims on him, the care of his diocese had claims on him, God had claims on him. He discharged them all. There was no more exemplary bishop in the Italian hierarchy than his Grace of Bologna, no gentleman more polished, no scholar more profound. He was a man who dared to think and speak his thoughts. Literature had broken down the artificial barrier with which superstition and prejudice sometimes fence off Catholic minds and hearts from the wild, yet beautiful spirit of the natural man throbbing in the world without the sanctuary. Lambertini was the friend and correspondent of all the scholars in Europe. Literature was a neutral field, a holy ground, where no rival pulpits stood, where no booming canons of the law echoed in the strife of decrees and councils.

Complaints had been made to Pope Clement XII. by interested parties against one of the vicars of Cardinal Lambertini. His Holiness listened to the accusers, and condemned the accused. The tale was plausible, but it was a fiction. Lambertini, who was on the spot, and knew his vicar and his enemies, read the charge as he read Æsop's fables. The Pope wrote to the Cardinal, and the Cardinal wrote to the Pope. The Pope requested the Cardinal to censure his vicar; his Eminence requested his Holiness to reconsider the case on the evidence that he, the ordinary of the diocese, would furnish. The proofs of the poor vicar's innocence were sent, and Lambertini concluded a respectful and affectionate letter by hoping that our Lord had as faithful a vicar in Rome as his Eminence had in Bologna. His Holiness, like a sensible man, took the lesson and laughed at the joke, and for the future always examined the affairs of Bologna through the eyes of Cardinal Lambertini.

Pope Clement XII. died in 1740. The Cardinal set out for the Conclave. It lasted six months of the Italian summer. There was much wire-pulling, and much sweating during those six months, and many a good Cardinal wished politics and statecraft were forever removed from this sublunary sphere by the honors of canonization. Lambertini's patience was evaporating under the burning roof of the Vatican, where the Conclave held its sessions; but the heat etherealized his playfulness. "My Venerable Colleagues," said he, at the end of the six months, "we have been here long enough. It is time for me to go home. Do you want a saint for Pope, choose Cardinal Gotti; do you want a politician, there's his Eminence Aldorrandi ready to serve; do you want a good fellow, then I am your man!" They took him at his word, and the *good fellow* became Pope under the title of Benedict XIV., on the 17th of August, 1740. "You see, my friends," he said, "I have not a papal face; I hope some charitable painter will give me one after my death."

Benedict XIV. was in favor of the largest liberty of thought, consistent with the authority of faith and the rule of morals. He reversed many of the decrees of the Congregation of the Index, and restored to theological science and general literature works, which an overhasty zeal had consigned to the list of prohibited books. In all political questions involving the rights of the Principality of the Church, he was ready to meet the sovereigns of Europe half way. He was no coercionist; he had more faith in kind words and kind acts than in hard blows or anathemas. In a word he knew how to temporize, to yield with grace what could not be retained with safety. No more conscientious Pope ever sat in the chair of Peter. When the path of duty was clear he boldly entered it; in doubtful cases he favored liberty in action and benignity in mode. He was what the world would call a model *Jesuit* Pope. Yet it was from him that Pombal hoped to wrest a decree for the suppression of the Jesuits. Benedict had always admired the Institute, and by his Bulls "*Devotam Gloriosæ Dominæ*" and "*Quantum recessu*," had officially expressed his admiration. On the vexed question of the Chinese ceremonies, his decision had been adverse to the practice of many of the Jesuit missionaries in the Celestial Empire. But the conscientious mistakes of individuals could not shake the confidence of the Holy See in the orthodoxy of a body of men, who were looked upon by the world as the most Catholic of Catholics, more Papal than the Pope himself. Benedict had a minister from whom Pombal had more to hope, Cardinal Dominic Passionei, a native of the Diocese of Urbino. His rise was rapid. At twenty-six he was performing in France and Holland the duties of a Nuncio, without having the title. Clement XI., Innocent XIII., and Clement XII., employed his diplomatic talents throughout Europe; and Benedict XIV. made him Librarian of the Vatican, a bosom friend and confidential adviser. No two characters could present a greater contrast than those of the Pope and the Cardinal. They were both learned. Lambertini's erudition was a defensive armor against the shafts of religious and political sophistry that were falling thick and fast in the Christian army. Passionei's erudition was a trenchant sword, which he flourished with keen delight, both in and out of the sanctuary. The Cardinal was pugnacious, always ready for a theological tilt, obstinate and overbearing, a hammerer of heretics, the hammerer of some of his best friends. During his nunciature in Switzerland he had converted several Protestants; now he was to share with Pombal in the dubious honor of destroying the Order, before whose onsets, for two hundred years, Protestantism had been routed, and had surrendered numerous and illustrious captives. Passionei believed only in one Order, that of St. Peter. He looked with suspicion on

religious communities, little states within states, which he was afraid might wax strong and overshadow the Hierarchy and the Papacy. To the Jesuits, least of all, was he friendly. He opposed the canonization of Cardinal Bellarmine and rejected from his library all works by Jesuit authors. He was a well-meaning man, but full of prejudices. His life was strictly ecclesiastical; it wanted but two ingredients to make it perfect, mildness and prudence. Benedict loved this prelate, so different from himself. He respected his talents and bore with his petulant humors. Ten years before Pombal began his intrigues, the Cardinal had occasion to show his ill will towards the Society. A Capuchin had published in Italy, under the name of Norbert, a book entitled, *Mémoires Historiques sur les Affaires des Jesuites*. He had travelled in India and America, and like many a tourist, returned with a bundle of lies. He hated the Jesuits. Afraid to attack them openly, he filled his book with the letters and sayings of other travellers and of the Governor of Pondicherry, accusing the Jesuits of engaging in commerce contrary to the prohibitions of the canons. The book was laid before the Holy Office; Passionei came forward in its defence. He sheltered the suspected volume and its author under the capacious folds of his scarlet cassock. "Norbert has not," he said, "incriminated the Jesuits, he only reports the accusations of others." Very true, your Eminence, but he reports them without answering them or without giving proofs of the truth of the charges. He adopted them as his own and then shifted the responsibility to the shoulders of others. "We would not," he says, after citing the testimony of Martin, Governor of Pondicherry, "have our readers accept the word of the Governor as gospel." The Fathers know that Popes and Councils forbid, under pain of excommunication, ecclesiastics to engage in commerce. They know it, Father Norbert, but you have written nothing to prove that you do not believe with his Excellency of Pondicherry that their practice varies from their theory. You would damn the Jesuits with faint praise. Like many a scandal-monger, you spread a false report and then would apply the salve to your wounded conscience by a hesitating "*I scarcely believe it.*" The *Mémoires Historiques* was an attack on the Society, and the world understood it as such. It was an insinuated lie. We prefer a robber to a thief; the open, public wickedness of the Middle Ages to the secret, polished villainy that corrodes the heart of modern society; we prefer a plump, dogmatic liar to a sneak. The Holy Office censured the book, and, in an appeal to the Pope, Passionei censured the censure. He expressed his own belief that the charge against the Society was not entirely groundless. It was his duty to investigate it before extending his patronage to a work which took it for granted. He did nothing of the

kind. He took refuge in a legal subterfuge. The Holy Office could not, he maintained, censure writings which related historically charges made by others. Norbert was the historian of the Jesuits' accusers; censure them, not him. The Cardinal's logic should have led him to conclude that he who spreads a false report, without contradicting it, shares in the guilt of the libellers and deserves their punishment. The question at issue was, "Have the Jesuits engaged in unlawful commerce?" That question Passionei would not, perhaps could not, examine dispassionately. There are some men who, when they conceive a prejudice against individuals or institutions, become totally incapable of a sane judgment about them. On other points they may be logical and charitable; mount them on their hobby and they are off at a John Gilpin pace. No curb of reason, no rein of truth, or charity, can guide the wild, restive animal of prejudice.

The laws of the Church forbid clergymen to buy for the purpose of selling again; but there is no prohibition against selling the produce of their own fields, the fruits of their own industry. In Paraguay the Jesuits were all in all to the Indians; upon them rested the care of the temporal, as well as the spiritual interests of the neophytes. They were the procurators and treasurers and men of business of the South American Reductions. They were all these by the necessities of the case. There were Yankee traders in those days as well as now, and between them and the Christian Indians the Jesuits threw themselves, as the defenders of justice and commercial morality. No other method offered of protecting the guileless natives from being robbed of their property and of their innocence. The governments of Portugal and Spain knew, and officially approved, the conduct of the missionaries. The commerce which they carried on, in the name of the neophytes, was transacted in the face of day. It was not the proceeding of a dark-lantern party. Popes knew it, the kings knew it, the world knew it for a century and a half; and Popes and kings and the world approved. The Jesuits in Canada were accused of speculating in furs. In 1643 the directors of the Company of New France attested, on oath, the falseness of the charge. In China, it was said, they had turned brokers, by exchanging European for Chinese money. The Procurator-General of the Congregation of the Propaganda at Canton, and the officers of the Indian Commercial Company, vindicated them on every point. No doubt there were instances, both in Asia and in America, of individuals combining the apostolic powers of Judas with his avarice. The sanctuary has been cursed with such ministers; the Society of Jesus would have been more than human in its good fortune, had it been entirely exempt from the curse.

The intrigue against the Jesuits marched on to its goal with the resistless tramp of fate. Pombal demanded from the Pope a brief for the reformation of the Society in Portugal. He specified his charges and omitted his proofs. Cardinals Passionei and Archinto lent him the influence of their names and stations. Pope Benedict was dying and yielded to the wishes of his ministers. On the brink of the grave he was willing to give a proof of his readiness to oblige the prime minister of His Most Faithful Majesty. The innocent never fear investigation; the Society of Jesus could bear to be searched with lamps and the keen eyes of Pontifical visitors. So thought the Pope. The brief was signed on the 1st of April, 1758. The friends of the Society might have taken it as an April joke; Pombal determined to make the joke practical. The house he resolved should burn, were but one speck of dust found in it. Reformation meant, in his mind, destruction. The execution of the brief was committed to the Portuguese Cardinal, Saldanha, a partisan of Pombal. He notified his appointment to the Provincial of Portugal and began the work. The investigation extended, in regard to place, to the world, wherever Jesuits lived the lives of confessors and died the death of martyrs; in regard to time it embraced thirteen days. Pombal was accuser, witness, and crown-lawyer in the case, Saldanha the judge. The Jesuits were condemned, without a hearing, of engaging in unlawful commerce. The trial was over, the sentence passed; the execution followed quick on its heels. Joseph Emmanuel, Cardinal Patriarch of Lisbon, interdicted the Jesuits throughout his diocese. With silent dignity the Society in Portugal met its fate, and lay bleeding and gasping at the feet of Pombal.

Benedict XIV. was succeeded in 1753 by Cardinal Rezzonico, under the title of Clement XIII. He was a man of sterner character than his predecessor, readier for a contest than a compromise. He came forward as the defender of the Society, and if need be, the avenger of its wrongs. Lorenzo Ricci, a Florentine, was its General; the meekest and most spiritual of rulers was called by the votes of his brethren to the chair of St. Ignatius, Laynez, and Acquaviva, when the occasion demanded the prudence of the first, the learning of the second, and the lofty Hildebrandic spirit of Claudius Acquaviva. Ricci could not save the Society. He presided at its funeral, and then died of a broken heart. On the festival of St. Ignatius, 1758, he offered a protest to the Pontiff against the late proceedings in Portugal. He protested in the name of his children, who had been accused and condemned in a breath. He protested against a trial, in which testimony had been admitted only on one side. He protested against the violation of the Constitution *Superna* of Clement X., which forbids a bishop to deprive a religious com-

munity of jurisdiction in the Sacrament of Penance without first consulting the Holy See. The Cardinal Patriarch of Lisbon had violated that Constitution; the Jesuits had been forbidden to preach or receive confessions in any place subject to his jurisdiction. He protested against the wholesale destruction that had overwhelmed the American and Asiatic missions. He protested against the justice of holding the Society responsible for the sins of its members, when it could be shown from the instructions, written and verbal, of the superiors, that a strict observance of the constitutions of St. Ignatius was enforced in Portugal as well as in Rome. When those constitutions are violated, when Jesuits, forgetting their vows, engage in worldly avocations, point out the offenders; but revile not, destroy not the Society, as if the ambition and avarice of these recreant children were the legitimate fruits of Jesuit training. He protested, in fine, against judges ignorant of the rules of the Order and bent on its ruin. He appealed from Pombal, from Passionei, from Saldanha to Clement XIII. Nor was the appeal in vain. The affair of the Jesuits was submitted to a Congregation, in which truth and justice triumphed. They were acquitted. Pombal's heart sank; he saw the airy fabric of his hopes crumble on the ruins of the falsehood which supported it. A fortunate accident put him on the old vantage-ground he had occupied before the accession of Clement XIII. From the fears or prejudices of the Pontiff he had nothing to expect, and he resolved boldly to rebel against the power over which he could not tyrannize. On the night of the 3d of September, 1758, as the king was crossing the Tagus in his barge from Tavora House to the palace, he was slightly wounded by a pistol-ball. The scandal-mongers of Lisbon said that the bullet was the messenger of vengeance for the Marquis of Tavora's disgrace and his wife's lost virtue. Be this as it may, that one bullet brought death to the Tavora family and to the Society of Jesus in Portugal. The incriminated house was one of the noblest in Portugal; it looked down contemptuously on the upstart Pombal. The Minister had solicited for his son the hand of a daughter of that house; the proposal was rejected. Pombal's hate was deep; he must have revenge. The opportunity was now offered; need it be said that he used it? He worked on the fears of the royal puppet. He kept him secluded from society. "Better, Sire," said the plotter, "the solitude of your own room, than the solitude of the grave." The royal suspicions were directed by him, who moved the springs of the royal mind, first to the Tavoras, and through them to the Jesuits. The noble house and the Society were prejudged and doomed; but the hour for striking the blow had not come. For three months Pombal feasted his heart on revenge, and his eyes on the calm unsuspecting faces of his victims. The Tavoras continued to come to court,

regardless of the gossip of the saloons and the calumnies of rival families. On the 12th of December, the Duke of Aveiro, the Marquis of Tavora, Donna Eleanor his mother, their relations and intimate friends were seized and imprisoned. The parvenu triumphed, his heel was on the noblest necks in Portugal. This was not enough; the blood of Tavora had refused to mingle in nuptials with the blood of Carvalho; it should, swore Pombal, in his heart of hearts, stain the axe of the executioner. An extraordinary tribunal, similar to the Blood Council of Alva in the Netherlands, was established for the trial of the accused. The Tavoras should have been judged by their peers; they were judged by a packed court, over which Pombal presided assisted by two of his creatures, Alcinha and Costa Real. The torture wrenched from the Duke of Aveiro an avowal of his guilt; that of his friends and the Jesuits. He was released from the rack senseless and mangled, and when restored to consciousness, declared that physical pain had caused him to belie his conscience. His judges turned a deaf ear to the retraction. Sentence of death was passed, and Pombal drew up the warrant with his own hand. The execution was fixed for the 12th of January, 1759, at the village of Belem, two miles from Lisbon. The axe, the rope, and the fire, formed a trinity of exquisite torture, in whose name, and by whose application, the victims were to receive the baptism of blood. Donna Eleanor, Marchioness of Tavora, headed the fatal procession, with the crucifix in her clasped hands, and the lofty spirit of Christian nobility in her heart. The doomsman advanced to bind her feet: "Unhand me, sir," she cried; "touch me not but to kill me." The man knelt before her and begged her pardon. She gave it, together with a ring from her finger. The neck was bowed, the axe flashed and fell, and the noble blood for which Carvalho thirsted streamed over the scaffold. The husband, the son, the son-in-law, and the servants of the illustrious lady were subjected singly to one or all of the modes of execution which the vengeance of the minister had collected on the scaffold. No charge was proved against these unfortunate nobles. Costa Freira, one of the first lawyers in Portugal, declared on legal grounds the innocence of the accused. The vindication of others brought an accusation of misprision of treason on himself. When, twenty years later, Pombal fell into disgrace, the records of his administration were searched, and on their evidence, the Portuguese council declared, that all persons, living or dead, who had suffered in consequence of the sentence in the Tavora case in 1759, were innocent of the crime with which they had been charged.

Pombal had swept the nobles from his path to absolutism; with bloody hands and feet he marched to the attack of the last citadel between him and his goal,—the Society of Jesus. On the eve of

the execution of the Tavoras, the Jesuits were accused in a body of aiding and abetting the attempted regicide. The Provincial of Portugal and the most illustrious of the Fathers were cast into prison. Calumnies and accusations beat with tempest fury against the doomed Society, and the rack began what the axe was to finish. The Jesuits bared their breasts to the storm, and met their fate with the silent resignation of insulted innocence. The Minister expected a deadly war, and had prepared himself for it, but he quailed before the serene glance of unresisting victims. He screened himself behind the throne and the altar. The crowned puppet of Portugal signed, at the bidding of his master, warrants innumerable of death and infamy. The Bishops were called on to denounce the Jesuits. Fear or policy induced some to comply with the iniquitous command. The King and the Minister, and a portion of the Episcopate combined in an unholy alliance against the work of God. The Pope and the Hierarchy of the Catholic world were indignant at the Portuguese government and the Judases of the Portuguese episcopacy. But remonstrances and threats were vain. Pombal had woven his web, his prey was trapped, and no power on earth could deprive him of it. Universal ruin hung over the Society in Portugal. Fifteen hundred Jesuits were in prison; the agents of their enemy swarmed over land and sea for new victims. Brazil and Paraguay were swept with the besom of destruction, and from their shores the Apostles of the new world were shipped to the doom that awaited them in Europe. The houses of the Society in the domains of His Most Faithful Majesty were seized and confiscated. Beggary, exile, the prison, death, were the punishments of the high treason of being a disciple of St. Ignatius; but then came the martyr's crown.

On the 20th of April, 1759, Pombal notified Clement XIII. of the intention of his majesty to expel the members of the Society from Portugal. A brief, forged by Pombal's ambassador in Rome, empowered the government to proceed in its work of iniquity. And it did proceed. In vain did Clement protest and pray. Pombal was defiant, and threatened schism. The Jesuits must leave Portugal, or the Society and the Papacy would be bound together and cast ignominiously from the country. The alternative was presented to the Pontiff of sacrificing the obnoxious Society or the exercise of his own rights. The Pope refused to share the guilt of robbery and murder, and threw the buckler of his protection over the victim that was bleeding to death at the feet of its destroyer. A murderous hand rudely thrust it aside, and hastened to complete the deed of blood. Malagrida and four companions were condemned to be executed, as accomplices of the Duke of Aveiro and the Tavoras, in the attempt on the king's life.

Gabriel Malagrida was nearly eighty years of age, and had toiled for his Lord in Brazil and Portugal with more than the devotion of a lover to his mistress. We have already seen him and Pombal digging side by side in the ruins of the earthquake of Lisbon for the mangled corpses of its victims. Both became popular idols. The image of the Minister soon fell from its shrine in the hearts of the people, while that of the Jesuit was honored with the votive offerings of a nation's love. Malagrida was a friend of the Tavoras; the marchioness had been his spiritual child. To have advanced the eternal interests of his enemies was, in the eyes of Pombal, an unpardonable offence. The father had been thrown into prison, as we have seen, with his unfortunate penitent; he had been condemned to death as a regicide, but by a cruel mercy Pombal spared him for three years, with the unrevoked sentence hanging like the sword of Damocles over his head. Those three years were passed in prison. At Pombal's voice, the grave of the dungeon gave up its living dead; Malagrida was handed over to the judgment of the Inquisition. Proof had been vainly sought of the old man's implication in the attempt on the king's life. Even the ingenuity of Pombal was baffled, and if the game was to be hunted to the death, it must be started in a new field. The political charge was dropped, and a spiritual one substituted. The saint of eighty was accused of sins which would have shamed a debauchee of twenty. He was called a seducer of the people, a hypocrite, a false prophet, a corrupter of morals. He was accused of writing two heretical pamphlets, *The Reign of Antichrist* and the *Life of the Glorious Saint Ann, dictated by Jesus and His Holy Mother*. The trial came on; the books were not produced, but Norbert the Capuchin, the protégé of Cardinal Passionei, who fluttered about scenes of Jesuit suffering and death like a bird of carrion over the panting remains of a noble quarry, drew up for the convenience of the Inquisitors a memoir which purported to contain choice selections from the missing writings. The Grand Inquisitor of Portugal was a brother of King Joseph. He heard the case and passed a Scotch sentence, not proven. Pombal resented the bold audacity of any man who had, and presumed to obey, a conscience. The royal Inquisitor was cashiered; and Paul Carvalho Mendoza, brother of the prime minister, succeeded to the vacant dignity. Blood is stronger than water, but hatred is stronger than blood. The ties of relationship which bound Pombal to Mendoza were weak in comparison with the tie of sympathetic hatred against the Jesuits. The Papal confirmation of the appointment was not awaited, the new Inquisitor took his seat, and Malagrida was at once condemned to death for the crimes of heresy, immorality, and blasphemy. The sentence was executed on the 21st of September, 1761.

Malagrida met his fate two years after the destruction of the Society in Portugal. Sentence of banishment had been passed against the Jesuits in 1759. One hundred and thirty exiles were embarked on a crazy boat, ill supplied with provisions, with its prow directed to the Mediterranean. They were the first waves of the reflux tide of religion that was soon to leave the Lusitanian coast a sandy desert, abandoned to the Arab depredations of French soldiers and English traders. The vessel was forced, by stress of weather, into one of the Spanish ports, where the fate of the Jesuits excited the pity, and their wants the munificent charity of Spanish hospitality. On the 24th of October they landed at Civita Vecchia. The Dominicans of the Papal port received them with open arms. Scholastic questions that had divided the disciples of St. Thomas and of Bellarmine and Suarez, the theological war of rival academies, and even the generous competition of missionary labor, were forgotten. The Dominicans saw, in the expatriated sufferers before them, their brethren in religion, and received them to their hearts and homes. A small slab in the Dominican Church at Civita Vecchia commemorates the landing of the Jesuits, and hands down to posterity, linked in a record of unmerited misfortune on one side and religious hospitality on the other, the names of the two most celebrated literary orders of the modern Church. To Rome, the refuge of the afflicted of all climes, the exiles went, and sought and found at the foot of the pontifical throne the protection and love which they had lost in Portugal. Pombal's hatred pursued them, and he determined to revenge himself on the Pope by flooding his dominions with the refugees. Colony after colony was shipped from the Tagus to the Tiber, but the pontifical heart of Clement XIII. was too large to be filled to repletion. It embraced the world; could it not embrace the whole Society of Jesus? His love for the sufferers was as tender as Pombal's vengeance was fierce. All were welcomed, all were received, as dear noble children who had ventured their lives and were ready to venture them again for Rome, the mother of the Christian world.

Cardinal Saldanha, the friend of Pombal and Patriarch of Lisbon, tried to seduce the young scholastics and novices who remained in Portugal. Dispensation from any vows they might have taken was offered, and a career of honorable ambition in Church and State was opened to them. The majority of the novices disdained the bribe, and preferred the glorious ignominy of martyrs to the ignominious glory of traitors. These young heroes were animated by the words and example of Father Joseph Carvalho, who vainly endeavored to redeem the infamy which his relation Pombal had attached to the family of Carvalho.

Two hundred and twenty-one Jesuits languished in chains for years; of this number, eighty-eight were released by death. They were not all Portuguese subjects; some natives of France or Austria were liberated by the intercession of their courts. The sufferings of these imprisoned confessors have been graphically described by one of their number, Father Lawrence Kauhen, in a letter to the Provincial of the Lower Rhine, written in the eighth year of his captivity, from the castle of San Juliano. They were swept from the retreats of learning and piety by a whirlwind of cavalry, and pricked forward by the goading spears of the Portuguese soldiery into the gates of the dungeon. Dark, damp, narrow cells, the walls clammy and leprous with green decay, the floor overrun with rats, with straw for their couches, and a scarce allowance of mouldy bread for their repast, the Jesuits were set to learn the lesson of how evil and bitter a thing it was to have resisted Pombal. Their breviaries and articles of devotion were taken from them, the sacraments were given only to the dying, and certainly death had a rich harvest in those subterraneous fields of tyranny and patience. Yet the grim reaper did not ply his hook rapidly enough for the Portuguese minister's vengeance. The ragged garments of the prisoners rotted to pieces. "Everything rots in my dungeon," petulantly exclaimed the Governor of San Juliano, "with the exception of the Jesuits." Our Lord was with them; members of His own Society, ministers of His altar, like the Apostles they counted it glory to suffer for the name of Jesus. Liberty was offered them on condition of abjuring the Institute. They spurned the offer, and so, one by one, the leaden years went on; one by one the prisoners died, or exchanged the dungeon for exile. The Society of Jesus had ceased to exist in Portugal. Pombal had triumphed over the king and the nobles; he had torn down the bulwarks of religion; a large party of the secular clergy and of the bishops applauded; the Pope had been insulted and defied; Portugal's iron age had begun. The miseries entailed on the country by Pombal's policy curse her yet. She is a cipher among nations, a scandal in the Church. Catholic faith and love still find a shelter in the hearts of the peasantry, but the government is demoralized, and, alas, the glory of the sanctuary is gone also.

Joseph I. died in 1777, and was succeeded by his daughter Maria I. The power of the minister expired with the sovereign whom he had cajoled. Pombal was brought to trial. Many of the decrees of his administration were reversed; the prisons were thrown open, and eight hundred captives returned to liberty and life. The fate that Pombal inflicted on others hung over himself. The charge of treason was brought and proved against him, and the executioner's axe flashed upon his startled gaze. His acts and his character were

condemned; his life was spared. He was forever banished from court; and all public and private claims against him, in person and property, were allowed a full hearing. In retirement, we may hope, he expiated in part the sins of his political life. Michael del l'Annunciata, Bishop of Coimbra, visited him once, and found him on his knees in prayer with his family, and gave to the fallen minister the episcopal benediction that he implored. Pombal died in 1782 in his eighty-fifth year.

Pombal was the type of a school of statesmen as numerous in the eighteenth century as in our own, and equally pernicious to religion and liberty. Machiavelli, the Florentine secretary, was the modern coryphæus of the school. Pombal, Choiseul, D'Aiguillon, Florida-Banca, Palmerston, Russell, Cavour, and Bismarck, have been its most distinguished disciples. Pombal destroyed the Jesuits and his country, and finally fell himself under the ruins he had caused. His example was imitated in France, Spain, and Naples. His success emboldened the Jansenists, and the philosophers, Diderot and Voltaire, hailed the fall of the Society as the dawn of the long-expected sun of liberty. The sun arose in a threatening sky, culminated in blood, and sank in the night of despotism.

Our subject was Pombal; we wished to record the history of a diplomatist, of a representative of a class, and from the latter half of the eighteenth century, to cast the horoscope of the corresponding period of our own. The fortunes of the Society of Jesus, after the triumph of Pombal, do not properly fall within the limits of the present article. They may, however, be briefly told.

In France the Jesuits had incurred the enmity of Madame de Pompadour, mistress of Louis XV. Her Jesuit confessors had refused her the sacraments. She promised to break off her scandalous connection with the king. For the future she would be no more to him than a friend, a sister, a counsellor. The spiritual interests of His Majesty, the interests of the country, her own honor, would compel her to remain at court. So she argued, but did not succeed in throwing dust into the eyes of her directors. She appealed to Rome; Rome referred her to her confessor. The favorite was furious; she swore the destruction of her spiritual guides, because they would not allow her to add sacrilege to adultery. Choiseul, the Prime Minister, desired, for reasons of state, the ruin which Pompadour sought from the private pique of a vindictive and licentious woman. Fortunately for the minister and the mistress, a scandal occurred just then in the Society, which enabled them, under the specious plea of the purity and fair fame of the Church, to urge on the king the banishment, and on the Pope the suppression of the obnoxious Order. Father Lavalette, a descendant of the defender of Malta, and superior of the Society in Martinique, had, in

contravention of the canon law and his own rules, engaged in very extensive speculations. Things went swimmingly with him for a time, until blinded by an overweening confidence in his own financial abilities and the splendid prospect of the magnificent prosperity of his mission, he rashly imitated the Scoto-French adventurer, Law. His bubble, if as gaudy and large as that of the Mississippi schemer, was equally empty. It burst and only after it had burst, were his superiors informed of the stupendous and far-extended schemes in which he had engaged. He was censured in the strongest terms, and expelled from the Society. His bankruptcy brought ruin on his French creditors. The case came before the courts and the parliaments, and the enemies of the Jesuits were not slow in availing themselves of the opportunity of charging the Society with the sin of one of its members. In vain did Lavellette write declaration upon declaration from London, whither he had gone after his exposure, acquitting his superiors of any knowledge of his schemes, of any complicity in his rashness. Logic and charity were disregarded. The storm raged with uncontrolled fury. Molchills were magnified into mountains; every charge, real or imaginary, ever brought against the Society, was raked from the ashes of the past, and had breathed into it a soul of courtier cupidity, Pompadourian revenge, and encyclopedist infidelity. The history of the intrigue against the Jesuits in France is long and sad. It ended on the 6th of August, 1762, in the publication of a decree, condemning the Order, and requiring an oath of abjuration from its members. Of four thousand Jesuits in France, five took the oath; three thousand nine hundred and ninety-five went into exile.

The Duke of Choiseul had united in 1761 the Bourbon courts in the famous family compact. France, Spain, and Naples brought to bear against the disciples of St. Ignatius the combined influence of diplomacy and violence. France, Spain, and Naples triumphed. The Jesuits, the grenadier guards of the Church, were proclaimed traitors to God and the king, and were driven in ignominy from the Bourbon states. But one link was wanting in the chain of iniquity, the extortion from the Pope of a decree of suppression. Just then Clement XIII., the steadfast friend and defender of the Society, died suddenly in December, 1768. Two parties battled in the three months' Conclave that succeeded his death. The black-robed Jesuit, with the banner of St. Ignatius, was the centre around which red hats and soutanes swayed to and fro on the eddying tide of the strife. The question at issue was one of expediency. Bourbonists and Jesuit cardinals rivalled one another in devotion to the Church, and acknowledging alike the past services of the illustrious Society, whose fate trembled in the balance, differed as to the necessity of the contemplated sacrifice. The bark of St. Peter was tossing in a

furious storm. Would the winds shift, and the waves be calmed, if the Society, like another Jonah, were cast into the deep? It is expedient that one man die for the people, said the Pontifical oracle of the Jews, in the time of our Lord. Could not a more illustrious Pontifical oracle decree to death the Society of Jesus, as a victim for the sins of the world, a victim noble and unspotted, a perfect holocaust for the afflicted Church? Are the European courts to be propitiated or defied? Are scandals to be avoided, and souls to be saved by concession or resistance? Are we to have a Bourbon Pope, or a Jesuit Pope? Two opposite policies lay open to election. There was one heart in the Conclave, but two minds. The goal aimed at was one, but it was sought by two different paths. Conclaves are subject to human passion, as parliaments or congresses, and Cardinals have affections and antipathies as strong as those of English Ministers and American Secretaries. The Church is the Incarnation continued. She is neither all divine, nor all human, but divine and human. Public events and private interests influence her human element, as they do all human institutions. Our Lord suffered and died in His manhood; the Church suffers and dies in the prejudices and passions of her human members. Yet our Lord was God even in His death; the Church is God's spouse, even in the tomb of her children's faith and love. Religion and politics, principle and passion, may struggle in the arena of a Conclave; Italian diplomacy and Austrian obstinacy and French intrigue may weave their webs around the Tiara and the Chair, and trimmers may call for compromise, when they should rather court martyrdom. Yet over the chaos of seething antagonistic elements, the Holy Spirit of peace and love broods as over the chaos of the primal world. Human motives are shaped by Providence to His own designs, and out of the storms of the Conclave, the Church's bark sails with a new pilot as stanch as when Peter took the helm.

John Vincent Anthony Ganganelli became Pope, under the title of Clement XIV., on the 19th of March, 1769. He was born in 1705, near Rimini, of a patrician house. The boy showed talent of a high order. He loved his books, and cared little for amusements or society; and the purity of his soul made him a fit flower for the garden of the cloister or the sanctuary. Ganganelli's inclinations pointed to the religious state. To embrace it, argued his friends, would be to cut himself off from the bright career which his birth and ability promised him in the Church. "Can I have better prospects," was Ganganelli's reply, "than in the Order which has produced Sixtus IV. and Sixtus V.?" So he went to the Franciscan novitiate at Urbino when he was eighteen years old. The Minorites are an active as well as a contemplative order, but

the future Pope took no part, for many years, in the public life of his religious family. He was a man of books, and, like all students, he loved retirement and the society of his own thoughts. Yet he was no misanthropist, and when duty sent him into the company of his brethren, he contributed his share to the simple, charming merriment which has its home in the hearts of pure children and the recreation-rooms of cloistered sanctity. Joy is a gift of the Holy Ghost to the unworldly. Ganganelli possessed it, for he was a true religious. He became a professor in the schools of his Order, and rose at once to academic eminence. It was found that he could rule as well as obey. Silence had not robbed his tongue of the gift of prudent speech in ecclesiastical and worldly matters; study had not destroyed a natural aptitude for business. He had studied his own heart, and therefore could fathom the hearts of others. We are inclined at times to draw too broad a line between man and man. Human nature is the same in the saint and the sinner, the prince and the peasant, the cloister and the court. Solitude is the vestibule to the temple of fame; the road through the desert often leads to the throne and the crown. The history of one soul is the epitome of the world's history; he who knows its winding may tread with secure step the mazy paths of diplomacy; he who can marshal his own great thoughts is a born sovereign. Here is a man, absolute ruler of himself, of large mind and large heart; cast him into the strife of the world, and he becomes lord of the ascendant. Ganganelli was not a great man, but he had talent, and his religious life made him its master. The Order of St. Francis prepared him for the world, the Franciscan cowl for the thorny tiara. There have been greater Popes than he. His lines were not cast in goodly places, yet he bore him bravely through the storm, and left a name untarnished by reproach. He may have prayed where he should have commanded, and destroyed where he should have saved. He was God's representative, but in deciding affairs which concerned only discipline, he had not God's omniscience nor infallibility. Admit that he erred, what then? Clement XIV. was still John Vincent Ganganelli, the Pope was still a man, and, apart from dogmatic and moral decisions, liable in all things to human infirmity. But we anticipate. Ganganelli, we have said, rose to consideration among his brethren. The shadow of the Generalship of the Order fell across the sunshine of his path. He was in an agony of fear. "If you love me," said he to his friends, "vote against me." "Non sitis pro me sed sitis mihi." The cloud passed, and he was again happy in his professorship at the convent of the Holy Apostles. He tried to cover his light with a bushel, but the good religious did not perceive that there were chinks in his bushel, and so the light flashed out.

He was a man of immense learning, and Pope Benedict had a special talent for discerning modest merit. Ganganelli was a student after the Pontiff's own heart. Their tastes were similar, and soon brought them together, and the humble Franciscan became Consultor of the Holy Office. "Take good care of this little brother of yours," said Benedict one day to the General of the Order, "he has my strong recommendation." Ganganelli, without knowing it, had entered upon the road to the sublimest dignity on earth. He became immersed in business. Questions from all the Congregations were submitted to his examination, and a pen or a book never left his hand. His patron died, but left in writing his very favorable opinion of the "little brother" of the convent of the Holy Apostles. One day Cardinal Rezzonico, nephew of the new Pope, Clement XIII., went to the cell of Ganganelli. "A great many reports about you, my friend," said his Eminence, "have been brought to the Holy Father. I am sorry to be the bearer of disagreeable news, but duty goes before friendship. You are irrevocably, beyond all hope of escape, Cardinal Ganganelli. The Pope foreseeing your refusal has commanded you, under pain of grievous sin, to accept the dignity." So the monk became a Prince of the Church, and from that moment popular opinion preconized him Pope. Nor was public opinion at fault; he became Pope on the 19th of May, 1769. He had scarcely started on his Pontifical career, when he was brought to bay by the bloodhounds that were on the track of the Jesuits. The Society might be banished by Pombal or Choiseul; it could be destroyed only by the power that created it. Its life or death hung on the word of the Pope. For four years Clement tried to elude the vehement importunities and threats of the French and Spanish ambassadors, until the question came to be narrowed to the alternative of the destruction of the Jesuits, or a European schism, perhaps as scandalous as that of Avignon. The Jesuits had fulfilled their mission; the Church required their sacrifice. The altar was built, and the victim consumed on the 21st of July, 1773. On that day, Pope Clement XIV. published his brief for the suppression of the Society of Jesus. The curtain fell, and the world thought that the brilliant drama of Jesuit history, that had been played before its wondering gaze for more than two centuries, had reached its final catastrophe in the tragedy of the suppression. The world was disappointed. The curtain rose again, forty years after, on lecture halls thronged with students listening to Jesuit professors, and penitents besieging the confessionals of Jesuit missionaries. The Jesuit was seen again in his old haunts, wherever there was a mind to be formed or a heart purified for heaven.

SYMBOLISM OF THE COSMOS.

1. *The Old Faith and the New.* By D. F. Strauss.
2. *First Principles.* By Herbert Spencer.
3. *S. Thomæ Aquinatis Summa Theologica.*

IN the candid title of the last work penned by Strauss a lesson is embodied. It is that man must have a religion; and if he overthrows one it is only to adopt another. After having rejected faith in revealed religion, he seeks the materials with which to build up a creed that will satisfy himself and the eager disciples who were dazzled by his sophistries. With that intent, in his old age, while the hand of death is upon him, he pens this profession of faith. The book is altogether unworthy of the man who at the age of twenty-seven wrote the *Leben Jesu*. It is a sad record of nearly forty years' thought. His disciples clamor for a religion and a doctrine; in return he gives them the dregs of thought that float on the surface of the fermenting intellect of Europe; he gives them the crude notions of science which he has been able to gather together from popular manuals on geology, anthropology, sociology, even phrenology; he gives them Kant's planetary dreams; he gives them Hegel's vague idealism; he gives them some commonplace criticism on Goethe and Mozart; and he leaves them as his final opinion, that life is nothing more than a dream of nothingness about something. But little consolation is to be found in this new faith. It is shadow taken for substance. It is an identifying of the symbol with the thing symbolized. This idea his Cosmic theory best illustrates. With him man is part and parcel of the material world, and nothing more. His life and being he has from the Cosmos, to which he returns after death, as does the dog or the tree. The soul is a metaphysical fiction. Matter is eternal. "If we contemplate the universe as a whole, there never has been a time when it did not exist, when there did not exist in it a distinction between the heavenly bodies, life and reason; for all this, if not as yet existing in one part of the Cosmos, already existed in another, while in a third it had already ceased to exist; here it was in the act of blooming, yonder in full flower, at a third place already in decline; but the Cosmos itself—the sum total of infinite worlds in all stages of growth and decay—abode eternally unchanged, in the constancy of its absolute energy, and in the everlasting revolution and mutation of things."¹ This is language worthy of a Lucretius or his master Epicurus. It is certainly a

¹ *The Old Faith and the New*, p. 173.

falling off from the young author, so intent upon drawing out the spiritual side of existence that he would reduce the well-authenticated facts of the New Testament to be simply mythical expressions of the deeper truths of thought and life. But Strauss goes further, and excludes God from his philosophy. "After the plurality of gods," he tells us, "in the various religions had resolved themselves into the one personal God, He in like manner resolved Himself into the impersonal but person-shaping All. This same idea forms likewise the ultimate point of departure—from which ever point of view one regards it—of our Cosmic conception."¹

Herbert Spencer has also a "Cosmic conception." In many points he agrees with Strauss. But he struggles hard against the logic of his position, which tends to drift him ultimately to the same conclusion at which Strauss got stranded. He acknowledges a power behind the Cosmos. "A power," he says, "of which the nature remains forever inconceivable, and to which no limits in time or space can be imagined, works in us certain effects."² But he makes that power impersonal, and by that one word destroys the whole force of his assertion. What is an impersonal power "that works in us certain effects?" We can understand how material force is impersonal; but an impersonal intelligent force is to our mind an absurdity. Herbert Spencer accuses Christian philosophers of attempting to measure the Divinity by their own finite notions. There are some who deserve the rebuke. But we would say to Mr. Spencer, *mutato nomine, de te fabula narratur*. He allows his imagination to impede his reasoning powers. He can conceive no personality that is not limited like his own. This shows that he has no proper conception of what personality is. The essential idea of personality is not one of limiting. It is the completion, not the limitation, of a rational nature. St. Thomas calls it that which is most perfect in all nature;³ and Boethius defines it as the individual substance of a rational nature.⁴ Therefore, an infinite personality is the completion of an infinite rational nature. Here is no contradiction; for assuredly the infinite is perfect. In the light of these principles an impersonal power is a meaningless term when applied to the Prime Mover and Ordainer of all things.

Again, Herbert Spencer makes a tottering move in the right direction when he tells us that "matter, motion, and force, are but symbols of the unknown reality." This is true, but he is not war-

¹ The Old Faith and the New, p. 169.

² First Principles, p. 557; London edition.

³ Respondeo dicendum quod persona significat id quod perfectissimum est in tota natura; scilicet subsistens in rationali natura. Summa, I., 29, iii.

⁴ Persona est rationalis naturæ individua substantia; which definition St. Thomas adopts, *ibid.*, I., 29, i.

ranted in asserting it. If the reality is unknown, how knows he that it is symbolized in these things? In his philosophy there is no means of knowing; and his only logical conclusion is with Strauss to make the Cosmos the great All—"simultaneously both cause and effect, the outward and the inward together." These partial truths occurring in the pages of Spencer, or Strauss, or Comte—and they all have paid sometimes eloquent tributes to truth—belong not to their philosophy. They are reminiscences of the old systems they would overturn; and in this clashing between old and new, do they receive their death-blow. With "advance" on their banners, these systems are fast receding to inanition. They begin in mistiness, and end in a maze of contradiction. Their authors pride themselves upon their enlightened conception of the Cosmos. This is especially their conquest and their boast. With their patient research, their wide-searching views of nature, their thoughtful consideration of her laws, they might throw a flood of light upon her operations, and demonstrate the power and greatness and exquisite work of the Great Worker, who is great in the creation of an atom as in the making of a world, provided they based their knowledge on sound principles in the stead of the scientific guesswork, which now makes the foundation of their theories.

To understand the symbolism of the Cosmos we must go back to principles found in the nature of things. True philosophy deals with the actual. It cannot, therefore, devote itself exclusively to nature. There is also a world of grace: though distinct, the two are inseparable; grace presupposes nature. There is not a man born of woman who has not been the recipient of grace, actual or sanctifying. The philosophy that rejects the religious element, can explain neither man nor nature; for it takes the one for what he is not, and it ignores the Author of the other. Therefore, the writer lays down as the principle that embodies the real relation of things, natural and supernatural, this synthetic formula:

*God actualizes the Cosmos by the Word and completes its destiny in the Word.*¹

This principle is not given to man intuitively; otherwise, all would apprehend it in the light of simple reason. Nor is it the product of unaided reason; else why so many theories denying a first cause and a future destiny? Besides, the WORD by whom God spoke and created, by whom man was redeemed, and whose coming raised humanity in the scale of creation, it was a purely gratuitous condescension of God to externize in time, and in His eternal designs to decree that He become incarnate, and that He be made

¹ For a short analysis of this principle and for the grounds on which the writer rejects the Giobertian formula *Ens creat existentias*, see the *International Review* for March, April, 1876.

the means by which the destiny of the Cosmos was to be fulfilled.¹ That Divine Word is a revelation of God to man. But inasmuch as the synthetic principle embodies actuality, it is truth. It is based upon reason, and the tradition of a primitive revelation. It is the last word at which philosophy arrives; but in synthesis it may become the first from which it starts. It throws a flood of light upon things of heaven and earth. It contains the how and the why of the Divine decrees concerning the creation. It explains the existence of humanity, of science, of literature. It is the realization of this principle that God sought in the act of creating and in the higher act of becoming incarnate. Let us see what meaning the Cosmos has for us in the light of this principle.

I. The Word by which God created, and in which He completed the destiny of the Cosmos, all things reveal.² Only by reason thereof have they a meaning. They reveal the Word as an effect reveals its cause; for every effect in one manner or other reveals its cause;³ and when God acts, medium and end are one with the primal cause; for all three are His own divine essence. Behind the veil of the created, and distinct from it, is the Creator. Back of the sign and symbol lies the reality. Now, man's knowledge of the finite and the sensible is subject to the conditions of space and time. But space and time are no constituents of essences; they only express relations; they clothe things in the drapery of the passing, and render them symbolical of the greater reality. Everything in life and literature, in art and science, is significant of something beyond that revealed by the actual impression. He who rests content with the smoothness and finish of the marble statue, or with the mere sound of the musical chord, or with the brilliancy of the colors on the pictured canvas, and perceives nothing more than a form, a note, a ray of light, mistakes the source and aim of art. The same is true of him who would gauge the meaning of life by its material pursuits. There is evidently something beyond the immediate object of living. Appearance says not all. The phenomenon does not reveal the whole of the noumenon. It reveals only so much as is necessary to distinguish specific differences in objects.

Here lie a Scylla and a Charybdis of thought, clear of which all philosophers have not sailed. It is not true that we only perceive

¹ Creation not being necessary, it follows that the Incarnation is not necessary; but the creative act being accomplished, it were incomplete in the realization of its destiny without the Incarnate act. This proposition admits of rigid demonstration by the law of sufficient reason, or as it is sometimes called, "of minimum means." See Rosmini, *Teodicea*, lib. iii, cap. vii, n. 433; also *Principii di Filosofia Soprannaturale*, vol. i, p. 41. The writer has learned that this work is from the pen of Padre Rossi.

² Ex uno verbo omnia, et unum loquuntur omnia. De Im. Christi, lib. i., cap. iii.

³ Respondeo dicendum quod omnis effectus aequaliter representat suam causam, sed diversimodè. S. Thomas, *Summa*, I., 45, vii.

the phenomenon, and that the noumenon is altogether beyond our knowing. We have a glimpse of the essences of things; were it otherwise we could not define them. Neither is it true that man knows the whole noumenon. That is known to God alone. There is philosophic truth in those lines of Tennyson :

" Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies ;—
Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower—but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is."

The value of a thing is expressed in the aptness with which it fulfils its destiny. It has a meaning accordingly. But finite things, not being self-existent, have not in themselves the meaning of their existence. That is found in their essential prototypes in the Divine Mind. Nor can man, if he would understand the Cosmos, measure its actual ways and workings by their apparent results. Their full bearing is known to Him alone who gave them being and set them in motion. The unseen is more than the seen. The actual is the symbol of the ideal. Though distinct, one cannot be separated from the other. The actual has its life only in the ideal. It receives therefrom all its significancy. As in speech, the object named determines the meaning of the word used—and not the word the object—so it is the ideal that gives meaning and significance to the actual. The ideal, then, is the real; the actual is its symbol. It is a false system of philosophy that gives the ideal only a mental existence, and makes of it simply a thing of abstraction. It exists in the Divine Mind, and the Divine Mind does not acquire knowledge by the process of abstraction. Therein is it one with the essences of things. Were the ideal only subjective, the Cosmos, God, the Word, would all of them be illusions, man the dupe of his own shadowy fancies, life the dream of a shadow. But no, the ideal has an objective existence. All things assert it. Art, in its various embodiments, in marble, in harmony, on the canvas, in poetry, symbolizes the ideal that gives it meaning. Religion, in its ceremonies and sacraments, symbolizes the spiritual world, with which it is for man the golden ladder of communication. Science, in the enunciation of its laws, symbolizes the relations of cause and effect, and the conditions that underlie the harmonies of the Cosmos. The ideal formula which expresses the synthetic principle of philosophy, is a symbol that speaks of the relations existing between God and His creation.

Nor is active life less symbolical. In its individual growth and development, in its personal trials and triumphs, it is significant of something beyond; it is a preparation; it is the composing of a

harmonious masterpiece which is to resound through all eternity ; it is the carving of a grand statue with which to adorn the great Hereafter ; it is the writing of a thrilling epic in which the spiritual warfare and progress of a soul will figure with undying interest. In time, only the rough materials are visible to us ; we but witness the uncouth block, the blacked and scored music, the scribbled and fragmentary epic ; but when the angel of death comes, unless we have been too indolent at our work, and left too much undone, he will illuminate the scroll, recite the poem, intone the sweet chords of harmony we have spun together, finish the statue ; and then, when the veil shall have dropped from our eyes, we will behold the import of all the mysteries of life. In its organic forms of society and government, life is equally symbolical. Government seeks to establish harmony political and social. It speaks and acts by a delegated authority. The power that gives it sanction is only represented in the actual ruler. He symbolizes the higher authority. The people may say who shall wield that power, but in themselves they possess it not. The sanction must come from above. Thus is government also a symbol. So, too, with the simple social relations of man with man. They cannot be ignored. They have serious claims upon his attention. It is an old maxim, and a true one, that he who lives alone must be either an angel or a devil. The disintegration of the social order leads to barbarism. Therefore it must be kept up by agreeable intercourse. The social life banishes all exertion ; it leaves strain and labor at the door ; it is accompanied with ease, graceful motion, pleasant expression ; therein is strength reserved and effort put aside ; the hard and rude in man's nature are softened and smoothed ; his selfish barbarism is suppressed ; the corners of his behavior are rounded ; truth, courteousness, beneficence, geniality are developed ; man becomes refined ; gentleness of disposition is drawn out ; he literally becomes a gentleman ; he falls under the influence of civilization ; he seeks a standard and follows fashion ; for when properly understood, fashion is, according to Emerson, "an attempt to organize beauty of behavior."¹ Nor is all this for its own sake. It has a meaning. It is a partial reversion to that civilization from which man originally fell. It is symbolical, though rudely, often a parody, of the harmonious relations of man with man, of thought with thought, that belong to another order of things, when neither distrust, nor suspicion, nor the selfish motive, nor sin, nor passion, can intrude and mar the beauty of the social intercourse. Life in its spiritual aspect approaches nearer to the ideal ; but it also has meaning by reason of something beyond. Those who look to the

¹ *Essays, Second Series, p. 144.*

workings of their souls, and listen to the dictates of their conscience, seem to live in another and a far different world from that in which those live who ignore the spiritual side of their nature. With them, "every event," says John Henry Newman, "has a meaning; they have their own estimate of whatever happens to them; they are mindful of times and seasons, and compare the present with the past; and the world, no longer dull, monotonous, unprofitable, and hopeless, is a various and complicated drama, with parts and an object, and an awful moral."¹ The belief in a spiritual world, the communion with God and His saints, the passing from festival to festival, the preparation to celebrate each worthily, the effort continuously made to suppress the disorderly emotions of human nature, to become more pure and spiritualized, and thus to advance in perfection, the belief in a spirit-world of evil as well as of good, the struggles with the angel of sin and darkness, the distinctness with which these things are visible to the eye of faith, each and all make of this life a living allegory, a *Pilgrim's Progress* in action. That which John Bunyan embodied in his prose poem, had been the uppermost thought of the Mediæval Christians during centuries. He wrote the history of each soul's spiritual life. The same history had in substance been frequently preached from the pulpit; and nigh two hundred years previously to Bunyan, did the monk, Guillaume de Guileville, in his *Pèlerinage de l'Homme*, embody the same idea in allegorical form. And if the tinker-dreamer is remembered, whilst the Cistercian monk is all but forgotten, it is because the former brought to his allegory a robust diction and a Protestant animus which the latter was incapable of, and to which responded the hearts of millions of English people. But life, spiritual and physical, is, like all God's designs, more than symbol. *Ernst ist das Leben*. It is serious, for the destiny of eternity depends upon the manner in which it is acted out.

To God, too, is the Cosmos a symbol; and to Him alone is the whole meaning of its destiny and the fearful reality underlying it, no mystery. To man, has it been given to think in sign and symbol. Therefore, in philosophy and literature, he attempts the explanations of the riddles he everywhere meets; in art, he undertakes to imitate the creative act and embody ideals which his genius learns from the nature of things; in life, he seeks to realize the meaning of his existence; in science he would rend the veil of creation's temple and read the deeper mysteries behind; in all cases, it is abyss leading to abyss, each deep calls upon a deeper depth; and the last discovery is a more abstruse enigma than the

¹ Idea of a University, p. 133.

first. One symbol becomes expressed in terms of another more inexplicable symbol. Only one Being has no symbolic significancy for man, and that Being is God. He is in Himself *actus purissimus*—most pure actuality. He is not circumscribed by the condition of space and time. He is an eternal Presence. He alone can define Himself as the *I am who am*. He perceives essences. But though a living, infinite, omnipresent Monad, He also possesses in himself number, for He is Triune. Therefore He not only sees things generally. He has regard also to the specific, the single, the individual. His Omniscience, like all His other powers and attributes, is infinite in intensity. By the preservative act with which He keeps all things in existence, He is intimately present to them, still remaining distinct from them. A different aspect does the Cosmos present to Him, from what it presents to man, which were man able to express he would no longer be man, but God. A far different idea of the Cosmos might man have, were there to be lifted, only for a moment, the scales of space and time which now bedim and confine his vision. He would behold the laws of nature in harmonious working, with exception and rule and apparent contradiction, contrast and opposition all reconciled; matter in its nature and essence; the source and principle of life; the long chain of vegetable and animal life, in all their linked organic relations germinating, living, acting, developing, decaying, dying; over all and greatest of all, the flower of earthly existence, man. Still grander were the vision of man: Every individual distinct; each showing a predominant trait of character; in each a different guiding principle; one actuated by this or that passion, or by this or that virtue; the dispositions and motives of all laid open at once; all the notes of humanity assailing the ear at one and the same time, from the infant's wail at birth, through the varied sounds of joy and sorrow, of pleasure and pain, to the death-rattle; life in all its phases simultaneously passing before the eye; humanity a moving mass between an eternal past and an eternal future, which are both but an eternal present. All is a continual becoming. But this is on the surface. In time we see but change and motion; in eternity is there fixity. Beneath the passing lies the permanent. Becoming is meaningless without a permanent state beyond which there is no further change. But the thing becoming cannot determine that state; otherwise it would already have experience of it and would no longer need to become. The Cosmos, then, has not in itself the power of determining permanency. That lies with Him who has in Himself the meaning of its existence.

The Word, the Incarnate Word, is the clue to the symbolism of the Cosmos. It is in the nature of things that the inferior exist

for the superior, and subserve its purposes. Therefore, the natural exists for the supernatural, the Cosmos for the Word; and whatever meaning there is in creation is solved by the understanding of its relations with the Creator. Now, the actual has its whole meaning, its life and being, in the ideal; but the ideal in actuality is the created real, fashioned after the uncreated ideal in the Divine Mind;¹ therefore reality has all its meaning from the creating Power, which is the Word; and through all forms of life and existence runs the Divine note. All symbolize one act; all speak one word. That Word is no symbol, it is reality. It possesses the wisdom of the Divinity; it contains the reason of existences. In becoming incarnate, it bridged over the abyss between the infinite and the finite, and reconciled them. In man is the Cosmos epitomized. He is matter and spirit. In the Incarnate Word, the God-man, has the Cosmos found the inchoate fulfilment of its destiny. *God actualizes the Cosmos by the Word, and completes its destiny in the Word.*

II. On a misapprehension of the fact that God is pure reality, *actus purissimus*, in no sense a symbol, but the author of all symbolism, is based that erroneous conception that He is unknowable. Those who so conceive Him, confound knowing with imagining. They fancy that nothing can be understood which cannot first be represented to the mind's eye. They forget that while man cannot comprehend the infinite, he may still apprehend it. Now, the unanimous testimony of men in reference to a Supreme Being proves that man conceives such. The various attempts made to represent Him in wood, or stone, or descriptive language, prove that His great simplicity and His infinite perfections were not thoroughly comprehended by man. To make finite reason the measure of the infinite God is to reverse the order of things, and make reason the only God. This Comte did when he reduced Him to a metaphysical entity; this Herbert Spencer does in relegating Him to the unknowable; and prior to either Dupuis did the same, when he undertook to prove that the God of Christianity was as much a fiction of the brain as the deities on Olympus. "The gods," he says, "are, to my mind, children of men; and I think

¹ I distinguish between the *real* and the *actual*. The *actual* has meaning only by reason of the ideal which it expresses. It is the ideal that gives *reality* to the *actual*. Therefore the ideal is the *real*. The *actual* expresses a *perfect reality* in proportion as it approaches the ideal in the Divine Mind; which it does by the embodiment of a *created ideal*. It is that *created ideal* which is the standard of all excellence, and which the poet and the artist endeavor to express in words, on canvas, or in marble. The ideal they express or represent cannot be the *uncreated ideal*; for in that case *they would have* intuition direct and immediate from the Godhead,—which is not so, no matter how strongly affirmed by Gioberti and the Ontologists. In this sense, the *ideal* is the *created essence*; perhaps it is the noumenon of Kant, but which Kant misapprehended.

with Hesiod, that earth has produced heaven."¹ This were true enough were heaven to mean simply the Olympus from which Jupiter thundered; but when it includes the abode of the one, true, eternal Deity, we must totally dissent from it, and say rather that heaven produced earth, after which earth produced polytheism and fetichism, including the myth of M. Dupuis. To trace how this came to pass, is to account for the origin of mythology, a theme interesting as it is difficult. A few words on the subject may not be amiss.

The physical Cosmos may be viewed either scientifically or æsthetically. In one case, reason is the faculty most exercised; in the other, imagination predominates. Viewed in either way, the Cosmos is a grand symbol. Scientifically considered, nature is investigated, and her phenomena are referred to their causes. Reason is not satisfied with the outward appearance. It seeks to investigate essences; the primary truths, common to humanity and recognized by all as evident, it brings to bear upon the rest and motion, the action and reaction, the solid and liquid and gaseous states of bodies. It applies instruments to discover the secrets of Nature; it questions her by experiment; it resolves matter into simpler and more primary elements. Mathematics is the key with which to interpret the physical sciences. In its simple formulæ it embodies laws, in obedience to which star and planet and atom move; which regulate crystallic and magnetic action; which define gravitation force; which point out the comet's track, and compute the electric flash. In the present time, this view of nature has become almost the exclusive one. But the primitive peoples did not forget to make a scientific study of the laws of the Cosmos. Nature was for them, as well as for us, an inexhaustible book; and, if all were known, it might be proved that, where we know scarcely the alphabet of the physical sciences, they were deeply read. The Bible, in Genesis, in Job, in the Psalms, speaks of the great problems of creation, with what Humboldt calls "individualizing accuracy; and," he adds, "many questions are propounded which we, in the present state of our physical knowledge, may, indeed, be able to express under more scientific definitions, but scarcely to answer satisfactorily."² And to mention only one instance of the broad views of things taken in the Book of Job, we need but recur to the history of science, and notice the numerous conjectures formed of the earth, its shape and position in space, and then read the profound science contained in these words: "He stretcheth the north over the empty space, and hangeth the earth upon nothing."³ Going back still

¹ Les Dieux, chez moi, sont enfants des hommes; et je pense comme Hesiode, que la terre a produit le ciel.—*Sur les Origines de la Culte*, I, Int., p. xxii.

² Cosmos, vol. ii., p. 59, Amer. ed.

³ Job, chap. xxvi.

further in the history of nations, we find the Chaldeans at an early period treating questions of astronomy and chronology with a scientific accuracy, astonishing even at present, and laying the foundation of modern astronomical calculations—nay, more, constructing for us our divisions of time. They gave us the signs of the zodiac; they divided for us the ecliptic into 360 degrees, the degree into 60 minutes, the minute into 60 seconds, and the second into 60 tierces;¹ they brought numbers to a degree of perfection that cannot yet be excelled, though they computed on a much more complicated basis than the decimal system, namely, the system of sexagesimal fractions. “The people of Babylon,” says Lenormant, “and of Chaldæa, constantly put this system in practice in all orders of quantities and measurements.”² The tablet of Senkereh, in the British Museum, written in cuneiform inscription of a very ancient character, reveals numerical calculations which prove the science of numbers to have been thoroughly understood at least twenty centuries before our era. Lenormant, commenting upon it in a special monograph devoted to the purpose, calls it an “heirloom of that mysterious primitive civilization which preceded the Semites in Babylon, and from which these Semites gathered their system of cuneiform writing already formed.”³ Here is a strong light thrown upon early times. It reveals to us these primitive peoples not as living in inaction, or bewildered by the greatness of the material universe, or in awe of all things animate or inanimate, as some would picture them; but as solid thinkers, whose speculations have already reached a practical result, entering into business transactions and commercial relations, following industrial pursuits, and learned in the arts and sciences. “Never before the discovery of this monument,” says Lenormant, in wonder at the proficiency it reveals, “would we have dared to make so bold a conjecture as to suppose that at least twenty centuries before the Christian era, at the beginning of the first Semitic empire of Chaldæa, if not still earlier, the science of numbers had made such progress in this part of the ancient world, that at that time the people of Erech, of Our, of Larsam, of Babylon, moved with so great facility in the operations of calculations the most delicate and complicated, knew how to form the squares and cubes of numbers, as well as to extract their roots, were acquainted with the scale of the powers of numbers, and employed a mechanism of exponents exactly like that

¹ Mais les Chaldéens n'avaient pas inventé seulement la division de l'ecliptique en 360 degrés et 720 moria. Sextus Empiricus dit formellement qu'ils avaient divisé le degré en 60 minutes, et Géménius que de plus ils divisaient la minute en 60 secondes, et la seconde en 60 tierces.—Lenormant, *Essai sur un Document Mathématique Chaldéen*. Paris, 1868, p. 12.

² Ibid., p. 9.

³ *Essai sur un Document Mathématique Chaldéen*, p. 159.

which mathematicians of our own time make use of."¹ These rays of light, coming to us from the remote past, reveal a state of things modern philosophy has been disposed to discredit. What the Egyptian priest said to Solon, as reported by Plato,² seems equally applicable to more modern times: "You are youths in intelligence; for you hold no ancient opinions derived from remote tradition, nor any system of discipline that can boast of a hoary old age." Men of the present are inclined to consider themselves as the discoverers and authors of all scientific progress. They break loose from the traditions of the remote past. They ignore the fact that they were as helpless as Archimedes in his boast to move the world, if that past had not given them the foothold, and planted for them the fulcrum upon which they might effectively move the lever of their scientific attainments. They are prone to take their ignorance of the past as a criterion of the knowledge it possessed. But let them remember that not all which antiquity knew has been written; nor has all which it wrote been preserved. This important rule seems to have dropped out of Kreuzer's calculations when he deduced the following inferences: "A glance at the poetry and the religion of the diverse peoples is sufficient to convince one of an incontestable fact, namely, that all have shared this antique and universal belief that everything in nature is endowed with life and sentiment. There is no distinction of matter and spirit in the native thought of the first men; everything lives a common and uniform life."³ These peoples did distinguish between spirit and matter; but so evident was the distinction to them, so intimately present to them was belief in an immaterial order of things, that it never occurred to them to assert it formally. The spiritual world was to them as much, perhaps more, a reality than the material world. The human mind begins to make formal distinctions only when it fears a misunderstanding.

Æsthetically considered, the Cosmos appeals to man's sense of the beautiful and awakens the ideal in his mind. It mirrors forth the Divinity, His power and glory; and as such man regards it with reverence. As man is the Cosmos in miniature, combining as he does in a single personality both matter and spirit, there is be-

¹ Jamais avant la découverte de ce monument on n'eut osé pousser la hardiesse des conjectures jusqu'à supposer que vingt siècles au moins avant l'ère chrétienne, au début du premier empire Sémitique de Chaldée, sinon plus anciennement encore, la science des nombres avait fait de tels progrès dans cette partie du monde ancien; que des lors les gens d'Erech, d'Our, de Larsam, de Babylone, se mouvaient avec une aussi grande facilité dans les opérations de calcul les plus délicates et les plus compliquées, savaient former les carrés et les cubes des nombres et en extraire les racines, connaissaient l'échelle des puissances des nombres et employaient un mécanisme d'exposants exactement emblable à celui dont se servent les mathématiciens de nos jours.—Ibid., p. 158.

² *Timæus*.

³ *Religions de l'Antiquité*, tr. fr. Guignaut, L. I., p. 19.

tween him and Nature a deep-laid link that binds him in relations of sympathy with it. When man fell, we are told that Nature, on his account, was cursed; the soil grew barren, and gave forth abundance only in return for the sweat he poured upon it; seeds of degeneracy took possession of the very plant and animal.¹ This hidden sympathy is in part the secret of man's attachment to his native land, to the place he has for years inhabited, to the scenery of hill and dale of which he grows fond. The æsthetic view of nature gives art and literature; the ratiocinative view gives science. They are both of them distinct, though each may occasionally intrude on the domain of the other; but once they went hand in hand; and were man still unfallen they would be found more intimately blended in the human mind. Prior to the fall, the symbolism of Nature was an unclouded mirror in which man read much of the meaning of earth and heaven. He clearly saw beneath the symbol the ideal which it symbolized. The harmony of spirit, sense, and soul within himself was reflected in the harmony of the universe. The true was not separated from the good, nor the good from the true, nor the beautiful from either, but all three were one.

. But the fall broke the harmony that had previously existed in man's consciousness. By it he came under the control of his senses; he gravitated towards the material; disturbance in the moral order produced disturbance in the physical and intellectual orders; the serene light of reason became clouded by thick-coming fancies, and man in its stead began to follow the will-o'-the-wisps of conjecture and opinion. The symbolism of the Cosmos became obscured. But at the same time, God more clearly expressed to man the real relations of things and completed in substance the ideal formula of philosophical instruction which He had been imparting to him. For it was then He showed man that his destiny was to be completed in and by the Word, whom He announced to him as the Redeemer.² This truth was kept alive with prophetic clearness among the Jewish race down to the coming of the Divine Saviour; the sacred depository since then has been intrusted to the Church which it pleased the Word to make the visible medium of salvation. It was also preserved among the Gentile nations, though in an imperfect manner, and overlaid with fiction. But in spite of this luminous truth so emphatically laid down in the Divine revelation, the veil of corruption shut out its brilliant rays from man's intelligence, and nations sat in the shadow of darkness. Man fell more and more under the dominion of the senses; he lost sight of the ideal; he lost sight of the creative act;

¹ Genesis iii. 17-19.

² Genesis iii. 15.

he lost sight of the Creator Himself; and finally identifying the symbol with the thing symbolized, he became an idolater. The many attributes of the Divinity which were symbolized in the sun and the stars, in light and darkness, in the elements—the wind, the rain, and the ocean—became so many divinities; thus, we find the signs of the zodiac to be, not of scientific or agricultural, but of mythological origin. The ideal having become separated from the actual in man's conception of things, he looks not beneath their surface. "The personal idea of God," say Lenormant and Chevalier, "was by degrees confounded with the various manifestations of His power; His attributes and qualities were personified in a host of secondary agents, distributed in a regular hierarchy, in agreement with the general organization of the world and the preservation of its inhabitants. Thus originated that polytheism which in its varied and strange symbolism finally embraced the entire creation."¹ And thus is mythology primarily based upon Nature-worship. Men saw not the Energizer back of Nature's energies; these they worshipped; these they personified and represented in picture and statue. "That which the purified intelligence calls a force," says Kreuzer, "this primitive observation calls a person."² But it is erroneous to consider this the sole fountain-head of mythology. It were to leave unexplained many of the myths and legends of antiquity. Hero-worship was another source of polytheism. "Among the Greeks," says the last-named author, "men were raised to the rank of gods for their extraordinary qualities, their fine actions, and their services."³ He might have added other nations as well. With all men is it natural, in the course of time and after the human failings and imperfections are forgotten, to make a hero of the benefactor, and as the deeds are exaggerated in number and quality, to attribute to them a Divine origin. Thus it was that the hero who had benefited a people was remembered with gratitude; statues were erected to his memory; the feats he performed became the germs whence sprung many with no existence outside the fancy that nurtured them; they were no longer deeds within the power of man to compass; only a god could have achieved them; therefore, a god was their benefactor. But among the Greeks there are myths of a later origin which may be regarded as moral allegories, for instance, the ethical myth of Pallas Athènè.

III. The history of mythology, in its origin and early development, is explained by, while it is a confirmation of, the synthetic principle of philosophy: *God actualizes the Cosmos by the Word and completes its destiny in the Word.* Men did not begin by forgetting

¹ Ancient History of the East, vol. i., p. 318, Eng. tr.

² Religions de l'Antiquité, trad. par Guigniant, t. I., i., p. 121.

³ Ibid., t. III., iii., p. 854.

this principle, but by misapprehending it. Indeed, it is doubtful if a single term of it has ever dropped out of the teachings of human tradition. Where it is unexpressed, it is frequently implied, for it alone can give meaning to many of the forms and ceremonies of the religions of antiquity. The first term upon which men erred was the term *actualizes*. In speculating upon the manner in which God actualized the Cosmos they lost sight of the nothingness from which He drew it. The maxim, *ex nihilo nihil fit*, true only when applied to secondary causes, practically became the measure of their conception of the Primary Cause. They could not grasp the idea of creation. They knew God to be a Monad, and they had to account for multiplicity. The idea which first and most naturally suggested itself was that of generation. Hence, they imagined the Primary Cause as an androgynous being, that is, one combining in himself both the male and female principle. All the older mythologies, such as the Egyptian and Assyro-Chaldæan, as well as the mysteries and ceremonies, abound in allusions to, and draw their meaning from, that idea. Mythology afterwards embodied the conception of two distinct beings, either eternally coexisting, as Ormuzd and Ahriman were conceived to be by the later Zoroastrians, though not by Zarathustra himself; or engendered from the First Principle as the Yn and Yang of the Chinese, or the humid and igneous elements of the Chaldæans.¹

But in the midst of these vagaries, those primitive peoples retained the consciousness of the term *God*. In recognizing more than one Divine Being, they were destroying the proper conception of the Divinity; but they were at the same time acknowledging the existence of Him they sought in His works. So evident was His existence to all, so easily might He be found by the earnest searcher, so intimately present was He to each individual, that St. Paul does not hold the pagan of his day excused for not having known Him. Nor was the term, *the Word*, altogether forgotten by men. Throughout the nations there hovered a dim idea, as of an almost forgotten tradition, that a Redeemer of men was to come among them. In India the idea took most definite shape. The Avatars of Hindu mythology foreshadow that central fact of all history, that clue to all philosophy, the Incarnation of the Word.² It might be proven that the primitive nations became

¹ Lenormant thus sums up his discussion of the legend of Semiramis. Fille d'un être ichthyomorphe, Dercéto, la déesse colombe, Semiramis, épouse un dieu-poisson, Ninus = *nunu*; sortie du principe humide, de l'abîme primordial la déesse ignée est fécondée par l'action de ce principe.—*La Légende de Semiramis*, Paris, 1872, p. 62. And still there are school histories which give the whole fable for fact. However, it is much more innocent than many another imposed upon man's credulity.

² F. Thébaud, in his late admirable work, has these suggestive words on the subject: "How did the idea originate among them, that some deity ought to take a human

more or less civilized in proportion as they more or less clearly realized in their actions and their literature the synthetic formula of philosophy, or in other words, their origin and destiny. A primitive revelation they all of them had. Tradition kept alive the substance of this revelation, and in so far as it was the actuating principle of their lives were they successful. If there were no God, it would be right and proper for man to consult self at all times, and under all circumstances to abide by its dictates. But since there is a God, man has Him to rely on and to make the motive of his deeds. Any turning away from Him is a degradation of the individual. Therefore, when man lost sight of God, he sunk down into himself, practically made self the principle of all things, and deified his passions, his appetites, his thoughts. Every stock and stone that he conceived possessed of Divine power he paid homage to, whether it was a tree, as the Vata of India;¹ a stone, as with the Dakotas of the West;² a dog, as with the Parsees; a bundle of rags or a tuft of straw; an old hat or a rusty nail, as with the negroes;³ there in a special manner was the Divinity conceived to be concentrated, and there was He worshipped. Such things were considered locations of the Divinity, because they were instruments of magic, by means of which supernatural results were supposed to be brought about. "When," says F. Schlegel, "we come to examine more closely the accounts of that Fetish-worship (so-called) which is most widely diffused through the interior of Africa, and prevails among some American tribes and nations of the northeast of Asia, it is easy to perceive that magical rites are connected with it, and that all these corporeal objects are but magical instruments and conductors of magical power, and that the religion of these nations, sunk undoubtedly to the lowest grade of idolatry, comprises nothing beyond the rude beginnings of a pagan magic, such as, in all probability, was practiced by the Cainites."⁴ Fetishism is also connected with the older forms of polytheism, when prior to the anthropomorphic image and the glowing myth of the Iliad or the Ramayana, the gods were symbolized in a stone or an uncouth block of wood.

And it would seem that the more profoundly symbolical a people was, the deeper was the degradation into which it became sunken. There is the Chaldæan of old. His founder, Nimrod, who is spoken of in Scripture as "a mighty hunter before the Lord," whom he remembered as a lion in the battle-field, an eagle in the chase, he

shape and 'dwell among us?' We cannot say. Perhaps it was derived from the primitive tradition about the one who was 'to crush the head of the serpent.'—*Gentilism*, p. 165.

¹ Hardwick.

² S. B. Gould.

³ Schoolcraft.

⁴ *Philosophy of History*, p. 199.

actually represented with the body of a lion and the wings of an eagle. In the formation of this species of symbolism the Chaldæan cosmogony had much to do. As that speaks of "bulls with human heads, dogs with four bodies and with fishes' tails, men and horses with dogs' heads, creatures with the heads and bodies of horses but with the tails of fish and other animals, mixing the forms of various beasts," all as existing prior to man, it was natural for the popular mind to couple the idea of their first founder with these monsters. But Chaldæa received its symbolism in a great measure from Egypt; for we are told that "Chur begat Nimrod;" and the latest researches of history prove the accuracy of the Scripture phrase.¹

"Symbolism," says Lenormant, "was the very essence of the genius of the Egyptian nation, and of their religion." Every relic of Egyptian civilization confirms the assertion, and points to her as pre-eminently the land of symbolism. The hieroglyph-covered monuments look down upon us with a look of deep significancy; the Sphinx tells of an insoluble riddle; the Pyramids have their meaning. The temples speak of mysteries symbolized. The deep scientific knowledge of the Egyptian priesthood gave them insight into the properties of plants and the predominant traits of animals; and accordingly both plant and animal were made symbolical of some attribute of the Divinity. The doctrine of emanation finally led them to conceive Him as embodied in these objects. With them, in all probability, began the custom of representing the gods with the heads of animals and the bodies of men. Herodotus was anxious to know why Jupiter was represented with the head of a ram, and was told that he so appeared to Hercules.² But primarily it symbolized "the great idea of a supreme and invisible God becoming perceptible to our sight by the creation of the universe, represented here by the sun entering the zodiacal sign of the ram."³ When the primitive idea became more corrupt, it symbolized the Divinity as existing alike in man and beast. The priests, in their religious processions, masked themselves in the head of some animal according to the god they were honoring. "The sun and planets," says Kreuzer, "have their abodes in heaven; these abodes are the signs of the zodiac, represented by animals; consequently the sun and the planets bear the figure of the sign in which they are found. And when the priests, in their processions and religious ceremonies, wished to represent the different stations and relations of these astronomical gods, they took themselves analogous masks."⁴ And still, with all its science, and all its symbolism, Egypt fell low in

¹ See Rawlinson's *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. i.

² *Gentilism*, p. 329.

³ Book II., chap. 42.

⁴ I., i., p. 505.

idolatry; perhaps no nation ever degraded itself in its mysteries and ceremonies of religion as did Egypt. It shows what a people can become when abandoned to itself and oblivious of God and His revelation.

But the age of myths is not passed. Man to-day, as formerly, uses sign and symbol in his thinking. A word gives sufficient material from which to spin a thread of fiction. The name of a person or place, a metaphor, a personification, is each the basis upon which many an aerial structure of mythology is raised. Man communicates ideas by means of sensible images. Abstractions he finds existing only in the concrete. The finite is the plane upon which his intelligence converges all things. It gives a miniature picture. Even the infinite, though ever making correct use of it, he knows how to express but in its relations with the finite: it is the not-finite. Men are still to be found who are content to rule their lives by fictions of the brain; that is, by myths. True, they have abandoned the sensuous and palpable form; but in its place they have substituted a scientific abstraction, a Cosmic theory without the author of the Cosmos. Now, he who reduces to a mathematical formula, as a mere natural force, the Being who created him; who finds in the universe no God but law; who considers nature self-sufficient, and self the sole standard of action, is a refined Fetish-worshipper. The meaning of the symbolism of the Cosmos has passed from him.

FASHIONS AND PRINCIPLES IN POETRY.

Deirdré. Boston: Roberts Brothers. No Name Series. 8vo., pp. 262. 1876.

Songs in the Night and other Poems. By the author of *Christian Schools and Scholars.* London: Burns & Oates. 8vo., pp. 211. 1876.

THE poetry of this generation is a revival of the artificial school which preceded Wordsworth, with, however, none of its verbal polish, and may be divided as follows: (1), the class of Motiveless Despair; (2), the Profoundly Unintelligible; (3), the Flesh class; (4), and the Croquet class, *vers de société*. The productions of these classes except the second (Browning being its chief), are generally of the newspaper grade of merit, and harmonize pleasingly with the amateurishness of "culture" peculiar to complaisant people in an immature stage of intellectual development; wanting standards and the educated faculty for their application, and pretentious and positive in proportion. The truest of American poets, Lowell, is not popularly appreciated to the full, because he does not belong to any of the classes specified; because, in other words, he is lucid, natural, correct, and true, and the beauties of his verse are too delicate for the hasty and unrefined. It is never necessary to resort to the symbols of algebra to ascertain what he means; he never despairs, and his lyrics are richly sensuous but never sensual—a significant distinction. He is a poet, moreover, of genuine sentiment, chaste and sweet in quality, and always perfectly in tune; yet one does not find his poems as frequently on American family tables as those of some of the journalistic verse-affectors "who string their losses on a ryming thread," and who "chatter on molehills (far under the hill of the Muses)."¹

"Greekish girls, not Greeks, are ye!"²

Most of the poetry of this character is merely *réchauffé*; the inspiration comes from without to the writers, not from within; its production is owing to reading, not to overpowering poetic feeling, much less to the *mania* of Plato. It is merely the infection of the poetry of others imbibed by contact;—a disease is mistaken for afflatus, infection for inspiration, sympathy for a call to write, and a corner in a newspaper for immortality.

Shelley used to ponder over the mythological fiction that the Muses were daughters of Memory, not of Invention; and their dis-

¹ Chapman's Preface to the *Iliad*, 1598.

² *Iliad*., lib. ii.

ciples have been true to the family origin since Homer supplied material for an *Æneid*, and an *Æneid* furnished many a later and lesser Virgil, but the Nine must not be held responsible for every one who cries " Muse, Muse !"

" We call the muse. . . . ' O muse, benignant muse !'—
As if we had seen her purple-braided head
With the eyes in it, start between the boughs
As often as a stag's. What make-believe
With so much earnest ! What effete results
From virile efforts ! What cold wire-drawn odes
From such white heats !—bucolics where the cows
Would scare the writer if they splashed the mud
In lashing off the flies,—didactics driven
Against the heels of what the master said ;
And counterfeiting epics, shrill with trumps
A babe might blow between two straining cheeks
Of bubbled rose, to make his mother laugh ;
And elegiac griefs, and songs of love,
Like cast-off nosegays, picked up on the road,
The worse for being warm !"

It is a manifest misfortune for art and imagination that so much verse is written ; if there were less poetry, there would be greater poets. The multiplicity of books has so crowded the mind with the creatures of others' fancy, that no room remains for the results of spontaneous generation ; one's own imagination is turned out of doors to make room for guests who, like a rural minister's donation party, bring baskets' full with them, but destroy the carpet, the furniture, and the dishes in exhibiting and enjoying their own generosity. To a poetic mind, capable of original self-sustaining operation, too many books are an injury ; they are wary foes hidden in devices worthy of wily Ulysses, and reverentially drawn inside the gates to inflict a ruin which no Sinon is required to hasten, and no Laocoön can stay. The poets born may well protest to the poets made,

" I fear the Greeks
Even when they bring us gifts."

Nor the poets only. Oratory has also suffered from over-production, and is in a decline by surfeit. Demosthenes transcribed Thucydides six times ; had he enjoyed six authors instead of one, Greece would probably have had smaller defence against Philip, and the orator of whom Fénélon says, " he lightens, he thunders, he is a torrent which sweeps everything before it," would have afforded himself more enervating delight, and incurred less fatiguing labor, and would have dissipated in the frivolous pleasures of transient fancy what he has enlarged for posterity. The great orations, like the greatest poems, are those which are freest from

recondite erudition. The ultimate sources of both are the same, nature and simple imagination; and both have flourished most successfully under conditions at first the rule, now the exception,—conditions which exclude many books and are limited in largest part to extreme simplicity or intense passion. Simplicity is the mother of poetry; but oratory is born of turbulence. The muse of the one is sightless, as Homer was and Milton; but it is war which furnishes the orations in the *Iliad*, which, when not oratory, is poetry in its simple elements—nature—physical, mental, and emotional; and Milton would have been a truer poet had he been a poorer scholar; his God he quoted from Calvin's writings, his Lucifer is snatched from the wars of the Lord Protector, his armament is that of his own age, his language is of all ages, and the reader feels overpowered by incessant showers of lore selected from every country and every epoch, so heterogeneous as to bewilder, so brilliant as to dazzle. Thus *Lycidas*, his least, is more popular than *Paradise Lost*, his greatest; the heart is in the former, the latter is produced from the memory and the brain. It was the wars which brought forth the oratory of Greece, it was war which commissioned the orators of Rome, of France, of England, of Ireland and the United States, and war leaves books in the secret dust, and has no respect for any science but its own. If we

“ To the famous orators repair,
Those ancient, whose resistless eloquence
Wielded at will the fierce democratie,
Shook the arsenal, and fulminated over Greece,
To Macedon and Artaxerxes' throne,”

we find these men to have been ignorant of science, and so far as their orations show, ignorant also of what it is now fashionable to call “culture.” The fiercer and more frequent the conflicts, the more science dwindled; books were not in demand; poetry alone was active and in sympathy with its twin sister, oratory. “Even the most illogical of modern writers,” says Macaulay, “would stand perfectly aghast at the puerile fallacies which seem to have deluded some of the greatest men of antiquity. . . . But the very circumstances which retarded the growth of science were peculiarly favorable to the cultivation of eloquence.”

Simplicity is the essence of poetry, as passion is of oratory; and the epic, the highest form of poetry, is most urgent in its demand upon simplicity. It has not been disputed, and, in all probability it never will be, that the *Iliad* remains the model of epic verse. Yet what is the *Iliad*? A story of brutal love and more brutal war.

Agamemnon frankly exclaims, alluding to the quarrel which comprises the whole of the first book:

"Myself and Thetis' son
Like girls, in words fought for a girl;"¹

and "the king himself thus prayed for all:"

"O Jove, most great, most glorious, that in the starry hall
Sitt'st drawing dark clouds up to air, let not the sun go down,
Darkness supplying it, till my hands the palace and the town
Of Priam overthrow and burn, the arms on Hector's breast
Dividing, spoiling with my sword thousands, in interest
Of his bad quarrel, laid by him in dust and eating earth."²

A savage prayer, but no more savage than the cowardly taunt of Agamemnon to the aged Chryses, offering ransom for his daughter. When the priest explained that Jove was wroth on that account,

"Heroic Agamemnon rose,"

—heroic in nothing except the brutal, and, wantonly insulting the seer as a "prophet of ill," expresses a reluctant willingness to give up "fair Chryseis" for the weal of the army, provided proper recompense is made to him. Then "godlike" Achilles displays the mettle of his heroism by coarsely charging Agamemnon with being "in all ambition most covetous of all that breathe;" but he is willing to dicker with him for the loss of the stolen girl, and insists upon publicly declaring with contemptuous candor:

"O thou impudent! of no good but thine own
Ever respectful, but of that with all craft covetous,
With what heart can a man attempt a service dangerous,
Or at thy voice be spirited to fly upon a foe,
Thy mind thus wretched?"

He calls the king of men "thou dog's eyes," and the king of men retorts: "Strifes, battles, bloody things make thy blood-feasts still." Whereupon Achilles could scarcely restrain his godlike sword from slaughtering his companion, and possibly he would have done so, had not Minerva "stooped down from heaven" and dissuaded him by a promise of future and sweeter revenge. He enjoyed, however, the temporary gratification of applying to the king such epithets as "ever steep'd in wine," "dog's face," "with heart but of a hart," "subject-eating king;" and the possible onset was again checked by "sweet-spoken Nestor," who appealed to the gods to "repel these young men's passions," and they separated in wordy rage, Achilles to his tent and ships, Agamemnon to offer sacrifice to the gods. Compelled by superstition to give up the priest's daughter, he orders Achilles to surrender to him Briseis, "whom

¹ *Iliad*, lib. ii., Chapman's versification is used throughout the article. ² *Il.*, ii.

all the Greeks to him (Achilles) gave," and godlike Achilles wails over it, and complains to Thetis of his loss, and prays her to kneel to Jove and persuade him to betray the Greeks, and to enable the Trojans "to beat them to fleet and sea," "embruing their retreat in slaughter." When the "rude fool" Thersites, dared allude to Agamemnon's injustice to Achilles, Ulysses, "the divine," poured upon that garrulous hunchback a sputtering of abuse and contumely; then whipped him, cripple as he was, until "bloody wales arose." Nor is the story of the *Æneid* less brutal, except that it is tempered more gently by Æneas's beauty and the recital of unhappy Dido's woes. Yet these are the great epics; the study of universal youth; the admiration and heritage of mankind; the most illustrious art of the brightest and serenest poetic genius. Their faults are protected with religious reverence, and they keep their position because in their essence is found the ultimate pure principle of poetry,—simplicity. They are offensive to Christian virtue, and outrage on almost every page the sensibilities of civilization; but they are nevertheless pre-eminent in the pure poetic element, and therefore retain their immortality in spite of their faults.

Lowell relates the anecdote of Wordsworth's striking his whip through the hooped petticoat of an old lady in a picture, as being happily typical, after the manner of mythological prefiguration, of his afterwards "striking his defiant lash through the hooped petticoat of the artificial style of poetry, and proudly unsubdued by the punishment of the reviewers."¹ We do not know whether any episode in the childhood of the author of *Deirdré* furnished fit augury of his desertion of the poetic school of his own time, in order to return to the distant fountain of epic verse there to drink his inspiration. Indeed, we cannot but wish that even the name of Dr. Robert Joyce were as unknown in this early and misty hour of his reputation, as the hidden freaks of his infancy—for the fact of his graduation by the University of Dublin only contributes prejudices to a discussion of his talent—and *Deirdré* does not acquire additional merit from the only other important fact mentioned in relation to its author, that he is an able and successful practitioner in Boston. It were better for the poet and the poem that his personality remained unknown and unsuspected until its proper place be judicially assigned beyond the chances of hypotheses; it is better, too, for the critics and the non-critical public that they should have an opportunity to read, discuss, comment upon, and judge literary and artistic productions independently of personal considerations, and unblinded by the predilections, for or against, which nationality, religion, social and professional distinction, or

¹ Among My Books, vol. ii.

unworthy friendship, or more unworthy enmity inspires. Predilections upon a personal basis are invariably misleading, though the friend study to be impartial and the enemy flatter himself that he is just, and criticism, even in its highest and most civil plane, is as thoroughly personal to-day, if it be granted the right to be so, as it was with Hazlitt. To be his contemporary was to be abused. The old Greek injunction, "Call no man happy till he be dead," read to Hazlitt, "Call no man clever whom I have met." Yet Hazlitt's criticism governed the reading public of England, perhaps unconsciously, more than that of calmer and fairer men; we smile at it now, but his victims had more to do with tears. The thing written was to him of less consequence than the person writing, and he delivered judgment upon the work *a priori*, in severe accordance with his verdict first upon the man, a verdict made up in violation of all rules of evidence, and deliberately defiant of justice, honor, and fair dealing. His praise was as exorbitant as his censure, his faculty of judgment was emotional, and rarely, except by chance, judicial; but his intuitions were often so superior to what he supposed to be his reason, that he was frequently correct in the sum of his opinion. Nor was he alone in this fault; the brilliant *coterie* who divided the humor and the rancor of *Noctes Ambrosianæ* might have bequeathed some judicious criticism to an admiring posterity had they been less ambitious to ridicule their and their friends' political and personal enemies. The speeches of Shiel are now read with astonishment and delight, and *Evadne* still charms the stage. The titanic labors of O'Connell are no less recognized by all mankind than his inflexible integrity. Yet, what epithet did the Shepherd spare in characterizing these two men, deriding the literary talents of the one and seeking to degrade the other into an apparent *rôle* of political trafficker! Personality in criticism is an immovable stumbling-block against candor. It is as great an obstacle to the friendly as to the wanton or the vicious. It has caused one class of writers to elevate *Deirdré* into the highest rank of poetic literature, and it has evoked from others expressions of stupid and wilful dispraise, suggestive chiefly of national prejudice and a failure to read the lines. *Deirdré* has been lauded as "one of the classics of the nineteenth century," and we are at a loss to know what the other classics of the century are. And a New England educational journal has so slight a conceit in regard to its merits, that its undeniable success is attributed solely to the publishers' pretty novelty, the "No Name Series," of which *Deirdré* is the second member. We say, therefore, that it is unfortunate for the poem, the critics, the public, and Dr. Robert Joyce, that the secret of the authorship has been prematurely violated. Time was when to touch the hem of the garment expressed the profoundest reverence. But to

handle a poet's "singing robes" now dissipates the glow of the glory which distance lends; enchantment crumbles between the fingers, when, on remote and inaccessible heights, it would appear seraphic.

We wish to thank Dr. Joyce, with the greatest frankness, for turning his back upon the prevailing fashions in poetry. In doing this, he exhibits not only high moral courage but true poetic instinct, and an exquisite sensibility as to harmony of subject and style. To write the story of this poem in other than heroic decasyllable would be to represent Samson in the shape and apparel of Sir Philip Sidney, or to paint Rachel in the glinting brocade, starched ruff, and powdered hair of Lady Jane. Anachronism is not limited to facts, it may be also a fault of style; and since the Gaelic story which Dr. Joyce selected is as purely epic, although in much less degree, as the abduction of Helen, the siege of Troy, and the wanderings of Ulysses and Æneas, it was imperative that it should be detailed in epic verse. Nor can we doubt that Dr. Joyce has devoted his leisure chiefly to the study of these universal models; the rich and masterly text is evidence enough, that in this respect, he was no less sagacious than Bossuet, who, before going into the pulpit, habitually read Homer. "I light my lamp at the sun," said he. Certain descriptions of scenery in *Deirdré* are modern, and, as we shall see, very pleasing and picturesque, without, however, adding strength to or confirming the unique individuality of the whole; they lend to the poem a kind of conventional grace. The conspicuous merit of *Deirdré* is in its sublimity—somewhat bald, we admit—of simple and strong delineation of two passions, love and hate. The accessories are not managed with equal or even striking skill, a fact which indicates that the author's genius is better than his talent; he conceives nobly, though he falls below his aim in execution. To sum it up in a word, *Deirdré* is an admirable and delightful attempt at a great poem, it is epic-ish, not quite epic, except in the narrow sense of being a legendary narrative in heroic verse.

The plot, if plot it may be called, which plot hath none distinguishable in member, joint, or limb, is, of course, brief and straightforward. *Deirdré* is the daughter of the court story-teller of King Connor of Ulster. Her birth is pronounced a fatal omen for the kingdom, and the nobles demand that the infant shall be slain, but the king calms the clamor by giving orders that *Deirdré* be shut up within a palace until she is old enough to become his wife. Naisi, one of the three sons of Usna, sees her beauty before she has reached womanhood; his affection is returned; and while the king is absent on the hunt, *Deirdré* escapes with Naisi and his brothers, who carry her to Alba, and there agree to render military

service to the Albanian monarch. He, however, falls in love with Deirdré, who again escapes, with her husband and his brothers, to an island in the sea, which, after a peaceful and happy period, they are persuaded by the King of Ulster to leave, in order that they may return to their home. The king breaks his oath, murders the three brothers and their kinsmen, and attempts to take Deirdré to wife. She is found dead upon the body of Naisi. This is not a "plot," neither is the taking of Troy. *Epos* in this connection means only a story or a song, and this story or song is only of nature, love, and war, the last being on a comparatively small scale, but savage, skilful, and terrific.

We will group together the metaphors and similes which are ideal only; then the descriptions of nature; and, lastly, the battles, in which the poet's power is most perfectly displayed; and this convenient classification will enable us more easily to reach a fair judgment of the qualities of the whole poem.

Lavarcam, Deirdré's nurse, is thus happily and aptly described. "Conversation Dame" has a subtle vein of humor in it which may be pardoned in a doctor :

" First of all there came
Old Lavarcam, the Conversation Dame
Of the great king, who told him all the sport
And loves and plots and scandals of the court.
A pace before them walked she mincingly,
And to each great lord bent the pliant knee;
Sharp eyes she had, each speck and fault that saw,
And face as yellow as an osprey's claw,
And wrinkled like tough vellum by the heat,
As moved she forward the monarch's golden seat,
Smirking and smiling on the baby bright
That in her arms lay clad in lily white,
With large blue eyes and *downy yellow hair*
And skin like pink leaves when the morns are fair."

After Caffa, the priest, has foretold Deirdré's beauty and the perils it would entail,

" Then rose an aged lord with haughty air,
And shaggy brows and grizzled beard and hair,
Whose fierce eye o'er the margin of his shield
Had gazed from war's first ridge on many a field
Unblinking at the foe that on him glared,"

and tells a northern legend.

" One young June day, when winter with shrill groans
Felt coming death through all his frozen bones,
And three long days had struggled in the North
In storm to march his drunken army forth
Of icebergs toppling o'er the ocean swell,"

a breaker dashed on the shore a young bear, which the fishermen

believed to be the progeny of a god. They built a temple, worshipped it year by year, and one day the mighty creature stole away.

"Beneath a hawthorn tree,
A little child sat weeping piteously,
With a great thorn in his white foot sunk deep
That made the red blood flow. Then 'gan to creep
The great bear round him snuffing till she came
And licked the blood;—then shot a dreadful flame
From the fierce depths of her red rolling eye,
And, like a fiend, she reared her head on high
O'er the fair child, and with fell face and grim
In hot blood wallowing tore him limb from limb;
Then turned she on the children all around,
And slew them, till the smooth green's grassy ground
Was all one mass of steaming flesh and gore,
And echoing to her loud remorseless roar!"

A literary authority,¹ accepted as one of the highest in the United States, speaks of this as "needlessly physical hideousness." If this be a valid objection, what shall be done with hundreds of lines in the *Iliad* which are much more objectionable for the same reason? Does it not indicate rather what Horne finds in Chapman as a fit translation of Homer, "primitive power, and rough truthfulness of description?" What condemnation is adequate for Homer's recital in the third book, of the manner in which Menelaus sent his lance into the entrails of Paris? The objection to the passage quoted is surely finical.

Deirdré, however, is not slain as the old knight argued that she should be; but, a prisoner in the palace, grows in beauty and in curiosity.

"And 'What am I?'
I asked the stream; and it was churlish too,
And would not speak, but from its weeds upthrew
A great brown frog, puffed up with too much pride,
And 'Ugly! ugly! ugly!' hoarse he cried."

Lavarcam tells her she is to be a bride.

"A bride!—O Lavarcam, I know that too!
Oft have I seen the little wild-birds woo
Their winsome brides amid the branches green,
And call, and call, 'My queen! my queen! my queen!'
'Twas only in the early yester morn
As I sat close beneath yon flowering thorn,
I saw a blue wood-pigeon and his bride
Adown the garden grass walk side by side,
Cooing in gladness as they went along."

A squirrel invites her to climb his tree, and, swaying in its branches, she first sees Naisi with his brothers, and

¹ The Atlantic Monthly, December, 1876.

"The world's great shining plains spread out so far,—
Oh, farther than the slender glittering bar
Of cloud that oft in windless nights of June
Lies like a golden lance athwart the moon !"

Is not the vividness of the following picture a manifestation of pure genius?

"They looked and saw
The eagle of the golden beak and claw,
And bronze bright feathers shadowy overhead,
And silent on the elastic ether spread
A space, or with alternate flutterings
Beating the light air with his winnowing wings ;
While, underneath, the quick hares 'gan to flee
Into the brake, save one that tremblingly
Crouched blind with fear. Then, as when 'cross the heaven
On a wild March day the dark smack is driven,
And a small cloud-rent sails athwart the sun,
Sudden a bright gleam smites the marshland wan,
Arrowy and swift, so like that flash of light
The mighty king-bird from the heavenly height
Shot down upon the shuddering prey below
With a great whirr that raised the powdery snow
In a pale cloud around, and from that cloud
His piercing mort-scream echoed shrill and loud
Upon the listeners' ears ; then with his prey
Up through the blue bright heaven he sailed away,
Leaving upon the snow a broad red streak
Of blood behind him."

In the eleventh book of the *Æneid* there is a picture of an eagle, and while the figure is less expanded and more quickly drawn, it is impossible to deny that it is a spark of the same genius which inspires both. We use Cranch's translation, being in the same metre.

"As when on high
A tawny eagle bears a serpent off,
And clings to it with griping claws, the snake,
Wounded and writhing, twists its sinuous rings,
And rears its bristling scales and hissing mouth ;
But none the less the bird with crooked beak
Strikes at the struggling reptile, and the air
Beats with her wings."

One of Naisi's brothers leads the march forward to the sea, a

"Ponderous sword hung low upon his thigh,
Whose huge hilt sparkled like a starlit sky
With many a gem ;"

And when Keth of Connaught seemed to threaten resistance to their march, Ardan

"Spoke to his followers their full files to close;
Then hoarse on either side a tumult rose
Of hostile preparation like the war
Of winds in piny woods, or on the shore
The sound of waves remurmuring in the night."

In the tenth book of the *Æneid*, Juno pleads with Jupiter in opposition to Venus. When she had concluded,

"The immortals all
Murmured their various sentences; as when
The rising breeze caught in the forest depths,
Muttering in smothered sighs and undertones,
Foretells to mariners the coming storm."

Some remarkable coincidences will be found in the fighting scenes in *Deirdré* and those of the *Æneid*, which, however, do not cast any shadow of plagiarism upon the former; for the lion, the wolf, the bull, have been employed in the lore of every age to typify boldness, strength, courage, cruelty or ferocity; and no poet claims a copyright upon the winds, the waves, the mountains, or the sky.

We cannot extend these citations farther, except to quote a few additional lines.

"The moon lit up the open glades,
Gleaming in harness, shields and swords and blades
Of brazen javelins, *changing momentarily*
Like the pale starbeams on a troubled sea."

* * * *

"The low grumbling of the guttural horn."
* * * *

"From his vernal bed
The sun upraised his glorious gladsome head,
And looked with smiles benign o'er earth and sea."

* * * *

"The furious wave of Toth
Rose round the giant's pillars *white with froth,*
And shook its mane, loud bellowing!"

* * * *

The poem contains many superb pictures of nature, which, if isolated and offered to the public by themselves, would make a gallery, not so great in numbers, perhaps a dozen in all, but of surpassing merit in composition, and rare nicety in detail. We can make room for only one. It is late autumn:

"Upon the spreading thorn
The fieldfares bickered at the ruddy haw,
The last fruit of the year; the thievish daw
Fought on the palace gable with his wife;
And the fierce magpie, born to ceaseless strife,

Swung on the larch, and told his household woes,
Or plumed his tail and threatened all his foes
With vicious screams and angry rhapsodies ;
And loud the finches chirruped in the trees.

* * * * *

Then from on high
To earth slow spiralling adown the sky,
The first great feathery snow-flakes made their way
Till all the garden changed from black to gray,
From gray to white."

And for this,

"A mighty herd of kine came driving in
Filling the hollow. High the steam arose
From their perspiring backs, like that which shows
Its rolling mists at morn o'er Gada's mere
Amid the young spring meadows, when the year
Dyes its last hoar frost in the risen sun,
And dim-seen cattle round the pasture run!"

Such spontaneous power as this is not mere poetic feeling ; it is genius ; and if *Deirdré* be not as free from minor faults, and occasional but not frequent lapses into mere functional verse, the reader is already in possession of sufficient testimony on which to base the highest hope of the poet's future.

Strangely enough, it is another Irish poet who, with Joyce, has contributed most conspicuously to the descriptive poetry of the time, John Boyle O'Reilly, also of Boston, and now editor of the *Pilot*. His volume entitled *Songs of the Southern Seas* contains Australian landscapes drawn with a dexterous hand, and finished with coloring of tropical gorgeousness. Strangely enough, too, considering their national ancestry, neither of these poets has shown a preference for sentimental rhapsody or that melodious lyrical jingle whose tintinnabulation suggests the clinking of wine-glasses and the smiles of Tom Moore. Irishmen both, they are pioneers in a healthier and more robust school of fancy, in which the permanent principle of the beautiful and the true is recognized above the quickly shifting moods, the exhilaration, and the languor of changing emotion, which produces a *Lalla Rookh* for the boudoir and couplets for a banqueting-room.

Yet we wish there was more of sentiment in *Deirdré*. It is singularly lacking in the domestic and the tender. To *Deirdré* herself we must make a specific objection ; she does not *materialize*. We know the poet is writing her praise ; we hear that she is beautiful ; we are assured that she is talking, and woful commonplace, too ; we read that she leaves Eman with Naisi and his brothers and the tribe ; we have learned the color of her eyes and hair ; but

nevertheless, we do not hear her or see her or touch her. She remains "hearsay" to us. Possibly, the fault is one of costume; she was carried into the feasting-hall, an infant, in white clothes, long and snowy, and appropriately brodered; and the poet, so to speak, has forgotten to change her dress and introduce us to her in garments of womanhood, rustling so that our senses may know that it is indeed Deirdré. Nor do we think that, in heart and soul, she is in the slightest degree heroic, as a young Irish wife would have been, and ought to have been under circumstances so favoring to heroism. She is not even as heroic as Helen; for that lovely person, despicable in so many qualities, was brave enough to reproach Paris with his effeminacy after the fight with Menelaus, by whom he would undoubtedly have been slain had not Venus hurried him away through the unresisting ether. Creüsa is not a heroine in the true sense; yet she rises superior to Deirdré as a wife and a courageous woman. From the moment Deirdré elopes with Naisi until the end of the tragedy, she is only weak, frightened, whimpering, and stupid. She is fond of her child, but in that ordinary and inexpressive manner peculiar to a Saxon; but by no means peculiar to a young and ardent Gaelic mother, who would have made a palace hall or a tent ring hourly with her own joy and the crowings of the bairn as he found his voice. One cannot reasonably complain of the fatal absence of love scenes between husband, wife, and child, while the clan were on the march, or engaged in preparations for battle; the poet's opportunity, which he so unaccountably neglected, was lost during their peaceful life in the Hebrides, where they dwelt secure from intrusion and free from embarrassment. We cannot refrain from hoping that Dr. Joyce will repair what we conceive to be a radical and original fault in so extended a poem, by writing an additional canto, devoted to the detail of this portion of the narrative; exhibiting more clearly the character of Deirdré as it exists in his imagination, whence he has failed to transfer it to his readers; and describing such incidents and episodes of the pastoral life the clan then led, as will correct the erroneous notion of Irish barbarity and savageness, which so generally prevails regarding the early period of national history. We now see only the military ardor, the muscular strength, and the animal daring of the sons of Usna. He should make us see their gentler nature; their generosity, chivalry, patience, and kindness. Naisi we admire for manly attributes of the coarser kind; he is a Gaelic Samson; and the only weakness the poet accredits to him is one which not only is inartistic, but which casts a stain upon his conjugal honor, and fires the passive Deirdré with jealousy, which she has not the strength to suppress nor the tact to conceal.

" In the green rose-garden beside the hall,
I saw my husband meet beneath the bowers
Dunthorne's young daughter, Enna of the Flowers,
The fairest maid of all thy lovely land,
And there he took and kissed her willing hand,
And spoke words that I could not hear. Ah me!
The soul-consuming fire of jealousy!
The torments and the wrath! Till Naisi swore
In presence of his arms that evermore
He loved me—me alone."

We sympathize with Deirdré, and pity her; but the poet should make us love his heroine, and we cannot love whom we do not know, even ideally. In a word, the artistic work upon Deirdré is not "filled in." She is given to our gaze only in sombre and indistinct outline; she does not "materialize." A canto of the kind we venture to suggest would, we are confident, supply what most readers now feel to be a lack,—a full, warm, glowing, and tender picture of Naisi and Deirdré as husband and wife, such as Dr. Joyce can write with a dainty and exquisite pen.

Notwithstanding the felicity of the protracted similes, and the singular accuracy and beauty of the natural descriptions,—of which we have been able to give only a suggestion,—the battle-scenes are incomparably the finest. They are not indeed Homeric—they are fights instead of systematic or scientific warfare—but Virgilian rather, exhibiting individual prowess; but the strain is not even so broad as that of the *Æneid*—there are fewer notes to the chord. The encounters selected for narration are commonly between the three brothers, singly or aiding each other, and the leaders of the opposing clan. These encounters are described with sudden and amazing directness. Episodes are related with a swiftness of brilliancy like that of a spear dashing through sunlight. We hear the rattle of the armor and the shouts of the excited participants, and blood flows in torrents on the breast of the streams and down the sides of the mountains. Naisi aims a blow at the heavy-barred Fomorian door:

" Through boss and sea-worn plank, intent to slay,
Crashing the cruel spear-head made its way,
Far-piercing through a soldier's head and breast,
Who stood behind, and bandied gibe and jest,
Laughing with his compeers—ah, knowing not
That Death oft seeketh man's securest spot
To strike unseen! Down drooped the soldier's head,
And a grim pallor o'er his features spread,
And fast his heart poured forth its crimson tide
And hanging on the spear impaled he died.

* * * * *

As Naisi with a shout plucked back again
His long spear, and the armed corse fell down
Clattering upon the causeway."

The naval battle is equal to anything in the *Æneid*—we say this deliberately. We cannot quote more than a brief portion:

“ Like the peal
Of the loud clarion ere the valiant cross
Their bickering swords with shields faced boss to boss
On the red field of war, from left to right
Of the long fleet rang Naisi's voice of might,
Ordering his battle. Loud the capstans groan
Shipping the anchors; strong the broad sails blown
Swelled their white bellies to the sunny ray;
Out flew the oars, to wreaths of hissing spray,
Churning the waters with well-measured sweep
And the fleet moved, first slowly, on the deep,
Till gathering strength at last along the main
It swept, far furrowing all the watery plain!

* * * * *

For a space
With many a sharpened hook in fell embrace
Each galley clasped the other; yard and shroud
And prow and poop shot forth its deadly cloud
Of darts and arrows; while in hands of might
Over the bulwarks crossed the sword-blades bright,
And the plume dropped from cloven helm and crest,
And the long spear in many a valiant breast
Buried its brazen head.

* * * * *

And now the king's great galley backward drew,
Swift swinging round with oars again outspread
To bring on th' Osprey's beam her armed head.
Swung round, she stops, and then returns once more
With speed redoubling 'neath the powerful oar,
Cleaving the water in her dreadful race
'Gainst th' Osprey, that, all-crowded, found no space
For turning from the shock that ne'er was given;
For, like the lightning bolt that shoots from heaven
And rends some lordly castle with its flame,
Round from the left the Hill Cat plunging came,
And struck the Alban galley where the side
Bends like a shoulder forward o'er the tide,
And reft her groaning ribs in thunder, then
Backed with wide-sweeping oars to plunge again!
Needless, for through the breach the waters poured,
And 'mid the galley's hollow entrails roared;
From side to side she rocked; with dreadful yell
Flat on the deck many a brave man fell,
Or at the bulwark clutched full desperately,
Or from the yards plunged headlong in the sea.”

Deceived by the promises of King Connor, the sons of Usna return to Eman. The story of their massacre is told with extraordinary vividness. They are beheaded by the monarch's orders. The pitying multitude burst into a shout of anguish rending the air:

" And with it rose the shrill voice of despair
From Deirdré, over all sounds rising high
And piercing, like a wounded sea-gull's cry
Heard 'mid the roar of storms,"

and the closing pages of the poem bring copious tears,—the deep, spontaneous tribute to the poet's power.

It is impossible to read the poem attentively without confessing that the inspiration is Pierian. It would be reasonable to suppose that the author had fed his imagination on two poems,—the *Iliad* and the *Aeneid*, just as Greek mothers filled their chambers with copies of the Apollo and the Venus in order to cultivate beauty in their children. Here and there, one is startled by familiar personification, such as "Terror led their flight," "Mercy fled the field despairing; rage or coward dread possessed all hearts;" "Slaughter with crimson wings and raven beak flapped the black sky about exultingly." The treatment of the sea and sky, the earth and the atmosphere, is strongly flavored with odors from Parnassus; and it may be objected that, to garnish the robe of a Gaelic tale with flowers from Hellenic Olympus is incongruous; but, if this objection be allowable, what apology shall Milton find? We do not know how to defend clearly an allusion to the "trump of Doom" in *Deirdré*; but it certainly is as tolerable for Dr. Joyce to write in an Irish epic

"The young dawn arose in ruby flame,"

as for Milton to write in a Mosaic epic,

"Now morn, her rosy steps in the Eastern clime advancing;"

we cannot, however, so lightly pass "strong spear-bristling shield," nor "Moyle's hoarse-resounding, high wave-curling tide," merely because Chapman found it necessary, in translating Homer, to construct such English as "His golden-riband-bound maned horse," and "divine joy-in-the-heart-infusing wine." In the Greek, "a language blest of all others in the happy marriage of sweet words," one word expresses what in our harsh tongue "are mere printer's compound epithets;"¹ and as Dr. Joyce was writing English, and not translating Greek, he should have avoided an extravagance in hyphens. The frequent use of "full" as an adverb, and "fell" as an adjective adds no dignity to the lines; the revival of "unmeeting," "stowne," "dreed," etc., only detracts from a limpid simplicity of phrase and mars its graceful strength; and a singular fault of syntax appears in "I cannot love but one" and "None else, O king, but thou didst save me."

¹ Hooper's Introduction to the *Iliad* of Homer.

The rhyming is smooth, sweet, and unobtrusive; like rich quiet music in a cathedral, carrying its sweet strain along, filling the air with incense of harmony, lending beauty to devotion, and giving unction to prayer, but never attracting attention to itself. Taken all in all, *Deirdré* is a noble effort of rare poetic genius; its merits are many and magnificent, the faults few and trivial—falterings of inexperienced talent unequal to the desires of its commanding genius—as Mercury failed sometimes adequately to deliver the celestial messages of Jove. The author is young enough to make this superb production the beginning of a splendid hope. Wordsworth was forty-four when he wrote *The Excursion*, Dante must have been nearly forty when he began the *Divine Comedy*, and the first lines of *Paradise Lost* were traced after old age and sorrow had closed the sight of Milton. *Deirdré* is the poetry of nature and passion—the glorious oak on the mountain's brow, instead of the scarlet oak-leaf, pressed, dried, and pinned on the lace curtain of a drawing-room. The author of *Deirdré* is a poet in the high and true acceptance of that high title; and what Macaulay denied of another, we may affirm of him, "he has taken a seat upon the dais, unchallenged by a single seneschal."

Songs in the Night is a volume of religious lyrics. A religious lyric is commonly a rhymed expression of dull piety. Many persons address to man in prolix verse what should be addressed to God in plain prose. If the rhymes be intended directly for the Deity, the artistic effect is much the worse; for it seems to be an unformulated canon of painting, music, and poetry, that what men will not tolerate, God will gratefully accept. The pictures gravely hung in the churches, the windows illuminated with pretended prophets, evangelists, virgins, and martyrs, the statues caricaturing the sweetest and dearest associations of sanctity—would art cry out if a new iconoclast should go among them with an axe to shatter the plaster and the panes, and tear the base canvas into ribbons? In what art gallery or parlor would be preserved three-fourths of the daubs that desecrate consecrated walls? Is God less worthy of homage than man? When Handel was giving concerts in London, a young singer who had been the tenor of a suburban church, was introduced to him as worthy to take a leading part in oratorio. The candidate was accepted, a rôle assigned, and the performance began; but the ambitious aspirant proved to be an execrable vocalist, and the audience hissed so violently that the great *maestro* summoned the tenor off the stage. "Young man," said he, in his broken English, "go back to de country and lead de choir in de church; God Almighty will forgive you your bad singing, but dese people dey will not." So it is in all the arts; we expect God to pardon us for bad painting, bad music, and bad

poetry, just as He forgives falsehood and slander; with this essential difference, that, while sin in morals is odious to Him, we think He looks with pleased indulgence upon sins in art. Eastern nations drown their deformed children; we give ours, in art, to God. The great sculptors of antiquity destroyed, with a single blow of the hammer, the finished statue which did not electrically respond to the final invocation, "Now, speak!" We industriously gather the halt, the lame, the blind, the ugly, in the studios of all nations, and hurry them into the Christian sanctuaries. We group around the altar Thersites for Moses, Bacchus for the Beloved Disciple, Thor and Odin for St. Peter and St. Paul, Silenus for St. Anthony, druids for patriarchs, satyrs for saints, and dryads for guardian angels. We are equally ignoble and inconsistent in music. An Eastern Bishop and a Roman Pope arranged for the Church the first system of music; a monk of Arezzo discovered the principle of the modern scale; a papal choir-master first applied the rules of counterpoint, and a St. Philip Neri was the father of the oratorio. Now, plain chant is rarely sung except by rude voices which torture it; the harmony of Palestrina is heard only in Rome; the oratorio has been frittered away into Italian opera; the grand unison of the massive, stately, and gracious Gregorian has passed out of the Church to let in the frivolity and *fleur-de-lis* of the concert-room; the chant is already a cavatina, and the *Gloria*, *Credo*, and *Agnus Dei* are syllabled to airs equally popular in the wine-garden and at the picnic.

As in art and music, so in poetry. Southwell, Heber, Keble, Faber, Adelaide Procter, and a few others, have laid at the foot of the altar the soul of their talents, baptized it at the holy fount, and preserved the white robe of its purity to the end. Yet ask the average reader of poetry what he knows of the verse of these, and he will recall perhaps a quatrain from "*The Christian Year*," or Heber's

"If thou wert by my side, my love,
How fast would evening fail
In green Bengala's palmy grove,
Listening the nightingale!"

but nothing of Faber or Southwell, and only a few lines of Adelaide Procter's gentle melancholy. The more recent religious poetry, which has received any notice whatever, is of the Motiveless Despair class, its most pleasing exponents being Christina Rossetti, with her spiritistic psychical introspection, and Jean Ingelow, whom everybody loves in spite of her exuberance of daffodils; but both are best known by poems not religious even in fantastic sombreness. In a word, so little reverence lingers in the skeptical and

gradually rationalizing Anglo-Saxon race, that one cannot wonder at the threatened disappearance of religion from poetry or of poetry from religion.

It is clear that no religious poetry can now find an audience unless it be characterized by a certain pure sensuousness and thoroughly good art. "Mysterious stirrings of the heart, and keen emotions, and strange yearnings after we know not what, and awful impressions from we know not whence" will not serve, notwithstanding that they may "have escaped from some higher sphere," and "are the outpourings of eternal harmony in the medium of created sound; echoes from our home; voices of angels, or the *Magnificat* of saints, or the living laws of Divine governance, or the Divine attributes." The condition of taste is such that religious poetry, to be generally read, must make its first appeal through the exquisiteness of its art; its religiousness will not be endured except as the inclosure by the art. The fastidious lover of our prevailing fashions in verse looks to the setting first; if the filagree suit him, he may be persuaded to examine the gem! Even artifice may be found expedient where candid art would fail, or only moderately succeed. "It is quite an ordinary fact," says our best American critic, Lowell, "that a blaze may be made with a little saltpetre that would be stared at by thousands, who would have thought the sunrise tedious."

Songs in the Night come to us from the cloisters and walks of an English Benedictine nunnery. The author is Mother Raphael Draine, prioress of the convent at Stone, Staffordshire. A patient and accurate writer, we have known her heretofore as the historian of *Christian Schools and Scholars*, a work as valuable to the investigator of education as the grammars to a philologist; a work whose comprehensiveness and research must have consumed years of toil, demanded exact mental habits, and largely exhausted the intellectual energy. Two such elaborate volumes, covering twelve centuries of universal history, might well have been toil enough for one, and that one a woman, whose time cannot under the rules of her vocation be wholly given to literature; yet there are poems here which would justify the belief that the writer never wrote aught but poetry, and was in the very bloom of youth and ardor of imagination.

This is entitled "Forgotten 'mid the Lilies:"

* * * * *

"O darkness! thou hast beauties as the morn;
The quiet pensive stars are all for thee;
They veil their eyes what time the shadows flee,
And their bespangled mantle is withdrawn
Before the rosy brightness of the dawn.

- * * * * *
- " I wander on, scarce knowing how I dare
Thus brave the terrors of the lonely night.
Ah me! what stirs before my dazzled sight?
From yonder turret in the dark-blue air
I see a shadow as of waving hair!
- " Art thou then near? Oh speak, and let me know!
I see thee, hear thee not; is this thy hand?
And dost thou by the waving cedars stand?
And does the night-breeze on thy forehead blow?
Wilt thou depart? Oh, answer ere I go!
- " And did he answer? Ask me not to say;—
I only know he left me, and I lie
As one forgotten, yet who cannot die;
And here I found myself at break of day,
Forgotten 'mid the lilies by the way.
- " It is a weary thing to be forgot—
A tearful, weary, melancholy thing
To lie here like a bird with wounded wing;
Yet there is something, though I know not what,
That makes me lie at rest, and love my lot.
- * * * * *
- " A sad sweet lot—I needs must call it sweet;
My cares, like withered buds, I cast aside,
And reck but little what may next betide;
The days and years fly past on pinions fleet,
Amid these lilies, crushed beneath his feet.
- " Till then among the lilies let me lie;
See, I have cast my idle cares away,
Howe'er it be, I am content to stay
Until once more the Bridegroom passes by,
And hither turns his gracious, pitying eye.
- " Know only this,—I suffer, yet I rest,
For all my cares and fears are cast away,
And more than this I know not how to say,
Forgotten though I be, I own it best,
And 'mid the lilies lie in perfect rest."

Most of the poems were suggested by passages, here and there, in the spiritual canticles of St. John of the Cross; a few are imitations of very old religious poetry, notably of Lydgate's *Court of Sapience*. Lydgate, we may add, was a poet of very high reputation in his day, not much below Chaucer. He was a monk of Bury Saint Edmund, and taught rhetoric there, and is the only poet of much distinction in the century between Chaucer and Spenser; yet only his name remains, and that flits like a phantom through manuals of English literature, to remind us of the brevity and hollowness of fame. A contemporary of Sir Thomas More, he was without a rival in poetic art and translation for nearly a hundred years, and

enjoyed the then enviable honor of composing at the royal request. Now, he is indebted to the learning and the fancy of another inmate of the cloister for a resuscitation of his memory!

Many of the poems in this volume are flawless; tenderness and grace of feeling are expressed in choice, chaste diction. They contain no striking novelties of metaphor, no metaphysical obscurities, or rhetorical tangles, as in Mrs. Browning, or artificial inventions and fantastic combinations, as in the verse of Jean Ingelow. Mother Raphael is a true poet in loving nature, and her fervor rises in the lines as sweetly as daisies in a meadow. We are not harassed by morbid grief, or set to sighing in sympathy with languid sentiment; she does not

"Dwell apart,
Tending some ideal smart
In a sick and coward heart."

The atmosphere of the book is young, vigorous, and healthy, full of salt-sea air as of chapel incense; and this, in religious poetry, is a merit which cannot be surpassed by any other quality. Its absence is the great fault of Adelaide Procter. Thus Mother Raphael writes of "disappointment:"

"He knew it must be so,
Some hearts for chorus tones are pitched too low;
The strings of his had borne too tight a strain,—
At the first chord he struck they snapped in twain.

"Dost thou despise him, friend?
Know that each soul is born for its own end;
*Nor is success the standard, for in heaven
A double bliss to broken hearts is given."*

This will answer for consolation, too, for we all cannot wait for heaven to console, if heaven shall; present burdens are so great sometimes, they fill the whole world we live in, and shut out heaven by the density and the darkness of their own sorrow. In such moments, a poet speaks dogmatic truth, for, though the world of each be very big with what presses close and thick upon us, and our atom swells into a universe,—how little each of us is in the world; specks, unseen of others, with eyes in the centre seeing only our own circumference and expanding that into the immense! And all the time, whether it be joy or woe with us, each speck is discharging its assigned function, with or without our will, and

"Life's pendulum swings on
As we with busy brain a texture weave,
And, hour by hour, infer, assent, believe.
The earnest eyes of angels by our side,
Behold the work, and all unseen, they guide
The shuttle's fall aright, till the fair web is done."

In nearly every musical composition we seem to hear strains which we think we heard before; so, in new poems, we fancy there are welcome reminiscences of earlier pleasure. In *Songs in the Night* we hear Wordsworth, with musical recurrence; and Christina Rossetti and dearly beloved Adelaide Procter. This makes the verse, if dear at all, so much the dearer; and thus we commend *Songs in the Night* for that deliciousness of charm which gives us a new and lovely companion, in addition to others hitherto and forever dear, and all congenial.

CAN THE IMMATERIALITY, SPIRITUALITY, AND
IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL
BE DEMONSTRATED?

Body and Mind. By Henry Maudsley, M.D., London. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

Primeval Man. By the Duke of Argyll. New York: George Routledge & Sons. 1874.

THE proof that the human soul is immaterial, spiritual, and immortal, seemed, even to some Christian philosophers of preceding centuries, to be a difficult task. Duns Scotus held the opinion that neither the mortality nor the immortality of man's soul can be conclusively proved by unaided reason. Other Christian philosophers, with Jandunus, Peter Pomponatius, and Simon Portius, maintained that according to philosophy and natural reason, the human soul is mortal; but according to faith it is immortal. Many understand Aristotle as wavering in his judgment of this matter; while others, with the schoolmen, explain his words as unequivocally declaring for the spirituality and immortality of man's soul. There is a numerous class of physicists at the present day, who, with Tyndall, hold that "in matter we have the promise and potency of every form and quality of life," and, by consequence, matter is in itself capable of intellectual life. Locke maintained that it is not intrinsically impossible for matter to think; on this account he denies that the immateriality of the soul can be demonstrated by natural reason, "for the state we are at present in, not

being that of vision, we must, in many things, content ourselves with faith and probability; and in the present question, about the immateriality of the soul, if our faculties cannot arrive at demonstrative certainty we need not think it strange. . . . It is a point which seems to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge."¹ Herbert Spencer, Mill, and other English writers on science, with a numerous school of German philosophers, simply remit this question concerning the spiritual nature of the soul, to the category of the unknowable; a dark abyss into which every subject pertaining to spiritual and personal natures is sent by them, summarily and without the benefit of a fair hearing. Finally, there are they who look upon the question concerning the nature of the human soul as still unsettled, and they expect the physiologist and biologist to decide it; for they deem it an inquiry which it is for this class of physicists to answer. The Duke of Argyll denies that this dispute belongs to the sphere of physiology: "The fundamental error of the phrenological school lay in the idea that a science of mind can be founded in any shape or form upon the discoveries of anatomy. Their error lay in the notion that physiology can ever be the basis of psychology; and this is an error and a confusion of thought which survives phrenology."²

No doubt the science of physiology and the philosophy of the human soul may mutually benefit each other, at least, indirectly; but the physiologist can never, purely by the principles of his own science, prove either that man's soul is spiritual, or that it is not

¹ Essay concerning Human Understanding; Book iv., ch. 3.

² Reign of Law, chapter vi. By the Duke of Argyll. George Routledge & Sons, New York, 1874. This work is, under several respects, worthy of high commendation; it is an able contribution to a kind of learning now much needed. In regard to Darwin's genesis of species, he maintains the following theses: "It cannot be too often repeated that Natural Selection can produce nothing whatever except the conservation or preservation of some variation *otherwise originated*. The true origin of species does not consist in the adjustments which help varieties to live and to prevail, but in those previous adjustments which cause those varieties to be born at all." It is undeniable that all Darwin's multitude of facts really bear on the preservation or growth, not the first origin of species. Argyll's theory for explaining and defending the freedom of the human will is, perhaps, susceptible of being ultimately reduced to that of the "*præmotio physica*;" his reasoning would be more clear had he distinguished precisely between the will's necessitated action, the principle of which is intrinsic to the will, and its forced action, whose principle, if such action be possible, would be extrinsic to the will. Necessitated action of the will is voluntary, or, it is spontaneous though not free action; but forced action would not be the will's action; it would be passion, or action suffered by it. To say that the will is free when it is *determined* by the motive, is certainly a confusion of language. It is true that the will cannot choose without a motive as the object of its choice; but the choice itself, *qua* choice, must be the act of the will alone; otherwise such action is not different from that of the merely physical or natural agent, which is not free but necessary action, as *v. g.*, the fire's burning, the eye's seeing, etc. The motive is a prerequisite condition for choice, but it does not determine the choice that is free; it is the will that determines such choice.

spiritual, any more than could the soothsayer of old veritably read the future doom of a nation in the entrails of birds. Some physiologists, who see that their science gives no direct demonstrative proof for or against the existence of man's spiritual nature, classify the subject with metaphysical and fanciful matters that are unknowable, which is a false assumption, whether we consider their assertion as related to science or to the legitimate art of reasoning.

Among the scholastic philosophers it was generally held that the immateriality, spirituality, and immortality of the human soul, can be truly and validly demonstrated by natural reason; and they agreed among themselves as to the particular main arguments which conclusively prove these truths. Making abstraction of supernatural revelation then, what conclusive reason can be given in proof that man's rational soul is immaterial, and capable of existing disembodied, and, by consequence, that it is spiritual?

Before proposing an answer to this question, the precise meaning here given to the terms, "immaterial, spiritual," should be defined and explained. The term, "immaterial," is applied to two kinds of spiritual nature and substance, 1st, to that spiritual nature or being which, besides having no property possessed by matter, cannot naturally be united with matter, so as by that union to form with it one compound substance: of such a nature every pure spirit, as *v. g.*, the angel, is believed to be; 2d, the term, "immaterial," is also applied to that spiritual nature or substance which, although it continues to exist and act when its union with the body has ceased, yet, by its nature, it is both fitted and ordained to union in composition with the body; such is the human soul, as we shall see. A thing is not really "immaterial," then, according to the sense in which the term is here used, unless it can exist independently of matter, that is, when not actually in union with matter, whether as a substantial constituent or as an accident of body. Whatever can exist only as a property, quality, or accident of matter, and also, whatever can exist only as a constituent of material or corporeal substance, is itself something material; for, it pertains to material substance, and it naturally depends for its existence on that material substance. To this category we must refer all the qualities in matter which our senses can directly apprehend; all its properties that are chemical or dynamic. Ascending higher in the order of material action we find corporeal substance capable of life or vital operation; that it may possess vegetable and animal organism, with two very distinct grades of life along with their respective classes of action specifically different from each other. All the kinds of action here enumerated, including that of vegetable and animal life, are plainly seen to be the operation of corporeal substance. Even that school of physicists, who are so un-

philosophical as to reduce all action of every kind to that of one force, thus making too little advance on the generalizations reached by the simple mind that omits all consideration of second or intermediate causes, and refers every effect directly and proximately to God;¹ even the physicists referred to admit that the highest purely animal action does not transcend the order of material nature. Only that is immaterial, then, which has no common predicate with matter, or which has no real property that matter has, and which, by its own nature, can exist when totally separate from material or corporeal substance. Therefore, in order to prove the immateriality of the human soul, it is necessary to show that its properties, powers, and whole nature are of a totally distinct order of being from a thing that is material in its nature; and that though it informs matter, it can exist independently of matter. Observe, then, that "immaterial" does not here signify what is merely negative; it expresses something positive, and it denies that thing to be material. We concede to the materialist that what is styled the brute soul, *anima belluina*, having no action which transcends the power of corporeal substance, is itself of matter; for, it has none but sensible or organic action, and a sense or organ is material substance. The brute soul is styled material, also because, as will be made more manifest in another part of this article, it cannot exist except when united with matter, although it is, in itself, simple as a principle of life.

The word spirit, spiritual, is employed in several distinct senses, which need not be here enumerated and described, as breath or air, spirit of wine, animal spirit, etc.; but it must, in this place, be ascertained precisely what is meant by spirit, spiritual, when it is predicated of the human soul. *Spirit* may be sufficiently described for this purpose by affirming of it, 1st, it is a substance which is of a species that is totally different from that of matter, and it is superior to material substance; 2d, it is a substantial rational nature that can exist alone or separate from any other substance; it does not necessarily require another substantial principle to be united with it in order for it to be sustained in existence.

Some modern authors affirm that the spirituality of the human soul is proved by the simplicity of the soul: the soul is simple, therefore it is spiritual. This argument is, at the best, not satisfactory, is open to logical objection, and it was never employed by

¹ As the wise axiom expresses it, "*bene docet, qui bene distinguit*:" he alone teaches us well who distinguishes well. It may be good, and it is good, to show that the ten categories can be reduced to two, that of substance, and that of accident; but he alone philosophizes well for us who also distinguishes and explains the categories. So, it is of little profit to learn that all action may be reduced to that of force; the action and the kind of power in every nature beheld by us must have its distinctive operations defined and described.

the acute scholastic metaphysicians. Simplicity is opposed to composition,¹ as unity is opposed to multitude or many. The brute soul, considered in itself, is simple; the formal principle in the living vegetable is, in itself, simple; so every substantial formal principle is, in itself, simple, as is everything that has in itself unity, and is at the same time, not *per se* divisible. Hence, the simplicity of the soul does not prove the spirituality of the soul; man's soul is simple because it is a substantial formal principle; its spirituality arises, not from its simplicity, which is generic and is common to it and the brute soul, but from its being intelligent, immaterial as well as simple, and capable both of existing *per se* and acting *per se*. When the soul is shown to be a spiritual substance, then its simplicity as *forma hominis*, becomes proof of its natural immortality. To attribute to the word simplicity an interpreted and arbitrary meaning, according to which it is made to express the specific marks or notes only of complete spiritual substance, seems to be a forced use of the term, and the reasoning for the spirituality of the soul will then require, in order to escape fallacy, much artful trimming of words; which is wholly avoided in the direct and simple proofs given by the schoolmen. The brute soul is a simple substantial principle naturally ordained to union with the brute body: the human soul is also a simple substantial principle naturally ordained to union in composition with the human body. Let us now see whether there be really demonstrative proofs that the human soul is moreover a spiritual substance.

It would seem that no one clearly understanding the terms and scope of the principal argument for the immateriality of the soul, can fail to grant the conclusion as necessarily following. Anything whose action transcends the action of material or corporeal substance, is superior to corporeal substance or is immaterial; but there is in man something that has action which wholly transcends the action of any corporeal agent; by consequence there is in man something which is superior to material substance or is immaterial. If this argument be true, then there is in man a principle of action which is superior to any one of his corporeal principles of action, and it is on that account wholly or specifically different from all corporeal or material principle.

Though the rebuke given by the Duke of Argyll to those physiologists that assume the office of settling this question with the

¹ The following kinds of composition are usually named and described in works on general metaphysics. Composition 1st, of matter and form; 2d, of genus and difference; 3d, of integrant parts; 4th, essence and existence; 5th, nature and subsistence; 6th, subject and accidents; 7th, power and act. All components must ultimately be constituents that are in themselves simple; as to whether or not these ultimate elements can exist separate from the whole, depends, not on their simplicity or their being uncompounded, but on their having or not having the requisites of substantial nature.

forceps and microscope¹ be just, yet let us concede beforehand, to Maudsley, Huxley, Bain, etc., all the genuine conclusions which their inductive proofs have established; and that the phenomena of brain action, molecular nerve force, brain ideation, are facts faithfully described by them; all this, however, does not concern the present dispute, except in what is secondary and accidental; for, after all, the anatomy of the brain, with a minute and precise description of its organization, while of prime importance to physiology, is not essential to the present subject, unless in some secondary sense. All that the physiologist can discover and describe is a material organ, with its material parts or constituents; if he discovers more, it must be by the metaphysics, which, however, he forswears. The question here considered is, has man a something in his nature whose action transcends the action of any material organ, how perfect soever it may be? The answer is to be maintained, not against the mere physiologist, whose proper office is with organs and organic life; but rather against the physicist or the philosopher of physical nature, who affirms that it is physically possible for matter to think rationally.

A power which knows what is entirely abstract, *i. e.*, what is totally removed from matter, so as to have no real predicate in common with matter, cannot possibly be a power of material substance. A body can act only as body; its action is physical, material, and the object which such action reaches and really modifies is also a material object, for how can an agent go out of its entire sphere, and put action, the principle of which is not at all in its nature? Hence our Lord said, "Does any one gather grapes from thorns, figs from thistles?" It exceeds the natural power of thorns to produce grapes, and it is above the power of thistles to bear figs. To this it might be replied, "It transcends the natural power of thorns and thistles to remain within their species and to produce these fruits; but since the bearing of such fruit does not transcend the sphere of vegetable action, they could be made, by superadded virtue, miraculously to produce those fruits." This supposition appears to involve no contradiction or intrinsic impossibility. But for material substance or a body to know the purely abstract, the universal, the virtuous or morally good, would be for it to go entirely out of the whole order or species of material things to another order or species of things, having no one real note or

¹ Draper sees the truth enunciated by Argyll, but less clearly and precisely. "Though under the most enlarged acceptation, it would fall under the province of physiology to consider this immortal principle (the soul), and to consider its powers and responsibilities; these constitute a subject at once so boundless and so important, that the physiologist is constrained to surrender it to the psychologist and theologian." *Human Physiology*, Book i., ch. i. It is evident that he confounds the object of physiology with that of anthropology or the philosophy of man.

quality in common with it. It may be said that there are no two species of material substance in nature, which do not possess some or other common real qualities; but moral good, or the universal, has no real quality possessed by any material thing whatever. Matter must act materially; it cannot act immaterially, for this is a contradiction in terms. A body cannot remain a body, and understand the true; it may be informed with an intellectual spirit; it may be annihilated and replaced by an intelligent spirit; but it cannot as body be made capable of what is not done by a body, or what wholly transcends the species of bodily action, no more than a line on a spherical surface can at the same time be a line in a plane surface. It is in this meaning the well-known axiom of the schools is used: "*Modus agendi sequitur modum essendi*," the mode of acting follows the mode of being; or, the action is according to the nature or essence of the agent. A corporeal agent cannot act on what is wholly incorporeal, since that would be to have incorporeal action. It is not inconceivable that an agent whose perfection is superior in its species to that of matter should possess virtue or power great enough in its superior species to be capable of acting on matter; since the ability to do what is greater may include the ability to do what is less; but there is repugnance in supposing the action of any being wholly to exceed the limits of its species and power. The principal action of corporeal nature as known to us, is dynamic, chemical, vital, and animal; and the species which is highest of all is that of sensation, while the one which is lowest in species is the mechanical. It is not denied by the materialist that every sensible power is a material power, for every sense is an organ of the body, whether it be an external sense, or an internal sense seated in the brain; but what he does deny is the impossibility of matter's thinking intellectually, or he holds that it is possible for matter to think, and put all the acts of cognition which distinguish man from inert matter and the brute animal. We accept the concession, then, that all sensible cognition is the act of a material agent; for, in fact all sensible cognition has for its object, and its only object, sensible or material things apprehended in a material manner. Therefore, the sense which is a material organic power cannot apprehend or perceive what is wholly abstracted from matter and from every real quality of matter, as is the purely metaphysical, the universally true, the morally right, etc., for this order of being is totally separated from the material order, and a material agent acts materially or on material objects only.

Here a difficulty occurs which it is not easy to solve satisfactorily to all minds; but yet it does not impair the validity of the reasoning which we have advanced: if the material agent cannot transcend the entire material order of objects, in its action; and if the spiritual

intellect can come to know the material thing, but not without concurrent action of the material thing as object, then why say that the material agent cannot in its action go beyond the entire sphere of material objects, or that it cannot have an immaterial object of its action? The scholastic philosophers saw this difficulty, and they solved it by attributing to the spiritual intellect a supremacy of perfection, and a superiority of action by which it can descend to the internal sense, supplement its action, receive from it what the intellect can dematerialize, and thus elevate it to the intelligible order, or the intellectual order; they made this operation the office of the active intellect, or *intellectus agens*. It must be confessed that philosophers have never relieved this point of all its obscurity; but no one of them ever sought to relieve it of its difficulty by supposing that the intellectual idea was formed by the sense or organ. The difficult question is, how can the sensible image become an object of intellectual action, or be *objected* before the intellect in any manner? The question is not, how can a material organ form an intellectual idea, for that seems to assume what is absurd. Hence, since this difficulty regards only the manner in which a material thing can concur as an object in originating intellectual acts or ideas, it is beside the question discussed with materialists, can organized matter form for itself intellectual ideas, or can it think the purely abstract and metaphysical? Therefore, this difficulty concerning the origin in man's mind of ideas whose objects are material things apprehended by the sense, need not further impede the progress of our discussion; for no matter what theory be chosen among those proposed to explain this point, it still remains true that the sensible power or the organ does not form the intellectual idea; its office is to present the object.

Another objection will here naturally arise. Since all our knowledge takes its first origin from sensible things, and since it is conceded by all, that intellectual thought is not naturally possible to us without the fancy, which is admitted to be a merely organic or sensible power, not at all a purely spiritual power; hence the understanding, being something thus wholly dependent on the bodily senses, it cannot be anything really distinct from the powers of the body. In this objection the facts, it may be granted, are really as it states them; but the conclusion here drawn does not truly follow from these facts. The fancy or imagination is a sensible or organic faculty, which, perhaps without any doubt, is seated in the brain; it is also true that we cannot naturally think except dependently on that faculty for the objects of thought; and yet the intellect that does think, is not a sensible or bodily power, but it is, and it must be, a spiritual power, for the reasons already given, and for others still to be adduced. We may make a comparison which will serve

to illustrate by sensible things the manner in which the intellect is dependent on the fancy for its objects of thought, and thus help the mind clearly to conceive the nature of that dependence. For this purpose let us make the odd supposition that a man was so made as to be unable to see any visible object, unless as imaged in a mirror arranged before his eyes in such manner that from no point of the horizon, from no point above him, beside, or beneath his eyes, could any object be seen, except as imaged in that mirror; he can turn himself so that the mirror will reflect any object around him, but the object cannot transmit its light directly to his eye; in order to be seen by him, everything must be reflected to his eye by that mirror.

In this case the man could see no visible object at all, except dependently upon the mirror. In a similar manner is the human intellect completely dependent on the imagination or fancy for the presentation of all its objects of thought; if that mirror be veiled, as in deep sleep, the intellect sees nothing; if that mirror, or the fancy, which is an organic power in the brain, be diseased, its action is abnormal, and the mental operation is more or less insane, in proportion to the extent of the organic ailment. But yet the abstract idea which the intellect forms for itself, and by the medium of which it knows the object imaged in the fancy, is something wholly outside of the material order; it is the immaterial idea of a thing presented materially by the image in the fancy; it is immaterial, for, it is wholly abstract, and by consequence it has no real quality or real property of matter. Let us understand clearly what is meant by the proposition, "the idea in the intellect, *v. g.*, of a tree, is abstract, and it therefore has no real quality which the tree has." Examples will help to render this more easily intelligible: suppose the photograph likeness of a friend—this likeness has some resemblance to the person—but it excludes most of what is real in that person, retaining only a diminished outline figure filled up with some shading; yet this photograph has, as a material substance, many qualities common to it and the original, besides the figure. The image of the same photograph likeness formed on the retina of the eye is far more refined; and it excludes or omits much of what is gross matter in the photograph itself; still more refined and less grossly material is the image you will contemplate by closing the eyes, and beholding the same picture as reproduced and presented by the fancy. The photograph is, in a certain degree, abstract, as regards the original; the image on the retina of the eye is much more so; and still more abstract is the image in the fancy. Now, the idea as in the intellect, is wholly abstract, for it retains no real physical quality of the photograph, but is an image of a superior and totally distinct order, possessing even the capability of being applied

as a universal ; then how is it possible to conceive an abstract and universal idea that is produced by an agent which is purely material ?

It is manifest that the reasoning here advanced is *a posteriori*, or, it is argumentation from the effect or acts of the intellect to their cause. From the nature of the effects, we infer the nature of the cause ; and the more numerous and various the effects observed, the more fully is the character of their cause manifested to us. Having formed our idea of the cause, we describe it by both positive and negative predicates ; for example, we observe the different effects produced by oxygen and hydrogen. Inferring their nature from the effects witnessed by us, we affirm them to be gases ; that they combine in a uniform proportion, and constitute water ; that hydrogen will not support combustion ; that oxygen will not burn, but it will support combustion, etc. We here conclude to the nature or species of these objects from the effects produced by them : this is man's only method of learning truth empirically ; but proof by this method may be perfectly demonstrative, and therefore certain, as all logicians admit.

We have seen that the abstract and universal idea which is formed by the intellect, is an effect that exceeds all material effects, and that it must, therefore, be ascribed to the action of a cause which is of a specifically and totally different order of being. The same kind of reasoning may be applied to the will or rational appetite ; it can love and desire the morally good or virtuous ; it can love the absolutely true, as beautiful and good ; but this is action having no identity of property or quality with the action of any power in material substance ; therefore, the will is a faculty that belongs to an immaterial nature. Also, there is no assignable limit, whether of species or magnitude, to the objects towards which the intellect and will can tend, and which, in a certain proportion, even including God, they can attain or reach ; they attain or apprehend things specifically below themselves, in a manner superior to those things, for they attain to material things in an immaterial manner ; they reach even God, but in a manner proportioned to themselves and to their condition while the spirit is united with the body. We may say, then, that the object of their action is unbounded, is infinite. Now what power of material substance can be conceived, the object of whose action is thus unlimited, especially when we take into the account the undeniable principle that a material agent or nature cannot put immaterial action ?

We may validly conclude, therefore, that the human intellect and will are powers belonging to an immaterial nature, or that the subject of such powers cannot be corporeal substance. We know a being or agent only by its action, and the objects of its action ; how

else can we know anything of it? By the action of the agent or being we learn its powers, and from those powers we infer the nature or essence of that being; there is no other manner by which man can come to the knowledge of any real thing whatever.

It having been shown that the intellect and will in man cannot be powers of his body, because their action is immaterial, the proof that his soul is a spiritual substance may now be stated: the soul has action in the eliciting of which the body does not share; *i.e.*, the soul acts *per se*, or of itself; therefore it must be capable of existing *per se*, or substantially. The action of the intellect in knowing abstract truth or the universal, cannot be attributed to the body, or to any power of the body; it must therefore be the act of what is incorporeal, the act of another substance distinct from, superior to the body. In order to perceive the force of this reasoning, it is necessary to understand the precise meaning, and see the truth of the axiom, "what acts *per se*, or by its own virtue, also exists *per se*, or is a substance."¹ The intellect is, in itself, a power or faculty; as a faculty it must belong to some substance which is the subject in which it inheres. Now, since the intellect exists and acts dependently on the substance to which it belongs, we conclude that because its action is independent of the body, its subject must be in some manner independent of the body, and must be a substance. There is a something in man, then, which is intelligent and free, having action of its own in which the body does not share; then it has the essential properties of a substance, and can exist *per se*, or substantially. The human soul is therefore spiritual; for a spirit is an immaterial, intelligent substance; it is simple, because it is the formal principle in man, "*anima hominis est forma corporis*;" it is intrinsically active, because it is a living formal principle. If the foregoing doctrine be true, we may infer that the soul is not, so to say it, wholly immersed in the body, or its whole nature is not totally absorbed by the body; but some virtue of that nature is left apart from the corporeal substance, and therefore not constituting a something of the compound made by union of soul and body;² the intellect and will are not powers of the compound; they are powers of the soul alone. This seems reasonable and according to the very nature of things; for the soul is a substance which is greatly superior in its nature to material substance, and it is therefore not commensurate with matter; its perfection exceeds the whole capacity of matter to receive. Hence, some illustrate this union of soul and body, in which the entire entity of the soul does not go into that union, by the simple comparison of a man whose whole person ex-

¹ Quidquid per se operatur, et per se existit.

² St. Thomas, Summa, p. 1, qu. 76, a. 1, ad. 1.

cept his head is immersed in water ; analogously, the intellect and will are not merged in the compound of soul and body ; they remain out of it or apart from it.

The dependence of the intellect on the fancy is, as already noticed, only for the presentation of objects ; hence, the fancy is necessary for intellectual action only by way of *conditio sine qua non*, as your eye depends for seeing an object reflected in the mirror, on having a mirror before it ; as the mirror is something extrinsic to the eye's power of vision, so in an analogous degree, the fancy is something extrinsic to the intellect. This reasoning suggests the objection : " Since the intellect thus necessarily depends on the fancy for the presentation of its objects, it follows that the soul cannot exist when separated from the body ; for, in that separated condition, the intellect could not act, for the want of an object, and by consequence, all the powers of the soul would be in a dormant state ; but as this manner of existing, in the very nature of things, is not to happen, we may infer that the soul has no existence except dependently on its union with body, and it is therefore not a spiritual substance." In answer to this statement we must reason *a priori* : as the soul of man when in union with the body must act in a manner proportioned to that condition ; so, when it is separated from the body, it must naturally have a mode of action, of understanding, which is proportioned to that manner of existing ; this cannot be doubted, for the natures of things are all perfect in their species. Hence, as in the one state the understanding acts dependently for its objects of thought on the bodily organs, so, in the other, it must act independently of this extrinsic and instrumental assistance.

We have no positive ground to doubt that the human soul is by its very nature ordained to union with the body. It is on this account that the soul as separated from the body is not styled a person ; for a person is defined in philosophy to be an intelligent substance, which is under every aspect complete ; and since the separate soul postulates that union with the body, it is not under all respects a complete substance. It is a legitimate corollary from this reasoning, that even natural reason furnishes some proof of the body's resurrection.¹

We may infer from the arguments thus far advanced that, aside from the proofs of the soul's immortality which remain to be given, man's soul, having action of its own, in eliciting which the body is

¹ St. Th., p. 1, 2, qu. 4, a. 6, ad. 1, 2, 3, and p. 1, qu. 76, a. 1, ad. 6, where he says, " Anima humana manet in suo esse cum fuerit a corpore separata habens aptitudinem, et inclinationem naturalem ad corporis unionem ;" the human soul keeps its own existence when separated from the body, possessing an aptitude for, and a natural inclination to, union with the body.

not a principle, is an immaterial substance, and it is capable of existing as a substance when it is separated from the body. Now as to its immortality: there are many reasons which prove with more or less of logical force the immortality of the soul; when all are taken together, they constitute complete demonstration, as even pagan philosophers admitted and maintained. We may here legitimately assume that the soul is the living principle in man; it is the principle in him to which we have attributed his highest living acts, those of intellect and will, and from it comes all vital action in man. Then, if this living soul dies or ceases to exist when separated from the body, either it must die by a law of its own nature, or else God must himself directly annihilate it; but it cannot actually happen through either one of these causes, and therefore it cannot happen at all.

To say that God has not the power to annihilate what He created, would be nonsense; but there are sufficient reasons on account of which He will not annihilate all His creatures; and hence it is sometimes said in this moral sense, God cannot annihilate spiritual natures. We cannot assign any end which would justify to reason the creation and the subsequent annihilation of an intelligent being; indeed, what valid reasons can we state which prove even that this earth, the planets and stars, should be annihilated? God's manifestation of himself *ad extra*, is perfectly accomplished only by the creation of intelligent beings destined in His designs and fitted by their nature to endure with unending life. These statements indicate the arguments by which it is shown to be irrational to suppose that an intelligent being can be created for annihilation.

As was already affirmed, the soul's natural immortality is proved by its simplicity and substantiality, or by its being a simple and living substance that can exist independently of matter. Since death is the separation of the living soul from the body informed by it, just as corruption is the dissolution of a compound whole into its constituent parts; only that substance can die, which consists of a body animated with a living principle; but man's soul when separated from the body continues to exist a living substance, no longer compounded with matter; therefore it cannot die. The brute soul dies with its body, because, though simple in itself, it has no action distinct from its corporeal and organic action, and by consequence, it has no existence as a substance distinct from its body. When the vegetable dies, its living principle perishes; when the brute animal dies, its formal principle, or the principle of life in it perishes; for that which can have no action can have no existence; and the brute soul, if conceived to be separated from its body, could have no action; for, it has no intellect nor other power except what it has through the organs of its body when it is actu-

ally informing that body. But man's soul besides informing his body, has powers superior to all organic and corporeal powers; it can therefore exist when apart from the body, and, being an uncompounded substance, it cannot suffer dissolution or die.

Again, man's soul both knows of, and it naturally desires, unending bliss; then he is fitted and ordained by his nature for a state of perpetual beatitude; therefore, either man's soul is immortal, or else he is created without an appointed ultimate destiny which is proportioned to his nature; but God creates nothing in vain, therefore man's soul is created immortal. We cannot conceive that any created nature should ever totally fail to reach or at all to fulfil the end for which its very essence is shaped, and which is obviously the final cause of its existence, and hence the axiom, "*nunquam deficit natura in necessariis*;" nature never fails or falls short of that for which it is necessarily ordained. Unless the capacity of man's intellect to know the good and true and beautiful, be in vain; unless the capacity of his will to desire longingly for perfect bliss be given to it in vain, then there is an object proportioned to those faculties of his nature, and that object necessarily supposes the immortality of his soul. We daily see the visible and passing things around us faithfully and exactly accomplishing the ends for which they are manifestly ordained by their nature, and by this we come to learn the most general and necessary law of everything's action.

Now there can, *a fortiori*, be no exception to this principle in natures of a superior order; therefore, since man's higher powers, his intellect and will, do not attain, in his mortal life on earth, an object proportioned to them, or commensurate with their capacity, his soul must be destined for a superior and immortal state.

That no object nor condition, attainable by man in this life, is adequate to the greatness of his powers and to the intrinsic dignity of his nature, is a truth that undeniable facts and principles render very evident. The most virtuous and meritorious life is passed, in numerous instances, either without any reward on earth, or, at least, without adequate or equitable reward; therefore the due reward of genuine virtue must pertain to a future state of existence. The quasi proverb, "virtue is its own reward," originated with the Stoic philosophers of old, and it is not really true in any but rare and exceptional cases; for, even when virtue brings to the good man some present recompense, it is never, at least in the case of difficult moral virtue, an adequate reward, as Lessius shows.¹ An action is not performed for its own sake, but on account of the end in respect to which that action is a means. The beauty and excellency of virtue cannot be duly appreciated by all, nor does its

¹ De Providentia Numinis et de Immortalitate Animæ, lib. ii., ratio 17a.

value proceed from these qualities principally or apart from all ulterior reason why virtue is good ; but it is the end to which virtue is ordained from which it derives its chief importance, just as the seed is not sown merely for the sake of that action, but for the fruit that the seed is to produce in the future.

The prophet Jeremias asks, "Why doth the way of the wicked prosper?"¹ and Job, "Why do the wicked live, are they advanced, and strengthened with riches?"² It is perhaps certain that the reason or argument which principally founds this conviction in the minds of all mankind of every nation, tribe, and tongue, namely, man will have a state of life succeeding his present life ; the principal reason which leads mankind to this conclusion is the fact that it is the obvious explanation, and it is at the same time the only consistent explanation of man's present condition in this world. Their idea of the future state is more or less perfect, more or less rude and obscure ; but yet every race of mankind infers from man's nature and from the present order of things as understood by them, that man has another life beyond the grave. How can that conclusion be false, which all mankind agree in drawing from the same substantial facts ? All feel the same strong desire, the same unsatisfied yearning for a future and better state of existence ; how can this inclination of man's rational nature be thus universal to the families of the human race, and yet have no corresponding end or object intended to be attained by it ? How can there be a nature that is brought into existence without a befitting end or aim, and thus prove an essential and manifest flaw in the very design of creation ?

That the spirituality and immortality of the human soul are believed as a dogma of the Christian religion, need not be here proved, nor is it denied by the materialists, though they deny both the immateriality of the soul and the fact of revelation. There are other cogent arguments from reason in proof of the soul's spirituality and immortality, which, however, cannot be stated and developed within the limits to which this article must be confined. Let us now briefly consider the theory of the materialistic school, and examine some principal reasons which they allege in proof of their hypothesis.

There are, indeed, several classes of materialists, differing more or less widely among themselves, and not agreeing even in essential principles. First, there are they, who with Locke affirm that it is possible for matter to think, and they deny that there is any conclusive proof of the soul's spirituality. It is not easy to assign any arguments advanced by this class of authors amounting to

¹ Jeremias xii. 1.

² Job xxi. 7.

more than vague generalities and unwarranted negatives ; unless we accept as possessing some positive logical value Locke's theory of ideas and substance. He identifies the idea in the intellect with the impression on the sensible organ ; that is, the image of the visible object formed on the retina of the eye, for example, is transposed to the intellect, where it has added to it the perfections that make of it the mental idea ; but it is in other respects the same image that was projected on the retina of the eye. This might be passed by, if intended merely for a description of brute thought ; but the arguments which are advanced above to prove the spirituality of the human soul, are a sufficient proof that this is no description of the idea in the human intellect. The image in the sensible organ always represents a singular or concrete object, or it is of this individual material thing ; the idea in the intellect expresses the abstract, the universal, and therefore the supersensible ; by consequence, the intellect must itself be above or superior to organic power. Locke also asserts that we know nothing of substance, we can know only its qualities and accidents ; whence it follows that we are unable to know with certainty whether or not the substance can think. It is true that while we know the qualities and accidents of such substance immediately, we know the substance itself only by way of inference from them ; but does it follow that we know nothing of a thing, even when we know it as the necessary conclusion from its evident premises ? To admit such principle is to deny all scientific and demonstrative truth, and Mr. Locke's inept reasoning about substance must also be included in this destruction, along with all the most precious knowledge which can be acquired by reason. We know real beings only by means of their action ; and that action as seen by us is, for our minds, the measure of their nature. We do not see those beings in their own intrinsic essence, but they manifest themselves to us by their action, their powers and qualities ; and it is absurd to say that from no number of effects and signs can we conclude to the certain knowledge of their cause, for that is to deny the validity even of geometrical demonstration. Hence, while our minds do not immediately apprehend material substance, or any other substance, but know it only by way of a rational act, yet it is absurd to affirm that all the real qualities, effects, and signs, manifested by material substance, found in our minds no certain knowledge of its nature as substance.

There is another class of authors who seem to differ from Locke, rather in the manner of wording and presenting their theory, than in what is essential to the theory itself ; they teach that all our certain knowledge of real things is limited to their phenomena, *i. e.*, to the direct sensible manifestation of their qualities and accidents ;

substance, spirit, etc., are unknowable. Others explain all things by the correlation and conservation of forces, or, as Herbert Spencer enunciates it, everything knowable "may be expressed in terms of matter, motion, and force." It will not be out of place here to state the main principles of this theory by which everything that can be known is reduced to force, and the phenomena of force;¹ but they repudiate, however, "vague and barren disputations concerning materialism and spiritualism;" also they would fain, but they cannot, relieve all terms of the meanings given to them by "metaphysical psychology." Hence they confess their embarrassment at being unable to say just what they wish; or, as Maudsley, who speaks the language of the school, puts it, "he must use words which have already meanings of a metaphysical kind attached to them, and which, when used, are therefore for him more or less a misinterpretation."² But these authors do not draw the legitimate conclusion from this unwillingness of mankind or their inability, it may be, to change the established meaning of terms: mankind are right; it is the "scientists" that are wrong in their use of terms.

According to this hypothesis, then, all things in nature are mere force. But, in order to account for the differences among the objects observable by us, this force is distinguished by most of the school into six kinds: 1st, the force or momentum of moving bodies; 2d, heat, in molecules or atoms; 3d, light, consisting of molecules or atoms; 4th, chemical force; 5th, electricity; 6th, nerve force or vital force, allied to electricity; to this enumeration of forces Balfour Stewart adds, "energy of position," or, vantage-ground. Each one of these forces has its correlated or corresponding forces into which it may be transmuted by the agency of some other force; this connection or relation among forces by which one may be changed into another, is that which is meant by the "correlation of forces." Since matter is never increased or diminished by the various transmutations that take place in it, its quantity remaining constant under all possible changes of force into force; it follows that "the sum of all the forces in nature is a constant quantity," or, as Bain says, "It is an essential part of the doctrine that force is never absolutely created, and never absolutely destroyed, but merely transmuted in form or manifestation." By the "conservation" or "persistence of force," therefore, they seem to understand only the invariability of absolute quantity as to the

¹ Mill says that at the present time, "it is universally allowed that the existence of matter or spirit is, in its nature, unsusceptible of being proved."—*Logic, Introduction*, p. 5.

² *Body and Mind*, preface, by Maudsley. They wish to put all metaphysical truth, it would seem, within the category of the fanciful.

mass or total of matter. Of this point Spencer says,¹ "Persistence of force is an ultimate truth of which no inductive proof is possible," *i. e.*, without a vicious circle. And again,² "By the persistence of force we really mean the persistence of some power which transcends our knowledge and conception. The manifestations do not persist, but that which does persist is the unknown cause of these manifestations."

It is evident, then, that the "scientists" do not agree in their opinions concerning the nature of this force whose "transmutations and manifestations" constitute the only objects which can be known by man. What is this force in itself? Is it something concrete and subsistent; is it something existent in itself, or is it something inherent in another thing as its subject? Is it the degree of power exerted, is it the agent itself, or is it both of them? In what does it differ from substance, nature, accident, and property, vulgarly so called among less "advanced thinkers?" What must be added to force in order to constitute with it "nerve force?" The answer is, "nerve;" but the question then is, what is "nerve?" The answer must be, "force." Spencer says truly, therefore, that the argument in proof of this one, constant or persistent force, is a vicious circle; but then, on the other hand, the thing is very obscure, and it is also doubtful as to what it is, and whether it is. What other reasons can be demanded in proof of falsity than that a statement is obscure and uncertain, and, at the same time, that its logical proof involves a vicious circle? Under this respect, then, the hypothesis which reduces all knowable things to one persistent, mere force, has less appearance of being a conclusion reached by reason than it has of being only a figment of the fancy. The advocates of the system seldom attempt giving strict definitions, and, indeed, definition is perilous for the mere theorist. Mill simply consigns questions regarding the nature of substance to the category of idle disputations about what is unknowable; Spencer, who, while he does not equal Mill in mere style of composition, seems much to surpass him in philosophical acumen, evades the plain fallacies by his equivocal assertion, that "only in a doctrine which recognizes the unknown cause as coextensive with all orders of phenomena can there be a consistent religion or a consistent science;"³ this proposition is equivocal, for it may be taken in a pantheistic sense or not, just as it best suits the exigencies of argument. But many of the authors belonging to this class, including Huxley, and most of the same school in the United States, should, perhaps, rather be styled idealists than materialists. They refuse to argue concerning the nature of the soul, about which they

¹ First Principles, p. 252.

² Ibid., p. 255.

³ Ibid., Part II., ch. v.

allege that nothing can be known, and, like pagans in the Areopagus, they pay offerings only to an unknown God. With men who make such a use of logic, plain facts, and the very testimony of all nature, there is no reasoning; and indeed there is no need of reasoning, since such notions can never be adopted by many minds; for, from the days of Pyrrho, the only answer given by the mass of sensible people to total skepticism and pure idealism was ridicule and laughter, and this is the only answer that seems justly due to either, as they are opposed to the evident first conclusions of good common sense.

The slurs on "metaphysical psychology," the refusal to argue "questions concerning materialism and spiritualism because vague and barren," can scarcely be considered either as loyal to truth or as ingenuous; such things are certainly unworthy either of philosophy or of philosophers. The denial of "the metaphysical," as well as their assertion that "the spiritual is not knowable," are vague negations, which they do not attempt to support by any demonstrative proof, nor do they attempt to refute the arguments usually advanced in proof of the soul's spirituality. As they do not give definitions, they are always at liberty to deny that their adversaries rightly apprehend their meaning. What do they mean by "metaphysical terms," "metaphysical reasoning?" Is not all absolute and necessary truth metaphysical? Is not even all abstract truth, in its way and degree, metaphysical? How can they form an argument that is conclusive, and that, at the same time, implies no metaphysical element? Do they not admit the principle of contradiction as explained in the logics? and yet this principle of contradiction is the ultimate metaphysical canon of all reasoning. It is self-contradiction for one to deny the metaphysical, who attempts to demonstrate a proposition by its reason.

If we assume, with Spencer, that the ideas in our minds, regarding the various manifestations of force, motion, and matter, are objectively real, or, in other words, that these three things are real objects existing concretely outside of the mind; then the arguments for the immateriality and spirituality of man's soul will apply to physical things thus conceived, with the same force that they have when applied to material things as they are understood by mankind in general, notwithstanding "the unknowable cause," which Spencer assigns for them: in any theory, his "force, motion, and matter," are, in themselves, merely sensible objects.

Apart from the question concerning the spirituality of the human soul, there are many serious objections to this theory which claims to explain all visible things by "the correlation and conservation of force;" first, it seems to be merely an arbitrary hypothesis which, without demonstrating any new thesis to explain the cre-

ated things around us, yet makes the extraordinary assertion that all man's previous ideas of real things, as classified under the "ten categories," are false. We are now to believe that such things as substance, quality, essence, property, accident, etc., are terms "of a metaphysical meaning," that express nothing but empty speculation founded on no reality. We must, henceforth, reduce all the species and families of things to unity, and their unit is force, but an undefined and undefinable force. Why not as well make that central unit to which all is reduced, "electricity," or "heat," or "motion?" For, it is sure that we can so strain our fancies of objects pictured before the mind, and so order our terms for things, as to reduce every phenomenon to some or other correlation of "electricity," or "motion," or "heat," just as, for example, we can when in total darkness, by dint of effort, compel the strained eye to see within itself every hue and figure of things possible and impossible. In fact, many a philosophical hypothesis has, in the end, proved to be a poorly devised figment of the fancy. Again, this hypothesis denies all the conclusions of general experience, concerning the qualities and properties of material things, as it also denies the previous teachings of physical science. Finally, as these authors propound the system, it pretends to explain philosophically the physical things of nature, as well as the facts and principles of mental operations, and yet it repudiates the essential basis of all philosophical reasoning, *i. e.*, it absurdly rejects absolute and necessary truth, stigmatizing it as "metaphysics," by which its votaries appear to mean, frivolous speculation, having no more value than day-dreaming.

It is but just, before concluding these remarks, to consider, at least briefly, the often-repeated complaint made by these physicists, that the "metaphysical psychologists" very absurdly ignore the conclusions of physiology, as well as the discoveries of other natural sciences, "without even having been at the pains of making themselves acquainted with what these conclusions and discoveries are."¹ Perhaps a like complaint may be made with equal justice against the "scientists" for repudiating "metaphysics," or absolute truths, and the conclusions from them.²

It cannot be doubted that the combined study of physiology and sound philosophy, gives mutual aid to these branches of knowledge, as already observed. But, in this matter, let us not

¹ *Body and Mind*, by Maudsley.

² Argyll, *Primeval Man*, Part I., rebukes, in pertinent terms, this conduct of "positivists" in ostracizing the philosophical investigation of their doctrines, and he cites for censure Mr. Lewes's words, interdicting all study of the "unknowable:" "Whatever is inaccessible to reason should be strictly interdicted to research." Among these questions forbidden by Mr. Lewes, we must reckon those concerning spiritual natures and the existence of a personal God.

affirm either more or less than the truth: the only knowledge of sensible things required for the perfect validity of the argument demonstrating the immateriality of the human soul, is that which regards the well-known and invariable properties of material substance, which determine its specific nature as matter, in other words, such qualities of all matter as are known to the mass of mankind. The particular qualities of matter in this or that species do not concern the argument. Just as the mathematician need not know the best kind of timber or the right temper of steel for bridge-building, in order to know demonstratively that, out of these materials, a triangular brace cannot be made, one of whose sides is longer than the sum of the two others, so, by a like proportion, in order to know demonstratively that intellectual action specifically exceeds the power of matter, it is not at all necessary to know all the ganglia or nerve-cellules in the labyrinth of the brain. What else can be discovered, inspected, and analyzed in the brain, than organs, shapes, adaptations, and constituents of organs, as related to organic action? As mechanics and engineering must take their absolute principles from mathematics, which, under this respect, has supremacy over those branches; so, the physiologist that will reason about spirit, or spiritual nature, is dependent, for the principles that must direct him, on another science, physiology aiding the argument only in an indirect manner, or inasmuch as organ or matter is *not* spirit. It is manifest that some knowledge of man's sensible organs, or of his external and internal senses, is strictly necessary for comprehending the intellect's action as dependent for its objects on the ministry of these organs. But yet, it still remains true that learning in the theories of physiology is not necessary for demonstrating the immateriality, spirituality, and immortality of the human soul, for, since physiological science is concerned only about particular forms of matter, as this organ of vital action, this tissue, these cells, etc., and not about the necessary and universal predicates of all matter, its own special conclusions do not really and directly pertain to the argument at all.

A PARTISAN ASSAULT UPON THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.

Vaticanism in Germany and in the United States (Circulated by the
"UNION REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE").
Washington, D.C.¹

IT seems as though Washington, "the Father of our Country," had more than human prescience when, in his "Farewell Address," he warned the people of the United States against the pernicious effects of party spirit. Several times since the publication of that memorable address, the integrity and continuance of our present civil institutions have been imperilled by the violence of partisan passions. And never in our country's history has there existed a deeper necessity to lay Washington's warning seriously to heart than in the present critical juncture of affairs.

The year which has just closed was ushered in with signs of universal gladness. The hour of its commencement was hailed with the shouts of exulting multitudes, with joyous peals of bells and salutes of artillery. The light of innumerable bonfires and illuminations seemed but the reflection of the light of the joyous hope that warmed the hearts and brightened the faces of American citizens, under the belief that our Centennial anniversary was but the first of an endless series of similar anniversaries, and that, in the course of ages yet to come, their descendants in countless generations would celebrate as a united people, knowing no North, no South, no East nor West, but only one common country, the one thousandth, and, if the world should so long endure, the ten thousandth anniversary of the independence of a land blessed, beyond all other lands on the face of the earth, with advantages of soil and clime, and blessed, too, with civil institutions securing freedom to all—institutions which would know no change except that which would grow out of a clearer and fuller apprehension in idea and application in practice of the principles of true freedom, and be but the ripened fruit of a richer and more perfect civilization.

But it so happened that the times of our Presidential canvass and of our Centennial anniversary came together, and partly through the agitations incident legitimately to that canvass, but still more through the bitterness and fancor of partisan dissensions, and the

¹ A note at the end of this pamphlet states that "Committees and individuals, in ordering POLITICAL PAMPHLETS (the capitalizing is that of the note), will please address 'UNION REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,' Washington, D. C."

lust for place and power and official emoluments of partisan demagogues, the year which at its commencement was bright with hope, at its close was darkened with a gloomy presage of danger to our civil institutions, and fear lest as a people we might be torn by intestine strife and plunged into the abyss of political anarchy.

If these perils shall happily be averted, it will not be through the moderation of partisan leaders or their reverence for the principles of justice, but through the good sense and calm judgment of the American people rising above mere questions of party, and triumphing over the passions which demagogues have persistently endeavored to excite.

At the outset of the recent Presidential canvass it was feared by the more unprincipled officeholders and strategists of the party in power that, under a calm consideration of the only questions which were legitimately involved in the contest between them and their political opponents, the American people would not divide themselves broadly into two parties; that perhaps, indeed, the old party lines would be obliterated, or if not, that at all events, the adherents of the Republican party would not rally to the support of their leaders with the unanimity and enthusiasm which passion superadded to political ideas would induce. Hence it was announced that "an emotional issue" must be made. The easiest way to make such an issue, and one which would create the greatest excitement, seemed to be by a revival of the old Know-Nothing movement, and the making of a religio-political attack upon Catholicity. But it was quickly discovered that an openly organized movement of this kind would not do, and the movement in the form in which it was first conceived and planned was not made.

A number of reasons may be assigned for this. The primary cause doubtless was, that He who "turneth the thoughts of men" as He does "the waters of the seas," did not will that the Catholics of the United States should at that time be exposed to the fires of open persecution. Many considerations had weight in the minds of demagogues sufficient to restrain them. It became evident from the manner in which General Grant's Des Moines speech was received, and subsequently Mr. Blaine's proposed alteration of the Federal Constitution, that an open assault upon Catholics would not be approved by the better portion of our non-Catholic population. The comments of the secular press of the country upon General Grant's and Mr. Blaine's demonstrations, showed clearly that the people of the United States were not prepared to combine in a gratuitous assault upon the liberties of a large number of citizens, whose fidelity to our Constitution and laws have been attested and confirmed by their uniform loyalty ever since the first settlement of our country, and who, in every crisis and struggle

through which, as a people, we have had to pass, have proved uniformly faithful, and borne in every emergency their full share of burdens and sacrifices. It was found, too, that it would be impossible to make a party issue on the basis of anti-Catholicity that would present even a show of plausibility, much less of fairness and justice. As regards the proposed establishment of a universal system of forced ("compulsory") "unsectarian" education by an alteration of the National Constitution, taking from the people of the several States of the Union the control they now exercise over the education of their children, and concentrating it in a bureau of the General Government at Washington, it became evident that the more thoughtful portion of the American people were already regarding with well-founded alarm, the centralizing tendency which of late years has been going forward as regards our civil institutions with constantly increasing power, and is absorbing into the control of the Federal Government affairs that heretofore have been left to the free action of the States severally and of municipalities; and that unnecessarily to further centralize political power by giving the Federal Government control over the subject of education, and increasing the official patronage at the disposal of the Executive Department at Washington, already enormous, and not unfrequently employed as a means of political corruption, would be a most perilous procedure.¹ On the other hand, it was found that the mere politicians of the Senate and House of Representatives, who are ever ready to support any measure which they suppose will be popular for the time being, would not divide upon party lines as regards the proposed alteration of the Constitution, and, consequently, that nothing would be gained to or taken away from either party by "rushing" the proposed measure through Congress. The fact, too, that in all previous anti-Catholic movements the demagogues who openly identified themselves with those movements almost invariably dug their own political graves, had also no doubt a restraining effect.

Another reason, also, probably had no inconsiderable influence. Catholics do not constitute a political party in the United States, never have done so. There are no reasons why they should attempt to form a party, but many and strong ones why they should not.

¹ The number of official places under the control of the Executive Department of the Federal Government now amounts to nearly fifty thousand. Let this be still further increased by the immense addition that would be made to it by "nationalizing," as it is called, the education of the country, and the peril growing out of this concentration of power at Washington, already great, must become incalculably greater. Of late years, too, the tendency of "national politics" to control the action of the people on purely local questions, and determine the selection of persons for positions that have not, and ought not to have, any relation whatever to the measures of the Federal Government, has made great and lamentable progress.

Nor do Catholics adhere exclusively and unanimously to either of the political parties into which the American people are divided. As *Catholics* they have nothing to expect from either of these parties. If a Catholic member of either party occasionally obtains an important office it is not because he is a Catholic, but rather in spite of it.

The questions and measures upon which the American people are divided into parties are generally of purely political character, not religious; and there is no more reason why Catholics, *as Catholics*, should belong to one party in preference to the other, than there is for them to engage, *as Catholics*, in the construction of railroads, the building of steamships, the spinning of cotton, or the manufacture of iron. And although it is true that in previous years a greater number of Catholics were members of one of the political parties than of the other, it was not from reasons referring in any way to religion, but from reasons analogous to those which caused the German population of the United States to occupy a similar position. This has come to be generally understood by the American people, and, though the cry of "priestly influence" is still occasionally raised by some demagogue, or fourth-rate newspaper, trying to swim into temporary influence on the little ripple of excitement thus created, it is regarded by sensible citizens generally as simply a cry gotten up for a purpose, and it influences none but the ignorant and the utterly prejudiced. While Protestant ministers do not scruple to introduce partisan politics into their discourses, Catholic priests rigidly abstain from it. Valuing as highly as other men their rights as citizens, they, with few exceptions, from regard for the sacred duties and functions of the priesthood, take no part whatever in political affairs. These facts are well known to the intelligent portion of the American people. Hence, it became a question, with politicians, which there was little trouble in deciding negatively, whether it would be politic needlessly to alienate, by an open assault upon their religion, the thousands of Catholics who were in the ranks of the Republican party, and, along with them, numbers of non-Catholics whose sense of right would make them indignant at the outrage.

From the force of these and other reasons no openly organized assault was made upon the religion of Catholics during the recent Presidential canvass. Yet while the idea of an open attack upon Catholics was given up, the assault itself was only changed from an open to a covert one. Secret anti-Catholic organizations were encouraged, and pamphlets containing most slanderous misrepresentations of Catholicity were circulated secretly among those whose fears or prejudices, it was supposed, could be excited and thus won over from the support of the Democratic ticket, or stimu-

lated, if they were already adherents of the Republican party, to greater efforts in its behalf. Some of these pamphlets are beneath notice, and carry the antidote to their own poison with them to the minds of all sensible, unprejudiced persons. But others are more skilfully conceived and composed, and doubtless have not failed to influence well-meaning persons not sufficiently acquainted with the subjects referred to, to enable them to perceive the untruthfulness of the statements made and the fallacies of the arguments employed.

A pamphlet of this latter character, the title of which we have placed at the head of this article, lies before us. It is evidently the production of a writer of no mean ability. Its assertions are specious, and the argument is conducted with considerable skill. There is nothing new in it, either in statement or in thought. Yet repetitions of old falsehoods have to be met with repetitions of truths still older, and as the pamphlet may be fairly regarded as an exponent of impressions, false yet widely prevalent, respecting the bearing of the doctrines of the Catholic Church upon civil rights and duties, we deem it well to notice it.

The design of the pamphlet may be seen by a discriminating reader all through its pages, but it comes out towards its close so clearly as to be unmistakable. The following may be taken as a fair specimen :

"There is a movement on foot not yet crystallized into a policy . . . but sufficiently defined in its object to excite in the minds of our citizens apprehension if not alarm. We refer to that alliance of Church and party, which in certain localities is so marked as to leave no doubt of its purpose. . . Our Catholic clergy have a perfect right to labor and vote for the Democratic party, but they have no right to use the discipline of the Church to force those who believe in their faith, but not in their politics, to unite with them at the ballot-box. Yet the coercive policy is the one now adopted. The discipline of the Church is to be brought to bear upon its followers, and the Romish Church, . . . is to make common cause with Democracy to overthrow the Republican party. . . . This accomplished the door is open, . . . through a national triumph of the party to which the Church is allied, to a radical change of our form of government.

"These possibilities should arouse intelligent American citizens of all creeds, whether of native or foreign birth, to the danger that threatens our country if the Ultramontane element of the Church, through the success of Democracy, should obtain control of our national affairs."

It is hard to exercise patience while reading such villanous insinuations, and to find conventional language strong enough to characterize them. What has the Catholic Church to gain by allying itself with the Democratic party, or any other party? What political party has ever had courage to look beyond the seeming expediencies of the hour, and stand firmly on the ground of principle, except so far as it supposed that it might thus win, or preserve, the favor of the populace, or those who were believed to lead and control it? What are parties but organizations, as changeable and

unreliable as the sands of the seashore or the currents of the air? They spring up in a day, and they seldom last for the space of even one generation. What has the Church, who counts her age by centuries, and has an abiding faith that she will continue as long as the world endures, to do with such ephemeral existences? The Church has long ago learned from experience as well as from divine revelation, not to "put trust in princes," whether they sit upon thrones and wear crowns, or manage "primary meetings" and "caucuses," and rule popular assemblies. What has the Democratic party ever done for the Church, that the Church should labor to secure "the success" of that party "at the ballot-box?" Why should the Church descend into the arena of partisan strife, and soil her pure robes with its dust and mire? When has any political party in this country dared to make even a show of doing scant justice to the civil rights of Catholic citizens, or as a party to lift a voice in their favor? What have the Catholic citizens of the United States, *as Catholics*, to expect from either party?

The Catholic Church teaches that civil governments have rights which no citizen can conspire against without sin. Is it likely that she, the unchangeableness of whose teaching her enemies have ever reproached her with, should set the example to her own members and children of disregarding that teaching, by engaging herself in a conspiracy (for that is what the writer means in plain English) to overthrow the American Government? Is the history of the Church, which shows that she has lived on terms of amity and peace with governments of every kind and form, and uniformly rendered to the State the things that are the State's, whether the authority of the State was represented by emperor, sultan, czar, king, director, president, or popular assembly, and has never asked from the State aught but the liberty of rendering to God "the things that are God's"—is this to be forgotten that room may be made for credence of a gratuitous and malicious falsehood? Are the immense and beneficent services which the Church rendered to mankind in re-establishing civil order in Europe, and building it upon the foundations of right, equity, and freedom, after it had been utterly destroyed by the convulsions that attended the dissolution of the old pagan Roman empire, and the invasions of the barbarians of Asia and the North of Europe—the work the Church did in fostering everywhere the principles which form the only enduring basis of our own civil liberty, in curbing the tyranny of feudal lords, kings, and emperors, defending the rights of the people, breaking the yoke from off the necks of serfs and bondmen, and encouraging everywhere through Europe the establishment of republics and free cities and municipalities, to be forgotten or ignored? Are there not countless testimonies on record, of non-Catholic writers as well

as Catholic, who have deeply studied the past history of the Church and of civil liberty, to the fact that her genius, her spirit, and the religious truths she inculcated, exert a most potent influence always and everywhere against lawlessness, tyranny, despotism, and in favor of the rights of the individual and in favor of civil liberty? Might not numerous instances be recounted from history where by her influence she has mitigated the severity of kingly rule, where she has rebuked the oppressions of tyrants and firmly advocated and defended the rights of peoples, while not one instance can be cited of her ever having espoused the side of absolutism? Is the Church so happily circumstanced in countries under kingly or imperial rule, is her freedom to fulfil her glorious mission so carefully respected and protected in those countries, that she should desire to exchange the wide liberty she enjoys here for the hampering restrictions she must submit to in some of those countries, and the persecutions she must endure in others?

Or, to come home at once to our own country's history, is the unswerving loyalty and acknowledged patriotism of Catholics in the days antecedent to the war for Independence, when they counselled and labored, hand in hand, with men of different beliefs religiously, but of one mind as regards their civil rights, to mature measures for resisting tyranny; when subsequently they united in making that memorable Declaration, and in defence of it Catholics contributed their money and shed their blood not less freely than citizens of other creeds; and thence on from those days to the present, is the loyalty and patriotism of Catholics in every crisis and struggle through which the country has passed, all to go for nothing? And are the countless splendid testimonies of American statesmen, and generals, and presidents, and governors, from Washington down, to the value of the services rendered to the country by Catholics, to their fidelity, their stanch loyalty, their pure patriotism, all to be set aside in order to make room for vile insinuations gotten up for partisan purposes?

"The coercive policy (says the pamphlet) is the one to be adopted! The discipline of the Church is to be brought to bear upon its followers . . . to make common cause with the Democracy!!!"

Here is the stale, senseless cry of "priestly coercion" again. Where is the man who knows anything either of the discipline of the Catholic Church, or of the manner in which Catholic citizens who live around him and come into close and constant contact with him in society, in business, and in public affairs, act and vote in political matters, that believes this infamous falsehood? Where is the Catholic citizen who ever admitted the truth of the slanderous

charge here made? Have all the Catholics of our country gags upon their mouths? Are all of them so obedient and faithful in fulfilling the obligations of their religion, and so submissive to "the discipline of the Church," that not even one can be found who would complain loudly enough to be heard, if any *such* "discipline" not to speak of "coercion," were attempted? The Catholic Church has in her communion men of every stamp and character, not only the submissive and devout, but many who are careless of their duties and rebellious in their dispositions. Of these latter there are those who complain of and sometimes resist her discipline as regards matters purely religious, and who endeavor to defend their contumacy in the most public manner; in some instances in journals especially established for the purpose. Is it credible that, if the clergy of the Catholic Church could so far forget their sacred duties (and their ecclesiastical superiors allow them) as to undertake to exercise "discipline," or the slightest "coercion" upon their members as regards political matters, the fact would not become notorious? And would not men who do not hesitate, at times, to despise counsel and resist "discipline" in religious matters, be still more bold in resisting if "coercion" were attempted in political matters? To ask these questions is to answer them. The insinuation is absurd upon its face as well as malicious.

In pursuance of his design, the author of the pamphlet refers to Germany, and does not hesitate to hold up the policy inaugurated there by Bismarck and the German infidels, as an example for the American people to follow. He says:

"If knowledge of what has been done in Germany through priestism will awaken our people to the designs of the same power in the United States, the firm stand of Bismarck has not been taken an hour too soon?"

This idea runs through the whole pamphlet, and forms the staple of its argument. Its writer is evidently an ardent admirer of the absolutism, which under the forms of law is depriving the citizens of Germany of all freedom, civil and religious, which denies to them even the right to have a conscience,¹ and is reducing them in fact, to mere atoms of the body politic, with no personal rights,—mere machines controlled by the will of the State.

¹ The declaration of Bismarck that "the subjective conscience cannot be allowed to set itself up against the objective law," is clear enough evidence of the ideas that underlie his movements. It is absolutism pure and simple. It leaves to the individual no liberty, civil or religious, and makes the State supreme, as regards both civil affairs and religion.

The Catholic Church teaches that no human authority can oblige an individual to act against his conscience. Bismarck—in this in perfect accord with the ideas of the advanced infidels of the day—declares that the State may and can. Who are the true upholders of personal liberty and the rights of man? Bismarck and his infidel co-workers, or the Catholic Church?

In view of the utter untruthfulness which characterizes the statements generally of the writer of the pamphlet, and also of his admiration of absolutism in government, it is not at all surprising that he should declare, what few others would have the hardihood to assert, that

"The present attitude of Germany towards Rome is not one of hostility to the Roman Catholic Church as a spiritual power, but as a temporal one assuming authority above the State."

The boldness of this statement is equalled only by its falsity, yet that very boldness gives it the semblance of truth to the ignorant and unreflecting. What, now, really is the fact? It is simply this:

1. The Catholic Church has no temporal power whatever. She never claimed, as a divine organization, to have authority in purely temporal matters anywhere or at any time.¹ Where her prelates during the Middle Ages exercised any jurisdiction in political or

¹ That this is not the writer's mere say-so, but the general belief of Catholics, and a doctrine which is expressly declared by the theologians of the Church, we refer to Cardinal Manning. He says:

"The authority which the Church has from God . . . is not *temporal* but *spiritual* (the italics are Cardinal Manning's). Again he says: "In all things which are purely temporal, and lie *extra finem ecclesie*, outside of the end of the Church, it neither claims nor has jurisdiction. . . . In all things which promote, or hinder, the eternal happiness of men, the Church has a power to judge and to enforce." . . .

To go farther back and to higher authority, Pope Innocent III., in the Bull *Novit Ille* (A. D. 1200), expressly declares that he did *not* undertake "to judge respecting the *fief*" (which was in dispute between the kings of France and of England), but "to decide upon *the sin*" committed.

Bishop Fessler, Secretary-General to the Vatican Council, Cardinal Manning, Bishop Ullathorne, and others, quote the Bull of Boniface VIII., *Unam Sanctam* (the Bull upon which the enemies of the Church constantly harp as establishing that Boniface VIII. did claim, in 1302, supreme temporal authority), as evidence that he did *not* claim temporal but *spiritual* authority. Their argument is that the declaration "*subesse Romano Pontifici omni creatura*," it is necessary "for every human creature to be subject to the Roman Pontiff," is explained by the qualifying phrase "*de necessitate salutis*," "necessary to salvation," and that consequently there is no reference whatever in this declaration of Boniface VIII. to temporal power. They refer also to Ballerini and Suarez, and to the Bull, *Meruit*, of Clement V., as sustaining their interpretation.

Suarez says that "the Sovereign Pontiff's authority is spiritual, except in the territory over which he is the temporal Prince; and that even his spiritual power is indirect as regards temporal things, and extends no farther than they affect the salvation of men, or involve sin." *De Legibus*, lib. iii., c. vi.

Suarez says also (after speaking of "the power of the Keys," Matt. xvi. 19), "In no other place did Christ imply that He gave to Peter or to the Church temporal dominion, . . . nor does Ecclesiastical tradition show this, but rather the reverse. *Defensio Fidei*, lib. iii., cap. v., sect. 14.

Bellarmino says that "when temporal princes come into the family of Christ they lose neither their princely power nor jurisdiction, but become subject to him (the Sovereign Pontiff) whom Christ has set over His family, *in those things which lead unto eternal life*." *De Potestate Summi Pontificis*, cap. i., p. 848.

civil matters, as some of them did, it was because the public law of Europe invested them with it. And the power generally was so notoriously used in a beneficent way that it became a proverb: "Better live under the shadow of a monastery than in a fortified castle;" "Better bear the weight of a bishop's thigh than of a baron's little finger." And this temporal power thus acquired and thus exercised, civil rulers frequently insisted on prelates exercising, in order that they might claim from them vassalage and the services due from feudal dependants to their feudal superiors. The arrangement was one which furnished plausible ground to kings and nobles to claim the right of nominating bishops, and, after they were inducted into office, exercising authority over them (just as the German government now claims), in things spiritual as well as temporal.

But it is not to this the writer of the pamphlet refers. He evidently has no objection whatever to a connection between Church and State, which places the Church under the State. For he alludes with manifest approval in his pamphlet, to the "ecclesiastical laws" of the German empire, by which both the Catholic Church and the Protestant "Churches" are subjected to the control of the State. What the pamphleteer insinuates, or rather plainly charges, is that the Catholic Church, "Rome," assumes authority as a temporal power above the State. He broadly asserts that

"The Papal authority in its organized form is a system arrogating to itself the divine right of governing, both in politics and religion, the whole domain of Catholic Christendom."

Catholics and most non-Catholics of any intelligence know that this is utterly untrue. We repeat that the Church does not claim for herself political authority anywhere. And the Sovereign Pontiff of the Church, or Pope, as he is commonly called, claims for himself temporal authority nowhere whatever on the face of the earth, except in the city of Rome and the adjacent country, commonly called "the States of the Church," now temporarily wrested from him by infidel revolutionists. The spiritual authority of the Roman Pontiff is universal, unlimited by nationality, by geographical or political boundaries. His temporal sovereignty has always been confined within certain geographical limits. Catholics, therefore, universally, the world over, do not believe that the Pope has any temporal authority over them, unless they reside within the limits, in Italy, of his temporal dominions. Nor has a claim of universal temporal sovereignty ever been made by any one of the two hundred and fifty-seven pontiffs who have occupied St. Peter's chair.

Catholics believe that the Pope should be entirely independent

of all temporal rulers, in order that he may be entirely unembarrassed and free in the exercise of his spiritual authority. They believe that, to secure and maintain this freedom, he should be the temporal ruler of the city in which, by the Providence of God, his Chair has been placed, and the adjacent country known to Catholics as the "Patrimony of Blessed Peter," and his title to which, even in a purely human point of view, rests on stronger grounds than those which support the oldest governments of Europe.

That the Pope's independence of all political potentates is necessary to the free exercise of the powers and the unembarrassed discharge of the duties of his Spiritual Office, is a fact so patent, that even European governments opposed to the Catholic religion, but regarding the interests of their Catholic subjects or citizens, admit it and frequently have acted upon it. It would be hard to find statesmen more decidedly hostile to Catholicity than Castlereagh, Palmerston, Peel, Russell, Derby, and Thiers, and yet each in turn actively interposed to secure the political independence of the Popes, when it was temporarily destroyed, or defend it when it was endangered by political changes in Europe. And until a few years back, if not still to-day, scarcely a nation in Europe would look with complacency upon the Pope being made dependent upon any temporal government.

This is a simple statement of the whole matter as regards the temporal power of the Pope, and of the belief of all Catholics respecting it. The Sovereign Pontiff no more claims or seeks to exercise temporal dominion in Germany, the United States, or any other country, except what is usually called by Catholics "the Patrimony of Blessed Peter" (Rome and the adjacent country), than he claims the right of exercising temporal power in the moon.

It may, however, not be amiss to say something further in regard to the words "assuming authority above the State." Strike out the false assertion that this authority is claimed by Rome as a *temporal* power, and for *authority* substitute *spiritual authority* and the assertion from a bare falsehood would be changed to a statement of the truth. "Rome" does claim, and does exercise, supreme spiritual authority, and all Catholics believe that the claim is valid and of divine origin, delegated expressly by Christ to Peter, and that the exercise of this authority is not only legitimate, but necessary to the salvation of men. It does not belong to our subject to vindicate the validity of this claim. But we freely say that we not only believe in its validity, but that all Catholics believe it, all persons who are in the unity of the faith and communion of the holy Catholic Church. To deny it is to deny the unbroken tradition of the Catholic Church from the days of the Apostles down to the present day, and to be outside of the obedi-

ence of faith. And the fact that this tradition goes back to the earliest ages of the Church most learned and candid Protestants admit, though they have not the grace to submit to it. Scarcely a Protestant now can be found, possessed of any real knowledge of Church history, who pretends that this tradition is of mediæval origin. They trace it back to the days of Cyprian and Irenæus; and back still of them to the time of Polycarp and Ignatius and Clement of Rome,¹ who all received the deposit of faith immediately from the lips of the Apostles, were ordained and consecrated by them as priests and bishops, and were their fellow-laborers in building up the Church. And with impious blasphemy some of these learned Protestants adduce the fact of the existence of this tradition at that time as evidence that even then, as soon as the Apostles fell asleep, and indeed even before some of them had entered into their rest, the Church of Christ began to be corrupt, and the very Martyrs and Confessors who had learned the doctrines of Christ from His Apostles, and whom the Apostles appointed as their successors, employed their authority to initiate this process of corruption. The exposure of this horrible idea does not enter into our subject. Of its falsity, its impiety, its downright blasphemy, we have, now and here, nothing to say.

Returning directly to our intended course of argument, we say that though Protestants deny to the "Church of Rome" the exercise of this supreme spiritual authority, they nevertheless strenuously claim its existence; and they, as well as Catholics, claim that it is "above the State," and that the State may not interfere with it. This claim is so universal among so-called "orthodox" Protestants, that nothing but sheer malice or ignorance can have suggested the bringing of it as a charge against Catholics exclusively.

In the "Confession of Faith of the Reformed Dutch Church," revised in "the Synod held at Dordrecht in the years 1618 and 1619," and still held to be binding, both in Holland and in the United States, by the adherents of that sect, occurs the following language:

"We believe, since this holy congregation (the Church) is an assembly of those who are saved, and that out of it there is no salvation, that no person of whatsoever state or condition he may be, ought to withdraw himself to live in a separate state from it, but that all men are in duty bound to join and unite with it, *submitting themselves to the doctrine and discipline thereof.* And that this may be the more effectually observed it is the duty of all believers, according to the word of God, to separate themselves from all those who do not belong to the Church, and to join themselves to this

¹ Isaac Taylor of England, is an instance in point. His extensive erudition and research into the belief and practice of the Christians of the first ages of the Church are indisputable. Milner, the Anglican Church historian, is another. And Dr. John W. Nevin, of this country, is another. Many others might be mentioned.

congregation, *wheresoever God has established it, EVEN THOUGH THE MAGISTRATES AND EDICTS OF PRINCES WERE AGAINST IT.*"¹

And in the "Heidelberg Catechism," which is in force in all the "Reformed" (in contradistinction to the Lutheran sects) in the United States, and in the scanty fragments which remain of them in France, Germany, and Switzerland, the "Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven" are defined to be "the preaching of the Gospel and Christian Discipline." And in answer to the question, "How is the Kingdom of Heaven shut and opened by Christian Discipline?" the answer as regards exclusion is, that

"Those who under the name of Christians maintain doctrines or practices inconsistent therewith . . . are complained of to the Church or to those who are thereto appointed by the Church, . . . and are by them *forbid the sacraments, whereby they are excluded from the Christian Church, and by God Himself from the Kingdom of Christ.*"

In the "Westminster Confession," still professedly believed by all Presbyterians in England, Scotland, Ireland, and the United States, the following statement is made:

"The Lord Jesus Christ, as King and head of his Church, hath therein appointed a government in the hand of Church officers, distinct from the civil magistrate.

"To these officers the keys of the kingdom of heaven are committed, by virtue whereof they have power respectively to retain and remit sins, to shut that kingdom against the impenitent, both by the word and censures, and open it unto penitent sinners by the ministry of the gospel and by absolution from censures as occasion requires."

"IT BELONGETH to *synods and councils*, ministerially, to determine controversies of faith and cases of conscience, to set down rules and directions for the better ordering of the public worship of God and government of His Church, to receive complaints in cases of maladministration, and *authoritatively to determine the same*; which decrees and determinations . . . are to be received with reverence and submission . . . as being an ordinance of God." . . .

"Civil magistrates may not assume to themselves the administration of the word and sacraments; or the power of the keys of the King of heaven; or in the least interfere in matters of faith."

In the first chapter of the Second Book of Discipline of the "Church of Scotland," under the title, "The Kirk's Jurisdiction is of God, and is grounded on His word," it is said:

¹ As showing clearly the belief of the "Reformed" (or Calvinistic) "churches" (we use the title by which they designate themselves in contradistinction to Lutherans), in regard to the character and source of the authority which they claim to exercise, we quote an extract from the "Form of Excommunication," of the "Reformed Dutch Church of North America:—"

. . . "Therefore, we, the ministers and rulers of the Church of God, being here assembled in the name and authority of our Lord Jesus Christ, declare before you all, that, for the aforesaid reasons, we have excommunicated, and by these do excommunicate N. from the Church of God, and from fellowship with Christ and the Holy Sacraments, and from all the spiritual blessings and benefits which God promises to and bestows upon His Church, so long as he obstinately and impenitently persists in his sins; and he is therefore to be accounted by you as a heathen man and a publican, according to the command of Christ, Matt. xviii., who saith, that whatsoever his ministers shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven."

"The Kirk . . . has a certain power granted by God, according to which it uses a proper jurisdiction and government exercised to the comfort of the whole Kirk. This power ecclesiastical is an authority granted by God the Father through the Mediator Jesus Christ unto his Kirk gathered, and has its ground in the word of God, to be put in execution by them unto whom the spiritual government of the Kirk . . . is committed."

Under the title of "The Difference Betwixt the Spiritual and Civil Jurisdiction," there is the following:

"This power and policy ecclesiastical is different and distinct in its own nature from that power and policy which is called the civil power, and appertains to the civil government of the commonwealth, albeit they be both of God. For this power ecclesiastical of law is immediately from the Mediator Jesus Christ, and is spiritual. . . . The civil magistrate neither ought to preach, minister the sacraments, nor execute the censures of the Kirk, nor yet prescribe any rule how it ought to be done."

The "Confession" of the French Protestants says:

"We believe that the true Church ought to be governed by that policy or discipline which our Lord Jesus Christ established. . . . We believe that all true pastors are endowed with . . . power by the Supreme Universal Bishop, Jesus Christ."

In the "Book of Common Prayer" of the "Established Church" of England, in the "Thirty-nine Articles," occurs the following:

"The Church hath power to decree rites and ceremonies, and authority in controversies of faith." . . . Art. xx.

"The power of the civil magistrate extendeth to all men, as well clergy as laity, in all things temporal, but hath no authority in things purely spiritual." Art. xxxvii.

And, to go further back, in the preamble to the Act of Parliament 24 Henry VIII., the very Act by which that tyrant and his subservient tools attempted to lay a foundation for the man-made Church of England, it is said:

"The body spiritual having power when any cause of the Law Divine happened to come in question, or of spiritual learning, that it be declared, interpreted and showed by that part of the body politic called the Spirituality, now being usually called the 'English Church.'"

In the collection of confessions, apologies, catechisms, and explanations of the Lutherans, strangely styled by them "The Book of Concord," are many declarations that the Spiritual Power is "above the State." The following will serve as a specimen:

"Wherefore the Episcopal office, according to divine appointment, is to preach the Gospel, to remit sins, to judge of doctrine, to reject the doctrine which is contrary to the Gospel, and to exclude from the Christian community the wicked, whose impious conduct is manifest, . . . and in that case the parishioners and churches are under obligation to be obedient to the bishop, agreeably to the declaration of Christ (Luke x. 16), 'He that heareth you heareth Me.'"

"The keys are an office and power in the Church, given by Christ to bind and to loose sins, not only such as are gross and manifest, but also subtle and secret sins, which God alone perceives."

. . . "Therefore the churches undoubtedly retain the authority to call, to elect, and ordain ministers, and this authority is a privilege which God has given especially to the Church, and it *cannot be taken away from the Church by any human power* as St. Paul testifies (Eph. iv. 8, 11, 12)."

We have thus examined the declarations of belief of all the leading sects which grew out of the "Reformation," and we might continue the examination *ad infinitum* through all their countless divisions and subdivisions with a like result. In no instance is there any acknowledgment whatever of any spiritual authority in the State. That authority in all cases is either expressly declared, or by implication assumed, *not* to belong to the State. Where the State is referred to at all, it is to declare that it ought to use its power to uphold and defend with "the sword of the magistrate" the rights of the Church, and protect Christians in the practice of religion from the impious and profane.¹

In a number of instances Protestants (as we might show from their own writings and from their actions, as in Scotland, in Switzerland, France, England, and Massachusetts, if it belonged to our subject) have held that the State had no independent sphere of its own whatever, but is or ought to be, in temporal as well as spiritual matters, a mere bureau or department of the Church. In this Catholics differ widely from them. For Catholics hold, in accordance with the teachings of the Church, that the State is a divine institution in the natural order, having its own proper sphere and end; and that, in that sphere and for that end, its authority rests upon divine sanctions. And this, no matter what may be the form of the government which represents and discharges the functions of the State—whether it be imperial, kingly, or republican.

It may be well to say that if we have not quoted from Methodist, or Baptist writings, or those of Congregationalists, or Unitarians, it is not because numerous citations might not be made from them, denying all spiritual authority to the State and claiming that there *is* a spiritual authority which rules and ought to rule men, and which is "above the State." The Congregationalists differ from the Presbyterians in regard to forms of church government, but not, or but slightly, in regard to professed doctrinal belief. The power which they deny to Synods and General Assemblies, however, they do not regard as belonging to the State, but place it in the single congregations or societies which their members form, or in a council of all the "churches," or else in the conscience of each individual member. The Baptists, as regards their ideas of spiritual authority, held and hold ideas similar to those of the Con-

¹ The "Westminster Confession" says: "Yet as nursing fathers, it is the duty of civil magistrates to protect the Church of our common Lord."

The "Confession" of the Presbyterians of Scotland says: "Moreover we affirm that kings, princes, governors, and magistrates are first and especially (*imprimis et potissimum*) for the preservation of religion, and that therefore they have been ordained of God not only on account of civil polity, but also for the preservation of true religion."

The "Confession" of the French Protestants says: "Therefore also God has given the sword into the hands of magistrates for the repressing of crimes, not only against the Second Table (of the Commandments) but also those committed against the First."

gregationalists or Independents. The Methodists and Unitarians place the spiritual authority in their "conferences" or "councils," or in the individual consciences of the members of their societies. Generally, in practice among these latter sects, there is less distinct profession of belief in the authority of "churches," "conferences," or "councils," but not even an appearance of yielding to the State authority over religion. What they do not concede to their "councils" or "conferences" or to each particular "church," they professedly place in the "Law of God,"¹ or in the conscience of each individual. In actual practice the private judgment of each individual is made the last and highest court of appeal in things spiritual.

We need not dwell further upon this point. Suffice it to say that no Christian society or Christian man can get rid of the conviction that there is a spiritual authority on earth which is supreme, and, therefore, "above the State," without denying Christianity itself. If he denies this authority he becomes in denying it un-Christian and, in fact, anti-Christian. For Christ expressly claimed to possess this authority and has expressly delegated it. If it does not exist, then the Christian religion is a mischievous myth, a monstrous system of superstition and imposture. The alternative is plain: either there is lodged somewhere; in the Catholic Church as Catholics believe; or in the "churches," "convocations," "assemblies," "synods," "conferences," or "congregations;" or in the conscience of each individual, a supreme spiritual authority and power, "above the State," and with the exercise of which the State may not interfere, and whenever it does interfere becomes guilty of sacrilegious usurpation; or else Christianity is a false religion, nay, more, a pernicious delusion!

And not only this. If the State possesses supreme power over religion, there is no room whatever for the exercise of individual conscience. Bismarck and the modern infidels of Europe then are correct; the individual has no right to a conscience; the highest arbiter of right and wrong is the State, and the individual must wait upon the decisions of civil tribunals to determine what right is, what the true principles of morality are, and what are the doctrines of religion—if there be a religion. Even our American freethinkers, we are of the opinion, are not prepared for this monstrous conclusion.²

¹ This expression—"the Law of God"—as used by Protestants is an evasion, a mere play upon words. A law is no superior; nor has it any real authority without a judge to expound and apply it. The interpretation and application of the law, in order that the law may have any real force and effect, must be either in an official person, or in a collective body, or in the individual conscience.

² It is pertinent here to refer to the "higher law" doctrine enunciated by the Abolition party of the United States during the anti-slavery excitement. They scouted as absurd, as a direct attack upon personal right and as a sheer usurpation upon the part

In charging upon Catholics, therefore, as a wrong done to the State, that they hold that the Church has in its own sphere an authority which is above the State, this pamphlet attacks the convictions of all who have faith in a divine revelation, and believe in a divine religion.

And it goes still further. The position assumed that the State is supreme in all things, and that there is no authority in any sphere higher than that of the State attacks the belief even of those who believe simply in natural religion. Every man, who believes in the inviolability of conscience, no matter on what his belief is based, is deprived of all right to his own convictions. There can be, under this theory, no such thing as an individual conscience, speaking authoritatively as regards right and wrong. All—right, duty, conscience—are swallowed up and absorbed in the authority of the State.

The author of the pamphlet, in order to give the color of truth to his false assertion that the Pope claims supreme power over the State in purely temporal affairs, refers to the action of Popes during the Middle Ages, in absolving, on certain occasions and in certain countries, subjects from their oaths of allegiance to wicked and tyrannical kings and emperors, and pronouncing upon them sentences of deposition.

Now, we have to say to this :

1st. That in doing this the Pope exercised no more authority than Protestant sects *claim* can be exercised by the councils, synods, etc., that represent the highest ecclesiastical power in those sects respectively, and no more power than others claim on the ground of Sacred Scripture for each person individually, and no more power than Liberals and disbelievers in a divine revelation claim for each person individually on the ground of natural right.

Look into the "confessions" and "symbolical books" of Protestant sects, and into the writings of the founders of those sects, still held to be of force, and you will find countless declarations that Christians are absolved in conscience from all allegiance to wicked and tyrannical rulers, that such rulers may be rightfully resisted and deposed. And this doctrine holds among them to this day. What does the expression—a favorite one in the mouths of liber-

of the State, to insist that because the General Government of the United States enacted certain laws, therefore American citizens were under any moral obligation to obey them, if in their consciences they disapproved them.

The resistance made to the Fugitive Slave Act, and the reprobation which the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the famous Dred Scott case met with, are not yet forgotten. It was insisted then that so far from the State having authority to determine principles of religion and morals, and the relations of men to each other growing out of those principles, the State was guilty of usurpation and tyranny, was attempting to support a system of wrong, and that there was no obligation to obey laws or judicial decisions based upon that wrong.

alists to-day—"the sacred right of revolution" mean, but that there are times and circumstances when the obligations of civil allegiance to tyrannical rulers cease, and those rulers may be deposed?

The Popes, therefore, of the Middle Ages exercised no greater and no more extensive authority and power as regards this matter than Protestants claim for themselves, either individually or for each sect in its collective capacity, and no more and no greater power than disbelievers in divine revelation, appealing simply to natural law, claim for themselves individually.

2d. But there is a great difference between the extent of the power exercised by the Popes during the Middle Ages and that claimed by Protestants and by deniers of divine revelation. The claim of the former is not near so extensive or unlimited as that of the latter.

No Pope has ever claimed to exercise, or attempted to exercise, this power except in relation to countries confessedly Catholic, and where both kings and peoples acknowledged themselves to be subject to the authority of the Catholic Church, and where by the public, organic law, the Catholic religion was recognized as forming part of the law of the realm. In no instance was this authority ever claimed, or ever attempted to be exercised, in countries whose people and rulers were outside of the Catholic Church. And not only this, but all such authority in non-Catholic countries, is formally disclaimed on the principle laid down by St. Paul (I. Cor. v. 12): "What have I to do to judge those that are without?" For further proofs see the evidence in the note we append.¹

Moreover, this authority was never claimed or exercised on account of the action of civil rulers in regard to things purely temporal. On the contrary all authority in regard to those matters is expressly disclaimed by Catholic theologians.²

¹ "The supreme judicial power of the Church has no jurisdiction over those that are not Christians, and the entire weight of its authority, if it were applied at all to such a State, would be applied to confirm the natural rights of sovereignty and to enforce the natural duty of allegiance; and that upon the principle that the supernatural power of the Church is for edification, not for destruction, that is to build up and to perfect the order of nature, not to pull down a stone in the symmetry of the natural society of man." (Cardinal Manning, *Vat. Dec.*, 52.)

"Power and authority are established by human right; the distinction between the faithful and those who do not believe is by divine right. But the divine right, which comes by grace, does not destroy the human right which is in the order of nature." (St. Thomas, 2 da, 2 dæ, quest. x., art. 10.)

² "Boniface VIII., in this very Bull, *Unam Sanctam*, expressly declares that the power given to Peter was the 'Suprema SPIRITUALIS Potestas,' not the temporal or a mixed power, but purely spiritual." (Cardinal Manning, *Vat. Dec.*, p. 66.)

"In things temporal, and in respect to the temporal end of government, the Church has no power in civil society." (Cardinal Tarquini, *Juris Eccl. Publici Institutiones*, p. 57.)

Cardinal Manning commenting upon this says: "The proof of this proposition is

3d. There is an immense difference, too, between the manner in which this absolving power was exercised by Popes, and the manner in which the claim of right to throw off civil allegiance and resist civil authority has been put forth, and often maintained by force of arms by non-Catholics.

According to the non-Catholic theory, a particular religious sect, or a person acting purely on his own individual judgment, may raise at any time the question of obligation to the civil power, charge it with usurpation or an attack upon conscience, summarily condemn it at the tribunal of private judgment, and make the sword the only arbiter of right. History shows what the result has been under this theory,—countless rebellions, social revolutions, and seas of blood.¹

But the deposing power exercised by Popes has always been exercised judicially, after patient and careful investigation and examination, conducted according to clearly settled and acknowledged principles and well-established rules,² and exercised, too, only in

that all things merely temporal are beside or outside of the end of the Church. It is a general rule that no society has power in those things which are out of its own proper end."

... "The civil society, even though every member of it be Catholic, is not subject to the Church, but plainly independent in temporal things which regard its temporal end." (Tarquini, *Juris Eccl. Institutiones*, p. 55.)

"Canonists affirm that the whole world is the territory of the Pontiff. But they do so in answering the objection, that where the Pontiff acts spiritually in the territory of any temporal prince, he is invading the territory of another. The meaning is evident, namely, that the Pontiff has universal jurisdiction over the whole world. But this does not say that his jurisdiction is temporal; it merely affirms that it is universal, and the same writers assert that it is only spiritual." (Cardinal Manning, *Vat. Decrees*, p. 74.)

¹ A French writer sums these up as follows for the last eighty years: 45 thrones overthrown, 25 royal families driven into exile, 34 charters and constitutions drawn up, sworn to, and then destroyed.

² We quote a few proofs from many which might be adduced. Dr. Döllinger in his work entitled "The Church and the Churches," says:

"Outside of the Catholic Church it has become almost a common form of speech to brand the Papal power as being boundless, as being absolute, as one which recognizes no law capable of controlling it. There is a great deal of talk of 'Romish omnipotence,' or of one with a never-ceasing pretension to universal dominion. All these representations and accusations are untrue and unjust. The Papal power is, in one respect, the most restricted that can be imagined; for its determinate purpose is manifest to all persons; and is (as the Popes themselves have innumerable times openly declared) 'to maintain laws and ordinances of the Church, and to prevent any infringement of them.' The Church has long since had its established ordinances and its legislation determined on, even to the most minute points. The Papal See is thus, then, before all others, called upon to give an example of the most rigid adherence to Church tenets; and it is only upon this condition that it can rely upon obedience to itself on the part of individual churches, or calculate upon the respect of the faithful."

Count De Maistre pithily says:

"What can restrain the Pope? Everything—canons, laws, national customs, monarchs, tribunals, national assemblies, prescriptions, remonstrances, negotiations, duty, fear, obedience, and especially public opinion, the Queen of the world."

extreme cases and after long and patient and repeated expostulations, and every other possible remedy had been tried and proved ineffectual. Under the non-Catholic views (both Protestant and rationalistic), therefore, of the relation of the "Law of God" and of the natural rights of men to the civil power, the good order and peace of society are far more subject to disturbance; and collisions with the civil power are likely to be far more frequent than under the Catholic view. History fully confirms this statement. For one instance that can be cited of subjects absolved by a Pope from their allegiance to a civil ruler, twenty can be cited of rebellions and insurrections against the civil power, and political revolutions made by non-Catholics on the ground of their private interpretations of the "Law of God" or of the law of natural right.¹

Whenever this deposing power was exercised by Popes during

Now let us hear what Pius VII says in an official document quoted by Dr. Döllinger: "The Pope is bound by the nature and the institutions of the Catholic Church, whose head he is, within certain limits, which he dare not overstep, without violating his conscience and abusing that supreme power which Jesus Christ has confided to him. . . . Although in the Catholic Church faith has always been regarded as unalterable, but discipline as alterable, yet the Roman bishops have with respect even to discipline in their actual conduct always held certain limits sacred, although by this means they acknowledge the obligation never to undertake any novelty in certain things, and also not to subject other parts of discipline to alterations, except upon the most important and impregnable grounds."

A pastoral of the Swiss bishops, published in 1871, just one year after the Vatican Council was held, speaks not less plainly on this subject. It carries with it the more weight, inasmuch as it has been referred to in terms of approval by Pope Pius IX. :

"It in no way depends upon the caprice of the Pope, or upon his good pleasure, to make such and such a doctrine the object of a dogmatic definition. He is tied up and limited to the divine revelation, and to the truths which that revelation contains. He is tied up and limited by the creeds, already in existence, and by the preceding definitions of the Church. He is tied up and limited by the divine law, and by the constitution of the Church. Lastly, he is tied up and limited by that doctrine, divinely revealed, which affirms that alongside religious society there is civil society, that alongside the ecclesiastical hierarchy, there is the power of temporal magistrates, invested in their own domain with a full sovereignty, and to whom we owe obedience in conscience, and respect in all things morally permitted, and belonging to the domain of civil society."

¹ It seems passing strange with what facility non-Catholics can reconcile themselves to the idea that every individual may set up a plea, on the slightest pretext, that civil authority is violating his rights of conscience, and that, therefore, he may resist it without moral guilt, yet they cannot understand how the Pope, in his official capacity, as the Visible Head of the Church, can rightfully exercise an authority no greater than what the non-Catholic theories claim for each individual. Protestant preachers and infidel lecturers may boldly instruct their audiences that the State, in a certain instance, is violating their natural rights or their religious rights, and urge them to resistance, and their followers may blindly obey them; and men look on complacently, and if the result is rebellion, they call it a struggle for liberty, civil or religious, as the case may happen to be. But when reference is made to the power exercised in a few instances, not a dozen in all, by the Popes during the Middle Ages (a power never exercised in modern times), of absolving subjects from allegiance to civil rulers guilty of outrageous tyranny and violation of rights, both civil and religious, then these sticklers for liberty at once raise the cry of "papal arrogance and assumption."

the Middle Ages, it was exercised in the interests of civil liberty and order, and never, not in any one instance, against them. We say what we have here further to say in the words of Cardinal Manning:

"Nothing is more certain upon the face of history, and no one has proved it more abundantly than Dr. Döllinger, that in every case of deposition, as of Philip le Bel, Henry IV. of Germany, Frederick II., and the like, the sentence of the Electors, press, states, and people, and the public opinion and voice of nations had already pronounced sentence of rejection upon those tyrants, before the Pontiffs pronounced the sentence of excommunication and deposition. It was only by the faith and free will of nations that they became socially subject to this jurisprudence; it was by their free will that it was maintained in vigor, and it was in conformity with their free will that it was exercised by the Pontiffs. Their free sentence preceded the Pontifical sentence. It was at their prayer and in their behalf that it was pronounced. The moral condition of spontaneous acceptance, and the material conditions of execution, were alike present, rendering Pontifical acts legitimate, right, lawful, wise, and salutary."

No Catholic theologian or prelate has ever been more outspoken in regard to the rights and authority of the Holy Roman See, and none more firm and courageous in insisting upon them and defending them than Cardinal Manning. We have, therefore, in the words just quoted, the testimony of one who, to use a cant phrase, is "an Ultramontane of Ultramontanes," as to how far that authority extends, and where and when and how it is limited. He also anticipates and answers an objection that is sometimes foolishly raised by non-Catholics in the United States as well as in Europe, which runs as follows:

"Catholics justify the deposition of princes by the Popes of the Middle Ages: to be consistent they would have to justify the Pope now if he would pronounce sentence of deposition on Queen Victoria" or the President of the United States.

Cardinal Manning's answer, and the answer of all Catholics is:

"I affirm that the depositions of Henry VIII. and Frederick II. of Germany were legitimate, right, and lawful; and I affirm that a deposition of Queen Victoria (or a President of the United States) would not be legitimate nor right nor lawful, because the moral conditions which were present to justify the depositions of the Emperors of Germany are absent in the case of Queen Victoria (and of the President of the United States), and therefore such an act could not be done."

What these "moral conditions" are, which justify the exercise by Popes in mediæval times, of the right to depose civil rulers, and the absence of which now entirely prevents any such action on the part of the Roman Pontiff, Cardinal Manning explicitly states:

"The moral conditions which justified and demanded the deposition of tyrannical princes, when the mediæval world was both Christian and Catholic, have absolutely ceased to exist, now that the world has ceased to be Catholic, and has ceased even to be Christian. It has withdrawn itself socially and as a whole, and in the public life of nations, from the unity and the jurisdiction of the Christian Church. . . . Not only is every moral condition which could justify such an act absent, but every moral condition which would render such an act unjustifiable is present."

Nor is this a mere personal opinion of Cardinal Manning's,¹ nor

¹ Dr. Newman says substantially the same thing, and says, moreover, in reference to the *jus publicum*, which is one of the conditions, without the presence of which this

even a mere opinion of Catholic theologians; the present Sovereign Pontiff, Pius IX., has spoken in unmistakable words on this very point. In an address to a deputation of the "Academy of the Catholic Religion," June 20th, 1871, after declaring that it is "a pernicious error" to represent that the infallibility (of the Pope) comprehends in itself the right to dethrone temporal sovereigns or absolve subjects from their oaths of allegiance, he continues:

"This right has indeed been exercised by Popes in extreme cases, but the right has absolutely nothing in common with Papal infallibility. It was a result of the *jus publicum* then in force by the consent of Christian nations, who recognized in the Pope the supreme judge of Christendom, and constituted him judge over princes and peoples even in temporal matters. The present situation is quite different. Nothing but bad faith could confound things so different and ages so dissimilar, as if an infallible judgment, delivered upon some revealed truth, had any analogy with a prerogative which the Popes, solicited by the desire of the people, had to exercise when the public weal demanded it! Such statements are nothing but a mere pretext to excite civil rulers against the Church!"

It is vain, therefore, to attempt to justify the attack made in this insidious pamphlet upon the Catholic Church, and specially upon Catholic citizens of the United States, by reference to the acts of Popes in mediæval times. The rightfulness of those acts is not a matter of Catholic faith, but we know of none which cannot be successfully defended. And almost all really erudite and candid non-Catholic as well as Catholic historians now look upon them as generally, if not universally, entirely justifiable; as done in defence of right, and in the interests not only of morality and religion, but of civil liberty and civilization. But those acts belong to another age, and to circumstances and conditions entirely different from those of our time; we therefore dismiss them from further comment.

The pamphleteer himself seems to be aware that he must find other ground on which to base his charges. Consequently, after doing his best, or worst rather, to create false impressions in regard to the mediæval Church, he refers to the Decree of the Vatican Council defining the infallibility of the Holy Roman Pontiff, and attempts to make that Decree an excuse for his assault upon Catholic American citizens, and a reason for commending the action of the German imperial government in persecuting the Catholics of Germany. He says that the German government, in at-

right cannot be exercised: "It was no consent which is merely local, as if of one country, . . . if that were probable, but a united consent of the various nations, . . . as a commonwealth of which the Pope was the head."

In a letter from the Cardinals, of the Congregation of the Propaganda, by order of His Holiness Pius VI., addressed to the Roman Catholic Bishops of Ireland, dated Rome, June 23d, 1791, like principles are set forth.

Bishop Fessler, Secretary-General of the Vatican Council, expresses himself to the same effect in his work entitled *True and False Infallibility of the Popes*, p. 146, and refers to Ballerini: *De vi et ratione Romani Pontificis*, ch. xv., § x., n. 38 and 41.

tacking the Catholic Church in Germany, avowedly because the Vatican Council declared and defined the infallibility of the Pope, "*is simply asserting its own supremacy in matters of state,*" and that "*the question is a political one.*"

The terms of the definition have become so well known by repeated publication that it seems almost unnecessary to quote them. Yet its scope and meaning continue to be so persistently misrepresented, that we give its language with sufficient fulness to show clearly its bearing on the point under consideration:

"Therefore, faithfully adhering to the tradition received from the beginning of the Christian faith, . . . We teach and define that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedra*, that is, when in discharge of the office of Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority, he *defines a doctrine regarding faith or morals* to be held by the Universal Church, . . . is possessed by Divine assistance of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed for defining doctrine regarding *faith or morals.*"

Now here note three points:

1st. The Vatican Council makes no new claim of privilege or power in behalf of the Pope. It adheres to the tradition of the Church, a tradition not only believed by Catholics, but known to be believed by them, by all non-Catholics. For this very tradition and belief has been a favorite point of attack by the enemies of Catholicity for the last three centuries.

2d. No other and no more extensive infallibility is claimed for the Roman Pontiff than that which has always been claimed for the Church: the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is defined as *that infallibility* "with which the Blessed Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed." Now here we simply say that if the infallibility of the Church, which has ever been held and known to be held as an article of faith by all Catholics, did not interfere with the supremacy in matters of state of the government of Germany previous to the decree of the Vatican Council, the assumption is entirely gratuitous that the definition of the infallibility of the Holy Roman Pontiff furnishes any ground for interference now. The relation of the Church to civil governments is precisely the same now as before. That subject is not touched upon, not referred to, not even in the most distant way, in the Acts of the Vatican Council; and the infallibility predicated of the Holy Roman Pontiff is identical with that predicated of the Church.

3d. The infallibility, both of the Church and of the Roman Pontiff, are expressly limited to faith and morals. These terms, *faith or morals*, are twice repeated in the definition. Does the State in Germany, or anywhere else, possess any jurisdiction over the faith of individuals? Can the State undertake to teach faith or morals, or to define a doctrine respecting either? If not, how can the dogma of infallibility affect "the supremacy of the German

Empire in matters of state?" And how can this pamphleteer represent the attack of the German government, confessedly based upon this dogma, as "not a movement against religion?"

Unless, therefore, questions of "faith and morals" are not religious questions, it follows by necessary consequence that, the attempt of the German government to assert supremacy in those matters is a monstrous usurpation, meriting nothing but indignant denunciation on the part of every Christian, nay, of every lover of human freedom, be his religious opinions what they may.

Let us now look more closely at the action of the German government. It undertakes avowedly to exercise supreme jurisdiction over every right and power and function of the Church.

The right and power of administering discipline is necessary to the free action, and existence indeed, of every human independent society and organization. The moment it is deprived of this right it must either cease to exist or lose its independence. This is a plain principle both of law and common sense.

Infinitely higher is the necessity that the Church exercise discipline with entire freedom and independence. She would not be free if her discipline were subject to the supervision of any other power. This truth has been frequently recognized and acted on by our civil courts. They have uniformly refused to exercise any revisory or supervisory power over the disciplinary action of religious societies, when members of those societies appealed to the civil law. They based their refusal on the ground that it was absolutely necessary to the autonomy and freedom of religious societies that they should be judges of their own doctrine, and have the exercise of discipline over their own members, without dependence upon or subordination to any other power. The Church is a society having officers of its own who have functions delegated to them, not by the State, nor by any human power whatever.

Moreover the Church was not only endowed by Christ with this disciplinary power which it cannot give up, or make subject to any potentate or power, of this world, but it is itself a divine organization instituted by Christ, and by Him made independent of every earthly potentate in the discharge and fulfilment of *all* its functions. In its own sphere and for its own end it is supreme. Nor can it learn from any human source what that sphere and that end comprehend. To be subject in any of these respects to the direction or oversight or limitation of any human power whatever, would be at once to surrender the liberty with which Christ has made His Church free, and the authority with which He has endowed it.¹

¹ "By its very nature, therefore, it (the Church) is a supernatural constitution, a truly real and abiding fact in the world, and yet, at the same time, a fact not dependent accordingly on the laws and conditions that reign in 'this present evil world,' and not at its mercy in any way. . . . As a supernatural presence among men

Our Divine Lord declared to His Apostles :

"All power is given to me in heaven and in earth. Go, therefore, teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world. He that heareth you heareth me." "And I will give to thee (Peter) the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, shall be loosed also in heaven." And to all the Apostles He subsequently declared, "Amen, I say to you whatsoever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven."

Thus the Commission runs, a Divine Commission, unlimited, unqualified, resting on no earthly basis whatever. What, now, has the German government been doing? It has undertaken to limit the clergy and hierarchy of the Church in regard to the exercise of every power and function which the Commission comprehends. Priests and bishops are prohibited under grievous penalties from exercising "the power of the keys," the power of binding and loosing in the Sacrament of Penance, the power of teaching, the power of baptizing and of discharging any duty or function whatever belonging to their offices, without the permission of the German government. If they visit the sick or shrive the dying, baptize a child, preach, or even say Mass privately, without the permission of civil functionaries, they are subject to fine, imprisonment, or exile. The religious orders of the Church have been banished. Her bishops are prohibited from ordaining priests or appointing them to parishes, and the clergy from disciplining the laity, unless under conditions

in any such constant and really historical way as the gift and presence of Christ seem necessarily to imply, the Holy Spirit must have His own supernatural sphere, in distinction from the order of nature, within which to carry forward His operations as the power of a new creation ever against the vanity and misery of the old. . . . It is not of the first creation like the art and science and political institutions of mankind in every other view. It holds directly from Christ in His capacity of glorified superiority to the universal order of nature." . . .

"On this ground it is that we declare the Church to be higher and greater than the State. Patriotism, after all, is not the first virtue of man, if we are to understand by it devotion to the will of the State regarded as an absolute end. To make this will the absolute measure of truth and duty; to find in it the last idea of right and wrong; to denounce the conception of a real jurisdiction on the part of the Church that shall be taken as owing no subordination whatever to the State (in the style of some who carry on the war blindly with the Church of Rome), is in fact to betray Christ into the hands of Cæsar, and to treat the whole mystery of His Ascension as a cunningly devised fable.

"Governments have no right to place themselves at the head of Church, or over it, in its own sphere, converting it into a department of state, as in Prussia, or making the civil power the source and fountain of ecclesiastical authority, as since the days of Henry the Eighth and Cranmer in England. What can be more monstrous than the conception of such a pretended headship of the Church? . . . But if it be monstrous for any civil power to usurp this sort of lordship over God's heritage, affecting to play the part of sovereign in the sphere of powers that belong not to this world, can it be less monstrous to think of making these powers dependent on the constitution of the simply natural world in any other view?" Dr. John W. Nevin, *Mercersburg Review*, January, 1855, vol. vii., pp. 76 and 77.

that imply absolute, unconditional submission to the State in matters spiritual as well as civil. Their salaries, derived from Church property tyrannically taken from the Church by the State, are withheld unless this submission is made, a submission no Christian man ought to make, or can make consistently with his belief in Christianity as a divine religion; and parishioners dare not even make voluntary donations to their priest, unless he is recognized as a priest by the civil authorities. Their church edifices have been taken from them and turned over to little squads of so-called "Old Catholics," consisting in many instances of Jews, infidels, and persons who habitually do not attend any religious services, while the thousands of Catholics who own those churches and worshipped in them are deprived of any place of worship. For they are not allowed to build, even with their own money, a new church edifice without government permission. The supervision of the government extends over doctrinal teaching. Neither a schoolmaster, a priest, nor a bishop, is allowed by the new ecclesiastical laws of the German government to teach or preach the doctrines of the Catholic faith as the Church defines them. The religious instruction imparted in schools is under government supervision. Theological seminaries must submit to the direction and supervision of State officials, or dismiss their students and close their doors; and candidates for the sacred office of the priesthood must study in State universities, where some of the professors are infidels and rationalists, and others are Protestants, and must pass an examination on philosophy, history, theology, etc., conducted by examiners irreligious, or of non-Catholic belief. And, as regards laymen, they cannot form even a Rosary Society or a Sodality without incurring legal penalties, unless civil functionaries first grant permission.

Yet the pamphleteer asserts that the German government's attack upon the liberty of Catholics and the rights and authority of the Church has nothing to do with religion, but is "simply the German government asserting its supremacy in matters of state." On the ground of this barefaced falsehood, Bismarck is held up to American citizens as an apostle of freedom, civil and religious, and the action of the German government is not only defended but extolled. On this ground, too, the effort to inflame passion and excite prejudice against Catholics, and subject them to an indirect, if not to an open and direct persecution, is justified.

Do we hold the members of the Republican party generally responsible for this infamous assault upon the Catholics of the United States, and not only upon them, but upon the Catholic Church as a religious organization? We distinctly say no. We have too much confidence in the good sense and sound judgment of the people of the United States, whether Republicans or Democrats, to

believe that they would approve any such action. But we do hold the "Union Republican Congressional Executive Committee," which published and circulated this vile pamphlet, responsible. It has proved that those who compose it are utterly unworthy of the trust reposed in them by those who placed them in power, and that they are using that power not for the best interests of the people of the United States, and not to promote peace and civil order, but for their own base, selfish purposes, to deceive and delude those whom they may succeed in deceiving and deluding into a movement that would array American citizens one against the other, and infuse distrust, suspicion, enmity, and, it might be, create riot and bloodshed, where all ought to be peace, harmony, and good will. Is it not time for the people of the United States to throw off the fetters of party rule? It is a despotism which has made slaves of them under the forms of a free government.

In conclusion, we say that the people of the United States are in no danger of having their civil institutions destroyed by Catholics. The danger will come from another direction. The danger is that the rapid spread of Liberalism, which is but another name for the rule of infidel revolution, and is always godless, blood-thirsty, and despotic in the end, however fair it may seem in its first aspects, will bring unspeakable calamities to the people of America. God in His mercy grant that this danger may be averted.



EDITORIAL NOTE, REFERRING TO NOTE 2 ON PAGE 37.

[This is not the fault of the Catholic Church, but (as the writer of the article sufficiently implies) of preachers, who will not listen to her admonitions and precepts. Nothing can be plainer or more reasonable than the language of the Council of Trent. Sess. XXV., Decret. de Purgator. "Sanam de purgatorio doctrinam a sanctis Patribus et sacris Conciliis traditam a Christi fidelibus credi, teneri, doceri et ubique prædicari diligenter studeant. Apud rudem vero plebem difficiliore ac subtiliores quæstiones, quæque ad ædificationem non faciunt, et ex quibus plerumque nulla sit pietatis accessio, a popularibus concionibus secludantur. Incerta item vel quæ specie falsi laborant evulgari ac tractari non permittant. Ea vero quæ ad curiositatem quandam spectant tanquam scandala et fidelium offendicula prohibeant."]

BOOK NOTICES.

THE AMERICAN STATE AND AMERICAN STATESMEN. By *William Giles Dix*. Boston: Estes & Lauriat. 1876. 12mo., pp. 171.

This is a remarkable book, and (apart from its ultimate conclusions, with which we can have no sympathy) is not only well written and able in argument, but shows likewise a deep insight into the present wretched condition of the country. It is only in providing the remedy, that the author has failed. He is a man of strong convictions, and filled with a deep sense of the necessity of religion as the chief support and safeguard of national prosperity. We cannot sufficiently commend the chapters, in which he proposes and proves this part of his subject. They are the fifth, sixth, and seventh, and are headed respectively, "Christianity, the Inspirer of Nations," "Materialism the Curse of America," and "America a Christian Power." And what makes these views more remarkable is, that they were written while Mr. Dix was yet outside of the Catholic Church.

We regret that we cannot speak thus favorably of two other chapters, and especially of one, which is a painful specimen of hero-worship. Heroes are not created by the clamor of angry passions, nor by the hollow applause of interested partisans. Their right to the title must be awarded, or confirmed at least, by the cool, calm judgment of posterity. Yet we must say, to the credit of Mr. Dix, that he knows how to rise occasionally above the level of mere partisanship and sectional feeling. He vindicates in noble words of praise the great statesman whose name is unpopular, but less for his politics than his principle; not so much for his advocacy of State Rights as for his incorruptible integrity, which would not turn aside from the path of honor and duty for the sake of any dignity, even the highest the country could offer. His memory is a standing reproach to the venal herd that sits in our legislative halls or busies itself with the more congenial task of official pillage. What wonder that they should hate it!

The author's theory regarding American nationality and the origin of its Christian State, though none can deny it to be ingenious, will be regarded by many as finespun and fanciful. He considers Columbus as the first founder of the American State which, though not avowedly Christian, is yet such by right and obligation; and he maintains that our national life is derived from Christian Europe through Spain, not through England. The sovereignty of the Christian State in America may be traced back through Spain to that Christian sovereignty, which was inaugurated by Constantine in the civilized world, and which came down through the nations that grew out of the wreck of the Roman Empire. It was a germ or new shoot of this principle that Columbus brought with him to the shores of the New World; and if others besides Spaniards followed him it can make no difference. They might bring with them their special institutions; they could not sow or plant what another had already sown and planted; they could neither do nor undo what had been done already. The people of the New World were not of necessity to be under Spanish or French or English dominion. But they had received the inalienable right and the peremptory obligation to establish civil society and national power on the basis of the Christian Faith. This is briefly the author's theory; and it has, no doubt, a certain basis of truth. For if Christ came to found a religion upon

earth, it surely was His Divine will that States as well as individuals should be bound by the New Law. A State that does not recognize God and His revelation, may at times be preferable as a choice of evils; it never can be the model or perfect State in the eyes of a Christian believer. We have no space to discuss further this theory of the author, nor to examine how far it is subordinate to the main purpose of his book.

The leading idea of Mr. Dix, the object in fact for which his book was written, is to propose and recommend that the substance of our government, without altering its forms, be radically changed, in fact subverted. He does not use, it is true, and would probably disclaim any such expression. He contends that the change would simply correct an error, would give henceforth meaning and consistency to a government that now does not correspond to the first great principle that underlies it. That principle he frankly acknowledges is not in the Constitution but outside of it. It may be thus expressed: we are a nation, therefore we should have a national government. Outside of the national government there is no sovereignty, no power. Away then with State Sovereignty, State Rights, and every vestige of a merely Federal union. Let them be consigned to oblivion as errors and follies of the past; and if they dare show themselves again, let them be punished as crimes. If the States prefer it, they may elect their governors; but these shall have no authority until they have received, like *Préfets* of *Départements* in France, their commission from the central government. Thus the States being turned, as is proper, into mere satrapies or provinces, the only hindrance to perfect "union" will be removed; the national government, without domestic foes to frustrate its designs, will bring about a new golden era of peace and prosperity, and its invincible ruler will have it in his power to march unimpeded to the conquest of the entire continent. This is substantially the author's theory, though not expressed precisely in his own words. One might say, that merely to state this theory will suffice to refute it. But if Mr. Dix reads the daily papers, and keeps note of current events, he must ere this have had the satisfaction of learning, that something very like a part of his programme has been not only attempted but actually carried out, and (what should gratify him still more) has been approved and sanctioned to all appearances by a great portion of the American people.

There can be no doubt that it was the intention of those who framed the American government one hundred years ago, that we should never have *irresponsible* rulers. Responsibility to the people seemed to them the best curb on those intrusted with power; and to secure this, the whole machinery of government was cautiously and wisely constructed. The careful apportioning of powers between the Federal and State governments, the equality of the States in the higher legislative body without reference to size or population, the limiting of the Supreme Court's decisions to Federal cases, the thorough separation of the executive, judicial, and law-making powers,—all these checks plainly show the anxiety of the founders of the Republic, lest despotism should find a hiding-place in Congress, or rear its head in the Presidential chair. But, from the very beginning, there was a party that chafed under these restraints, prompted partly by the fear that the government as constituted was too weak to achieve national greatness, partly by base motives. Even before the close of the Revolutionary War there were complaints, to which actual circumstances lent a color, of the government's inefficiency; and the venal pen of the notorious Tom Paine was employed to urge upon the people the necessity of a strong central government. But it was chiefly under the first Presidential administra-

tion that Hamilton labored to develop this idea, and give life and vigor to the party that had adopted it. From that day to this, under various names and disguises, that party grew stronger and stronger by degrees, until at last it reached the acmé of its hopes and got possession of the government. Its history is before the country and the world, and it is not pleasant to look things in the face and see how successful the party has been, how much it has accomplished. Since it began, scarcely a year has passed, and during the last fifteen or twenty years, scarcely a month or a week that does not bear witness to the wisdom of those old statesmen, and to the reality of those dangers against which they strove to make provision.

What is the condition of the country at the present time? Is there anything in it to afford a hope that a central despotism or (to use its euphemistic name) a strong government, such as Mr. Dix recommends, will be a source of lasting prosperity or even of temporary relief? In a government of the people, the people must be virtuous; there must be a standard of public morality, before which all must bow or bear the penalty. And if this moral standard is fast vanishing from the country, it might be an argument for those who contend that we ought to lose our liberties because we are no longer worthy to possess them. But to have good government under rulers who are not responsible to the people, it is necessary that the rulers should be good men, that they should come up at least to the pagan standard of political morality.

Where are such men to be found? Look at those of our public men—it is unnecessary to name them—who are likely to become our irresponsible masters in Mr. Dix's promised millennium. No one can look without shuddering. Such shameless venality, lying, perjury, fraud, and robbery have been seldom seen under the sun; the atmosphere of Washington is reeking with the stench of political corruption, that extends from the highest to the lowest; the judge on the bench is as ready to quibble and prevaricate and crush justice, as the hireling in the jury-box, or the very culprit in the dock; even the military uniform of the officer is no longer what we remember it to have once been, a sure pledge of the honesty, honor, and truth of him who wears it. How would the country fare under the arbitrary rule of such men? We should have a Sylla or a Catiline in Washington, and a Verres in each province or State, so-called, with a host of brutal troopers to crush out the "bandits" who dare talk of their rights to life and property.

And what would be the condition of Catholics under the new regime? Have we any special reason to sigh for the new, glorious era, prophesied by Mr. Dix? We think not; though this may be for some pious souls an incentive to hasten its advent. In all probability we should see revived in succession the persecuting days of Shaftesbury and Titus Oates, of Robespierre, of Bismarck, and the cowardly Liberals of Southern Europe. But would there not be Catholics in the new government, who would protect their brothers in religion? We can only repeat with Anchises:

Di, prohibete minas! Di, talem avertite casum!

May God save us from this threatened protection, and from the chance of ever needing it! There have been, and are now Catholics, so-called, among our lawgivers, and in other high places of honor and trust, but who are not a whit less corrupt and dishonest than their non-Catholic or infidel associates; whose word or even oath, where party was concerned, no prudent man would believe; with whom no honest man, that is guided by the good old-fashioned laws of social intercourse,

could conscientiously shake hands. Such Catholics would, no doubt, have their fitting, well-earned places in the new government, and when persecuting measures would come up in Congress, we should have more than one of these Catholic Freemasons crying out, like the vile Earl of Bristol in the Parliament of Charles II., "My religion is Catholic ; but not the religion of the court of Rome."

It frequently happens that good men become so disgusted with the selfish greed of office, with the dishonesty of candidates, and voters, and the political wickedness generally which surrounds them, that they fall insensibly into the persuasion, that a strong government, a mild despotism would be an enviable refuge from the turmoil of political tumult, and the wicked strife of conflicting parties. They are good themselves, and disposed to hope for the best in the future, if they can only get rid in any way of the moral evils that sadden them at present. Mr. Dix belongs to this class, or its aspirations have found an echo in his book. But their hope, their line of policy, however natural, is selfish and short-sighted. An Augustus will always be a relief after the angry broils of Cæsarian and Pompeian factions ; and his gentle sway will seem a happy exchange for the bloody proscriptions of the Triumvirate. But sooner or later the mild Augustus will give way to the ruthless Tiberius, the ferocious Caligula, and the monster Nero. We may never have the luck to see Augustus ; but, judging from the present aspect of things, we are pretty sure to have Sejanus in the cabinet and Tiberius on the throne.

The fate of the country is even now trembling in the balance, and though the crisis may not arrive in a few months, as some apprehend, yet a few years at the utmost will solve the problem, whether government by the people for the good of the people on this side of the Atlantic be a possibility or a chimera. We have habitually sneered at Mexico and her periodical anarchy, but if some men amongst us are allowed to have their way much longer, Mexicanism threatens to be our next condition. If these unprincipled men are not put down by the good sense and firm attitude of the American people, by their clearly expressed determination not to surrender their real freedom for the nominal triumph of party, the republic is not only in danger, but on the very verge of ruin. It may be by process of disintegration ; it may be by the absorption of power, to be held henceforth by the dictator or military adventurer. The former seems to be the ultimate, the latter the immediate point to which we are tending. We shall learn by bitter experience at home, the horrors of chronic disorder, which we have derided in our Mexican neighbors. There is already no lack of bold unprincipled men in high places, who will be the Diazes, Lerdoes, and Escobedos, of the new state of things ; and, even if we had not a stock on hand, the demand would bring about the supply.

Perhaps, owing to our sins as individuals and as a community, our blind party spirit that makes us do wrong, connive at wrong, and even defend the wrong in books and newspapers, in public assemblies, in legislative halls, and even in courts of justice, our iniquitous secret societies, our atrocious treatment of the poor Indians, and other national crimes, we have aroused the just anger of Him who raises up States or casts them down as He wills and as they may deserve. We have abused our freedom ; perhaps it will be taken away in punishment. We would not serve God ; perhaps He will hand us over to taskmasters of our own making, who have grown up out of our sins. It may be that undisguised despotism or the fate of Mexico awaits us. But, if come it must, let it come as the penalty of our offence ; let it come at the hands of Him who knows how to temper mercy with justice. Let us not of our own accord hasten its

coming by singing the praises of the rod that is to scourge us, and by shouts of encouragement and welcome to the avenger who is to wield it.

LETTERS, AND SOCIAL AIMS. By *Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1876. Pp. 314.

This book is made up of the lectures and essays which the author had been delivering and writing in the past five years. It will not be the least popular of Emerson's works. Some of the essays are charming. On the whole, the book is less marred by the author's paradoxes and sphinx-like sayings than any other of his productions. Then, the style is so toned down, so severely classic, that it is a great pleasure to read it in these days of inflated utterances and bad writing. Emerson speaks only when he has something to say worth listening to. He is not loud-mouthed as is Carlyle, to whom he is sometimes compared. Because a greater thinker than Carlyle, he is less of a croaker; indeed, he is no croaker. The great fault with him is, he does not find fault enough. He presses everything into his system as an essential part. If he does not express it in so many words, he at least implies that things are facts, and facts could not have been otherwise. "A point of education," he says, "that I can never too much insist upon is this tenet, that every individual man has a bias which he must obey, and that it is only as he feels and obeys this that he rightly develops and attains his legitimate power in the world" (p. 274). This is due in a great measure to the company his thoughts keep. He finds everything in Swedenborg and Spinoza. Raised in the tenets of Puritanism, he felt within its pale like a man suffocating in a small and crowded room. He, so to speak, leaped through the window into the open air of free thought, and so pleased was he with the change, so gladly did his heart beat under the feeling of living and thinking, above all, so full of himself did he become, that he cast off all forms of church doctrines. Taking that which pressed so hard upon his soul, as a type and excellent specimen of all others, he refused to look elsewhere; and he now lives content in the reflection that all creeds are only so many forms of thought, and that thought alone is life and the reason for existence here and hereafter.

In Emerson the style reveals the man. His mind is as peculiar as his expression. He does not give the reader a continuous course of reasoning on any topic. He does not intend to reason syllogistically. "We use semblances of logic," he says in the volume under review, "until experience puts us in possession of real logic" (p. 9). Like Bacon in his *Novum Organon*, he is satisfied with asserting a truth in forcible language. He does not believe in talking any man into his way of thinking. He considers it sufficient to give the hint or make the suggestion; he then leaves it to others to follow out the argument. And herein lies the chief power of Emerson. He has no system. He is not the founder of a school. He has had to create his own audience, as did Kant and Wordsworth. The time is not so long past when he was the laughing-stock of all but a few discerning minds. But he is a thinker and a suggester of thought. He himself—his inner life and experience—is so bound up with his thought that did this book come before the public with no name, it could by no possibility be attributed to any other living writer. He tells us: "A man's action is only a picture-book of his creed. He does after what he believes. Your condition, your employment, is the fable of *you*" (p. 20). So, when in another place (p. 50) he tells us that "the philosopher is the

failed poet," he means Ralph Waldo Emerson. No essayist, since Montaigne wrote, has more individual personality in his essays—and he is pre-eminently an essayist—than Emerson. He possesses it, too, without the egotism of the French skeptic. But we may have occasion in some future number of the *REVIEW* to develop this estimate of the philosopher of Concord. Let us now dip into the book under notice.

The most charming and satisfactory essay in the book is that on "Social Aims." It is replete with such hints and observations as only a skilled and acute observer of society could have made. It is an essay on manners, written by one who has been a ruler in society and who knows whereof he speaks. "It is even true," he says (p. 71), "that grace is more beautiful than beauty." He finds a good word for the intellectual man, so good and so true that we transcribe it: "It is a commonplace of romances to show the ungainly manners of the pedant who has lived too long in college. Intellectual men pass for vulgar and are timid and heavy with the elegant. But if the elegant are also intellectual, instantly the hesitating scholar is inspired, transformed, and exhibits the best style of manners. An intellectual man, though of feeble spirit, is instantly reinforced by being put into the company of scholars, and to the surprise of everybody, becomes a lawgiver. We think a man unable and desponding. It is only that he is misplaced. Put him with new companions and they will find in him excellent qualities, unsuspected accomplishments, and the joy of life. 'Tis a great point in a gallery how you hang pictures; and not less in society, how you seat your party. The circumstance of circumstance is time and placing" (p. 74). Again, himself a man of sincerity, he finds no sympathy for the insincere, the person of affectation, the sentimentalist. As an illustration of the Socratic irony with which he can speak, when occasion requires, we give the following on the sentimentalist: "Now society in towns is infested by persons who, seeing that the sentiments please, counterfeit the expression of them. These we call sentimentalist—talkers who mistake the description for the thing, saying for having. They have, they tell you, an intense love of nature; poetry, O, they adore poetry, and roses, and the moon, and the cavalry regiment, and the governors; they love liberty, 'dear liberty!' they worship virtue, 'dear virtue!' Yes, they adopt whatever merit is in good repute, and almost make it hateful with their praise. The warmer their expressions, the colder we feel; we shiver with cold" (p. 94).

Of the other essays in this book the two most noteworthy are the first, on "Poetry and Imagination," and the last, on "Immortality." Poetry is that nameless something which the poet feels, better than he can define, and which he who is not a poet can only talk about. Therefore, as Emerson has felt poetic inspiration and occasionally written some genuine poetry, he is entitled to a careful hearing on the subject. He wrote upon it frequently before; but this is his last and most mature essay on the subject. He begins by distinguishing between what he calls first sight and second sight. First sight is the perception of matter—that common sense or common ground upon which all agree. Second sight is matter viewed as a symbol of thought, and belongs in a pre-eminent degree to the poet. He is the seer. He it is who really knows the meaning of things. To him the brooks speak and all nature reveals her secrets. Hence he defines poetry to be "the perpetual endeavor to express the spirit of the thing, to pass the brute body, and search the life and reason which causes it to exist; to see that the object is always flowing away, whilst the spirit or necessity which causes it subsists. Its essential mark is that it betrays in every word instant activity of mind,

shown in new uses of every fact and image—in preternatural quickness or perception of relations. All its words are poems. It is a presence of mind that gives a miraculous command of all means of uttering the thought and feeling of the moment. The poet squanders on the hour an amount of life that would furnish the seventy years of the man that stands next him" (p. 15). This is rather description than definition, but it is characteristic of Emerson's conception of things.

Emerson thinks in such a peculiar groove of his own, it is impossible for the ordinary listener or reader always to understand him. About five or six years ago we heard him deliver this lecture or essay on "Poetry and Imagination" to an intelligent audience. In the centre of the hall was an old man who evidently was enthusiastic over the lecturer, but who as evidently understood little of what he said; for he broke in with applause so frequently—and generally in the wrong place—that he became a source of distraction to the audience and annoyance to the lecturer. It has been the fate of Emerson to be so misunderstood,—to be applauded where he least deserves it, and censured where he is most meritorious. Thus it is that his spirituality has been lauded and held up for admiration as an offset against the material principles of other philosophers. Transcendentalism is not materialism; but upon one issue at least is there a coincidence between them. They both identify matter and thought; the former by spiritualizing matter, and the latter by materializing thought. What else but this identity means Emerson in these words: "Mountains and oceans we think we understand: yes, so long as they are contented to be such, and are safe with the geologist; but when they are melted in Promethean alembics, and come out men, and then, melted again, come out words, without any abatement, but with an exaltation of power—" (p. 15). In the book under review are other passages equally strong, which have no meaning, to the reviewer at least, outside of this false doctrine of the identity of matter and thought. What becomes of personality in the light of such a teaching?

This reflection lands us at the weak point in Emerson's intensely absorbing essay on "Immortality." It is his denial of a physical resurrection and his doubting of a personal existence hereafter. Thus he asserts that the body rises again, is a doctrine of the past. "It was an affair of the body, and narrowed again by the fury of sect; so that grounds were sprinkled with holy water to receive only orthodox dust; and to keep the body still more sacredly safe for resurrection, it was put into the walls of the church; and the churches of Europe are really sepulchres" (p. 292). And then, speaking of personality, he says: "I think all sound minds rest on a certain preliminary conviction, namely, that if it be best that conscious personal life shall continue, it will continue; if not best, then it will not; and we, if we saw the whole, should of course see that it was better so" (p. 294). In another place he is more positive of the failure of personality: "I confess," he says, "that everything connected with our personality fails. Nature never spares the individual. We are always balked of a complete success. No prosperity is promised to *that*. We have our indemnity only in the success of that to which we belong. *That* is immortal, and we only through *that*" (p. 306). This is unmistakable language. It means that the individual, the singular, exists not for itself, but for the general, the genus. Again, he tells us that our Lord "never preaches the personal immortality" (p. 311). It is evident that this question of the resurrection of the body is one Emerson has only treated in a flippant manner. So, too, with the question of personal identity

in a hereafter. Our Lord speaks of Dives recognizing Lazarus in the bosom of Abraham. And when the Sadducee asked Him about the woman who had several husbands, whose wife she should be in the other world, He said there was no marriage or giving in marriage there; for all would live as angels. That is, each would retain his individuality and personality. There would be no marriage; for men will have passed from the order of genesis to that of palingenesis. Here, of all places, would the Divine Wisdom set men's minds right upon that important issue, if there were aught to detract from the popular belief of a resurrection of soul and body. On the vital issues of life and death, Emerson is no wiser than the books he consults; not as wise as some; indeed, he is a man of half-utterances.

ESSAYS ON CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, AND SOCIALISM. By *John Donoso Cortes*. Translated by Rev. William McDonald, S.T.L., Rector of the Irish College, Salamanca. Dublin: William B. Kelly, 1874.

It is at first a subject of wonder that such a book as this should have been written by a modern Spaniard, and one who during the greater part of his life had been attached to the Liberal party, a political and personal friend of Christina, a supporter of Narvaes, a promoter of the designs of Louis Philippe on Spain with regard to the Montpensier marriage, and the ardent advocate in the Cortes of measures of the modern school of politics.

The wonder ceases in a great degree when it is remembered that Cortes was a thorough Spaniard, and consequently a religious man. Of this he gave a manifest proof at the very beginning of his political career, when he resigned his position in the Mendizabal cabinet, because of his opposition to the suppression of Religious Orders. The change is great from the ardent liberalist and keen publicist at Madrid in 1840, to the writer of these Essays after the sudden and astounding European revolutions of 1848. But Cortes's eyes were wide open and his powerful brain actively at work. He perceived the culpable folly of Liberalism, the absurdity of many of the theories of modern politics, the sublime grandeur of the Church.

His Essays may be called, not improperly, a compendious cyclopedia of theology, history, and politics; for nearly all the great questions comprised in the scope of these three noble sciences are treated in them with masterly ability. Any one who is tempted to embrace the modern delusion that the action of the human intellect must be confined within the limits of the purely material world, should read this book. He will learn from it that there is another world immeasurably superior to the material world in interest and grandeur.

When a subject of history comes under the pen of Cortes, it is at once illumined by his genius. His wonderful historical insight, however, is much less surprising than the deep knowledge of Catholic theology which he exhibits throughout this admirable book. How a layman, occupied during his whole life with political questions, could so master the most difficult problems of heavenly and earthly things, and speak so accurately of the dogmas of the Trinity, Original Sin, Redemption, Grace, the Incarnation, etc., is almost inconceivable. We learn, it is true, from a short note placed at the head of the first chapter of the first book, that he submitted this part of his work—the main part certainly—to the revision of the Benedictines of Solesmes in France, and that “he adopted all their observations;” but the alterations suggested by them very probably were few and unimportant. The note informs us

that there is nothing in the work to which the strictest orthodoxy could object.

In point of fact, only one leading idea appeared to us likely to be misunderstood by some. The idea referred to is contained chiefly in the fifth chapter of the first book, where the author says:

"Prevaricating and fallen man was not made for the truth. . . . Between the truth and human reason, after the prevarication of man, God established a lasting repugnance, and an invincible repulsion. . . . On the contrary, between human reason and the absurd there is a secret affinity and a close relationship. Sin has united them with a bond of indissoluble matrimony."

This certainly has a tinge of Calvinism, and seems to make the fall, with regard to the natural aptitude of man for truth, greater than it actually was. It also seems to be suggestive of propositions condemned not long ago by the Holy See. But the harsh doctrine which *seems* to be involved in it, cannot have been the real meaning of Cortes; for if it had been, his friends at Solesmes would have corrected him. His great mind, moreover, knew well enough the true prerogatives of human reason, even after the fall of man. Surely the philosophical question of the possible infallibility of reason for reaching the truth was not here even thought of by Cortes. From what follows, it is clear that he merely meant to say that *abstractedly* truth cannot be *easily* reached by the intellect of man left to itself; and that, *concretely* and in point of fact, the most absurd systems are promptly and by a natural impulse embraced and adopted by fallen man; whilst on the contrary what is most reasonable and simple, is often rejected by the pretended upholders of the rights of reason. The present age is manifestly a glaring proof of this assertion; and the picture of the actual state of philosophy in the most rationalistic nations, given in the work with the author's usual pungency and *bris*, cannot be gainsaid, and is but too true.

We could not discover any other leading idea in the book which should give rise to any hesitation or doubt in the mind of Catholics. Many pages are brimful of metaphysical discussions; the author shows himself a thoroughbred Spaniard in his bent toward the abstract outlook of religious and philosophical questions. Like many of his great countrymen, he does not confine the world to its outward manifestations, but thinks, on the contrary, that the visible universe is only a material figure of the great unseen; that consequently to reach truth even in physics, the thinker must start from what is called Ontology in philosophy, and that only by the Christian dogmas studied metaphysically, the utmost heights of thought can be reached. Thus only, also, in his opinion, can the most solid basis be established both for the enlargement of the human mind, and the certainty of even its physical speculations. Donoso Cortes is not a scientist of the school of Mr. Huxley and his compeers. The reader is everywhere thrown into the midst of a scientific edifice of an infinitely higher construction. The reasoning is very close, and requires the most unwearied attention. But wherever we have stopped in the reading, and considered carefully the concatenation of thoughts, to bring on the final evolution of great truths, we could not but exclaim that the nineteenth century cannot be said to be altogether destitute of metaphysicians. Donoso Cortes alone would worthily represent a school formerly numerous and powerful, but repudiated in our age by the greatest number of writers, and regarded in general by thoughtless readers as at best of no consequence whatever, and as often engaged only in mere logomachies.

Donoso Cortes's thoughts on the physical world, spread here and

there, are best expressed in the sixth chapter of the first book, where he considers the action of God in nature as distinguished from His miraculous interposition; and also, and, we may say chiefly, in the fifth chapter of the second book.

History and metaphysics are for Donoso Cortes the two great auxiliaries for diving into the mysteries of religion, as far up or down as is possible for the human mind without danger. He knew well that unless one relies on the authority of the Church, *Scrutator Majestatis opprimetur a gloria*; and consequently he always takes good care, even in his highest flights of fancy, to rest his intellect wholly on the faith of the Catholic Church. In fact the book which some one has called, *The Demonstration of the Supernatural*, can be likewise said to be the most rigid demonstration of the divine origin of the Catholic Church that perhaps has ever been written; yet it is neither an apology nor a defence, nor yet an answer to objections. He merely holds up Catholicity to the astonished gaze of mankind, with its glories, its sublime truths, its incomparable beauties, its eternal splendors; and seems to ask you: "Who dares find fault with this great figure? Is it not the real offspring of God Himself? Where could it come from except from Heaven?"

If after having described Catholicity with all the eloquence the human pen or voice can use, he speaks of its antagonists in our ages, Liberalism and Socialism, it is not merely to compare terms so absolutely antagonistic, but to oblige the reader to recoil instinctively from these last, and embrace with ardor the first.

Yet with all this enthusiasm breathing in every page of the book, there is no attempt whatever at effect, no mere literary claptrap, no exhibition of sensational writing. The greatest simplicity of style is visible throughout, except where the sublime subject brings on suddenly and perforce the use of imagery and metaphor. Sometimes the irony of Cortes's caustic style shows that he is a master of all the resources of satire. But his noble mind evidently recoils from employing them, even in a good cause. There is, however, a passage (pages 170, sq.,) where he descants at some length on the idiosyncrasy of the Liberal school, with a keenness of supreme mockery worthy of the pen of a Juvenal. He knew the school well, since he had long been an ardent supporter of its theories. Yet on this subject a remark ought to be made of real importance. The liberalism which he attacks and utterly demolishes is not the liberalism of our day, which is far more advanced. He himself distinguishes two schools of liberalism, represented by what was called in Spain, in his time, the *Progressista* and the *Moderado* parties. He says plainly that he will not discuss the first, already identified in his opinion with the radical party, and breaking out glaringly into open socialism. He confines himself, therefore, in his remarks, to the doctrines of the Spanish *Moderados*, of whom he had long been the most brilliant light. He says justly of them, that they admitted, at the origin of things and in the abstract, the sovereignty of God, but pretended that in politics God had in fact abdicated, and left the affairs of this world to the merciful guidance of the middle classes, the only ones able to unite liberty with order. The Liberals, whom he attacks, had, therefore, a sort of religion, and called themselves Catholics, and admitted that in an abstract sense, *omnis potestas a Deo est*. This, through a defect in the former English translation which we read long ago, led to some degree of confusion, which we attributed to hasty composition on the part of the great writer. But in this translation by Rev. Mr. McDonald, the confusion has entirely disappeared; and the connection of ideas, the crushing logic, the overpowering philosophical blows are

remarkable, even in so remarkable a work. But we cannot extend our comments further, and we leave the subject of socialism entirely untouched.

To come to a practical conclusion, we say that every educated Catholic ought to peruse the book attentively, to increase his faith and his attachment to the Church. As to the clergy, each and all of them ought to read it carefully, and oftener than once. They will find in its pages a deep mine of information on things human and divine, and they will be able to speak to their flocks after its careful perusal with renewed energy and zeal.

THE SWORD THAT DOTHTH CUT: OR, THE WORD OF GOD. Extraordinary Fulfilment of Prophecies and Revelations concerning the Latter Days. By *Samuel*. Number I. New Orleans: Clark & Hofeline. 1875. 8vo., pp. 64.

THE SWORD THAT DOTHTH CUT: OR, THE REVELATIONS OF PROPHECIES. The Present Extraordinary and Visible Fulfilment of the Prophecies of St. John. By *Samuel*. Number II. Same place and publishers. 1876. 8vo., pp. 117.

[We had received from a most estimable source a well-written and rather commendatory review of these two pamphlets, and were on the point of inserting it; but having since received a copy of the work, after a careful and impartial examination of its contents, we believe it due to justice and to the REVIEW, that we should substitute for the friendly notice our own candid opinion.—ED.]

The purpose of the author as it appears in these pages is good and praiseworthy, his orthodoxy unquestionable, his hits at sectarianism and infidelity happy and telling, and his explanations of prophecy often very ingenious, and, indeed, surprising in one circumstanced, as the author was, with regard to early education and calling in life. But when we have said this much, we have said all that our judgment and conscience will allow us to say in favor of these pamphlets.

His system of interpretation is new, as he acknowledges (No. I, p. 10); but novelty is not sufficient praise if truth be wanting. And what is there to guarantee the truth of this new style of interpretation? The assumption that "all inspired prophets, when speaking prophetically, have invariably used the same words in the same mystical and figurative sense" is quite gratuitous. To become a canon of biblical interpretation, this should either be self-evident or needs proof. This the author does not and cannot give. The object, from which a figurative sense is drawn, may be viewed under more aspects than one, and consequently may yield various mystical significations. One may be used for his purpose by one prophet; another by another, whose scope in writing is different. A *woman* may be the type of weakness, of motherhood, of secluded life, as well as of the Church. The *moon* may denote human fickleness or the baleful influences that reign by night (Ps. cxx. 6), just as well as "changeable doctrines." *Heaven* may be and is used for the Divine abode, or the portion of the world where the gospel is preached (as in the New Testament), or it may signify the Angels of God in opposition to the children of men, as appears from the canticle of Moses, from Isaiah, and other prophets. Why should its mystic meaning be *invariably* the "domain of spiritual things" as the author contends?

He does not try to prove his new rule, which would be impossible, but seeks to confirm it indirectly by illustrations, by exhibiting passages from the Old Testament, in which he claims that the "invariable" meaning of such words as Heaven, Sun, Moon, Stars, Sea, etc., is admirably suited to the context. Of all these passages there is not one,

we believe, that cannot be more easily and better understood by adhering to the literal sense, or (if a mystical sense be needed, or flow of itself from the literal) by adopting a figurative explanation, different from that of the author. Thus (No. I, p. 51), the words of Isaias lx. 5, "the multitude of the sea shall be converted to thee," do not mean "tumultuous nations (much less 'sects and isms') shall be converted to thee," but simply "the nations beyond the great sea, the Chittim, viz., the Greeks and Romans, shall become thy children." And this, to say nothing of the traditional interpretation, is confirmed by the parallel member that follows, "the strength of the Gentiles shall come to thee." The promised converts are described under two points of view, as is usual in the poetic parallelism. These are their nationality and their religion. They are strange peoples, they are idolaters ignorant of the true God; but they shall be gathered into the bosom of the new Israel, and with it form one people and have one religion. And this explanation is sanctioned by the Church, who, in the Mass of the Epiphany applies these words to the calling of the Gentiles, which is commemorated by that festival.

Another and (as the author calls it, No. I, p. 18), "wonderful illustration" of his meaning of the word *moon* is educed from Ps. lxxi. (Heb. and Angl. lxxii. 7), which he thus quotes: "In his days shall justice flourish and abundance of peace; *when the moon shall be taken away.*" On this he reasons as follows:

"Here is a very extraordinary passage, and it certainly could not be understood, unless the true figurative meaning of the word 'moon' was known. What could be meant by promising a time of justice and peace when the moon would be no more? In a literal sense, what has the moon to do with justice and peace on earth? But take it in the sense in which an All-wise Providence has intended it to be taken, and it becomes a most wonderful and intelligible passage, and this will be its meaning: 'In his days justice shall flourish and abundance of peace, *when the changeable teachings and doctrines shall be taken away.*'"

Now, all this reasoning is based on a mistranslation, and this being set aside, necessarily falls to the ground. What authority he can plead for this false rendering is hard to imagine. The second hemistich which he has italicized, should read as in the Douay Bible, "until the moon be taken away." In the Latin it is "donec auferatur luna." In the Septuagint, the Syriac, and the Hebrew original it is the same. In the last it is idiomatically expressed, "Until nought (*i. e.*, the failure or ceasing) of the moon." The Anglican version, heeding the sense rather than the words, translates "so long as the moon endureth." As the moon and other heavenly bodies are to last down to the end of time, it is equivalent to saying, "justice and peace shall endure forever." What room is there here for the arbitrary meaning assigned to "moon?" Its absurdity becomes evident the moment the passage is correctly translated.

We have no space to go over the fantastic as well as arbitrary meanings given by the author to such words as Earth, Land, World, Lamb, etc.; but merely remark in passing, that his change of the meaning of *καταβολή* (Ap. xiii. 8) from "foundation" to "overthrow," is no less unnecessary than opposed to all versions modern or ancient, including the Syriac, the oldest of them all. The apparent difficulty of the verse is caused only by the unusual collocation of the words *ἀπό καταβολῆς κόσμου*. That there is here nothing more than a figure of hyperbaton, is plain from the parallel passage in chap. xvii. 8, of the same book. Placed in their natural order, the words would run thus: "All whose names were

not written from the beginning (or foundation) of the world in the Book of Life of the Lamb, who was slain in sacrifice." We might object also to the author's frequent use of the Anglican version, to his mixing it up at times with our own, to his spelling of proper names, such as Micah, Zechariah, Reemaliah, which does not accord with our recognized version. These are trifles, but there is in them some degree of irreverence, to say the least.

To return to the main point, even granting the author's unfounded postulate, that such terms as Heaven, Sea, Moon, Woman, Child, Lamb, etc., *when used in a mystical sense*, are invariable in their meaning, and granting further that he has guessed that meaning aright, what will it avail him unless he can show that they are *actually* used in that sense. Admitting that they *might be*, does it follow that they *are* so used? We may not argue *a posse ad esse*. Who is to decide that in all the passages alleged, this mystical sense must be adopted either side by side with the literal, or to the exclusion of the latter? Merely to assert this without further proof, would be dogmatism, which would scarcely be allowed to pass unchallenged, even in a biblical scholar of world-wide fame. There is no Catholic text-book of Sacred Scripture that does not lay down the principle that the greatest caution should be used in giving typical meanings to the sacred text, unless they be warranted by the testimony of Scripture itself, or by the tacit approval of the Church, which may be gathered from her holy fathers and standard interpreters. Another principle is, that the prudent investigation and moderate use of the typical sense may be allowed, not only with a view to foster Christian devotion, but also to illustrate the well-known teachings of the Church, whether in dogma or morals. But it must not be used as proof conclusive of her doctrines against heretics and unbelievers.¹ Still less should it be alleged in support of what is mere opinion, though nowise opposed to Catholic faith; nor for the decision of vexed Bible questions, whether they relate to the history or the prophecies of the sacred volume. An ardent, indiscreet investigation of the hidden meaning of those portions of Scripture which the Holy Ghost, their Author, has purposely left shrouded in obscurity is dangerous, and has often led men into manifold error. The fault is not in the Holy Book, but in the wayward imagination of the seeker, which makes him take wrong, false views of what is good and true in itself, however dark and enigmatical, or as St. Augustine forcibly expresses it, "*dum Scripturæ bonæ non intelliguntur bene*" (Tractat. 18, in 10). Nothing but the most profound childlike obedience to the Church, and a deep sense of humility, can save from danger him who boldly lifts his eyes to gaze on the Apocalyptic vision, and ventures to sport confidently with its perplexing intricacies.

And this is precisely what causes our apprehension for the writer of these pamphlets, and makes us regret the favor and encouragement that he has received in the Southwest. He claims that he has made an important, an extraordinary discovery, reserved for him by an All-wise Providence (Preface); that there is a key to prophecy, hitherto unknown, but revealed to him, as may be seen by the wonderful things that have been given him to unfold (p. 9). He fancies that the Woman's Child (Apoc. xii. 5) is the doctrine of infallibility, as defined in the Vatican

¹ "No argument," says St. Thomas, "can be drawn except from the literal sense, because nothing necessary to faith can be found under the spiritual (typical) sense, which Scripture does not reveal elsewhere through the literal sense." *Ex solo literalī sensu posse trahi argumentum, quia nihil sub spirituali sensu continetur fidei necessarium, quod Scriptura per literalem sensum alicubi manifeste non tradat.* Summa, p. 1, qu. 1, art. 10.

Council, and boldly adds: "This child, which God has given me the eternal honor of naming, shall henceforth be called 'The Child of Infallibility'" (p. 35). He is in possession of a secret revealed to him, no doubt, from Heaven, touching the 1260 days; but he will not let it escape him as yet. "I have good reasons of my own," he says, "for not revealing this secret at present. But when the time comes I promise to make it known, and also to reveal to you, *Deo volente*, the meaning of those astonishing and wonderful 'Seventy Weeks' of Daniel. And who will believe our report? And to whom is the power of the Lord revealed? For yet 666 prophetic days from September 2d, 1875, and all will be fulfilled" (p. 39). We do not wish to characterize such language as it deserves; but it recalls forcibly the "*linguam magniloquam*" and the "*linguam nostram magnificabimus*" of the Psalmist. After this, it need surprise no one that he finds the Old Catholic schism in the second Beast (Apoc. xiii. 11), and identifies Bismarck with Antichrist. We rather think that this is doing quite too much honor to the wretched little handful of Dollingerites, and even to M. Bismarck, who, after all, is not so formidable an enemy to the Church of Christ as was the first Napoleon, or even the mean, cowardly ape of his name and empire in our own day. The Church has buried them, and she will bury in due time the semi-savage Pomeranian who now rules Germany with an iron rod. Yet he has done good, though with no good intention, to the German Church; and when in a happier season she shall have forgotten her present sufferings, she may remember, perhaps, with gratitude, that Bismarck was only a tool in the hand of God to sift her like wheat and to "separate the precious from the vile" (Jer. xv. 19).

As warm fancies are frequently apt to take a local coloring, it would not in the least have surprised us, had the author discovered some Apocalyptic woe in store for the Kelloggs, Packards, Caseys, Returning Boards, Bulldozers, and other wild "beasts," foreign and domestic, which have been preying on the life and substance of poor Louisiana for the last ten years.

We have no right to give spiritual advice to "Samuel;" but in the bond of Catholic charity we may exhort him to cherish a spirit of humility and of unconditional submission to the Church, the only representative on earth of Him who has the key of David, and to be more fervent in prayer than anxious in the investigation of Apocalyptic mystery. If God's providence has chosen him to deliver a message of truth, it will appear in His own good time; if not, like the rest of us, he can afford in hope and resignation to await that day, when we shall see no longer darkly, but face to face, and even the enigmatical scenes that passed before the astonished mind of the seer of Patmos will be made clear as noonday in the light of the Beatific Vision.

THE RACES OF MAN, AND THEIR GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION. From the German of *Oscar Peschel*. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1876.

Among the modern branches of natural science ethnology stands unquestionably one of the foremost and most important. The great questions of anthropology, namely, the unity of the human race, the place man holds in creation, the connection between human languages, the distinguishing characteristics of the civilized and the uncivilized races, and many other kindred questions, depend, in a great measure, upon the right direction given to ethnological studies.

When the races of man began to be studied with some care, it was expected that the new science of ethnology would furnish powerful

weapons against the doctrines of Christianity. It is now but little more than one hundred years since this study began to be systematically prosecuted, yet in this comparatively short space of time it is amazing to consider the many theories, most of them antagonistic to the Christian faith, that have been invented to explain and classify the varieties of our species. One of these writers, Luke Burke by name, claimed to have discovered no less than sixty-three chief races of man.

Strange to say, however, the great truth of the unity of mankind came forth from this ordeal brighter and stronger, so that scarcely any "advanced thinker" now dares to question it. The same result will be reached, no doubt, for all the other Christian truths connected with anthropology.

In order to draw proper conclusions from the innumerable facts comprehended in the new science, the inquiry must be carried on without any preconceived opinions on anthropological questions. The great truths of the unity of man, his position in creation, his origin, and the true source of his civilization, must be deduced from the facts of ethnology. The contrary mode of proceeding cannot lead to any reliable conclusions.

Now, unfortunately for the recent book of Mr. Peschel, it is precisely this contrary mode of proceeding that the author has chosen. With him ethnology has very little to do with solving the questions referred to, except, perhaps, so far as furnishing confirmatory examples. Of the 518 pages contained in the volume, the first 318 are concerned about the antiquity of man, his primitive savage state, the gradual development of his language, etc., all this independently of ethnology. Only the last 200 pages treat of the Races of Man. This is just the reverse of scientific method, and we might at once conclude from this that the work is a failure as a scientific treatise.

The book cannot be considered satisfactory either for the scientist or for the student. For the scientist it is entirely valueless, as it gives scarcely an idea of the science on which it professedly treats, and entirely omits to mention some of its most important branches. Not a word, for instance, is said of the Turanian races, called Allophylian by Prichard, which at this moment attract the attention of the whole scientific world, as the study of them is destined probably to open entirely new views on the most important subjects connected with the history of man. What reason the author could have for passing over entirely such a pregnant subject of inquiry we cannot even imagine. If he believes that the notions already entertained by many scientists on the almost universal Turanian stock are based only on misconceptions, let him say so, and prove it if he can. But to omit all mention even of so important a subject is fatal to the value of his work, and few scientists will care to place it on their shelves. Nor will it be useful to the student even as an elementary handbook. A handbook, of the kind, to be useful, must be clear, methodical, well systematized, complete in its way, and ought to contain numerous references to more copious works on the same subject, where the student may find the explanation of what may otherwise be obscure. No student of ethnology can expect to meet with these requisites in the two hundred pages of Mr. Peschel. The very classification he adopts is altogether unscientific.

As he, in what we may call the preliminaries of his book, strongly declares in favor of the primitive savage state of man, there is nothing surprising in the fact that he begins his inquiry with the Australians and ends it with the Europeans. This was natural on his part, and appears at first to be scientific, but on looking at the work more closely, the reader

is puzzled to find that the Australian is *not* considered by him as the lowest race of mankind, an opinion heretofore generally entertained. The author tries to reverse completely the common ideas on the subject, and finds, particularly in the Australian languages, a solid proof of high mental development. He does not appear to know that the languages of most of the uncivilized tribes offer the same peculiarity, and that it is a powerful proof that they are degraded from a former higher state.

But besides this want of reflection at the start, the remainder of his classification does not show any attempt at a rising scale, progressing from the lowest to the highest, since he speaks of the Mongolians and the Polynesians before he comes to the negroes, who are, in his scale, placed immediately before the Europeans. How can a student find in this clumsy arrangement solid instruction on this extensive topic? No one ought, therefore, to be surprised that the reader does not meet anywhere in the book with references to other more complete works, and is left altogether in the dark as to the authorities he can consult. The references at the bottom of the pages point merely to a large number of volumes where, we suppose, can be found, *in extenso*, the facts often irrelevantly mentioned in the text. It cannot be denied that Mr. Peschel has perused an immense number of books, chiefly of travels, but science has very little to do with that kind of erudition.

The first 318 pages of the volume under consideration we have called preliminary, and they might be called also fragments of anthropology. In this most comprehensive subject-matter the principles of the author are mainly those of the new school of scientists,—the prodigious antiquity of man; the theory of evolution, even for man himself; the primitive barbarism of the race; the origin of human language from mere animal ejaculations; the gradual progress of mankind through a natural process; the negation of the supernatural, which he calls *Shamanism* or priestcraft; the development of religion from Fetichism to the purest Monotheism; the Hebrew religion not differing from the others in this particular. The reader may judge what must be the opinions of the author in the sketch he pretends to give of the various religions of mankind: Brahminism, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Islamism, and Christianity. We pity indeed the poor young men who will try to find in this book a substratum for their religious belief, or their scientific opinions.

For none of his assertions does the author give any proofs worthy of the name. On the antiquity of man, admitting the calculations of Lyell and Sir John Lubbock, he gives no reasons; about the only fact on which he relies is the precious piece of pottery found by Mr. Horner, at the depth of thirty-nine feet, near the base of the statue of Rameses II, in Egypt, alluded to in *Gentilism*. On this subject Mr. James C. Southall, of Richmond, Va., ought to be read in his *Recent Origin of Man*. The reader may find in this most remarkable book (chapters iii and iv) a much more striking array of plausible reasons in favor of the antiquity of our race than Mr. Peschel, we are sure, can even imagine. But the gifted writer employs the remainder of his powerful volume in completely demolishing this plausible fabric which imagination only can raise. On evolution Mr. Peschel adopts the doctrines of Darwin and Huxley. Yet strange to say, he is obliged to confess that the "natural selection" and "sexual selection" of the author of the *Descent of Man* are not proven, although they may be said to be the main support of his theory. As to Mr. Huxley, Peschel could not even allude to the *demonstration* he gave lately of evolution before a New York audience.

When he hears of it in Germany, we wonder whether in his next edition he will consider it as a subject of triumph?

The same complete want of proof characterizes almost everything Mr. Peschel says on the primitive barbarism of man, on the development of religion, etc. Even when he advocates a good cause he does not know how to prove it. Thus he pronounces in favor of the unity of the human race, and almost the only reason he gives for it is the adaptability of man to all climates; thus, again, he does not reduce man to mere materialistic functions; he distinguishes him really from animals, and thus admits the moral order. But he does not even attempt to show how there can be a moral order in his system. On marriage, where he rebukes the grossness of the theories of Sir John Lubbock, he does not do it consistently; because, rejecting totally the supernatural, he is unable to assign the true and divine origin of that primitive institution.

Much more could be said, but we have no room for it. We only wonder if the author of this book ever heard of the modern palæontologists and anthropologists of France, such as Alcide d'Orbigny and De Quatrefages, or even of the celebrated ethnographer of England, James Cowles Prichard, without mentioning our American Charles Pickering, who gave to his book the very title Mr. Peschel adopted long afterwards for his own. Besides his master-work on the *Physical History of Mankind*, too large certainly to be put in the hands of a student, Prichard wrote the *Natural History of Man* in two volumes, of which Edwin Norris, of the Royal Asiatic Society, gave an edition with notes and illustrations. How is it that, with such a work in existence, which could be easily republished in smaller type and at less cost, the Messrs. Appleton, of New York, have thought it worth while to print the book of Peschel for their *International Scientific Series*? It is true that it is *as valuable* as several other publications in the same *series*; for instance, the *Consciousness* of Huxley, the *Brain* of Bastian, the *Conflict* of Draper, etc. It seems fated that books of mere trash, whose authors have adopted the pernicious but pet theories of the age, shall be given to the public as the latest and highest *dicta* of science. We suppose that those who protest against such an abuse as this will, of course, be counted among the partisans of darkness and the advocates of ignorance. If such be the case we ask to have our name inscribed at the very head of the list.

AN ESSAY, contributing to a Philosophy of Literature. By *B. A. M.* Second Revised Edition. Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger. 1876. 12mo., pp. 208.

Bad or worthless books, in which a little tinsel or pandering to the prejudice of the day takes the place of genuine merit, run too often a prosperous course, that does no credit to the reading public, or to the boasted century in which we live. They are lauded by the press, devoured by multitudes, and, sustained as they are by popularity and the love of gain, they find eager publishers and pass through repeated editions. On the contrary, many a good, deserving book, after a struggle between the author's modesty or poverty and the publisher's thrifty cautiousness, contrives to get through the press, receives a few grains of faint praise, and after a few months, however worthy of circulation and reprint, is heard of no more. It is, therefore, a matter of sincere congratulation, that the essay before us, which is not only a good but an admirable book, has had the good fortune to be not only warmly welcomed and highly praised by competent judges, but also to be so exten-

sively read as to call for a second edition. This the author has now given us with his revision and additions. But it is to its own singular merits, rather than to good fortune, that this excellent book is indebted for its popularity and its success.

Literature in its most general aspect may be considered as the expression of the affections produced in man by his contact with whatever can act upon his rational or sentient nature. He may hold communion with himself; he has, outside of him, relations with his individual fellow-man, with the world, material and moral, that surrounds him, the world of nature and of man, with the infinite Maker of all, who has been pleased to reveal Himself in the natural and supernatural. It is coextensive with thought and with science, ranging as it does through every form of being, from the inmost depth of consciousness in the soul to the farthest and highest point outside of it, which is God, the author of all being. It differs from thought not only in form, being its outward expression, and as it were its garment, but also because to thought it adds feeling; it differs from science, because it seeks to realize not only the true, but likewise the beautiful.

Our author does not attempt to trace literature through every path of its vast domain, but wisely deals with it only in its most general relations. After explaining its fundamental principles and chief function, its origin and its medium of expression (language), he proceeds to show the influences exercised on literature by certain epochs or phases of human society, from the earliest times down to the Renaissance and what is called the Reformation. Among these agencies are enumerated the School of Alexandria, the Fathers, the irruption of Northern Barbarians, the Scholastics, etc. We consider worthy of special attention the author's judicious observations on the philosophy of Aristotle and its use among the Scholastics (p. 67), the tendency of the Miracle-plays (p. 73), and the rationalistic character, so little understood even by Catholics, of the great revival of letters known as the Renaissance. On p. 54, instead of mentioning that graceless pagan courtier, Claudian, we should have preferred that the author had not overlooked the claims of Prudentius, the prince, if not the father of early Christian poetry, and who, if not older than Claudian, was at least his contemporary. In spite of the Calvinist Boëthius, we cannot believe that the epigram to "Dux Iacobus" (part of which is given in the note to p. 54) is genuine, no more than that Claudian was a Christian, as the same writer contends.

The chapter on "Literature and the Reformation" is well worth reading by those who still imagine that there was any legitimate connection between the revival of letters and the great revolt of the sixteenth century against the divine authority of Christ perpetually present in His Church. One might as well argue that Satan rebelled against his Maker, because he was a spirit of more than ordinary intelligence. But there is even here some difference. Though Lucifer rebelled in spite of his wisdom, yet after his fall he retained his wisdom, or enough of it to enhance his punishment; whereas, the Reformation, conceived, like all rebellions against Divine Truth, in pride of intellect, far from promoting or preserving letters and science, had a contrary tendency. And had it not been for counteracting agencies outside of itself, the Reformation would have proved to be what a keen observer proclaimed it from the beginning, *interitus literarum*. To the average non-Catholic reader of books, this sounds strange; but he may thank his reading and education. If he were better taught he would discover what a shameful paradox had been forced upon his credulity. But delusions purposely set afloat to poison the public mind, pertinaciously repeated for three

centuries, and, in the case of individuals, cherished from infancy, are not easily removed. They cannot be brushed away like cobwebs in a moment even by the strong hand of reason. It needs time as well as evidence to dispel them. Yet in the case of a sincere inquirer after truth, the testimony of an eye-witness like Erasmus might be supposed sufficient to outweigh the assertions of newspapers and text-books of the Sunday-school and even of the public school order. Let any one, who wishes to think for himself, read our author's brief but sufficiently comprehensive statement of the case. It is candid enough, for it tells the plain truth on both sides of the question.

In this connection we would recommend also another chapter, entitled "Bacon and Modern Thought," in which the so-called Baconian philosophy is fairly judged, and its pretensions brought down to their proper level. It is there shown that the fundamental points of Lord Bacon's *Novum Organon* had been anticipated centuries before by his namesake, the friar Roger Bacon. The sly Anglican chancellor appropriated and disguised in more modern speech the grand ideas of the humble Franciscan; but we could not expect "the meanest of mankind" to disclose the name of his benefactor or indicate the source to which he was indebted. From Bacon the author passes to other modern schools of philosophy, those of Comte, Spencer, and Hegel, and shows how hurtful must necessarily be their influence on literature. Two other chapters have pleased us very much, one on "The Religious Basis of Literature," the other on "Literary Morality." We are sure that they will enlist the attention and excite the admiration of every intelligent reader.

We have endeavored briefly to give some idea of this book, which does honor to our time and country. The good religious, who conceals himself under the modest initials B. A. M., is one of whom Catholic literature in America may well be proud. He is the lineal descendant and representative amongst us of those good and great men who for centuries have nursed and kept alive the lamp of science and letters in the cloistered shades of Europe. His book must be read to be properly appreciated. It is not easy to analyze, for there is in it a great deal more than appears on the surface. Almost every word and sentence furnish material for new thought. The style, we may add, is faultless—terse, luminous, and almost epigrammatic. Yet, it always conforms to the tranquil dignity of the best English models, and does not seek, as some are doing, to introduce into our language the painful straining after effect, the false glare, and the affected sententious brevity of the Senecas and their French imitators.

LECTURES ON SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY. By F. John Cornoldi, S. J. Part I. Logic. London: Burns & Oates. 1876. Pp. 98.

There seems to be a general tendency among Catholic philosophers to return to scholastic philosophy. The movement is a good one, for it is in the right direction. We cannot dispense with St. Thomas. But we must not blindly follow his philosophy. As he reasoned with an eye upon the prevailing errors of his day, so ought we discuss issues that are playing havoc in our own time, and let the dead past bury its dead. This seems to be F. Cornoldi's idea in the popular course of lectures, of which the present is the first English instalment. The book gives only the essentials of logic. It does not pretend to be a complete treatise. It is rather an introduction to the main subject. As a rule the author's definitions are good. There is no better test of a philosopher than his defining power. John Henry Newman says that it were as easy to create

as define well. The author does not define genius and species ; but he tells us what a generic term and a specific term are. "A *specific* term," he says, p. 22, "is that which indicates the whole essence of the objects to which it is applied. . . . A *generic* term is that which indicates that part only of the essence which is conceived as undetermined and determinable." These definitions are much clearer than those laid down by Branchereau, who shows rare philosophic grasp in defining. The latter says that essences can be distinguished from mere nothingness, and from one another. Genus is that note by which an essence is distinguished from mere nothingness—*illa nota qua essentia distinguitur a mero nihilo*; and species is that by which one essence is distinguished from another—*illud per quod essentia quævis ab aliis essentiis seceratur*. —*Praelectiones Philosophicæ, Ontologia*, p. 10

But we do not see any improvement whatever in the author's innovation on the time-honored manner of designating the various figures and modes of the syllogism. "Barbara" is as easily remembered as "Malaga." In Lecture IX., on page 51, there is a serious error. The author is giving rules for finding the middle term. If a particular affirmative is to be demonstrated, he tells us: "The middle term will disagree with the subject, and be the antecedent to the predicate, and thus the syllogism will come under Assizi." We think not. If there is disagreement expressed between the subject and predicate of any proposition, its natural form will be a negative. But with a negative in the premises the conclusion must also be negative, for it will follow the weaker premise. Both premises must necessarily be affirmative, or expressive of agreement, in order to give an affirmative conclusion. And according as the middle term is antecedent or consequent of predicate and subject, will the syllogism fall under "Datisi" or "Darii." Not having the original, we know not whether this error is due to the translator or the author.

In England, since the publication of Whately's treatise on the subject, logic has assumed a formidable appearance in the works of Sir William Hamilton, De Morgan, Bain, and John Stuart Mill. A work of similar scope bearing directly upon these writers, especially upon Hamilton and Mill, is greatly to be desired, and he who would write such a book would prove himself a lasting benefactor to our Catholic youth. Will this hint remain unheeded?

POEMS OF PLACES. Edited by *Henry W. Longfellow*. Vols. 1 to 4, England and Wales; vol. 5, Ireland. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1876. 16mo.

Poetry has a charm that extends even to the places of which the poet sings. He reveals in them beauties of which our duller nature might not otherwise dream. Even places which are the mere coinage of his fancy, or which we can never hope to see, please and delight us when pointed out by the magic wand of his muse. Whose imagination has not revelled in Homer's lovely Western isle of the old Phæacians, or in Tasso's enchanted gardens of Armida, or in Milton's "blissful bower" of Eden, which made "Hesperian fables true?" The poet entwining our sympathies with his own draws them on irresistibly, localizes them, and compels us to behold each spot and scene with eyes of affection or dislike, as he pleases. He will make for us hallowed ground of the rude forest under the Alban mount, that witnessed the death-struggle of the two bosom friends, Nisus and Euryalus; or he will force us, in spite of ourselves, to share the feelings of the Trojan fugitive as he sailed by Ithaca, and with him to curse the land that bore cruel Ulysses.

The object of the present compilation is thus explained in his preface by Mr. Longfellow. "This collection of *Poems of Places* has been

made partly for the pleasure of making it, and partly for the pleasure I hope it may give those who shall read its pages. It is the voice of the poets expressing their delight in the scenes of nature, and, like the song of birds, surrounding the earth with music. For myself, I confess that these poems have an indescribable charm, as showing how the affections of men have gone forth to their favorite haunts and consecrated them forever." At the close of the preface, the editor promises that the series of volumes will be continued, until the imagination of the reader shall have been enabled to make the circuit of the whole world.

The poets whom Mr. Longfellow has pressed into his service in the volumes describing England and Wales, are principally those of the last eighty or a hundred years; and amongst them, as might be expected, the name of Wordsworth recurs most frequently. Yet even those more ancient, Chaucer, Spenser, Shakspeare, Drayton, no less than Cowper, Southey, and Tennyson contribute their share to the reader's delight.

The fifth volume of the series is devoted to Ireland, and seems to us more lively and animated than the preceding volumes. This may be partly from the greater natural warmth of the Irish poetic heart, partly because the scenes are illustrated as freely by legend and patriotic reminiscence, as by mere description of river, mountain, and forest shade. The writers who have thrown the charm of song around the places of the Green Isle mentioned in this volume are familiar, and many of them illustrious names: Thomas Moore, Davis, T. D'Arcy McGee, the two De Veres, Sir Aubrey and his son, Clarence Mangan, Gerald Griffin, Father Prout, etc.

THE ETHICS OF BENEDICT SPINOZA. From the Latin. New York; D. Van Nostrand, Publisher. 1876.

This is a questionable boon to the English-reading public. It is placing in the hands of intellectual children an edged tool. But there are so many such, one more or less does not materially change the course of affairs. And perhaps, when we come to consider the loose manner of reasoning indulged in by the leading writers of the day, it will prove a benefit to some of their readers by showing them how to reason cogently and logically, and therefore how to detect the inconsistencies of these more brilliant but less logical writers. For Spinoza is at least a logician. And this sums up his good qualities. He is no better a metaphysician than is Mr. Darwin or Mr. Mill. He is a poor definer; his conceptions of things are very inadequate; he introduces into his reasoning elements of thought, the inadequacy of which a small share of common sense would have sufficed to detect. But the work is too important to pass by with a summary notice, especially as all our readers have now an opportunity of examining it for themselves. We will, therefore, leave it for the present, and confine ourselves to a remark on the translator. He seems to have done his work faithfully, almost to literalness. It was evidently a labor of love. The tone of his preface shows him to be as greatly in sympathy with Spinoza as he is hostile to Christianity, especially to Catholicity. When he speaks of the Church he is flippant and insulting. But sometimes he misses his mark, and expresses compliments when he intended to censure. Thus he tells us: "It is only Rome that launches anathemas against his (Spinoza's) teachings" (p. 38). This amounts to the admission that it is only Rome that is the bulwark of Christianity and revealed religion, since it is only she who defines the proper relations between the finite and the infinite, substance and accident, matter and spirit. Thanks to D. D. S.

for his unintentional tribute. It is all the more welcome for being so. In a footnote to this assertion of his, the translator quotes some of the canons of the dogmatic decrees of the Vatican Council on substance and pantheism. That same council has defended human reason, and with admirable precision pointed out the boundary-line between reason and faith. Now, in the name of that infallible reason, does the writer not know that Spinozism and Christianity cannot dwell together in the same man's convictions; that they are incompatible; that to approve of one is to condemn the other? This being so, where is the reason for finding fault? We fear the Church is to D. D. S., of Englewood, N. J., what a red flag is to an enraged bull. Its very mention deprives him of all power of reasoning. In his "infallible ignorance" (p. 39), he can only assert his prejudices.

THE SCIENCE AND ART OF EDUCATION, an Introductory Lecture, and PRINCIPLES OF THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION, a Paper. By *Joseph Payne*. New York: E. Steiger. 1876. Pp. 24.

This is a short but able essay on a most important subject. It was read at the College of Preceptors, Queen Square, Bloomsburg, in 1874. The author has since died. This essay shows him to have been possessed of clear ideas of education both as a science and an art. He starts out with the idea that the science of education is a branch of psychology. This is only a partial truth. The intellectual part is based upon psychology, as the physical part is based upon physiology, and the moral part upon ethics. But in proper training of the child all three go hand in hand.

The principles put forward by the author are sound. He lays great stress on the fact that a teacher advances his pupils only in so far as he sympathizes with them. Then alone will he enter into the difficulties each mind encounters, and by dint of repetition and placing the same idea in various lights, endeavor to make all learn. He is in favor of the student's not being put at work beyond his ability, so that he may learn as much as possible by himself. He thinks that it is only the knowledge so gained that becomes for him real knowledge. For this reason he is opposed to "rote" and "cramming." But in his whole essay he does not once insist on the means best calculated to determine when the student learns and when he is simply cramming. That means is questioning. The essay is well worth reading by every parent and educator.

THEOLOGIA MORALIS, Novissimi Ecclesiæ Doctoris *S. Alphonsi*, in compendium reducta et usui Ven. Cleri Americani accommodata, Auctore *A. Konings*, C. SS. R., Editio altera aucta et emendata. Neo-Eboraci: Benziger Fratres. Two vols., 8vo.

THE FAITH OF OUR FATHERS: BEING A PLAIN EXPOSITION AND VINDICATION OF THE CHURCH FOUNDED BY OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST. By Rt. Rev. *James Gibbons*, Bishop of Richmond and Administrator Apostolic of North Carolina. Baltimore: John Murphy & Co. London: R. Washbourne. 1877.

THE WELSH REDISCOVERY OF AMERICA AFTER THE NORSE AND BEFORE COLUMBUS. America discovered by the Welsh in 1170 A.D. By *Rev. Benjamin F. Bowen*. Y Gwir ynerbin y Byd. "The truth against the world." Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1876. 1 vol., 18mo., pp. 184.

CONTEMPORARY EVOLUTION. An Essay on some recent Social Changes. By *S. George Mivart*. New York: Appleton & Co., 542 and 551 Broadway. 1876.

POEMS: DEVOTIONAL AND OCCASIONAL. By *Benjamin Dionysius Hill*, C.S.P. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1877.

We have been compelled, by want of space, to omit reviews of the abovenamed works. A number of other important books have reached us, and will receive attention in due time.

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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THE CHURCH AND THE PRINCES OF EUROPE.

A RETROSPECT.

Aurelii Augustini De Civitate Dei. Libri xxii. Parisiis, 1841.

Histoire de la Papauté, par Francis Lacombe. Paris: Adrien Le Clere et Cie, 1867.

WHAT causes have chiefly contributed to bring about the visible decline of the Church's influence in this age? How is it that the rulers of Europe in our day have come to look on her with indifference, if not distrust? These are important questions, and in thoroughly studying them, we may detect the fallacy of the supposition, too often indulged in at this time, that it has been the fault of the chief pastors of the Church, in past ages and in our own. The beauty of the Bride of Christ is so dazzling, that, unable to bear its splendor, the eyes of her adversaries often drop down from her face to her feet; and their hearts rejoice if they can succeed in detecting on the hem of her garment any dust or stain, which, expanded by the power of a wicked imagination, seems to them to cover her whole person, and change the Heavenly Queen into a frail and faithless daughter of Eve.

This fallacy must be done away with. Consequently, this paper will offer a retrospect embracing a considerable part of the Church's history. A general outline of it, however, will be sufficient; and if it be accurately drawn the picture will be correct, though devoid of details and of color.

Two preliminary remarks will render the task easy, and avoid

the necessity of lengthy discussions. The first may be stated thus: The decline of the influence of the Church, and the unmistakable opposition of Christian princes, so called, had been foreseen long before, and predicted, independently of prophecy, by the anticipation of logical sequence from well-ascertained premises; all to the Church's honor, and constituting a complete justification before the fact. Yes, several great and holy men, ages ago, announced it; but particularly St. Augustine, whose most striking words will be quoted as much *in extenso* as a brief discussion permits. In the second place, the Catholic Church having been constituted by her Divine Founder so as to depend altogether on a visible and all-powerful centre—the Papacy—the only question to be examined reduces itself to an inquiry into the causes of the constant opposition between Rome and the secular rulers of Europe. This inquiry can be made within the limits assigned to a Review article.

I. St. Augustine, in his great work, *De Civitate Dei* (lib. xviii., c. 52), examines, first, the truth of the assertion of many Christian writers in his time, that there had been only ten persecutions of the Church from Nero to Diocletian; which had been typified, as they thought, by the ten plagues of Egypt; and that henceforth there would not be any other until the last persecution by Antichrist. The holy Doctor proves that this historic generalization, although plausible, and to many Catholics of that epoch satisfactory, is nevertheless untrue. No analogy, he says, can be drawn between the persecutions of the Christian Church by infidel princes and the plagues of Egypt, which were in fact directed, not against the people of God, but against its enemies. Later on in the volume, reasoning from the past and from what was taking place in his day, with regard to the propagation of the faith in infidel countries, he concludes that persecutions will continue until the end of time, at least in places not brought under the yoke of Christ; that at the end of the world only will all countries be evangelized. This, he thinks, is foreshadowed by the Gospel parable of the tares and the wheat growing together in the same field until the day of judgment.

This first remark, however, of the Bishop of Hippo, though it has some reference to our present question, is not altogether pertinent to it. We must examine the causes of the opposition to the Church, on the part not of infidels and idolaters, but of so-called Christian princes and believers. This St. Augustine attempts to do, after discussing for a moment the general question of good and evil in this world (lib. xx., c. 2). He there briefly observes, that "good men are sometimes miserable and bad men happy." Often, however, "*et malis mala eveniunt et bonis bona proveniunt.*" "From which it seems as if there were no uniform rule followed

in this world by Providence. Yet God is supreme virtue, wisdom, and justice, in whom there can be no weakness, no thoughtlessness, no iniquity. A wise man, consequently, will learn from it not to attach too much importance to the good and evil things which are common to good and bad men. But when the day of the final judgment shall come, not only the last decision will appear perfectly just, but whatever has been permitted to take place in this world, shall also be judged to have happened justly." This may not please modern atheists, and Mr. John S. Mill, were he living, would not, probably, be satisfied with this general answer. But the opinions of atheists are not worthy of much consideration. Those who are not atheists will undoubtedly find weighty matter for reflection in this doctrine of St. Augustine.

In the seventh chapter of the same book, however, a great step in advance is taken by the learned African Doctor. He begins by discussing a well-known passage of the Apocalypse (ch. 20), where it is said that an angel was sent to bind Satan, and cast him into the abyss, and leave him there a thousand years, during which the saints were to reign with Christ. At the end of this period of time the great Tempter was to be unbound, and left free during three years and a half. In this St. Augustine saw the future history of the Church, and conceived therefrom the great ideas which he afterwards developed.

It is known that several Fathers of the Church and ecclesiastical writers have attempted, many of them with small success, to interpret this sublime but very obscure book of St. John. It is useless to refer to the numberless essays of the kind, written within the last half century or previously. But whoever reads the explanation of this chapter by St. Augustine, will admire the simplicity, naturalness, and admirable adaptation of it to our age in particular. The object here, however, is not to examine how far his exegesis can be adopted. We merely look at the ideas of the author with regard to the future history of the Church; and no one will refuse to admit that he has admirably foretold what our ancestors have seen, and what we ourselves witness every day.

He thinks that, in speaking of a thousand years, during which "Satan was to be bound, and the saints were to reign on earth with Christ," St. John meant simply an indefinite period of time, extending from the first propagation of Christianity, when holiness began at last to dwell on earth—*regnum sanctorum cum Christo*—to the epoch of the unbinding of Satan previous to the coming of Antichrist. It is in fact the whole history of the Church except the last catastrophe. This present age is comprised in it. It is evident that St. Augustine entirely discards not only the harsh millenarianism condemned by the Church at its first appearance in the second

and third centuries, but also the milder opinion of a great number of good Christians whom the Church has not forbidden to expect that Christ will actually come and reign visibly on earth during a thousand years, previous to the last resurrection and judgment.

In the impossibility of giving the whole explanation of St. Augustine, we are obliged to confine ourselves to a mere sketch of his ideas. The simplest way of doing this is to develop briefly with him the short passage of St. John on which he comments, following strictly the order of the Scripture text.

First, therefore, what is the binding of Satan during those thousand years, if the time extends from the preaching of the Apostles to the last persecution of Antichrist? Is he bound now? Was he bound in the sixteenth century when Protestantism broke loose? Yes; because, says St. Augustine, when he is unbound at the end, he is let free to seduce all nations, *ut seduccret omnes gentes*; therefore, the great thing which really binds him is the impossibility of his accomplishing this universal seduction. He is thus bound, only because he is less powerful than he was before Christ came, and much less powerful than he will be at the end. But that in this state of bondage he seduces many, and thus he makes them partakers of his own eternal damnation, is known to all. And "those," declares St. Augustine, "who thus openly embrace his cause, though they appeared to belong to us at first, had, however, no real claim to that privilege." For as St. John says (1 Ep. ii. 19): *Ex nobis exierunt, sed non erant ex nobis; nam si fuissent ex nobis, mansissent utique nobiscum.*

The second thing to be considered is the meaning of the reign of Christ with His Saints during this indefinite millennium. It is in considering this in the light under which St. Augustine views it, that the reader will understand the right St. Augustine has to be considered as a revealer of futurity. He, certainly, is not an inspired prophet like David and Isaias; but he is a profound thinker, and, by the strength of his reason, supported by the text of Holy Scripture, can foresee future events. The reign of Christ, he says, is the strict keeping by many of the commandments of God, by which holiness comes to prevail in the hearts of a great number of people. Has not God chosen to Himself a peculiar people over whom He rules and who accept cheerfully His government? Do not we who live so long after St. Augustine, know that it has been so in all ages, even the most corrupt and degraded?

The *Saints*, as he explains in a remarkable passage, are those who succeed each other on earth; new ones being successively and constantly born, baptized, and moulded by the Church according to the great pattern of all virtues, Christ Himself. At every epoch there is a new generation of them to replace those who die and go

to their reward in heaven. The nature of this reign of Christ is more particularly explained in the ninth chapter of the twentieth book of *De Civitate Dei*. It consists in the observance of the commandments of God, the smallest as well as the greatest, so that "the justice of the Christian is above that of the Scribe and the Pharisee;" so that the Christian, according to St. Paul, "looks to the things on high where Christ sits at the right hand of His Father."

Whilst Christ reigns thus in all those who follow Him, that is, in the true members of the Church, the Church herself reigns with Christ; because, even on earth, according to Scripture *judicium datum est sibi*. The Saviour besides said to His Apostles, *quæ ligaveritis in terra ligata erunt in cælo*, etc. (Matt. xviii. 18). The Saints in heaven, also, form but one body with the Church on earth, who makes mention of them at the altar of God.

Seated, therefore, as a Queen, the Bride of Christ endeavors to establish in all men the reign of her Spouse. She does it in two ways, and, consequently, meets with two kinds of opposition, and these are to continue until the end of time. She has, first, the exterior mission of converting the world. This was begun originally by the Apostles; it has been going on from their time to ours, and is to continue until the end of time, when the Gospel shall have been preached *per totam terram*. This stupendous work of evangelization must constantly meet with fierce opposition from without, that is, from pagan and infidel princes and peoples. This kind of persecution is always open, above board, and employs the usual means of tyranny, namely, the sword, the rack, and other most cruel tortures ending always in death. The reader need not be reminded that this part of the prediction of St. Augustine has been fulfilled in all ages, and continues to be fulfilled to the letter in our day. It is now at the eastern edge of Asia that the process is going on under our eyes, and we have only to read the letters written by Catholic missionaries from China, Japan, Corea, Tongkin, Cochin China, and other places, to see that the work of evangelization is accompanied with open persecution by infidel rulers, as it was in the times of Decius, Severus, and Diocletian. But this is not exactly included in the present investigation, the object of which is to see how within the material kingdom of Christ, that is, the visible Church, persecution must always go on, stirred up by some of her own children. This is the main point we propose to consider.

How is it that the Church, all intent on establishing the reign of Christ in the hearts of her spiritual offspring, meets with opposition from them, finds enemies among them, so that her influence is curtailed by them, her power sought to be taken from her, and she is reduced at last to the condition of a captive in the hands of pretended friends, as is happening in our own day? Yes, the same

men who thus persecute her belong to her by baptism, even by belief to some extent, by exterior connection at least, though they can scarcely be said to belong to her by their works. St. Augustine tells us that they are represented in the Gospel by the tares, *zizania*, which Satan, *homo inimicus*, has sowed in the midst of the wheat, and which will continue to grow along with it until the time of the harvest, when God shall command his angels to winnow the wheat and cast the chaff into the fire.

This phenomenon—which existed already in the time of St. Augustine, as he often comments upon it, was to continue during the thousand years or indefinite millennium, and almost to the end of the world—is easily explained by the open refusal of a number of the children of the Church to have the reign of Christ established in their hearts. Consequently, they turn against their mother as against an enemy, and openly exclaim: "We do not want her to rule over us," *nolumus hanc regnare super nos*. And to show that St. Augustine regarded this rebellion of unworthy Catholics as a perpetual feature of the Church in all ages to come, and considered the continual vexations of bad Christians as deadly an opposition as the open persecutions of infidels, we have only to quote a few words of his comment on this short passage of the Apocalypse: *Si qui non adoraverunt bestiam, nec imaginem ejus, nec acceperunt inscriptionem in fronte aut in manu sua*. "This," he says, "must be understood *de vivis ac mortuis*, of men actually living in our time, and of those who have died before us." . . . But what is this *bestia*? Although this is a question of importance and requires deep investigation, it can be said, without fear of going in the least against faith, that it is the city of the impious, the mass of unbelievers, always opposed to the faithful people, to "the City of God." They are those who have never belonged to the Church by baptism. "Its *image*," however, seems to me to be its *personation* on the part of those men who profess to believe, and yet live as if they did not. They pretend to be what they are not, and they are called Christians although they do not bear the true stamp of Christianity, but only a false image of it. For to the same *bestia* belong not only the open enemies of the name of Christ and of His most glorious city, but also the tares, *zizania*, which are to be gathered up at the end of time, and only then separated from the kingdom of Christ, which is the Church. Thus bad Christians often *personate* open infidels by persecuting the Church of Christ, and enlisting themselves in the ranks of her enemies, although by baptism they ought to be her friends.

Nothing can be clearer than these ideas of the holy Bishop of Hippo; and it is wonderful how in a few pages he has given to posterity a substantial abstract of a history which now has lasted nearly

nineteen hundred years. It is only because the Church is divine, and the general features of her future annals were pencilled by Christ himself and His Apostles, that any man, even with the deep mind of an Augustine, could tell us how it would be in a thousand years or more. It is in fact nearly fourteen centuries since he wrote, and a thoughtful man cannot but wonder when he reads those entrancing pages, replete with the thoughts of previous prophecy analyzed and elucidated by human genius.

These remarkable speculations are the best answer to the questions propounded at the very beginning of this paper; and, at the same time, they also contain a clear justification of the Church in regard to the matter under consideration. How can it be said that it is her fault that she has lost in our day some of her previous influence or power? Was there any accusation brought or intended to be brought against her in the predictions of St. Augustine? If he now lived among us, or could come back from heaven to hold converse with us, and supposing that God had not made him acquainted through the Beatific Vision with the successive vicissitudes of the Church, he would not feel any surprise at anything we know, and see, and daily grieve to experience from false brethren and pretended Christian rulers, lawgivers, and men of influence of every kind, but would, probably, only repeat a few sentences of what he has penned in another part of his *City of God*. "*In hoc ergo malo sæculo*," etc. We give the translation by Rev. M. Dods, in the Edinburgh edition 1871:

"In this wicked world, in these evil days, when the Church measures her future loftiness by her present humility, and is exercised by goading fears, tormenting sorrows, disquieting labors, and dangerous temptations, when she soberly rejoices, rejoicing only in hope, there are many reprobates mingled with the good; and both are gathered together by the Gospel, as in a drag-net. In this world, as in a sea, both swim inclosed without distinction in the net until it is brought ashore, where the wicked must be separated from the good, that in the good, as in His temple, God may be all in all."

II. The great Doctor of Hippo in various passages speaks constantly of the Church, but scarcely mentions her pastors. He likewise descants on the virtues or vices of nations and peoples, yet very seldom names their princes and kings. But for us it is evident that the expression now must be different, the sense remaining the same. In his time the nations appeared on the convulsed stage of the world simply as peoples, and the Church was uppermost in the mind of all, instead of the Papacy. Why so? St. Augustine lived and wrote in the precise epoch of the confused mingling of all tribes and races in an almost inextricable disorder. The barbarian invasions, it is true, had begun their ravages much earlier, and already at the time of Gallienus the Goths had invaded Western Asia, and Europe was at the mercy of numerous German tribes.

But these were then mostly in the service of Roman generals who disputed the empire against Valerian's son. There was still an empire, and there were only too many emperors. It was from 375 to 568 of our era that almost the whole population of the North and East swept like the waves of the sea over the West and South. It is now ascertained that all the northern tribes then living, from the frontiers of China to the Atlantic Ocean, were in constant motion, warring perpetually with each other and, one and all, were making incursions into the rich domain of Rome. During those two centuries the barbarian peoples did not move fitfully as they did before, returning after awhile to their former haunts. They meant to settle permanently on the plains of Europe, or wherever else fortune might offer them the opportunity of securing more desirable abodes. The whole life of St. Augustine was passed in the midst of those violent convulsions; and the Vandals were besieging Hippo, his Episcopal city, when he closed forever his eyes on a world apparently in ruins. Persons must then have been accustomed to speak oftener of peoples than of their rulers, who were mostly unknown. The destiny of the world was in fact trembling in the rough hands of numerous tribes rushing impetuously forward in their career, without an intelligent directing head. St. Augustine was thus naturally brought to look at the future fate of the Church as dependent more upon peoples than on their rulers.

He, also, could not but look on the Church as on a body already everywhere established, having received from Christ the mission of converting those infuriated savages, and keeping in the observance of the law of God her defenceless children, then in the throes of agony. The Popes had enough to do in Rome and the surrounding country. They could not exercise a universal power in the prevailing confusion, and it was designed, in the providence of God, to be at a much later period that peoples should look on them as the fathers of regenerated mankind and the arbiters of the whole world. This explains why St. Augustine speaks thus in general terms, and uses phraseology differing greatly from ours, yet carrying with it, after all, a like meaning.

As soon as peace and order succeeded to war and confusion; as soon as Europe became mapped, nearly as it has been ever since, and the various kingdoms and empires which we know, began to develop, each its own individual life; as soon as, at the same time, the Church could set in working order the divine constitution which Christ had given her, and the Papacy visibly arose to take the lead of Christendom; then the moral power of the Christian Church, whilst it continued to fulfil the predictions of St. Augustine, did so under vastly different circumstances, and presented to a thoughtless looker-on a very dissimilar scene, though it was in fact the same.

The nations came to be represented by their individual princes, chiefly after feudalism arose; and the Church also became, as was proper, identified with the Pope. Thus it came to pass that the words of St. Augustine had to be slightly altered, though their meaning remained the same. The wicked of whom he spoke as inclosed in the "net of the fisherman" were, most of the time, the emperors, or kings, or powerful barons, who, by persecuting the Church, caused her to lead a life of sorrow, and fear, and labor, and temptation, just as described in the last passage we have quoted from the work, *De Civitate Dei*.

• It is proper, consequently, to review briefly the secular contests between the Papacy and the empire, in order to come to a more exact understanding of the situation of the Church at the present day. From the very exposition of the subject just laid down, it is evident that whatever happened between the former Roman empire and the Christian Church previous to the final success of the barbarian invasions, is excluded from this present inquiry. The former Roman civilization was entirely destroyed by the barbarian invaders. Whatever came into existence afterwards was entirely independent of the anterior period; and the complexion of things at the present time will be sufficiently explained, when the principal facts which were evolved in the contest between the crosier and the sceptre, say from the time of Charlemagne down, will have been properly understood and stated. In this review even the Greek or Byzantine world scarcely enters; because the modern civilization of Europe, and the relations between the Popes and the kings have derived very few elements from the effete organization known as the Byzantine Empire. The fact is that the problem is reduced to the examination of its proper conditions as involved in Germany, England, France, and Spain. Italy forms a subject of itself, apart from the others, very important certainly, but which it will be more profitable and convenient to consider at the last.

It is impossible to enter into this discussion without indulging first in a general remark on the most important element of the problem, namely, the Papacy. But the Papacy placed here under our eyes is not that of the catacombs, however great, sublime, superhuman it may have been. It is neither the heavenly but hidden power wrestling in the dark with a corrupt and tyrannical paganism, nor the already manifest City of God confronting, in and around the Roman capitol, the undisguised city of Satan. This first struggle had long previously passed away. The victory had been won and paganism had ceased to exist. The Pontiffs had planted the cross on the summit of the Capitol. Rome and the world had become Christian. But the Papacy which at this moment stands before our gaze, is the majestic, and at the same time sweet and mild figure of

a high priest placed in antagonism to his own wayward spiritual children. It is the hand which has poured by proxy the regenerating waters of baptism on the heads of all those emperors and kings, constrained to ward off, nay, anathematize those whom it desires only to bless; it is the tongue proclaiming the saving precepts of true morality, which, strange to say, is not listened to with reverence, but is mocked by the open and unreasonable disobedience of those who have freely sworn to obey; it is the heart of a father, deeply wounded by those very sons whom he had engendered in Christ. For it ought never to be forgotten that from Rome had been sent the Apostles who converted originally the Germans, the Anglo-Saxons, the Franks, the Visigoths of Spain, the Ostrogoths of Italy, all those nations which afterwards formed Christendom. In their first enthusiasm they had gratefully acknowledged their allegiance to the Papal power. They had called the Supreme Pontiff their spiritual ruler; they had blessed his hand full of holy ministrations; they had recognized it as an instrument of untold blessings; they had heard his voice and called it the voice of Christ explaining to every Christian the same clear, strict, absolute duties; they had, finally, been folded to his heart, which they knew was that of a father prompted only by a true heavenly charity. This was, in fact, the Papacy which has been so often misrepresented and accused. Yet any impartial reader of the annals of those times is compelled to acknowledge that in all its contests with the powers of this world, the Papacy bore in fact either all the characters just described, or at least some of them unmistakably. We shall see this more satisfactorily in the details of these contests, in the various changes which resulted from them, and in the final consequences which we now explore and study.

Germany.—The natural and chronological order would seemingly require that the Italian politicians and princes should be considered first. For, during a part of the ninth century and the whole of the tenth, the margraves of Tuscany and the counts of Tusculum often intrigued at the Papal elections, with a view to introducing their detestable feudalism into the very organization of the Church, and perpetuating the abuses of simony and incontinency among the clergy of the whole peninsula. But Italy, for various reasons, ought to be studied apart, and will be deferred to the last.

The strongest proof that the subsequent deplorable antagonism between the German Empire and the Papacy did not result necessarily from the assumptions and pretensions of Rome, as the enemies of the Papacy allege, consists in the fact that with the restoration of imperial power in Germany, after the disappearance of the Carolingian dynasty, the greatest harmony prevailed for a long time between the temporal and the spiritual powers. The Carlovin-

gian era itself might be adduced in corroboration of this proof; but as the present discussion must date from the origin of the difficulty between the empire and the Papacy, there is no need of going farther back than to the Saxon line of emperors. When they first took up the sceptre which the progeny of Charlemagne were unable any longer to wield, they adopted the large views and Christian policy of the first Charles; and continued up to the end of their dynasty in perfect accord with the Popes. The single exception which will be mentioned does not affect the general result. When Otho I. went to Rome for the purpose of putting an end to the dissensions of contending factions, he recognized John XII. as Pope in spite of what he had heard against him from his German courtiers, and he took an oath as explicit as that of Charlemagne's could possibly have been, "to always exalt the Church of Rome and her Pastor." If later on he appeared to swerve from his purpose, if he went so far as to depose the Pope and have another elected, he was urged to it by unworthy bishops and cardinals, and thus an excuse, though an insufficient one, could be found for his conduct. But it must be said that this deplorable excess is the only one which can be alleged against the Saxon line. Otho II., surnamed the Great, was a still greater benefactor to the Roman Church than his father had been. Almost the same might be said of Otho III. But all other Saxon emperors were surpassed in this regard by Henry II., the last of them. This pious prince, the holy husband of the still holier Cunegunda, has been considered in all ages a pattern of all Christian virtues on the throne.

Had this policy been followed by all the German imperial dynasties, there would have been no conflict between the Tiara and the Sceptre. It is impossible to find room for such a conflict when we consider that those first emperors never took upon themselves to mix in the affairs of the Church or take part in the clerical elections, or grant the investiture of spiritual offices without the full consent of the Popes, which consent they knew, and acknowledged they knew, was necessary. Thus all the subsequent troubles with the Franconian line would have been avoided, had the emperors of that line adhered to the same principles. As to the unheard-of pretensions of the Hohenstaufen, it is not possible to imagine that the Saxon emperors would ever have originated them. What would have been, in consequence, the happiness of Europe and the world, had all the emperors of Germany followed the example of the Saxon emperors? When the two powers, the spiritual and the temporal, are in perfect accord, nations can advance in civilization without any inward hinderance. All the powers of the State are set forth either for the submission of exterior enemies or for the normal development of interior activity. In the case of Germany, at the

time we are speaking of, the exterior enemies were all pagan tribes which were successively to be subjected to the sweet yoke of Christianity, and consequently to be highly benefited by the process; the development of interior activity consisted in doing away with the last remnants of barbarism which had not yet disappeared, and in elevating the nations, in as short time as possible, to the highest pitch of true civilization, which all Christian peoples reach under the powerful sway of the sublime doctrine of the Saviour.

Many in our day will say, perhaps, that submission to Rome would have brought about an entirely different result; would have established servility, gradually leading on to degradation, etc., etc. We all have heard of these modern axioms of so-called philosophical historians, but have no room for discussing them at length. A general observation must suffice. Does history prove that such deleterious effect resulted when the temporal power submitted cheerfully to the Papacy? This was the case under Charlemagne and most of his dynasty; this was emphatically the case under the Saxon line of emperors which replaced the Carolingians; this was the case in Germany whenever a truly Christian prince ruled. Was not the country then more prosperous and powerful than under the majority of the Franconian, Hohenstaufen, and Hapsburg emperors? On this subject we must content ourselves with the remarks of Höfler in his admirable paper on the German Empire, in the *Dictionnaire de Theol. Cath.* (vol. vii.). He says:

"In spite of the insistence of many writers to regard as the most flourishing period of Germany that in which the two heads of Christendom were at war, when the energetic efforts of the two parties produced, no doubt, an extraordinary development of talent and institutions, history will always prove that the grandest period, and the one most productive of a natural and solid development was that during which a common principle animated the empire and the Papacy; when, as a consequence of this union, the Christian world—*orbis christianus*—going on from victory to victory, crushed the powers both of paganism and Islamism. It is dating from those memorable days that the country began to *Germanize* the surrounding regions, a remarkable operation, to which historians do not give the attention it deserves, and which was certainly the immediate result of the union of the temporal and the spiritual powers. North Germany became thenceforth Christian and German. The countries devastated by the Huns were soon teeming again with men and cities. Toward the East the Alemanni arrived," etc.

The writer speaks here of the precise time when the Othos and the first two Henrys of the Saxon line carried the empire over which they ruled to such a pitch of glory. Did their constant union with the Popes bring on "servility and degradation" for their persons and those of their subjects? The same reflections might be indulged in with reference to France, and also to England in regard to its Anglo-Saxon kings. But this must suffice.

Germany had become so prosperous and great by the adoption of the policy of union with Rome under the Saxon princes, that the two first emperors of the subsequent, Franconian, line naturally followed the same course. They appeared only intent on leaving Rome free, and protecting the Pontiffs against the plots of Italian politicians and intermeddlers, of whom there will soon be occasion to speak. They allowed, in fact, Hildebrand who was not yet Pope, but had already acquired immense influence in Rome, to energetically oppose simony and incontinency among the clergy. Henry III., however, the second Franconian emperor, gave the first hint of a change of principle, when he publicly withdrew his friendship from Wasson, Bishop of Liege, who had declared that "he owed fealty to the emperor, but obedience only to the Pope." The germ of the contest on Investitures was contained in this declaration. It is known that open war on this subject broke out only under Henry IV., to continue with fury during almost the whole reign of Henry V. What was the real meaning of this war of Investitures? It was, in fact, at the beginning, when controversy and argument had not yet made clear the various points of the question, nothing else than the bold assumption on the part of the emperors of the spiritual power itself, through their claim of *investing* the chosen bishops and abbots, before their consecration, with the crosier and the ring. *Consecration* was supposed, by the lawyers of the crown, to add almost nothing to the ceremony of *investing*. The emperors pretended also to have thus the right of *electing* the future prelates, and becoming the real source of their authority by merely conferring upon them its emblems. There was, of course, on their part, the obligation to notify the Pope afterwards, and the Pope was expected to approve everything they did with cheerful assent. This was indeed to repress "the assumptions" of the court of Rome with a vengeance.

In our age this must be acknowledged, even by Liberalists, to have been an outrageous pretension, since they seem at least to respect the spiritual initiative of the visible Head of the Church, and acknowledge that in spiritual matters he must be independent and perfectly free. Yet Gregory VII. has been for a long time abused, even by pretended Catholics, for having opposed the Franconian pretensions. If he had not, he would have openly prevaricated and been unfaithful to his most sacred duty. But the reader may wonder how such an abuse as this could possibly have crept unperceived into the Church, and then at once burst out openly so soon after the Christian Saxon line. This happened very simply through the development of feudalism, which was then beginning its career all over Europe, but particularly in Germany. Bishops, abbots, ecclesiastical officers of all degrees (for the ceremony of investiture ex-

tended to all) began, before the Franconian dynasty, to receive from the emperors, kings, and other sovereign princes, fiefs by which they were made dukes, counts, barons, etc. In this capacity they depended on the emperor or king, owed him feudal fealty, a well-known expression in those times, and became great dignitaries of the empire. Under the Saxon line the princes, all of them, had been so great benefactors to the Papacy, that extensive privileges were granted them by the Pontiffs with regard to the nomination and election of Church dignitaries. This was enough to lay the foundation for strange and pernicious abuses.

Imagine the position in which Gregory VII. was placed, when determining immediately after he had been elected and crowned Pope to eradicate incontinency and concubinage from among the clergy, and wipe away at once this foul blot from the garments of the Bride of Christ, he found the youthful Henry IV, just come of age after the regency of his mother Agnes, already a profligate, given over to all vices, chiefly to unbridled lust, established in state at Goslar in Germany, and acting in the following shameful and wicked manner:

At Goslar there was a collegiate church with Canons in it. These Canons were notoriously among the most immoral men in Germany. But His Majesty, the Emperor, who treated them as his boon companions, would not look beyond them, when a bishopric, a rich abbey, or a fat ecclesiastical benefice became vacant, for a person to fill it. Instantly the golden prize fell to the lot of one of those infamous men. They were not long in receiving the investiture of their new office by the crosier and the ring. The Pope, of course, would then be notified of the appointment by Henry IV., but could not prevent the unworthy candidate from receiving consecration at the hands of some worldly bishop. Was the reformation of the Church possible under such circumstances as these? Neander himself, though a Protestant writer of Church history, cannot refuse to acknowledge that the Pope was right in his conflict with Henry IV.

Other Protestant writers besides Neander have justified Gregory with respect to his claim of universal dominion in spiritual matters. There is no need, however, of discussing this point at present, since no one in the time of Hildebrand objected to it, and the Hohenstaufen were the first, subsequently, to controvert it. The claim being then admitted by all, it could not give rise to any contest. But is it not most painful to see such a man as Gregory spending all his Pontifical life in these arduous conflicts, dying at last in exile, to be subsequently abused by scribblers of every description? Is it not a disgraceful sight on the part of Germany to witness in such a plain, nay, self-evident question, all the strength of a large

empire arrayed against an unarmed Pontiff, after having deprived him of his natural allies by gaining over, through open corruption, the bishops themselves to the cause of Henry, so that there was a time when only six of them sided with the Pope? Worse yet! Henry having been able through his creatures, the corrupt bishops of his court, to have an antipope elected, there soon were in many dioceses two rival bishops, in order, we suppose, to compass the more quickly the total destruction of Christianity. Had St. Augustine come back to visit the earth at that epoch he could have said of Gregory what he had prophesied of the Church in general :

“ In this wicked world, in these evil days, the Church is exercised by goading fears, tormenting sorrows, disquieting labors, and dangerous temptations !”

The quarrel of Investitures appeared at last to have reached a settlement at Worms under Henry V. in 1122, and this settlement by a *concordat*, then made, was undoubtedly a rightful victory on the side of the Church, since the emperors of Germany gave up the privilege of election and investiture, by cross and ring, of the ecclesiastical prelates, who were thereby declared to owe to the prince feudal fealty only for their temporal possessions. But at the extinction of the Franconian line in 1137, when the Hohenstaufen came into power, a new pretension set up by this dynasty soon began to disclose itself. It was nothing else than the principle of universal dominion in all matters, in the strictest sense of the term. This could not be said to have been suggested by the anterior claim of Gregory VII. to spiritual rule all over the earth as Vicar of Christ, since the two claims had absolutely nothing in common. This new and most startling doctrine was first proclaimed on a most solemn occasion by Frederick I., or Barbarossa, the second Hohenstaufen emperor. After having humbled Milan, the head of the republican confederation of the Lombard cities, which was openly fostered later on by Innocent III. and other Popes, and from which originated the celebrated Italian republics, Barbarossa called a general assembly of German and Italian noblemen in the plain of Roncaglia in 1158. He there introduced four legists from Bologna, who were to open the legal era of Imperial Germany, and whose names ought to be preserved and remembered forever. These were Bulgarus, Martinus Gossia, Jacobus da Porta, and Hugo de Alberico. Hegel, in his *History of Municipal Corporations*, has, fortunately for us, extracted their names from some old and authentic MSS. The decision of these four men, learned in the law, was simple enough, but was also more than sufficiently comprehensive. The pith of the matter consisted merely in declaring,

“ That the German Empire being the continuation of the Roman, the former Roman

code must be that of Germany. Consequently, all the despotic powers of the renowned Roman Cæsars must essentially belong to the Cæsars of Germany."

This was solemnly proclaimed in the plain of Roncaglia, at the command of Frederick I. This is a fact which cannot be contested, and we find reason here to wonder that lawyers in general, at least in Germany and France, after this, have generally been so loud in their denunciations of "papal pretensions," yet have scarcely ever uttered a word against those of temporal rulers. This most extraordinary declaration was directly opposed to all German traditions which recognized in the sovereign, only the elected head of the nation, *primus inter pares* (Cantù, tom. 10, p. 404); and at the moment of its utterance it was emphatically denied by the then quite recent establishment of the Lombard municipal cities, founded on popular rights, or rather on strongly republican principles. The Hohenstaufen wished, on the contrary, to establish an absolute monarchy with all the forms of despotism, nay, with all the detestable features of former Roman Cæsarism, over the whole extent of Germany and Italy. It was in fact the resuscitation of paganism, at least as regards political doctrine and rule. For, in all pagan countries the harshest despotism of the State, or of the head of the State, has always been maintained in vigor, even in the case of pretended republics. The citizen was invariably regarded as having no conscience of his own, and was obliged to submit to the authority of the State, or of its ruler, in all things whatever.

The Popes had to firmly oppose this outrageous pretension, because they were the natural defenders of the people's rights, and their own temporal possessions would have been absorbed into the scheme of the new legists. Moreover, the principle set forth with such solemnity, involved the spiritual as well as the temporal supremacy; for who does not know that every Cæsar of Rome was *Pontifex Maximus* as well as *Imperator*? The great contest carried on between the emperors Frederick Barbarossa, Henry VI., and Frederick II., on the one side, and the Popes, from Alexander III. to Clement IV., including the great Innocent III., on the other, was waged chiefly on the principles involved in this great question. Had the Hohenstaufen succeeded, the people would have been crushed under the heel of these despots, religion would have been enslaved, and the Popes, deprived of their temporal States, would have become the mere tools of politicians. But, thank God, the victory again remained with the Papacy; and at the end of the contest the municipal republics of Italy were consolidated, chiefly by Innocent III., and immediately began that brilliant career which brought European civilization at once to the highest pitch of glory. This may be counted as one of the chief results of the Pontificate of

Innocent in particular. (Lacombe, *Histoire de la Papauté*, tom. 2, p. 298, § 9.) Thus disappeared in a short time the vaunted power of the new Cæsars, to the first of whom the Archbishop of Milan, a great supporter of the Roman code, did not scruple to say: "*Scias omne jus populi in condendis legibus tibi concessum. Tua voluntas jus est, sicuti dicitur. Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem, cum populus ei et in eo omne suum imperium et potestatem concesserit.*" (Cantù, *Hist. Univ.*, tom. 10, p. 405, note.)

But although the Papacy triumphed gloriously over the Hohenstaufen, who could never carry a single one of their points, neither in Germany nor in Italy, the long-protracted contest between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines had commenced in earnest, and was to bear its baneful fruits during centuries. For the Hohenstaufen, who belonged to the Ghibelline family, continued as a party long after their dynasty had ceased to disgrace the throne, and the Saxon princes who remained constantly faithful to the Popes, were Guelphs. To whom, then, ought to be attributed the wars, devastations, and often the desolation of fair Italy, if not to the Hohenstaufen? Were not the Popes constrained by the strictest duty to oppose a policy which would have trampled on the rights of the Church and of humanity itself? Were they not appointed by Christ to fight for justice against might? Could they stand mute when the old pagan principles, which Christianity in fact had buried long before, were again asserted as living and true, and attempted to be re-established in full vigor? What the first Popes had obtained by their austere life in the catacombs and by the shedding of their blood, namely, the downfall of paganism and of the most outrageous despotism on earth—was it to be lost by yielding to the pretensions of princes who by baptism were the spiritual children of the successors of Peter? For it was nothing else but the re-establishment of pure paganism in politics and law, that the Hohenstaufen attempted to achieve by the help of their lawyers and the power of their armies. And the state of open war declared by the clear enunciation of these principles was to continue for a long time under the banner of the Ghibellines, against which was justly raised that of the Guelphs. Meanwhile the Popes had "to be exercised by goading fears, tormenting sorrows, and disquieting labors, inflicted upon them by their own wayward spiritual children." So Augustine had foretold it, and so it must continue to the end. And, instead of wondering that the Church in our age has seen her influence decline, and of searching around for the causes of it, as though they were obscure, we might rather ask ourselves how it is that the Church still exists and was not destroyed ages ago.

Our want of space compels us to conclude this branch of the subject by merely remarking that the contests between the Papacy

and the empire in Germany, had the fatal tendency to establish a constant antagonism between both, and to increase, consequently, the animosity of the secular power against the Church. This continued, more or less, under the dynasties subsequent to that of the Hohenstaufen, until the time when the rebellion of Luther, enlisting on its side a great number of German princes, resulted in the division of Christendom. The actual situation of the Church in Germany is thus sufficiently well explained; and if any one has to blush on account of it, it is undoubtedly not to the Popes that the shame of it is due.

England.—The struggle which brought the Church in Great Britain to the state to which it has been reduced for the last three centuries, began directly after the conquest of England by the Normans. Our short sketch, which we must necessarily make brief, will prove this assertion, which many, owing to a want of serious reflection, may be inclined to doubt. The first kings of the Norman line introduced *customs* thoroughly opposed to the former relations between Church and State under the Anglo-Saxon dynasties; and it may be said, without fear of great error, that in these so-called customs lay the germ of future Protestantism. Mr. Freeman in his celebrated *History of the Norman Conquest of England*, pretends, it is true, and brings many facts to prove, that the policy pursued from the beginning by the Conqueror and followed out by his successors, consisted mainly in changing nothing in the customs of the nation. This general thesis cannot be examined here; but, supposing even that it is thoroughly proved, and must be henceforth admitted as historically demonstrated, the notorious *consuetudines regie* with respect to Church affairs, which soon began to be spoken of, must certainly be regarded as forming a remarkable exception to the general policy of the new princes. These *customs*, certainly, had no existence under the old Anglo-Saxon kings. They were so evidently new that at first nobody could say precisely in what they consisted. The people and the clergy were kept for some time in the dark as to the meaning of these ominous words. It must, certainly, have been with great surprise that their purport became finally somewhat better known. The fact is that their object was: 1st. To interfere on the part of the State in the ecclesiastical elections, by requiring the presence, on those occasions, of officers, from the king. 2d. To prevent free communication between English Church dignitaries and the Pope. 3d. To introduce gradually in many cases the civil jurisdiction, instead of the ecclesiastical which the people always preferred. 4th. To limit the right of excommunication, a right purely spiritual, by requiring the consent of the king for its exercise. How is it that these *customs*, openly declared at last in the pretended Council of Clarendon, came into force? No one in

England had ever heard of them before the invasion of William the Conqueror; and there was no positive mention of them, neither under his reign nor under those of his immediate successors, until Henry II. If any fact known to history during that first period of Norman rule could have any reference to such customs as these, it ought to be looked for during the reigns of these first Norman kings, and a short discussion of the subject is required.

William the Conqueror, William Rufus, and Henry I., the only Norman kings, predecessors of Henry II., who can deserve attention, Stephen's reign being short and unimportant, tried, undoubtedly, to establish in England *royal customs* in cases between Church and State. But they did not succeed, owing chiefly to the noble opposition of Lanfranc and Anselm. Moreover, those attempts at introducing ecclesiastical customs were very different from that of Henry II., whose programme at Clarendon may be called altogether new, and was stamped with a character *sui generis*. The efforts of the three first Norman kings were bold, but, at least, honest in their violence. Had they succeeded, Christianity would soon have been altogether subverted in Great Britain, and a savage supremacy in spiritual things and temporal on the part of the kings, worse yet than the long subsequent one of Henry VIII., would have been established as early as the twelfth century. The attempt of Henry II. had, on the contrary, all the characteristics of the cunning attributed by French Bretons to his race. It was a dishonest attempt. But it did not deceive Thomas a'Becket who knew his master well, and could immediately perceive *in cauda venenum*. Let us look at this a little more in detail.

William the Conqueror was a bold soldier, as is well known, and by no means gentle in his manners or moderate in his aims. But, at least, he spoke out and expressed himself with a kind of blunt frankness. It seems that his first wish after the conquest was to reform the clergy, and for this he prevailed on Lanfranc that he should accept the archiepiscopal dignity in Canterbury. In this he undoubtedly rendered a great service to religion; but it was strangely qualified by the care he took to appoint only Normans to the sees, abbeys, and other important benefices; and the Norman clergy of that epoch had scarcely had time to imbibe all the mildness and virtue prescribed in the Gospel to the ministers of God. But what was still worse was the stubbornness of the king, who could scarcely imagine that any one could be above him in any capacity whatever, and consequently he refused to yield, even to the Pope, the proper tokens of filial submission. This amounted, in fact, to the declaration that he was supreme in all things. Lanfranc, who knew how easily an open schism, with all its deplorable consequences, could be brought about, did not dare to use in this case the

severe measures of ecclesiastical censures, and for this he was reprimanded by Gregory VII., who then was Pope. This is the first attempt tending to the establishment of "royal" ecclesiastical "customs" we can find in the history of Norman England.

With William Rufus the state of affairs became much worse, and the position of the king was unambiguously announced. He boldly announced from the first that he alone was master of State and Church; that no *foreign* influence in his dominions could be tolerated. What could he possibly have to do with a Pope to whom he had not given the proper investiture, etc.? Henry VIII. never went further in his assumptions, and there is, consequently, nothing rash in the assertion already made, that the struggle which ended in securing the ascendancy of Protestantism in England began with the Norman conquest. What amount of prudence, forbearance, mildness, joined to a firmness which never surrendered the essential rights of Christian truth, did not Anselm, the successor of Lanfranc, give constant proof of during a long life of anxiety and trouble? His biography should be read by all those who wish to know what is the true spirit of the Catholic Church in her conflict with the wicked powers of this world. Any one who comes to this knowledge will be able to form a correct judgment on the important question, whether false pretensions, inordinate ambition, and glaring encroachments are chargeable against the Church, or the State?

In the impossibility of going more into detail, we can only state, as an incontrovertible conclusion, that a bold attempt had been made by Rufus to establish in England customs which could not prevail, owing to the sublime virtues of the greatest Archbishop of Canterbury that ever lived, Anselm of Piedmont. The same conclusion will be reached on investigation with regard to Henry I., who, like his predecessor, fostered simony among the clergy, and wished to assume to himself the right of investiture. These few words must suffice on the subject. If the question is studied thoroughly the odious violence of all those Norman kings will come out in such bold relief, that the reader, however prejudiced against the Popes he may at first have been, will be compelled to confess that the resistance of the secular powers by such Pontiffs as Gregory VII. and Alexander III., and by such prelates as Lanfranc and Anselm, was inspired by a profound sense of right, and saved, in fact, Christianity from destruction.

It is now in place to examine the celebrated *consuetudines regie*, of Clarendon, and see how far they differed from the pretensions of the first three Norman kings. The reader is referred back to the statement of their object as given above. It is taken from Lingard's *History of England*, and is unquestionably a correct state-

ment. It is important here, for many reasons, to keep in mind the date of the pretended Council of Clarendon. It was held in 1161. This was just two years after the proclamation of pure Cæsarism at Roncaglia by Frederick I. of Germany. The long quarrel of the Popes with the Franconian emperors terminated in a victory for the Church. The pretended right of investiture had been given up very reluctantly by the secular power in Germany, though it was afterwards claimed on several occasions. The question raised now by Barbarossa was of a very different character, and had it been decided in his favor it would have resuscitated the long-dead despotism of the ancient Cæsars. It may be presumed that Henry II. knew this. He was far better educated than the rude conqueror, William I., and the still ruder William Rufus. His predecessor, Henry I., with all his natural violence, cultivated the fine arts and received the surname of *Beauclerc*. Henry II. did not live constantly in the retired island of Great Britain; he resided often in Normandy and other parts of France, where the great questions, agitated between the empire and the Papacy, were daily discussed, at least by the cultivated part of mankind. He knew, therefore, that the pretensions of kings in regard to investitures had passed away; still he hankered after them and would certainly have greatly rejoiced could he have revived them under another name. The articles of Clarendon, therefore, never mention this name; but the first and the second, evidently, aim at a return to the substance of these pretensions by requiring the presence of some officers of the king at the election of prelates, and by preventing the free communication of English ecclesiastics with the Pope. These first two articles once secured, it would not have been difficult to usurp again into the hand of the king the bestowing of spiritual offices. The last two articles of this fine schedule, by substituting civil jurisdiction for ecclesiastical, and placing the king, in fact, above the reach of ecclesiastical censures and excommunication, might have gradually paved the way to a future assumption by his majesty of all power, civil and religious. Does it not look as if this really was the intention of Henry II. in claiming so loudly his precious *consuetudines regie*? To aspire directly and simply, as in Germany, to supremacy in spirituals and temporals, that is, to an undisguised Cæsarism, would have been too bold a thing for a simple king of England. Moreover, he was not supported by the arguments brought out by the four celebrated lawyers of Bologna, whose system required a certain line of descent, moral or otherwise, from the Roman Cæsars. Again, the French bishops he had to deal with—a great part of his possessions were then in France—could not be as easily managed at that time, as those of Germany or England. Motives of prudence, therefore, led him to the course he adopted. He was, indeed, a

cunning Norman, with the savage, crafty, and cruel character of his wild Scandinavian ancestors.

But he had to meet Thomas a'Becket; and he did not fare as well with him as he at first expected. The reader knows the rest. By the murder of the Archbishop of Canterbury at the foot of the altar, which Henry II. had certainly provoked, if not positively directed, he raised against himself the indignation of Christendom. How he had to atone for it is well known. Not drawing back even from the public penance imposed upon him by an assembly of bishops, he could not claim either the right of investitures or of unlimited authority; and the *consuetudines regie* were, for the time being, hidden out of sight.

They were not, however, altogether dead, though apparently buried. They manifested occasionally strong signs of life; and one or another of the four articles of the Clarendon creed appear but too often in the annals of ecclesiastical England, besides several other heavy grievances against the Holy See, such as the refusal to pay Peter-pence and the denial of the obligation to receive from time to time the visit of Papal legates. The consideration of these in detail would greatly exceed the limits assigned to this paper. There is, however, a compendious way of reaching a proper conclusion. It is known that the real encroachments of the civil power over the prerogatives of the Holy See went on, gradually increasing, with or without the help of parliaments and courtly prelates, until the *Reformation* capped the climax, by placing in the hands of the king all spiritual as well as temporal authority. On the restoration of Catholicity in England, under Mary Tudor, the Papal jurisdiction was, of course, re-established; and it is known how poets and historians have represented the heaviness of the yoke placed by this act on the neck of the English people. Now Lingard, a moderate Roman Catholic writer, to say the least, thus expresses himself in the first chapter of Queen Mary's reign, in a remarkable note which must strike every thoughtful reader. The occasion for publishing this note is the act of Parliament by which Catholicity was restored, and which Lingard states "deserves the attention of the reader, from the accuracy with which it distinguishes between the civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and the care with which it guards against any encroachment on the part of the latter."

"Most readers," says Lingard in his note, "have very confused and incorrect notions of the jurisdiction which the Pontiff, in virtue of his supremacy, claimed to exercise within the realm. From this act of Parliament and the statutes which it repeals, it follows that that jurisdiction was comprised under the following heads: 1st. He was acknowledged as Chief Bishop of the Christian Church, with authority to reform and redress heresies, errors, and abuses within the same. 2d. To him belonged the institution or confirmation of Bishops elect. 3d. He could grant to clergymen licenses of

non-residence, and permission to hold more than one benefice, with care of souls. 4th. He dispensed in the canonical impediments of matrimony. 5th. He received appeals from the Spiritual or Ecclesiastical Courts."

All persons acquainted with Church history and Catholic theology will readily acknowledge that it was not only on this occasion, of framing a bill in the English Parliament, that the Pontiff "claimed to exercise only this jurisdiction within the realm." These are the only necessary conditions required at all times by the Popes. If any other prerogatives were granted them by some Catholic States, the Pontiffs did not refuse to surrender them when the circumstances of the times required it. It is very doubtful if at any time the Popes ever claimed anything more from England, except once owing to the extraordinary act of John, who, in order to save himself, felt compelled to place his kingdom at the feet of the Pontiff. Let the history of England be read carefully, and it will be found that in all the difficulties raised between Rome and the English kings, some one or other of these five specifications was the subject-matter of dispute. The first article especially was the one which had created most trouble during previous conflicts. Yet every candid man, having a just notion of the Christian Church and of its Chief Pastor, must admit that it is absolutely necessary for the spiritual welfare of Christians. A like remark may be made respecting the others, except perhaps the third. It is not to be doubted, however, that nearly all the controversies which had previously convulsed England with respect to *Papal pretensions*, were carried on, on the part of the Church, only to obtain these necessary liberties; and that, consequently, she had never done anything more than oppose the encroachments of the State in matters which were absolutely necessary to the welfare of her spiritual children. And the men guilty of those encroachments, though the highest and most influential in England, were not less her spiritual children than the poorest and lowliest of the English people. There is no need of again repeating here the text of St. Augustine, which the reader by this time ought to know by heart. And this must suffice for Great Britain.

France.—Of all the countries on the continent of Europe, France undoubtedly is the one which imbibed more thoroughly from the very start the true Catholic spirit. This commences with Clovis, her first king. All the other new nationalities on the Continent, at that time, Vandals, Goths, Ostrogoths in Italy, Visigoths in Spain, were Arians. But the strict union of France with Rome dates from her cradle. As the Bishop of Poitiers eloquently said in the Cathedral of Rheims, the 1st of October, 1876:

"Dating from this day," the baptism of Clovis, "a great nation, another tribe of Judah under the New Dispensation, was just starting on its career in the world. The

Roman Pontiffs recognized this fact as well as the bishops of Gaul. . . . From that moment faithfulness to orthodoxy, the indissoluble alliance of the priesthood with the civil power, the Apostleship and Catholic protectorate all over the world, became the three distinguishing marks of the religious vocation of the French."

But to Charlemagne principally was France indebted for her deep spirit of faith. She, however, followed his lead most cheerfully, and in a better and more constant disposition of mind than the other Germanic nations subject to the sceptre of the great Charles. For France remained, more than any of them, faithful to the policy of the head of the Carolingians. Should any one feel disposed to controvert these assertions, he needs only to throw a glance on the Capitularies of French kings of this dynasty to be convinced that our position is unassailable. These Capitularies are, at this day, accessible to all in Migne's edition (vols. 97, 98, of *Lat. Fath.*). No one, even if he merely looks over them, will deny that the whole essence of the Ages of Faith is contained in those strange but singularly beautiful enactments; and it is in them that France found the food which nourished her infancy and her youth up to manhood.

The Carolingian race, without a single exception, were faithful to what may be called the traditions of the greatest exponent of their line. The Capetians even, who followed, entered largely into the same religious path. This may be said to have continued until the time of Philip the Fair at the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth centuries. For the troubles which arose between the Popes and both the first and the second Philips, regarded merely the personal affairs of those kings, and had no reference to any of the great principles of Church and State. Both successively tried to divorce their legitimate queens and to contract new alliances contrary to divine and human law. In these contests no question arose regarding the temporal and the spiritual powers. It was only after Germany had been fiercely agitated for a long time by the pretensions of her emperors that the first storm of a like nature arose in France. And in extenuation of the crime of Philip the Fair, it may be said that although he was inexcusable in his assumptions, carried on the contest in bad faith and with duplicity, placed himself unreservedly in the hands of legists more unprincipled still than those of Henry IV. and Frederick II. in Germany, yet Boniface VIII., unfortunately, had not the equable temper of Gregory VII. and Innocent III., and on some occasions may have been rather harsh during the long series of events which ended in open and revolting outrages against his sacred person. Yet justice was certainly on the side of the Pope, and the cause of Philip was as wrong, as it was disgracefully carried on.

And what, after all, was the first cause of this long quarrel?

Simply the obstinacy of the French king in refusing to submit to the decision of the Pope, after having requested his arbitration between himself and the king of England. All Europe was then a bloody field of battle. It was the duty of the Pontiff, as the recognized arbitrator between rival princes, to restore peace by his kind offices. He succeeded in bringing to an end the interminable dispute of the kings of Aragon against the dukes of Anjou, for the possession of Sicily. He likewise settled, for a time at least, the differences between Adolph of Nassau and Albert of Austria for the Imperial crown. He was most anxious to re-establish peace between Philip of France and Edward of England; and, had his endeavors not failed on this occasion, the fierce war of a hundred years which soon after broke out between the two nations might have been averted. Philip had recognized the Pope as arbitrator; but the decision, which he wanted to be all in his favor, did not please him, as it involved a compromise. It was simply that "things should remain as they were at the breaking out of the dispute." This disappointed and enraged the king of France, who henceforth considered the Pope as his enemy.

Boniface thought it was his duty to complain shortly after, in the Bull, *Clericis laicos*, of the universal abuse then prevalent, by which ecclesiastical property, bestowed originally for merely pious or charitable objects, was unjustly and heavily taxed for mere secular purposes. Philip looked upon the Bull as though it were addressed to himself alone, although there was no intimation of the kind in the document. It was an encyclical and a universal circular; and it applied more to the king of England than to that of France, because the abuse was greater in the former country than in the latter. But Philip alone appeared to resent it; and he retaliated on the Pope by issuing a decree against the exportation of coin from France to any foreign country, not excluding the Papal States, thus aiming a blow at the Papal exchequer, which relied upon its dues from France as well as from other Catholic countries. The Bull *Clericis laicos* was explained unreservedly in three other documents, but the king would not hear of explanation.

The details of the whole affair cannot be given in these pages; but a general statement of what immediately followed is important. The king of France saw that the strength of his antagonist lay in the principles of the canon law, which then was the law of all Europe. He was acquainted with the details of the previous contests of the Franconian and Hohenstaufen Emperors of Germany against the Papacy. He had, no doubt, remarked that in these conflicts the Emperors had derived great advantages from the employment of legists skilled in canon law. The fact has already been mentioned that Barbarossa brought out on one occasion four able Doc-

tors *utriusque juris* from Bologna, to sustain his cause. Later on, but before Philip's time, Frederick II. used very successfully his "dear Doctor," Petrus de Vineis, whom he rewarded afterwards with perpetual imprisonment. The poor Doctor, it is known, broke his skull in a fit of madness against the walls of his prison, to put an end to his misery. Enlightened by these very remarkable precedents, Philip called to his aid two learned men of this kind, Peter Flotte and William Nogaret; Nogaret in particular, "whom the king," says Alzog with great justice, "called to Court in order to avail himself of his knowledge and ability in cloaking royal usurpations under the legal forms and appearances of justice." This is admirably said, and explains the success which later on crowned the efforts of numerous Doctors of Law in the councils of Constance and Basle, in the first outbreak of Protestantism—for instance in the case of the divorce of Henry VIII., and his assumption of spiritual supremacy,—in the whole history of Gallicanism in France, and in the antics of Jansenism afterwards, finally in our own days in the frantic efforts of the Anti-Vaticanists in England, and the "Old Catholics" in Germany. On all those occasions, law, and particularly canon law, has been the constant outcry of the enemies of the Church. The reader, however, will understand that this outcry has always aimed at setting up a pretended canon law advocated by these men, not the noble creation of the Church herself, bearing the same name, but having a very different object.

The use the first asserters of the so-called canon law in France made of it, was simply to falsify abominably the Bulls of the Pope. Boniface, obliged at last to assert the rights of the spiritual authority, had issued his celebrated Bull, *Ausculta fili*. Peter Flotte got a copy of it, and by erasing a few lines, and writing others in their place, he made the Pope say that "there was no civil or temporal power in existence, and everything was absorbed in the spiritual authority." Boniface, however, had merely reasserted the principles previously declared by Gregory VII. and Innocent III. He recognized everywhere in his Bull the *two swords*, namely, the two distinct powers, temporal and spiritual. If he placed the papal over the kingly power, it was only in the sense that the king was a Christian, and as such subject to his pastor in spiritual matters.

"If Philip," says Alzog, "was subject to the Pope, it was not as a temporal prince, *ratione dominii*, but in a spiritual sense and as a Christian. In temporal matters he was subject to him only when and in so far as there was question of sin and injustice, *ratione peccati*. The Holy See, far from denying, recognized the fact that there was a difference between the two powers established by God." (Alzog, vol. ii., p. 623, and note, p. 624.)

The simple meaning of this is, that according to Boniface VIII.

every king or civil sovereign has full power to rule his dominion, and exercise his office ; but if he openly violates the rules of justice, and becomes a tyrant, he is subject to the authority of the Pope as his spiritual superior, who can call him to order, or depose him in the end, leaving to the people the election of his successor. This was the public law of Europe at the time.

The reader knows what followed. Two successive States-General were convened by the king in France. The three orders, persuaded of the genuineness of the copy of the Bull produced by Peter Flotte, took the side of Philip against Boniface. The Pope was declared deposed as a heretic. Nogaret was sent to Anagni with a troop of soldiers. There is no need of narrating the atrocious proceedings of Nogaret and his satellites, which a few years later on brought from the heart of Ghibelline Dante the well-known agonizing cry, *Veggio in Alagna entrar lo fiordaliso*, etc.

Thus from her French children, as early as the fourteenth century, the Church experienced all the terrors, sorrows, etc., predicted to her by St. Augustine. And more strange than all is the fact that the prevailing public opinion during succeeding ages, from the time of Philip the Fair to our own, has been that Boniface VIII. was a most ambitious and overbearing Pontiff, justly punished for his pretensions, though, in fact, he merely demanded the acknowledgment by Christian princes of the most elementary Christian truths, namely, that every member of the flock ought to obey his spiritual superior, listen to his advice, and reform his conduct. Thus has public opinion continued for ages to mislead people, and has gradually prepared what we witness in our day, a widespread hostility to the Church of God, and an eager emulation on the part of secular rulers of nations to spurn her, neglect her, if not to conspire for her utter destruction.

Spain.—There is nothing to say of Spain on this subject, thanks be to God! During all the time we have been speaking of, she was fighting nobly for Christianity against Islam ; and it was not from her that the Popes could expect any persecution. If in our age a different spirit has infected many of the rulers of that noble country, it was not so during the times we have been considering. Spain has not contributed, in any great measure at least, to prepare the way for the decline of the influence of the Church in Europe.

Italy.—If an exception could be supposed to have been intended in the predictions of St. Augustine, it surely, one might suppose, would have been Italy. The seat of the Papacy brought to that favored country advantages which no other enjoyed, and the Italians ought to have been the most submissive children of the Popes. Yet the very reverse is the fact, and the Church, in the persons of the

Supreme Pontiffs, has suffered more from her Italian subjects than from any others.

Look at the whole series of Popes from Peter down to his successors at the beginning of the tenth century—this is about the epoch from which our investigations began—and say if Italy ought not to have been proud of such an array of illustrious men. In the first three ages who can withhold admiration for the heroism displayed by the founders of Christianity in Rome? In their arduous and obscure labors, so fruitful, however, since they finally conquered paganism in its stronghold; in the extraordinary purity of their lives shining steadily as a bright luminary in the midst of unprecedented corruption; in the prudence and wisdom of their administration as they laid the foundation of a spiritual empire which was never to disappear; finally, in their fortitude and unflinching constancy when led before the pagan judges who condemned nearly all of them to cruel deaths, they showed themselves true heroes, so that even the enemies of the Catholic Church are either compelled openly to admire them, or endeavor to escape from expressing their admiration under the pretext that their biographies are only legends, and that their lives cannot be truly said to be known.

When the storm of persecution finally abated, we see a second line of Supreme Pastors, worthy of the first, in the great men placed at the head of the Church, who fought so bravely against Arianism and its kindred heresies. The names of Sylvester, Julius, Liberius, Damasus, Siricius, and Anastasius must forever be illustrious in the annals of mankind. Directly after, the barbarian invasions began, and the Papacy was often the only bulwark able to stand against the violence of the shock. During this period the Popes had to contend against both the rudeness and barbarism of foreign invaders, and the intrigues and violence which attended the attempted intrusion into Christianity of Nestorianism and Monophysism. Can anything grander at that epoch be presented to the admiration of the world than the lives of such men as Innocent I., Bonifacius, Celestinus, Sixtus III., and Leo I.? The conversion of the barbarians, which began from the very first day of their irruptions, and the settlement of many questions between Italy and Greece, that is, between Rome and Constantinople, present afterwards to our gaze the noble figures of Felix II., Gelasius, Symmachus, John I., Agapetus, Sylverius, Vigilius, Pelagius, and at last Gregory the Great! Finally, the continuation of the struggle between the Pontiffs on the one side, and the Eastern Emperors and the Patriarchs of Constantinople on the other; the new relations, also, just beginning to exist between the Papacy and the Frankish kings, both of the Merovingian and Carolingian lines, continue to add to the list of Popes names of which Italy ought to have been forever proud.

For, the successors of Peter were evidently laboring not alone for the Church of God, but for the general good of mankind, particularly of Italy. And here it is needless to recall to the memory of the reader the long list of distinguished Popes, since it would be an insult to suppose him altogether ignorant of the lives of Zacharias, Stephen III., Hadrian I., Leo III., and the Pontiffs who immediately followed them. Who among men of culture has not read of the epoch of Charles Martel, Pepin, and Charlemagne?

But here begins, precisely, the period which is to be examined more closely. It has been already anteriorly remarked that the vexations the Church experienced from the old Roman empire, and consequently from the Byzantine also (which was only a continuation of the first), do not enter into our subject, because they did not influence, except very slightly, subsequent European history. On this account the ancient Europe which prepared the way for and produced the modern Europe of our day, dates only from what is called the beginning of the middle ages. In Italy it immediately followed the Carlovingian epoch, and grew out of the troubled state of affairs consequent on the establishment of feudalism.

But it is proper to insist briefly on the fact that during more than nine hundred years after St. Peter's time, nearly all the Pontiffs who ruled over the Church at Rome were conspicuous for their noble deeds, and that all of them, without a single exception, were distinguished for the purity of their lives. They were elected by the Clergy and the people; and although the elective system has invariably proved, in all large countries where such a means of choosing civil rulers obtained, a source of confusion ending often in anarchy, it worked well for nearly a thousand years in the Church; so as to present the historic spectacle of more than one hundred successive spiritual rulers worthy of the respect of all mankind. The reader will soon perceive why the system of election by the people had to be discontinued, without any probability of its being ever revived. But compare this array of Pontiffs with any series of kings who ruled over nations of whatever race you select, and say if anything of the kind has ever been reproduced in the annals of mankind. Yet Italian rulers who had witnessed it, or who lived at least at the close of this grand period, were among the first opponents of it, and vied with Germany in the contest, or rather gave the first hint to future adversaries. The Church in the persons of the Popes was to find henceforth arrayed against her not pagan emperors of the cast of Decius or Diocletian, not fosterers of heresies like the immediate successors of Constantine, not barbarous half-Christian kings like the Lombard dynasty, but full-fledged Catholics, recognizing the Popes professedly as the Vicars of Christ, but bent on making them their tools, and introducing, as early as the

tenth century, all the deadly resources of hypocrisy, violence, hatred, which good men of our time are too apt to record as the exclusive character of this nineteenth century.

Feudalism, introduced chiefly by the Northmen, in spite of what many writers assert of its Roman or purely German origin, never had so firm a foothold in Italy as in the other European States. It flourished, however, during a few hundred years in the north of the peninsula, brought down thither probably by the Scandinavian Lombards, and in the southern half of it in the wake of the Normans. Tuscany was soon invaded by it, and from this beautiful country it naturally passed to the "Patrimony of St. Peter." It is proved beyond all cavil that Charles Martel, Pepin, and Charlemagne had successively granted this territory to the Popes as a means of supporting their dignity and preserving their independence of all civil rulers. Louis the Pious confirmed these grants and added to them.¹ The Popes of that age did not think that armies were required to guard their temporal authority. They relied on the Carolingian emperors to protect and preserve it as defenders of the Holy See. But at the breaking down of the Carolingian dynasty, the Pontiffs found themselves at the mercy of the feudal chieftains of Tuscany and of their own States. This is the simple truth, and it fully explains what followed.

The new state of things naturally brought disturbances into the Papal elections. At the death of every Pope factions arose. It is impossible to give in detail an account of these events. The only reasonable way of treating them, is to consider the chief causes of the popular commotions which constantly existed in the Papal States. The German emperors, degenerate successors of Charlemagne, always had a party in Rome. The Margraves of Tuscany were at the head of an opposite party. This last faction represented feudalism, pure and simple; and, unfortunately, the chiefs of it resided mainly in Rome. Adalbert was the first of those Margraves who openly proposed to himself to make the Papacy a kind of heirloom in his family, and the Popes themselves the vassals and tools of the secular ruler for the time being. He did it easily by controlling the Pontifical elections. One of his female relatives, Theodora, a known courtesan, but a brilliant one, obtained through Adalbert the chief power in the city; and her two daughters, worse than herself, Marozia and Theodora the younger, successively replaced her, and continued, like a dynasty of three Furies, a long reign of scandalous horrors and revolting crimes. On this subject, Cardinal Mathieu, in his *Pouvoir Temporel des Papes*, justly remarks:

¹ See F. Lacombe's *Histoire de la Papauté*, t. 1, p. 472.

"No one ought to be surprised that in such circumstances as these, there have been bad Popes, but that there have been so few of them. God's providence thought proper to try his Church by scandals, but scandals have always been a rare exception in the Chair of St. Peter, and virtue has constantly been the rule."

The fact is, that in the numerous list of Pontiffs who are acknowledged to have been real Popes during the greater part of the tenth century—when their reigns were so short under the sway of Theodora and her daughters—only two or three have been really bad men. Some of those who, until lately, have been considered as among the worst, are now believed to have been calumniated by Luitprand, the sycophant of the German Emperors. John X. is undoubtedly one of them. Octavian even, the son of Alberic, known under the name of John XII., and regarded for a long time as the most profligate, appears almost like a great ruler when the slanders of Luitprand are set aside. Mr. F. Lacombe, in his *Histoire de la Papauté*, ought to be consulted on the subject. He speaks more plainly and consistently than Alzog.

But whatever view of the subject is taken, it is evident that the Church cannot be held responsible for these scandals. She was merely the victim of infamous princes who bore the name of Catholic, but were, in fact, worse foes to her than the most undisguised persecutors; and thus again we have in Italy the realization of the prediction of St. Augustine.

When the Margraves of Tuscany disappeared, after more than fifty years of abominable domination, the counts of Tusculum replaced them as disturbers of the peace. But, adopting a line of policy just the reverse of that of the former Margraves, they advocated the interests of the German Emperors. In order, however, that there should be two parties in the field, with a view, we suppose, to a continuation of the strife, Crescentius, Count of Sabina, the pretended first advocate of Italian nationality, rose in opposition to the Tusculan chieftains. The Papacy continued, therefore, a prey to faction and anarchy. The temporal power of the Popes, in fact, was lost, although they alone, among the contending factions, had on their side the real power, *de jure*. But it must be again insisted upon, that no reproach whatever can be cast upon the Church in all these disorganizing broils. It all came from the fact that in receiving their temporal authority from the Carlovingians, the Popes gratefully accepted civil authority in Rome and the Papal States, but refused even to touch the sword, and take rank among the military powers of Europe. Who can blame them for it? Did they not act prudently in leaving the sword in the hand of Charlemagne and his successors? In the end they appeared to have leaned upon a reed which broke and pierced their hand. Whose fault was it?

Nevertheless God—as it was meet—took pity on his defenceless Church. As the first ray of the sun shining at last through the drifting clouds, seems speedily to allay the fury of the storm, so only at the appearance of a man of genius and piety, Sylvester II., the factions were lulled to rest, and the holy Emperor of Germany, Henry II., coming soon after, the great era of Gregory VII. was prepared to heal the bleeding wounds of the prostrate Church.

Strange to say, however, in that glorious epoch of Hildebrand, Alexander III., Innocent III., when the Papacy was acknowledged in Europe as the leading power, when Christendom appeared as a unit under the guiding hand of the Pontiffs, the petty factions of feudal chieftains still existed in Rome. The quarrels of the Guelphs and the Ghibellines continued to disturb the peace, and often obliged the Popes to leave the city. The opposite parties of the Emperors of Germany, of the kings of France, of various other rulers, went on, making of Rome occasionally a bloody battle-field; keeping the Popes often in prison, either in the Vatican, or in the Castle St. Angelo, or in some other fortress; giving, in fine, to the world the wonderful spectacle of the most powerful sovereign of Europe scarcely able to enjoy or command the peaceful submission of his immediate subjects.

This state of things became at last intolerable, especially during the violent resistance of Philip the Fair to the authority of the Church, so that the successor of Boniface VIII., Benedict XI., had to retire with his court to Perugia, where he could at least find rest. Rome was thus left at the mercy of two Roman families, the Orsini and the Colonna, who, not satisfied with ruling alternately by main force in the city of the Pontiffs, wished, by intriguing in the Pontifical elections, to become the real owners of the Papedom. It is said that Benedict XI. was poisoned to secure the success of some scheme or other. It is certain that when he died at Perugia, the Roman factions were directly transferred to that town of Umbria, in order to influence the election of his successor. Intrigues of every kind became so unscrupulous and violent that the Perugian people rose at last in opposition to the outrageous partisanship which threatened to render an election impossible. A French prelate was at last chosen, De Got, Archbishop of Bordeaux, principally to please Philip the Fair; and Clement V.—that was the name he took after being crowned Pope in Lyons—on being urged by the Cardinals to go to Rome, could easily convince them that it was impossible under the then present circumstances. The Papacy was then transferred to Avignon, and thus was produced the chief cause of the deplorable schism which followed.

From a study of this lamentable period of Church history, the causes which led to the so-called Reformation are clearly evident

to the reader of its annals. There is no doubt that among the bishops, the cardinals, the Popes even, of that epoch, there were unworthy dignitaries and rulers. But can their guilty conduct be attributed to the principles of the religion they professed to believe, and of which they ought to have been the guides by their virtues, as well as the teachers by their doctrine? Who can say that the Church was responsible for them? They were, in fact, her greatest enemies, worse than former persecutors; and St. Augustine, had he known them, would have placed them at the head of the City of Satan. But no sensible man can imagine that there were not at the same time in the Church virtuous and holy men, powerful preachers of the word of God, leading after them the multitude of the people for the reformation of their morals and the practice of the highest virtues. Any one who does not know this has only to read a detailed life of Vincent Ferrer, and from the powerful encouragement which he will perceive this holy man received from Popes, bishops, cardinals, princes, also dukes and kings, he will be led to the conclusion that the true Church of God possessed at that time a countless multitude of children worthy of her in all ranks of society, and that there was no need of such men as Luther, Calvin, Zwinglius, and their associates, to restore to the Bride of Christ her former beauty and loveliness.

They came, however, and by this time the most unintelligent reader of history must know what kind of faith and holiness the *Reformers* have introduced into Christianity. They have been the most powerful agents to give birth to the spirit of unbelief and lawlessness, so prevalent at this time, and which agrees so well with the position which secular rulers of nations have striven to give to the Church. Thus the object of this paper has been fully attained. The causes of the condition of things which we now witness are patent, and, instead of being attributable to Catholicity, they are for her a just subject of glory and honor. By her war of nineteen hundred years against the spirit of evil, she has saved the principles of the Gospel which would have perished ages ago if it had not been for the imperishable strength which God gave her, when he built her on the Rock against which the gates of hell cannot prevail.

WHAT THE UNITED STATES OWES TO JAMES II.

History of the State of New York. By John Romeyn Brodhead. First Period, 1609-1664. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1853. Second volume, 1664-1691. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1871.

THE title we have thought proper to give to some reflections suggested by Brodhead's *History of New York* will seem to many preposterous. The idea that our country can be indebted, in even the slightest degree, for any element of its present greatness to the unfortunate sovereign, who was the last male of the Stuart line to occupy the English throne, will doubtless appear too extravagant for sober consideration.

In England, history has been written to sustain and justify the Revolution of 1688, and the exaltation of the character of William III. entailed almost of necessity the darkest picturing of James. Hence the majority of writers and readers have adopted certain theories on the reign of James II. and the Revolution of 1688 as axioms not to be examined or disputed, and the career of James is judged by these hypothetical assumptions rather than by the sober facts of history.

In this country, public opinion on the subject has been but a reflex of that of England, and local causes aided to make the unfortunate James stand forth on the canvas painted in still darker colors. New England had to justify the course which she pursued in 1691, and could do so most easily by blackening the character of James; a task all the more easy as there was no one to gainsay the writers, or to defend a man who had no one to defend him, either from attachment to a lost cause or from pure love of historic truth.

This has caused so general and sweeping a condemnation of James, that the pet phrases of condemnation slip almost as naturally from Catholic as from Protestant lips, from American as from English.

Yet we think the time has come when examination into real facts may allow us to adopt opinions not based on the century's re-echo of party clamors, but on documentary and substantial evidence.

American history has dealt largely in fiction. Short as the period is that our annals embrace, a curious article might be written that would merely touch on the mooted or doubtful points. The history of our colonial period has been written almost exclusively by persons of New England origin, and from the New England standpoint. Other parts of the country may have amounted to a little,

may have weighed a grain in the balance; but all that was great, noble, pure and liberal originated in New England. This is in fact the theory underlying all our popular histories, and inculcated in most of our school-books.

The apathy of other parts of the country has been as great as the activity of New England, and the consequence is that there are few works in the hands of the people that give the early history of other sections anything like a fair treatment as showing their part in the general growth of the country from the early struggles of the first settlements.

Among the States thus indifferent or careless was New York. Till within a few years her colonial history was virtually unwritten. The State, however, has done much to collect material for her colonial history. Some years since, stimulated apparently by the publication of Dr. O'Callaghan's *New Netherlands*, she sent John R. Brodhead abroad as the State agent, and he collected from the archives of England, France, and Holland an immense mass of documents bearing directly or indirectly on the early history of the State.

Dr. E. B. O'Callaghan virtually laid the foundation of New York history by his patient researches into the printed and documentary material still extant, relating to the Dutch colony of New Netherlands; a mass of historical matter overlooked and ignored. His *History of New Netherlands* first gave an insight into the early beginnings of a mighty State, and the growth of her liberal institutions. This labor was followed up by the translating and editing of the vast mass of documents collected by Mr. Brodhead as agent for the State, in the archives of England, France, and Holland, and by the arrangement and publication of documents of that period in the State archives. Mr. Brodhead, familiar with the subject, then gave us his *History of the State of New York*, which he unfortunately never lived to complete, but which remains as one of the most important contributions to the history of the country. His first volume traverses the ground already covered so ably by Dr. O'Callaghan, giving on various points the benefit of different views by two competent students and writers. His second volume is devoted exclusively to the connection of James with American colonization, as Duke of York and King of England. Mr. Brodhead came to his task evidently with the usual strong prejudices against James, so that his judgments where favorable are wrung from him by the very power of the authorities before him. In this view it is perhaps not unfortunate that he, rather than the Catholic historian of *New Netherlands*, treats the period of James's influence.

The volume is full of interest as a picture of the growth of the colony, from the period when it passed into English hands down to the moment when William III. at last shook off his lethargy, and

took some steps to extricate the colony from the fearful evils into which his apathy had plunged it, and which continued for years to hang as a blight over New York.

To study the growth of the State as shown by Brodhead would be interesting, but in this paper we shall confine ourselves to a consideration of the character and acts of James II., as revealed in the cautious and accurate pages of the New York historian.

To most this history will come as a surprise, so different will be the estimate which the reader will form of the Stuart prince.

The life of James was an active and eventful one. He began a military experience as a boy of seven on the battle-field of Edgehill, and when finally captured by the Roundheads at Oxford the boy contrived to escape and reach Holland. In France he entered the army under Turenne, and in several campaigns displayed not only the intrepidity of a brave soldier but the military ability of a commander. Unlike his brother Charles, who lived only for pleasure, James was a serious man of work. "He loved the details of business," says Brodhead, "as much as Charles detested them; and with all the method of a conscientious clerk he seemed to work for work's sake." He is accused of being slow and obstinate, and harsh in his manner, having none of the winning power of Charles; but he was "upright and sincere, and his word was sacred," says the New York historian. At most periods of her history he would have made England an excellent ruler; he was thoroughly and characteristically English, slow perhaps, but brave, truthful, business-like, wise in council, and strongly conservative.

His brother's restoration to the throne gave James a new field of action. He was an active member of the Council for Foreign Plantations. He was also created Lord High Admiral of England, and his systematic mind introduced reforms, and established rules which were maintained when all else of the Stuarts had disappeared. But he was not content with a nominal command merely. In the wars with Holland we see James at the head of English fleets, and he showed an aptitude for command at sea as he had shown for generalship on land.

To this prince, who lacked only popularity, Charles made a grant which more than any other act shaped the future of America. James, in soliciting it, showed that he was in advance of the English statesmen of his time, for he recognized the coming greatness of the British empire growing up unheeded beyond the Atlantic. In soliciting the territory James was impressed with its vital importance to England.

France had planted her colonies on the banks of the St. Lawrence and the islands at its mouth; she held Nova Scotia and the coast-line westward towards the Kennebec. Below them, on the

coast, the English separatists and Puritans held New England for themselves, if not for the English crown; further south the ancient colony of Virginia with its Catholic neighbor, Maryland, were increasing in wealth and power. These two clusters of colonies were, however, kept asunder by the Dutch colony of New Netherlands, which, absorbing the petty Swedish province of Nye Sverige, controlled the Hudson, a great natural highway, navigable for large vessels and almost interlocking with Lake Champlain and its outlet into the St. Lawrence, while its mouth widened out into a bay unequalled on the coast as a harbor.

The indifference of English and French statesmen had allowed the Dutch to occupy and hold this key position, on which, in fact, their future power in America depended. A nun, the venerable Mary of the Incarnation, seems to have been the first to arouse attention to the importance of this position for the safety of Canada, but her advice to those who guided the destinies of France fell unheeded on ears of men who perhaps smiled at the idea of their following the advice of a cloistered nun on an affair of state. France neglected to acquire or reduce New Netherlands. On the other hand, though New England was an annoying neighbor to the Dutch, encroaching on them and molesting them, New England rulers and English statesmen were as indifferent as the French to the importance of possessing the Dutch colony.

James, Duke of York, saw that it would never do to allow France to secure for Canada that second pathway to the ocean, cutting off New England from Maryland and Virginia, and by her active energy hemming in the two isolated groups of English colonies to the seaboard. The Dutch, slow and quiet, were not dangerous, but they held their possession by a frail tenure; and France might, by a single stroke or by adroit negotiation, plant her fleur des lis at the mouth of the Hudson.

The sagacious and far-seeing mind of the Stuart prince perceived distinctly that England must in justice to her own future anticipate any such movement of the French. New Netherlands must become English, and English colonists must be induced to occupy the coast, so as to exclude all other nations from the St. Croix to the Chesapeake. Below that again the unoccupied coast-line trending towards Florida was to be possessed, and men of rank and means stimulated to settle it.

His position as Admiral, again, interested James in the colonies, and to him is undoubtedly due the first idea of the exclusive occupation of the Atlantic coast from Acadia to Florida.

The course to be pursued was soon decided in English councils. The rights of the Dutch were to be ignored, and they were to be considered as unauthorized intruders on soil which was English by

right of discovery. As the colony of New Netherlands was the domain of the Dutch West India Company, the affair did not seem to rise to the importance of an international question. The extension of British claim to lands originally theirs, but on which a trading company had inadvertently entered, need not, it was reasoned, disturb the harmony of the two countries.

Acting on this idea, the Duke secured the rights of Lord Stirling to Long Island under an old grant, and having thus color of title, he solicited from his royal brother a patent, which issued March 12th, 1664, and vested in him all the territory from the west side of Connecticut River to the east side of Delaware Bay. Audacious as this proceeding was the Duke followed it up promptly. Borrowing several vessels of the royal navy and a small force of veteran troops, he dispatched them under the command of Nicolls, an officer who had served under him in France.

The Dutch, deluded by diplomatic explanations, made no effort to reinforce the colony, though warned of its perilous condition. Nicolls appeared in the harbor of New Amsterdam in August, having by James's shrewd directions called upon Massachusetts and Connecticut to aid him in reducing the Dutch, as they did promptly. The Dutch governor, Stuyvesant, was utterly unprepared to meet the force thus swelled by contingents from the adjacent English colonies. He capitulated. The Dutch garrison marched out and embarked. The flag of Holland was hauled down, and the English colors, borrowed from one of the ships, were run up. New Netherlands ceased to be. New York suddenly appeared as a new English colony, binding those already on the coast indissolubly together.

So rapidly had all this project of the Duke's been carried out that a French expedition, sent from Canada to chastise the Mohawks for hostile depredations, were astonished by a summons from an English officer, demanding to know why they had invaded the territories of the King of England. They returned to Canada with the alarming intelligence that the greatest French colony in America had now to cope, not with the easy and friendly Dutch, but with the English under the guidance of the Duke of York. Governor Courcelles prophetically remarked, "that the King of England did grasp at all America."

If the Duke of York evinced the farsightedness of a great statesman in seeing the vital importance of this point, for the very life and existence of English power in America, a point to which all before him seemed blind, he showed the sound judgment of a ruler in his steps to transform into contented British subjects the alien elements thus suddenly torn from their own allegiance. His whole policy was shaped by sound and wise caution. Its fruit was seen

in the fact that the Dutch settlers, the governor and his council, ministers and people, all remained in the colony. To the mind of James, the surest way to make the colony strong and useful to England was to make the people contented and satisfied with the change; and, above all, to make them feel that their foreign language, habits, and religious practices should not be an obstacle to their free enjoyment of all rights possessed by English settlers.

To conceive how far James, Duke of York, was in this respect the superior even of English statesmen nearly a century later, we have but to compare his treatment of the conquered Dutch of New Amsterdam with the English treatment of the conquered French in Acadia. The statesmen of the last century, by their own orders and through the governors they sent over, harassed the neutral French in every possible point—in their religion, their customs, their trades, their intercourse with their neighbors. Instead of endeavoring to make them, as James made the conquered Dutch, contented English subjects, they kept them in a state of chronic uneasiness and doubt, deluded by unauthorized promises, misguided by false hopes, and finally seven thousand inhabitants were at once swept away on board a fleet, neither subjects nor prisoners of war, while their farms and villages were committed to the flames. How can we call men statesmen whose only plan of retaining a conquered colony was to depopulate it, and restore it to its pristine state of wilderness? Judged by the standard of the men of George II., James, Duke of York, in his treatment of the conquered Dutch, rises in moral grandeur like a giant among pigmies.

James was wise in the system of laws which he proposed for the government of the colony, till such time as, used to English forms of government and constitution, the newly acquired settlers might take part in the administration. The code known as the Duke's Laws was not a philosophical dream, a Utopia, like that which the learned Locke prepared for Carolina. The practical sense, the experience in actual life, the systematic mind of James, led him to far different results. He collected the laws actually in force in the various English colonies, laws originating in America, and therefore, as he wisely inferred, best adapted to meet the wants of an American community. From these he compiled the best enactments, avoiding all that savored of local harshness or bigotry, providing for religious services among the people, but establishing no church.

James was wise in his selection of governors. Brodhead, speaking of the first appointed, Colonel Richard Nicolls, says: "The Duke was singularly fortunate in the choice he made." Lovelace, the next, was, he tells us, "of a generous mind, and noble, upright, and good-natured, and, by the very moderation of his character,

unwilling to disturb the policy by which Nicolls had administered the government of New York with such success." "Andros was an English Episcopalian, but no bigot. Moreover, he was a good Dutch and French scholar, of unblemished private character, with talents, energy, and zeal." "Dongan was a Roman Catholic, enterprising, and active, coveting money, yet a man of integrity, moderation, and genteel manners."¹ Compared with subsequent governors of New York, those selected by James are remarkable. But it was not mere good fortune; he selected men whose ability he knew. His instructions to them were clear and detailed, and many of his letters to them, entirely in his own handwriting, show how zealously the Duke studied the well-being of the province.

To James is, therefore, not only due the idea of occupying the valley of the Hudson, but the merit of securing to England the possession of the province by wisely gaining the goodwill of the Dutch settlers through judicious laws, and governors beyond reproach.

Intimate with many of his assistants in the Naval Board, at which as Lord High Admiral he presided, he interested several in American colonization, and to two, Carteret and Berkeley, he granted New Jersey, to stimulate the colonization of that territory, into which the Dutch had not penetrated with their settlements to any great extent. And in the part which these and other associates took in the attempt to colonize Carolina we can easily trace the influence of James, as we see it undisputedly in Penn's settlement of his colony.

But as New York took form, we see the statesmanlike views of James unfold themselves more grandly. To this English prince it was not enough that his country should hold and control the vast seaboard line on the Atlantic. The Greater Britain was to extend without limit into the interior; as it was to have no rival where the waves of ocean broke upon their western shore, so it was to brook none in the great valley beyond the Apalachian range that stretched from north to south. To those who read the usual accounts of James, he was a feeble, incapable man, the pensioner and slave of France. In his American policy he showed himself as unlike this as possible. From the outset his policy was antagonistic to France; he obtained New Netherlands as a check on her power in America, and New York at once assumed an attitude that New Netherlands had never taken. To the Dutch the powerful Iroquois confederacy, the Five Nations, extending from the valley of the Mohawk to the Falls of Niagara, were allies and good customers. To James they became tribes within his territory and under his protection. The first English officers who replaced the Dutch com-

¹ Brodhead here certainly underrates the singular ability of Dongan.

mandants at Albany gave the French to understand that the territory of the Five Nations was British soil, not to be invaded by a foreign power.

As the Iroquois had kept up a war on the French and their allies from the very foundation of the colony, and had overthrown and exterminated tribe after tribe, besides carrying death and desolation through the French settlements, this new position of the occupants of New York was fraught with danger to Canada. The Five Nations were to be not merely a savage nation warring on Canada by the aid of purchases from a Dutch trading company, but a nation of savage warriors to be armed, controlled, and directed by the hereditary enemies of France.

The French had secured influence among the Iroquois by the generous, self-denying labors of the Jesuit missionaries, who, at the peril of their lives, had for more than twenty years been laboring to win the Five Nations to Christianity. In all the cantons, though the old heathen rites still prevailed, there were some believers in Christianity, and many who listened readily to the missionaries. James was a Catholic, and at once prepared to deprive France of any influence for her national interests that could result from the nativity of the missionaries. He obtained English Jesuits and sent them to New York, that they might continue the good work begun by the French priests, without alienating the cantons from English influence.

Through the able and energetic Colonel Thomas Dongan, governor of New York, James strove to neutralize the influence of the French and their commercial advantages with the western tribes. He first claimed the line of the great lakes as the English boundary, and sent English trading parties, guided by French and Indian pioneers, to offer the products of England to the tribes of the Northwest. The trading parties of James pushed further into the interior than any expeditions starting from the English colonies on the coast had ever done.

Under his impulse New York traders sought to open their goods to Indians at Detroit, and made their way along Lake Erie years before New Englanders had contrived to reach Lake Champlain, or Virginia grown ecstatic over the immense achievement of her governor in crossing the first range of the Alleghanies and riding down into the lovely valley of the Shenandoah.

James sought to plant an English trading post at Detroit; it was not his policy, but the indifference of his successors of the House of Brunswick, which allowed the French to plant their forts at Niagara, Le Bœuf, Venango, and Fort Duquesne, with another line at Mackinaw, Detroit, Vincennes, and Fort Chartres.

As early as 1666 he projected the conquest of Canada; but as

New England deemed it impossible at the time, to James's mind the lakes formed the great natural boundary, and his whole policy tended to hold the French to the northward of that line. The energetic missionaries and explorers of France had, however, gained one vast advantage. Pushing on through Wisconsin, Marquette and Joliet, representing well the two great bodies of pioneers, had reached the Mississippi and traced its course, which La Salle followed to its mouth, and finally attempted to hold that important point by a settlement. With the upper waters and the mouth of this great river in her hands, France seemed to hold the interior of the continent with a firm grasp. Nearly a hundred years after the occupation of New York by James, the English rulers woke to a sense of danger, and, appreciating at last the schemes of James, found France holding every strategic point, so that the united efforts of England and her colonies were required, and tested to their utmost, to break up the French lines of outposts, and restore the northern boundary as claimed by James. France met the struggle manfully, and preferred to lose all rather than yield the point.

"Bigot and tyrant," says Brodhead, using terms which have become stereotyped in connection with James; "bigot and tyrant, James had one characteristic which shone in vivid contrast. He was a more patriotic Englishman than his faithless brother. Anxious for the support of Louis, James scorned to betray England to France." Dongan, following out James's policy, so persistently thwarted the plans of the French governor of Canada, that De la Barré declared that affairs in Europe alone prevented him from marching against "Dongan, who fain would assume to be sovereign lord of the whole of North America, south of the river St. Lawrence." "The King," says Brodhead again, "directed Barillon, his ambassador at London, to ask the Duke of York to prohibit Dongan from aiding the Iroquois, and order him to act in concert with De la Barré to the common advantage of both nations." No such orders, however, were or could be given at Whitehall, where Dongan's policy was cautiously but fully sustained.

The evidence teems that James as duke and king was thoroughly alive to England's interests in America, and planned for British America a vast power. The seacoast and the northern line of the United States are his work, and remained at the close of the American Revolution as James had planned them a century before.

James's foresight and statesmanship appear all the more striking when we contrast his colonial policy with the utter want of policy, the fitful neglect and occasional ill-timed energy of William, Anne, and the Georges, and their wretched appointments of governors; and we see clearly that they never seemed to have appreciated the importance of the American colonies or really sought their well-being.

From Elizabeth to Charles II. the sovereigns of England had been lavish in granting charters and titles; from William III. to George III. there was neglect of American interests, colonies involved in European wars, and their final loss by misgovernment. In the whole series of British rulers James II. stands alone for his constant, active, and intelligent interest in America; and the United States is thus really indebted to that maligned prince for far more than many dream of.

"Of all the sovereigns of England," says Brodhead, "James II. knew most about her colonies. Soon after the restoration of his brother he was made the proprietor of a large royal English-American province. In the details of its administration he took a lively personal interest, because the revenue of that province affected his pocket. So, with his own hand the hard-working Stuart prince wrote many letters to his deputies in New York. Certainly his dispatches had the merit of directness and precision. Unconstrained by the conventional phrases, which often beguile mere secretaries, the terse holographs of the Duke of York uttered his own imperious will."

"With this long proprietary experience, James became the sovereign of England and her dependencies. Yet while as king he could no longer correspond directly with his colonial subordinates, he retained some tranquil pleasure in guiding the action of his plantation committee. The diligent business habits of the Duke of York infused order and economy into every department of the government of James II. As far as mere administration was concerned, his short reign seems to have been more effective than that of any other English sovereign."

His policy in regard to the Indians was sound. He wished them to be instructed and converted, as he did the negro slaves, whom he repeatedly directed to be instructed and baptized, dispelling the old idea entertained by many masters that baptism operated as a manumission of a slave.

But he determined to control the Five Nations, break up French influence, and use the confederacy as the great bulwark of New York, making it with English support a terror to Canada and the western tribes, and at the same time the means of drawing the trade of the Indians on the Mississippi and upper lakes to New York.

The Indians were loath to give up their independent action, and, in the apathy of later New York governors, they frequently caused serious embarrassment, but on the whole James's policy prevailed. The Five Nations became a powerful arm in the hands of England, baffling French efforts, exciting Indian tribes to oppose them, and luring others to join the English side.

Even when James was tottering on his throne in 1687, James in

reply to Louis XIV. maintained that it was "well known that the Five Nations of New York had been British subjects, as proved since the first settlement of their country by Europeans, and now lately by their voluntary submission, made and confirmed by them in writing, to the crown of England, on the 30th of July, 1684, before His Majesty's governors of Virginia and New York. The English king was, therefore, obliged to protect those Indians 'as others of his subjects.'"

James showed equal energy in his treatment of the Indians in Maine, where he was thwarted by the greed of Massachusetts.

We now pass to another point, the union of the colonies. Some of the New England colonies had indeed confederated, but all their operations were bound within the narrow circle of similar religious views. Nothing broad or general, or looking to the general good of all the British colonies, could originate with them.

A general union of the colonies under one government was a project long entertained by King James, a project carried out in full, only when the colonies repudiated the house of Hanover. This idea grew out of his plan for checking French power in America. "New France, with its undefined territory, was governed by a viceroy who executed the French king's orders. The neighboring British possessions had discordant local administrations of English authority. To the savages Louis seemed a greater monarch than James. As long as Canada had the energy of union, while New England, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania were distinct and inharmonious, so long France would be stronger in America than England. Dongan's warnings now impressed Whitehall, James's recent arrangement with Louis about colonial hostilities offered British statesmanship a grand chance to establish the supremacy of England in the transatlantic world. And so the king did the best thing he could, which was to unite, as far as convenient, all the North American British possessions under one viceregal government."

The moment was favorable to his plan. When James came to the throne, Massachusetts had become a royal province. "The separate name of Massachusetts no longer existed legally; and that part of New England which had been governed under the patent of Charles I. was left to the discretion of Charles II." "Charles thought that those subjects who controlled his colony had abused their corporate privileges. If they had done so by excluding from the freedom of their corporation those who did not agree in the Congregational way or by other methods, it was his duty to resume the authority of the crown."

Proceedings similar to those taken against Massachusetts were instituted against other colonies, into which we need not enter.

The colonies were in his hands. "The King's attention had been drawn to the encroachments of the French upon the territory claimed by England in North America, and especially to their interference with the New England fisheries, of which Preston, his ambassador at Paris, had complained, but had gotten no satisfaction."

Another point which, to the mind of James, made a general union of the colonies necessary, was the great point of Indian relations. Trouble with the various savage tribes was scarcely to be avoided, as Andros well observed, "so long as each petty colony hath or assumes absolute power of peace and war, which cannot be managed by such popular governments, as was evident by the late Indian wars in New England." In fact, while each colony claimed and exercised the right of declaring peace and making war with its Indian neighbors, complications might easily ensue. New England would be negotiating with tribes in New York, while those tribes were attacking the settlers in the latter colony; or making war upon them at a moment when the very existence of New York depended on the friendly attitude of the Indians. The savages, too, finding the different English colonies pursuing different courses would be induced to throw themselves into the hands of the French.

The Duke of York showed from the outset a wise policy in regard to the Indian tribes, and began with a principle which this country has at last adopted after a century of blunders. By his directions Indians were to be treated as subjects, not as independent nations with whom treaties were to be made. From the commencement this attitude was assumed by his governors in New York; and Andros censuring the treaty plan pursued in New England, said: "Nor did I ever make treaty with, but dealt with them as being under or part of the government." Carrying out the Duke's wise policy, his governors never allowed the other colonies to hold intercourse with New York Indians, except in their presence. But the Duke on becoming King resolved, if possible, to remove the difficulties in the Indian and French relations by uniting them all as "one people and country."

The solidity of this motive was apparent only a few years later, when New England, refusing terms which New York accepted, was left to bear the whole brunt of hostilities from the French and their Indian allies, a state of things which would have been impossible under the Duke's plan.

As Massachusetts, at his accession, was a royal province without a charter, the first step was to unite as many of the New England colonies as possible under one rule. "The best English lawyers," says Brodhead, "concurred in the opinion that the only way in which English authority could be exercised in English unchartered

colonies was by their king's commission under the great seal. . . . If the King could delegate any of his prerogatives to any of his subjects so as to make them proprietors or corporations by charters under his great seal, he certainly could delegate similar authority to his governor by a commission under the same waxen symbol of his sovereignty. This logic seemed indisputable." So in 1686 Andros was made captain-general and governor-in-chief over his "territory and dominion of New England in America," which meant Massachusetts Bay, New Plymouth, New Hampshire, Maine, and the Narragansett country. As no provision was made for an assembly this act has been denounced; but Brodhead well observes: "James should not be charged with having removed that which never existed. 'The people' of Massachusetts, before the abrogation of the charter which a sectarian oligarchy misused, never had the share in local government which their fellow English subjects in Jamaica, Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York actually enjoyed. Although arbitrary in form, the instructions of Andros were equitable in substance." In 1687 Connecticut was also included in New England, and in 1688 "James resolved to add New York and the Jerseys to his dominion of New England. Thus all the territory which his grandfather's patent of 1620 had named 'New England in America' would be brought, for the first time, under one royal English governor." "Protected by her astute owner's interest at court, Pennsylvania alone in her immunity escaped the forfeiture of her charter. But all the rest of British North America between Delaware Bay and the Passamaquoddy, and stretching across the continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific, was now to be made a political whole under one colonial governor chosen by the King to rule his dominion of New England." Thus the union of the colonies into one grand State, extending from ocean to ocean, under one system of laws, and one form of government as regarded the neighboring States, a union realized fully in our own time, was the conception and the thought of the maligned James.

It may be said that chief magistrates and legislative assemblies elected by the people are essential to good government, and that James's projected "New England in America" lacked this material element. This objection can now have no weight, for we have lived to see legislatures made and unmade, and even a President of the whole country made by returning boards, which had been proclaimed fraudulent in their constitution and in their action by State tribunals and the decision of Congress.

Thus James, in his grand policy two hundred years ago, looked forward to a "Greater Britain" in this continent, formed by a union of colonies under one head, extending from ocean to ocean

south of the St. Lawrence and the lakes, and with the whole Atlantic shore, greeting Europe beyond the sea.

One of our boasts is that in our land there reigns perfect liberty of conscience. No English king but James ever tried to establish liberty of conscience. It was the cause of his fall. The English people endured arbitrary acts, but when the King sought to force them to tolerate their fellow-Christians they rose against him. Liberty of conscience was inculcated in every state paper from the beginning of James's power in America, and if applied to it, the motto of his seal was not undeserved, "*Nunquam libertas gravior extat quam sub rege pio.*" By the capitulation of New Netherlands, the Dutch inhabitants were to enjoy the liberty of their consciences in divine worship and church discipline. The Duke's laws adopted many in force in New England, "with abatement of the severity against such as differ in matters of conscience and religion," and they provided explicitly: "Nor shall any person be molested, fined, or imprisoned for differing in judgment in matters of religion, who profess Christianity." In the "Conditions for New Planters," liberty of conscience was prominently allowed. In 1674, he said, in his orders to Andros: "You shall permit all persons, of what religion soever, quietly to inhabit within the precincts of your jurisdiction, without giving them any disturbance or disquiet whatsoever, for or by reason of their differing opinions in matters of religion; provided they give no disturbance to the public peace nor do molest or disquiet others in the free exercise of their religion." The Charter of Liberties, in 1683, guaranteed entire freedom of conscience to "all peaceable persons which profess faith in God by Jesus Christ." The New York Common Council wished under this to prevent the Jews from having a synagogue, but Brodhead remarks: "This severe construction, however, was contrary to the Duke's policy in regard to New York." When Andros was made governor of New England, King James added to his instructions, "And for the greater ease and satisfaction of our loving subjects in matters of religion, we do hereby will, require, and command that liberty of conscience be allowed to all persons, and that such especially as shall be conformable to the rites of the Church of England, be particularly countenanced and encouraged." Similar clauses run through all his instructions. In the last of all, that to Andros on his appointment to the vast province of "New England in America," James required liberty of conscience to be allowed "to all persons, so they be contented with a quiet and peaceable enjoyment of it."

We have thus drawn from Brodhead's thorough and well-considered work, often in his own words, the arguments to sustain the positions we claim as entitling James to the honor of having contributed by his policy and forecast to the actual establishment of

our republic, and the possession of its northern and eastern boundaries: "a union of States, and a land of religious liberty."

Mr. Brodhead never lived to complete his history. The part especially his is devoted entirely to the period of James's influence over the destinies of British America. He studied his subject profoundly and with leisurely examination. His array of authorities on every page show how completely he examined all that bears on the period. Different as many of his estimates are from those of writers of the New England school, it will not be easy to refute them. His work compels a rectification of American history, as popularly written, and nowhere is this rectification needed more absolutely than in the popular conception of James, Duke of York and King of England, and the part he took in the well-being of the American colonies.

The work is overlooked by many, as State and local histories are not widely read; and, except in New England, local history seems not to attract general attention, and the societies intended to collect and preserve the materials are but poorly sustained; but Brodhead's *New York*, as a study of the colonial policy of James, enters directly into the general history of the country, and must modify in no inconsiderable degree the estimates formed by English historians.

THE LIBERALISTIC VIEW OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL QUESTION.

SECOND ARTICLE.

HAVE CHRISTIANS NO RIGHTS IN REGARD TO PUBLIC EDUCATION?

Lecture on The Public School Question, as Understood by the Liberal American Citizen. By Francis E. Abbot. Boston, 1876.

PEOPLE are easily misled by fine phraseology. It is owing to this that the Liberals frequently succeed in bewildering the judgment and winning the applause of the simple. Their phrases are adroitly turned, and sound very well. They speak highly of justice and liberty, of enlightenment and progress, of morality and religion, as if they were the born champions, nay, the only champions, of all that is good. Their reasonings, too, are finely spun, and appear to be uniformly based on the most popular notions; but

the conclusions drawn from such reasonings, while seemingly favorable to the general interests of the people, tend in reality to further the interests of a party, and always turn against the Church. Mr. Abbot's lecture on the public school question is a very good sample of such a liberalistic style, as the readers of our previous article already know. But, as we have given in it only a portion of the lecture, we think that in justice to the lecturer, and to the cause of the public schools, we must continue our analysis of Mr. Abbot's production, even at the risk of being tedious, though we believe that the subject is one which cannot fail to prove interesting to most of our Catholic readers.

WHAT THE CATHOLIC CONSCIENCE CLAIMS.—After having mentioned the Catholic protest against the present school system, Mr. Abbot asks :

"What, then, is the essence and the rational ground of the claim that the Catholic conscience is wronged and trampled on by the maintenance of the public school system?"

To this question he replies by putting forward no less than seven distinct claims of the Catholic community, which he as distinctly rebuts.

"First. The Catholic conscience demands, in the apt phrase of Cardinal McCloskey, 'Catholic education for Catholic children.' But by whom is this demand refused? Surely not by the State, which imposes on no child any particular form of religious education. I admit, that the practice of Bible-reading in the public schools is a wrong and infringement upon the rights of Catholics, Jews, and all non-Protestant children; but that this practice prevents Catholics from giving Catholic education to their children, it would be preposterous to pretend. They are doing it at this very time. Certainly the demand of 'Catholic education for Catholic children' is granted in advance, unless it means that the State should *furnish* such education. That is a very different matter. Whoever wants sectarian education is perfectly free to get it; but it must be at his own cost. The State ought to furnish education, but not sectarianism; that is its own affair altogether. The right and wrong of this matter are evident: the State should not, and does not, prevent 'Catholic education for Catholic children;' but equally it should not and does not *furnish* it."

Thus, according to this *liberal* luminary, everything is just as it ought to be. His liberality goes as far as to tell us: "Gentlemen, you are taxed to the amount of fifteen or twenty millions a year for the support of certain schools which your conscience condemns as totally unfit for your children; yet you must not complain of being plundered, for those schools are fit for our *liberal* children; and you are free, after all, to tax yourselves again to any amount, if you wish to educate your children according to your conscientious convictions."

Exceedingly generous indeed! But we cannot expect more from men who hate religion. What do they care for us? They care for our money; and, if we complain, that, while we pay for education, no suitable education has been provided for us, they bluntly reply:

"The State cannot furnish the education you ask for." Thus we are first robbed, then snubbed.

We know that the State cannot adopt a system of Catholic, any more than of Presbyterian, Jewish, or Mormon, education. Religious education lies beyond the competency of the State. Nevertheless, the State needs, and must encourage, religious education; and since it is incompetent to give it, as all agree, it follows that it should not assume the office of educator. This is an obvious conclusion; any other course would be unjustifiable, as it is manifest that to tax the people for an object which you are confessedly incompetent to secure, or even to promise, is to extort money under a false pretext.

But here we are met by Mr. Abbot, who informs us that the State "ought to furnish education, but not sectarianism." We reply, that if the State cannot furnish religion, it cannot furnish education; for education without religion is but a shell without a kernel, a body without a soul, a shadow without a reality. On the other hand, is it true, as Mr. Abbot pretends, that the State schools are free from sectarianism? By no means. They are supremely sectarian; they serve the exclusive interests of the worst of all sects—Freemasonry; and they are conspicuous for their sectarian intolerance and hatred of every form of religious belief. Hence those of our citizens, whether Catholic or not, who wish to provide their children with real education, are constrained to turn away from the public schools, and overtax themselves for the maintenance of better, or less objectionable, institutions. This is the fact which Mr. Abbot points out with a proud satisfaction when he says: "Whoever wants sectarian education is perfectly free to get it; but it must be at his own cost." Indeed, we thought that the public schools had been built and were managed "at our own cost;" for we Christians of all denominations are the mass of the population from which the school tax is wrenched, whereas the professors of infidelity are a small part of the community, and contribute but little to the school fund, which they seek to manage for the exclusive interests of irreligion. We might, therefore, turn to the infidels, and say to them in their own words, and with much greater reason: "Whoever wants a godless education is perfectly free to get it; but it must be at his own cost," for the American people believe in God, and cannot afford to have Him banished from public education.

Mr. Abbot continues:

"Secondly. The Catholic conscience demands freedom of exercise, says Bishop McQuaid, and he proceeds to declare: 'The majority of the people rule, by the power of numbers, that a large minority shall not be free to educate their children according to their conscience.' I can only pass over this assertion in mere astonishment. The simple fact is, that Catholics *are* educating their children according to their consciences, either at the public, or at the parochial schools, as they freely elect."

To this no new reply is needed on our part. What we have just said shows that Mr. Abbot does not speak to the point. If the majority of the people were to rule by the power of numbers, that the *small* minority of unbelievers shall not be free to educate their children in the public schools, unless they submit to Catholic teachers, use Catholic books, and imbibe a Catholic spirit, we fancy that Mr. Abbot & Co. would not feel quite satisfied with the arrangement, though they would still be "free to elect" another kind of education "at their own cost." But to proceed :

"Thirdly. The Catholic conscience demands equal rights. Very well : *that* it ought to have. The equal rights of the Catholics, like those of the Liberals, are infringed by Protestant worship in the public schools. Equal rights will be established when the Catholics have as much right to have their religion taught in the schools as the Protestants, Jews, or Radicals ; that is, no right at all. The trouble with the Catholics is that this equality of rights does not satisfy them ; they feel aggrieved unless their own religion is positively taught in the schools to which their children go. But so far as the public schools are concerned, this is to demand unequal rights ; and this is to have a very unreasonable conscience."

Here our lecturer is evidently trifling. If the Protestant worship in the public schools is an infringement of equal rights, it is manifest that a systematic exclusion of all religion from the public schools must be accounted a much graver infringement of common rights. To assume, as Mr. Abbot does, that no denomination has any right at all to have its religion taught in the schools, is to beg the question. Of course, neither the Catholics can oblige the Protestants to frequent their schools, nor can the Protestants compel the Catholics, or the infidels, or the Jews, to frequent theirs. This, however, does not prove that these denominations have no right to demand that the public education be what all real education must be, that is, religious. But, as this cannot be done in the present system, they have the right, and if they unite, they will have the power to obtain a fair distribution among themselves of the school fund, which comes out of their pockets, and which is destined to promote, not the interests of free-thinkers, but those of all the denominations that are in the country, and constitute the State.

After having contended that religious denominations have "no right at all" to have their religion taught in the public schools, our lecturer remarks very truly, that Catholics are not satisfied with this "equality of rights." He might have added, that such is the case with others too, who are not Catholics. For this pretended "equality of rights," when the right of all denominations has been denied, is nothing but a general and equal disregard of those rights themselves, and it must cause general dissatisfaction. Mr. Abbot says also that Catholics "feel aggrieved unless their religion is positively taught in the schools to which their children go." This is true.

But how does it follow from this, that "so far as the public schools are concerned, this is to demand unequal rights," and therefore that we Catholics have "a very unreasonable conscience?" Mr. Abbot knows full well that we ask nothing for ourselves that we do not concede to others. Our conscience, therefore, is perfectly reasonable; and so is the conscience of other Christian denominations, too, when they claim the same right; though they claim it with less persistence than we do, for reasons which all know, and which it is not our present duty to examine.

After this misrepresentation, Mr. Abbot mentions our fourth claim as follows:

"Fourthly. The Catholic conscience demands, in Bishop McQuaid's words, 'the non-interference of the State in church or in school.' On the other hand, the secular conscience requires the non-interference of the Church in State or school. To which shall the school belong, to the Church or to the State? That is, indeed, the clean issue. But I do not see any way to reconcile here the two consciences. I suspect they are equally stubborn, equally unable to yield; but which is the more *reasonable* is a point which must prove in the end decisive."

From these words it would seem that there is something in the world which assumes the name of "secular conscience," and that this so-called "conscience" orders the non-interference of the Church in the education of her children. But let us say it plainly, the existence of such a conscience is a mere fiction, and an absurd one too. Guardians may feel obliged in conscience to oppose the notions of their wards, if they think them wrong; but secularists are not our guardians, nor are we their wards. How, then, can they feel obliged by their conscience to define what should be our conduct in relation to the system of public schools, and to decide that religion must be ignored in those very institutions in which it is most needed? A conscience of this kind cannot be found in human beings. If Mr. Abbot had said, that the secular conscience does not feel the duty of yielding to our just claims, we might easily believe him; for we know that free-religionists do not much mind their consciences. But to tell us that the secular conscience feels it a duty to ignore the rights of religion in our public schools, is to say what is false. No conscience can feel bound but by the moral necessity of obeying the moral law; and this law does certainly not order the maintenance, as it did not order the creation of schools in which God—the Author of the moral law—must be ignored; and, therefore, there can be no question of two opposite consciences "equally stubborn, equally unable to yield." Those who do not scruple to deny God's right in the public schools, cannot decently pretend that they do so for motives of conscience. Conscience without God and without religion is as impossible as a sphere without a centre. Accordingly what makes them "stub-

born" is not their conscience, but their antichristian spirit. If stubbornness were a test of reasonableness, as Mr. Abbot seems to hold, no creature would be more reasonable than the mule.

He continues :

"Fifthly. The Catholic conscience claims to be violated by a system which supports Protestant schools at the public expense ; and the justice of this claim must be allowed. To make the public schools Protestant by requiring or permitting Protestant worship in them is truly a violation of all but Protestant consciences. But it is easy to rectify this wrong, and to establish a perfect equality of rights in the case, by simply secularizing the schools altogether. If this would satisfy the Catholic conscience, a permanent settlement of the school question could be effected ; but the Catholic conscience is not satisfied with equality—it demands *privilege*, which is a very different matter."

This passage is a compound of cavil and calumny. The Catholic conscience claims to be violated by the school system, not because the system supports Protestant schools at the public expense, but because it does not equally support those of other religious denominations. Protestants, so long as they continue to pay their school tax, have a clear right to have Protestant schools supported at the public expense ; and, therefore, whatever Mr. Abbot may say to the contrary, no injustice is committed in thus supporting their schools. The injustice consists in not supporting the schools of other denominations, which have as much right as their Protestant neighbors to the benefits of religious education.

Mr. Abbot maintains that "a system which supports Protestant schools at the public expense" is unjust, because "it is truly a violation of all but Protestant consciences." This would be true, if Protestants alone were to be supported. But how did the lecturer fail to see that, for a similar reason, "a system which supports *god-less* schools at the public expense" is even more glaringly unjust, as it truly violates all Christian consciences without exception ? He says, that "it is easy to rectify the wrong" of which we complain, "by establishing a perfect equality of rights in the case," but he is shameless enough to tell us, that, to obtain this "perfect equality," the schools must be "secularized altogether," that is, our rights must be equally crushed, and *the secularists alone* must have the privilege of carrying on their hateful business at the expense of a protesting public. Mr. Abbot should be very careful indeed not to demand privileges for his party when he accuses others of not being satisfied with *equality*, and of demanding *privileges*. That we ask for privileges is a stupid and wicked invention of the lecturer, as we have shown ; but that the infidel party ask for privileges is a matter of fact, of which innocent Mr. Abbot himself furnishes us the most incontrovertible evidence.

Nor is this a matter of surprise. Freemasons in Europe have long been in the habit of charging the Catholic community with all

the evils which they themselves were actually maturing or perpetrating. When they were working out their plans for the enslavement of Italy, of which they are now the masters and the scourge, they pretended that Italy was being reduced by the priests to a deplorable state of slavery. When they determined to attack the Church in Germany, they contended, and Prince Bismarck was ready to swear in Parliament, that it was the Church that was preparing to attack Germany. When they were busily engaged in France and elsewhere in curtailing the ecclesiastical liberties, they furiously accused the bishops and the whole clergy of interfering with the liberty of the people. Their journals were always full of bitter denunciations. Church pretensions, ultramontane arrogance, Jesuitic conspiracies, usurpations of National or State rights, and other inventions of the same sort, formed the constant subject of violent articles and noisy declamations; and while the attention of a credulous public was adroitly drawn to these silly and imaginary charges, the Lodges were actually and effectually doing the very things of which they accused their neighbors. Such were, and are, their tactics in Europe. American Freemasons are said to be less treacherous; but it is remarkable, that they have never condemned the iniquities perpetrated by their European brethren. Nay, do they not rather show the same overbearing spirit, and resort to the same hypocritical means? Mr. Abbot, at any rate, strives to reach the perfection of the European craft, when he accuses the Church of demanding a privilege which none but his own party aspires to secure.

And now let us see how he treats our sixth claim.

"Sixthly. The Catholic conscience claims to be still more violated by a system which should support secular schools at the public expense. Now what is a secular school? A school in which the elementary branches of an English education—reading, writing, arithmetic, etc.—are taught, and in which religion is not taught; one which teaches nothing but what all children, whether of Catholic, Protestant, or Liberal parentage alike need to know, and which is scrupulously protected from all usurpation by any class of parents in matters of religion. To pretend that this careful exclusion of all religious worship and instruction is to teach irreligion, is an instance of unparalleled audacity. It is impossible to teach the alphabet or multiplication table and the Catholic Catechism at one and the same instant; and even in the Catholic schools a certain time is devoted to teaching the alphabet and the multiplication table exclusively. Is that to teach irreligion? I must press this question: is it teaching irreligion to devote a portion of time exclusively to teaching arithmetic or geography? If it is, then Catholic schools also teach irreligion just so long as they are teaching arithmetic or geography, and they should be denounced just as sweepingly as the public schools. But if not—if it is not teaching irreligion to devote in Catholic schools one or two hours exclusively to instruction in secular knowledge—then it is no more teaching irreligion to devote in the public schools three, or four, or five hours to the same instruction. The Catholics may choose which horn of the dilemma they please; either the Catholic schools teach irreligion part of the time, or else the public schools do not teach irreligion at all."

Well, we will tell Mr. Abbot, though he knows it perfectly, that his dilemma is a mere cobweb. We never said that to teach arithmetic or geography is to teach irreligion; but no one will deny that the atmosphere of the school, the personal bias of the teacher, and the manner of teaching whether arithmetic, geography, or any other branch of secular instruction, is calculated to instil religion or irreligion, according to the conditions of the case. An infidel may surely teach irreligion along with geography, and a Catholic may as surely teach religion along with arithmetic. This is a fact of common occurrence, and Mr. Abbot knows it as well as every one else. Hence it is really "an instance of unparalleled audacity" on his part to pretend that the Catholic schools, just like the infidel schools, when teaching the secular branches, are teaching irreligion. Again, to teach geography is not to teach irreligion, just as to furnish bread is not to forbid water. But a system which does not allow one to put any drink on the table, is a system which virtually forbids all drink, and violates the laws of health, and a system which does not allow religion to be learned and practiced in the schools, is a system which virtually condemns all religion, and violates the laws of conscience.

The lecturer proceeds as follows:

"The sole ground of complaint against secular schools is, that they omit to teach a positive Catholic doctrine; and the attempt to twist this omission to teach Catholicism into a direct teaching of the contrary is a very desperate shift."

Catholics do not complain that the omission in question is a *direct teaching* of infidelity. They only maintain that, owing to such an omission, the child is frustrated of religious education. The "very desperate shift" is, therefore, a product of mere sophistry.

"Let us illustrate. I go to a carriage warehouse where buggies are advertised for sale, and order a horse and buggy. 'But,' replies the proprietor, 'I do not sell horses; I sell only buggies.' 'That will do very well for those who want buggies only,' I answer; 'I don't believe in separating horses and buggies, and my conscience forbids me to purchase them separately.' 'I should be glad to accommodate you,' replies the puzzled proprietor, 'but really, my dear sir, I have only buggies for sale.' 'Then,' I exclaim, 'I denounce you for a violation of equal rights, and for a secret purpose to outrage the community by abolishing horses. You grant all they ask to those who conscientiously want buggies alone; but you refuse what I ask, when my conscience demands a horse and a buggy, one and inseparable. This is an invidious discrimination against my equal rights, a direct assault on the very existence of all horses; and now I propose to shut up your establishment altogether.' This is exactly what the Catholics are doing; they propose to shut up all State schools, if they can, because State schools can teach only secular knowledge, and not religion at the same time. They have profound scruples of conscience against buying buggies without horses."

This pretended illustration must have amused Mr. Abbot's audience, though every one might have easily discovered that it had really no bearing on the case. A buggy without a horse is still a

complete buggy, whilst education without religion is no education at all. Hence the illustration is not to the point. We might suggest to Mr. Abbot a better one. We might suppose that a company is formed, which obliges itself to furnish a city with buggies at the expense of the public, and we might suppose also that all the buggies provided by such a company are found to be without wheels. Would not this illustration harmonize much better with the point in question? But enough of such trifles. Let us see how our lecturer propounds and discusses what he considers our seventh claim.

"Seventhly. But the gist of the claims made by the Catholic conscience is, that Catholic parents ought not to be taxed for any but Catholic schools, since they cannot conscientiously send their children to any other; and since the State cannot support Catholic schools, Catholic parents ought to be relieved from school taxes altogether, or else to receive back their own taxes from the State to be expended under their own control for Catholic schools. This is the beginning, middle, and end of the Catholic claim; all other claims of the Catholic conscience grow out of this. Bishop McQuaid says distinctly: 'Catholics who are thus taxed are, to the extent of the taxes they pay, punished—persecuted for religion's sake.' And again, 'It must not be lost sight of in this argument, that our rights go where our money goes.'"

The case is fairly stated, though by no means completely. We do not believe in raising uniform State taxes even for Catholic schools. Taxes must be justified by necessity; and there is no necessity of educating at the public expense the many thousands who can educate themselves better by their own means. The only educational taxes which can be reasonably defended, are those which go to the support of orphans and helpless children; who, however, should be confided not to free-thinkers, but to educators of their own denomination. All other schools should be paid by those who frequent them. And as to the State (or rather to the few scores of politicians who are said to represent the State) we maintain that it has no right whatever to tax citizens for an object which it is wholly incompetent to secure. The objection, therefore, which we raise on this head, is not grounded exclusively on the Catholic conscience, and it may be as justly and reasonably urged by the Jew and the Protestant, as by the Catholic. After this remark, on which we will not now insist, but which is not without importance, let us hear what Mr. Abbot has to say in defence of his cause:

"It is in the name, therefore, of *Catholic parents*, who are taxed by the State for the support of the public schools, that the whole protest of the Catholic conscience is entered. But in truth the State deals exclusively with individuals in this matter of taxation; it deals with them neither as Catholics nor even as parents, but simply and solely as *citizens*. The State does not ask whether the taxpayer is a Catholic, or Protestant, or Jew, or Free-thinker; it does not ask whether he is married or unmarried, a parent or childless; it only asks him to pay his fair proportion of the school expenses *as an individual member of the civil community*."

In other words, the State *pleads guilty*. It knows the needs of the community ; it knows that the Catholic wants Catholic education, the Protestant a distinctively Protestant teaching, and the Jew a Jewish instruction. It knows that these denominations constitute the great bulk of the people ; it knows that the rights of these denominations are sacred ; and yet it says : " I do not care whether the taxpayer is Catholic, Protestant, or Jew. I disregard alike all family rights, all duties of religion, all claims of conscience. Men, when not free-thinkers, have no rights ; they are mere cattle. *I only ask them to pay!* " It is money that I want ; and this money, which I extort from them in the name of education, I will put in the hands of said free-thinkers, that they may multiply, fatten, promote all their interests, undermine all religious spirit, and form a generation which shall worship nothing but self." This, we conceive, is what Mr. Abbot's reply amounts to.

But he has more to say :

" Now the question whether the State, which wholly ignores the inquiry as to the taxpayer's religion or family relations, has a right to tax all citizens indiscriminately for the support of the public school system, will presently come up for independent discussion ; but I wish to point out that this general question is not raised by the Catholic conscience, which claims exemption from the public school tax for *Catholic parents as such*. It is the duties imposed by Catholic parentage which constitute the ground of the demand of ' Catholic education for Catholic children ;' and it is the rights inherent in the Catholic parentage which constitute at least the ostensible grounds of protest against taxation for public schools. The protest is essentially a denial of the general obligation of *citizenship* in the name of *Church membership and family ties*."

We deny this malicious conclusion, together with its premises. When we complain of the injustice done to us in particular, we simply mention the rights of *Catholic parents as such* ; but Mr. Abbot should be able to understand, that while we do so, we by no means imply that we alone are dealt with unjustly. Protestants and Jews are just as badly treated as Catholics ; and though we in pleading our cause, protest only against the school taxes which Catholics are forced to pay, yet we are fully convinced that all the other denominations have as much right to protest against the school taxes that weigh upon them. The State is quite incompetent to educate children and to form good citizens, for the very reason that it cannot teach religion. This is why Catholics and non-Catholics alike maintain that the State oversteps the boundaries of State rights in assuming the part of educator, and that it grossly violates justice in taxing the people for the godless system of public schools.

Mr. Abbot promises to show that the State " has a right to tax all citizens indiscriminately for the support of the public school system ;" and he points out that this right is not objected to by the

Catholic conscience. We must inform him, however, that our Catholic conscience, while bidding us to pay our part of school taxes so long as they are enforced, does not cease to protest against the system for which such taxes are extorted. Whether the State has a right to levy taxes on all citizens indiscriminately for the support of public schools *adapted to the special needs of each religious denomination*, and to which children of each denomination respectively may be sent *without danger to their faith and morals*, we will not discuss; for we think that this question, apart from all reasons which may be alleged for either side of it, can be safely left to the decision of the citizens themselves, whose will, in this matter, makes law. But that the State can levy taxes on all citizens indiscriminately for supporting a public school system which disregards alike the religious needs of the pupils, and the religious rights of their parents, we most unhesitatingly and most deliberately deny; and every man of sense, whether he be a Catholic or not, will equally deny it. The State, in free America, is the servant, not the master of the people. The people may indeed be cheated, and has been cheated on this very subject of education by false promises; but now that the experiment has been tried long enough to test the demoralizing influence of the secular system, all intelligent men confess that the country has been the victim of a misplaced confidence. We will not denounce the State for betraying its duty towards a Christian people. This denunciation would be unfair; for the State could not do better. But it was for the people, before allowing the State to meddle with education, to reflect that the State has no power of modelling the consciences of children, no grace for controlling their passions, no means of instilling virtue, of educating the heart, or of doing anything else that reason and universal experience teach to be necessary for the formation of good and moral citizens.

The State, therefore, cannot be the educator of the children of the people; and this proves that the State has no right to be paid for what it is radically unable to perform. The State is for the people, not the people for the State. When all good Americans who grieve at the fearful spread of dishonesty and crime in the country will raise a loud unanimous cry against the State godless schools, it will be in their power to shake off the incubus, and to show to the secularists that not Catholics alone, but millions of all denominations agree in the great principle, that "where our money goes, there our rights go." Our protest, therefore, is not "essentially a denial of the general obligation of *citizenship* in the name of *church membership and family ties*," as Mr. Abbot vainly contends: it is a denial of any right in the State to be paid for a work which it is incompetent to do.

PARENTAL PREROGATIVES.—Our lecturer continues thus :

"Before discussing the right of the State to tax all its citizens for public schools, I must first consider the astounding claim of Catholic parents to be treated as if they were no citizens at all, but to be excepted, set apart by themselves, and permitted to receive the benefits of the State without discharging the corresponding obligations. The Catholic claim is, not to be taxed for non-Catholic public schools; and it rests wholly on the alleged absolute rights of Catholic parents as such. These rights, it is evident, must be closely scrutinized and analyzed."

We are quite willing that parental rights should be scrutinized; but Mr. Abbot should state things as they are, not as they can be colored by malevolence. The "astounding" claim of parents "to be treated as if they were no citizens at all" is *not* a Catholic claim. Nor do we aspire "to receive the benefits of the State without discharging the corresponding obligations." The calumny is even too silly to need a word of refutation. Rights and obligations are correlative, and Mr. Abbot, who is not ignorant of this truth, before speaking of our "obligation" to pay taxes for the *godless* schools inaugurated by the State, should have established the "right" of the State to tax all citizens for *godless* schools. But our lecturer lays down that obligation without having established this right; and although he promises his audience "a discussion" of such a right, he does nothing of the sort, but contents himself with a parade of gratuitous assumptions. Thus the right of the State to tax all its citizens for the support of *godless* schools is not established, and indeed it never will be, for it has no existence. Accordingly such a tax for such a *godless* object is an injustice, and, therefore, all citizens have a natural and a constitutional right to demand that either the public schools cease to be *godless*, or if this cannot be done, that the tax be repealed. Catholics, therefore, do not claim to be treated "as if they were no citizens at all;" they claim, on the contrary, to be treated as all citizens should be treated in a free country, that is, justly and with common decency. On the other hand, they are by no means anxious "to receive the benefits" of a *godless* State education; for they, and all Christian parents, may well afford to abandon such unwelcome benefits to the enemies of God and of his Christ.

But let us proceed :

"The protest of the Catholic conscience against taxation for a non-Catholic public school system grows out of what Bishop McQuaid has well described as 'parental prerogative.' But in this matter he speaks not for himself alone. Chief Justice Dunne, of Arizona, in a lecture delivered a year ago, laid down these two principles as the basis of the Catholic demand respecting the schools: '1. Religious instruction is of paramount importance. 2. Each parent has the right to say what religious instruction his child shall receive.' And he says in another passage: 'This claim to the absolute control of our domestic affairs is a sacred right which we cannot yield to the State.'"

Let us remark by the way, that our lecturer, while stating our

claims, carefully avoids all mention of similar claims advanced by other denominations, and by all mankind in general. His style of arguing compels him to ignore the well-known fact, that all religions and sects throughout the world admit the doctrine of parental prerogative as laid down by the Catholics—a fact which, if mentioned by Mr. Abbot, would have sufficed to show that his argumentation is directed against a universal principle rather than against a specifically Catholic claim.

He continues :

“The *Catholic World*, for January, speaks in the same strain, laying the foundation for the Catholic demands in a seemingly very harmless proposition : ‘Whatever you do keep your hands off the family altar. Do not set foot into the hallowed precinct of the domestic sanctuary. The family, though subordinate, is not to be violated by the State. Parents have rights which no government can usurp.’ Those rights are intended to include absolute control over the education of children.”

And so, indeed, they are. If however this proposition is not *really*, but only *seemingly* harmless, why did not Mr. Abbot avail himself of the opportunity for revealing the hidden meaning of the same, and the harm of which it would be the source? Let him reflect, that a lecturer who substitutes insinuation for argument, has no right to the respect of an intelligent audience.

“Rev. Father Müller, in his book called *Public School Education*, defines the doctrine of parental prerogative as follows : ‘It is not on the State, but on parents, that God imposed the duty to educate their children, a duty from which no State can dispense; nor can fathers and mothers relieve themselves of this duty by the vicarious assumption of the State. They have to give a severe account of their children on the day of judgment, and they cannot allow any power to disturb them in insisting upon their rights and making free use of them. The State has no more authority or control rightfully over our children than over a man’s wife. The right to educate our children is a right of conscience and a right of the family. Now these rights do not belong to the temporal order at all; and outside of this the State has no claim, no right, no authority.’ ”

This excellent passage from Rev. Father Müller’s book contains not only a statement of our claims, but also the proof of their reasonableness and justice. To quote it, as Mr. Abbot does, and then to throw it aside without the least attempt at refutation, is an act of dishonesty; but it was the only course open to an enemy of religious truth. Mr. Abbot adds :

“Again, condensing into a pregnant phrase the whole Catholic theory of parental prerogative, Father Müller emphatically declares, and I would solicit special attention to the declaration : ‘*The social unit is the family, not the individual.*’ ”

The reason why our lecturer solicits special attention to this declaration is, that he has at hand a queer set of masonic implements, with which he will soon endeavor to demolish this cardinal principle of social life. We may be sure that the attempt will end in failure; but, even supposing that the social unit is the individual,

as he imagines, we do not see how this would suffice to destroy "the whole Catholic theory of parental prerogative," which is not a special whim of Catholics, as the lecturer falsely insinuates, but a universal principle admitted and acted on in all times, by all civilized nations, under all forms of governments and religions.

Mr. Abbot continues:

"Bishop McQuaid thus stated the same general position in a lecture at Rochester, N. Y., in March, 1872. 'Parents have the right to educate their children. It is wrong for the State to interfere with the exercise of this right. By the establishment of common schools at the expense of all taxpayers, the State does interfere with this right, especially in the case of poor parents, who find it a burden to pay double taxes.' Last Sunday the Bishop expressed the same general views as follows: 'The last to be heard and consulted is the one to whom the settlement of the question first and finally belongs—the parent of the child. . . . In despite of all, the responsibility of the education of this child falls upon him, and on no one else. . . . Parental rights precede State rights. . . . A father's right to the pursuit of happiness extends to that of his children as well. . . . Parental rights include parental duties and responsibilities before God and society.' After quoting various authorities in defence of his position, the Bishop continued: 'It is the Christian view of parental rights and duties which is here given. . . . The doctrine coming into vogue, that the child belongs to the State, is the dressing up of an old skeleton of Spartan paganism, with its hideousness dimly disguised by a thin cloaking of Christian morality.'"

It is remarkable, that Mr. Abbot, in making these quotations, avoids giving any of the reasons by which the Bishop proved his conclusions. Let our reader glance at the first three or four pages of Bishop McQuaid's lecture, and he will understand how prudent Mr. Abbot has been in quoting but detached sentences. The same high prudence he has shown in quoting from Father Müller's book and from Chief Justice Dunne's lecture. Whether such a discriminating prudence does credit to a lecturer who undertakes to refute the Catholic view of parental rights, we leave to our readers to decide.

Mr. Abbot, thinking that he has given sufficient evidence of impartiality by such quotations as we have seen, continues thus:

"I have quoted enough, I think, to give a fair view of this theory of parental prerogative, on which the Catholic protest against the public school system is founded. Its principal points are as follows, restated in something like logical order.

"1. The social unit is the family, not the individual; and in the family the father is the supreme authority or head, both the wife and the children being required by the Catholic Church to 'obey' him."

"2. The father, representing the family, is charged with all the rights, powers, and responsibilities concerning the education of the children. The State has absolutely no share either in the rights, powers, or responsibilities; for all education must be Catholic, and the State has neither capacity nor authority to impart it."

"3. The State, consequently, by establishing a common school system, and taxing all citizens to support it, violates the sanctity of family rights, invades and usurps the parental prerogative, and oppresses the father's conscience by requiring him to support a system of schools to which he cannot send his children, and by which all these wrongs are committed."

"Here we have the core and pith of the Catholic protest against taxation for the

public schools, so far as it is deemed wise to address it to the general intelligence of the American people. It is the side of the Catholic conscience which is turned to the outside world, although there is another side of it, which is turned towards the Catholic Church."

O shame! It requires either a stolid ignorance or a heartless soul, full of venom and hypocrisy, to utter before the public a charge of duplicity against such respectable and respected citizens, as Father Müller, Bishop McQuaid, and Chief Justice Dunne. Mr. Abbot's impudence in affirming that "there is another side" which these men wisely conceal from "the intelligence of the American people" is indeed worthy of the editor of the *Index*, but it is a blunder for all that; for, if these gentlemen were to ask an explanation about that "other side," he would be unable to cite a single fact in support of his mendacious insinuation, and he might be compelled to swallow his falsehood. But without insisting any further on the meanness of such an unjustifiable assault, we have something else to point out concerning his manner of recapitulating our claims.

First. Is it only the Catholic Church that requires "both the wife and the children to *obey* the head of the family?" Are Protestant fathers to obey their children? or Protestant husbands to obey their wives? Or is obedience to be banished from non-Catholic families altogether? Then, why should boys and girls obey their teachers? Why should teachers obey their superintendents? Why should even Freemasons obey their grand-masters? But, if obedience is a necessary condition of all society, why does Mr. Abbot speak as if the Catholic Church alone required children to obey their parents?

Secondly. Where did he find that the Catholic Church denied to the State any share in the education of children for the reason that "all education must be Catholic?" Did we ever pretend that the Jew, the Protestant, or the Mormon, must be educated in Catholic schools? Even the Popes themselves have always allowed the Jews in Rome to suit themselves with a Jewish education. Does Mr. Abbot suppose that American Catholics are more Catholic than the Pope? Is this that "side" of our conscience which Catholics do not turn to the outside world? No, Mr. Abbot, it is Freemasonry that has two "sides," the one to show, and the other to conceal; the whole world knows it. But, as for us, we have no secret oaths, and we make no mystery of our doctrines and aims.

But let us proceed. He says:

"We see that, so far as this protest is addressed to the universal reason of mankind, it plants itself on a doctrine of 'parental prerogative,' which is at bottom a general social theory; namely, that society has for its ultimate unit the *family*, not the *individual*, and that all the educational rights, powers, and responsibilities of the family are concentrated in the father as the divinely constituted head of the family."

We beg pardon of Mr. Abbot ; but our protest is "planted" not only on the doctrine of parental prerogative, but also on the well-recognized inability of the State to perform the duties of educator. It is this inability that disqualifies the State to impose its educational tax. Moreover, we do not say that all the educational rights of the family "are concentrated in the father." The children have their rights perfectly distinct from the rights of their father, whose duty it is to protect them. But let us follow our lecturer.

"Whether, therefore, the protest of the Catholic conscience against the public school system is an intrinsically reasonable conscience or not, is a question which only can be determined by examining the social theory on which it rests. Should this theory not prove to be inherently reasonable, but to involve unreason and injustice of a grave character, then the school question will be fundamentally changed. It will no longer be the question whether we ought to abandon the public school system out of deference to the rights of an oppressed minority, but rather how we should most justly and most tenderly deal with the honest but unenlightened and dangerously misguided conscience of a sect which is discontented with the essential principles of republican institutions."

Mr. Abbot is willing to deal with us "most justly and most tenderly." He dreams a victory, but he will not abuse it; quite the contrary. Meanwhile, to show us how justly he can afford to deal with us, he calls us "a sect," which we are not; and to prove his tenderness and kindness towards us, he assumes that we are "honest" in deed, but "unenlightened," and even "dangerously misguided" so long as we prefer the light of the Gospel to the smoke of masonic theories, and the guidance of the Church to that of *The Index*. He also takes care to remind us that the adversaries of the godless schools are only "a minority," which is true, if he refers to Catholics alone, but very probably false, if the feelings of other religious denominations be taken into account. Lastly, he imagines, that so long as we defend parental rights, we are in conflict "with the essential principles of republican institutions." The remark is silly. Our readers who know something of the world's history, need no assistance from us to pronounce their judgment.

Mr. Abbot continues :

"This is certainly a question of the greatest gravity ; but it is not so grave as one which involves the possible abandonment of all State education."

The gravity of this last question, from the point of view of our free-thinkers, is undeniable ; for the fall of State schools would put an end to their usurped supremacy, and take from their hands the money of the people which they are now squandering for the glory of their fraternity. This explains the great interest felt by Mr. Abbot in the cause of State schools. But to our Christian people the abandonment of all State education is not a very grave question ; it is only a return to common sense, and a legitimate corollary of civil and religious freedom.

"If the Catholic protest is actually not based on sound reason and impartial reverence for the rights of all, if it turns out to be the stealthy and masked attack of an ambitious hierarchy on the bulwarks of popular liberty, our minds will be at least relieved of much perplexity and embarrassment."

Perfectly true. But if the stealthy and masked attack on the bulwarks of popular liberty turns out to be the work of Mr. Abbot's friends, a truth which no amount of tergiversation can obscure, it will be evident that the appeal of the lecturer to "sound reason and impartial reverence for the rights of all" is either unmeaning or hypocritical. Freemasons, we have said, have long been in the habit of charging the Catholic Church with all the evils which they themselves were actually maturing or perpetrating. If the fact needed confirmation, the sounding twaddle just adverted to would furnish additional evidence of it.

IS THE CATHOLIC SOCIAL THEORY A RELIC OF BARBARISM?—Mr. Abbot continues as follows :

"What, then, is the intrinsic character of this doctrine of parental prerogative? Is it true or false? Remembering clearly the chief features of the Catholic social theory which lies at the bottom of the so-called parental prerogative, namely, that the social unit is the family, not the individual, and that all powers and rights touching the education of children are vested in the father as the head of the family, you will gain a clearer insight into the truth of this matter if, instead of giving you any reflection of my own, I read to you some pretty copious extracts from a book which every well-read person will recognize at once as one which enjoys a world-wide reputation of the highest possible character. I refer to the treatise of Sir Henry Sumner Maine on *Ancient Law*, a work which, by common consent, ranks among the ablest and most valuable productions of the century. What he has to say on this subject will hardly be gainsaid by any but the uninformed, and I prefer to give his views in his own language without attempting to translate them into my own."

Sir Henry Sumner Maine has a good reputation as a lawyer, and we wish to say nothing against him. Yet, if his views were contrary to the Catholic doctrine, we should not be embarrassed by his authority. What is the authority of an able man, or of a hundred able men, when contrasted with the authority of the Church, and the verdict of nature itself? Mr. Abbot's argument comes to this: "A learned English jurist opposes the Catholic doctrine; therefore the Catholic doctrine is false." Oh, most lame and impotent conclusion!

This answer might suffice. But we must add that the words of Sir Henry Maine do not warrant Mr. Abbot's conclusion, namely, that the Catholic social theory is "a relic of barbarism." We will copy from the passage quoted by our lecturer the phrases on which he pins his arrogant conclusion, and we will barely insert a few parenthetical remarks of our own, which Mr. Abbot would do well to consider.

Sir Henry Maine says: "The effect of the evidence derived from

comparative jurisprudence is to establish that view of the primeval condition of the human race, which is known as the Patriarchal theory. . . . Society (*political* society, as the author explains later) in primitive times was not what is assumed (only *assumed*, but by no means proved), to be at present a collection of individuals. In fact, and in the view of the men who composed it, it was an aggregation of families. The contrast may be most forcibly expressed by saying that the unit of an ancient (ancient, but not necessarily *barbarous*, as Mr. Abbot would have it) society was the family; of a modern (that is, revolutionary, socialistic, and masonic) society the individual. . . . In some of the Greek States and in Rome (that is, in the most civilized nations of antiquity) there long remained the vestiges of an ascending series of groups out of which the State was at first constituted (and when those vestiges disappeared their political organization lost its natural support and crumbled down and finally became the prey of barbarian valor). The family, house, and tribe of the Romans may be taken as the type of them, and they are so described to us that we can scarcely help conceiving them as a system of concentric circles, which have gradually expanded from the same point. The aggregation of families (in the best times of the great Roman Republic) forms the gens or house. The aggregation of houses makes the tribe. The aggregation of tribes constitutes the Commonwealth. . . . No doubt when with our modern (socialistic) ideas we contemplate the union of independent communities, we can suggest a hundred modes of carrying it out (with or without regard to pre-existing rights), the simplest of all being that the individuals (women and children too?) comprised in the coalescing groups shall vote or act according to local propinquity; but the idea that a number of persons (the most stupid and wicked ones, as well as the wisest) should exercise political rights in common (and have exactly the same weight in deciding political or social questions), simply because they happened to live within the same topographical limits, was utterly strange and monstrous to primitive antiquity (and to all civilized nations up to the present century). . . . This was the principle of local contiguity (which is no principle at all) now recognized everywhere (by demagogues, schemers, and rotten administrations) as the condition of community (or rather communistic prevalence) in political functions."

It is plain that Sir Henry Maine considers universal suffrage as the simplest mode of exercising political functions; and it is in this sense that he calls the individual *politically* a social unit. In other terms, the number of votes that decide any political question is made up of units, and these units are the votes of individuals.

But does this system of political voting imply that voters alone as individuals constitute society? Far from it. If the ultimate element of society is the *voting* individual, then the wife and children of the voter are no part of society, and society owes nothing to them. But, if they, too, are a part, and a most important one, of society, then it is evident that, since they are not personally entitled to vote on political issues, the protection of their interests devolves on him whose vote is recognized by the law. The law, of course, may not care whether the voter is the head of a family or not; but the fact is that the head of a family as such acts for all the members of the family, whose rights and interests he is bound to protect. And thus the individual, this pretended "social unit," is in fact, even according to the modern system, only the head of a social unit (the family), and its natural representative.

Our lecturer clinches the long passage just quoted by the following words:

"We thus see clearly, that the Roman Catholic social theory, according to which (in the very phrase of Father Müller himself) the social unit is the family, not the individual, appears to be a mere relic of primeval barbarism, the survival of an antiquated and fossilized conception, utterly out of harmony with the pervading spirit of modern society."

This conclusion disappoints all logic. Sir Henry Maine would scarcely concede, and certainly did not assume, that the Romans were "primeval barbarians." His words, therefore, do not warrant Mr. Abbot's assertion. We might, on the contrary, infer from them, that our Catholic social theory is the real foundation of civil society, that it has been constantly recognized by the most civilized and powerful nations on earth, that it is not an antiquated and fossilized conception (since even Mr. Abbot acknowledges that it has *survived* in the universal Church), but a permanent dictate of reason, and that it cannot be called "a relic of primeval barbarism" any more than could the theory and the practice of eating and drinking, which Mr. Abbot surely does not condemn, though he knows that it was in use among primeval barbarians. The duties, the rights, and the wants of nature are independent of the whims of speculators and politicians; they will always assert themselves, and they will continue to rule modern society in spite of the "pervading spirit" of modern socialism and Freemasonry, which is nothing but a disease of society. It would be useless to insist any longer on this point. Mr. Abbot may insult us, as he does; but all men of judgment, who have paid a moderate attention to the teachings of contemporary history, will say that the "relics of primeval barbarism" have been treasured up by the secret societies and by the Bismarckian Liberals, not by the Church.

And now Mr. Abbot goes a step further. He says :

"A closer investigation only reveals this fact most plainly. The parental prerogative of Bishop McQuaid is nothing but a modification of the *patria potestas*, or fatherly authority of the ancient Roman law."

This new argument, like the preceding one, attacks in Bishop McQuaid all mankind at once. It amounts to this: "The parental prerogative is a modification of the *patria potestas*. But *patria potestas* is a relic of primeval barbarism; therefore, the parental prerogative is a relic of primeval barbarism." Bravo! Mr. Abbot. If this form of reasoning were admissible, we might say: Mr. Abbot's coat is a modification of raw wool; but raw wool is unfit for the dress of a gentleman; therefore, Mr. Abbot's coat is unfit for a gentleman. Also: The custom of sleeping in bed is a modification of the primeval custom of sleeping on the bare ground; but sleeping on the bare ground is a relic of barbarism; therefore, sleeping in bed is a relic of barbarism. What will our sophist reply? Indeed, the *patria potestas*, as countenanced by the old Roman law, armed with excessive powers the head of the family; but does logic warrant the conclusion that its "modification" must have retained the same objectionable feature?

To support his sophism, our lecturer again quotes a long passage of Sir Henry Maine, which we can turn against him. In this passage we read that, according to the Roman law, "the parent had over his children the *jus vitæ necisque*, the power of life and death, and a *fortiori* of uncontrolled personal chastisement; he could modify their personal condition at pleasure; he could give a wife to his son; he could give his daughter in marriage; he could divorce his children of either sex; he could transfer them to another family by adoption, and he could sell them." Has Bishop McQuaid's parental prerogative the least resemblance to this parental tyranny? "Late in the imperial period," that is, when the influence of the Roman Church had begun to be felt at large, "we find vestiges of all these powers, but they are reduced within narrow limits. The unqualified right of domestic chastisement has become a right of bringing domestic offences under the cognizance of the civil magistrate; the privilege of dictating marriage has declined into a conditional veto; the liberty of selling has been virtually abolished; and adoption itself, destined to lose almost all its ancient importance in the reformed system of Justinian, can no longer be effected without the assent of the child transferred to the adoptive parentage. In short, we are brought very close to the verge of the ideas which have at length prevailed in the modern world." All this has been effected under the direction and by the efforts of the Catholic Church.

Sir Henry Maine adds: "The movement of the progressive societies has been uniform in one respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of the family dependency, and the growth of individual obligation in its stead. *The individual is steadily substituted for the family, as the unit of which civil laws take account.* . . . Nor is it difficult to see what is the tie between man and man, which replaces by degrees those forms of reciprocity in rights and duties which have their origin in the family. It is *contract*." This, of course, has not been the work of the Church. The Church cannot sanction the "gradual dissolution," but only the "rational limitation" of family dependency; and for this she deserves the best thanks of society. To substitute "the growth of individual obligation" for family dependency, is either a loose or a nonsensical phrase. For, it is evident that the throwing aside of family dependency is a practical impossibility; whilst, even if it were possible, it would by no means increase, but rather diminish the individual obligations of the child. That "the individual is steadily substituted for the family as the unit of which civil laws take account," does not mean that the civil law ceases to recognize the family and the duties of parents to their children or of children to their parents, but only that the civil law now reaches every individual of the family, and is as ready to protect their personal rights as to punish their personal misdeeds. Finally, that the forms of reciprocity in rights and duties which have their origin in the family are replaced by *contract*, if understood of rights and duties of parents towards their children, and of children towards their parents, is such an absurdity as no man in his senses could ever dream of. And we are, therefore, quite certain, that the eminent English jurist has not for a moment entertained such a stolid idea.

Now, what is there in the passage we have thus considered, which can give a pretext to Mr. Abbot for declaiming against the Catholic and universal doctrine of parental rights? Does the English jurist, or any jurist worth the name, maintain that the law has ceased to recognize the family, or has suppressed the rights and duties which bind the members of the family in a social unit according to natural law? And yet Mr. Abbot has the audacity to say:

"We are now in a condition to understand precisely the value of that parental prerogative, on which Bishop McQuaid and other Catholics base their claim that the school system violates parental rights. It is the old skeleton of Roman paganism dressed up with a thin cloaking of Christian morality."

The lecturer is here entering into a series of errors, of which the one we have just heard is the first.

"It is the ancient outgrown patria potestas intruding itself into modern society with

its claim of despotic authority for the father over his child, and ignoring both the personal rights of the child, and the collective right of society."

Here are five other errors. First, our parental right is not the outgrown patria potestas of the Romans, which on the contrary has been overthrown by Christianity. Secondly, our parental prerogative does not intrude itself into modern society; for it has always been in possession everywhere. Thirdly, it does not claim, but it absolutely condemns, despotic authority. Fourthly, it does not ignore the personal rights of the child. Fifthly, it fully recognizes the collective right of society, so far as it is a real right and not a dream of free-thinkers.

"It is the galvanized corpse of the old patriarchal theory, good enough for the days of Abraham, who, in obedience to it, undertook to murder his own son, but a disgusting anachronism in the nineteenth century, and in the centennial year."

We have here three errors more. First, the old patriarchal theory about parental rights has never been defunct, that we could galvanize its corpse. Secondly, Abraham did not undertake to murder his own son in obedience to any theory of parental rights, as even children might teach Mr. Abbot. Thirdly, our theory is most needed in the nineteenth century to check the growth of crime, and to unmask the hypocrisy of the Liberals who tyrannize the country with the name of liberty on their lips; and it is most acceptable to all good citizens in a year which reminds us of the respect with which the founders of our liberties and the authors of our independence surrounded the rights of family and religion.

After these nine false assertions, Mr. Abbot argues as follows:

"The school question cannot be justly referred for settlement to the 'parents' alone; the children have something at stake, society has something at stake, and parents must dismiss the notion that their despotic selfishness will be allowed to substitute the rights of one party alone for the rights of three parties to this issue."

This argument, as has been well observed ere now, would prove that parents must consult their neighbors and the general public before they attempt to furnish a bed, a pair of breeches, and above all a breakfast, dinner, and supper to their children; for in all this the children "have something at stake," and "society has something at stake," and "parents must dismiss the notion that their despotic selfishness will be allowed to substitute the rights of one party alone for the rights of three parties to this issue." But, to answer directly, we simply remark that, as a rule, the rights of children in no hands are more secure than in those of their loving parents, and that the rights of society are equally safe whether the parents educate their children at the public schools, at home, or in private institutions; whereas the rights of children, parents, and society itself, are now shamelessly trodden upon by the very system

which Mr. Abbot patronizes, and by the "despotic selfishness" of the State, as we have abundantly proved. The present school question has originated in a usurpation of common rights by organized enemies of Christianity. Let the usurpation cease, and the question will be ended. This is the only possible solution.

But Mr. Abbot continues :

"The Catholic social theory, with its claim that the family, not the individual, is the social unit, is the unburied skeleton of prehistoric barbarism, the most ancient and best authenticated relic in the keeping of the Church ; while the parental prerogative, which is so confidently relied upon to crush the great public school system under its elephantine tread, is nothing but the pale and powerless ghost of the ancient Roman patria potestas, with not enough substance in it to crush life out of a daisy."

Is it not amusing to see a grave man like Mr. Abbot fighting so furiously against a "pale and powerless ghost?" The truth is, however, that the ghost has a body, that is, two hundred millions of Catholics, and many other millions of various creeds all over the world. This is a very substantial and ponderous body ; and it is upon it, not upon a mere ghost, that Mr. Abbot heaps insult and contumely, though he declares it to be only the "unburied skeleton of prehistoric barbarism." Prehistoric, of course, means fabulous ; for we have the history of the first man, and this man was not a barbarian.

A STALKING-HORSE OF THE POPE.—The "pale and powerless ghost," after having become a "skeleton," is now to assume the form of a "horse." In fact, Mr. Abbot tells us that "parental prerogative is a mere stalking-horse of the Pope." This we did not expect. Bishop McQuaid had been altogether silent about the Pope ; he had treated his subject "before the universal bar of reason," "just as if no Pope had ever sat on the throne of the Vatican," as Mr. Abbot himself testifies. It was, therefore, quite unnecessary to drag the Pope into the controversy. But how could an infidel neglect the opportunity of reviling the holy and venerable Father of the faithful ? He says :

"But I have not got through with this parental prerogative as yet. It is a most shrewd and sagacious appeal to the very democratic instinct to which it is really opposed. It is an endeavor to rouse the jealous independence of the American father in repulse of a purely illusory attack on his reserved parental rights. That he has parental rights I am the last to deny ; I am a parent myself, and not slow to defend the rights of a parent. But it is tyranny for a parent to forget or disregard the rights of his child ; and it is usurpation for a parent to defy or despise the rights of society. Let the parent by all means stand firmly by his true parental rights in the school question, but let him be intelligent and self-restrained enough to recognize that he is not proprietor of all the rights in the case. Children are no longer the absolute property of the father."

All this is idle talk. Mr. Abbot seems to be ignorant that the right of providing and controlling education is not a right of "ab-

solite property." This ignorance, whether real or pretended, spoils his declamation and makes it ridiculous.

"The plea of parental prerogative is well calculated to create a sense of wrong where no wrong exists; to sting ignorant parents into claiming a jurisdiction that does not belong to them, and to induce them to look on the Catholic Church as the bold champion of their rights against the assault of a tyrannical majority."

Indeed! Our children are robbed of religious education in the public schools, and "no wrong exists!" And if parents see the wrong, they are "ignorant parents!" If they claim redress, they claim "a jurisdiction that does not belong to them!" To whom, then, belongs the jurisdiction? To venal politicians, or to masonic lodges? We have not yet abdicated our rights, nor will we ever resign them into the hands of these public enemies. And if our exertions in the cause of Christian education induce men to look on the Catholic Church as the bold champion of parental rights and of popular liberties, Mr. Abbot has no reason to complain; for he knows full well that the course we have taken in the matter has been forced upon us by his very friends, the self-styled Liberals, whose tyrannical spirit prevents the possibility of looking upon them as the champions of popular rights. Yes, the Church is the bold champion of popular liberties and of popular rights against the assaults of tyrannical majorities and of despotic rulers. Who can deny it?

"Such parents as these need to have their eyes opened; they are unsuspecting dupes."

This was the language of the serpent to Eve. Apparently Eve was an unsuspecting dupe of her Creator! It was but natural that the serpent should wish to open her eyes!

"When the Catholic Church pleads 'parental prerogative' to break down the beneficent public school system, and seemingly champions the right of parents against the oppressions and aggressions of the non-Catholic majority, such parents ought to see that the Church does not recognize any parental prerogative at all *as towards itself*."

Parents know this, and find it just and right. Must they, in order to please Mr. Abbot, exercise their parental prerogative in a manner contrary to their Catholic conscience? Or should the Church say: Your parental prerogative gives you the right to have your children poisoned by the *beneficent* public school system patronized by your enemies?

"No sooner has the Church succeeded in rescuing the Catholic parent from the imaginary jaws of the State, than it immediately proceeds to devour both parent and child with its own jaws."

That the jaws of the State are *imaginary*, is a very ingenious idea; but, if these jaws are imaginary, how could they have devoured in twelve years 1,999,000 Catholic children, as a Methodist

minister exultantly averred? As to the jaws of the Church, Catholic parents are not afraid of them. Catholics are the body of the Church, and the Church does not devour her own body.

"It claims for the parent, so far as the State is concerned, absolute and undivided authority over his child; but as the divinely deputed parent of all Catholics, it claims for itself absolute and undivided authority over both parent and child."

Certainly. Were the Church to claim less, she evidently would betray her duty to God and to her children. We recognize her divinely received authority, and we cheerfully submit to it. What business has Mr. Abbot to meddle with our convictions?

"It is well to understand this matter thoroughly. Whatever parental rights, or parental prerogative the Church may claim for Catholic parents, it concedes to them no rights whatsoever that are inconsistent with its own autocratic dominion over them."

How *autocratic*? Poor Mr. Abbot has the misfortune of not knowing the Church. He knows only the secret societies, and for this reason he cannot conceive of an authority which is not harsh, autocratic, and overbearing.

"Let no one for a moment imagine that the Church would tolerate any exercise of parental prerogative which should withdraw Catholic children from parochial schools to place them in the public schools. That sort of parental independence it is swift to punish with the severest penalties in its power to inflict. I must adduce some evidence of this statement to convince you that I am not talking at random."

To convince whom? The Catholic parents are already convinced that they cannot without sin neglect the Christian education of their children or disregard the warnings of their mother—the Church. They know also that sin deserves punishment. All Protestants also, and even all infidels, are convinced that every organized society has its constitution and by-laws, which cannot be infringed by its members without incurring penalties. It is, therefore, lost time to labor to convince them that the members of the Catholic Church cannot violate Catholic laws without incurring the penalties sanctioned by the Church. Mr. Abbot might just as well have tried to convince his audience that water is watery, and that talkers have a tongue. Yet it may be interesting to follow our lecturer in his superfluous endeavor, inasmuch as we shall see how the Catholic language can be appreciated by a stranger to Christianity. He says:

"In the list of 'damnable heresies' known as the *Syllabus Errorum*, denounced and condemned by Pope Pius IX., in 1864, the forty-eighth, is as follows: 'That method of instructing youth can be approved by Catholic men, which is separated from the Catholic faith and from the power of the Church, and which has regard, or at least principally to a knowledge of natural things only, and to the ends of social life on this earth.' The condemnation of this proposition is the explicit condemnation of all secular education by the supreme and infallible head of the Church, and it forbids all Catholics to sanction or approve anything but strictly Catholic education."

We beg to make three passing remarks. First, the *Syllabus* is not a list of "damnable heresies," but of condemnable propositions, whether heretical, or simply false and mischievous. Secondly, those words: "Which has regard, or at least principally, to a knowledge of natural things only," make no sense. They should read: "Which has regard only, or at least principally, to a knowledge of natural things." Thirdly, the *Syllabus* in this proposition does not condemn *secular*, but only *secularistic* education. The Church favors and encourages the teaching of all the branches of secular knowledge; what she condemns is only the banishment of religion from the school.

"The whole warfare of the Catholic Church in this country against the public school system is the direct consequence of obedience to this command of the Pope, and the Church could not possibly recognize any parental prerogative which should dare to dispute it."

It is evident that we cannot consistently with our principles dispute the official decision of the head of the Church. But, even before that decision, we knew that no "parental prerogative" could withstand the right of Catholic children to receive a Catholic education. It is not true, therefore, that "the whole warfare of the Church against the public school system is the direct consequence of obedience to the *Syllabus*." To speak only of America, and of our own time, Bishop Hughes, as Mr. Abbot himself informs us, "began his attack on the public school system since 1840," that is twenty-four years before the *Syllabus* was issued. Moreover, what shall we think of the Protestant conventions, which have condemned the public school system? Did they, too, condemn it in obedience to the Pope?

"Further, in answer to the question, 'Who is bound to obey the Church?' the Catholic Catechism replies: 'All baptized persons; for we are commanded by Jesus Christ himself to obey his Church.' What parental prerogative is left outside of this obligation of universal obedience?"

We fully admit this excellent doctrine; for Jesus Christ's command is the rule of our conduct. Can Mr. Abbot find it strange? Must not Christians obey Christ? and yet our "parental prerogative" is not curtailed by our obedience; for the Church commands nothing contrary to the natural rights of parents.

What follows we copy without comment, nay, with special pleasure:

"But I do not adduce merely abstract declarations of *Syllabus* or Catechism. The Dubuque *Daily Telegraph* of January 3d, only seven weeks ago, had this paragraph: 'Father Ryan announced in St. Patrick's Church yesterday, that the rule heretofore adopted of refusing the Sacraments of Penance and Holy Eucharist to parents who send their children to the public schools would be enforced and adhered to henceforth. He spoke emphatically on the matter, and advised parents who send their children to the

public schools not to attempt to approach the sacraments while they persist in refusing obedience to this law of the Church, alleging that such is the law.' Remember, that to refuse the sacraments to a Catholic is practically to condemn him to an eternal hell."

"There can be no doubt that this is the law of the Church. Bishop Gilmour, of Cleveland, explicitly declared it to be the law in his Lenten Pastoral of 1873, as follows: 'We solemnly charge and most positively require every Catholic in the diocese to support and send his children to a Catholic school. When good Catholic schools exist, where it may be honestly said a child will get a fair common school education, if parents, either through contempt for the priest or through disregard for the laws of the Church refuse to send their children to a Catholic school, then, in such cases, but in such cases only, we authorize confessors to refuse the sacraments to such parents as thus despise the laws of the Church and disobey the command of both priest and bishop.'"

After these quotations, which might have been multiplied without end, and which evidently prove the existence of a very wise and necessary law concerning the obligations of Catholic parents in regard to the education of their children, Mr. Abbot adduces the following fact:

"In Rhode Island, according to the *New York Independent* of February 10th, 1876, 'it seems that the father of a Miss De Fray made an affidavit in which he swore that the mother of the child had been excluded from the sacred rites of the Catholic Church, because she allowed her daughter to attend the public school, and was told that so long as she persisted in doing so, she would not be entitled to the privileges of the Church.' In consequence of this oppression, a bill has actually been introduced into the Rhode Island legislature to prohibit such interference with family affairs. In other words, the State, which is denounced as violating parental rights, is actually invoked to protect Catholic parents from violation of these very rights by their own priests."

This is simply ridiculous. The priest who denies the sacraments to bad Catholics, by no means interferes with the family affairs. When parents forget their duties towards the members of their family, they commit a sin; and this sin cannot be pardoned without repentance and atonement. The priest has no power to absolve unrepentant sinners; and no "bill introduced into the Rhode Island legislature" can confer on him such a power. The priest, therefore, will not change his ways, but will merely laugh at the ignorance of those who introduced the bill. Nor is it true that "the State is actually invoked to protect Catholic parents from violation of their parental rights;" it is rather invoked to protect them in the open violation of their parental duties. Mr. Abbot should have had sufficient perspicuity to see this manifest truth.

He continues:

"I must not fail to add some personal testimony of my own to the same effect. Last Sunday evening Bishop McQuaid lectured on 'Catholic education for Catholic children,' in St. Mary's Hall, Cambridgeport; and, desiring to hear him speak on this subject to a Catholic audience, I attended the lecture. Among other things, he said substantially this (I may not give the exact words in every part, but I know I give the exact substance of his words): 'Now I am going to read to you from the *Syllabus*, which is a bugbear to many people as if it were the horn of the beast of the Apocalypse thrown into the world to make mischief. But the *Syllabus* is only the condensation of

great truths which the world needs for its salvation.' He then read the extract I have already quoted condemning so emphatically all Catholics who approve of any education apart from the faith and power of the Church, and said with a lowering of the voice and an intensity of manner and tone, which well conveyed the verbally suppressed menace: 'Whoever does not believe in the *Syllabus* as the infallible truth of God, *ceases to be a Catholic*. He may perhaps attend Mass and go to confession; but'—and he spoke with an emphasis sure not to be misunderstood—'I would not like to have the absolving of him.' Such is, then, the extent of the parental prerogative which the Bishop so eloquently claimed for Catholic parents on Sunday afternoon, and as eloquently scattered to the four winds of heaven on Sunday evening."

Mr. Abbot is greatly deceived if he thinks that Bishop McQuaid contradicted in the evening what he had maintained in the afternoon. Though a free-religionist, Mr. Abbot should have been able to understand that there is no right against duty. Parental rights are, therefore, measured by parental duties, and consist precisely in the right of fulfilling such parental duties according to the dictates of their own conscience, without hindrance or interference on the part of outsiders. Now, Catholics know their parental duties; they know that they are guilty before God and before their conscience, if they expose their children to the mischievous influence of a godless system, when they can bring them up in Catholic schools. Hence it is not Bishop McQuaid that sets a limit to parental rights; it is the conscience itself of the Catholic parents. To please Mr. Abbot, the Bishop should have said to his Catholic audience: "Know, that your parental rights extend beyond the dictates of your conscience, and therefore you have the right to act against your conscience, and to expose your children to the pernicious influence of godless schools." Because the Bishop did not use this absurd language, Mr. Abbot declares that the Bishop "has scattered to the four winds of heaven" on Sunday evening what he had just established on Sunday afternoon! Indeed, free-religionism makes men very malignant or very stupid. This remark is strikingly confirmed by what Mr. Abbot immediately subjoins:

"Nothing can be plainer than that the Catholic conscience hurled against the school system is not the free and independent conscience of individual Catholic parents, but rather the conscience formed irresistibly in them by the clergy to whom they listen with fettered minds, massed like an obedient and well-disciplined army in defence of the Church. It is not the unbiassed conscience of the parents as such, left to form their candid opinions in profoundly respected liberty, but the coerced and yet honest conscience of spiritual slaves. It is, in short, not the conscience of free parents at all, but the organic conscience of the Church of Rome, knowing its own interests, oblivious of everything else, and determined to protect them at all cost. It is the conscience of the priests, the bishops, and the Pope, using the consciences of the laity as mere pawns in their desperate game with modern civilization."

Well, we know that every good Freemason must always be ready to swear that it is the Church, not Freemasonry, that attacks

civilization, and uses men like pawns in a desperate game. The wolf will never fail to accuse the lamb which it is eager to devour. Of course, the Catholic laity must form their conscience upon the same principles on which the priests, the bishops, and the Pope form theirs; for we are all guided by the same natural reason and by the same Gospel. We therefore concede that the Catholic conscience is not free and independent. But is there in the world a free and independent conscience? Is there a conscience which does not depend on certain principles, of which it is the necessary practical conclusion? Can Mr. Abbot himself boast that his conscience is free and independent? The whole question, therefore, will be not whether the individual conscience of Catholic parents is free and independent, but whether individual Catholics are free and independent in the adoption of the principles on which they form their conscience? This question is easily decided. The Catholic must form his conscience on Catholic principles as understood by the Catholic Church. So long, therefore, as a Catholic remains Catholic, he is not free and independent in the adoption of his ruling principles. Honest Mr. Abbot is scandalized at this. He holds that Catholics "must be left to form their candid opinions in profoundly respected liberty;" that is, must be left in ignorance of the Catholic doctrine, that they may not be biassed or fettered by truth (which is the enemy of free thought), but may become accessible to doubt, perplexity, and seduction (which is undoubtedly more in accordance with the spirit of *modern* civilization), and thus be left to form a "candid opinion" that their Catholic children must receive a pagan education.

Every one will say that this method of forming the Catholic conscience is absurd; but Mr. Abbot, as a man of progress, protests in the name of modern civilization that our present method "feters the mind," makes "spiritual slaves," destroys the possibility of "candid opinion," and reduces men to "mere pawns." To which we reply, that if our present method satisfies us, free-religionists have no business to trouble themselves with the subject. We are glad that our minds are "fettered" by truth. Truth alone can make man free. Truth is the ballast which prevents mankind from foundering. When the Church teaches us our duty, we obey, not as "spiritual slaves," but as loving and grateful children. Our "candid opinion" is that every one must be consistent with his own principles, and that it is a great honor to be even a "mere pawn" in a game on the success of which depend the temporal prosperity of our country and the eternal happiness of our children. Is Mr. Abbot sure that he himself is not a "mere pawn" in the organization to which he belongs? Is he sure that he is not a "spiritual slave" of some Grand Lodge, and that his mind is not

"fettered" by the organic conscience of his sect, that is, by prejudice, error, and bigotry? Men must believe something. We know what we have to believe, and why we have to believe; but we doubt if Mr. Abbot can say as much for himself; for, though he believes in free religion and "modern civilization," he would scarcely be able to state clearly what these things are, and on what conscientious grounds he has formed his "candid opinion" in their favor. Can we not entertain some suspicion that his conscience was "irresistibly formed" in him, as in his associates, by men to whom they listened with "fettered minds" as destined to form "an obedient and well-disciplined army" for the destruction of the Church?

But, to conclude, let Mr. Abbot remember, that, true as it is that Catholics must form their consciences according to the teaching of the Church, yet the Church has no worldly means for compelling men to remain Catholic. James G. Blaine, and others whom we need not name, will tell him how any one who does not like what he calls "spiritual slavery" can abandon our ranks without being molested, and enlist in the devil's army with full liberty to form his "candid opinions" till he be called to give an account of them in a world, whose existence he is now at liberty to deny either "candidly" or otherwise, according to his degree of stupidity or of malice. A man who obeys only so long as he is willing to obey, is not a slave. Hence all the big talk of our lecturer about the "spiritual slavery" of Catholic parents is nothing but twaddle.

Mr. Abbot continues thus :

"Let us understand the matter. The battle is between the corporate, consolidated, ecclesiastical conscience of the Roman Papacy on the one hand, and, on the other, the multitudinous, independent, and secular conscience of the American Republic; nothing but that; and this whole theory of parental prerogative, which is now held up high before the gaze of the outside world in order to compass the destruction of the public schools, and now trampled scornfully under feet within the precinct of the Church, in order to build up the parochial schools, has no life, meaning, or veracity, except as the Pope's stalking-horse."

This last insult is too base to deserve an answer. We only repeat, what we have already proved, that the Church does not trample under foot our parental prerogative, and does not hold up this prerogative in order to compass the destruction of the public schools. The Catholic theory only maintains that the public schools must not be *godless*. Let them be denominational, and no one will urge their destruction on the ground of violated parental rights.

"In saying this, I do not in the least question the sincerity of the Roman priesthood. Ambition is a terribly sincere thing: despotism is a terribly sincere thing."

Our priesthood must be very bad indeed, if their sincerity cannot be accounted for except by ambition and despotism. Are, then,

Freemasons so wicked, or so dull, that they cannot explain our conduct by anything short of false imputation? The rogue of course thinks that all men are rogues; but, if our priests are despots because they urge on us the discharge of a recognized duty, what name shall we give to those "enlightened" gentlemen who have fastened on the protesting consciences of millions the monstrous despotism of the godless school system?

"But the American citizen who is deceived by this talk of 'parental prerogative,' and consents to abolish the public schools out of tenderness for parental rights, unbolts and unbars the cage of a tiger, whose first leap will be at his own throat."

Who does not see the buffoonery of this threat? No, Mr. Abbot, you do not believe what you say. That there is "a tiger" somewhere, is a matter of fact; but unfortunately it is not confined in a cage. We can show on the body of the Catholic Church the marks of its bloody ferocity, and we see every day how it mangles and devours the children of American citizens. Look at the godless schools, and you will see the tiger.

"The Church cares nothing for parental rights except as an outer wall of defence against the Republic's just claim to establish schools for the education of her own children."

This is a manifest calumny. On the other hand, the Republic is no mother, and has no children. Again, the Republic has neither parental rights nor parental duties. Moreover, the Republic has no just claim to give a godless education to Catholic children, or to tax them for the benefit of free-thinkers.

"Before the Church the parent has no right but to obey. The Pope commands the bishops, the bishops command the priests, the priests command the parents, the parents command the children; and the burden of the command is evermore the same: *Believe and obey!* That is the beginning, middle, and end of 'parental prerogative.' Shall any freeman be so simple as not to know slavery when he sees it? No."

Our lecturer omits to say that there is a God who commands Popes, Bishops, Priests, parents, and children "to believe and obey." Will Mr. Abbot say that there is no God? Of course, if there be no God, there are no rightful superiors, for God is the source of all authority. In such a case no pope, emperor, president, or other human being has a right to command, and no one has the duty to obey; and if any one be compelled to obey, he is treated as a slave. But the American Republic and the American Constitution recognize a God, and condemn the doctrine that all obedience is slavery. In our Republic the general commands the colonels, the colonels command the captains, the captains command the soldiers, and the burden of the command is evermore the same: "Hark and obey." This is the beginning, middle, and end of military discipline. Shall any American be so stolid as to conclude that the army of the United States is a herd of slaves? Answer, Mr. Abbot!

LAST SUMMER'S EXPEDITION AGAINST THE SIOUX
AND ITS GREAT CATASTROPHE.

IN the old geographies of the country an immense tract was left blank except for the words, printed across it in large letters, "*The Great American Desert.*" Through a portion of this country I propose to take my readers in the present paper.

The Great Missouri River, heading in the heart of the Rocky Mountains, at about the intersection of the forty-fourth parallel with the one hundred and eleventh degree of west longitude, flows directly north for nearly four degrees, then turning to the eastward continues in that direction for about eight degrees more, and then after its junction with the waters of the Yellowstone at old Fort Union, near Fort Buford, doubles on its course and flows south-eastwardly for hundreds of miles towards its union with the Mississippi. The northern portion of this great bend of the Missouri River was the scene of events during the spring and summer of the Centennial year, in a search for General Sitting Bull and the hostile bands associated with him, some of which we will describe.

With its head waters only a few miles to the south and east of those of the Missouri, the Yellowstone River also flows directly north for over a hundred miles, passing through the National Park and then turning to the eastward pursues its northeastwardly course for nearly five hundred miles to its junction with the Missouri at Fort Buford. Where it turns to the eastward the Yellowstone is only about twenty miles from Fort Ellis, at the head of the Gallatin Valley; and a few miles lower down it receives the waters of Shields's River, the only *northern* tributary it has throughout its whole course. From the *south* it receives numerous streams, heading in the mountain ranges far to the southward. The largest of these are Clarke's Fork, the Big Horn, Tongue, and Powder Rivers, all streams named by the Lewis and Clarke expedition of 1806. The largest of them all, the Big Horn, runs for several hundred miles directly north, and joins the Yellowstone at a distance of over two hundred miles from Fort Ellis, and furnishes about as much water as the main Yellowstone. It drains an immense area of country, and has numerous tributaries from the east and west. About forty miles from its mouth, it receives from the southeast the waters of the Little Big Horn, around whose name mournful memories will linger for many years to come.

On the Big Horn, seventy-five miles from its mouth, are the ruins

of old Fort C. F. Smith, and eighty miles to the southeast those of Fort Phil. Kearny, the scene of the Fetterman massacre in 1866, the perpetrators being the same tribe which ten years later made a spot on the Little Big Horn, not a hundred miles away, mournfully notorious by the slaughter of the gallant Custer and his three hundred men. A few miles below the mouth of the Big Horn and on the left bank of the Yellowstone, stands, or stood, Fort Pease, named after a former agent of the friendly Crows, on whose reservation, extending south of the Yellowstone and far to the eastward of the Big Horn, General Custer's battle took place on the 25th of June. Fort Pease is not, and never was, a military post. It was established as a trading and "wolfing" station, was formed of little log huts connected by a line of stockade, and was occupied by a party of hunters and trappers, whose principal occupation consisted in collecting furs from the numerous wild animals inhabiting the country. The most valuable of these are derived from the wolves, which exist there in great numbers, and those who collect the skins are known in the western country as "wolfers." The skins are most valuable in the winter season when the fur is heavy and soft, and the method of securing them cruel in the extreme. During the severe weather of winter when the ground is covered with snow the wolves in immense numbers range over the whole country, especially at night, in search of food. The quick nose of the wolf soon discovers the location of any dead animal, and it is at once eagerly devoured by the half-famished animals, whose cries bring others to the scene of the feast. The "wolfers" after slaying a deer, antelope, elk, or buffalo, removes the skin, takes such portion of the meat as he wants, and then taking from his pocket a little bottle of strychnine proceeds whilst the flesh is still warm to impregnate it with the poison. The next morning when he visits the scene he has only to follow the wolf-tracks in the snow for a short distance to discover the bodies of all the wolves which have participated in the feast, lying where the poor animals have expired in the most intense agony. He removes the valuable skins at his leisure, or if the weather is cold waits for a milder day to perform the skinning operation.

So violent is this poison that it is said that another animal eating of the flesh of a poisoned one rapidly falls a victim to the deadly taint, and the stomach of a poisoned wolf will retain its fatal properties for a long time to come, as many a hunter with valuable dogs has found to his cost. This active poison, strychnine, is sold in immense quantities throughout this whole western country, and is, I believe, the only one used; the more common one, arsenic, producing, as is well known, no effect upon the dog-kind. The Indians are very much prejudiced against its use, and it is said they

have a superstition that where it is used on dead buffalo it destroys the grass, and drives the buffalo away. The Sioux in the vicinity of Fort Pease early testified their hostility towards the "wolfer" party, and took every occasion to waylay and kill any of them who imprudently wandered too far from the post. They even threatened the post itself with attack, and so beleaguered the little garrison in the winter of 1875 and 1876 that it was with difficulty any of them could get out for procuring the necessary food or fuel. In the early spring of 1876 their cries for help became so loud that in February a command was ordered from Fort Ellis to go to the relief of Fort Pease. Four companies of cavalry started on the 22d, made the march of over two hundred miles down the Yellowstone, crossing the river several times on the ice, and returned to Fort Ellis in less than a month with the rescued trappers, having seen no Indians on the trip.

The Sioux did not confine their hostile acts to parties, like the one at Fort Pease, immediately on the borders of their hunting-ground. For several years, murdering and thieving war parties had invaded the white settlements of Montana, carrying consternation wherever they went. Cattle were slaughtered, horses stolen, and men killed in the settlements east of Fort Ellis, in the summer of 1875, and during August of that year several soldiers, whilst hunting and fishing in the vicinity of Camp Lewis, a post established for the protection of a mail and freighting route from Helena to Carroll on the Missouri River, were killed. These depredations were all supposed to be committed by men belonging to a tribe presided over by a chief, called Sitting Bull, a rather notorious Sioux who prided himself greatly upon standing aloof from the whites, never going to an agency and never trading with one personally, although he was not averse to trading with the agency through others. His home camp was supposed to be on the dry fork of the Missouri, a stream which running north empties into that river just above Fort Peck (a trading post and agency for the northern Indians). These war parties from his camp, operating during the summer season, would pass over vast distances on their fleet little ponies, commit their depredations, and be off hundreds of miles away before anybody but the poor victims would know anything about it.

But Montana was not the only region which suffered from these depredations. Similar transactions were taking place to the southward along the northern borders of Wyoming and Nebraska, and in the Black Hills (a region guaranteed by solemn treaty to the Indians), the "irrepressible conflict" between barbarism and the invading gold-seekers was carried on, and, as may be imagined, did not tend to bring about peaceful relations between the government

and the Sioux nation. At length the government, having through its agents *starved* many of the Indians into leaving the agencies in order to get food, ordered them all back there in the depth of winter at the penalty of being proceeded against by the military, and early in March the troops took the field from the south, struck Crazy Horse's camp on Powder River, and returned.

On the very day of this occurrence (17th), five companies of infantry left Fort Shaw, and, in the midst of snow and mud, commenced their march of one hundred and eighty-three miles for Fort Ellis, whilst another company from Camp Baker dug its way through the deep snowdrifts of a mountain range, and proceeded towards the same point. These troops reached Fort Ellis in the latter part of March, probably the most inclement month of the year, and, in the midst of heavy storms of wet snow and sleet, and over roads which were simply horrible, were pushed across the divide which separates that post from the waters of the Yellowstone, under the supposition that they were moving to co-operate with General Crook's column from the south. On the 1st of April, the four companies of the Second Cavalry left Fort Ellis to follow the same road, and overtake the infantry. It proved anything but an April day. The steep and rocky road was intersected in places by streams and marshy spots where our heavily loaded wagons sunk to the hub, and on the 3d a furious storm of wind and drifting snow assailed us, so that it was midnight on the 4th before the train reached Shields's River, a distance of twenty-eight miles. This was slow progress, indeed, if we wished to co-operate with General Crook's column, the account of whose fight, some four hundred miles away, had just been received by telegraph.

The military was started out to punish and bring to subjection the hostile bands which were defying the government. These were known to be not numerous, and they were, during the summer months, in the habit of roaming at will over the vast uninhabited region I have described in the great bend of the Missouri River, hunting the buffalo, laying up their supplies of skins and meat for the winter, and varying their operations by sending out small war parties to raid upon the white settlements, or fighting the Crows, against whom they were at deadly enmity. If these were all the troops had to contend with it was natural to suppose that the moment General Crook commenced to press them from the south, these bands would move north, and, if not interfered with, would, if the pressure continued, cross the Yellowstone, and perhaps even the Missouri. Hence the necessity for other columns of troops with which to strike these moving bands on the march, or interfere to prevent their crossing to the north of the Yellowstone. For this purpose two columns moved, one from the east the other from

the west, and marched towards each other. But two weeks before the Montana column started from Fort Ellis, General Crook had struck his blow, and hence the necessity for pushing forward down the Yellowstone as rapidly as possible, for the Indians, if moving north, would succeed in getting across that stream before the yearly spring rise, and before either the eastern or western column could interfere.

The original intention was to move the Montana column directly on Fort C. F. Smith by what was called the Bogeman wagon-road, then to cross the Big Horn River and move eastward, with the expectation of striking any hostile camps which might be located in that vast region watered by the Little Big Horn, Tongue, and Rosebud, but, on the receipt of the news of General Crook's fight, it was deemed advisable to move this column directly down the Yellowstone, and to keep it north instead of south of that river. This rendered necessary a change of our depot of supplies from the new Crow agency on the Stillwater, one hundred miles from Fort Ellis, to the north side of the Yellowstone River. For, in a few weeks that stream would be entirely impassable from the melting of the spring snows. A train with a month's supply of forage and rations had already been forwarded to the Crow agency. The troops found no difficulty in fording the Yellowstone River, and on the 7th the cavalry overtook the infantry in camp on the Yellowstone above the mouth of the Stillwater, where the whole command was luxuriating on the delicious trout caught in the greatest quantity from the clear and almost ice-cold waters of the Yellowstone.

I had in the morning sent forward a courier to the agency, calling a council with the Crows with a view to obtaining some of them to accompany the troops as scouts, and had requested Mitch Bowyer, a noted guide and interpreter, to meet me that night in my camp. This man I had never seen, but he had served with troops before, and bore the reputation of being, next to the celebrated Jim Bridger, the best guide in the country. Whilst seated in my tent the next morning, a man with the face of an Indian and the dress of a white man approached the door, and almost without saying anything seated himself on the ground, and it was some moments before I understood that my visitor was the expected guide. He was a diffident, low-spoken man, who uttered his words in a hesitating way, as if uncertain what he was going to say. He brought the news that the Crows were waiting to see me, and mounting my horse I was with a small party soon on the road to the agency, which we reached after a disagreeable ride of eighteen miles through a severe storm of wet snow. The agency, situated amidst bleak and barren hills, was surrounded by the teepees of some three thou-

sand Crows, scattered in family groups all over the little valley of Rosebud Creek,¹ a branch of the Stillwater.

The next day, Sunday, the chiefs assembled in council to hear my "talk" and the proposition to furnish us scouts. Somewhat to my surprise the proposition did not appear to be favorably received, and when an Indian does not want to do a thing he resembles a white man a good deal, and has a thousand and one excellent reasons why he should not do it. They listened in silence to the interpreter as he translated, or *appeared* to translate, what I said. For when he came to translate their answer to me he strung his English words together in such a fearfully incongruous way as made me tremble at the idea that my eloquent appeal to the chiefs had been murdered in the Crow tongue, as he was murdering the English in conveying to me their answer.

These Indian interpreters are a peculiar institution. As a class, they are an interesting study, and will bear generally a good deal of watching. A white man, usually a renegade from civil society, takes up his abode with a tribe of Indians, adopts their mode of life, takes unto himself a squaw, picks up gradually enough of their signs and words to make himself understood, and when the Indians come in contact with the whites becomes, in the absence of any other means of communication, an "interpreter." He may not understand the English language, or be able to put together a single intelligible sentence, and it does not mend the matter much if he happens to be a French Canadian, for then broken French, broken English, and broken Indian are mixed up in a hodge-podge which defies all understanding and makes the listener sometimes give up in despair. I suspect many an Indian commissioner would stand aghast could he have *literally* translated to him the perfect jumble of words in which the "interpreter" had conveyed his eloquent and carefully prepared speech to the ears of his red audience. For this reason it is a matter of some importance in communicating with Indians to make use of the plainest language and the shortest sentences, and even then you are by no means sure that anything like what you intended is conveyed to your listeners, especially if what you say does not happen to meet the peculiar views or interests of the one who, for the want of a better term, is called an "interpreter." The one who officiated on this occasion appeared to try to be making up by gesticulations and a loud voice for any defects in his knowledge of language. I believe he did finally succeed in conveying to the Indians the information that we wanted twenty-five of their young active warriors to accompany us to the field and serve as the "*eyes*" of the expedition, in spying out the

¹ This must not be confounded with the other Rosebud lower down.

country and giving us information regarding the location of the Sioux camps.

The talk was received in silence, followed by a very earnest discussion amongst themselves, after which two of the principal chiefs, Iron Bull and Blackfoot, replied to the effect that if the young men wanted to go they could go, but that if they did not want to go they (the chiefs) could not make them; that they were friends to the white man and desired to remain at peace with him; appealed to the Almighty (the interpreter called him *Godalamily*) as to the sincerity of what they said, and ended with what I fear is a very common appeal now amongst Indians, for more flour and beef than was issued to them. But one single man seemed to talk in favor of going to war, but they asked time to talk about it amongst themselves, for such weighty matters are never decided in a hurry, and have to be discussed with due deliberation and the appropriate amount of smoke. So the council broke up without any definite conclusion being reached, and I began to think we should have to enter the Sioux country blindfolded. I soon discovered, however, that only the "old fogies" had spoken in council, and that as soon as "Young America" had a chance to be heard in the camps our chance for obtaining scouts improved, and the next morning the whole number required came forward and were sworn into the United States service. This ceremony was peculiar. We wished to bind them to their contract in some way, and in casting round for a method were informed that the Crow's way to take an oath was to *touch with his finger the point of a knife*. After this solemn proceeding if he failed to stand up to his pledges he was a disgraced man; but what was far more likely to keep him faithful was the belief that a violation of the oath laid him open to direful calamities in the way of disease and misfortune, not only to himself, but to all the members of his family! All the volunteers were paraded, and an officer presented to each in succession a hunting knife, on the point of which each one gravely placed the tip of his forefinger and the deed was done. They thus became United States soldiers for three months, and were to receive soldier's pay, rations, and clothing. After all had gone through the ceremony, one of them took the knife and gravely presented the point of it to me. When asked why he wished to swear me, he said he wished to bind me to do what *they* said; but I told them I could not do that, for the obligation to obey was on their side alone. The officer who swore them in offered to swear that he would see they got all the pay, rations, etc., they were entitled to, and as all they wanted apparently was some kind of a mutual obligation, they readily consented to this, and the officer solemnly touched the point of the knife.

I will not burden my readers with the long list of the long names

of the twenty-five warriors who thus engaged to join us in our campaign against the Sioux, but will mention simply the names of several who afterwards became noted amongst us.

Ee-suh-seé-ush, whose English name was "Show-his-Face," was an old man, who went along with no idea of engaging in the labors of war, but accompanied the party simply to give it character, and bestow upon the younger members the benefit of his advice. He was early looked upon as what in Western phraseology is called a "coffee-cooler," a fellow who loafs around the camp-fire, and whose principal occupation consists in cooling *and* drinking coffee from a tincup. From his supposed resemblance to a venerable senator from the State of Pennsylvania he soon became known in the camp as "The Senator."

Iss-too-sah-shee-dah, Half-yellow-Face, was a large, fine-looking Indian, who afterwards became a great favorite with us, and was one of the six Crows who accompanied the Seventh Cavalry and was present with it in its fight on the 25th of June.

Meé-uah-tsee-us, White Swan, also accompanied the Seventh Cavalry, and was badly wounded in the battle.

Shuh'-shec-ahsh, Curly Hair, was quite a young man and became noted afterwards as the one single person who, of all those taken into action under the immediate command of General Custer, made his escape.

On the 10th our wagon train arrived from the camp, our supplies were loaded up and ready to start the next morning for the depot to be established on the north bank of the Yellowstone. That night a furious storm of wind and snow raged, and we opened our eyes to find the ground covered with two feet of snow and rapidly deepening. To remain stationary, however, was simply to contemplate the possibility of being snowed up in the mountains for a week, perhaps longer. As soon, therefore, as the harness could be dug out of the snow, and the teams hitched up we started to plough through the deep snow notwithstanding the storm, which still raged directly in our faces. As we receded from the mountains, however, the snow decreased in depth, the storm abated, and the train reached camp late at night, the only mishap being the loss of two mules drowned in crossing the Yellowstone at a ford which was quite a deep and rapid one.

All the supplies and extra baggage which we could not carry in our wagons we now prepared to leave here under charge of one of the infantry companies, and, with the remainder of the command and our heavily loaded wagons, we resumed the march down the Yellowstone. The ground was, however, very soft from the melting snow, and the teams labored slowly along. For several days we made but little progress, and only reached Baker's battle-ground, a

distance of forty-three miles, on the 15th. This was the scene of an attack made by Indians in 1872 upon a body of our troops engaged in escorting the engineers of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company.

Below this, in order to avoid the rough broken ground extending for miles along the north of the river, we were obliged to cross once more to the southern bank, at a ford which was deep and rapid, and came very near proving fatal to one of our officers. His horse yielding to the force of the swiftly rushing current soon got out of his depth, and in an instant both he and his rider disappeared beneath the surface of the water. Soon the horse's head came up and then the rider's; but to the horror of the lookers-on the horse seemed to be utterly incapable of swimming, and engaged in frantic struggles, without aim or object, in the course of which he nearly fell over backwards on his rider. The current fortunately, as it swept them along, carried them close enough to the river-bank to strike bottom, when horse and rider, the latter still clinging to the bridle, but chilled with the ice-cold water, were pulled ashore.

On the south side of the river there is no longer any road, and we have to make our way as best we can through the thick heavy sage brush of the valley to Prior's Creek, which we find a deep rushing torrent of muddy snow-water, with high banks. Crossing this delays us so long that the day is far towards its close when we go into camp, chafing at having made only seven miles.

The next day brought us to the far-famed Pompey's Pillar, almost under the shadow of which we camped. It is an irregular mass of sandstone, rising several hundred feet above the level of the valley on the south side of the river, and evidently belonged originally to a corresponding bluff on the opposite side of the river, from which it has been separated by the wearing away of the intervening rock. The account of Lewis and Clarke mentions that a fine view of the surrounding country was had from the top of Pompey's Pillar, which was ascended by Captain Clarke for that purpose the day the expedition passed the pillar, which is stated in their journal to have been the 25th of July, 1806. I climbed up the not very steep ascent on the eastern side, and whilst resting on one of the ledges read over the names, which, in travellers' fashion, were roughly scribbled over the face of the soft sandstone, until I came to this:

Wm Clarke

July 25th 1806

My first thought was that some later visitor had amused himself by inscribing the great explorer's name on this landmark; but an examination of the more recent inscriptions showed them all to be light-colored, whilst the lines of this one were of the same tint

as the face of the brown sandstone upon which the writing was placed, and I remained satisfied that I stood face to face with Captain Clarke's name inscribed nearly seventy years before. I continued the ascent, pondering over the different circumstances surrounding me in this Centennial year of the country, and those under which Captain Clarke climbed up when the nation was but thirty-one years old, and this whole region one vast wilderness. On reaching the top I found myself standing upon a grass-grown mound surrounded on three sides by a sheer precipice of perpendicular rock, down which it made one's head swim to look. To the north, across the beautiful clear river, rose a mass of rough broken hills, whilst to the south and west extended the broad flat plain of the river bottom, bordered on the north by a curved line of timber which marked the course of the river, and to the south by a range of bluffs which, opening in one place to allow the passage of Fly Creek, permitted the eye to range far up its little valley towards the mouth of the Little Big Horn River, afterwards to play so prominent a part in the history of our campaign.

With a view to the examination of that region the command laid over here one day, and scouts were sent off in that direction. They returned without having seen any sign of Indians, but reported that the whole valley of the Big Horn was black with countless herds of buffalo quietly feeding, the best of signs that no Indians are close about, and yet the best in the world that they are not very far away; for the buffalo herd is the natural *commissary* of the Indians on the plains, and they constantly follow this moving depot of supplies. When they commence to hunt them, the buffalo immediately about the hunting-grounds stampede and run for miles, pushing the rest of the herd before them. Hence, if the buffalo are quietly feeding you may be sure there is no pressure from behind, and no Indians near. But if on the contrary the herd is found to be moving, you may look out for Indians, as surely as you look for cars behind an approaching locomotive.

Ordinarily on reaching camp both officers and men are so tired out with the march that as soon as the evening meal is finished, and the night guard posted, all are ready to seek that sleep, the want of which tells fearfully upon the physical forces the next day, and usually by nine o'clock, frequently earlier, the whole camp except the sentinels are wrapped in deep slumber, which is enjoyed securely, with the knowledge that several pairs of eyes are peering out into the darkness and the same number of pairs of ears eagerly on the alert to detect the approach of any prowling Indians who may be seeking an opportunity to steal our animals. But after a day's rest the powers are recuperated, groups are formed around the blazing camp-fires, and the still night re-echoes with songs sung

in full chorus. Such an evening was spent under the tall cottonwoods of our camp at Pompey's Pillar, and long after the campfires were out and everything was still, the thoughts of many of us wandered off towards those "true loves," who, in the words of the ringing chorus, still echoing in our ears, were, so far as communicating with them was concerned,

"Playing the grand in a distant land,
Ten thousand miles away."

During the next day's march the bluffs on both sides abutted so closely on the river as to force us to ford the stream twice within a distance of two miles, and now haste becomes all the more necessary, for the river is evidently rising, and we must make our last crossing so as to be on the north side before it becomes impassable. Our guide, Mitch Bowyer, is of inestimable value now, for he rides forward to search for a crossing, and is an indefatigable worker, riding his hardy little pony into the ice-cold water sometimes to a swimming depth, testing the crossings where anybody thinks there is a chance to get our wagons over. At last the shallowest point is found, and although deeper than is comfortable we must take to the water, for we cannot afford to wait another day. A company of cavalry, with its old soldier captain at its head, mounted on his old and long-tried favorite, "Dick," enters the ford, stringing out in a long curved line behind as brave old "Dick" breasts the rushing and rapidly deepening stream. Higher and higher rises the water, and just as we begin to think some of the smaller horses will have to swim, "Dick's" shoulder commences to emerge, and the worst is passed. Now the wagons, covered with infantrymen, start in, and as they approach the deepest part some of the smaller mules barely have their backs above the water, but still they struggle on, seeming to understand as well as their drivers that when crossing a river is no time "to swap horses." Suddenly down goes the forepart of one of the wagons, and for a moment it is a matter of doubt whether a wheel is broken or is in a hole. The mules struggle and plunge, fall down and get up again, the drivers, outsiders, and men shout out their loudest yells to encourage the frantic animals, and at last the long line of wagons reaches the opposite shore, water pouring from every crack of the wagon-bodies, which makes us hope that the bottom layer of each load is bacon rather than "hardtack" and bedding. Our dripping teams are given a short rest, mounted officers and men pour the water from their boots, and we all feel relieved that we are on the right bank of the river at last. A few miles further, and from the top of the bluffs bordering the valley of the Yellowstone we catch sight of the walls of Fort

Pease, still standing, with a little United States flag fluttering in the breeze.

The next day a courier arrived from Camp Supply, bringing an important dispatch from department headquarters. It had reached Camp Supply just after the departure of two couriers with our mail, and an energetic young son of one of our officers started with it, accompanied by a single soldier, to ride a hundred miles and bring it to me. He followed our trail, saw nothing of the other couriers, crossed, with great difficulty, the river at our last ford, and reached our camp in safety. The dispatch was dated at St. Paul on the 15th (six days before), and informed me that General Crook would not be prepared to take the field before the middle of May, that the third column had not yet started, and directed that I proceed no farther than the mouth of the Big Horn unless sure of striking a successful blow. Our camp was, therefore, moved down to Fort Pease, and for three weeks we were engaged in what to a soldier is the hardest of all duties—*waiting*.

Advantage was taken of this delay to send back our wagon train under charge of a company, to bring up the rest of our supplies, and to thoroughly examine the valleys of Little and Big Horn in the direction of old Fort C. F. Smith. This latter was accomplished by a scouting party of two companies of cavalry, which left us on the 24th and returned on the 1st of May, having seen no signs of Indians during the trip.

On the 30th, some of our Indian scouts returned from the Rosebud, reporting that country free from any signs of Indians, and it began to look as if they had all fled to the agencies. Our Crow scouts are kept constantly on the alert, some of them being out every day, early and late. They appear to be of a nervous, excitable temperament, and some of them came running in one day to announce the approach of a party of Sioux. A mounted party was at once sent out to reconnoitre, and came back with the information that the scouts had seen one of our hunting parties, and took them for Sioux.

Fort Pease is situated directly on the bank of the river, at the edge of a wide open prairie. Directly opposite, on the other side of the river, a steep rocky bluff rises up almost perpendicularly from the edge of the water, and this our scouts were in the habit of using as a lookout, crossing the river in a small boat, several of which were found at the fort when we arrived there. The 1st of May was a bright clear day, and about noon the whole camp was startled by hearing loud and continued yells from the opposite bluffs. Immediately the Crows in camp seized their arms, and started on a run for their pony herd, grazing about a mile from camp. Looking up to the top of the bluff, four Indians could be

seen running in single file at the top of their speed, and uttering the most piercing screams. They looked as if about to pitch over the perpendicular bluff into the river below; but just before reaching the edge, the leader commenced circling around, followed by the others, all uttering the wildest shrieks, and then all disappeared behind a projecting point, to reappear soon after at a lower point, still on the full run. The running in a circle was the signal for "an enemy in sight," and word was sent to draw in the herd. In an incredibly short space of time the scouts had crossed the river, and came panting into camp with the information that they had seen a large war party of Sioux coming out of the valley of Tullock's Fork. As I was expecting the scouting party from Fort Smith, I suggested that it might be that; but they declared they were not white men, did not move like them, and were far too numerous to be our scouting party, and altogether were so positive and confident, and moreover apparently so hurt that I should think they could confound white men and Sioux, that I began to have serious misgivings in regard to the safety of our two little companies of cavalry, and to imagine that they had met with serious disaster, and the victorious Sioux were now coming in to pay their respects to us. Hence I was very much relieved when, a few hours later, our friends, dripping from the deep ford of the Yellowstone, rode into camp and reported the result of their scout. The Crows looked crestfallen at the idea of their false cry of "the wolf," but were soon to learn by sad experience that the "wolf" was even closer than they thought, for the very next day a heavy windstorm set in, and all that night the camp and vicinity were swept with driving clouds of dust, through which objects could be seen only at a few paces' distance. Just such a night do Indians select for their thieving expeditions, and early the next morning one of our white scouts came into camp and exhibited, with a rueful countenance, a picket-pin with two bits of rope cut off close to the pin-head. The night before, that picket-pin had been driven into the ground a hundred yards outside of our line of camp sentinels, the bits of rope were thin lariats, and at their opposite extremities were tied to graze two of his own animals, a horse and a mule. Now, all of his property that remained was this picket-pin and the cleanly severed ends of his lariats. All our own animals were inside the line of sentinels, as his two should have been. We had never been able to bring our Crows sufficiently under military control to induce them to keep their ponies in camp at night, and they were permitted to roam at large night and day in search of subsistence. The lonely picket-pin demonstrated beyond doubt that "the wolf" had come, and that the thieving Sioux had paid our camp a visit. It did not take long to make the discovery that

the whole pony herd of the Crows, some thirty in number, had, alas, disappeared, and the scene which followed was absurd in the extreme. The Crows assembled at their camp and *cried* like children whose toys had been broken. There is nothing unnatural in a crying child, and the manly grief of a broken heart excites one's sympathy, but to see a parcel of great big Indians standing together and blubbering like babies, with great tears streaming down their swarthy faces because they had lost their horses, struck every one as supremely ridiculous. Scouting parties were sent out, the trail of the marauders discovered leading down the river, and signs found which left no doubt of their being Sioux.

On the 8th our train, with the two companies, arrived from Camp Supply, and the whole command being now together, with wagons enough to carry all our stores, I decided to move farther down the river. There were evidently nothing more than small war parties about us, and my reiterated instructions were to guard as much as possible against the Indians crossing the Yellowstone to go north. The principal crossing-places were lower down near the mouth of Rosebud River, and on this side. We moved on the 10th, but were delayed by bad roads made worse by a furious rainstorm, and on the fifth day had made only fifty-two miles to a camp a short distance above the mouth of the Rosebud. Here we were visited by a heavy hail and rainstorm, which stampeded our animals, flooded our camp, and rendered the surrounding country impassable for wagons. Both sides of the river were kept well scouted, and on the 17th one of our party reported the presence on Tongue River, some thirty-five miles distant, of an Indian camp. The Yellowstone was now a raging torrent of muddy water; but we had, on leaving Fort Pease, brought along several small boats found there, and with the assistance of these it was determined to throw a force across the river, and by a night march, surprise the camp on Tongue River. Pack saddles were now got out, extra ammunition and rations issued, and preparations made to cross the river with the whole force except one company, which was left at our camp in charge of the train. The crossing-place selected was about a mile above the camp. The boats were pulled up there and used to cross over the men, saddles, etc., of a company. The horses of the company were then brought down to the shore and an attempt made to drive them into the water. They resisted stoutly; but a few finally entered the water, which was cold and rapid. But no sooner did they lose their footing and commence to swim than, turning round, they returned to our shore, followed by the few which had ventured in after them. Again and again were they forced to the water's edge, but with the same result, and finally the whole of

them broke from the men around them and stampeded back to camp. Several hours were consumed in these fruitless efforts, and then a different plan was tried. One of the oldest horses was selected, and to his tail was firmly tied the halter of another; to the tail of this one another, and so on till a long line of half a dozen were tied together. A rope attached to the leader was now taken into the boat manned by rowers and the boat pulled out from shore. The leader quietly followed, dragging his trail behind him, whilst the loose horses, seeing so many going in, followed in a body, urged on by the shouting men. Soon the deep water was reached and the leader began to swim, followed in fine style by the others, and everything was looking favorable for the passage of the horses at last, when suddenly the whole scene changed and one of the most indescribable confusion followed. From some cause or other the boats became unmanageable in the swift current, and instead of keeping on a straight course with a taut rope stretching to the leading horse, it floated for a moment at the mercy of the current, the rope became slack, the rear horses continued to swim forward, the third or fourth horse got across the line in front of the leader, and in an instant the water was filled with a tangled mass of frantic animals struggling for life. Most of the hitching halters held, and the longer the poor creatures struggled the worse entangled they became. Some soon became exhausted and sunk beneath the ice-cold muddy torrent; some few continued across and landed on the other shore, but most of them returned, whilst one powerful beast waded back, pulling after him a comrade which had fallen exhausted and died in water so shallow that only about one-half his body was covered. Four horses were drowned outright, and the rest so frightened that they could not be again made to approach the water. It was now late in the afternoon, the attempt to cross the river was abandoned, the few men and horses thrown across were brought back and the troops returned to camp. We were now, perforce, confined in our operations to the north side of the river, up and down which mounted parties were constantly kept on the move, and occasionally two or three of the Crows would cross and reconnoitre the south side, or start on horse-stealing expeditions; but in each case they returned unsuccessful and disappointed.

One day whilst seated in my tent I heard the distant cry of a wolf. Wondering at the bark of a cayote in broad daylight, my attention was attracted by a great commotion amongst the Crows, several of whom with their guns started on the run for the river-bank, repeating the wolf-like cry. It was answered from across the river, and jumping into one of the boats they soon returned with two of their number, who had gone off on a horse-stealing expedition, and now,

having been unsuccessful, were coming back, and took this way of informing their friends of the fact.

On the 18th two companies of cavalry were started on a scout to the mouth of Tongue River, and two days afterwards the Crows reported a heavy force of Indians moving towards the mouth of the Rosebud, evidently with the design of crossing the Yellowstone. Leaving one company of infantry in charge of the camp, the remainder of the command was pushed hastily down the river, and bivouacked for the night just below the mouth of the Rosebud. No Indians, however, were seen, nor any indications of a projected crossing, and the next day the remainder of the camp was brought down to the new position, and the two companies from below joined us. They had gone down as far as the mouth of Tongue River, had seen a party of about fifty Indians trying evidently to get across to our side, and not having themselves been seen, had laid in wait for them several hours. But the Indians after several attempts to cross, had evidently given it up, and proceeded up the river on the other side. On leaving, however, they had concealed their extra ponies in the timber, and with the idea that they had left no guard to look after them, Mitch Bowyer and one of the Crows with the scouting party conceived a bold attempt to capture these ponies. Stripping, and without a weapon of any kind, they swam the Yellowstone, and crept through the timber to within sight of the grazing animals, which they found under charge of two Indian boys. To get to them they were obliged to pass an open space, and no sooner did their naked forms leave the shelter of the timber than they were perceived by the watchful boys, who with loud shouts hurried the band of ponies off into the hills beyond their reach, and Mitch and his companion had nothing to do but to swim back to their own side of the river.

We had in the command a number of fine shots, and permission was constantly given these men to hunt, and by them the country in the vicinity of our camps and line of march was kept very well scouted. One of these parties reported on the 22d that they had been fired upon by Indians in the hills that day, but they were evidently not in great force, for the scouting parties sent out discovered but few pony tracks, and saw no Indians. The next morning early the pickets reported firing in the hills. Several hunting parties were out, but the firing being continued, and a number of horsemen making their appearance on the bluff about three miles from camp, two companies of cavalry were at once sent out in that direction, and it was then for the first time discovered that two men belonging to one of these companies and a citizen teamster were absent from camp without authority. Why they should go without permission when all they had to do was to ask for it, I could not

imagine, and it is a singular fact that of all the parties out that morning this one of three was the only one to encounter Indians. The cavalry started at once for the point where the horsemen had been seen to disappear on the bluffs. On reaching the foot-hills the party found itself in the midst of a succession of knolls rising higher and higher, and forming a number of narrow valleys. The men appear to have entered one of these blindly without taking any precaution in the way of a lookout. They were doubtless watched from the high ground, and parties of Indians posted out of sight behind the hills on each side permitted the three hunters to advance until surrounded on all sides, and then making their appearance, delivered their fire from several directions upon the doomed men. The bodies were found stripped, shot in several places and horribly mutilated, with heads beaten in, and one of the men had two knives, taken from the bodies of his dead comrades, driven into the sides of his head. The knife of the third man was afterwards recognized and picked up on Custer's battle-field. When the cavalry reached the top of the bluffs, not an Indian was to be seen. The trail was followed for some miles, but the only thing seen of the party was a single horseman rapidly disappearing on a distant hill. The bodies were brought into camp and laid side by side to rest under a large cottonwood tree, upon the trunk of which, after removing the bark an appropriate inscription was placed, and heavy logs piled up over the grave to guard against the action of wolves. As the scouting party came into camp about sundown, quite a number of heads appeared cautiously above a distant hill on the other side of the river, and from this time forth our camp was doubtless very carefully watched.

We had now been out nearly two months, and our supplies were becoming short. I had sent back to Fort Ellis for more supplies, and had information that they were on the road. For the double purpose of escorting this train in, and taking back a number of surplus contractors' wagons, two companies left our camp in charge of a train the very morning of the murders (23d), and we now had nothing to do but to await the arrival of our supplies, keeping the river above and below well scouted by parties of cavalry. I had received dispatches from General Terry that he expected to reach the Yellowstone at the mouth of the Glendive Creek about the 28th, and on the 27th I called for volunteers to carry a dispatch down the river by boat. Two men who afterwards became quite noted for a deed of great daring, offered their services for the trip. Their names were Evans and Stewart, both soldiers, belonging to Captain Clifford's company of the Seventh Infantry. They were accompanied by a white scout, named Williamson, and just at dark, with muffled oars, they got into their frail bark and noiselessly dropped down the stream on their perilous and uncertain voyage, many of

their comrades assembling on the bank to see them off. The very next morning I received by boat from Fort Ellis an important dispatch from department headquarters. It informed me that General Terry had left Fort Lincoln on the morning of the 15th; that he had received information that the hostiles were concentrated on the Little Missouri, and between that and the Powder River; that he anticipated opposition between the Missouri River and the Yellowstone, and directed me to march at once to a point on the Yellowstone opposite Stanley's stockade, to cross the river, if possible, and advance to meet him on Stanley's trail, and to use one of the steamers which I would probably find there for crossing my command. The point designated was some one hundred and fifty miles from where we then were. A speedy movement was evidently expected, and yet with the region about us infested with hostile Indians, how could we leave the large train of supplies now on the road to follow us with its escort of one small company of infantry? All our wagons were at once unloaded, and the next morning under charge of two companies started back to lighten the supply train, and hurry it forward as fast as possible. Notwithstanding a furious *snow*-storm, which raged all day on the 1st of June, our train made good time, and reached camp on the 4th, so that the command was now once more together, and its supplies with it. The morning of the 5th found us on our way down the river once more, every one eager to push forward and join the Lincoln column. But we were now entering upon a comparatively unknown region, and on the second day encountered a single hill which required four hours and a great deal of hard work to get our train up, and, on the third, after a march of twenty-one and a half miles, had made only forty-one miles. Mitch Bowyer informed us that the roads passed over heretofore were good compared with those we should have in the next few days, when we should be compelled to enter a terrible section of the "*Mauvaise terres*."

On the morning of the 8th, our scouts reported Indians in front, and, later on, two who had followed on the trail of two horsemen brought in a package which told us a tale words could not have made plainer. The package consisted of a small sack containing a number of army cartridges, some small round crackers, such as are kept for sale in the subsistence department, and a piece of *cheese*. The last-named article Indians seldom, if ever, use, and would never carry on a trip, so that the contents of this little sack told us as plainly as if the news had been received in a letter that General Terry was close by, and was trying to communicate with us by couriers, and that the couriers were white men. We camped that night in the open prairie on the bank of the Yellowstone, and about two o'clock in the morning, I was waked out of a sound sleep by

loud shouts. Jumping up, I reached the picket-line in time to receive a white man and an Indian, who brought dispatches from General Terry at the mouth of the Powder River. He had reached that stream without encountering any Indians, and invited me to meet him coming up the river on the steamer "Far West" the next morning. I learned too that the sack and its contents picked up by our scouts the day before had been correctly interpreted. It had been dropped by one of two white men who had been sent to communicate with us. They had seen from a distance our Crow scouts, had taken them for Sioux, and had fled back to report the country filled with hostiles, and lose a reward of two hundred dollars which had been promised them if they got through to me with their dispatches, dropping in their flight the articles which were picked up the day after by my scouts, who had never even seen the men who dropped them.

The morning of the 9th I proceeded down the valley with a company of cavalry, and soon had a specimen of the bad lands referred to by Mitch Bowyer as existing in the vicinity of Powder River, north of the Yellowstone. We climbed up an almost inaccessible mountain, being several times obliged to dismount and lead our horses, and on reaching the top had a fine view of the valley of the Yellowstone beyond far down in the direction of Powder River. The muddy rapid stream wound around the foot of the mountain almost directly beneath us, and through the fringe of timber on its banks little puffs of white steam rose up and revealed the presence of a steamer slowly making her way up against the strong current. It was the most civilized scene we had witnessed for more than two months, and as the deep hoarse voice of the steam-whistle broke upon the still morning air, the top of what we afterwards named "Steamboat Point" resounded with a loud cheer of welcome from our little party. Following a buffalo trail down the steep side of the Point we were soon on board the steamer and on our way back to camp, where the men flocked down to the bank to welcome the second steamer which had ever been so far up the waters of the Yellowstone.

The existence of any large camps of hostile Indians in this region was now more than ever a matter of doubt; for General Terry had discovered no trace of any on his march from Fort Lincoln to the Powder River, which he had reached at a point twenty-five miles above its mouth. He informed me that he had heard nothing from General Crook, and intended on his return to Powder River to send a cavalry command on a scout up that river and across it west to the Tongue and Rosebud. If no Indians should be discovered then the only remaining chance would be higher up the Yellowstone, where from my observation there must be some Indians, and if

General Crook should strike them from the south, it would be all the more necessary for us to guard the line of the river and prevent any escape to the northward. He therefore instructed me to retrace my steps and await his arrival at the mouth of the Rosebud, and as dispatch was now of more importance than ever I agreed to start the cavalry part of my command that afternoon. The General had no guide at his disposal acquainted with the country south of the Yellowstone, and I suggested that he take Mitch Bowyer, who had proved so valuable to us, and as I knew well acquainted with that country. Mitch, always ready and willing, assented at once, and as soon as he and his horse were on board the steamer started down the river, and preparations were at once made to commence the march back. Before, however, the cavalry was ready to move one of those terrific rain-storms, of which we had had so many, set in. The whole alkali flat around us became one immense quagmire, and a gulch back of our camp, which was dry when we came, was soon a torrent ten or twelve feet deep. This rendered any movement out of the question until the afternoon of the next day, when the cavalry succeeded only in making a few miles, and the next day (11th) were overtaken by the infantry, having been delayed to build a road and pull up a very steep hill, it being impossible to follow the road used coming down on account of Sunday Creek being impassable from high water. All the bridges built and crossings cut during the trip down were found washed away by the heavy rains, and the low grounds were filled with driftwood brought down from the hills through the gulches, which, except during heavy rains, are entirely deprived of water.

Finally, the whole command was reunited on the 14th at the mouth of the Rosebud, where we waited for the arrival of General Terry, keeping in the meantime the country well scouted up and down the river. Four days afterwards (18th) a party of horsemen was reported by our scouts as coming down the Rosebud, and riding to a point about three miles above our camp. I started a couple of Crows to swim across the river, then higher and more rapid than ever, with a note to General Terry. The Indians stripped and commenced their preparations for their cold swim by rubbing themselves all over with red paint. I had the curiosity to inquire the object of this, and was surprised to learn that it was to protect them against the attack of *alligators*. As the alligator is an animal unknown to the waters of this region, the fact referred to is a curious evidence of the southern origin of the Crows, at the same time that it shows how traditions are transmitted for long ages in a barbarous tribe. Having completed their preparations against the attack of an animal of which perhaps their progenitors long ago had a wholesome dread in more southern waters, the note to Gen-

eral Terry was tied in the scalplock of one of them, and the two men started on the run for a point higher up the river. There providing themselves with a log of dead wood, they plunged into the water, and singing to keep up their courage, they were swept past us down the swift current, and after a swim of nearly a mile landed safely on the other side, and were seen through our glasses to approach the party opposite. All this took time, and being curious to know who was in the party, one of our officers tied a handkerchief to a stick, and commenced waving it from side to side as a signal. It was soon answered in the same way, and before our Crows had reached the opposite bank, the army code of signals was spelling out for us the information we wanted. In this way we learned that the party was composed of six companies of the Seventh Cavalry under command of Colonel Reno, which had been on a scout up Powder River and across the Tongue to the Rosebud, and had seen no Indians, though signs of camps had been discovered on the last-named stream and a large trail leading up it. Our Crows swam back to us with a note from Colonel Reno, and the poor fellows were very much exhausted when they reached us. Could we have known what had taken place only twenty-four hours before on the head waters of the very stream at whose mouth we stood, the information would have been invaluable to us, and probably have given a different shape to our whole subsequent operations. As it was, we were still groping in the dark in regard to the location of the hostile camps, and had every reason to believe that the Sioux with their women and children were solicitous only to avoid us. General Terry was understood to be at the mouth of the Tongue River, and the next morning Colonel Reno started with his command to join him. Our scouts reported seeing large fires in the direction of the Little Horn, and now every one was anxious for the arrival of General Terry, for our last chance for striking the Indians appeared to be in the direction indicated.

Anticipating a move up the river, I ordered, on the 21st, three companies of infantry to proceed up the road to replace the bridges, and repair the crossings over the various streams destroyed by the recent rains. During the morning General Terry reached our camp on the "Far West." After conferring with him, the whole command was at once started up the river, and at his request I accompanied him on the steamer to meet General Custer, who was coming up on the other side with the whole of his regiment. The steamer was run up to the mouth of the Rosebud, and afterwards dropped down to a point below, where Custer had arrived in the afternoon, and gone into camp or rather bivouac. As soon as we were tied up to the bank, he came aboard, and seated in the cabin with a map before us, we discussed the proposed operations. The

large trail found by Colonel Reno leading up the Rosebud and the fires seen in that direction by my scouts led to the belief that the Indians, if overtaken at all, would be found somewhere on the Little Big Horn, a favorite resort, where the grazing was good and game close by. It was therefore arranged that General Custer should start the next day with the whole of his regiment, take up the trail on the Rosebud, and follow it; that my command should march to the mouth of the Big Horn, something over sixty miles distant, be there ferried across the Yellowstone, and march from there to the valley of the Little Big Horn, and up that stream to co-operate with Custer's command. An examination of the map showed that the course of the Rosebud approaches that of the Little Big Horn nearest at a point about as far distant from where we then were as the mouth of the Big Horn was from us. Were then Custer, whose command was exclusively of cavalry, marching with pack-mules, to follow the trail directly into the valley of the Little Big Horn, he would probably strike the Indians long before I could be anywhere in the vicinity with my command, part of which was infantry, and to prevent the escape of the Indians, which was the idea pervading the minds of all of us, it was desirable that the two commands should be as near each other as possible when they approached the supposed location of the camp. The Indians, if struck, would probably not retreat *west*, for in that direction was the formidable Big Horn, beyond which was the whole Crow nation, the deadly enemies of the Sioux. They could not go north without running into my column, nor east without doubling on their course, and exposing themselves to attack from both columns. They would, therefore, in all probability, go south; for, in addition to its being their natural and only practicable line of retreat, was the fact that in that direction lay the Big Horn range of mountains, in the fastnesses of which they would be comparatively secure, and could live on the game and wild berries which abounded there. But if, as we had good reason to expect, General Crook's column was somewhere in that direction, there was a third column against which the Indians incumbered with their families were liable to run. Hence it was agreed that Custer, instead of proceeding at once into the valley of the Little Big Horn, even should the trail lead there, should continue on up the Rosebud, get closer to the mountains, and then striking west, come down the valley of the Little Big Horn, "feeling constantly to his left," to be sure that the Indians had not already made their escape to the south and eastward. General Terry, applying a scale to the map, measured the distances, and made the calculation in miles that each command would have to travel. My command having already started, was to be at the mouth of the Big Horn prepared to cross the Yellowstone on the third day.

- The scouts with Custer's regiment were entirely ignorant of the country he was to pass through. Mitch Bowyer, who knew all about it, was to go with him, and in addition, by direction of General Terry, I assigned to duty with him six of my Crow scouts who volunteered for the service. Besides this, General Terry expressed a desire that Custer should communicate with him by sending a scout down the valley of Tullock's Fork, and send him any news of importance he might have, especially as to whether or not any hostiles were on that stream. As he had no one with him suitable for this service, I engaged, by General Terry's order, a white man named Horendem, who had been with my column for some time, was a good scout, and well acquainted with the country he would have to pass over. Horendem stipulated that in case he was called upon to incur the additional risk of carrying dispatches his compensation should be increased. This was agreed to, and he accompanied General Custer's troops.

At noon the next day, General Terry, accompanied by myself and General Brisbin, rode to the upper end of the camp to witness the departure of Custer and his fine regiment. The bugles sounded the "boots and saddles," and Custer, after starting the advance, rode up and joined us. Together we sat on our horses and witnessed the approach of the command as it threaded its way through the rank sage brush which covered the valley. First came a band of buglers sounding a march, and as they came opposite to General Terry they wheeled out of the column as at review, continuing to play as the command passed along. The regiment presented a fine appearance, and as the various companies passed us we had a good opportunity to note the number of fine horses in the ranks, many of them being part-blooded horses from Kentucky, and I was told there was not a single sore-backed horse amongst them. General Custer appeared to be in good spirits, chatted freely with us, and was evidently proud of the appearance of his command. The pack-mules, in a compact body, followed the regiment, and behind them came a rear-guard, and as that approached Custer shook hands with us and bade us good-by. As he turned to leave us I made some pleasant remark, warning him against being greedy, and with a gay wave of his hand he called back, "No, I will not," and rode off after his command. Little did we think we had seen him for the last time, or imagine under what circumstances we should next see that command, now mounting the bluffs in the distance with its little guidons gayly fluttering in the breeze.

A very heavy cold wind was blowing from the north, and our steamer did not start until 4 o'clock in the afternoon. We ran on till near dusk, when we tied up for the night and took in wood. The next day (23d) we ran steadily all day, and just before night

we tied up, the captain stating that he was unable to reach Fort Pease before dark. We arrived there, however, early the next morning, and my command being in position was at once ferried across the river, and at 5 o'clock started on its march up the Big Horn. I had been attacked with very severe illness the night before, had remained in bed all day and was unable to move. General Terry accompanied the command in person, leaving me on board to meet the column at the mouth of the Little Big Horn. The next day at noon (25th) we entered the mouth of that stream, the "Far West" being the first steamer that ever ploughed its waters, and running till dark tied up for the night, little dreaming what a disastrous day had closed over the gallant Custer and his command. The next morning we were early under way again. The river, which was very full, began to be intersected with numerous islands, and the boat experienced some difficulty in finding a navigable channel. We had just finished pulling over a bar, and were approaching a difficult rapid, when two horsemen were seen on the bluffs coming towards us. They were soon made out to be one of my staff officers and an orderly. He came aboard and informed me that the infantry part of the command was only a few miles up the river; that they had had a terrible march the day before over the rough mountainous region lying between the Big Horn and Tullock's Fork, during which the men suffered very much from exhaustion and the want of water, and that General Terry, with the cavalry and Gatling guns, had started ahead for a night's march the evening before. This looked as if he anticipated meeting with Indians, and as I now began to be impatient lest the boat would be unable to reach the mouth of the Little Big Horn that day, I determined to mount my horse and overtake the command at once. It was lucky I did so, for the command was not again in communication with the boat until four days afterwards. After a brisk ride of four or five miles I overtook the infantry marching over a plateau not particularly rough, but intersected by numerous deep ravines, which must have rendered the march of the cavalry the night before very tedious and slow, as the night was dark and rainy. Later in the day we overtook the cavalry as it was leaving the place where it had bivouacked at midnight, and on reaching the head of the column and receiving the command from General Terry, I was informed that our scouts reported Indians in front in the direction of the Little Big Horn. Soon after, the officer in charge of the scouts reported that several Indians had been seen to whom the Crows gave chase, and that they had fled across the Big Horn. In their flight they had dropped articles which showed them to be Crows and not Sioux, and our scouts declared them to be some of the Crows which I had lent General Custer at the mouth of the

Rosebud for scouting purposes. They were directed to communicate with their friends across the Big Horn, bring them back, and ascertain what news they brought from Custer. For, of course, the inference was at once drawn that these Crows had been sent out by Custer to communicate with our column. We were utterly unprepared for the startling report which our Crows brought back after calling across to their friends on the opposite bank of the Big Horn. Our best interpreter had been left sick at the mouth of the river, and from what we could make out by the indifferent one with us, who appeared very much excited and demoralized by the news, Custer's command had been entirely cut to pieces by the Sioux, who, so said the interpreter, "were chasing our soldiers all over the hills and killing them like buffalo."

This startling piece of news was received with incredulity by every one, and the absconding Crows were again sent for, to come back that we might question them, and try to ascertain something near the facts. Whilst the head of the column was halting for the infantry to close up, General Terry and myself walked over to the edge of the bluff overlooking the valley of the Big Horn to await the return of the scouts, and ascertain from them such news as we could. The broad river intersected by numerous wooded islands was spread out at our feet, and from the edge of a piece of timber nearest us our scouts were soon seen emerging, and approaching a buffalo trail which led up the bluffs to the spot where we were standing. As they came nearer we detected signs of grief; and as old "Show-his-face" (the senator) mounted the steep slope on his pony, he was seen to be crying as if his heart was broken, with great tears streaming down his old weatherbeaten face, and uttering every now and then the most doleful exclamations. We had become used to this after seeing them cry at the loss of their horses, and therefore did not attach much importance to it; but when the others arrived and confirmed the previous report, with the information that their friends declared their horses and themselves were too exhausted to cross the river again, and positively refused to come back, it became manifest that the Indians themselves believed in the truth of the report as they heard it.

Of course there was but one thing for us to do, which was to push forward as rapidly as possible and try and clear up for ourselves the terrible uncertainty; for, at all events, the fact seemed undoubted that Custer had come in contact with the Indians, and the sooner we could reach him the better. The march was at once resumed, and we shortly reached the bluffs overlooking the valley of the Little Big Horn, some distance up which huge columns of smoke could now be plainly seen. As we wound along over the rough broken hills seeking for a place to get down into the valley,

I observed that all our Crows, instead of travelling well to the front, as was their custom, stuck close to the column. I ordered the interpreter to take them to the front and report for duty with the advanced guard; but he declared his inability to get them to go, and was evidently himself so badly scared that he produced a bad effect upon the Indians. Finding I could not get them to the front I angrily ordered them to the rear of the column, an order which they obeyed with so much alacrity under the lead of the white interpreter that we saw them no more; and they never stopped till they reached their agency a hundred miles away. This, of course, we ascertained afterwards. They were evidently very badly stampeded, but I attributed this more to the demoralized condition of the white interpreter than to any want of courage on their part; and they afterwards assured me, when they rejoined us at the mouth of the Big Horn, that the interpreter had told them that I said I did not want them any longer.

We had to remain for some time on the high bluffs overlooking the valley of the Little Big Horn, up which the smoke of the fires continued constantly to increase in volume, which gave rise to the hope that, as our guides expressed it, Custer had "got away" with the camp and was destroying it. Such a hope was in consonance with our ideas, for I do not suppose there was a man in the column who entertained for a moment the idea that there were Indians enough in the country to defeat, much less annihilate, the fine regiment of cavalry which Custer had under his command. Distances in this clear, rarefied atmosphere are very deceptive, and, as we moved on, the distance to the smoke which at first appeared to be only a few miles seemed to lengthen out and grow greater under the weary feet of our men, and when we did finally make our way down into the valley and cross the stream at a deep ford we were still some twelve or fifteen miles from the nearest smoke. To afford rest and food to both men and animals the command was halted here; the animals permitted to graze for an hour and a half and the men to make coffee. In the meantime efforts were made to communicate by courier with General Custer, General Terry offering a large reward to any one who would carry through a dispatch. Two of our guides, Bostwick and Taylor, although unacquainted with the country volunteered for the service, and, shortly after they left, the column resumed its march up the broad open valley. After we had proceeded several miles some stray ponies were picked up by the advance guard, which were evidently estrays from an Indian camp. On our left ran the stream bordered with timber and brushwood, and some distance on our right the valley was bounded by low rolling hills. In our front the stream after cutting into the bluffs crossed the valley from right to left, the

timber shutting out all view beyond, save above its top appeared a sharp mountain peak, on the edges of which could now and then be indistinctly made out a few moving figures, and just beyond this peak the smoke appeared to have its origin. Up to this time no Indians had been seen, but shortly after one of our couriers came riding in from the front, and reported that in attempting to reach Custer's command he had run into a number of Indians in the hills, and was unable to proceed farther. A company of cavalry was now thrown out to the hills on our right, and the column pushed forward as rapidly as the men could march, the infantry responding with alacrity and almost keeping up in pace with the horses. Small scattered bands now began to make their appearance on the tops of the distant hills up the river where the latter began to deflect its course to the northward, and as it grew dark more of them could be seen in the distance.

The condition of affairs regarding Custer's command was now more involved in doubt than ever. If he had defeated the Indians and destroyed their camp, as the fires seemed to indicate, it was difficult to account for the presence of these Indians in our front, who were evidently watching us; whereas, if the report of the Crows was correct, and the Indians had defeated Custer, their bearing was equally inexplicable. This state of doubt was only increased when our other courier came in and reported the result of his attempts to get through to Custer. He had struck into the hills to the southward, and had encountered Indians, who appeared to be friendly, and responded to the signals he made them. He approached some of them on foot, and leading his horse, when one of them he said treacherously fired a shot at him, and he fiercely declared he had recognized him as one of Custer's Ree scouts, and that he would kill him when he met him for firing at him. As night closed around us the command was halted and bivouacked in the open prairie; the scouting parties were called in, who reported seeing quite a large number of Indians on the distant hills, but in the gathering darkness nothing could be plainly made out. After watering and grazing the animals they were all carefully picketed inside the command formed in a square, guards established just outside, and the tired men sank to rest eight miles from the brave little band of fellow-soldiers which, unknown to us, was watching and waiting on those bleak bluffs of the river above.

Every one was astir at the first appearance of day, and after a hurried breakfast of hardtack, bacon, and coffee, the march was resumed up the valley. The trail, forced into the hills on the right by the encroachment of the river, led through rough ground around a bend in the stream, and as the view opened into the valley beyond, we caught sight, through the scattered timber, of a couple of Indian

teepies standing in the open valley. The advance guard with flankers out on the hills to the right now moved rapidly to the front, whilst a party of mounted infantry, which had crossed the river, scouted the hills on that side. As soon as the Gatling guns were passed over the rough portion of the trail, the whole command, well closed up, moved in compact order up through the open valley beyond, every one eagerly pressing forward and anxious to solve the dread doubt which seemed to hang over the fate of our comrades. Silence reigned around us, only a few distant horsemen had been seen, and, but for the presence of a few scattering Indian ponies, the valley seemed to be entirely deserted. The company of cavalry in the advance was seen to push more rapidly to the front, past the Indian teepies, which showed no life, and on beyond at a gallop, whilst our more slowly moving column seemed merely to crawl along. At length we reached the teepies, found them occupied by dead Indians laid out in state, and surrounded in every direction with the remnants and various odds and ends of a hastily abandoned camp. Teepie poles, skins, robes, pots, kettles, and pans lay scattered about in every direction. But we had little time or inclination to comment on these sights, for every thought was now bent upon the possible fate of our fellow-soldiers, and the desire was intense to solve as soon as possible the dread doubt which now began to fill all minds. For, in searching about amongst the rubbish, some one had picked up a pair of bloody drawers, upon which was plainly written the words, "Sturgis's 7th Cavalry," whilst a buckskin shirt, recognized as belonging to Lieutenant Porter, was discovered with a bullet-hole passing through it.

It was plainly to be seen now that a conflict had indeed taken place, but of its extent or results we were still in as much doubt as ever, when a report came to me from the scouting party in the hills to our left that several dead horses had been discovered in a ravine in that direction. Every eye was now strained to the utmost in search of information, and whilst looking up the valley I caught sight of something on the top of a hill far beyond the sharp peak before referred to, which at once attracted my attention and a closer scrutiny. I sprang from my horse, and with a field glass looked long and anxiously at a number of dark objects which might be either animals or stubby cedar trees. The closest scrutiny failed to detect any movement amongst them, and yet I could not divest my mind of the idea that they were horses, and called upon a pair of younger eyes to try the glass. One of General Terry's staff officers took the glass and seating himself on the ground peered long and anxiously at the spots, but finally said "they are not animals." But scarcely had the words escaped him, when we both noticed a very apparent increase in the number of objects on the highest

point of the hill, and now one doubt was solved only to give rise to another. Were the objects seen friends or foes? Had we come in time to save some of our friends, or were the objects on the hill simply a party of Indians watching our approach after having, as the Crows said, destroyed them all? The feeling of anxiety was overwhelming, and the column seemed to crawl along more slowly than ever. The advance was moving ahead fast enough now, and I dispatched a staff officer in haste to ascertain and bring back any information it may have picked up; for I had observed on the peak before spoken of, and opposite which the advanced guard had now arrived, three horsemen evidently observing our movements and watching us closely. They could scarcely, I thought, be white men, for our troops were marching up the valley in two columns, in plain sight of where they sat on their horses, and if friendly they surely would have come down and communicated with us. They did finally come slowly down to a lower hill standing nearer to the river, but there they halted again and seemed to question us with their eyes.

Whilst watching these lookouts and wondering at their strange movements, the officer in charge of the mounted infantry party, in the hills to the north of us, rode up to where General Terry and I sat upon our horses, and his voice trembled as he said, "I have a very sad report to make. I have counted one hundred and ninety-seven dead bodies lying in the hills!" "White men?" was the first question asked. "Yes, white men." A look of horror was upon every face, and for a moment no one spoke. There could be no question now. The Crows were right, and Custer had met with a disaster, but the extent of it was still a matter of doubt; and as we turned our eyes towards the lookouts on the hill above us, as though to question them, we saw them moving, still slowly, however, down closer to the river. Then as they reached a gentle slope they rode on a little faster, and were seen to approach the advance guard, and some one in our anxious group exclaimed, "They are white men!" From out of the timber near the point, a horseman at full speed was now seen coming towards us. It was my staff officer coming with news, and as he approached us on the full-run he called out, "I have seen scouts from Colonel Reno, who report their regiment cut to pieces, and Colonel Reno fortified in the bluffs with the remnant." We were still some distance, probably a mile and a half from the objects we had been observing on the hill, and now pushed forward more eagerly than ever, the advance guard being already opposite their position. After we had gone about a mile a party of horsemen was seen approaching, and as we rode forward to meet them we recognized two young officers of the Seventh Cavalry, followed by several orderlies. Hands were

grasped almost in silence, but we questioned eagerly with our eyes, and one of the first things they uttered was, "Is General Custer with you?" On being told that we had not seen him, they gave us hurriedly an account of the operations of the past two days, and the facts began to dawn upon us. No one of the party which accompanied General Custer when the command was divided, about noon on the 25th, had been seen by the survivors, and our inference was, that they were all, or nearly all, lying up in the hills where our scouting party had found the dead bodies.

Whilst General Terry accompanied the officers to Colonel Reno's position on the hill, I proceeded to select a camp for the command. Nearly the whole valley was black and smoking with the fire which had swept over it, and it was with some difficulty I could find grass sufficient for our animals, as it existed only in spots close to the stream where too green to burn. Except the fire, the ground presented but few evidences of the conflict which had taken place. Now and then a dead horse was seen; but as I approached a bend of the creek (for it is little more than a creek), just below the hill occupied by the troops, I came upon the body of a soldier lying on his face near a dead horse. He was stripped, his scalp gone, his head beaten in, and his body filled with bullet-holes and arrows. Close by was another body, also close to a dead horse, lying, like the other, on its face, but partially clothed, and this was recognized by one of our officers as the body of Captain McIntosh. More bodies of both men and horses were found close by, and it was noted that the bodies of men and horses laid almost always *in pairs*, and as this was the ground over which Colonel Reno's command retired towards the hills after its charge down the valley, the inference was drawn, that in the run the horses must have been killed first, and the riders after they fell.

The command was placed in camp here, and details at once set to work to haul away the dead horses and bury the men, both of which were already becoming offensive. Then mounting my horse I proceeded to visit Colonel Reno's command. As I rode a few hundred yards up the river towards the ford, bodies of men and horses were seen scattered along at intervals, and in the river itself several dead horses were lying. The banks of the river at the ford were steep and some six or eight feet high, with here and there an old buffalo trail leading down to the water. The water itself was not over a horse's knee, and close to the bank, on the other side, a series of steep bluffs, intersected at short intervals by steep and narrow ravines, rose up for probably a hundred feet. Up the sides of these ravines, winding about to make the ascent more gradual, numerous paths led, now tramped hard and smooth by the many animals which had recently passed over them. My horse struggled

up the steep path, wide enough only for a single animal, with difficulty, and on emerging from the ravine up which it led, I found myself on a sort of rough broken plateau, which sloped gradually up to the curved summit occupied by the troops. I soon came to a line of rifle-pits facing the space I was crossing, and running from the summit of the ridge down to the bluff overlooking the river, whilst behind this and facing the other way was another line, running in a similar way along the summit of an almost parallel ridge. Between the two were standing and lying, almost motionless, the horses and pack-mules of the command. As I approached the summit of the main ridge which overlooked all the rest of the ground I have described, the evidences of the severe struggle which had taken place here began to manifest themselves. Dead horses and mules were lying about in every direction, and in one little depression on the other slope of the main divide I counted forty-eight dead animals. Here and there, these had evidently been made use of as breastworks, and along the top of the ridge holes and rifle-pits extended, connecting the two lines before referred to. On the far side of the ridge, the ground gradually fell away in lower ridges, behind which the Indians had sheltered themselves and their ponies during the fight.

Standing on top of the main ridge with my back to the river, I overlooked the whole of the ground to the front ; but on turning to my left, the ground was seen to rise higher and higher in successive ridges which ran nearly perpendicular to the stream, until they culminated in the sharp peak referred to in my description of the previous day upon which we had seen objects at a great distance down the valley. Several of these ridges commanded in reverse the position occupied by the troops, and we were told had been occupied by the Indians during the fight of the 26th, their long-range rifles covering all the space within the lines. Turning again to the left so as to face the river, the broad open flat where Colonel Reno had made his charge at the commencement of the battle on the 25th lay directly at our feet, whilst off towards the south the bluffs which bordered the valley rose up abruptly, and were succeeded by a gently sloping country intersected by several small valleys, with brushwood lining the now dry beds of the streams at the bottoms, while in the far distance the rugged range of the Big Horn Mountains rose, their tops partially covered with snow. One of the little valleys referred to was pointed out to us as the place where at dusk, the evening before, the last of the Indians disappeared in the distance after passing over, in admirable order and in full view of the command, the rolling plateau which bordered the valley of the Little Big Horn to the southward. Looking down the river in the direction we had come was a point of

timber jutting out into the plain, where for a portion of the time the cavalry had fought dismounted; and beyond this, in plain sight from where I stood, was located the village where the fight began; and opposite that, hidden from sight by the high peak so often referred to, was the scene of Custer's fight, where his body was found surrounded by those of his men and horses.

On the highest point of the ridge occupied by the troops, and along what had been the northern line of defence, were pitched a number of shelter tents, and under and about these were lying some fifty wounded men, receiving the care of the surgeons and their attendants. The cheerfulness of these poor fellows under their sufferings, and their evident joy at their rescue was touching in the extreme, and we listened with full hearts to their recital in feeble tones of the long anxious hours of waiting and fighting, during which every eye was strained, looking for the coming succor, hoping for its arrival, yet fearing it would be too late. At one time, so strongly did the imagination affect the judgment, the whole command was convinced that columns of troops could be seen moving over the hills to their assistance, but in directly the *opposite* direction from which they actually came. So strong was this delusion that the buglers of the whole command were assembled and ordered to sound their bugles to attract attention. When we finally made our appearance down the valley, the same thing was done, and it is supposed that it was the gathering together of the buglers on the highest point of the hill which finally decided in our minds that we were looking at men and horses, and not clumps of cedar trees. But we heard nothing of the bugles, for the wind was blowing from us.

Standing on the scene of the conflict, we heard from officers and men the story of the struggle and their experience for the past forty-eight hours. The battle commenced some time about noon on the 25th by the charge of the three companies down towards the village. They reached the point of timber I have referred to as jutting out into the plain. Here they were dismounted for a time, and fought from the timber, and then when the Indians came swarming around them from the ravines in the bluffs, they mounted again, and then commenced the race for the bluffs bordering the river. It must, from their description, have been a race of life against death. Look up the stream, and you will see the ford where Reno's command crossed to enter the fight. The one it crossed to reach its present position lies directly at your feet. Turning now to the left again so as once more to place your back to the river, and looking up to your right and front, you can trace with the eye a little valley winding its way up into the broken ground to the northeast. It was down this valley that Custer's

command approached the Little Big Horn, and near where it joins the valley of that stream is the ford where Reno crossed before the battle. Before reaching that point, Custer, it appears by his trail, turned to the right with his five companies, skirted along through these hills to our front, passed to the right of the sharp peak, and still on, beyond it and out of sight of where we stand. His trail is all that is left to tell the story of his route, for no white man of all those who accompanied him has since been seen alive. To us who stand upon the ground, and make these observations, his fate is still a matter of doubt, and is now to be solved. One of Colonel Reno's companies is mounted and started for the scene of Custer's fight. It leaves our position, and winding along the rolling hills, ascends the high ground to the right of the high peak, and disappears beyond, just as Custer's command would have vanished probably from the sight of an observer standing where we are now.

Whilst this company is away we are busy preparing to remove the wounded down from the hot, dusty hill where they are lying to my camp, where they will be more comfortable and can be better cared for.

After being absent a couple of hours the detached company is seen winding its way back, and as it approaches we all collect round General Terry to hear the report of its gray-haired captain, who won such praises by his indomitable bearing in the fight. He comes forward, dismounts, and in a low, very quiet voice, tells his story. He had followed Custer's trail to the scene of the battle opposite the main body of the Indian camp, and amid the rolling hills which borders the river-bank on the north. As he approached the ground scattered bodies of men and horses were found, growing more numerous as he advanced. In the midst of the field a long *backbone* ran out obliquely back from the river, rising very gradually until it terminated in a little knoll which commanded a view of all the surrounding ground, and of the Indian camp-ground beyond the river. On each side of this backbone, and sometimes on top of it, dead men and horses were scattered along. These became more numerous as the terminating knoll was reached; and on the southwestern slope of that lay the brave Custer surrounded by the bodies of several of his officers and forty or fifty of his men, whilst horses were scattered about in every direction. All were stripped, and most of the bodies were scalped and mutilated. And now commenced the duty of recognizing the dead. Of Custer there could be no doubt. He was lying in a perfectly natural position as many had seen him lying when asleep, and, we were told, was not at all mutilated, and that, only after a good deal of search the wounds of which he died could be found. The field was searched and one after another the officers were found and recog

nized, all except two. A count of the bodies disclosed the fact that some twenty-five or thirty were missing, and we could not, until some time afterwards, form even a surmise in regard to their fate.

The great mystery was now solved, at last, of the destruction of that part of Custer's command. It was possible that some few individuals might have escaped the general massacre; but so far as we could judge all had fallen; and the particulars of that sad and desperate conflict against overwhelming numbers of the savage horde which flocked about Custer and his devoted three hundred when Reno was beaten back, will probably never be known.

THE RED MAN GAUGED BY HIS SPEECH.

1. *Dictionnaire de la Langue des Cris.* Par le Rev. Père Alb. Lacombe, Prêtre, Oblat de Marie Immaculée. Montreal: C. O. Beauchemin & Valois, 1874.
2. *Grammaire de la Langue des Cris.* Same author, publishers, and year.

THE demand for Indian grammars and dictionaries is, we presume, rather limited, and neither authors nor publishers will make fortunes out of them. For the few, however, who need such books they are great treasures, and it would be well if there were many more of them. In fact, every contribution to the better understanding of the aboriginal American tongues, every help toward their easier acquisition deserves a hearty welcome, not only at the hands of practical laborers in the Indian missions and of linguists, but of every patriot and philanthropist. Prejudice and antipathy, whether they exist between individuals or between nations, can have no better ally than ignorance, and no worse foe than more intimate mutual knowledge. Thus stands the case between the Indian and his more gifted, though frequently no less prejudice-ridden white brother. Father Lacombe's dictionary and grammar of the Cree language,¹ the result of twenty years' practical experience

¹ A grammar of the Cree language was published in London, 1844, by I. Flowse. Of this fact Father Lacombe seems not to have been aware. His dictionary is the first that deserves the name, only short vocabularies having been published before in works of travel, etc.

and study, will prove another effective means of breaking down the barrier which the pride of ignorance has, in this western world, raised up between the conqueror and the conquered. Every new Indian scholar, and many such, let us hope, these books will help to make, is sure to become a friend of the race ; at least no honest and good man, having once learned to converse with Indians in one of their own dialects, can continue, if he ever did before, to despise them or to doubt their right to a position, however humble, in the family of nations, and to possess and enjoy a little corner in this wide world of ours. And this is not all. Our Indian brethren not only need friends, but friends that understand them and know how to deal with them. The overestimation of the red man's capacity, the supposition that by a certain method of training he may be brought up to the full stature of the white man, or very near to it, has led to practical mistakes as serious as the opposite error which rates the Indian as a being extremely low in the scale of creation, and utterly incapable of any kind of civilization. The pedagogue must know his pupil, and what he is capable of accomplishing, or he will lose much time and labor. There are no better means to gauge the capabilities of the Indian tribes than the theoretical study of their dialects; no more indispensable aid for effectively managing our uncultivated, and often refractory wards, than the practical knowledge of their speech. A more intimate acquaintance with the red man will be gained by the study of his mental physiognomy as portrayed in his speech, and it cannot but greatly aid in piloting us between those two extremes, each equally fatal in its practical effects, either underrating or overvaluing the Indian's capabilities; the aim, limits, and method of the plan of education will at once present themselves in more clearly defined form, and many of the blunders thus far committed, even by the Indian's friends, may be avoided. For those actually engaged in the education of any one of the tribes, the knowledge of its language, it hardly needs to be added, is simply indispensable.

Our aim, in the following pages, will be to present to the reader, in a form as free from technicalities as the subject will allow, a critical examination or appraisal, principally from a psychological point of view, of one of the great branches of Indian speech, the so-called Algonquin or Algie, of which the Cree is one of the most interesting offshoots. The result of our investigation, we are confident, will go far towards elevating the Indian in the estimation of our readers. But no less will it show the very great, and, we are tempted to add, almost measureless difference that exists between his mental constitution and that of our own branch of the human family.

The study of the Algic tongues is certainly a delightful task ; not without its thorns, to be sure ; but the labor of acquiring any one or more of them, as a key to all others, is more than compensated by the intellectual treat it offers to the student, a treat akin to the intense delight the traveller through strange and never before explored countries experiences, as, following their river-courses and scaling their mountains, he meets at almost every step with novel scenes and remarkable products of nature. No doubt the touch of the Master-hand that made all things according to number, weight, and measure, is perceptible in any human tongue ; but as our minds are apt to become blunted to the beauty of objects familiar to the sight, so our mother tongue and those nearly related to it fail to make the impression produced by idioms of a widely different character. Indeed, to fully appreciate the excellence of our happily organized and highly cultivated Indo-European languages, some knowledge of those spoken by the less gifted races is indispensable. We must go abroad, would we learn how we really live at home. As in Europe the study of the Scythian or Ural-Altaic languages has of late become a favorite occupation of linguists, so on this side of the ocean the study of the American aboriginal tongues should naturally recommend itself to the attention of the scholar ; and to begin with what lies nearest, much more should be done towards preserving and investigating the dialects of those Indian tribes, at least, whom we are dispossessing, and whom the tidal wave of a superior civilization may eventually sweep out of existence. Says Professor Whitney in his masterly lectures on linguistic science : " Our national duty and honor are peculiarly concerned in this matter of the study of aboriginal American languages as the most fertile and important branch of American archæology."¹ To this let us add that the example of our early missionaries, who first of all and amid fearful difficulties unravelled the mazes of Indian speech, may well spur on their successors toward taking upon themselves so considerable a part of that national task as their in many ways privileged relation to the aboriginal population seems to assign them. It is true their generally isolated position, their distance from large libraries and consequent want of literary helps, and above all the pressure of duties incomparably more important, form great difficulties in the way of their critically examining and comparing dialects which they learn for merely practical purposes. If, nevertheless, they dare to offer to the scientific world the results of their

¹ *Language and the Study of Language.* By William Dwight Whitney. Fifth edition. New York : Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1876. The words quoted above, with other pertinent remarks, will be found on page 352. While giving our humble meed of praise to a work of such eminent merit, we do, of course, not wish to indorse the author's opinions on questions controverted between believers in revelation and their opponents of various hues.

personal observation and study, may they not count on the indulgence of the professional linguist who, for the material he works upon, depends so much on their assistance.

The Algic branch of Indian languages holds a prominent place among the small number of aboriginal American tongues that thus far have been subjected to the scrutiny of our modern science of language. It comprises a large number of dialects, the most distant apparently standing to each other in not much nearer a degree of relationship than Latin and Greek. Between those two extremes, the Wapanashki and Satsikaa, several minor groups may be distinguished, with differences of speech ranging from that of mere local dialects (such as are met with in all European countries) to that existing between the most distant members of the Slavonic family; in other words, while the tribes speaking the Wapanashki and the Satsikaa are mutually unintelligible, all the rest have enough in common to understand at least a word here and there of each other's tongues, and thus, with more or less facility, keep up some kind of a conversation. The principal dialects of the northern intermediate group are the Cree or Nehiyaw, the Ojibwa and Ottawa, the Algonquin proper, or, as we shall term it, the Niinaw and the Pottawattamie; and it is upon the examination of their peculiarities that the following observations are based. Most of the examples needed for the support of our criticisms and for the illustration of our theories will be selected from the Ojibwa, which occupies a most conspicuous position among the Algic dialects. Being, with but very slight variations, spoken over a wider extent of country and by a larger number of individuals than any of the rest, it is also understood by what we might call the educated among the surrounding tribes, and has received the greatest share of attention and literary cultivation on the part of both missionaries and linguists. As for the graphical rendering of Indian sounds we shall, for the sake of uniformity, make a compromise between the systems adopted by the writers in or on the several dialects, culling from each what appears most appropriate for our present purpose.¹

In presenting the characteristics of an Indian language to the general reader, or even to the linguistic student, the same deception can easily be practiced that certain writers of travel have, perhaps quite unconsciously, become guilty of in describing peoples and countries. And, in fact, preconceived ideas, want of penetration or

¹ Pronounce the vowels *a e i o* as in *far, get, pin, bone*. In Cree, there is an intermediate sound between *o* and short *u*, represented by *u*. The consonant *g* has always the hard sound and, in many cases, is interchangeable with *k*. *Y* is in every case a semi-vowel, as in *yet*. When two or three vowels follow each other, every one is distinctly pronounced. *Ch* has the sound of *tch*, as in *watch*. All the rest as in English, or nearly so. It should be observed that the writer has had no opportunity to hear the Cree and Niinaw spoken.

of judgment, too limited a field of observation, and even erroneous data used as a foundation to build theories upon—all these things have had full play in essays descriptive of our aboriginal languages. Were we, for example, to select our linguistic specimens solely from the extant Algonic translations, old or modern, of parts of the Scriptures, our readers would be as certainly led astray as the foreigner to whom the discussions of some scientific society in the "Hub" were presented as a fair example of how American people generally talk. Open, for instance, the book of Genesis, translated by Kahkewaguonaby Ahmashenahba Makahdawekoonahya,¹ and passing over the first verse, whose longest vocable counts but five syllables, launch into the third line; there you will at once be brought to a dead halt by a word-giant of no less than thirty-seven letters in fifteen syllables. In vain you try to pronounce with any degree of ease: wahwanahkahmegezesejegahdasenoogoobun; or, as we would write, wawenakamigizhissijigadessinogoban.² The task might be facilitated by dividing and accentuating, as follows: wāwēn-ākāmīg-izhīs-sijīgād-éssīn-ógōbān; but the spectre of the long-winded, quadruply sesquipedalian vocable will still haunt you, and your suspicion as to the clumsiness—the general reproach—of Indian speech will hardly be much allayed. "How in the world did those people come to such a monstrous language?" and "Who can ever learn it?" are questions we are wont to hear addressed to us even by educated and intelligent people. Nor will you become more assured if glancing over the paradigms of a grammar you meet with such forms as WayABamigossiawangoban, WayABamissinowangobanenag, etc., the capitals alone representing the root of the verb. And what, if your guide in that primeval forest of Algonic speech should bid you look up at a twenty-syllable giant-tree like this: bonibigwakamigibijiganikewininiwissiawangoban! Father Lacombe, like most Indianologists, also takes pleasure in exhibiting and analyzing remarkable specimens of word-conglomerates, such as: kitosawasoniyawiwaskuteniganabiskum-isisinowok, or kitayamiewosawasoniyawiwaskuteniganabiskum-isisiwawok, etc.

But, now, waiving for a moment the task of explaining those truly hyperpolysynthetic words, let us invite the reader to a party of harmless Ojibwas engaged in one of their ordinary avocations. Do they still speak the same language? Let us listen to them.

¹ Printed for the Toronto Auxiliary Bible Society, 1835. The English name of the translator—probably of mixed blood—is P. Jones. *Anishinabemkatewikwanaye* (so we would spell his Indian title) means "Indian Black Goat."

² The syllable *iz* or *izh* seems superfluous, and was declared so by an intelligent native. Accordingly, when we come to analyze the vocable, we shall take no account of it.

Eidon abwi! Bring the paddle! Oma aton! Put it down here! Anindi koss? Where is your father? Tibidog. I don't know. Aia-na kizhime? Is your younger brother here? Ka; zheba gi-gopi. No; he went into the woods this morning. Nin gabiskab, ikitoban. He said he would return to-day. Noĩ dash? And Louis? Megwa madabi. He is just coming down to the shore. Pien, awi-nadin makak! Pierre, go and fetch the box! Tiwe, nin bwawinan! Oh, I can't lift it up! Bositon! Put it aboard! Kizhikan, Saswe; bosin! Hurry up, François; get into the canoe! Andabin! Sit elsewhere! Kidebab-ina? Have you room enough to sit? Taya, bidanimad! Ah, the wind is getting up! Ombakobijigen! Put up the mast and hoist the sail! Kigaminwashimin. We shall have a fine sail.

But why multiply by examples? The reader is already aware that something similar to what every one knows to be the case with the English language must hold good of the Algonic tongues: words in common and frequent use incline to shortness; those employed in stately and formal language, or for the designation of more abstract, or more complicated ideas of less frequent occurrence generally, require a larger number of syllables. Some points of difference, however, must be adverted to.

In the first place, it cannot be denied that the average length of Algonic vocables, including the inflected parts of speech, exceeds not only that of English words in common use, but even of those of the Sanskrit, of the classic idioms of Europe, and of some living tongues of the Indo-European family that have in a higher degree preserved its original synthetic character, such as the Slavonic dialects. The proper inference to be drawn from this fact must remain reserved for a later paragraph; here we only remark that words exceeding a dozen syllables are at least of extremely rare occurrence. The average length of vocables, in ordinary talk, may range from three to four syllables, the Pottawattamie dialect verging on the lower, the Niinaw and Cree on the upper mark, the Ottawa and Ojibwa holding the middle.¹

Secondly, the very same ideas with which the civilized European has been familiar for ages must not be expected to have fared as well among uncultivated American nomads. No wonder, then, if the Algonquin equivalents of numberless words which in the Indo-European tongues have lost the last vestige of their originally compound character, still appear in the full array of their time-honored polysynthetic trimmings. On the other hand, the Indian mode of life must have favored the working out of many vocables for which we have no corresponding terms of similar shortness. The differ-

¹ The average number of syllables in an English word is, according to Whitney, 1.358. In Ottawa we found it to be about 3.4.

ence, both in degree and kind of culture, between any two nations is strikingly portrayed in the more or less complicated character of terms employed for the expression of the same ideas. The Chinese, for instance, designate "a person who died in jail of hunger and cold" with the one radical syllable *du*, a term for which we fortunately have not even a polysyllabic equivalent. Anamite civilization has worked out or naturalized one single term (ti) for "one hundred millions," but none for "philosophy," which is but loosely defined as "the trade of loving the perfect virtue of the prudent and gentle" (*su yeu nhon duc khon ngoan*). Thus the English "tablecloth," or the still shorter French "nappe," unfolds in Ojibwa to *adopowinigin* ("eat-upon-thing-cloth"), and in Cree spreads out into *michisurwinatikakwanaigan* (eating-wood-covering). In this particular case the length of the vocable corresponds, it would seem, with the frequency the article itself is called for, or with the lapse of time since its first introduction. But when the Ojibwa wishes to tell you that "he rows against the current," he simply says *nin nitaam*; when the enemy's "footsteps are visible," the fact is fully expressed by *okawi*; and when a hunter "breaks up camp to move to some other ground," all that need be said of him is *gosi*. The plough, when first introduced among the Ojibwas on Lake Superior, some thirty years ago, was termed *bigwakamigibijigan* (ground-break-up-implement), and it is an encouraging fact that three syllables have since been dropped, and *bigobijigan* or *bigoboijigan* (break-up-implement) alone answers the purpose. On the other hand, the snowshoe has from immemorial ages been *agim*, the lodge-pole *abash*, the whortleberry *min*, and the burrow of a bear or beaver simply *wash*. Here, again, however, we must make an important concession. A host of long polysyllabic vocables, that must have been in frequent use for ages, are still found wonderfully preserved in the various Algonic dialects; and this phenomenon, too, will be explained and appreciated in due time.

In the third place, let it be well understood that the length of Algonic vocables, however extreme, causes not the least embarrassment to even the most illiterate native speaker. There is, of course, some difference in the degree of ease and rapidity with which novel or seldom heard combinations will be appropriated by different individuals; but blunders of the Mrs. Partington type are an impossibility, and the fact is of easy explanation. The English language being both a mixed and a highly cultivated one, its measurably perfect management, especially as far as the foreign element is concerned, is the exclusive privilege of the educated, and only indeed of the highly educated; the mass of English-speaking people as a matter of course, moving principally within the range of that host of monosyllables into which most of the Germanic and a part

of the Norman French ingredient have been ground down in the course of ages. Let them go ever so little beyond their familiar ground and they will be bewildered as hearers, and stumble or blunder as speakers. The Algic dialects, on the contrary, containing but slight traces of heterogeneous admixtures, and only a small number of vocables that owe their origin to a higher stage of intellectual culture, have no boundary line which it would not be in the power of any member of the tribe, however devoid of literary training, to overstep. The mother tongue with all its wealth is the property of each individual, in an incomparably higher degree than can be predicated of our cultivated European languages, especially the English. Hence polysyllabic words of apparently abnormal dimensions will be found mixed up with the ordinary discourse of the Indian people, and used by them with perfect propriety and surprising ease; and even new terms of considerable length, necessitated by the progress of civilization, and either formed by intelligent natives or introduced by whites, will be readily understood and accepted, provided they be idiomatically compounded together or derived from the existent roots. Thus, what appears to be a blemish in reality proves a blessing—the introduction of new ideas among an illiterate people, and the instruction of old and young become matters of comparative ease. One or two examples may illustrate this fact. In Father Lacombe's *Dictionary* we find the term *aperceptibilité* rendered by *otisabatteyittamowin*, i. e., "the state of being discernible by the mind." Rarely as the employment of such an abstract term may be called for in addressing "savages," the word will no sooner be pronounced than understood by every intelligent hearer, which would be far from being the case with the corresponding term "intelligibility," or "comprehensibility," if uttered before a mixed English audience. The Ottawa term *Kotagitowini-webinamagewini-zhawendagosiwin*; literally, "penalty-remission-favor;" that is, "indulgence," at once explains itself and effectively excludes the idea of the remission of guilt, which is *batawini-gassiamagewin*, "the wiping off of sin."¹ In this manner the whole nomenclature of our little catechetical and devotional Algic works, whether original or translated, is transparent and self-explaining. It is so, at least, in a much higher degree than the religious terminology even of those European languages which, in forming compounds and derivatives, to a great extent draw on their

¹ It may be remarked that the above term for "indulgence," was suggested by an educated native in the stead of *Kotagitowini-zhawendagosiwin*, "penalty-favor," as posterosely used by a white man. The Ottawa naturally objected against *punishment* being granted as a *favor*. Our catechisms use the shorter form *webinamagewini-zhawendagosiwin*, "remission-favor," and supply the object of the remission in the course of the instruction as our English catechisms do in regard to the term "indulgence."

own resources. If the Algic terms of that sort are sometimes anything but short, there is something to make up for the blemish; the native hearer or reader has, if not a reflected knowledge, at least an unconscious or instinctive perception of the import of most of the roots, and of every theme and formative syllable or articulation that enters into the new combinations offered to him; and his memory is not uselessly burdened.

After the preceding remarks and illustrations it hardly needs to be mentioned that our Algic vocables in innumerable instances include a bunch of ideas, a cluster of relations, or both combined, to such an extent that the English and most other languages would for their adequate expression frequently require as many, or nearly as many, independent words as the Indian vocable contains syllables. A few examples of such word-conglomerates or crystallizations have been presented at the outset of our inquisition, but left unexplained. We will now take up the task of analyzing them, and begin with the samples selected from the Cree grammar, as exhibiting a simpler kind of formation. The task may be somewhat facilitated by typographically distinguishing their component parts in this manner: *kid-osawa-soniyawi-wasaskutenigan-ABISK-umisis-inow-ak*.

The nucleus of the formation figures in large capitals. *Abisk* (after a vowel *wabisk*; in Ojibwa, Ottawa, etc., *abik* or *wabik*; probably a compound of two roots) is one of those word-elements, that, without possessing an independent existence, go to make up innumerable compounds. It implies any hard mineral substance, such as stone, glass, metal. Thus it appears in *piwabisk*, "metal," especially "iron." The word *piwabiskokutawanABISK*, "iron, fireplace, stone," that is "a stove," contains it twice; so does the Ojibwa *kizhabik-isiganABIK*, "heating-stone, iron," or likewise "a stove." In the vocable that forms the subject of our inquisition, *abisk* is qualified by *wasaskutenigan*, "any contrivance for illuminating purposes, a torch, a lamp, a candle." The compound *wasaskuteniganabisk* accordingly signifies "a piece of metal used for illuminating purposes;" that is "a metal candlestick." The history of *wasaskutenigan* is as follows: of the root *was*, which implies "shining, luminosity," and the noun *iskute*, "fire" is formed a verb *wasaskutew*, "it shines like fire, there is a shining fire;" of this another verb is derived; namely, *wasaskutenike*, "he illumines, he uses fire for a light;" and this, by a process which it would lead too far to fully describe, is transformed into the noun *wasaskutenigan*, "a contrivance for making light by the means of fire."¹ But let us return to our metal candlestick, *wasaskuteniganabisk*. This is again quali-

¹ *Wassenamarwin*, Ojibwa *wassechigan*, is "a fixture for making light (without fire)," that is "a window."

fied by the compound *osawa-soniya*, "yellow silver," "gold." The syllable *wi* at the end of it, whatever its original signification may have been, now only serves to solder the noun and "ad-noun" together. At this stage of growth the vocable literally signifies "a yellow-silver light-fire-making-thing metal," or "a gold candlestick." The further accretions are principally of a pronominal character. The prefix *Ki*, or *Kit*, before nouns represents the possessive pronoun of the second person singular, provided no pronominal suffix change its value. The letter *m*, affixed to our noun by means of the connective vowel *u*, enhances the idea of possession. Hence, *Kitosawasoniyawiwaskuteniganabiskum* would be "thy own gold candlestick." By further adding the double diminutive ending *isis*, the meaning of the noun is reduced to a "very little gold candlestick." The suffix *inow* has a twofold effect; it shows that the speaker shares with the person addressed the ownership of the object in question, and makes it optional to understand the pronominal prefix *Ki* as referring to several persons. In consequence, the vocable thus obtained may signify "my and thy," or "my and your," that is, in either case, "our . . . candlestick." Finally, the plural ending *ok* shows that there is question of several objects; and the translation of the vocable, thus trimmed up, will be "our very little gold candlesticks." There is, however, room left for further additions. By inserting between the pronominal prefix and the body of the compound the qualification *ayamie*, "relating to the prayer," or "used in the church," and by changing the termination *nowok* into *wawok*, the form *kitayamicwosawasoniyawiwaskuteniganabiskumisisiwawok*—the longest in our series—will be obtained, with the signification "your very little golden church candlesticks." Being so well under way, we may yet run a little farther ahead and complete the score and a half of syllables by adding the ideas of "old" (*gayas*) and of "lost" (*iban*) in this manner: *kigayasayamicwosawasoniyawiwaskuteniganabiskumisisibaniwawok*, "the old little golden church candlesticks once in your possession." And even this is hardly the *ne plus ultra* of possible Algie polysyllabism. We say *possible*; for the limits of the allowable have already been transgressed in the preceding examples. No Indian will use words of such length. Their value, in grammars, consists merely in the exercise of intellect and tongue they may afford to beginners. Were we to say otherwise, some critical reader could justly call us to task for doing what we criticize in others, that is, drawing a caricature, instead of describing the characteristics of Algie speech.

Of our remaining samples, the next in length is evidently one of those artificial constructions, bordering on the burlesque, which, upon being brought to any Indian's notice will make even him

wonder at the remarkable adhesiveness of his vocables. The Ojibwa word *bonibigwakamigibijiganikewininiwissiwan goban* includes not only the implement of husbandry our red friends are so slow in appreciating, but also its making; for, freely translated, it means "had we not given up the ploughwright's trade." As for the analysis of this and the following samples we must refer to a note, such readers as are more particularly interested in the matter.¹

¹ The following explanations do not lay claim to the highest degree of analytical accuracy; but they will give the reader a general idea of the character of Algic compounds and derivatives, and an opportunity to catch a glimpse of the Ojibwa conjugational scheme. The interlinear translation of our first sample will become intelligible by reading the English words in the order marked.

I. Bon - i - big - w - akamig - i - bijigan - i - ke - w - inini - wi - ssi - wang - o - ban
 4 9 10 8 7 6 5 3 2 1
 cease(d) (for)breaking ground instrument(s) making man(men) to be not we had
 With the exception of the word *inini*, not one of the elements of the compound, as here divided, has a separate existence; no more, in fact, than the syllables *neigh*, *bor*, *li*, and *ness*, outside of the English vocable, or vocables, formed by them; nay, our interlinear translation does not even as nearly approach the original meaning of the corresponding Algic elements, as "nigh," "dweller," or "farmer;" "like" and "quality" would answer the etymological signification of the component parts in "neighborliness." This will appear from the following analysis: BON (probably allied with BAN, "dropping down," "falling off," "going to loss"), "ceasing;" as in *bonita* "he ceases working." The following vowel (*i*) is merely a euphonic connective. BIG (BOG, PAK), "breaking;" as in *bigoshka*, "it breaks." Another euphonic connective (*w*, originally *o*) follows. AKAMIG, earth-like, relating to the earth; as in *anamakamig*, "beneath the ground." (The root appears to be KA or KI; outside of compounds "earth" is *aki*, Pottawattamie *ke*, Cree *askiy*.) Another connective (*i*). BIJIGAN includes three roots: (1) BID (BIN), which implies "hand," or "using the hand;" as in *bigobidong*, "breaking;" (2) IG, originally a demonstrative pronoun (preserved in *igiv*, "these," and (Cree, *eoko*, "this"), now, in the form of IGE, an ending of neuter verbs, as in *bigobijige*, "he is breaking up;" (3) AN, another demonstrative root (preserved in Ottawa *aniwi*, "those," and Cree *anah*, "this," "that"), now an ending of verbal nouns, as in *bigobijigan*, "a contrivance for breaking up." (BIJIGE, if used separately, would be "he uses his hand," and BIJIGAN, "a handle" in the sense of "a tool.") Another connective vowel (*i*). KE, the formative ending of "constructive" verbs, as in *zhominabo*, "he makes wine," *chimanike*, "he makes a canoe," or "canoes." (BIJIGANIKE, if in separate use, would be "he makes a tool," or "tools.") The next letter is again the euphonic connective *w*. *Inini* (Ottawa *anini*, Cree *iyiniw*, Indian, Pottawattamie *nenn*, probably allied with ININ "perfect," "the best of its kind," "the thing *kar' êfoχhv*"), "man," *vir*. WI (from *awi*, "he is," and this from O, *aw* "he," "this"), forms denominative verbs, as *ogimawi*, "he is a chief," from *ogima*, "a chief;" hence *ininiwi* signifies "he is a man;" first person singular *nind-ininiw*, "I am a man." SSI, a formative syllable, implying negation, e. g., *nind-aw*, "I am," *kawin nind-awissi*, "I am not;" *ayawiyaw*, "I who am," *ayawissiwan*, "I who am not." WANG (YANG, ANG) termination of the first person plural in the subjunctive mood. BAN, with a connective vowel, OBAN, IBAN, etc. (perhaps from the root BAN, "dropping down," "falling off"), the imperfect ending of verbs.

Synthesis.—*Inini*, man; *ininiwi*, he is a man; *ininiwiyang*, if we be men; *ininiwissiwan*, if we be not men; *ininiwissiwan goban*, if we had not been men; *boniwininiwissiwan goban*, had we not ceased to be men. *Bigobijigan*, "a breaking-tool;" *bigwakamigibijigan*, a "ground-breaking-tool," a plough; *bigwakamigibijiganike*, he makes ploughs; *bigwakamigibijiganikewinini*, a man that makes ploughs, a plough-

As for our two specimens of the polysynthetic scheme of conjugation in the Ojibwa dialect, it will suffice to remark that participles of the type of *wayabamigossiawangoban* "we who were not seen," though sometimes convenient and withal of easy construction, may generally be dispensed with, not only in common conversation, but also in formal addresses and literary compositions. In a still higher degree is this true of more complicated forms, such as our second example *wayabamissinowangobanenag*, "they who, perhaps, did not see us." No student need burden his memory with almost endless rows of similar forms, which the grammarian himself who strung them together most likely evolved by a somewhat laborious process, or with the assistance of a good native speaker.

There remains one word-specimen to be at least glanced at, the first in our list, and not the least interesting. It forms, together with three other distinct vocables, the translation, rather periphrastic, some will say, of the text *terra autem erat inanis*. The closest possible interlinear translation of the Ojibwa version might run as follows :

Ka dash mashi wawen-akamig-issijigadessinogoban aki not however yet nicely earthlike was made to lie (it is related) the earth; or

wright; *bonibigwakamigibijiganikewininiwissiawangoban*, had we not ceased to be ploughwrights.

2. The following scheme will exemplify the progression of polysynthetic verbal forms. Root: WAB (allied with WAB, "white"), "seeing." *Nin wab*, I see, I have the sense of sight. *Nin wabama*, I see him; *nin wabamig*, he sees me; *nin wabamigo*, I am seen; *wabamigoyan*, if I be seen; *wabamigoyang*, if we be seen; *wayabamigoyang*, we who are seen; *wayabamigoyangoban*, we who were seen; *wayabamigossiawangoban*, we who were not seen. *Nin wabamig*, he sees me; *wabamid*, if he see me; *wabaminang*, if he see us; *wayabaminang*, he who sees us; *wayabaminangoban*, he who saw us; *wayabaminangobanig*, they who saw us; *wayabaminowangobanenag*, they who perhaps saw us; *wayabamissinowangobanenag*, they who perhaps did not see us.

3. *Wawen-akamig-i-ssi-jig-ade-ssi-n-o-go-ban.*

Analysis.—WAWEN, reduplication of WEN, ON, "fine," "good." AKAMIG, explained above (No. 1). The connective *i*. SSI, from SSIN, SHIN, "lying," "being in place;" the letter *n* is shifted toward the end of the word. J (CH would be the proper spelling, etymologically) from AT, ASS, "putting," "setting." IG, from IGE, as above (No. 1). ADE, ending of "inanimate" neuter verbs, implying the substantive verb, as *ishijigade*, "it is made," from *ishijige*, "he makes." SSI (explained above) implies negation. N, complement of the mutilated element SSIN, five syllables to the rear. The connective *o*. GO, formative syllable in imperfects, implying uncertainty, doubt, or, as in this case, the circumstance that the fact related is not one of the speaker's personal observation. BAN, explained above (No. 1).

Synthesis.—(*ish*)-*ijige*, he does, he acts in such a manner; (*ish*)-*ijigade*, it is done in such a manner; (*ish*)-*issijigade*, it is made to lie, or constructed, in such a manner; *wawenishissijigade*, it is made to lie, or constructed in a nice manner; *wawenakamigissijigade*, it is made in a proper earthlike manner; *kawin* (not) *wawenakamigissijigadessinon*, it is not made in a proper earthlike manner; *kawin wawenakamigissijigadessinoban*, it was not, etc.; *kawin mashi wawenakamigissijigadessinogoban*, according to tradition (or information received) it was not yet made in a proper earthlike manner.

more intelligibly, "but as yet the earth (so it is related) had not been put in its proper earthlike shape."¹

Readers who may have chanced to examine the historian Bancroft's dissertation on the peculiarities of the Algonquin, Huron, Iroquois, and Cherokee dialects, will be inclined to consider the preceding examples as good evidence of the correctness of that writer's views.² Being ourselves of a different opinion, and, at the same time, taking the essay in question to be but a condensed statement of the opinions entertained on the subject by linguistic authorities of high repute, we think it proper to devote a few paragraphs to the examination of its merits. It would carry us into too much detail to undertake a refutation of every objectionable statement in that little treatise. A few remarks, however, touching the singularly distorted and exaggerated view it gives of the synthetical character of Indian speech will but help to throw light on the very subject of our present inquiry. Need it be remarked that it is not in a fault-finding spirit we take up this task? It will be seen that certain conclusions, drawn by our author himself from the premises we impugn, are too pregnant with consequences bearing on a vital question in the early history of mankind to be too lightly passed over.

Bancroft predicates of the Indian mind "a *total* want of reflection and analysis," and, consequently, also "the absence of all reflective *consciousness*." This is strong language and should be supported by the strongest of proofs. Whether the evidence furnished can be called so, we must let the reader judge, after offering him a résumé of our author's argumentation. The learned historian grounds his assertion exclusively on the character of Indian speech, which he holds to be *originally* and *absolutely* synthetical. According to him, or, as we should always be careful to remember, according to his authorities, "the American does not separate the component parts of the propositions which he utters," "every complex idea is expressed in a group," "the character of each Indian language is one continued, universal, all-pervading synthesis." It is the last of these three propositions that expresses most emphatically, if not most pointedly, the idea which forms the ground note of the whole treatise. Its wording, however, being too vague, and its sense too elastic for a successful attack, we must direct our criticism against the two preceding sentences, of which, in fact, the third is only the summing up and sublimation.

First, then, we learn that "the Indian does not separate the component parts of his sentences." Almost any sentence taken at

¹ A more explicit treatment of this sample may be found in the preceding note.

² See that author's *History of the United States*, vol. iii., ch. xxii., pp. 254-265 of the twenty-third edition.

random from some printed Indian work would be suitable to demonstrate the contrary. We will choose, for our basis of operation, a sort of counterpart, as far as the form is concerned, of the very proposition we deal with. "*The white man should not overrate the confessedly superior endowment of his mind.*" Translated into idiomatic Ojibwa, our sentence assumes this form: *Kawin osam o-da-ishpendansin wayabishkiwed od-incendamowin ayano-niganendágwadinig*; and this again turned, word for word, into Latin (the English idiom not being pliant enough for the purpose), *ne nimis exaltet albus ingenium suum utcumvis præcellens*. As a matter of course, our point of view or term of comparison, in judging this particular case, can only be the construction of the sentence. How, then, will the three samples compare? As far as the number of words is concerned, and if you will, the corresponding degree of analytical power in the mental constitution of the respective races, the Anglo-Saxon bears off the palm, parcelling out, as he does, among thirteen vocables, the ideas which the Roman distributes among eight, while the Ojibwa puts them on the back of six proportionally broad-shouldered bearers. If we compare the distinctness with which the parts of the sentence, or the subjective, predicative, objective, and attributive relations are expressed or held asunder, the difference between the three idioms is much less striking. Were we to analyze our seven Ojibwa vocables, the synthetical character of Indian speech would certainly appear in a much stronger light; nor would it be difficult to build up Algic sentences with a less favorable proportion between the number of words and that of ideas, and with strange combinations of subject and predicate, substantive and attributive, adverb and verb, verb and its object, etc. This we freely acknowledge, and at some future opportunity shall more fully discuss the subject. But after all, the verdict of every competent and impartial judge will be that, as far as the analytical character of the sentence is concerned, the difference between the Indo-European and the American idioms is one only of degree. At all events, the one sentence under treatment fully proves that there *can* be in the Indian proposition a subject, a predicate, an object, an attribute, a verb, an adverb, etc., all plainly discernible and properly distinguished from each other; and the sweeping assertion that the Indian does not separate the component parts of his sentences falls to the ground. It evidently rests on a most superficial examination of American speech and on a palpable pseudo-syllogism. We might as well assert that the Indo-European languages are incapable of combining words, on the ground that in very many instances where the American employs compounds, the Indo-European expresses his ideas by a series of separate terms.

Secondly, we are assured that in the Indian languages "every

complex idea is expressed in a group." How are we to understand the terms of this proposition? Ideas, logicians say, are complex when the object is qualified. But how about the outward expression of the qualifying idea? Will "a scholar" pass for a simple idea and "a learned man" for a complex one? Is "man" simple, and "rational animal" complex? And, taking for granted that our author speaks only of those ideas whose complex character is manifested by their expression in language, is it not obvious that in this respect men's judgments are liable to be swayed by the idiosyncrasies of their accustomed form of speech? Thus "smiling" would be looked upon as a simple idea by an English-speaking person, while those who say "*sourire*" or "*subridere*," might be inclined to call it complex; and the Ojibwa *bapingwening* "laughing with the face" would naturally suggest the like judgment. The same will be the case with the ideas "brown," "green," "olive," etc., which our Indians express by several independent vocables, or by compounds, signifying respectively, "black, but rather a little red," "grassy-yellow," "yellow inclining to red," etc.

On the other hand, groups of words, like "a younger brother," "an old man," "a beaver less than two years old," etc., leave no doubt as to the complexity of the ideas expressed by them, while the corresponding Algic vocables *weshimeimind akiwesi*, *aboyawe*, etc., present the same objects in the garb of simple ideas. Where, then, does the complexity begin that placed our Indian language-makers under the obligation of forming groups? And again, what are we to understand by "groups?" Will two vocables suffice, or is a larger number required? Are those vocables to stand separated from each other, as in our English examples, or loosely connected, like "dark-blue," "candlestick," etc., or must they form a well-cemented and undissolvable whole, such as the samples of polysynthetic word-formation already presented and analyzed? A little more of Anglo-Saxon analytical power brought to bear by our author on his sweeping assertion as to complex ideas being always expressed in groups, would have prevented the possibility of a misunderstanding. However, from certain indications which it would be tedious to point out, we should surmise that by "group" he understands what has been called "a cluster-word," "a bunch-word," *i. e.*, a compound vocable of such transparency that its ingredients become visible even to a superficial observer; and by "complex ideas" he seems to mean those for whose enunciation through the medium of the English tongue several vocables are needed, such as "a wise man," "speaking slowly," etc. Now let us see how the Ojibwa language expresses these ideas. "Man" *inini*, "wise" *nebwakad*, "speaking" *gigitong*, "slowly" *beka*; or combined into a proposition: *nebwakad inini beka gigitong*, "a wise

man speaks slowly," or "is slow to speak." In all this we fail to discover a single group. In the following sentence the verbs are qualified by several accessory ideas: *pangi nawach besho enabing'in apichi go bakan naningotinong gego izhinagwad*, "a little more near if one look very much indeed otherwise sometimes something appears" (if you look a little closer at things, they sometimes present a very different appearance). The English parenthetical translation of our Ojibwa text plainly shows that the difference between the two idioms, as far as group-forming is concerned, may occasionally be extremely slight. That this is always the case we will not by any means say. Thus, in the first example, "a wise man," might as well have been translated *nibwakawinini*, "a wise-man;" and though there happens to be no single term in Ojibwa for "speaking slowly," we have *bekadoweng*, "speaking low;" *kishiweng*, "speaking loud;" *babekikadanjigeng*, "eating slowly;" also, more multiple compounds, like *kashkabiginamasong*, "cutting off one's own breath by means of a rope," *madweganeninjinidinisong*, "making the bones of one's (own) fingers crack."¹ It is perfectly true, moreover, that very many complex ideas which the English tongue dresses in the garb of short vocables, seemingly non-compound, reveal in the more transparent Indian idioms their complex character by their very wording; thus, the analytical counterpart of the Ojibwa compound *debweyendamowin*, "faith," would be in English "the act of considering that which is spoken to be in accordance with reality;" the simple word "rowing" is translated or defined by *ashebwoyeng*, "paddling (while sitting) backwards;" and what is only a "kite" to our boys, becomes in the mouth of the young redskin *babamassichigan*, "a contrivance driven about by the wind." But what does all this signify? That some complex ideas—or let there be a host of them—for whose enunciation we employ either a simple word or a series of distinct vocables, are, in some Indian tongues, expressed by binary, triple, quadruple, and, still more, multiple compounds. But hence to conclude that in each Indian language "every complex idea is expressed in a group," is as unwarranted a proceeding as if we asserted of the English language that it possesses not a single compound, on the plea of its capacity to express even highly complex ideas by means of simple monosyllabic terms. What could not be proved by such logic! Suppose an Ojibwa Indian to turn over the leaves of a dictionary of his dialect, explained in English, and discover that the proper interpretation of the verb *ana* requires seven or eight words ("he

¹ It should be observed that every one of these complex ideas could also be expressed—though more or less clumsily—in the analytical style, for instance:

o-madwewetonan okanan (ima) o-binakwanininjing etenigin,
he makes sound his bones (there) in his fingers which are.

has something sticky in his throat"), or that *geget*, *sesika*, and *kisha* are, in a manner, the equivalents of vocables made up of a dozen and more articulations ("unequivocally," "instantaneously," and "preliminarily"); all he could reasonably assert would be that his English-speaking friends occasionally give themselves more trouble than absolute necessity would require. But let him conclude from those few instances that the white man's language moves on very slowly, at the rate of about one-third or one-fourth of the rapidity of his own: will not this red-skinned linguist's logic be on a par with that of our misled historian, or rather of the authorities that misled him? So much about propositions and "groups." Now, what has our author to say, more particularly, about words?

On page 261 we read: "An Algonquin cannot say *I love*, or *I hate*; he must also, and simultaneously, express the object of the love or hatred." The fact is, that, like every other verb that is capable of being used both transitively and intransitively, "*I love*" has a double form: *nin sagia* (or *nin sagiton*) and *nin sagiwe*. Hence, whenever the Ojibwa wishes to express the object of his love, or when that object is understood, he employs the active form *nin sagia* (or *nin sagiton*), and when the object is only implied, the simple verb means "*I love him (her, it)*," very much in the same manner as *amo* does when it answers a question like "*amasne Deum?*" "*amasne illam?*" etc. If no particular object be mentioned or understood, the neuter form *nin sagiwe*, "*I love*," "*I feel the affection of love*," must be used. In like manner, "*I hate lying*" is *nin zhingendan gagingwishkiwin*, "*I hate it*," *nin zhingendan*; but "*I hate*," simply will be *nin zhingenjige*, or, if a habit or disposition be implied, "*nin zhingenjigeshk*." The same difference obtains in Cree: *sakiew Kiche-Manitowa*, "*he loves God*," *sakiwe*, "*he loves*;" *pakwatw iyiniwa*, "*he hates an Indian*," *pakwatam*, "*he hates*." This distinction is likewise made in Pottawattamie, Menomonee, Niinaw, and probably in every other Algonic dialect. In some cases the neuter form is even the simpler of the two, the mere root, for instance, *nin gagibingwenaban*, *nongom dash nin wab*; *Kakinagogo nin wabandan*, "*I was blind, but now I see; I see everything*."¹

¹ The ending *a* in *nin sagia* is undoubtedly the remnant of an original demonstrative pronoun *aw* "*this*," "*this living being*;" and even in the neuter *nin sagiwe* the ending must probably be traced to the pronoun *iw* "*that*." But of this circumstance the Indian speaker is as unconscious as Cicero was of the presence of an original pronominal affix in such words of his native tongue as *lex* (*leg-s*) and *rex* (*reg-s*), or in conjugational forms like *amas* (*ama-si*) and *amat* (*ama-ti*). Hence, we do an injustice to the Indian when we take him to task for saying *nin sagia Kiche-Manito*, "*I love 'm God*," while no one finds fault with the Roman orator for saying *ille reg-s* "*this king-he*," or *iste amat* "*he love-he*." Are we not ourselves guilty of the same linguistic misdemeanor whenever we say "*he loves*," or "*he loveth*?" The power of habit is great! Were we but accustomed to say *anion Deus* in the stead of *amo Deum*, we

Our author continues: "As each noun is blended with a pronominal prefix; as each adjective amalgamates with the subject it qualifies; so each active verb includes in one and the same word one pronoun representing its subject, and another its object also." It is more especially with the first section of this sentence we find fault.¹ Each noun blended with a pronominal prefix! We could wish it were so. But this would bring the American idioms a step nearer the mother tongue of our own family of speech, in which, if we may trust the results of modern linguistic research, nouns were formed by blending pronominal with verbal roots. There are, indeed, traces of the prevalence of a similar law in the oldest strata of Algic speech. Thus, by prefixing the demonstrative *mi*, the noun *mitig*, Cree *mistik*, "a tree," was formed from a root *tig* or *tik* (probably "rising," "sticking up"), and *migoss* "an awl," from *gwass* or *goss*, "sewing;" and in the Cree dialect the same demonstrative root is still regularly prefixed to a large class of nouns, whenever they happen to be used unconnected with personal pronouns, as *mistikwan*, "head," *mipit*, "tooth;" a process akin to the well-known rule in the Aztec tongue, according to which isolated nouns take the termination *tl*, as *teotl*, "God," *tepetl*, "mountain," from the themes *teo*, *tepe*. But this can hardly be what Bancroft, or his authorities, had in view when denying to the Indian speech the capacity of employing nouns without their pronominal companions. If we are not mistaken, they had simply remarked that in the case of composites like *noss*, "my father," *kishtigwan*, "thy head," *onik*, "his arm," the prefixes *n* (*ni*), *ki*, and *o* (*wi*) being dropped, the remnant of the vocable would not, as expected, yield the simple noun, as "fathers," or "heads," and "arms," do in English, upon being shorn of their case or plural endings. They found *oss*, *shtigwan*, and *nik* to be as unfit for use as *patr*, *capit*, and *brachi* would be in Latin; and from this discovery those scholars not only concluded that the Indian nouns in question could not be employed

would not be in the least surprised to hear the Indian say, "I love 'm God" (if we may thus imitate his *nin sagia Kishe-Manito*). At all events, the want of analytical power cannot be proved by these grammatical characteristics, or, if it can, the Indo-European stands not a whit higher than the American. As for the conclusions to be drawn from the fact that the Algonquin form of speech accomplishes by conjugational endings what the Indo-European arrives at by means of declension, we purpose to examine this matter on some other occasion.

¹ As for active verbs, said to include two pronouns, we refer to the preceding note, where the import of the *objective affix* is explained. A *subjective prefix* is met with, in some dialects, in the form of the personal pronoun, somewhat mutilated, or more rapidly pronounced; but even this is dropped in the subjunctive and imperative mood, in participles, etc. Or should the personal *endings* be meant? If so, we need not remark that in this respect the Indo-European tongues were, and to a great extent still are, as synthetical as the Algic dialects; even *objective affixes* are not wanting in some of them. And what about the Semitic idioms?

without a personal pronoun, but also surmised a general law, or peculiarity, according to which each noun must be blended with a pronominal prefix. We should copy a considerable part of the dictionary, were we to get up a list of exceptions to that remarkable rule! Other circumstances may have helped to strengthen the preconceived idea. The following is a case in point. Bancroft (on page 258) assures us that "the savage could not say *tree*, or *house*; the word must always be accompanied by prefixes defining its application." We simply open our Ojibwa dictionary, and there, *sub voce*, "tree," we find *mitig*, while "house" is interpreted by *wakaigan* (Ojibwa) and *wigiwam* (Ottawa). Neither in these vocables, nor in their equivalents in other Algonic dialects, a trace is discoverable of prefixes "defining their application." How could our author's guides be led so far astray? In the simplest way in the world. Ask an Ojibwa child, pointing at the same time to his father's house (for many of them *have houses*), "what is this?" In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, the answer will be: *mi sa* ENDAYANG, "this is where we *dwell*," or, as our children would say, "where we *live*." Repeat the question, pointing to the nearest habitation: *mi sa Maingan* ENDAWAD "this is where Wolves are *living*," may happen to be the reply. A third question will be answered with *Wakosh sa* ENDAPANIG, "where Foxes *lived*," and so forth. If a Frenchman, upon his return from a short excursion into the realms of Her Majesty of England, seriously informed his countrymen that across the Channel they have no word for *maison*, a habitation with them being either "a live," or "a living," or a "lived," according to its being or having been, occupied by such or such parties, that foreigner would not go farther astray than the American linguist on whose authority Bancroft assures us that the word "house" must always be accompanied by a prefix defining its application.

This particular error, however, concerning "prefixes of application" seems to be traceable to another source. Edwards, to whom our historian refers in a marginal note, undoubtedly observed that the element *gamig*, or its equivalent in the particular New England dialect he was acquainted with, evidently signified "house" in a number of compounds, such as *ishkwegamig* "the last house," *atassowigamig*, "a storehouse," *anamiewigamig* "a house of prayer," etc. Failing, nevertheless, to hear or to discover in the written documents of the dialect, the simple vocable *gamig*, he very reasonably surmised that it could have no separate existence. When he, however, concluded from this that those savages could not say "house," he shot as far beside the mark as a young Latinist would do who, after searching his authors in vain for such terms as *fex*, *fices*, or *cen*, *cines*, though there is no lack of *pontifices*, *tibicines*,

etc., would come to the conclusion that Cicero's countrymen could not say "maker" or "player."¹

Does each adjective "amalgamate with the subject it qualifies?" If compounds like "vice-president," "arch-bishop," "six-pence," etc., are amalgams, then the assertion is true of the very limited number of adjectives apparently radical, or adjectives proper, which the Algonic dialects possess. But besides these, there is a great number of attributives in daily use which we see no reason why not to call adjectives merely on account of their participial dress; and these adjectives hold their own place in the sentence, so much so as to be sometimes separated from the substantives they qualify, by one or more intervening vocables. The same is generally the case with numerals. Examples will be found in the following lines:

Kichi-ogima pizhikiwan gi-bawamad nizhwasswi o-gi-wabaman
 The great chief, of cattle when he dreamed, seven he saw
ikwe-pizhikiwan waninonijin; minawa dash gi-inabandang
 cows fat ones; again ðt when he dreamed,
nizhwasswi pizhikiwan o-gi-wabaman kechi-pakakodosonijin.
 seven cattle he saw very lean ones.

Passing over several other statements in Bancroft's essay, either similarly erroneous or greatly exaggerated, we now come to some conclusions the historian draws from them. The first is that language, so far as its organization or its grammatical forms are concerned, is not the work of civilization but of nature. On this question, as lying outside of our present scope, nothing need be said. Another "momentous" and "more certain" conclusion is this, "that the ancestors of our tribes were rude like themselves." Over this assertion we have no disposition to quarrel, provided we be allowed to determine the degree of rudeness and the point where the ancestral line of our tribes must be conceived to begin. But our author continues: "It has been asked if our Indians were not the wrecks of more civilized nations. Their language refutes the hypothesis; every one of its forms is a witness that their ancestors were, like themselves, *not yet disenthralled from nature*. The character of each Indian language is one continued, universal, all-pervading synthesis. They to whom these languages were the mother tongue,"²

¹ With regard to "tree," the mistake must have occurred in a similar manner. The Algonic dialects designate most trees by compounds whose second term consists of the elements *ak*, *atig*, or *agawanzh*. Some Anglo-Saxon linguist, misled by the analogy of his "apple trees," "pear trees," etc., expected to meet, at least once in awhile, with some solitary *ak*, *atig*, or *agawanzh*, and being disappointed in this, concluded that the simple term for "tree" is wanting in those dialects.

² From the context we must understand this phrase to mean: "they who first used these languages." Bancroft inclines to the hypothesis according to which language was *given* to the several families of mankind together, and in proportion with their other endowments.

were still in that earliest stage of intellectual culture *where reflection has not begun.*" (Page 265.)

We have again to complain of a certain want of definiteness in the use of terms. What does our author mean by "reflection?" Reflection on the parts of speech and the rules of grammar and syntax? Then we fully agree with him as to its total absence among our untutored Indians, at least among those who never had their attention turned to those rules by a white man blundering in the use of their difficult dialects. We have no objection against placing the ancestors of the red man on the same stage, so far as grammatical knowledge is concerned, with our own sires, or their cousins who composed the Vedic hymns and the great epics of the world. None of the latter, if we are rightly informed, were able to parse a sentence or even to distinguish, by name, a noun from a verb. Would our historian, on that account, call them "rude," and assign them "to that earliest stage of intellectual culture where reflection has not begun?" He knows too well that quite a respectable height of civilization can coexist with a total want of reflection on the parts of speech and the rules of grammar. We must, then, presume him to have had in view what is ordinarily understood by reflection: the reverting of the mind to its own inward operations, the attentive and continued consideration of one's own thoughts or feelings, or the like. Here we must distinguish. If men should study psychology and logic ere they can be looked upon as disenthralled from nature, then again we shake hands with the historian, and even give up all hope of ever seeing our Indian friends throw off the shackles of intellectual bondage. But if reflection on thought, as distinguished from sensation or volition, be understood, or reflection on thoughts as different from, and opposed to, one another, as standing in various relations to the idea of truth, and so forth, then we claim for the Red Indian and his ancestors, back to the very beginning of their particular form of speech, a moderate share of that self-consciousness and that capacity of reflected self-determination which prove the white man to be something more than the bondsman of nature, and that very speech, fairly presented and competently tested, will bear out our assertion. Our next step, to this end, would be a comparison of the Algonic tongues with the principal types of human speech. We must not, however, presume too much on the patience of our readers, and hence, conclude here, with the hope of taking up the subject at some future time.

SCHULTE'S ROMAN CATHOLICISM: THE PLEA OF AN APOSTATE.

Roman Catholicism, Old and New, from the Standpoint of the Infallibility Doctrine. By John Schulte, D.D., Ph.D., Rector of Port Burwell, Ont., Canada. Toronto (Belford Brothers, publishers): 1876, 12mo., pp. 350.

WHEN a man comes before the Christian world to give evidence which he considers of great importance to its religious interests, there are two questions that should naturally occur to the public mind: Who is this witness, and what has he to say? In other words the character of the witness and the nature of his evidence offer reasonable ground for preliminary investigation.

Even if we knew nothing of Dr. Schulte personally, we know enough of the class to which he belongs; and it is proverbially an unsafe one. For the last three hundred years or more they have been constantly coming before us with their "testimony" from the vagabond monks who flocked to Wittenberg clamoring (as Luther complains) for a crust of bread and a wife to share it, down to the Gavazzis and Schultes of our day. They come upon the public stage and claim as a right that the world should see and hear them. This is, generally speaking, their formula of self-introduction: "Look well at me, O religious public! and behold in me a genuine convert from the errors and wickedness of popery. I have managed by stealth to read the Bible, which the Church of Rome fears and proscribes, and in it I have found Protestantism. I was a priest, but I have renounced my ministry and its obligations. I have done forever with celibacy and confession; with penances, fasting, and irksome daily task of vocal prayer. They were galling fetters of the Man of Sin, and I have cast them off to enjoy Gospel liberty. Listen then with open ears while I unfold the horrors of the prison-house whence I have escaped. Listen, for I have anecdotes to amuse you, choice bits of scandal to tickle the palate of the curious, and tales of terror to thrill your inmost hearts." Such substantially, *mutatis mutandis*, has been the programme of all the "brands plucked from the burning" when about to entertain evangelical audiences with lectures or the reading public with books, purporting to give the history and motives of their change. It is not perhaps to the credit of human nature that such charlatans should be seldom at a loss for gaping mouths and willing

ears; but the maw of anti-Catholic prejudice is insatiable, and besides, as the poet tells us,

Infinita è la schiera degli sciocchi.¹

But of late years, whether the charm of novelty has vanished, or the intelligent portion of the Protestant world has had its eyes opened by experience to the worthless character of these men, or from both causes combined, it is certain that converts from popery and their spoken or written "testimony" have ceased to be the attraction that they once were. The converts, too, have become more cautious.

There is also another reason which has not been without its weight. Side by side with these self-styled proselytes the world has beheld with astonishment a host of other converts moving in an opposite direction. It has seen them issuing in crowds from the walls of the great city, that incloses many different religions whose only bond of unity is a common name, and knocking quietly and humbly for admission at the gates of the Catholic Church. The conduct and demeanor of these men, and indeed their whole history, if it excited the wonder, has also claimed and compelled the respect and admiration of the intellectual and better-disposed class of Protestants. These converts were men of polished understanding, and many of them had made for themselves a great name in the literature of the period. They were men of moral excellence, esteemed and beloved by all who knew them. Many of them left their churches amid the tears and blessings of the congregations with whom they were parting. There were among them none tainted by suspicion of crime, none seeking pelf or preferment, none clamoring for carnal liberty under color of the Gospel. They left behind them no dark whisperings of mortified pride or disappointed ambition that had revenged itself by apostasy, of ecclesiastical censure avoided by timely flight. They threw away wealth and honored position in the Church of their birth. In some cases they had to renounce the most sacred ties of friendship and even of kindred. They attested the truth of their convictions by facing poverty and not unfrequently the frown of the world and obloquy. All this they counted as nothing compared to the happiness of being restored to Catholic unity. When they entered the Catholic

¹ Petrarch. This is nothing more than a literal version of Eccl. i. 15. *Stultorum infinitus est numerus*. Petrarch, like all scholars of the "dark ages," was wonderfully conversant with the Bible, far more so than Protestants or Catholics of our day. One proof of it is, that in his exquisite ode (Canzone 49) which abounds in most happy scriptural allusions, one of the choicest of them has been utterly ignored or misconstrued by the commentators (including the erudite Liberal Catholic or infidel, Leopardi), because they were ignorant of the source whence he derived it.

Church some of them saw fit to give to the world the motives of their change; others said nothing, as if unconcerned about the judgments of men, and content with the testimony of their own conscience. But whether they wrote or kept silent, none of them had either publicly or privately any word of reviling for those they had left; they had no idle gossip to retail, no tales of scandal or of imaginary horrors to awaken mockery or indignation against their former co-religionists. They lived, and some of them have since died, loved and respected in the Church of their choice as they once had been in that from which they departed.

The intelligent Protestant world could not help observing and reflecting on all this; nor could it fail to be deeply impressed by the marked contrast between those honest, conscientious men (mistaken, if you choose) who return to the Church of their fathers, and those unhappy waifs who from time to time are swept by some wind or other into the open sea of Protestantism. The comparison cannot have been very favorable to the latter. The Church has no reason to fear, but every reason to desire, that the non-Catholic world should carefully examine and compare those who return to her bosom and those who abandon her fold, and from the comparison draw whatever inference candor and logic may suggest. But for the Catholic it is quite unnecessary, and even incompatible with his habitual mode of thought, to institute any such comparison. He does not regard the difference, striking as it may be, between the conduct and the history of the Newmans, Fabers, Wilberforces, Mannings, etc., on one side, and of the Hogans, Leahys, Gavazzis, Achillis, etc., on the other, as a mere phenomenon in the moral or religious world, offering to the curious observer a fine field for thought and deduction.¹ Taught by his religion, he judges men and things from a higher point of view and sees in the light of faith what escapes the vision of the children of men.

He knows that conversion from heresy to the Church of Christ is one of the greatest triumphs of God's grace; and that, without this conquering grace, no amount of human certainty, no fulness of conviction can accomplish it. He knows, too, as none but a

¹ Even Dr. Schulte is compelled to acknowledge this "puzzling phenomenon," as he calls it, "that talented men, men of standing in other denominations and in society, should leave their own Church and enter the Roman communion" (p. 37). There is nothing "puzzling" in it that a Catholic child might not easily unravel, to say nothing of the Doctor himself, had he not put off his candor with his cassock. The real "puzzle" is his attempted explanation. Besides Rome's "imposing exterior," converts hope to find in her the old Catholicism of the Apostles. They are also attracted by "a certain amount of *rationalism* in Roman theology" (Ibid.). This is playing rather too boldly with anti-Catholic credulity, and we scarcely think any one can be found, orthodox Protestant or Rationalist, to swallow this explanation.

Catholic can know and understand, the dreadful meaning of apostasy with all that it implies. It is not for him a mere exchange of one form of Christian opinion for another, as the blind unchristian world is pleased to regard it. It is in his case the deliberate renouncing of salvation, the casting away of all hope, the voluntary surrender of one's self to final reprobation. It is to renew the denial and betrayal of Peter and of Judas, for Christ our Lord is one with His Church. Apostasy, however, may possibly be preceded by loss of faith; but even this is sad and horrible to contemplate. For the Catholic does not believe as other men do, because he has argued himself into the persuasion that the doctrine is true. There can be amongst us but one ground of faith for all, for the peasant and the philosopher, for the beggar woman and the one who sits and teaches in the Apostolic chair. All must believe on the authority of the Church bearing witness to what God has revealed. And even thus we cannot believe without the grace of faith, which is a special gift of God. Being God's gratuitous gift, it may be forfeited; but this can happen only through our own fault, through some prevarication, actual or habitual, which renders us unworthy depositaries, and forces an angry God to take back his gift. The loss of faith, therefore, reveals the moral ruin of the soul, and that apostasy should ensue can cause no wonder.

But sometimes faith continues to live in the soul not only up to the hour of apostasy, but who may say how long after it? None can set a limit; for, as it is God's gift, whether He may choose to recall it, or when, depends solely on His own good pleasure. But where sanctifying grace is wanting faith is virtually dead. It is the faith of the devils, who, as St. James says, believe with trembling, not with hope and joy (James ii. 17, 19, 26). And even the purpose of apostasy presupposes the loss of sanctifying grace. Yet as long as faith of any kind remains, who can imagine or describe the agony and remorse that must accompany the deliberate contemplation of the sacrifice of one's soul, heavenly birthright and God himself for some dross of earthly advantage? And how fearfully evil must be the energy of bad will that forces this sacrifice upon the reluctant soul! It can only coexist with moral desolation of frightful degree, and usually of long standing. Whence came this moral waste and ruin, and what may be its special character, we may not always be able to determine or even to guess, nor is it necessary. There is no doubt, however, that it may ultimately be traced to some one of those three sources in which, as the Apostle tells us, all the moral evil of the world has its origin. Perhaps it is pride, perhaps it is inordinate desire of the goods of this life, perhaps it is sensuality in some disguise

or other. That a Protestant should exchange one form of religion for another outside of the Church, may involve no moral guilt of any kind whatsoever; in some cases he may be acting laudably by following conscience, which is unable to guide him any higher. But in the case of a Catholic this is impossible, and no one knows or once knew it better than the doctor of theology whose book lies before us. Outside of the Church they have no *faith*, in the true sense of the term, but only *opinion*, which being purely human may be readily and in some cases commendably altered and amended. But we have divine faith, which cannot be taken from us save on account of our sin, like the Gospel talent from the faithless servant.

The Catholic cannot be good, cannot be acting conscientiously, who deliberately abandons the Church. This is no hasty, uncharitable statement prompted by anger or resentment. It is the direct consequence of Catholic theology, and has been the doctrine of the Church in all ages. St. Cyprian cries out with loud, indignant voice, "Let no one imagine it POSSIBLE for those who are GOOD to depart from the Church."¹ It is not the good grain (to use the same Father's illustration) but the empty chaff that is carried away by the wind; not the firmly-rooted tree, but the one which has lost its sap and vigor, that is overthrown by the storm; and one greater than St. Cyprian had long before given utterance to the same truth. *Prodierunt ex nobis*, says St. John, *sed non erant ex nobis*.²

And this furnishes a general answer to the first question: Who is the witness that offers himself to testify against the Catholic Church? He is a priest who exercised his ministry for years in the care of souls, and as professor of divinity. It is only fair then (unless one would needlessly charge him with dishonest dealing) to assume that during that time he held the Catholic faith, and that amongst other things he held and taught that the gift of faith can only be lost by unworthiness. He would have us believe that he has lost that faith, but he takes care not to tell us how he came by the loss. If he had a plausible reason to assign he would have done so; but even then we should be under no obligation of taking his mere word for it. We measure him not by what he may say of himself, or may be said by his new patrons, but by what we know of him. Judging him, therefore, by the Catholic standard, by the faith which he himself professed and taught for so many

¹ "Nemo existimet BONOS de ecclesia POSSÈ discedere. Triticum non rapit ventus, nec arborem solida radice fundatam procella subvertit. Inanes palæ tempestate jactantur, invalidæ arbores turbinis incursione evertuntur." *De Unitate Ecclesiae*, opp. S. Cypriani, ed. Ven., 1758, col. 470.

² They went out from us; but they were not of us. For if they had been of us, they would *no doubt* have continued with us. 1 John ii. 19.

years, in what other light can we regard him than as one who, having tasted of the heavenly gift (Heb. vi. 4), has with perverted will flung it away in exchange for the flesh-pots of Egypt? Who can discover or follow the course of a perverted will, the working or suffering of a heart that has swerved from the allegiance sworn at the awful imposition of hands in ordination? It is the province not of man but of the all-seeing eye to detect the root and trace the ravages of moral decay in such a soul. They may and will elude the keenest scrutiny of hostile criticism or of friendly censure. But there are cases in which to affirm that the moral taint, however invisible, certainly exists, is no violation of truth or charity. This may sound harsh in the ears of some, and others will insist that it is uncharitable. It is neither; it is not even discourteous, though it may not be the way precisely in which Catholic writers usually state the case against our apostates. What can there be, we may ask, either honest or profitable in the mock courtesy, which fosters the delusion that our apostates may be in good faith when they leave the Catholic Church?¹ Besides, the *Review* addresses both Catholic and Protestant readers. It is but right that the latter should be correctly informed as to the theory and doctrine of the Church in regard to wilful apostasy. As far as Catholics are concerned, what harm can it be to remind them of a truth which they have known from infancy, viz., that it is not the good, but the bad, unworthy son, who turns his back upon his mother? And surely we owe none any apology for taking to heart and repeating, for our own benefit and that of others, the wholesome teaching of those great saints who lived, and suffered, and shed their blood for the true faith. We say, therefore, again, and cannot say it too often, in the language of the holy African doctor and martyr, "Nemo existimet BONOS de ecclesia posse discedere." That they CANNOT possibly be good men who depart from the Church, is as true in the New World as in the Old; as correct a standard of practical judgment in this nineteenth century, as when it was first uttered by St. Cyprian more than sixteen hundred years ago. Some Catholics, we are told, have been scandalized by the fall of this unhappy man and still more by the appearance of his wicked book; but let them remember that our Lord, while denouncing woe upon the bringers of scandal, warned us at the same time that scandals

¹ There are not a few Protestants whose good sense has preserved them from this delusion, or who have been weaned from it by a sad experience. We know on the best authority that a distinguished Presbyterian minister, whose name is still remembered and revered by his New England brethren, used to repel persistently two classes of men, pretended converts from Judaism and apostate priests, no matter what credentials they might bring with them from other ministers, and never allowed them to "give their testimony" in his pulpit. Nor did he make any secret of his reason. They were as a class, he would say, rank impostors.

must come. It is better that the author of this scandal should be outside of the Church than hurting his own soul, and possibly the souls of others, in her bosom and in her ministry.

As to who the Rev. Dr. Schulte may be individually, we have no need nor do we care further to inquire, though we have heard him spoken of once or twice by his former classmates. His title-page tells enough of his story. He was once a weed in the Pope's garden, as the witty Dean Swift used to express himself, was plucked up, thrown over the Anglican side of the fence, and had the luck to tumble into the snug little rectory of Port Burwell. What concerns us more is the next question: What has the witness to say for himself? What is the nature of his testimony?

Dr. Schulte's book has been hailed in some quarters as a work of great power and originality, and a "deathblow to popery." But the latter clause can only be a publisher's stereotyped flourish, as we remember having heard it repeated in the case of a thousand and one books of the sort, from Maria Monk's *Awful Disclosures* to the late stupid, mendacious book of R. W. Thompson, who sits by the side of John Sherman in the new cabinet, and is the representative, we suppose, of its Christian statesmanship. Power or originality it has none; of the latter not even the shadow. On the contrary we have been pained and to some extent ashamed to see that the author cannot rise above the twaddle and common place of every-day scribblers in the no-popery line of the most vulgar, offensive sort. There is nothing in him that may not be found in the most ordinary manuals of Anti-Catholic theology for the people; and if there be anything that looks like an exception, he has borrowed it to all appearance from his namesake of Bonn,¹ or Dollinger, who in turn stands indebted to Richer, Febronius, etc., to say nothing of Protestant writers. No doubt the author has some ability; his education and academical degrees would lead one to suppose so. And had he exercised it in the cause of Truth, some undeniable trace of it would be stamped upon his pages. But no man can defend error in such way as to give a respectable showing to those talents that he may possess. And logic, above all, is not the weapon which any one can wield with credit against the Catholic Church. His bad logic shows itself from the very start, when giving an account of his religious change. He tells us, with somewhat of mixed metaphor, that when he made the final plunge out of Rome, without knowing where to land, he found himself in the atmosphere of Protestantism. But as the Church of Rome possesses the whole body of revelation, though incrustated

¹ Dr. Schulte, a layman, who is suspected of having had a hand in the compilation of that vile book of the masked Janus, "The Pope and the Council." His apostasy has been rewarded by Bismarck with a professorship in the University of Bonn.

with error, he felt it his duty to separate revealed doctrine from its Roman excrescence. And as the Church of England told him that she possessed de-Romanized Catholicity, he took her at her word and blindly entered her communion. To avoid all suspicion of exaggeration we give his own words :

"I had made the final plunge out of Rome, without knowing where to land, and I found myself in the atmosphere of Protestantism. . . . I had to distinguish and separate the purely *Roman* from the purely *Catholic*, rejecting the former and adhering to the latter. And in looking around me among the different churches, I found that the Church of England professed to have followed the same process. This was the reason which at that time determined me to join her communion."

Let any one imagine, if he can, a Catholic doctor of theology so ignorant as not to know what the Anglican Church professes to believe, and only finding it out after he "had made the plunge into Protestantism!" *Credat Judæus Apella*. But let this improbable, impossible story pass, and let us admire the Doctor's process of reasoning. He rejected the Catholic Church and rushed into the embraces of the Anglican, because she *professed* to separate truth from error. This and this only was the reason that determined him. How logical and consistent! If we are to believe himself, it cost him a long mental struggle to get out of the Church of all ages, and which claims infallibility; yet without serious study, without even an hour's investigation, he unites himself with the church begotten of the monster, Henry VIII., *because*, while boasting of its fallibility, it *professes* to hold the truth unmixed with error. Do not the Presbyterians and Baptists of British America profess the same? Is there any church at all, calling itself by whatever name, there or elsewhere, that does not make the same profession? But we are sure Dr. Schulte has been unjust to himself. It was not this solitary, flimsy reason, but others of more strength and substance, if not logic, that drew him into the Church of England, and gave its peculiar tinge to his Anglicanism, which is of the lowest grade. Baptists and Presbyterians in that region have no rectories to bestow on every hungry newcomer, and the patronage of the establishment is not in the hands of high churchmen, who are oftener heard of than seen in the Dominion.

Dr. Schulte devotes his book to the examination of Church infallibility "not only because it is the root of Papal infallibility, but also because it is held by the liberal Catholics of all countries, the old Catholics of Germany, and in a modified form, though unconsciously, by some Protestants" (p. 11). The first part of his work reviews the arguments used by Catholics to prove infallibility, the second discusses the practical workings of infallibility in the Church, the third finally treats of the Papacy and its infallibility. He looks on Church infallibility as the very "essence of Roman-

ism," and says that therefore this doctrine must be refuted in the first place in order "to demolish the very bulwark of the Church of Rome" (p. 44). Who will not be surprised after this to hear him, a few pages farther on, disguising the commonest every-day Protestantism under such high-sounding language as the following:

"We agree with the Roman Catholic that the Church is infallible, but we differ from him as to the seat of that infallibility. We maintain that it resides in the inner element of the Church, namely, in the Word of God contained in the Bible and deposited within the Church. We believe that the Bible is the infallible element of the Church, and that on this account only and no other she is said to be infallible, etc." (p. 47).

Now what does this verbiage amount to after all, but to what is held by the most rabid advocate of private judgment, viz., that the Bible is infallible but the Church is not? The distinction that he makes (p. 46) between the two elements of the Church, of which the outward is formed by its members, preaching, rites, and ceremonies, the inward by the Word of God or Bible, has no foundation in reason or in fact. We can understand how the Church may have an inward and an outward life. The former is a life of faith, hope, charity, and sanctifying grace, which she imparts to her children by her outward ministry and chiefly by the administration of the sacraments. Or, since she is a moral individual, we can understand that she may have by analogy what is called a body and a soul. But that a volume, however holy, should form the inner one of the two elements that constitute her being, as the author intimates (*ibid.*), is absolutely unintelligible.

Besides, this hypothesis is hopelessly destroyed by the undeniable fact that the Church existed before a syllable of the New Testament was written. The first book, St. Matthew's Gospel, only came to light according to some eight, according to others thirty, but most probably fifteen or twenty years after the death of our Lord. The other Apostles had been gathered to their rest, and the Church by their labors had been spread over a great part of the world, before the last of its books came from the pen of the Beloved Disciple. Moreover, the genuine writings of the New Testament were only separated by degrees from their apocryphal counterfeits and gathered into one body. The first attempt of the kind was not made until the latter half of the second century (A.D. 160). Still several of the books remained doubtful, accepted in one place, rejected in another, till at last after the lapse of almost four hundred years the Canon, or body of Scripture books, as we now have it, was definitely fixed by authority. Was the Church of Christ, during the whole or any part of that time, wanting in one, and the more important one, of her two constituent elements? God's work, and surely His Church deserves that name, is never imperfect. The Church of God was as full and complete

a masterpiece of His wisdom on the day when she was first proclaimed to the world, as she has been at any time since that great Pentecostal feast. But this fact does not suit Dr. Schulte. Let us see how he tries to get rid of it, and to prove that the Church is behind the Bible in point of time as well as in authority.

"All will agree that the Scriptures of the Old Testament existed before the Church; nay, Christ and His Apostles built their divine mission on them by constant appeals to them. Moreover, none will deny that the Gospel is contained in the Old Testament, and that the constitution of the Church is clearly foreshadowed therein. The Christian Church, therefore, depended greatly as to her rule of faith on the Old Testament Scriptures, especially as the first Christians were mostly converts from Judaism, who needed constant reference to their sacred writings as a rule of faith. Further, as the Church of Christ was to be 'built on the foundation of the Apostles, Christ himself being the chief corner-stone,' she cannot be said to have fully existed before their death. The building of the Church on this foundation, and the writing of the New Testament Scriptures commenced and proceeded concurrently until both were completed by the same workmen, so that at their death the Church stood forth with a complete constitution and a rule of faith given by God's Spirit to lead men into all truth 'even to the end of the world.' We are justified therefore in concluding that the Bible existed prior to the Church" (p. 53).

The Scriptures of the Old Testament existed indeed before the Church of the Christian dispensation, but a church, foreshadowing that of the New Law, had already existed in the Old. And the same had existed for a long time before the Law was written, living meanwhile on tradition or the Unwritten Word. The Patriarchs had revelation, but no volume that contained it, a case analogous to that of the Christian Church in her early days. And when the Law was written, it was not so much a doctrinal code as a body of laws, by which Jehovah sought to bind more closely to Himself and to His allegiance the people whom He had deigned to adopt as His own peculiar people and the depositary of His gracious promises to the human race. The Law of Sinai, save wherein it re-enacted the precepts of the natural law, contained, it may be said without irreverence, a mite of doctrine under a mountain of ritual and ceremonial observance. The Law included, it is true, the promise of a new prophet and lawgiver (Deut. xviii. 15, 18); but it was only in the subsequent prophecies that this promise began to grow in fulness and distinctness, till at last his glory, sufferings, family, birthplace, and even the time of his coming were clearly announced. Now it was a belief in these *promises*, coupled with faithful adherence to the precepts of the Law, that constituted the Jewish rule of faith, such as it was, and not a body of dogmatic doctrine, properly so called, to be found in their sacred books. Otherwise it is hard to explain how the Sadducees could have any standing in the Synagogue and even creep into the high priesthood. Though denying doctrines contained in tradition and the sacred books themselves, their observance of the Law and profession of

a belief in the promises gave them some color of orthodoxy or outward title to it.

If our Lord and His Apostles appealed to the writings of the Old Testament, it is scarcely correct to say that they "built on them their divine mission." Our Lord appealed constantly to His own miracles, and but seldom to the sacred writings. And when He did, it was only to the prophetic *promises* that were receiving their fulfilment in His person. He used them against the obdurate Scribes and Pharisees, but we nowhere find Him proposing them as a standard by which believers of good will, the *docibiles Dei* (Jno. vi. 45), were to test His claims to their obedience. That the first Christians, being mostly converts from Judaism, "needed constant reference to their sacred writings as a rule of faith" is not only false but absurd. Where was the rule of faith any longer in the Old Testament for men, who in becoming Christians had learned that its *Law* was abolished, its *promises* fulfilled, its *moral teaching* supplemented and perfected by the teaching of Christ and His Apostles? Had they not the Apostles or their successors, the CHURCH, in a word, which Christ Himself had commanded them to hear under penalty of being cast out with the heathen and the publican (Matt. xviii. 17)? Had they not the traditions, which they had received from the Apostles either by letter or by word of mouth (2 Thess. ii. 14), or from those "faithful men" who had been commissioned to teach by the Apostles or by their representatives and successors (2 Tim. ii. 2)? There does not occur in the whole New Testament history an instance in which our Lord or His Apostles referred their hearers to the Old Testament as a rule of faith.¹

¹ The hackneyed quotation "search the Scriptures" (Jno. v. 39), the well-known praise of the Bereans (Acts xvii. 11), and the general commendation of Scripture (2 Tim. iii. 16) are not to the point. We are glad to see that Dr. Schulte has cautiously avoided them, except the last, to which he returns once and again (pp. 62, 83, 89). The words "search the Scriptures," which as Selden says (he means the Protestant gloss put upon them) have undone the world, are merely an argument *ad hominem*. It is probably, as St. Cyril, a Greek father, explains it, not in the imperative but in the indicative mood. The context seems to require it, and scores of Protestant commentators have thought so from Beza, Œcolampadius, and Causabon down to Doddridge, Campbell, Bloomfield, Ernesti, and Rosenmuller in our day. Whatever it be, it is evidently not a command, but a rebuke for reading the Scriptures, and not finding in them Him to whom they bear witness. The passage of Acts xvii. 11, is very adroitly translated in King James's Bible, "who received the word" . . . *searching* (*ἑρῶντες ὁμολογῶντες*) being rendered by "in that they received the word . . . and searched." Yet nothing more results from it than that the Bereans are praised, *because* they differed from those of Thessalonica in preferring the way of rational investigation to that of blind hostility and persecution. Both of these passages regard not Christians, but Jews who have not yet believed. And the Catholic Church of to-day would most cheerfully address the same words of encouragement and praise to Jews and unbelievers.

That the reading of the Old Testament is profitable, instructive, etc., we freely ac-

Dr. Schulte in support of his theory, that the Church had no complete existence up to the death of the Apostles, refers us to the words of St. Paul (Eph. ii. 19). The reference is as artful as it is dishonest. The words "*was to be built*" are skilfully chosen, leading the reader (without saying it) to infer that the Apostle spoke of something in the future, but they betray an unscrupulous controversialist. St. Paul does not speak of a church *to be built*, nor of a church at all, but addressing the Ephesians, he tells them that by their admission into the Church *they* have been built¹ upon the foundation of the Apostles. The Church had been already built upon their foundation, and especially upon St. Peter their chief and prince. The Divine Founder had made the promise when He said: Thou art Peter and on this Rock I will build my Church (Matt. xvi. 18). He fulfilled the promise when He gave him his commission "Confirm thy brethren," "Feed my lambs; feed my sheep" (Luke xxii. 32; Jno. xxi. 15-17). The kingdom of Heaven had not the fanciful growth imagined by Dr. Schulte, and which argues imperfection. It could grow in no way but one; in the accession of new subjects, in the number of new lands over which it extended its sway. From the first day on which it was solemnly proposed to the homage of mankind, it was perfect in its constitution, its governing power, its mode of teaching and guiding the souls of men. It had its rule of faith not in the dead letter of the Old Testament—which Christians left to themselves might disfigure and pervert by false glosses, as the Jews had done—but in the living voice of the Apostles or their representatives and successors. These were the Prelates of the Church, who were charged not with the bodies but with the souls of the flock, that they might feed them with sound doctrine and govern them with wholesome counsel, and who therefore were to be HEARD and OBEYED (Heb. xiii. 17).

But when we say that the Apostles left their infallibility to their successors, Dr. Schulte will not hear of it. He hates the idea of Apostolic succession as fiercely as any bigot of Exeter Hall, and will have it that their only successors were their inspired writings. But beforehand he talks very confusedly of the inspiration of the

knowledge after the Apostle (2 Tim. iii. 15-17), but that it is, or ever was, *necessary*, or that they had to consult it as a rule of faith, is quite another thing. The Apostle has not said it, and we may deny it without slighting his authority. And the reading of the Old Testament is only profitable "through the faith which is in Christ Jesus," as St. Paul himself explains (ibid. v. 15), that is, when it is read with due subordination to the Gospel teaching of Christ and His Apostles. Any other reading of it is injurious. The Puritans, who had very little in them of the spirit of the Gospel and a great deal of the spirit of the Jew and the Pharisee, were very fond of reading the Old Testament. But with what result? They learned from it to be iconoclasts, vandals, robbers, and murderers.

¹ The past participle *ἐποικοδομηθέντες*.

Apostles, and even sets about proving it against Catholics, as if we denied it from interested motives.

"The Apostles," he says, "were individually inspired, or they would not have been qualified for their office as founders of the Church. They were inspired, or the promises of Christ to them would have failed of accomplishment; they were inspired, or they would not have given so many miraculous proofs of the special presence of the Holy Ghost, nor would they in their writings have, either directly or indirectly, so repeatedly laid claim to inspiration. . . . When they departed this life, their *writings* were looked upon as the Apostolical foundation on which the Church was built. And what better substitute could we have for the living voice of the Apostles than their inspired writings? But here Roman Catholics step forward, and endeavor to prove that the infallibility of the Apostles did not die with them, but is shared by their successors" (pp. 53, 54).

This is not quite correct and it lacks clearness. But the last sentence gives us the clue to the author's intention. We do not think there is any confusion on this matter in his mind, but it would seem his set purpose to confuse his readers' notions, so that they may no longer be able to distinguish between the inspiration and the infallibility of the Apostles.

The Apostles, no doubt, were all *infallible*, because of the presence of the Holy Ghost that came down upon them at Pentecost, to recall to their minds and render clear and perfect the teaching they had received from Christ, full and complete indeed, but poured into the ears of imperfect hearers. It had lain sluggish and dormant in their carnal hearts, but by the descent of the Holy Ghost it was to be quickened into new life, and invested with the brightness of heavenly light. This gift of the indwelling spirit was common to all. But none of them were inspired, in the true technical sense of the term, save those five who were moved by the Holy Ghost to write; and their inspiration ceased when they ceased writing. Inspiration was *not* necessary, as Dr. Schulte pretends, to found the Church. They could bear their part in doing this without any such gift. St. Peter was pre-eminently the foundation of the Church, but he was inspired only when he wrote his two Epistles. There is no question of the promises of Christ being made void, unless the Apostles were inspired, for He never made any such promise. Yet we will not deny that on some extraordinary occasion, as for example when they were in the presence of persecuting tribunals, He may have put words into their mouth, as He did with others of His servants in their hour of trial. But this is not necessarily inspiration, nor is the inspiration of the Twelve proved by their "miraculous powers." What had St. Peter's miracles to do with his inspiration, when his shadow healed the sick, as he passed through the market-place unconscious of their presence? All were infallible, we repeat, but not all inspired. Those who were inspired wrote, and their inspiration died, not with their leaving the world,

but as soon as they laid down the pen which they had been moved by the Spirit to take up. All were infallible, as long as they lived. Did their infallibility die with them? We shall see presently, and if it did, in what sense.

Dr. Schulte maintains that infallibility died with the Apostles or survives only in their writings, and contends (pp. 58, 59) that the texts (Matt. xvi. 18 and xxviii. 20) usually adduced by Catholics¹ to prove the perpetual infallibility of the Church amount to very little or nothing. However, he carefully avoids all direct discussion of these texts, but spends pages of loose declamation in reply. He tells us how the Apostles were infallible as founders of the Church and as witnesses; how they left behind them an infallible deposit of truth in the Bible; how reasonable Protestants are in being content with certainty in getting at the meaning of this infallible truth; how unreasonable are Catholics in aiming higher and trying to get an infallible knowledge of that meaning; with a hundred other things which, true or false, are nothing to the purpose (pp. 59-64). Instead of following his devious route *per ambages et longa exorsa*, let us examine the passage of St. Matthew (xxviii. 20) and see if it proves nothing for Catholics. It is no wonder that Dr. Schulte runs away from it, for he cannot afford to see or acknowledge its true meaning. It is a glorious text; it contains the high, heavenly commission of the Catholic Church, and the death-warrant of all human systems of Christian theology framed in opposition to her authority.

When our Lord was about to return to His Father, after fulfilling His mission on earth, He gathered His Apostles and addressed to them a few parting words. They listened with breathless, eager attention, treasuring up every syllable, and guarding them with such anxious memory that St. Matthew years after could have put them on record even without the aid of inspiration. And well they might; for they were the last words He was to utter amongst them on earth. The words themselves were of the highest importance and worthy of that solemn hour. "Jesus spoke to them saying: All power is given to Me in heaven and in earth. Go ye therefore and teach all nations; baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you. And

¹ To bewilder his reader and to belittle our case, he gratuitously adds two other passages, Luke xxiv. 47-49 and Jno. xvi. 13, which have reference only to the Apostles personally, and which Catholics never use for the purpose mentioned in the text. This fabricating men of straw and then knocking them down triumphantly has no part in fair and candid discussion. But Dr. Schulte perhaps cannot help it. Dishonesty and trickery in dealing with Catholic doctrine are the hereditary portion and distinctive badge of all his tribe.

behold! I am with you all days even to the consummation of the world" (verses 18, 19, 20). Here we have Christ commissioning the Apostles as authorized teachers of the whole world. They are to teach whatsoever they have received from Christ. They are commanded, not to write books but to preach the Gospel. They are not told to argue with men, nor to allow any investigation of the reasonableness of what they propose for belief; they are simply to present their credentials, prove them, if necessary, by miracles or otherwise, and then demand unqualified submission and obedience. All who receive their teaching will be saved; all who reject it will be condemned.¹ He declares that He will be present with them down to the end of the world. This last promise evidently regards their teaching, and is tantamount to saying: Teach with confidence, without fear or hesitation; for you can teach no error, as I shall be with you while you teach to the end of time. It was a promise of infallibility for the teachers; indeed, nothing short of this high privilege would justify the accompanying threat, that whosoever refused to listen to those teachers should incur no less a penalty than the everlasting death of his soul.

Now, to whom was this gift of infallibility promised? Was it to the Apostles personally? No; and this for two very good reasons. In the first place the Apostles had already received the assurance of such gift personally, through the presence of the Holy Ghost, who was to take possession of their souls as His dwelling-place on the tenth day after Christ's departure from the world, and was to remain with them to the day of their death. That they might clearly understand how distinct from this was the second gift, He lets them know that it will be caused by His own abiding with them forever. The other was to be brought about by the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in their souls; this was to be the fruit of His own perpetual presence with their body corporate. If the former then was a personal favor, the latter must have been granted to them in virtue of their office. And that the Saviour spoke to them on this occasion not in their *personal* but in their *official* character, is manifest from the whole tenor of his words. In God's Church the person dies, the office never. Fifty or sixty years after these words were spoken, all of the Apostles, save one, had slept in death; and their hallowed dust now reposes in Ephesus, Rome, Salerno, Compostella, or wheresoever it has been deposited by the pious reverence of their children in Christ. And yet those men who stood face to face with our Saviour, when He addressed them His parting in-

¹ St. Mark (xvi. 16) adds, "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned," or "shall be damned," as King James's Bible forcibly expresses it.

structions, if His words have any meaning, were to live down to the consummation of the world, were to preach to *all* nations. In the course of nature and her laws, the Apostles personally could not expect such immunity from physical decay, could not possibly fulfil such commandment. It was, therefore, in the Apostles in their official character that His words were to be verified. It was the Apostles living and enduring in their successors whom He promised to be with forever, whom He commanded to teach all nations down to the end of time. Divine wisdom could not have used more appropriate and convincing words to let us know that the Apostles and their successors are ONE in authority, ONE in possessing the privilege of infallibility, as long as the Church shall last, which will be until time is swallowed up in eternity. The personal infallibility that came to the Apostles from the descent of the Holy Ghost on the day of Pentecost, died with them. The infallibility that comes of Christ's abiding with them in their office endures forever, because in the Church the Apostolic office and character are to last even unto the consummation of the world.

No one knows better than Dr. Schulte how eagerly the great Anti-Catholic public will swallow any statement, however absurd and monstrous, provided it militate against Catholic doctrine and history. Hence it is with no feeling of surprise but rather of amusement, perhaps of grim satisfaction, that we behold him manifesting by his reckless assertions the utter contempt that he entertains for their ignorance and their credulity. He boldly affirms that none of the early fathers, especially of the Apostolic times, ever claimed infallibility for the teaching body of the Church, that in those early days all controversies about doctrine were settled by simply appealing to the Scriptures, and that it was only when the Episcopal body became corrupt and a political power, that it began to claim infallibility.

"If we read the writings of the early fathers, especially those who lived in the Apostolic age, we find that they looked upon the Scriptures of the New Testament as the inspired word of God, and quoted copiously from their pages.¹ However carefully we may examine these patristic writings, we cannot find any organized body of churchmen in those early times claiming the gift of infallibility. On the contrary, all controversies of faith were settled by appealing to the Scriptures. . . . What we have here briefly stated may be easily verified by any impartial inquirer who will take the trouble of reading the works of the early Christian writers. . . . It was only when the

¹ How striking and original this idea! Later Fathers, Popes, Councils, and divines, we must suppose, entertained quite a different idea of the New Testament, and studiously avoided all reference to its pages. Seriously speaking, we say without fear of contradiction, that on an average there is more Scripture quotation in the pages of one mediæval writer, than in all the Apostolic Fathers, more than in the books taken together of any half-dozen Protestant controversialist writers of our day. But we will not pursue this tempting train of thought. Our only purpose is to call attention to the platitudes with which Dr. Schulte has contrived to eke out his worthless book.

Episcopate obtained high political influence that it lost the primitive Apostolic spirit, becoming haughty and despotic, and arrogating to itself the attribute of infallibility" (pp. 63, 64).

Had any fifth-rate Methodist ranter discoursed in this style, we might excuse his boldness on the score of ignorance. But Dr. Schulte cannot be excused on this poor plea. *He* cannot have forgotten the text-book that he conned daily in college during his theological studies, nor the names and passages that he found there, of the many Fathers who bear witness to the Catholic doctrine. We must rather say of him, what St. Jerome said of a similar brazen apostate of his day: "*Ignoscerem nescienti, nisi viderem consulto reticentem.*"¹ The Apostolic Fathers and those who lived before Constantine were not many in number, and all their works have not survived. But enough remain to show that on this point they were one in belief with the Catholic Church. Tertullian, one of the earliest Latin Fathers, plainly intimates that truth can only be found where the Apostles left it in the Church, and that individuals who presume to teach differently become by the very fact trespassers, intruders, outsiders, and enemies, in a word *heretics*. He puts into the mouth of the Church the following complaint against Marcion, Valentinus, Apelles, and other heretics of his time, which she may with equal reason address to Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, Henry VIII, Elizabeth, and all other founders of Protestant Churches:

"Who are you? When and whence did you come? Since you belong not to me, what are you doing in my domain? The property is mine. I am long since in possession, I am first in possession. I am the heir of the Apostles, and hold in virtue of their duly attested last will and testament. You, as outsiders and enemies, they have ever disinherited and repudiated. And why are heretics outsiders and enemies of the Apostles, save because of their holding different doctrine, which each one either invents of himself, or receives from others in opposition to the Apostles?"²

¹ I would forgive him, were he in ignorance, but I find him deliberately suppressing the truth. S. Hieronymi, Lib. adv., Helvidium, cap. xv.

² "Qui estis? quando et unde venistis? quid in meo agitis, non mei? . . . Mea est possessio. Olim possideo; prior possideo. Habeo origines firmas ab ipsis auctoribus quorum fuit res. EGO SUM HÆRES APOSTOLORUM; sicut caverunt testamento suo, sicut fidei commiserunt, sicut adjuraverunt, ita teneo. Vos certe exhaeredaverunt semper et abdicaverunt ut extraneos, ut inimicos. Unde autem extranei et inimici Apostolis hæretici, nisi ex diversitate doctrinæ, quam unusquisque de suo arbitrio adversus Apostolos aut protulit aut recepit." Tertul., De Præscript., cap. xxxvii. To understand fully this passage, we must remember that according to Tertullian's idea, which he lays down repeatedly in this book, heretics have no claim to any portion of revealed religion or of the Scriptures. They are the exclusive possession of the Catholic Church. If heretics happen to have them in their hands at all, it is by chance. They came by them fraudulently and illegally. If they presume to set up their opinions against the teaching of the Church they are not to be listened to, much less allowed to dispute on an equal footing with the Church or to quote Scripture against her. They are to be met at the very outset with the peremptory question: Quibus competit fides? Cujus sunt Scripturæ? Who is the true judge of faith? To whom do the Scriptures belong?

Tertullian, who was born about the year 160, and was a convert from paganism, never

This language of an African priest who lived and wrote nearly a century and a half before any of Constantine's courtly prelates, is just as forcible (as arrogant Dr. Schulte would probably say) as anything they ever uttered.

St. Irenæus may be considered a quasi-Apostolic Father, for he was the disciple of St. Polycarp and of Papias, who were the immediate disciples of the Apostles. To explain how fully he is in accord with the Catholic belief of our day, we should have to quote the greater part of his magnificent work, *Adverses Hæreses*. We have only room for an extract or two. In the fourth book of that work he says: "There must the truth be learned, where the Apostolic succession of the Church is found."¹ And elsewhere he affirms that "to confound and silence the presumption, blindness, and wickedness of all heretics, it is quite sufficient to appeal to the teaching of the Roman See," by which² "the true doctrine of the Apostles has been preserved, and with which, on account of its primacy (*potiorem principalitatem*), all the churches and all the faithful must agree in belief."³

St. Cyprian wrote a whole book on the Unity of the Church, in which he illustrates at great length his own maxim that "no one can have God for his Father, who has not the Church for his mother," and in which he proves that even schismatical opposition to church authority, on the part of orthodox believers, is a matter

ascended higher than the priesthood. In spite of what some critics may think, his work *De Præscriptionibus* was written before he fell into Montanism. Intrinsic evidence bids defiance to all critical quibbling. Let the student, who has an opportunity, read the work with the long, elaborate, erudite, and nervous commentary of F. Christianus Lupus (*Inter Chr. Lupi, Opera*, tom. ix.). If this learned Augustinian has any fault it is his prolixity.

¹ "Ibi discere oportet veritatem, apud quos est ea quæ est ab Apostolis Ecclesiæ successio." *Adv. Hær.*, iv., cap. 45. By *quos* he means the official teachers of the Church, the bishops, and a few lines after says of them, that from them we get the true sense of Scripture without any danger of being led astray. "Hi Scripturas SINE PERICULO nobis exponunt." St. Irenæus was born in the East about A.D. 120; but devoted his life to preaching the Gospel in Gaul, where he sealed his testimony with his blood in extreme old age. His relics were preserved for nearly fourteen centuries with great reverence in his episcopal city of Lyons, until the Calvinists in 1562 broke into the church, seized and ill-treated the saint's body, kicked his head in impious sport through the streets of Lyons, and finally threw it into the river. These were the men who fully realized Dr. Schulte's mythical pattern of early Christianity. They devoutly read the Old Testament, and made of it their rule of faith, caring little for the Gospel. One of the choicest and most welcome lessons they learned from it was that Catholics were Canaanites, Amorites, Hittites, etc., whom it was their duty to exterminate.

² IN QUA. The Lutheran scholar, Thiersch (we quote from memory), in his commentary on this passage of the Holy Doctor suggests that IN is here used in the Scriptural or Semitic sense of Beth *instrumentale*, "by means of which."

³ "Ad HANC enim Ecclesiam propter potiorem principalitatem necesse est omnem convenire Ecclesiam, hoc est eos qui sunt undique fideles, IN QUA semper ab his qui sunt undique conservata est ea quæ ab Apostolis est traditio." *Adv. Hær.*, lib. iii., cap. 3.

of deadly sin, which shuts a man out of the Church and excludes him from the kingdom of Heaven. What must he have thought of those who contradict her in doctrine, and presume to set up their private opinion in opposition to her decisions? Have we not already heard his terrible intimation, that NO GOOD MAN, but only the depraved and morally rotten, can voluntarily separate himself from the Catholic Church.¹ We have room only for a short extract, in which he clearly identifies the infallibility of the post-Apostolic Church with that of the Apostles themselves.

"Christ says to His Apostles (Luke x. 16), and in them to all prelates who legitimately succeed them: He who heareth you heareth me."²

To these might be added St. Jerome who, at a time when religious controversies disturbed the Church of Antioch, wrote to Pope St. Damasus, beseeching him to send an exact formula of Roman faith that would guide his course amidst these contending factions, and adding as a reason that he knew full well that whosoever was not in full communion of belief with the Holy See would surely perish, as did those who were outside of the ark during the deluge.³ But though St. Jerome was no bishop, and even a "supporter of Calvinistic or Low-church views" of the Episcopate, as some Protestants fondly imagine, we will waive his testimony, since he did not live before the days of Constantine, when bishops first "arrogated to themselves the prerogative of infallibility."

From these few but unanswerable testimonies it may be seen how utterly false is the barefaced assertion of Dr. Schulte, that the infallibility of the teaching body of the Church was unknown until the bishops became a political power in the state under the Emperor Constantine. Saints Irenæus and Cyprian were bishops, it is true; but they lived under a persecuting pagan government, which recognized bishops only as the most fitting subjects for legal condemnation. In fact both suffered martyrdom, the one under Severus in the year 202, the latter under Valerian in 258.

Before closing these remarks we would give the reader a specimen of the style of reasoning which Dr. Schulte is compelled by his unhappy position to adopt in defence of his new creed. His aim is to show how *reasonably* the non-Catholic receives the Bible as God's Word and an infallible rule of faith, without any reasoning at all.

"But they retort against us that we, too, must suppose a certain amount of reasoning before we can admit the Bible as the infallible element of the Church. We answer that our position is entirely different from theirs. We base the authority of the Bible on no

¹ "Nemo existimet BONOS ab Ecclesia posse discedere." De Unit. Eccles.

² "Christus dicit ad Apostolos, ac per hoc ad omnes præpositos, qui Apostolis vicaria ordinatione succedunt: Qui audit vos, me audit." Ep. 69 ad Florent. Pup.

³ Ep. ad Damas.

human arguments, as they establish the doctrine of infallibility; but we take it on its own merits. Without any argumentation we find that the Bible is the great book, the only book of an *historical* and *providential* importance, admirable in its origin and relation to all mankind. It excites, therefore, our attention, and stimulates in us an almost irresistible interest. We find, without any logical process, that it is and has always been the book of the Church, and that whatever truth and life there is in the Church has been drawn from its pages. We open it, read it attentively and with a prayerful disposition, and we find that all the praises we have heard of this wonderful book are fully justified. As we read on the truth contained in it strikes our mind, touches our conscience, deeply impresses our whole being. I cannot enter here into details, but this much I unhesitatingly say, that the book has in itself the internal evidence of truth, and bears witness of its divine origin. There may be obscure passages, and surely there are, but who can all at once understand the wonderful works of God? The more we read it with a fitting disposition of mind and heart, the more we understand of it; and that which we understand we cannot help but acknowledge to be divine truth; by virtue of this we are compelled to believe that those parts which we do not as yet understand are also divine. We need no external proofs, however profound and learned, to establish the authority of this book. We simply say, come and see; here is a book that bears unmistakable evidence on its face of being the truth of God; and if you read it guided by the Spirit of God, you will see as we see, and be fully satisfied" (pp. 51, 52).

And again. "The sacred writers address themselves . . . to men of sound common sense who will use their judgment in a normal way. . . . We clearly see that men of common sense, and they are generally in the majority, will by the aid of God's spirit find it no impossible task to find in the Bible as much saving truth as is necessary for them. So long as sober common sense exists in the Church, the Bible will be understood without recourse being had to the interpretations of a hierarchy. . . . And does not history prove that wherever the Bible is read and studied with befitting earnestness, there true Christianity prevails, pure and intelligent?" (pp. 94, 95).

All this would be unpleasant enough to listen to, if it were the extemporaneous effusion of some half-crazed ranter in a Methodist conventicle; but from one who was once a "doctor in sacred theology," it is simply intolerable, and we can only exclaim, "*Quantum mutatus ab illo.*" We take up the Bible, and *before opening it, we find* that it is the great book, the only book of historical and providential importance. We know all about its *origin* and relation to mankind. We find that it is and *always has been* the book of the Church (the Church that was hopelessly sunk in Romanism and idolatry for over a thousand years, as his sect believes and professes!). Having discovered all this without argumentation, without logical process, and therefore without investigation of any kind, we *open the book*, read it, and the more we read the better we understand. Any refutation of this silly stuff would be labor lost. Yet it is substantially the doctrine of the early Anglican Church, of the Westminster Confession, and of the Synod of Dort, in which by order of King James there sat representatives of Anglicanism. That common sense, even of the *sound* and *sober* sort, can enable men to understand rightly the Scriptures might pass for a mere rhetorical flourish. But practically considered it is a bold, reckless assertion to which all experience gives the lie. We need not quote Germany, where the Bible is more earnestly read and studied than

elsewhere. Yet in that land of Scripture investigation, not one student in twenty (perhaps not in fifty or a hundred) believes in the divinity or inspiration of Scripture. There is not a single book of the New Testament that has not been rejected in its turn by German theologians from Luther¹ down to the Bauers, De Wettes, and Bretschneiders of our day.² We need only confine ourselves to the Protestant Church of England, into which Dr. Schulte has made his "plunge," as he calls it out of Popery. In that Church every form of religious error from Calvinism to Puseyism finds itself at home. Amongst her bishops she counts Socinians and Rationalists like Colenso, Hoadley, and Chandler,³ with a host of others. Her representative man at this day is perhaps Dean Stanley.⁴ And in what does he differ from the Bretschneiders, Ewalds, and Wegscheiders of Germany, save that he lacks their honesty and truth-

¹ Luther, and Calvin with him, scouts the idea of allowing the Apocalypse a place in the Canon. He further rejects the Epistle of St. James, which he calls an epistle of straw, "eine strohern Epistel," and pronounces its teaching to be in direct contradiction with that of St. Paul. "Many have taken trouble," he says, "and labored and sweat to reconcile them, but to no purpose; 'Faith justifies' and 'Faith does not justify' are two things that will not chime together. If any one can make them agree, I will put my doctor's cap on his head and allow him to call me a fool." "Viel haben gearbeitet, sich bemühet und darüber geschwitzt über der Epistel S. Jacobi, das sie dieselbige mit S. Paulo verglichen. Es ist stracks wider ein ander, Glaube macht Gerecht und Glaube macht nit Gerecht. Wer die zusammen reimen kan, dem will ich mein Bareth aufsetzen und will mich einen Narren schelten lassen." Tischreden, Franckfurt am Mayn, 1567, fol. 494. In other words, either St. James is a heretic or I am a fool. But these were not the only books Luther attacked. He would talk over his cups at home or in the Wittemberg tavern, which he frequented, in the most contemptuous style of other books of Scripture, Esther, Ecclesiastes, Jonas, St. Paul to the Hebrews, etc., as it suited his humor. The Preface to the New Testament, in which he spoke ill of St. James and the Apocalypse, appeared first in 1522, but after that was carefully suppressed and hidden by "orthodox" Lutheranism for over two hundred years. Had this happened in the Catholic Church, it would no doubt be quoted, *usque ad nauseam*, as an apt illustration of what Protestants love to call *Jesuitism*. But though Luther treated the single books of Holy Writ with contempt whenever it suited his fancy, for all that, as Rev. Mr. Dewar says, "he laid great stress upon the Bible, and would allow of no appeal to any other authority; but it was the Bible *as revised and interpreted by himself*." German Protestantism, by Rev. Mr. Dewar, of Exeter College, Oxford, British Chaplain at Hamburg. Oxford, 1844, p. 29.

² See them enumerated one by one in Rev. Mr. Dewar's German Protestantism, p. 130, et seq.

³ It was the example of this rationalistic Bishop of Coventry and Litchfield, that induced and encouraged the free-thinker, Dr. Anthony Collins (as he himself tells us), to give out his wicked book, *The Scheme of Literal Prophecy Considered*. London, 1727.

⁴ In a recent sermon delivered at Battersea (see New York Catholic World, April, 1877, p. 135), Dean Stanley says, "The Church of England is what she is by the goodness of Almighty God and of His servant, Queen Elizabeth." For Almighty God substitute Henry VIII., and instead of *servant* read *daughter*, and the Dean would tell the literal truth. For just as truly as that Jezabel was the daughter of his adulterous lust, so was the Anglican Church the daughter of his avarice, pride, and bloodthirstiness.

fulness of speech? His churchmanship is so *Low* that it rises very little above infidelity or refined Deism. He believes in the Eternal Son of God no more than any Mussulman or Brahmin. Yet he prates often, and elegantly, too, we must admit, of the Bible and its beauties. Not one out of every ten English-speaking Protestants who enjoy the free, untrammelled use of King James's Bible, holds the real, true divinity of Him who bought us, our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ. And of the few who really fancy that they believe it, if closely questioned, it would turn out upon examination that their belief resolves itself into the abominable heresy of Nestorius. The readers of King James's Bible in England and our own country laugh and sneer at miracles, vows, fasting, ceremonial worship, the evangelical counsels, the honor given to God's chosen servants and heavenly courtiers, and other scriptural doctrines, as heartily as could any infidel or Deist. They commit daily, with deliberation, without any scruple, almost without consciousness of evil-doing, horrible sins, which are forbidden or denounced in Scripture, and the very mention of which would blanch the cheek, and paralyze with terror the heart, of any ignorant, superstitious, priest-ridden simpleton that dwells in Ireland or the Tyrol, where the Bible is of course a prohibited book. So much for the *pure, intelligent* faith that the Anglican Church has bestowed on the English-speaking world.

It has been sufficiently shown, we think, that Dr. Schulte has failed to establish his main assertion, that Church infallibility is a system unsupported by Scripture and the early records of the Church. The more we read of his book, the more we feel that he has written not of his own free will, but under moral pressure. Had he been left to himself, he would have preferred to keep quiet, to enjoy his rectory and domestic bliss in peace and silence. But the busy, restless ones, men and women, of his congregation, his new patrons, would not have it so. They have driven him at last to open his reluctant mouth and give his testimony, as they call it. He has done it, sorely and against his will it may be, and he must take the consequences. Eager partisans may compel a man to say something, but they cannot infuse into him logical argument.

Having proved that Church infallibility is not the flimsy error that Dr. Schulte pretends, but has its foundation in Scripture and the testimony of the early Church, we see no reason why we should follow Dr. Schulte in his discussion of Papal infallibility. For, by proving the one, as he himself admits, we prove the other. "Papal infallibility and Church infallibility are intimately interwoven; on admitting the latter, the former must be conceded" (p. 43). Nevertheless, in a future number, we shall examine some of his false statements and perversions of historical facts in regard to the infallibility of the Holy See and its dogmatical decisions.

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

IN ANSWER TO A CORRESPONDENT.

THE *American Catholic Quarterly* has no reason to complain of the welcome extended to it by the press of the country, both inside and outside of the Church. If there could be any room for complaint, it might be found in the exaggerated praises of some too kindly disposed critics, which to interpret in their literal sense, would argue senseless vanity on our part. We have not so understood them; we have construed them rather as words of encouragement, as merely a loose, somewhat ornamental translation of the good advice contained in the maxim "*amulamini meliora.*" But it was not in the nature of things that our *Review* should escape the common fate of all periodicals, and should be so privileged as never to hear any other words than those of kindness, praise, and encouragement. And as we never expected any such wonderful good luck, to have missed it is no disappointment. Whether with the view of holding a salutary check over us, while yet in swaddling-clothes, lest we should be tempted to become "wise in our own conceits," and "more wise than it behooveth to be," or with some less charitable intent, the press, Catholic and non-Catholic, takes care to mortify our vanity now and then by misunderstanding or misrepresenting, as the case may be, the meaning and purpose of some of our articles. We say nothing of the anti-Catholic press, which, styling itself religious, has for its almost avowed aim to decry and distort everything belonging to the Church of all ages, and which seeks in our pages only matter for misrepresentation of Catholic doctrine or history. Private correspondents, too, both Catholic and non-Catholic, give us occasionally the benefit of their advice and criticism. One finds a flaw in the logic of certain arguments. Another detects heterodoxy lurking under a seemingly quite innocent proposition. A third drags to light what he considers disguised attempts to exalt certain nationalities at the expense of others. Some one else complains that the tone of some articles is too sanctimonious, good for a preaching-desk, but not for the pages of a review, and so on to the end of the chapter.

It is unnecessary to say that neither usage nor propriety requires of us to make any reply to these attacks, reproaches, or complaints, whether public or private. They must pass unnoticed and unanswered. The writers have vented their spleen or put on record their dissatisfaction. They, perhaps, think they have annoyed us, and feel the better of it. And if they are satisfied we have no objection.

But like all general rules this may admit of some exceptions. Not every criticism is hostile, nor every objection captious. Hence, whenever the statements of the *Review* are questioned, or objection is made to them honestly and in good faith, we are not only willing, but anxious either to be corrected ourselves, or to set the doubter or objector right by explaining what he may have happened to misapprehend. One such letter from a clergyman in a neighboring State is now before us; and, as the writer is moved only by the love of truth, and proposes his diffi-

culties candidly and honestly, we will devote to it a few pages, not only out of consideration for his good faith and candor, but also because it offers an opportunity to say something on a subject less generally understood than it should be by educated Catholics and even by clergymen.

The letter has reference to Prof. Paley's article in the January number of the current year. The portions of the letter that bear immediately on the subject are as follows :

"I was much surprised and not a little pained to find in the *Review* for January such an article as the one by Prof. Paley. . . . It is well known that the Holy See has put forth a decree, stating that the spirituality of the soul amongst other truths may be proved with certainty by reasoning; and although the immortality of the soul is not exactly the same thing, yet it is closely united to it, and may be regarded as its consequence. Father Hill has shown it in this number of the *Review*.

"Besides combating, in no measured terms, the immortality of the soul as a truth accessible to reason, Prof. Paley speaks very unbecomingly of certain preachers, and of the 'devout and intelligent' people of the Middle Ages."

If the decree of the Holy See, declaring the spirituality of the soul provable by reason be "well known," it is fair to suppose that Prof. Paley and the editors of the *Review* knew its existence; and charity might suggest that neither the Professor would impugn the teaching of the Holy See, nor would such course be tolerated by the editors. Has the Professor attempted to impugn that teaching? Not directly and in terms, says our reverend correspondent, but indirectly and inferentially. If the reverend writer will only examine the case a little more closely, he will find that whatever there is of *inferential* in it, is not Prof. Paley's but his own and utterly unfounded.

Let him weigh well his own reasoning and see what it amounts to. "Though the immortality of the soul is *not exactly the same thing* (as the spirituality), yet it is closely united to it, and may be regarded as its consequence." Here the writer, phrase it as he may, is forced to admit that the immortality of the soul is *not* its spirituality. Therefore, say we, it is *not that* which the Holy See has declared demonstrable by human reasoning. Or to couch the syllogism in words of his own choosing, the Holy See has declared that the spirituality of the soul is provable by reason; but the immortality of the soul is not exactly the same as its spirituality; therefore, the immortality of the soul is not exactly what the Holy See pronounced demonstrable by human reason. We defy him to draw any other conclusion. But the writer thinks and would have us believe, that if not exactly defined, it is *almost so*. He is mistaken. There is no medium between *defined* and *not defined*. In Catholic theology there can be no place for such an absurdity as a quasi definition. It involves contradiction, for a definition includes certainty and compels belief, a quasi definition would not bind the Catholic conscience, but would leave it as free to doubt or deny as it was before.

Yet our reverend correspondent is impressed with the notion, and wishes to convey it, that whoever impugns the demonstrability (by natural reason) of the soul's immortality, lays himself open in some way to censure, as running counter to a decision or quasi decision of the Holy See. We need not repeat what has been said. The Supreme Judge at Rome

either decides or he does not. Just as in his laws and precepts there is no such thing as a quasi command, so in his ruling from the Supreme Bench of the Church there is no such thing as a quasi decision. And on the matter before us the Holy See has never pronounced or decided at all. This is manifest from an examination of the document itself, which haunts the mind of our reverend correspondent and fills him with needless terrors. Here is the text of the decree or declaration of the Holy See, which may be found in a hundred books printed within the last twenty years. For the sake of accurate reference, we quote from a well-known handbook in general use:¹

"Reason may prove with certainty the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, and man's free will. Faith is subsequent to Revelation; hence it cannot fairly be adduced as proof of the existence of God against an atheist, or as proof of the spirituality and free will of the rational soul against a naturalist or a fatalist."²

The full meaning of this decision will perhaps be better understood when it is known why it was made and against whom. It was directed with some other propositions of kindred nature against some good, very good men (for error strives to creep into the stronghold of truth, *a dextris et a sinistris*, on the right side as well as on the left), who took it into their heads that they would be more orthodox, more Catholic than the Church herself. It is laid down in Catholic theology, that there are some primitive natural truths which man's reason may know with certainty, independently of revelation. They are called primitive, because they are the inheritance of rational man, and occupy the chief place among the traditions that have come down from the beginning of his race. They are called natural, because man's rational nature, even unaided by revelation, discerns their truth. They do not follow faith, but precede it; and as St. Thomas³ says, technically speaking, they are not articles of faith, but its preliminaries. Amongst these preliminary truths are the existence of God, His providence, the spirituality and free-will of the soul, future state of reward and punishment, and the chief points of the moral law. The hyper-Catholics of whom we spoke undervalue or ignore the province of reason in establishing those primitive truths. They would have authority, tradition, faith set up as a rule not only for Christians but even for unbelievers. From a mistaken notion of what they call the fallibility of reason, they will not allow it to prove the primitive truths nor even the all-important fact of Christ's resurrection. The disciples of this school vary in the details of their teaching, and even go by different names (Traditionalists, Supernaturalists, etc.), but their fundamental principle is one and the same. They had among them

¹ Denziger's *Enchiridion Symbolorum et Definitionum*, Wirceburgi, 1856, p. 448.

² *Ratiocinatio Dei existentiam, animæ spiritualitatem, hominis libertatem cum certitudine probare potest. Fides posterior est revelatione, proindeque ad probandum Dei existentiam contra atheum, ad probandum animæ rationalis spiritualitatem ac libertatem contra naturalismi ac fatalismi sectatorem allegari convenienter nequit.*

³ "Deum esse et alia hujusmodi quæ per rationem naturalem nota possunt esse de Deo, ut dicitur Rom. I., non sunt articuli fidei, sed preambula ad articulos." I. P., Q. 2, ad 1. In the "alia hujusmodi," the saint includes what we know of God as Creator and Legislator of His rational creature, man, and consequently of the nature and destiny of the soul. His reference to St. Paul implies this.

great and good men, such as Viscount de Bonald, Gerbet, Lacordaire, Bautain, and others. They had adherents even in Italy and Germany. M. Bautain, a priest and professor of Strasburg, wrote a book containing these errors in 1833. His ordinary, Monseigneur Raess, Coadjutor in the See of Strasburg, remonstrated with him, and issued a pastoral letter explaining the doctrine of the Church. The matter was referred to Pope Gregory XVI., who by a brief of December 20th, 1834, approved the bishop's pastoral, and expressed his hope that M. Bautain would hold out no longer, but make the sacrifice of his private opinions on the altar of Catholic obedience. But even the good, pious man may have his own slight share of self-will and obstinacy. M. Bautain not only remained deaf to the exhortations of his ordinary and of the Supreme Bishop, but even more than once defended himself in print against what he considered the censure and condemnation of the truth.¹ It was only on the 8th of September, 1840, after a delay of seven years, that he humbly submitted and made his retraction. Fourteen years after that date, M. Bonnetty, the distinguished editor of the *Annales de la Philosophie Chretienne*, and a man of great learning and zeal for religion, renewed in some shape the same erroneous teaching. By decree of Pius IX. (June 15th, 1855), the propositions which had served for the retraction of M. Bautain, were sent with modifications and additions to M. Bonnetty for subscription. The second of these is the one which we have printed above.

Now, although Catholic theologians teach that the primitive truths are demonstrable to natural reason, they are by no means a unit in fixing definitively the number of such truths. Is the immortality of the soul one of these truths? Many, and we freely grant it, the majority of theologians class it among the number, but not all. There are theologians of good reputation and undisputed orthodoxy, who do not think that the immortality of the soul ought to be included in this category. They say that it is a most rational truth, inasmuch as it commends itself on its first enunciation to right reason; they acknowledge that, while it has many arguments in its favor, there is no shadow of an argument against it beyond a bare possibility; but they hold that, in view even of that possibility, the prop of revelation is needed to give the immortality of the soul its absolute certainty. Had the Holy See actually or virtually decided otherwise, it would be impossible for them to affirm this. Had Rome spoken there could be no dissentient voice.

Has Rome spoken? Has she given any decision in which the absolute demonstrability by reason of the soul's immortality is stated either immediately or by evident illation? Let any one read over the proposition of June 15th, 1855, and he will see that the immortality of the soul is not spoken of, not even hinted at in any way whatever. There is a clear, distinct mention of three truths, the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul and free will; but of the soul's immortality not a syllable. Did this happen by chance, or was it from forgetfulness that

¹ Bautain, *Philosophie du Christianisme*, Paris, 1835. *Idem*, *Psychologie Experimentale*. *Ibid.*, 1839

the latter was omitted? We know that our reverend correspondent has too much respect for the Holy See to indulge in such supposition. No! the Holy See when about to compel MM. Bautain and Bonnetty to acknowledge that reason may know with certainty some primitive truths without the aid of revelation, knew full well that many, very many Catholic theologians included the immortality of the soul among those truths. It knew likewise that MM. Bautain and Bonnetty had denied that *any* of these truths (therefore the immortality of the soul amongst the rest), could be demonstrated by unaided reason. And yet with this certain knowledge the Holy See in making its decision, deliberately enumerates three, and as deliberately omits a fourth among these truths. Is not this a clear, evident case, where *inclusio unius* is tantamount to *exclusio alterius*? If we ventured to make as free with the decisions of the Holy See as our reverend correspondent seems to do, we might say it has decided that the soul's immortality is *not* one of the truths that are demonstrable by human reason. But our inference is more modest and more safe. It is what appears on the very face of the document. The Holy See has decided that the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul and man's free will are truths demonstrable by reasoning, and need not revelation to give them certainty; about the immortality of the soul it has declined to make any decision.

But our reverend correspondent cannot get rid of the notion that the demonstrability of the soul's immortality has been decided by implication in that of her spirituality. The immortality of the soul, he says, "*may be regarded as the consequence of its spirituality*;" and the demonstrableness of the one, he would infer, involves that of the other. If the reverend writer made deliberate choice of the words we have italicized, it argues caution, and we commend him for it. But waiving for the present the *equivocal* meaning of immortality in this connection, and granting that it not only may be, but is regarded, and with good show of reason, by many as a consequence of spirituality, are we to infer that it shares the privilege of demonstrability accorded to the soul's spirituality by the proposition of June 15th, 1855? This would be a most lame, untheological conclusion. When a proposition is connected by immediate intrinsic evidence with another that is revealed in Scripture, or defined as of faith, or otherwise established by Church authority, the former shares the authority of the latter. It may be contained in it, for example, as a part in the whole. Thus, Christ died for all; therefore He died for John, for Peter, etc. Christ assumed a human soul and human body; therefore he had a mouth, hands, and feet, and could suffer pain, grief, sadness. These consequences, even though Scripture were silent, would have been sufficiently revealed in the premises. Or had I the wicked presumption to make this assertion, "As a Catholic, I believe in the spirituality of the soul, but were I ignorant of the teaching of revelation and the Church, I think that the philosophy of materialism would furnish me quite a satisfactory explanation of what is called soul and its operations," in this case the impiety and falsehood of my assertion would reach the same degree of authority as the Pope's proposition.

That is, my statement would be as anti-Catholic as his teaching is authoritatively Catholic.

But on the other hand, where the propositions are not immediately connected, where the evidence of their mutual relation or union is not intrinsic, but is rather, so to speak, in the mind of the reasoner, where it can only be evolved and shown by a process more or less prolonged of reasoning, it is going quite too far to assign to both propositions the same degree of authority. The proposition that I establish, through a train of reasoning, as an illation from some truth revealed in Scripture or defined by the Church, is after all only a *conclusio mere theologica*, which may be true. But, absolutely speaking, it may also be false. Being convinced of it from the strong light of evidence in which I see it subjectively, I may urge it and do my best to press others to receive it as true. But I must not force its acceptance on others as if it were a necessary truth, as if to dissent from it were the same as to deny the original truth from which I claim it as a deduction. And, however strong the language I use, I must never go to the length of identifying my conclusions with the definitions of the Church. And even when the words used seem to imply this much and nothing less, they must be limited by the rule of orthodox interpretation. The great Bellarmine is remarkable for his moderation, for his freedom from all controversial bitterness, especially when he deals with the opinions of Catholic schools. Yet he is so stirred to indignation by what he considers the anti-Catholic tendencies of the system of Melchior Canus *de ministro matrimonii*, that he says, "if Canus has proved his theory, he has proved also that there is no such sacrament as marriage in the Catholic Church." And again, almost in an angry strain, he concludes that "either the doctrine of Canus is false, or the Church has grievously erred for many centuries." Now, does any one imagine that Bellarmine would have his readers believe these two propositions to be of equal authority: "the Church cannot fall into grievous error; therefore the doctrine of Canus is false?" By no means. The former is of faith and to be believed under pain of damnation; the other is merely Bellarmine's theological conclusion, which he thinks is derived from the former. In the same way some theologians may be heard to say that they cannot see in what the *delectatio vitrix* and other such doctrines, the teaching of which is tolerated in some Catholic schools, differ from Jansenism and Calvinism; yet, while denouncing in no measured terms such teaching, they would not wish to be understood as saying or insinuating that the Church tolerates heresy in her schools of divinity. They would be the first to repudiate such construction of their words.

We hope we have satisfied our reverend correspondent, that the demonstrability of the soul's immortality has not been decided in the proposition of Pius IX., simply because the immortality of the soul may be regarded by him and other theologians as a consequence of its spirituality. If they think so, let them cherish, maintain, and propagate their opinion by all lawful means. We by no means undertake to deny its truth; we merely remind him and them that it is a *conclusio theologica* which they must not attempt to raise to an equality with a

decision of the head of the Church. If the Sovereign Pontiff, or any of the Roman congregations with his sanction, has ever pronounced that the immortality of the soul is one of the primitive truths which human reason can prove with absolute certainty, let it be produced, and none will bow to it with more heartfelt submission than ourselves. Until then, we consider it a theologian's duty to abide strictly by the known decisions of the Holy See, and out of reverence to refrain from putting our interpretation of their meaning on a level with the definition itself; and finally, in all cases of doubt, not to force dogmatically upon others our construction of their sense, but to await with patience and docility the time when the successor of St. Peter may further explain himself (should he think it necessary), or give an official interpretation of his own words.

We said above that the meaning of immortality as understood by our reverend correspondent is equivocal. The immortality which is a consequence of the spiritual nature of the soul, is not exactly the immortality which natural theology, or even treatises of Catholic psychology, seeks to establish. The former, for distinction's sake, may be called *negative*, the latter *positive* immortality. Man is a compound of soul and body. The body being composed of parts, is liable to corruption, that is, resolution into its component parts. Its elements, though undergoing change and modification, are imperishable; but the body *as such* perishes, because the organism perishes, which constituted it a body. The soul, however, being no result of parts organized as a whole, but a simple substance, has in it no germ of decay or dissolution. It is consequently incorruptible and imperishable. In this sense immortality may be called the consequence of the soul's simplicity and spirituality. But this is only *negative*. It simply means that the soul considered in itself has in it no principle of death, and can neither destroy itself nor be destroyed by any created power. Nothing beyond this can be pleaded as a consequence from the soul's spirituality. Yet the soul, though free from all danger of destruction by aught that is created, remains by its nature essentially subject to annihilation at the hands of the Creator. In order, therefore, to establish what may be called the *positive* immortality of the soul, there must be added the certainty that it *will not be destroyed* by the supreme power of God. God *can* annihilate the soul, if it so please Him; and as long as this possibility lasts, there is no such thing as *positive* immortality of the soul. How can this possibility be removed? Only in one way. As God's omnipotence is coeternal with His nature, and can be controlled by nothing but His own free will, we must have His promise, that is the act of His free will, engaging itself never to annihilate the human soul. Nothing short of this can stay His hand and limit His power; nothing else can establish for us with certainty the *positive* immortality of the soul. It will not do to fall back on abstract considerations of His goodness. This, as St. Thomas says, did not compel Him to creation, nor will it compel Him to conservation.¹ Where it is question of action by God's free will, some intima-

¹ Bonitas Dei est causa rerum non quasi ex necessitate naturæ . . . sed per liberam voluntatem. Unde sicut potuit sine præjudicio bonitatis suæ res non producere in esse,

tion of His intention must either be had positively from His own declaration, or it must be contained undeniably and with immediate evidence in the consideration of His attributes.

Have we this assurance, this pledged action of God's Free Will, for the conservation of the human soul? Many answer, unhesitatingly, in the affirmative. The equivalent of a promise on His part, they say, will be found by applying in this case the axiom, that God cannot deny Himself or His attributes. When creating man He implanted in the soul aspirations and desires which His justice cannot allow to go unfulfilled. He is the supreme legislator, and His sanction of the Moral Law would be incomplete, unless there were another life in which virtue and vice should receive the recompense, which they do not always meet in this world. Besides, the concurrent voice of all peoples and generations of earth in favor of the soul's immortality seems to stamp it with a primitive universal character, which argues a truth received by the parents of our race, together with their existence, at the hands of the Creator. Therefore, they argue, God, by His very creative act and by His Providence, and, still further, as Legislator and by natural right Teacher of His creatures, has pledged Himself to preserve the soul of man from annihilation. These are strong arguments, no doubt. We only indicate them, but they may be found developed fully in all scholastic treatises, and eloquently in many of the apologists of religion, natural and revealed, who have written against skeptics and freethinkers. They have been urged, not at great length, but with great vigor and cogency of reasoning, by Rev. F. Hill, in his admirable article in the January number of the *Review*. It is not our wish, nor can it possibly be our interest, to seek to weaken the force of those arguments. But justice to the truth forbids our disguising the fact, that there are Catholic theologians, known for their religious sentiments and unquestionable orthodoxy, who have not hesitated to express their opinion, that the arguments usually adduced from natural reason, do not amount to absolute proof of the immortality of the soul. And this opinion they have uttered at Rome, under the very eyes, and with at least the passive approbation, of the Holy See.

Among these theologians we may mention the celebrated Muzzarelli.¹

ita absque detrimento sue bonitatis potest res in esse *non* conservare. (1 p., qu. 104, art. 3, ad. 2.)

¹ Alfonso Muzzarelli, born of an illustrious patrician family at Ferrara, towards the middle of the last century, became a Jesuit before his twentieth year. But, like many others, he was cruelly driven out of the peaceful home of his choice by the storm that burst upon the Society in 1773. Out of obedience, like the rest of his brethren, he left the religious house, which had been dissolved by the brief *Dominus Ac Redemptor Noster*; but during his sojourn at Reggio, Ferrara, Parma, and elsewhere, he continued in the world to preserve the obligations, and follow the routine of cloister-life for more than a quarter of a century. At the accession of Pius VII, though called to Rome by special favor, and treated with the highest distinction, he changed nothing of his former mode of life; and when the Jesuits were allowed to assemble and practice their Rule in Naples, he would have flown to join his brethren in their community, but yielded his own wishes out of deference to the Pontiff, who pressed him to remain in the immediate service of the Holy See. He was deported to Paris (to use their pet language) by order of Napoleon's government in 1809, about the same time that his

He was an ex-Jesuit, a personal friend of Pius VII. who loved and esteemed him so highly, that he sent expressly to Parma for him, brought him to Rome, and made him "Teologo della S. Penitenzeria," which is another name for the Pope's special theologian. In one of his works,¹ printed at Rome in 1805, discussing the arguments generally used to demonstrate the immortality of the soul, Muzzarelli says :

"Any argument of reason that you may bring forward to prove the immortality of the soul in this sense (viz., that beyond its natural incorruptibility the positive will of God also concurs to preserve the soul from annihilation) may be indeed an argument of congruity in the highest degree, such as to gain the assent of every sensible, prudent man ; but it will not be an argument that demonstrates, that has metaphysical evidence, so as to make all evasion impossible for an unbeliever."²

And again, after recommending that the great fact of revelation be proposed and proved as the first and most important point for an unbeliever, he continues :

"It may be necessary for example to prove the immortality of the soul. If you have first proved the existence of divine revelation, you have in it a stronghold from which you cannot be driven by any amount of force or artifice ; and then every proof drawn from natural reason is an additional argument, which derives lustre and strength from the aid of revelation. But if you attempt to prove the immortality of the soul in its full meaning without the help of revelation, I foresee that probably you will not succeed in evidently convincing your opponent."³

Half a century before Muzzarelli, the illustrious Dominican, F. Casto

benefactor, Pius VII., was dragged into exile ; and lived long enough to see the downfall of the usurper, who had so brutally trampled on the independence of the Pontiff, his patrimony, and his faithful subjects. But death prevented his return to Rome in triumph with his august patron. His holy life edified all Paris. He was a great propagator of the devotion of the Month of Mary.

¹ Il Buon Uso della Logica in Materia di Religione. This book seems to have been printed first at Foligno, in the Papal States, and immediately afterwards, perhaps simultaneously, reprinted at Rome. Since then it has been published at Naples, Florence, Rome, and at Venice by the Society for the Diffusion of Good Books. It was translated into Latin by a Hungarian priest ; and into French by some Catholic Association in Belgium.

² "Qualunque argomento di ragione voi mi rechiare per provare in un tale senso l'immortalità dell' anima, questo sarà bensì un argomento di somma congruenza, onde guadagnare l'assenso di ogni uomo discreto e prudente, ma non sarà un argomento dimostrativo e di metafisica evidenza, onde rendere impossibile ad un incredulo ogni ritirata." (Buon Uso della Logica. Roma, Salomoni, 1805. Appendice, Vol. II., page 115.) This *Opuscolo* is generally put in the first place in all subsequent editions. Its special title is, "On the Method to be observed in our day in writing about Religion" (*Sul Metodo da osservarsi al presente negli scritti di Religione*).

³ "Non arriverete probabilmente a convincere con evidenza il vostro avversario." Ibid., p. 113. As an apt illustration of this remark, we received a letter a few days ago from a gentleman in our native State, a habitual reader of the *Review*. He is an honest inquirer after truth, but his Protestantism has given him a skeptical turn, an effect it always has on logical and sincere minds. He complains that Father Hill's proofs of the immortality of the soul failed to convince him. In our reply, after expressing our surprise and regret, we could give him nothing better than Muzzarelli's advice,—to give up all abstract investigation, and to study the great fact of revelation, which, because it is a fact, may be tested and discovered by evidence, and once discovered renders speculation in detail unnecessary.

Ansaldi,¹ a name respected and honored in the annals of his Order and in the Italian Church, had held and published the same opinion. And nearly five centuries ago the celebrated Duns Scotus² taught in like manner; or, as he shrewdly expressed himself: "There exist, no doubt, good arguments from natural reason for the immortality of the soul, but they have not yet been discovered." Any one who had the privilege of listening to the lectures of the Roman professor Graziosi, may remember how strongly this point was pressed by that great and good man, when discussing before his class the necessity of revelation. We ourselves have known in the centre of orthodoxy those wearing the religious habit, men of most holy life and undoubted Catholic faith, who did not think differently from Muzzarelli, Ansaldi, and Scotus. To suppose that all or any of these worthy men were inclined to encourage or countenance freethinking, or that they did not know, or knowing wilfully disregarded the doctrine of the Church or the decisions of the Holy See, would be an insult to religion and to common sense.

Though nothing is farther from our design than to say anything that could detract from the arguments generally alleged in natural theology to prove the immortality of the soul, yet we cannot help observing with Muzzarelli, that the very men who use these arguments, occasionally speak in such a manner as to suggest, that after all they are not quite so sure of their ground. They are not agreed which are the strong arguments, and which are weak and mere auxiliaries. One disparages the force of another's proofs in order to recommend his own. Thus, even Cajetan finds fault with the main argument of St. Thomas. Suarez does the same, and declares it inconclusive, unless it be understood in the sense and coupled with the explanation which he (Suarez) adds.³ But may we not take the same liberty with Suarez which he has taken with St. Thomas?

Another point not to be overlooked by the Catholic theologian, is this: If some of the arguments used to prove the immortality of the soul be not cautiously handled, there is danger of running into extremes, and wounding Catholic theology by unduly exalting and Catholicizing human philosophy. By pushing these arguments too far, we may inadvertently fall into Bajanism, or at least straggle on its confines. But we have neither space nor inclination to pursue this topic. Our object is not to blame those who do their best to prove by human reason the doctrine of *positive* immortality, nor to disprove the opinion of those who hold that it can be apodictically proved without any recourse to the help of revelation. If any one believe this, he has at his back the support of great and weighty names. As far as we are concerned, he is welcome to

¹ This work was noticed by the *Journal de Trevoux*, of the year 1759, ap. Muzzarelli, l. c.

² Reportata super (Libros) Sententiarum. Parrhisiis (sic) apud Joannem Granion, 1517. In 4, Dist. 43, Qu. 2. Some of the volumes of this fine old black-letter edition were printed eight or nine months before the outbreak of Luther's so-called Reformation. In confuting the arguments of St. Thomas, Scotus does not mention him by name, but calls him rather quaintly "unus doctor."

³ Suarez de Anima, in the third volume of Palme's Paris edition.

believe and maintain it; we only insist that he shall not identify his opinion with the defined doctrine of the Church, nor say anathema to theologians who happen to think differently.

Our reverend correspondent further accuses Professor Paley of "combating, in no measured terms, the immortality of the human soul, as a truth accessible to reason." This, we humbly submit, is going too far, and does gross injustice to Professor Paley. He has pointed out in the text as well as in a note, at the very beginning of his article, the arguments by which the soul's immortality is upheld. He does not deny their value, he does not even discuss them, favorably or otherwise, for that is foreign to his subject; he merely enumerates them. And we venture to say, it could not have been done with more lucid brevity. And if Professor Paley has preferred to content himself with a reference to the proofs of immortality drawn from the *moral*, rather than the purely *meta-physical* argument, he has only followed in the footsteps of the great Archbishop of Cambrai, who was a great philosopher as well as theologian. He thinks the latter no proofs at all. Here are Fenelon's words: "La vraie preuve de l'immortalité de l'âme n'est pas tirée des recherches incertaines de sa nature, mais de l'idée de Dieu et de son dessein en la créant."

But Professor Paley "speaks unbecomingly of certain preachers" of former ages. Did the Council of Trent speak differently, when it forbade them to handle "difficult, subtle, uncertain, curious questions about purgatory" in the pulpit, and denounced their doing so as not conducive to piety, as disedifying and a stumbling-block to the faithful? That there were such preachers at the time of the Council of Trent is plain from the Decree of the Twenty-fifth Session, which denounces them, and calls on the Bishop to watch over their conduct in the pulpit. Much more would they be found in the middle ages. And that such preachers may possibly show themselves again, even in this polished century and country, would appear from the fact that the Fathers of the Plenary Council of Baltimore thought fit to reproduce in their Acts (page 18) the very warning and condemnation that were issued three hundred years ago at Trent. The people of the middle ages are called "devout and intelligent" by Professor Paley, not by way of slur or irony, but because such they were, as is plain from the context.

Our reverend correspondent seems to think that we ought to have made some remarks, by way of censure, on Professor Paley's article. Now we may not agree with all that the Professor has said; we seldom do with all the assertions of all the writers who contribute to the *Review*. But it would scarcely seem either required by justice, or in accordance with propriety, that we should add postils to each page of the *Review*, merely to let the reader know that in this and that point we dissent from the writer. Did he say anything in real or apparent contradiction with the teaching of the Church, the case would be different. Professor Paley has said nothing against the doctrine of the Church, nothing that is not susceptible of a Catholic interpretation. Our reverend correspondent thought otherwise; but we hope he is now convinced that he was mistaken.

BOOK NOTICES.

HAROLD. A Drama. By *Alfred Tennyson*. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1877. 16mo., pp. 170.

ST. THOMAS OF CANTERBURY. A Dramatic Poem. By *Aubrey de Vere*. Henry S. King & Co. London: 1876. 16mo., pp. 267.

It is a remarkable coincidence that these two dramatic poems should appear about the same time. Each is the second of the kind written by the veteran authors whose names are appended. Mr. Tennyson wrote *Queen Mary*; but, notwithstanding the facility with which he adapted himself to the language of the Elizabethan poets, and the numerous gems in which the piece abounds, he failed. We take it that he wrote *Harold* to retrieve his failure. Aubrey de Vere wrote *Alexander the Great* as his first published dramatic effort, and succeeded to the gratification of the most conscientious critics on both sides of the Atlantic. With what success his present effort is written, we will endeavor to determine in a few minutes. But first, a word upon *Harold*.

It is a hazardous undertaking for an author to attempt success in one department of letters after he has achieved it in another. It is seldom given to the same man to show genius in two distinct lines of thought. The very conception of genius is opposed to such an idea. Now, Mr. Tennyson is emphatically the poet of the day. In his *In Memoriam* he has caught up its reflective and philosophic mood. In *The Princess* he has attempted the discussion and solution of one of its most vexing problems, the social position of woman. In *Maud* he has sought to express those erratic and violent passions that are constantly seething in society, and which, when their impulses are uncontrolled, throw upon the surface the wreck of a character or a life, and disturb the moral equilibrium of a whole community by the shock they give. In the *Idylls of the King* he has rehabilitated the romantic spirit of mediæval times. And here, in a great measure, lies the secret of his success. The age lays special stress on the cultivation of the æsthetic and the sentimental in human nature. In going back to the Arthurian legends the poet was only going to the fountain-head of modern sentimentalism. He was supplying food for which the greatest craving was shown. Tennyson is pre-eminently the poet of refined sentiment. He is also successful in his exquisite description of nature, human and material. A mountain or a rill, the ocean-storm or the flash of a lady's eye, each is within the sphere of his excellence. He is a perfect word-artist, as minute and accurate in poetry as Meissonier is in painting. He is also as painstaking. These are the qualities that have insured success to Tennyson as the poet of the sentiments, and made him the pocket companion of many among the educated and refined of the day. But are they sufficient to make him a dramatist? By no means. Description is not action; sentiment is not stormy passion.

Harold is thrown in one of the most stormy periods of England's many stormy times. The Godwin family is harrowing the land and all but exhausting the patience of the saintly Edward. It is a time when men are not nice about the expression of their thought. For this reason the character of Harold is an unfortunate selection for the poet of nicety. He is not equal to the grasp of life and feeling and thought that actuated the men and women of the eleventh century. There is in his drama no development of character. It does not grow upon one. It is simply

made up of parts pieced together. The dialogue is short and occasionally crisp. And, as in everything that Tennyson writes, there are gems of description. Here is a specimen :

"Harold.—Poor brother! still a hostage!
Wulfnoth.—Yea, and I
 Shall see the dewy kiss of dawn no more
 Make blush the maiden-white of our tall cliffs,
 Nor mark the sea-bird rouse himself and hover
 Above the windy ripple, and fill the sky
 With free sea-laughter—never—save indeed
 Thou canst make yield this iron-mooded Duke
 To let me go."—P. 59.

But we are disappointed with the artistic construction of the drama. It is that of a novice. The first act is supposed to foreshadow the *dénouement*. Tennyson gives us insight into the whole play in his first act. Edward, in a mysterious manner, tells him :

"Go not to Normandy—go not to Normandy."

And Edith, his betrothed, tells him her dream in such a manner that it contains beginning and end :

"Oh! that thou wert not going!
 For so methought it was our marriage-morn,
 And while we stood together, a dead man
 Rose from behind the altar, tore away
 My marriage ring, and rent my bridal veil,
 And then I turned, and saw the church all filled
 With dead men upright from their graves, and all
 The dead men made at thee to murder thee,
 But thou didst back thyself against a pillar,
 And strike among them with thy battle-axe—
 There, what a dream!"—Act i., sc. ii., p. 33.

The vision of Edward added to this gives us the whole play. It has no plot. It is simply a series of panoramic views of historical events. It will give occasion for some pretty tableaux with explanatory speaking. As for characters, there are none. Stigand is a shadow of a miser. Edward is a driveller. William is a monster of refined cruelty. Shadows and puppets these, and nothing more. All this is unhistorical; it goes to show that the poet did not understand the times or the personages he would represent. Harold he means to be strong. But we see in him no other strength than that of a war-beast. He appears at his best in the first act. There he is manly, truthful, repeats the maxim, "Better die than lie;" but he does not make even a show of resistance when called upon to live his own words. He gives way before Edith and betroths himself to her; he gives way before Aldwyth and marries her; he gives way before William and swears a false oath. This is weakness rather than strength. One lesson *Harold* teaches us. It is that Mr. Tennyson has not the remotest conception of what Catholicity is, or of what makes up a Catholic saint. It is something his exquisite art cannot reach, because his thoughts have not penetrated to it. When he wrote *Queen Mary* we were under the impression that he was only caught in that temporary current of bigotry which dictated the Gladstone pamphlets. This last effort of his satisfies us that it is the normal state of his mind, and that the mediævalism of his poetry is drawn from the surface of chivalric sentimentalism.

Passing from *Harold* to *St. Thomas of Canterbury* is going into entirely a new region of thought, and one much purer and more elevated. It takes an effort to climb into the sphere of Aubrey de Vere's poetry.

He is no less a conscientious worker than is Tennyson himself, though he has not arrived at the perfect artistic word-power of the latter. In alluding to John Henry Newman's *Dream of Gerontius*, in a note to the present poem, he speaks of "the higher poetry." His is a "higher poetry," because it is the poetry of the higher life. It is the poetry of spirituality. If Tennyson is the poet of sentiment, Aubrey de Vere is the poet of the spiritual life. In his earlier poems he dwelt especially upon the noble passions and the noble natures of a people which has a spiritual life on record. He is the living laureate of the people of Ireland. Their aspirations, their sufferings, their constancy in the faith, their self-devotedness, have all filled his soul with glowing visions, and he has found for them in his beautiful productions "a local habitation and a name." In his *Legends of St. Patrick*, he went back to that twilight time when the setting glories of pagan song became blended with the dawns of rising Christianity. Only those who have read these noble poems can form any conception of how great a poet Mr. Aubrey de Vere is. This last effort seems to crown his poetical labors. It is a grand dramatic poem. It raises one up out of his materialistic surroundings and makes him feel what it is to be a great saint. Perhaps, and this is the most serious fault to be found with the poem as a drama, it is not *human* enough in its representation of St. Thomas. He did not arrive at that total estrangement from the world and that continual living in the upper regions of the spiritual life in a day or a year. It was a long and laborious work. Still we find him perfect from the moment he accepts the bishop's crosier till the day of his martyrdom. We would like to see his keen satire roll back upon their own heads the taunts which courtiers heaped upon him when they found him out of the King's favor. His vivacity is well known. Then again, such a great man, with the power of attaching children to him, such as he possessed, must have had a good deal of childlike simplicity in his nature, an element that has not been drawn out. This would require some scenes in which Becket's nature would be unbent. But, in justice to our poet, we must say that it is not in accordance with his plan. He casts the character of his hero more in a Grecian mould. He represents him as a statue is made to represent one. He gives him the pose of a saint in the attitude of resistance to lawlessness personified in Henry, to hate personified in De Broc, and to court obsequiousness represented in the Bishops of Oxford and London. We see all the powers of his soul under a constant strain, as single-handed he fights the many-headed monster that threatens his destruction. The poem is a spiritual Laocoön. The groupings are admirable. Becket stands out in bold relief. By him are two fast friends, John of Salisbury and Herbert of Bosham; the latter—

"A mystic, feeding on faith's inmost love—
A dreamer, scanning mysteries in flowers."—P. 232.

The former intellectual, learned, acute, and faithful. Becket so speaks of them:

"Herbert and John—both gone—how few are like them!
God made me rich in friends. In Herbert still,
So holy and so infant like his soul,
I found a mountain-spring of Christian love,
Upbursting through the rock of fixed resolve,
A spring of healing strength; in John, a mind
That, keener than diplomatists of kings,
Was crafty only 'gainst the wiles of craft,
And, stored with this world's wisdom, scorned to use it
Except for virtue's needs."—Act v., sc. ii., p. 198.

With admirable dramatic effect does the poet make the hate of De Broc follow the saint with all the persistency of a fate, and wreak his wrath upon his family and friends.

"*De Broc*.—One task is mine—
To slay the man I hate; and I will slay him. (*Departs.*)
De Luci.—The air grows healthier now De Broc has left us:
That man's a forest-beast no art can tame.
Three times my hand, with iron mace of law,
Hath spurned him to his den, or else Idonea;
But you, long absent, know not that black fount
Which feeds his hate for Becket.
Cornwall.—Tell his tale.
De Luci.—In youth his bad heart was a nest of adders,
Envenomed purposes and blind, at war.
A monk, on false pretence he burst his bond,
And roamed a preying on the race of man."—Act i., sc. ii.

But enough has been given to show the character of the human fiend who makes use of all his energies to bring about the ruin of Becket. And there is another character who loves not the Primate. It is Eleanor.

Unlike *Harold*, the poem is not pieced together; it grows. Act I. gives us the opinions of various stations in life upon the promotion of Becket to the See of Canterbury. Therein we find the various shades of men who will afterwards become the friends or enemies of Thomas. It also opens the breach between him and the King. Act II. introduces us to the struggle from the resignation of the great seal to the contest upon the royal customs, and the final break with Henry. The greatness of Thomas towers above all others. The bishops urge him to temporize. He answers them grandly:

"Bishops of England!
For many truths by you this day enforced,
Hear ye in turn but one. The Church is God's:
Lords, were it ours, then might we traffic with it;
At will make large its functions, or contract;
Serve it or sell; worship or crucify.
I say the Church is God's; for He beheld it,
His thought, ere thine began; counted its bones,
Which in His book were writ. I say that He
From His own side in water and in blood
Gave birth to it on Calvary, and caught it,
Despite the nails. His Bride, in His own arms;
I say that He, a Spirit of clear heat,
Lives in its frame, and cleanses with pure pain
His sacrificial precinct, but consumes
The chaff with other ardors. Lords, I know you;
What dare ye have and what intend ere yet
Yon sun that rises weeping sets this night;
And therefore bind I with this charge upon your souls:
If any secular court shall pass its verdict
On me, your lord, or ere that sin be sinned,
I bid you flee that court; if secular arm
Attempt me, lay thereon the Church's ban,
Or else against you I appeal to Rome.
To-day the heathen rage—I fear them not:
If fall I must, this hand, ere yet I fall,
Stretched from the bosom of a peaceful gown
Above a troubled king and darkening realm,
Shall send God's sentence forth. My lords, farewell!"

Act ii., sc. iii., pp. 64, 65.

This is the language of a great soul, firm in its resolve, and unflinch-

ing in its duty. He is summoned before the King. Personal charges are brought against him. He refutes them. He is asked to confirm the royal customs. Barons and bishops load him with abuse. Gilbert says to him :

" My Lord, your pardon ! you have placed your bishops
This day between the hammer and the anvil ;
At Clarendon the customs you received,
This day you spurn them.

Becket.—You have heard, my lords,
That partial truth which more envenoms falsehood.
At Clarendon I sinned—this much all know ;
Few know the limits of that sin, and fewer
The threefold fraud that meshed me in that sin,
From which, like weeping Peter, I arose,
To fall, I trust, no more.

* * * *

My lords, that eve
A truthful servant, and a fearless one,
Who bears my cross—and taught me to bear one—
Probed me and proved with sharp and searching words,
And as the sun my sin before me stood.
My lords, for forty days I kept my fast,
And held me from the offering of the mass,
And sat in sackcloth ; till the Pope sent word,
' Arise ; be strong, and walk.' And I arose,
And hither came ; and here confession make
That till the cleansed leper once again
Takes, voluntary, back his leprosy,
I with these royal customs stain no more
My soul which Christ hath washed."—Act ii., sc. iv., pp. 74, 75.

Thomas leaves the kingdom. After an interview with Pope Alexander III. he retires to the abbey of Pontigny. It is a haven of rest after his many tossings on the stormy sea of troubles through which his life has passed. Here, his language reflects the settled calm of his mind :

" *John of Salisbury.*—The spirit of Bernard
Hangs on this pure and hallowed air. Your brow
Was furrowed once ; to-day it wears no frown ;
His Holiness did well to send you hither.

Becket.—Leisure and peace, and communings with God
Above the glebe new-turned, when fresh and sweet
Rises earth's breath, and the thicket near
The unimpatient bird-song, evening-lulled,
Is soberer than at dawn, must help, I think,
Attuned by daily offices divine,
And faces calm wherein the chant lives on
When psalms are o'er—must help to soften hearts
How hard soe'er, and softening them, to brighten.
Here learn we that, except through the sin of man,
There's evil none on earth—not pain, not scorn,
Not death ! How well they name that stream ' Serene !'
Serene it wanders from the chestnut forests,
Serene it whispers through yon orchard bowers,
Serene it slides along the convent walls :
It counts the hours ; even now the sun descends,
And therefore in its breathless mirror glow
The gold-green pillars of those limes beside it.
This spot is surely holier than men know ;
I think some saint died here !" —Act iii., sc. vii., p. 114.

This is a passage that would have satisfied Wordsworth's fastidiousness. It is so natural, so suited to the occasion. Becket, after an interview

with the King, finally returns to England with full consciousness of all that awaits him.

"*Herbert*.—Bad rumors thicken.

Becket.—In three days hence I tread my native shores.

Llewellen.—With what intent?

Becket.—*To stamp this foot of mine
Upon the bosom of a waiting grave,
And wake a slumbering realm.*

Llewellen.—May it please your Grace—

Becket.—My friends, seven years of exile are enough :
If into that fair church I served of old
I may not entrance make, a living man,
Let them who loved me o'er its threshold lift
And lay my body dead."

There is sublimity in this language. The high resolve in the face of the doom awaiting is grandly expressed in the words italicized. Becket's prophetic soul spoke correctly. The Queen has not forgotten her old hate for him. She stirs up the pride of Henry once more. She seems bent upon the death of the Primate. The poet thus groups the scene in the spirit of an old Grecian :

"*Queen Eleanor*.—Ye that have goblets, brim them ! Mark this cup :
It flames with Albi's wine !

[*QUEEN ELEANOR rises and stands on the highest step of the throne
with a golden cup in her right hand.*

Leicester (to Lisieux).—Behold her, Lisieux !

That smile is baleful as a winter beam

Streaking some cliff wreck-gorged ; her hair and eyes

Send forth a glare half sunshine and half lightning.

Queen Eleanor.—A toast, my lords ! The London merchant's son,

Once England's Primate—henceforth King of England !

King Henry (leaping to his feet and half-drawing his sword).—Woman,
be silent !"

Well she may. She has done the mischief. She has reopened the old wounds. Others are there ready and glad to keep them so. In the meantime Becket's return to England is one continuous triumphal reception from the people. And this fact is so represented that it chafes the King still more. When Gilbert, the venal Bishop of London, tells the King that Becket,

— "like a king, an army at his back,
In vengeance sweeps from shore to shore of England,
To abase a king ill-crowned"—

he grows furious, and gnaws the straws on the floor like a raving maniac.

"That too past.

The King was standing in their midst : his eye

Slowly he turned from each to each ; then spake

With pointed finger, and with serpent hiss :

'Slaves, slaves, not barons hath my kingdom bred,

Slaves that in silence stand, and eye their king

Mocked by a low-born knave !'

The Prior.—Did none reply ?

Llewellen.—No man. From that mute hall four knights forth strode,

Fitz-Urse, De Tracy, Moreville, Richard Brito,

At twelve last night they entered Saltwood gates :

De Broc attended them.

The Prior.—The end draws nigh."—Act v., sc. vii., p. 230.

The end was nigh. We all know what it was. It is not a piece of fiction that the poet is weaving from his fancy. It is historic truth. And he is throughout most faithful to history. In a laborious preface he confirms his conception of his hero with authorities, most of them adverse to the religious belief of the martyr. In this he contrasts with Tennyson, who distorts history and says nothing about it.

We have so far omitted mention of the most touching and beautiful portions of the poem. They are what we might call an episode. It is when speaks Idonea, whom Thomas à Becket wrested from the foul touch of De Broc. She has become a nun. Her delicate soul has received unusual insight into things spiritual. Her conversations with the dying Empress are sweet, mystical, heavenly. We cannot refrain from giving a quotation :

"The Empress.—What see you, child?

Idonea.—An Eden, weed o'ergrown, but still an Eden;
Man's noble life—a fragment, yet how fair!
My father, pilgrim once in Southern lands,
Groping mid ruins, found a statue's foot,
And brought it home. I gazed upon it oft,
Until its smiling curves and dimpled grace
Showed me the vanished nymph from foot to brow,
Majestical and sweet. Man's broken life
Shows like that sad, sweet fragment.

The Empress.—Life, my child,
In times barbaric is a wilderness:
In cultured times a street, or wrangling mart:
We bear it, for we must.

Idonea.—O madam, madam!
God made man's life: it is a holy thing!
What constitutes that life? The Virtues, first;
That sisterhood divine, brighter than stars,
And diverse more than stars, than gems, than blossoms;
The Virtues are our life in essence; next,
Those household ties which image ties celestial;
Lastly, life's blessed sorrows. They alone
Rehearse the Man of Sorrows; they alone
Fit us for life with Him."—Act iv., sc. i., p. 145.

Here is another passage that would have delighted Wordsworth or Shakspeare had they dropped it in their metaphysical musings:

"The Empress.—Here too sin hides us from God's face; yet here
Feebly we mourn that loss.

Idonea.—So deeply here
Man's spirit is infleshed! Two moments are there
Wherein the soul of man beholds its God;
The first at its creation, and the next
The instant after death.

The Empress.—It sees its Judge.
Idonea.—And seeing, is self-judged, and sees no longer,
Yet rests in perfect peace. As some blind child,
Stayed in its mother's bosom, feels its safety,
So in the bosom of the love eternal,
Secure, though sad, that Vision it awaits
(The overbending of that Face divine)
Which now—now first—it knows to be its heaven,
That primal thirst of souls at last re-waked,
The creature's yearning for its great Creator."—Act iv., sc. i., p. 148.

These are passages not to be read simply; they are to be studied. Only so does their beauty grow upon one. They carry the reader, as they carried their author, into regions of the highest order of thought.

They are pure philosophy steeped in the glories of genuine poetry. But a truce to quotation. The book itself must be read.

We will not judge Mr. De Vere's poem by the rules for the drama. We do not think he intends to have it enacted. There is not in it sufficient diversity of style. It is rather too sustained throughout in the same elevated tone. Mr. Tennyson's drama is better adapted for representation, inasmuch as it is shorter, and has not such long speeches for any character, though *Harold* will fail through lack of plot. But poetry is not a quality required for dramatic representation. Vivacity in the dialogue, and versatility in the style, peculiar to each personage, are the chief requisites; hence the great successful modern plays are void of poetic merit. But in good truth the age of the drama is past. Goethe's *Faust* has shown how the dramatic form may be used in a poem not adapted to the stage, and has opened the door to a new use for the drama besides that of representation. In the same spirit, so far as concerns form, we conceive Aubrey de Vere to have written *St. Thomas of Canterbury*.

In conclusion, we say that the historic verdicts upon the dramatic writings of these two poets will be very distinct. Of Tennyson it will run somewhat in this fashion: "Combining in himself the sensuousness of Keats with the idealism of Shelley he rose to pre-eminence as the poet of the sentiments. In the cultivation of this field he has been most successful. The delicacy of his thoughts and the sweet music of his verse give him an unfilled niche in the Valhalla of great English poets. But in his latter days he undertook to write dramas, which betray a falling off. The mine of his genius became exhausted, and he filled up his life by giving us the rubbish he continued to gather, instead of the pure gold he used to dig out so frequently. This rubbish he worked up into the form of dramas, and to give them some appearance of worth he scattered an occasional gem among them. They are of value in enabling us to make a complete estimate of the poet's genius." And of Aubrey de Vere the verdict will read thus: "At first an enthusiastic disciple of Wordsworth he occasionally mistook that great poet's faults of detail for perfections, and literally imitated them. But soon outgrowing his defects he asserted his own individuality, and finally achieved crowning success in his dramatic poems. As Wordsworth used, in his efforts to conform to his own theory, frequently to prosaicize his poetry, and became truly great only when he forgot himself and his theorizings; so Aubrey de Vere became so lifted into the regions of poetic thought that he occasionally poeticized prose, and spiritualized every idea he touched upon. The great and the sublime in human nature were themes according to his own heart. Alexander among the ancients and Thomas à Becket among the moderns, he presented as specimens of aspiring souls actuated by emotions above the crowd by which they were surrounded." And let us add that it is to be hoped he will present us many more such; for we take it that only now has his genius flowered into its true greatness.

CONTEMPORARY EVOLUTION. An Essay on some Recent Social Changes. By *St. George Mivart*. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1876.

This is a very interesting and thoughtful work. The author brings under review the various elements that enter into the social movement of the age, traces them back to their first principles, shows their workings and effects in previous ages, and endeavors to forecast their bearing upon and relation to Catholicity in the future. It is not easy to state in brief the scope of the argument, the premises on which it is based, or

the different considerations by which it is illustrated and strengthened. The number and variety of topics touched upon is great, and the arguments are so condensed that anything like a fair synopsis of them would be a work of extreme difficulty.

Whatever differences of judgment may be formed by readers as to the correctness of some of the views expressed by the author in his analyses of mediæval and modern society, and the conclusions he arrives at as regards their relation to the Church in the present and future, there can be but one opinion as to the importance of the subjects touched upon in the book, and the ability and thoroughness with which they are treated. The book has another merit. It is in a very high degree *suggestive*. Where topics are briefly touched upon, or thoughts stated without full discussion, they are so handled as to suggest to the reader further reflections, and open up to his mind kindred topics and thoughts which he may develop himself and place in proper relation to the main subject.

The leading idea and purpose of the work may be gathered from its introductory chapter. The author believes that we are "traversing an epoch destined to be memorable for a long time to come," and one which is "as critical as, even if not more so than, that of the sixteenth century, and that which occurred towards the close of the last century." It is not enough, however, to perceive that we are living in a critical epoch; it is also necessary, though very difficult, "to appraise that epoch and estimate its tendencies correctly." For, "no one, of course, can withdraw himself completely from the special influence of his age and country, however vigorous may be his will or extensive his culture, yet to estimate such phenomena correctly, and with as little bias as possible, is about the most important task to which a thinker can in these days apply his intellect."

"It is so supremely important because we are all called upon to contribute to social evolution, and more or less distinctly to take sides; and, of course, only by rare accident can beneficial action result from erroneous judgments."

The author then points out that "the very same character of religious excitation marks, however, both the French revolutionary epoch (of '98) and the period of the Renaissance as well as that in which we live," and then states as questions demanding our attention:

I. "Whether, in fact, one spirit has or has not really animated these great movements which have marked the post-mediæval epoch?"

II. "If there has been one such inspiration, what has been its true nature and character?"

III. "What is likely to be the farther effect of such a spirit, and is it likely henceforward to increase or to diminish?"

The first of these questions the author believes must be answered affirmatively. To the second he answers by the affirmation (which is substantiated by a strong array of evidence), "that the deeply pantheistic and pagan spirit with which the Aryan mind was once saturated, profoundly modifies and actuates not the minds of the poor only, but of the rich and educated, who, from whatever cause, have either failed to master or who (in rare instances) having mastered, have deliberately rejected Christian philosophy and theology. The result is the assumption of no merely negative attitude towards Christianity, but of a profound and violent antagonism to it, springing from a keen, often passionate, attachment to an opposite system."

With the proof and illustration of this statement the remainder of the introductory chapter is occupied. The argument covers a wide field, and the topics touched upon in it are treated with eminent ability and

with great clearness, and at the same time great condensation. The superstitions of the day are traced back to their origin in ancient paganism, the persistent though latent spirit of pantheism, lingering still among the peoples of Europe and occasionally showing itself in their national peculiarities and characteristics, is pointed out, the passionate study and worship of nature, and the passionate admiration of visible beauty, are dwelt upon as evidences of this pantheistic tendency. The material philosophy of the age is discussed, particularly as represented by Herbert Spencer, and the harmony between it and Brahmanism is traced out.

After a keen and searching analysis of the tendencies of modern thought and action in their different forms and manifestations, the author states his conclusion as follows:

"Hereafter, then, in the worship of the First Cause, not as made known to us by His own act of voluntary self revelation, but as manifested in the material world alone, we may find a fuller development of that pagan revival, which for more than three centuries has been gathering life and energy. But we shall not yet have reached its culmination.

"To be logical, we must not ignore *any* side of nature, which is equally in every aspect a mode of the Unknowable. If acts prompted by the devotion of a mother's love are to be reverently recognized as one mode of that which alone Is, not one bit less is the traffic of the courtesan another such mode; and if the chastisement of the assassin may claim Its sanction, so the assassin may equally claim it for the act on account of which he is chastised."

The author then devotes the main body of his work to a consideration of the effect on Christianity of the further development of this general movement towards paganism, and endeavors to "predict the result of the renewed conflict between such a modified Christianity and a so revived paganism."

In investigating the question, "whether Christianity is likely to be utterly destroyed, or more or less enfeebled, or slightly or greatly strengthened by the further development of the naturalistic movement," Mr. Mivart examines that movement in its (1) political, (2) scientific, (3) philosophic aspects.

In the discussion of the movement of modern society under its political aspect he reviews the destruction of Christian mediævalism in England, France, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland, and traces out the development of the great modern political movement as containing three distinct ideals:

"1. The mainly unconscious and partly conscious real pagan revival and revolt against God—PAGANISM."

"2. The assertion of natural right, and revolt against the domination of man (*merely as man*) over his fellow—CIVICISM."

"3. The tendency to preserve, and more or less bring back, the mediæval Christian theocracy—MEDIÆVALISM."

It is then shown, by a very clear and thorough analysis of these tendencies, that there is a temporary union of the first two (though essentially divergent and conflicting) against the third; and that in this temporary union the two first fiercely oppose and resist the last-mentioned tendency.

Mr. Mivart shows that the system of thought embodied in civicism holds, as regards morals (1), "that right is but another name for pleasure; (2), that temporal good is the only good to be sought after or desired; and (3) that no man has control over or is responsible for his actions." As regards politics he says:

"Such a system, recognizing no distinction of kind between God and

nature, the natural and the supernatural, man and brute, the good and the pleasant, naturally and logically asserts the *absolute* right of the State to control all and everything in the life of every individual citizen, and necessarily denies all rights to individuals or minorities. In principle it warrants the performance of acts incomparably more atrocious than the massacre of St. Bartholomew or the burnings of the Spanish Inquisition. There is no principle in the views advocated by Professor Huxley's school to which a minority might appeal in bar of utter extermination by a majority, if unable to convince the majority that it would injure *itself* by that minority's destruction."

The author traces out the effects of the combination of "civicism" and "paganism" in the hostility to the Church manifested in almost every country, and then passes on to point out the manner in which the Church will eventually surmount and overcome this hostility, with an immense gain to Christianity. The argument is able and forcible, though we are not prepared to accept it in its entirety.

The subjects of Scientific Evolution, Philosophic Evolution, and *Æsthetic* Evolution, are treated, each in a separate chapter, with great ability and analytical acuteness. At the end the general conclusion is reached that "the great movement of the RENAISSANCE (of which the present movements in politics, science, philosophy, and *æsthetics*, are, in the author's opinion, simply the outcome and fruit) will hereafter take its place as the manifestly efficient promoter of a new development of the Christian organism, such as the first twenty centuries of its life afforded it no opportunity to manifest."

PUBLIC LIBRARIES IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Their history, condition, and management. Special Report, Department of the Interior, Bureau of Education.

Under this title the Government of the United States has issued a work of decided interest to the bibliographer, and of great use to the bibliomaniac. An introduction, by the joint editors, gives excellent *raisons d'être* for the book. While they have not presented any very new ideas on the subject of the importance of public free libraries, they have collected and classified all the benefits which accrue to the people from such institutions. Of course the editors view this importance chiefly in connection with the public free schools, and into that vexed question we will not follow them. Fortunately the usefulness of a public library is not confined to a form of education to which, as Catholics, we cannot subscribe; but such institutions are rather to be regarded by us as a means by which such schools will be finally and conclusively proved more hurtful than helping. We agree with the editors, that a librarian is as much a "teacher" as the professor, and only in proportion as he thoroughly understands his duty to the mute but eloquent objects of his care, and to the public, is he worthy of the post he fills.

In the introduction is embodied, in a necessarily condensed form, reports of public libraries in Mexico, of which there are sixteen, in Brazil, and in Japan.

The report, as must be expected in this centennial year, begins with an account of the resources for literary culture one hundred years ago, collated mostly from the memorabilia of Franklin, and is most interesting in giving the story of his struggles to establish a library in Philadelphia, and of the growth of the institution since known as the Philadelphia Library. The honor of establishing the first public library in the United States is divided with Philadelphia by Charleston, S. C., where in 1748 several young men associated themselves for the purpose

of forming such an establishment. In Georgetown, S. C., the Winyaw Indigo Club organized a library in 1753, and the New York Library was not established until 1754.

Following this interesting paper by Mr. Scudder is one upon school and asylum libraries by the editors, also a distinct one by them upon college libraries, and one upon theological libraries, divided into three parts, the second part being from the pen of Father Sumner of Georgetown College. Scientific libraries are treated by Prof. Gill, of the Smithsonian Institute. Of the thirty-nine divisions or chapters of the report, those numbered twenty-seven to thirty-seven are devoted to papers by the librarians and bibliographers of the country upon the cataloguing, binding, indexing, choice, and general care of books. There we find several articles from the pen of Mr. A. R. Spofford, the Librarian of Congress, than whom no one is better able to lay down the law in all things pertaining to the subject. The penultimate chapter is a contribution of ten several papers, giving a history of the public libraries in ten of the principal cities of the Union, and is extremely interesting reading. The closing chapter is one on the general statistics of all public libraries in the United States.

The volume is a bulky one, and had been much better divided into two smaller ones, more convenient to handle and to bind. It is one which should find its way into every study, for it is a storehouse of knowledge and suggestion for which every one who values books will be thankful. And nowadays who so bold as to profess not to care for books? While those who are blessed with a literary taste cultivate and cherish it as a glorious endowment.

It is a source of gratification to us, as citizens of a great country, to be able to offer the proof which this volume gives, that intellectual and mental culture have not been neglected in spite of the reproach so often flung upon us, that the "mighty dollar" is the "will o' the wisp" which leads us on a wild all-absorbing chase, and which is only relinquished when the eager foot is tripped up by the grave. Almost every city in the Union has its public library, a collection not confined to sectarian publications, but where people of all creeds can find mental food without being obliged to swallow, against their wills, aught that disagrees with their religious digestion. This, at least, is the theory on which our public libraries are professedly managed, though it must be acknowledged that in many instances they fail to practically realize it. A vitiated taste for sensational fiction crowds the shelves even of some of our larger public libraries with an immense quantity of trash; and a spirit of hostility to the Catholic Church, concealed under professions of liberalism and unsectarianism frequently gives only reluctant admission to a few Catholic works, while every new Protestant publication is immediately procured. It is to be hoped, however, that as our public libraries acquire solidity and their management passes, as it is passing, more into the hands of those who better understand the true use and functions of libraries, that they will come to represent and embody in their collections of books their proper purpose and design.

But to make it easier to reach the mental food they have stored up, a good system of cataloguing is necessary, and Mr. Spofford gives some excellent advice upon this point. While reading the Congressional Librarian's articles, and remembering the thousands of volumes under his care, and the aids and resources for their acquisition and preservation which have been furnished him by the government, we cannot help reverting to the first article in the report, which details the struggles of

Benjamin Franklin and the anxiety and trouble the collection of the first library cost him.

The Commissioner of Education, in his letter to the Secretary, gives the year 1874 as the date of the commencement of the compilation which he has just published. We congratulate him upon the result of the two years' labors.

THEOLOGIA MORALIS. Novissimi Ecclesiæ Doctoris S. Alphonsi in compendium redacta et usui Venerabilis Cleri Americani accommodata. Auctore A. Konings, C.S.S.R. Editio altera aucta et emendata. Neo-Eboraci, Cincinnati, S. Ludovici, Einsidlae. Benziger Fratres, 1876. Oct., vol. i., pp. 481; vol. ii., pp. 458.

The study of moral theology or casuistry, as it is often called, is erroneously supposed by many to be something new in the Church, the product of later ages, an outgrowth of scholastic theology, unknown to the fathers and the early Church. This opinion is not only held but studiously and eagerly put forward by not a few Protestant divines. But there could be nothing more false than this supposition, nothing more evidently disproved by the history of the Church in her earliest period. It might as well be argued that there was no systematic study of Scripture, no scientific knowledge of its laws and canons of interpretation in the first ages of the Church, because the technical names of biblical criticism and hermeneutics had not yet come into general use. St. Jerome, for example, knew nothing of our modern terminology, but no worthier or more accomplished Bible scholar ever lived inside or outside of the Church. And Protestants, especially German Rationalist interpreters, have come at last to discover and recognize his merits, and show how fully they appreciate his biblical lore. They often quote him with honorable mention, and perhaps just as often they appropriate his researches without any mention at all. Any student, who has the opportunity of going through the learned commentaries of modern authors, and comparing them with the Catholic sources from which they have drawn without acknowledgment, will find how largely, how skilfully, and we must add dishonestly too, they have availed themselves of the labors of a Sanctius, a Pineda, and other old Jesuit interpreters, whose only aim, according to the great Protestant tradition, was to suppress all knowledge of the Bible and keep people in ignorance, because ignorance is the mother of devotion. It is astonishing to see how much in them of what is purely erudition, illustration from classic sources, etc., is borrowed from those old scholars. This, however, is nothing new. In the same way the great Jeremy Taylor has a name that is universally revered amongst pious Anglicans. But how few of them know that he struts before the world in borrowed plumes, and that whatever is valuable in his devotional works is taken from French and Italian Catholic authors. And the better to hide his theft, he soundly berates his benefactors. But we are wandering from our theme.

The Fathers were eminently moral theologians. Many of their works are complete treatises on some parts of moral theology, or casuistry. St. Augustine's two books, *De Mendacio* and *Contra Mendacium*, exhaust the whole subject of the eighth commandment. We might add the great names of Clement of Alexandria, St. Cyprian, the two saints Gregory, one of Nazianzum, the other of Nyssa, St. Basil, St. Ambrose, St. Gregory the Great, and a host of others. Not only their formal treatises, but even their familiar epistles contain an abundant fund of decisions of moral questions, cases, doubts, etc. The decrees of councils, too, such as those of Elvira, Ancyra, and Arles, all held before the triumph of the Church under Constantine, and the decretals of many early Popes lay

down not only practical rules, but likewise occasionally the theory of moral science.

But it was only in the days of the scholastics or soon afterwards, that moral theology began to assume something of its present shape. Perhaps the first to publish what may be called an approach to the regular courses of the present day, was the learned canonist St. Raymond de Pennafort, who wrote in the early part of the thirteenth century. He called his book a *Summa*, or Summary of Moral Doctrine, and this name was commonly adopted by all those who imitated him in the compiling of these summaries. The name of the author, or of the place where he was born, or where he taught, was generally added by way of distinction. Thus after the *Summa Raymundiana* we have the *Astesana*, written by a Franciscan of Asti in Piedmont; the *Monaldina*, by Monaldus, Archbishop of Benevento, about 1320; the *Pisanella*, called also *Magistrucchia* or *Bartolina*, from its author the Dominican, Bartholomew a Sancta Concordia, who was Professor of Canon Law at Pisa; the *Pacifica*, compiled by the Franciscan Fra Pacifico of Novara. John Baptist Trovavala, a Genoese Franciscan, gave to his work the fanciful title of *Summa Rosella*, for what reason we are ignorant. The most famous of them all, and the one most frequently reprinted in the latter half of the fifteenth century, was the *Summa Angelica*, of another Genoese Franciscan, John Angelus de Clavasio. The last of the series seems to have been the *Summa Sylvestrina*, so called from its author the Dominican Sylvester Prieras, the same who wrote against Luther at the beginning of his career. Some of these treatises were in alphabetical order, but not all; and De Wette (in his *History of Moral Doctrine*) is mistaken in ascribing such arrangement to the first of them all, the *Summa* of St. Raymond.

The modern plan of teaching moral theology in the shape of graduated treatises, beginning with Human Actions, Sin, Conscience, etc., and ending with the sacraments, dates from the Council of Trent, and is almost simultaneous with the transition of scholastic into dogmatic theology. The whole doctrine of conscience has acquired a greater importance and is more fully treated now than in former times; but principles never change. What is now taught in the schools, differs in nothing from what was taught by the Gospel and the Fathers. It is the same in substance, with the addition of scientific development. Among the books of this last epoch, there is none that surpasses, none perhaps that equals in clearness and scientific precision the *Medulla* of the Jesuit, Hermann Busenbaum. Hence eminent casuists, such as F. Claudius La Croix and St. Alphonsus have chosen it as a text for their comments.

That Laxism, so called, was ever organized into a system by theologians (especially Jesuits) of the Catholic Church, is one of those bold, wicked assertions, which we hear every day, but which cannot be substantiated by any testimony, and which must soon be recognized as false by any one who has the courage or the honesty to examine for himself. Like all errors, it found a few adherents; but it met with speedy and universal condemnation. And even the small number of its adherents, as well as the extent and nature of the error, has been grossly exaggerated by unscrupulous partisan zeal. Even the good nature of the Holy See has been imposed on, though its wisdom never could be at fault. Propositions, said to be from Catholic authors, were submitted to Rome for condemnation. They were condemned because they were false; and their condemnation implied this and nothing more. It gave no warrant to the malignity of those who pretended they could be found *taliter qualiter* in the obnoxious Jesuit theologians. But, though the Laxism im-

puted to a few be almost mythical, Rigorism on the contrary was very far from being a myth. It was a fearful reality in the Church, but not of her. What is said of the Jansenists and their famous project of Bourg-Fontaine may be no fact historically, but it is at least a parable that represents and vividly illustrates an over true fact. To do away with the sacraments, by making them impossible, is to overthrow the Church. And Jansenism labored to make the sacraments practically impossible. Therefore it sought to overthrow the Church of Christ. Whether it formulated this purpose in certain words, on such a day, in such a council-chamber at Bourg-Fontaine, is quite immaterial. When Jansenism, against its will and in spite of its lying protests of submission, was forcibly ejected from the house of God, a few of its craftier adherents managed to remain behind, some under the innocent delusion perhaps that certain Jansenistical points of faith or morals were not inconsistent with external Catholic communions. We will not, we presume not to judge them; since the Church, who is sole judge, has tolerated them. They were not heretics; for they professed—and we are willing to admit that many, perhaps most of them, were sincere—unlimited obedience to her authority. But their periodical outbursts of mistaken zeal for what they called “the purer” moral doctrine were a standing source of scandal to good Christians. In the Catholic Church there is a “Rigorism” which is not only allowed but admired. It is that of the saints, who prescribe for themselves a lofty, stern, inflexible standard of conduct, from which nothing can turn them aside. But they have the spirit of the Gospel; austere and rigid with themselves they deal gently with others. But our theological rigorists, as far as we have been able to study their lives, did not take after this saintly pattern. They were indulgent to themselves, while imposing the yoke on others. It was against these men, and others of unquestionable orthodoxy, the brothers Ballerini of Verona, “*par nobile fratrum*” in every other respect, against the Concinas, Patuzzis, Contensons, Bertis, and others of this stamp, that God raised up His holy servant Alphonsus about the middle of the last century. He was not, perhaps, a man of extraordinary talents; but he had the grace of sanctity, and special gifts beside, bestowed upon him by Almighty God for the special task. He was called by God to be a Teacher, a Doctor of the Church, as Pius IX. has lately declared in the technical language of her tribunals, in a most important period of her history, and he has faithfully and gloriously fulfilled the mission assigned him.

When we say that Father Konings, in the work before us, has laid down well and faithfully the moral doctrine of St. Alphonsus, we consider it no ordinary praise. But he has done more. He has written for no general, abstract purpose, but for the special benefit of the American clergy. Accordingly, he has sought out and carefully brought together whatever there is in our civil laws or social customs that has a moral character, and has examined it by the doctrine of St. Alphonsus. The peculiar condition of the Church in this country, from our legislation and society—especially since the wide spreading of New England ideas, which have pervaded the willing West and sought to force themselves upon the reluctant South—often brings about difficulties and complications that never existed in Europe, certainly not in the days of St. Alphonsus. These Father Konings has scrutinized keenly and decided by the unerring principles of Catholic doctrine. As an instance, we may quote the vexed question of mixed education, which he treats, as far as we can judge, with wise discretion and sound theology. Elegance of style is not expected and would be out of place in a book of the

kind. Father Konings has taken the proper course. He writes with clearness and in a way to make himself intelligible to every reader.

We should like to say something of the system of Equi-probabilism, and the disputes that have grown out of it; and we know that several of our clerical readers have manifested their desire, that we should give some expression of opinion on this point. But we have sealed our lips, and have no inclination to obtrude our opinion, where wise men disagree. And we have a still better reason. It is strange enough, but it is nevertheless a painful fact, that there are some things about which one can scarcely write, short of a miracle, without wounding charity. We are either tempted, it would seem, to write in an angry spirit; or without any evil intention we offend others, and stir up in their souls the waves of angry passion. It may be said without hesitation that, on an average, more sins—material sins if you will—more breaches of charity have been committed by any one Catholic writer who has written on these vexed questions against other Catholics, than by all the theologians together who have waged controversial war with Protestantism for the last three hundred years. Why this should be so, is a problem beyond our grasp. But we feel reluctant to utter even one word which might give additional meaning and illustration to this wicked, shameful enigma. We have dipped into this polemic literature in our early days, have perhaps enjoyed it with the zest of a young student, but have thrown it aside long since, depressed, disheartened, and disgusted by these domestic dissensions. We have read all the documents laid before the Sacred Congregation, the *Summarium Additionale*, the *Vindiciæ Alphonsianæ*, the *Vindiciæ Ballerinianæ*, etc., and can only marvel that instead of going forth to meet the common enemy, brave and worthy soldiers of the cross should, in our own camp, *Iliacos intra muros*, deem it their duty or make it their choice to lift even a finger in fraternal strife. And we cannot but recall the noble words of Pius IX., in his letter to the Jesuit Fathers of Lyons: “*Utinam omnes qui pro Deo, religione et patria decertant, licet in iis quæ liberæ sunt disceptationis varias sequantur sententias, uno velut agmine facto unanimes irrumpant in solos veritatis osoros ancipitisque et perniciosæ doctrinæ magistros: sed memores veteris et sapientis effati: Eadem propositio in ore catholici est catholica, in ore hæretici hæretica, properantibus commilitonibus non injicerent impedimenta, nec per clamorosa et severiora judicia verbi alicujus aut sententiæ non satis perspicue proditæ, eorum auctoritatem et efficaciam apud honestos elevent.*” We have alluded to Father Anthony Ballerini’s work, but pass no judgment on it. We neither assail nor defend him. But we have known enough of this worthy man, of great learning and holy life, for the last forty years, to make it hard for us to believe that he would intentionally dishonor one of God’s saints.

THE LIFE OF OUR LIFE. By *Henry James Coleridge*, of the Society of Jesus. London: Burns & Oates. 1876.

This work is based on the Latin Harmony of the Gospels, published some years ago under the title *Vita Vitæ Nostræ Meditantibus Proposita*. A large amount of matter, however, has been added which is not to be found in the Latin edition.

The importance of studying what is commonly called the harmony of the Gospels, is not generally appreciated as highly as it should be. Many turn away from this study because of certain difficulties which meet them at the outset; many more fail to see the advantages that are claimed for it; others have a fear that the seeming discrepancies be-

tween the several Gospel accounts may turn out to be irreconcilable; while still others see no great good to be accomplished by their perfect reconciliation. But no Catholic, and no believer, indeed, in the inspiration of Sacred Scripture, can admit that there are discrepancies in the Gospel which are real contradictions, and not due merely to our imperfect knowledge. Moreover, the study of the harmony of the Gospel is not limited to the solution of difficulties. In addition to the refutation of objections that otherwise might be embarrassing, it throws fresh light upon the history of our Divine Lord's work upon earth, conduces to a clearer understanding of the whole plan and method and development of that work, and opens up more fully the interesting subject of the gradual formation of the Gospel history as we have it from the hands of the Church.

The objects of Father Coleridge's work are, therefore, very important. We need not say, in view of his widely known ability and learning, that he is eminently qualified for undertaking it. His book is not critical, in the technical sense of the word; it deals with results of critical researches and examinations rather than their processes. On this account it is likely to be more widely useful; for, while of great value to the clergy as a clear and careful digest of the results of Father Coleridge's own studies added to those of previous writers, it is also well adapted to the needs of intelligent laymen.

Father Coleridge does not enter upon any elaborate proof of the genuineness and authenticity of the Gospels. That and other topics preliminary to a "Harmony," he passes by, or only refers to briefly, as not lying strictly within the scope of his work. He says that we have a right to treat the four Gospels as the works of the authors whose names they bear, "mainly for two reasons, either of which is abundantly sufficient for all who will give the subject candid and serious consideration. The first of these reasons is that the four Gospels may be considered and dealt with on the same principles as the works of any other ancient writer, Cicero, Cæsar, or Seneca," and indeed that there are "no ancient writers, whose works come to us with half so much certainty, even on simply critical grounds." The second reason is that "that has happened in the case of the Gospels, which cannot be said to have happened in the case of any other books, except such as so far are like them in the peculiarity of having been the authoritative books of a society which has been spread over the whole world. . . . The perpetual influence and life, so to speak, of the Gospels, such as we have them in the Church, establish the truth that they are what they are called with a force of evidence quite as strong, to say the least, as that by which we know Rome to be Rome, or Athens to be Athens."

At the same time, while the author starts with certain assumptions, he employs none which have not been already worked out, and proved to be "reasonable conclusions by a series of writers whose works are in the hands of scholars."

The preface is an able discussion of matters preliminary to the immediate subject of the work. In this preface Father Coleridge gives a brief but lucid sketch of the history and circumstances attending the formation of the four Gospels. He shows that "the Gospel existed before it was written;" and that, too, not merely in the form of general tradition, a recollection more or less full and distinct of the events of our Saviour's life and of his acts and teachings, but also in the form of definite distinct instructions given by persons duly authorized by the Church; that whether or not it was the special office of those whom St. Paul speaks of as "evangelists," to relate and comment upon the incidents of

our Lord's life and His carefully recorded sayings, "it is clear that there must have been from the earliest days some such office and some such teaching, on which the practical system of Christian morality, the imitation of the virtues of our Lord considered as our Great Example, and the following out of His peculiar precepts and counsels of perfection must have been built. The Epistles of the Apostles evidently suppose a large range of practical, we may surely say very catechetical, teaching of this kind, and the basis on which this must have been built must have been the substance of the Gospels. . . . This may be considered the nucleus of what we now call the Gospel history. Even before it was committed to writing it would take shape, and form, and character, according to the persons who were its authoritative exponents, and the spiritual needs or even the controversial position, or again the national and social peculiarities of the community to which it was addressed. It would gradually become a history, or it would assume the character of a series of arguments from the fulfilment of prophecy, or, again, form a chain of evidences of miraculous power by which the teaching and mission of our Lord had been attested, or it would bring into prominence doctrinal truths concerning our Lord's person, according to circumstances of time, place, and person."

The examination into the special purposes of the evangelists in the construction of their respective Gospels, of their selection and treatment of topics with constant regard to those purposes, and the manner in which this influences, throughout, the plan and character of each Gospel, is thorough and able, and the results arrived at are stated with great clearness and precision. It would be interesting to follow our author; but we cannot attempt either a synopsis or indulge in quotations. The principles which should govern the Harmonist in his efforts to construct, as it were, a history of our Lord's life upon earth are then discussed and stated; and Father Coleridge here takes occasion to administer a just rebuke to German rationalistic critics and others of the same school who, "approaching the Gospels with their own peculiar notions of what is possible in nature and in history, have introduced the practice of cutting up the text of the Evangelists into small portions, and declaring on their own authority whence each portion comes, and what amount of credence of respect is to be attached to each." This method of criticism Father Coleridge justly styles "childish," and says that the only excuse "for such writers, if it be one, is that they are mere *littérateurs*, and believe too little to have any serious purpose or sense of responsibility in what they say."

In the main body of his work the author treats in the first chapter of "The Life of our Blessed Lord as independent of its records;" he then examines what are the divisions that may be made in tracing out our Saviour's life on earth. Besides the self-evident lines which separate off His infancy, and hidden life, previous to entering upon His Public Ministry, and again the Passion, and the Resurrection, with the forty days which preceded the Ascension, Father Coleridge finds "two distinct breaks which mark a change in our Lord's method of action, and these are sufficient to justify corresponding divisions in the narrative of His life." The first of these occurs at that point of His life when he first drew upon himself the decided enmity and persecution of the Jewish ecclesiastical authorities, by occasion of His teachings as to the Sabbath. There is a plain difference in His attitude towards them, and in their attitude towards Him from that time. The second of these divisions, and one which is even more obvious than the first, is at the point of the confession of St. Peter. It is only after that solemn

scene at which the first Apostle confessed the divinity of our Lord and received in return the great commission and office of being the Rock on which the Church was to be built, that our Lord began to speak either of His Church or of His passion. This transition is noticed directly by the three first Evangelists, and its influence is discernible even in the arrangement of St. John, who gives an almost equivalent confession of faith on the part of St. Peter, in answer to our Lord's question to the Apostles after the great discourse on the blessed sacrament in the synagogue at Capharnaum.

Separate chapters are devoted to the consideration of the "Earlier Mysteries of our Lord's Life," "The Infancy and Hidden Life as Related in the Gospels," "The First Period of our Lord's Public Life and the First Stage of our Lord's Ministry." After this follows the Harmony of the Gospels, for this first period. This is supplemented by a number of very valuable notes on the Harmonistic questions that arise in regard to this period.

The author then gives a chapter to the study of the second period of our Lord's Public Life, which is followed by a chapter on the "Second Stage of His Public Life, as related in the Four Gospels." The Harmony of the Gospels is then given as regards this second period, followed by numerous learned notes on Harmonistic questions. After this Father Coleridge devotes a chapter to a consideration of the "Theology of the Parables." This makes up the first of the two volumes, into which the work is divided.

The second volume opens with a study of the third period of our Lord's public life, followed by an exhibition of this third period as narrated in the four Gospels; after which comes the Harmony of the Gospels for the same period, followed by notes. The First Days of Holy Week, The Passion of our Lord, and the Resurrection and Ascension are studied and treated in a similar manner.

The work evinces ripe scholarship, careful and extensive research, and a profound study of our Saviour's life on earth. To persons who find it necessary to be prepared to answer the objections of cavillers, to those who wish to understand more clearly the historical connection of the events narrated in the Gospels, and to those who devoutly desire and strive to apprehend more deeply the spiritual significance of our Divine Lord's words and actions, the work will be of great value.

HOURS WITH JOHN DARBY. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1877. Pp. 250.

This book is of a piece with the latter years' effusions of Oliver Wendell Holmes, in the *Atlantic Monthly*, but it lacks the redeeming trait of that author's genuine wit-flashes. They are, both of them, of the same nature with the monologues of Professor Wilson in *Blackwood's Magazine*, written over the *nom de plume* of Christopher North. But neither of them has the healthy tone of the Professor's outpourings. He had in himself a rare combination of parts. He possessed the elasticity of a boy and the delicacy of a woman; and his writings were frequently as accurate as they were eloquent. But Dr. Garretson's book possesses a trait Christopher North was unequal to; and for this reason it ought to be according to Hegel's own heart. It is well known that Hegel made the principle of logic to consist in the reconciling of contradictories. *Hours with John Darby* practically illustrates how a man may read much, give his assent to all he reads, and still call himself consistent. It is a book of contradictions. Its title implies that it is merely recreative. But looking inside the covers, we find the weightiest subjects

treated with a strange mixture of levity and seriousness. The style is forced and unnatural. This writer seems to be continually sailing in a balloon. Prick his inflation and he falls to the earth with a bang and a crash. The book is intended for young men who have read and learned to think. A most worthy object. It undertakes to solve the problem of life. A sublime aim. The greater portion of it deals with woman, and the choice of a wife. A not inappropriate theme. It were well that our young men thought carefully and seriously upon the question of marriage before taking a step that renders their lives happy or miserable, a success or a failure. A good book on such a subject would not be out of place. But does not Dr. Garretson's suffice? This is what he counsels a young man to do with a wife, when he has one: "Handle a wife when she comes to thee, as a jewel is handled; keep her in soft places, that the gloss be not injured; hold her at length of arm, that the gleam may enter thy heart; wear her upon thy bosom, that thereby thou shalt thyself be made beautiful; gloat over thy possession in secret, because that a something so priceless belongs to thee," p. 15. All of which means what? Ask John Darby.

But it is not with such harmless nonsense as that we have quoted that we would occupy the pages of the *Review*, were it not that beneath it all we find a pernicious idea. Dr. Garretson is one of a class of writers who attempt to naturalize the supernatural and to rationalize the mysteries of Christianity. "Nothing different from a parrot in Christianity is an unlearned man; he cries Christ, Christ, and cries it glibly enough; but what can he know—except apprehensively—of the God which spake from the mouth of a carpenter's son? What can he know of that which leaves no question to be asked?" p. 240. On the same page he says: "The philosopher saves himself through Christ, for in this man he recognizes the fullest wisdom of the world; aye, recognizes in him demonstration,—the great riddle solved,—philosophy at fruition,—the study completed." "*In this man!*" There is no misprint here. Dr. Garretson believes himself to be as much of a God as he does the Saviour. In another place he says: "The difference between Christ and Plato was the difference between soul and brain," p. 227. And in another place he tells us: "The meaning of man is in what he does, and in what he becomes; in whether he denies the God and remains an animal, or denies the animal *and grows into the God*," pp. 107, 108. The italics are the reviewer's. This is identifying God with man: it is making a divinity of humanity; it is a total ignoring of the revelations of Christianity; it is reducing mystery to myth, and identifying faith with knowledge. The author is at no loss to let us know his meaning: "I would assert that Faith and Knowledge are one and the same thing," p. 106. Therefore he concludes that there is only one evil in the world, and that is ignorance. In speaking on this subject he throws out some ballast, and his balloon rises a few feet: "O Ignorance! let man execrate thee; thou, thou alone art death, and beside thee is there none other; the demon of affliction art thou to mankind, apart from thee exists no evil," p. 34. And lest this contradiction may seem only apparent or momentary he carries his assertion to its full length, and says there is no such thing as death. "No death, Lysias; never yet has death come into the world. To die, as man calls dying, is to change—only to change—is to pass from an old shell into one new and fresh; is to assume bright colors and gay attributes; is to lapse into some expression of the great thing called life; is to go to other office; is to follow the beckoning of nature that one may be where most needed; that one may be in that fashion best suited to a necessity.

. . . Heed thou, my scholar, it is the eternal principle of life, and not a body, not any body, which is real existence," pp. 37, 38. The outcome of all this, and pages of similar language is, that all men will find themselves transformed after death—"no death, Lysias," p. 35—into another form of existence, in much the same manner as the caterpillar becomes a butterfly. Perhaps man, too, is going to have wings with which he will be able to play around the solar orb or fly among the stars. How about reward or punishment? It will be all reward. There is no such thing as punishment. "As regards the matters of future rewards and punishments, . . . the author accepts, with Spinoza, that little regard is to be had for the religion of him whose service of his God is founded alone on such tenure," p. 250. This sentence gives us a better idea of the author's position. In its light the whole meaning of the book has dawned upon us. It is intended to bring euthanasia in death and inculcate respectability in life to the contented and lettered few, whose worldly means enable them to sail smoothly above the trials and annoyances of the common folk. We assure Dr. Garretson that it is all an illusion.

MANUAL OF THE CONFRATERNITY OF THE SACRED THIRST AND AGONY OF JESUS TO REPRESS INTEMPERANCE. By *Rev. Edward McColgan*, Pastor of St. Peter's Church, Baltimore, Md. Approved and Recommended by the Most Rev. J. Roosevelt Bayley, Archbishop of Baltimore.

Among all the Catholic associations which have been formed for the special purpose of cultivating the virtue of temperance and controlling the evil of drunkenness, there is none which commends itself more highly to our judgment than the "Confraternity of the Sacred Thirst." We have no confidence in associations which derive their strength solely from good resolutions unsupported by divine grace, accomplishing any lasting good, or permanently repressing, much less destroying, any form of evil. And, as regards intemperance, the mushroom organizations which have successively sprung into existence, and promised to do great things in the way of reforming drunkards and preventing drunkenness, but have died almost as soon as they were born, furnish to every thinking mind abundant evidence that more than the sentiments which can be called into exercise by appeals to the better feelings of the natural heart of man, and by associated efforts resting on a like basis, is needed to lessen and repress the admitted evils which spring from the inordinate use of spirituous liquors. The help of divine grace is necessary, and the frequent and devout use of the means by which that grace may be obtained.

The Confraternity of the Sacred Thirst recognizes and is based upon this truth. It owes its origin, we believe, to Father McColgan, the author of the work which we have placed at the head of these remarks. The first association of the kind, if we remember rightly, was formed in St. Peter's Church, Baltimore City, of which he is pastor. The idea was taken up by others, and specially by a number of the clergy in Ireland. About seven years ago Rev. Robert Kelly, S. J., regularly instituted the association in Ireland, with the permission of his superior and the approbation of his Eminence, Cardinal Cullen. Similar associations were formed also in England and the United States; and on the 30th of August, 1874, the Holy Father, Pius IX., on the report of the Secretary of the Congregation of the Propaganda "ordered the association to be erected into a Confraternity under the direction of the Rev. Father Provincial of the Society of Jesus for the time being in Ireland, with the power of appointing a substitute, and of aggregating to this

Confraternity other religious bodies or congregations, and of communicating to them all the privileges and graces granted to the Confraternity." To this Confraternity his Holiness has granted a great number of special indulgences, both partial and plenary.

It is not necessary to take the total abstinence pledge in order to become a member of this Confraternity, but total abstinence societies can be affiliated to it.

We have entered into these details the more fully, from the conviction that this Confraternity is one of the most reliable and efficient, if not *the* most reliable and efficient organization existing to combat with and repress the sin of intemperance. It is a religious organization; it relies not on virtuous resolutions made in dependence solely on the strength of the natural will; nor on sentimentalism, the momentary excitement of feeling, or the influences connected simply with voluntary associations. Its weapons and sources of strength are prayer, religious services, devotions, self-mortification, and the exercise of charity, all connected with frequent resort to the sacraments of the Church. While, therefore, it has all the power and efficiency of ordinary temperance or total abstinence societies, and more, it is free from the dangers and objections which, in the opinion of many, attach to those societies. Without pronouncing any judgment upon the soundness or unsoundness of those objections, we simply remark that total abstinence societies will secure additional strength and efficiency in carrying out their laudable purposes by aggregating themselves to this Confraternity.

The Manual furnishes full information on this subject, and also in regard to the nature, rules, etc., of the organization. It contains, too, much other edifying and devotional matter, and is also a very good manual of devotion, both for private and in church services.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. By *Rev. C. O'Brien*. Charlottetown, P. E. I.: Bremner Brothers, 1876.

The title of this new book might raise expectations in the mind of the reader which the work itself cannot fully satisfy. The Bible contains the revelation of God; philosophy follows merely human reason as its guide. Holy Scripture never contradicts reason, and always supposes it, because faith itself supposes it. But the method followed in the Bible is entirely different from that of philosophy. The Bible contains the word of God to man, and consequently it must speak with divine authority. Philosophy relies on the authority of human reason, infallible in its own way, it is true, but grounded on an entirely different basis.

The book before us contains only an ordinary course of philosophy, and consequently refers to the reason of man for the development of its various theses. Nothing else could be done in such a work, and we are glad to say that it has been well done. First, it is complete, with the exception of its omission to treat on logic, of which nothing is said, probably because of its being considered a preliminary study. But all through the work the relation of philosophy to natural religion is solidly established, so as to guard against the danger attending studies of this kind. In this regard the doctrine set forth in the work compares favorably with that of other Catholic elementary treatises of philosophy, published in recent times with the highest approbation.

This is true, also, of the development given, in *part second*, to the metaphysical branch of psychology, and in *part third* to the important metaphysical branch of ontology. It is well in this age to oppose steadily the efforts of a large school of pretended philosophers to set aside

entirely everything above physics, and to regard as of no value every object of study that is not referable to mere matter. For this reason the publication of such books as this should be warmly encouraged.

The author states in the *preface* that "it is not a class-book; it is rather intended as a book in the reading of which any intelligent person may find profit." The idea is a good one, and to make the speculations of Catholic philosophy accessible and pleasant even to all educated readers, is most praiseworthy. The present volume, however, is only a first attempt, and for the purpose intended is too short and lacking in sufficient development to render the treatment of the various topics clear and entirely satisfactory. A text-book intended for students may be brief, because the professor is expected to explain what is obscure. But it is different with a volume thrown upon the public, and left to the meditations of people who are not well versed in those arid and difficult subjects.

We would advise the author, if he should publish a second edition of his work, to make it at least double in size. He might also speak more clearly in regard to innate ideas, of which he seems to admit two, and to reject all others. Why that choice, and why any? He might also examine more thoroughly how far the criterion of certainty is subjective only, and whether objectivity must be granted it? Then will naturally come the question, is the dynamic theory with respect to extension perfectly demonstrated? A general revision of the style of the work would also probably result in some improvement. On such a subject as the author treats of, the style, it is true, should not be exuberant or florid, but it should be refined in its simplicity.

But taking the book as it is, it is an important one, and deserves a favorable reception from the public. If all Catholics, nay, all Christians, knew how far philosophy corroborates, or rather settles, the principles of natural religion, the tendency to atheism and materialism, so prevalent in our age, would be to a great extent checked, if not entirely arrested. The noble questions long ago discussed, and brightly and strongly illustrated by the labors of our schoolmen, chiefly of St. Thomas, would carry the day, if they were lucidly explained in modern phraseology, and placed before readers in all their strength rendered more attractive by a plain but tasteful style. So might it be!

CREATION AND COSMOGONY. By *Rev. Dr. Theodore Appel*. Reprinted from the *Mercersburg Review* for January, 1877. 8mo., pp. 56.

This essay is written in the spirit of true science and criticism. Its scope is commendable. The canons of biblical interpretation made use of by the author are correct. It is perfectly true that God cannot say one thing in His revelation and another, its contradictory, when He speaks in the cosmos. Both orders of truth must harmonize. When contradiction appears, we may rest assured, it is not in science as such, but rather in our misapprehension of some truths of science.

The author strikes the right keynote of discussion when he at once and without equivocation lays down that the whole doctrine of creation is involved in the first verse of Genesis: "*In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth,*" p. 2. We like the manliness that shows its banner from the start. And we are glad to find the author display the true colors of Christian belief upon that all-important issue. He thus proves himself one of the faithful few who do not allow themselves to be carried off in the whirl of scientific novelties which is just now making so many dizzy. He takes this proper view of the Mosaic account in contrast with the mythical ones of primitive peoples: "To us it seems that it requires only a small amount of reflection to

perceive that it rises up immeasurably above the cosmogonies of the nations in dignity and truthfulness; and that, instead of being one of many other myths, *it is their proper climax or truth to which they all look, and of which they are nothing more than variations, corruptions, or the dim shadows floating on the surface of human consciousness,*" p. 13.

But when Dr. Appel places his sense upon the words, "created from nothing," we do not see our way clearly enough to follow him. He says: "These ideas, by which the universe existed potentially in the Divine mind from all eternity, were, however, not simply the models according to which the world and its contents were fashioned, for that were Platonism; but their foundations, *their very substance*, the spiritual basis on which the entire phenomenal world rests," p. 8. The italics are ours. We think that in this sentence the author falls into the Pantheism he is otherwise so careful to avoid. Everything in the Divine mind is God. But if the ideas in the Divine mind are the "very substance" of the world and its contents, at the same time that they are God, then are they both God and creature, and on this supposition Pantheism were correct. A glance at St. Thomas would have cleared up the Doctor's ideas on this vexed point. He would there have learned that matter without form is a mere potentiality, and that it is the form that gives it actuality. This idea would have aided him in conceiving the cosmos as created from nothingness. The "form" of the scholastics is identical with the "force" of modern scientists. But, in giving actuality to existence, God makes it the embodiment of a created ideal, fashioned after the uncreated ideal in His divine intelligence. The uncreated ideal can in no sense exist in the created real. It is the archetype after which the latter is fashioned. But everything in that latter is creature, except the power by which it passed from not-being to being, and by which it is still preserved from lapsing into its original nothingness. Many of the errors of the day are based upon the misconception of the ideal in the Divine mind, and the identifying it with that in the human intellect, and in objective realities as distinct existences.

With the exception of this point, we see little or nothing to disapprove of in the essay under review, whilst there are many things in it really fresh and brilliant. The whole shows learning and a well-trained and thoughtful mind.

TWO THOUSAND YEARS AFTER; OR A TALK IN A CEMETERY. By *John Darby*, Author of "Thinkers and Thinking," "Odd Hours of a Physician," etc. Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger. 1876. 12mo., pp. 106.

This is a singular little work. The author seems to have devoted much attention to it, and to have written it with best intentions. He thinks that it will help earnest inquirers after truth, and guide their steps out of a skepticism, which is so to speak involuntary, and out of which they would cheerfully see their way. He even seems a believer in Christianity and the Bible. But this only shows how loosely Christian faith may be claimed outside of the Church, and how consistent with the gravest errors in philosophy and theology may be the Christian name and belief, if they are sundered from due respect to her authority.

The writer has adopted the old philosophical form of dialogue, his chief interlocutors being Socrates, who represents the teacher, and Cebes, who acts the part of inquirer and disciple. In spite of the authority of the ancients, we do not believe that this is the best form of investigating and expounding truth. There is in conversational flow many a hiding-place for weakness of argument, which would not be found in direct reasoning by syllogism. And then our author has a way of using Chris-

tian words, but which in his mouth have no Christian meaning. He speaks of mind, but he means thereby a function of organized matter; he speaks of the soul, but it is a part of the All-soul; of creation, but it is no act presupposing divine power. He speaks of Christ, but it is not the eternal Son of God that he sees in Him; his pages are full of God's name, but He is the imaginary monster of the Pantheistic sects, not the God whom Christians worship, not even the God of natural theology. When he tells us of man's immortality he means nothing more than his absorption into the great WHOLE. He might as well call it with the French infidel, "the great NOTHING."

He believes in nothing but Matter and Force, and bows down at their shrine, as if they had succeeded in ousting the true God from His place as Creator and Arbiter of the universe. It is a great deal harder to believe in Force and thinking Matter than it is to believe in God and the spirituality of the soul. But no devout Catholic swallows his creed half as blindly or unreasoningly as the men who, scouting the idea of God and revelation, accept the incomprehensible absurdities of modern philosophy so-called. Instead of indulging in philosophical speculations that weary the heart and bewilder the understanding, let our author study the great FACT of Revelation. It needs no atomic philosophy to discover it. It stares the world in the face, and cannot by any ingenuity be hidden or set aside. Its truth or falsity can be measured by the rules of evidence that guide our courts of law. If it be false, human life and the world are a dreary void which no philosophy can fill. If it be true, God will one day judge mankind by that same revealed law, and by that only. By it we shall stand or fall. To fear God is not degrading to man, but, as the Psalmist says, is the starting-point of all true wisdom.

A *certain* fact overthrows all opposite theories. If the fact of Revelation *can* be established—the Catholic Church not only thinks so but claims to be sure of it, and hosts of witnesses have not only spoken and sworn, but died to attest it—it is the death-sentence of all the false philosophy that desolates the moral and religious world. In that case, the Lord, and He alone is our God, not the imaginary God of Socrates, Cebes, and John Darby, but the God of Sinai and of Calvary; and matter, force, and the *Welt-seele* are idolatrous figments. Even a prudent Pagan should investigate so far at least as to make sure of his deities before adoring them.

THE FAITH OF OUR FATHERS: Being a plain Exposition and Vindication of the Church founded by our Lord Jesus Christ. By *Rt. Rev. James Gibbons, D D.*, Bishop of Richmond, and Administrator Apostolic of North Carolina. Third edition, revised and corrected. Baltimore: John Murphy & Co., 1877. 12mo., pp. 438.

The whole country, Protestant and Catholic, owes a debt of gratitude to the good bishop for this excellent book. What must forcibly strike even the average Protestant reader is its tone, so honest, so candid, so gentle, all of which is in such marked contrast with the ordinary polemical literature of the day. How is it, we may ask, that whilst our divines write against error, or defend the Church, in such a spirit of love and gentleness, Protestant controversialists on the other hand cannot attack the Church or dispute her claims without losing their temper and heaping upon her head scurrilous language and foul abuse? This is no trifling question, but one well worthy the attention of all reasonable, soberminded men in the various Protestant denominations. Even the apostate Dr. Schulte, whose book has been noticed in the present number of the *Review*, has been compelled to make the same remark, though he himself is not a whit better than the rest of the anti-Catholic tribe.

"They (Catholics)," he says, "look upon us with suspicion, when we meet them in the arena of theological disputation; and *well they may*. Do not our best Protestant controversialists, men whom we regard as patterns in every Christian walk, seem to become inflated with bigotry and seized with insane frenzy, as soon as they enter the field of controversy with Roman Catholics? Is it not the settled custom to apply to the Pope and the Roman Church the most opprobrious epithets?" (Schulte's *Roman Catholicism*, p. 38.)

Bishop Gibbons's book is a model of religious controversy. It has the vigor of Bossuet and Milner clothed with the sweetness and evangelical spirit of Fenelon and St. Francis de Sales. We know well the class of men for whom the bishop principally wrote; and he could not, without the aid of inspiration, have more happily succeeded in accomplishing the purpose that he intended. Hence we are not surprised to learn that twenty thousand copies of the book have been sold already, and that fresh orders in great number have been pouring in upon the publishers from every part of the country and even from Great Britain. The book will lead many to the knowledge of the truth, and will be a crown of glory for its author both in this world and in the next.

ROMAN LITANIES IN HONOR OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN MARY. Compiled and arranged by *Edwin F. MacGonigle*, Professor of Gregorian Chant, St. Charles's Seminary, Overbrook, Pa. Philadelphia: J. M. Armstrong, Musical Typographer, 1877, 4to., pp. 64.

It is a fortunate thing for the American Catholic Church that Prof. MacGonigle should have conceived the idea of publishing these litanies for the benefit of church choirs and also for the purpose of domestic psalmody. It is equally fortunate that one, of his singular gifts, rare taste and resplendent musical talents, should have had the charge of selecting and arranging them for publication. The selection and the arrangement are what might have been expected from Mr. MacGonigle's taste, skill, and experience. The melodies are not intricate or complicated. They are simple, but noble and majestic in their simplicity, and stir up devotion in the soul. To any one who finds in them some difficulty, from being unacquainted with the *style* of Roman music (which is more a matter of tradition than written rules), or from lacking the guidance of an experienced *maestro*, we must say, let them not be discouraged if they fail to appreciate them at the first trial. Let them try again; but above all let them remember two things: first, to approach this music in a devotional spirit; and, secondly, to avoid drawling. What may suit one of Watts's hymns will never suit a Roman litany. There lies hid in them a loving, cheerful strain of piety which never can be evoked by one who should sing them in the dreary fashion that some consider essential to sacred music.

We are glad to learn that Professor MacGonigle intends, if the present work meets with sufficient encouragement, to publish some choice masses, mottets, and psalms out of his Roman musical treasures. None could be more competent for such a task.

CONCILII PLENARII BALTIMORENSIS II. In Ecclesia Metropolitana Baltimorensi a die vii. ad diem xxi. Octobris, A.D. MDCCCLXVI, habiti et a Sede Apostolica recogniti Acta et Decreta. Editio altera mendis expurgata. Excudebat Joannes Murphy Summi Pontificis atque Archiepiscopi Baltimorensis Typographus. Baltimore MDCCCLXXVII. Royal octavo, pp. 311.

Mr. Murphy, in a brief and satisfactory preface, informs his readers of his reasons for publishing this new edition. We are glad to see this practice revived. He only imitates the example of the Aldi, and other

great printers of other days. And well he may tread in their footsteps, for he has done for the glory and advancement of Catholic typography amongst us what was done by the Aldi and Juntas for Venice, the Plantini for Antwerp, and other men of typographical renown for other places.

Of the two editions that preceded this, one seems to have been too scanty, the other too full and bulky for the use of students. The former lacked documents, which were necessary to give completeness to the work. The present proposes to strike the happy mean, omitting what can be dispensed with, and retaining all documents, decrees, etc., that are necessary to a full illustration of the text. As far as we have been able to see, the book is singularly free from typographical errors.

The work is got up in the usual style, which has won for Mr. Murphy praise and admiration at home and abroad; and to which he refers, as justly as modestly, in his preface. The first edition, of which this will be a fac-simile, as far as possible, was a magnificent volume, of which we have heard the highest praises in Europe from professional men, and in the halls of the prelates and princes of the Roman Church.

TRANSFER OF ERIN; OR, THE ACQUISITION OF IRELAND BY ENGLAND. By *Thomas C. Amory*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1877.

A pretentious book, of no merit as a history, based upon the notion that the long-continued resistance of the people of Ireland to English aggression "had not its root" in religious or patriotic sentiments, but "was little else than a struggle to acquire or retain property and possession of the soil"—a notion too preposterously false to need refutation.

A POPULAR LIFE OF THE HOLY FATHER, POPE PIUS IX., DRAWN FROM THE MOST RELIABLE AUTHORITIES. By the *Rev. Richard Brennan, A.M.*, Pastor of St. Rose's Church, New York. Benziger Brothers: New York, Cincinnati, and St. Louis, 1877.

A work of real merit and interest, "popular" in the best sense of the word,—its adaptation to all classes of persons.

THE COMPLETE OFFICE OF HOLY WEEK, according to the Roman Missal and Breviary, in Latin and English. New edition, revised and enlarged. New York: Catholic Publication Society. 12mo., pp. 562.

The Same, in smaller type. Same Publishers.

MAJOLICA AND FAYENCE. ITALIAN, SICILIAN, MAJORCAN, HISPANO-MORESQUE, AND PERSIAN. By *Arthur Beckwith*. With Photo-Engraved Illustrations. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1877.

A HISTORY OF MARYLAND, UPON THE BASIS OF MCSHERRY. By *Henry Onderdonk, A.M.* Second Revised and Enlarged Edition. Baltimore: John Murphy & Co., pp. 360.

LAST SEVEN WORDS OF JESUS ON THE CROSS. By a *Passionist Missionary Priest*. Permissu Superiorum. New York: P. O'Shea, Publisher, 1877.

Notices of the above-mentioned books were prepared, but must be omitted from want of space. A number of other important books have reached us too late for this number of the *Review*. They will receive attention in due time.

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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THE ENGLISH IN THEIR CONTINENTAL HOMESTEAD.

1. *The Anglo-Saxon Poem of Beowulf.* By Benjamin Thorpe.
2. *England under Anglo-Saxon Kings.* By Lappenberg. 2 vols.
3. *History of English Literature.* By H. A. Taine. 2 vols.

I.

HYPOLITE ADOLPHE TAINÉ is a critic; he is at times an agreeable gossip; but he is no historian. He makes reflections and calls them philosophy; he strings a series of them together and designates the result a book. That they ought to be pertinent to their subject-matter never seems to enter his head. A book, a name, a single word, is a sufficient peg on which to hang them, as so much furniture with which to decorate the vacuity of his ideas. It is no exaggeration to say that one-half the matter contained in the two volumes of his *English Literature* might be omitted without the least detriment to the connection of the essential parts. Whole sections are inserted which would bear as much relevancy to the portion treated of one hundred pages before or after. And then he is biassed in his judgments. He has it all prearranged concerning what he will find in an author's works. To establish proofs for his theory, he often takes mere incidental remarks as characteristic of the whole tone of a poem. This is the secret of his inability to do justice to Shakspeare. His opinions are all tinctured with newspaper flippancy. What he says is smartly said; it is all point; it can never be taken as a rounded expression of the author or work on which he delivers judgment. Few of his

decisions can be regarded as final. Add to this the fact that he talks, throughout the book, a most pernicious system of philosophy, which proves him to be a disciple of Auguste Comte, and it may easily be understood why Mgr. Dupanloup so strenuously opposed the crowning of his work by the French Academy. Paying public honor to such a book were giving open approval to atheism. It were even countenancing superficialness, for Taine is superficial. The moment the reader resists the fascination of his style, and weighs his assertions in the light of history and philosophy, he finds him to be a skilful manipulator of surface facts, and nothing more. Nowhere is this more manifest than in the first chapter on the Saxons. A few quotations from Scandinavian mythology, a passage from Tacitus, the mention of Beowulf, and a few items of history, promiscuously thrown together, suffice for him to spin his thread of fiction upon. More things go to make up a history of English literature than are dreamt of in Taine's philosophy.

Literature has value only by reason of the thought it conveys. But thought has various outlets. It is expressed in a people's laws and life, in its arts and architecture, in its philosophy and religion, in its science and industry. Each explains the other. Thus literature is only one out of many forms of thought. To make it the whole embodiment is to destroy the real relation of things. Thought is as subtle as the spirit that gives it existence. It pervades every action of life; it is the suggester of man's plans; it is the motive power of his deeds; it is the regulator of his industries; it moulds his religion and mythology; it explains his views; it sings of his heroes. Man is so called because of his thinking power.¹ But thought is reacted upon by circumstances. It gets its shape from the time and place in which it is expressed; it receives its coloring from the person who speaks it. No thought stands alone. It forms an inseparable link with the past and the future. A sentence, whether spoken or written, would at no other time and in no other place receive the exact shape it receives then and there. Nor could other than the person speaking or writing it give it the same tone as that it takes. This truth applies with equal force to a nation. According to the degree of its civilization will a people express itself. At no two epochs will it retain exactly the same form of utterance. Hence the necessity of taking into account the precise condition of a people in forming an estimate of its literature. We will examine the state of thought among the English people prior to their leaving the Continental homestead. We will then be in better condition to appreciate their real progress under Christian and Norman influences.

¹ The word *man* is pure Sanscrit and means *to think*.

II.

We will begin by giving things their right names. In calling the English Anglo-Saxons, we are calling them what they had never called themselves up to the last century. In early times they spoke of themselves as *Englisc*. The elegant translation of Polydore Virgil's History, made towards the end of the sixteenth century, speaks of "the dominion of the Engleshiemen, as a fresshe burden and ofspringe of nature,"¹ beginning after the overthrow of the Britons. True, England was peopled by three races, the Angles or English, the Jutes, and the Saxons; but they are of the same stock, having the same religion, the same manners and customs, and nearly the same language. They inhabited that part of Europe now known as the Schleswig-Holstein provinces and the Netherlands. This was their second homestead. Many centuries previously they lived in their cradle-land in Asia. They bear kinship with the Persian and Hindu; but their difference of occupation, the nature of their soil, and the influence of climate, so changed their natures, and gave such direction to their thoughts, that it were difficult to imagine them originally one people with the Hindu, did they not retain evidence of the relationship in their language. And that proves them to be of the same stock. In both do we find words identical in sound and in meaning, as the term *naman*, which means "name" both in Sanskrit and old English.² Sometimes, while the word remains, its primitive meaning becomes changed in one or other of the languages. Such is the word *path*, which, as a verb, means to go.³ In this sense is it used by Shakspeare, in a passage over which the critics have been greatly exercised.

"For, if thou path thy native semblance on,
Not Erebus itself were dim enough
To hide thee from prevention."⁴

It is the privilege of genius to strike the original meaning of a word long after it has passed from the common intelligence. Such was Shakspeare's case in this instance. Again, in our irregular verbs, we have forms which can be accounted for only by a comparative study of the Sanskrit. Take, for instance, the verb *to be*. The forms *is* and *am* come from the verb *as*, of the same meaning, and its first person, singular, *asmi*; the form *was* is found in the verb *vas*, to dwell; and the form *be* is one with *bhu*, a word having also the same meaning.⁵ And it is only in a language cognate to

¹ Vol. i., p. 126, Camden Society Publication, 1846. The author of the translation is unknown.

² See Bosworth's Anglo-Saxon and English Dictionary, p. 171, and Max Müller's Sanskrit Grammar, p. 87.

³ Benfey's Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p. 508.

⁴ Julius Cæsar, Act ii., sc. 1.

⁵ See Max Müller's Sanskrit Grammar for the conjugation of each of these verbs, pp. 277, 260, 245.

the Sanskrit that we find the root-word of our comparative *better*. "In the Persian," says Cardinal Wiseman, "we have precisely the same comparative, *behter*, with exactly the same signification, regularly formed from its positive *beh*, good; just as we have in the same language *badter*, worse, from *bad*."¹

The English, then, are a branch of the Aryan family. That primitive people, the mother race of Kelt and Teuton and Hindu, was devoted to the cultivation of the soil; they have, at all times, shown a fondness for the tillage of the land, except when brought face to face with almost insurmountable difficulties, as the encroachments of the sea. That mother race was passionately attached to Nature-worship; they retained that inherited love for Nature. They deified the elements, even as did their sister peoples, the Greeks and Hindus, and as did their Aryan mother prior to either. With impetuous feelings rushed they to the hunt; with reckless eagerness they committed themselves to the mercy of wind and wave. The Aryan was a people fond of philosophical speculation; the common problems and the nearly common solutions it has left the sister nations, prove as much. But the English of old became too besotted with heavy and coarse drinks, which they indulged in to excess, to be able to speculate with the acuteness of a Greek or Hindu. With the Aryan, home was a sacred refuge, and all the family relations were held in reverence as well as honor; this became, with the English, one of their most widely cherished and deeply rooted sentiments. Among the nine maidens who are represented, in Scandinavian mythology, as giving birth to Heimdall, are Jarnsaxa and Angeia. Who is more of a home-body than the Englishman, and with what other people could *Heimweh* exist than those to whom the word is native? The Aryan fell under the influences of his senses, to the clouding of his spiritual parts; so were the English greatly wrapped up in their material natures. The Aryan was given to poetry in which the greatness of man and nature were blended; so were the English, but with a difference. Living in the land of the sunny East the ancestral race rejoiced in the harmonies and beauties of form and color; but in their woody, mist-enveloped land, the English lost sight of these things, and they ceased to be for them what they were for the Kelt and the Greek, a passion.

In their Continental homestead, the English lived and worked and had their aspirations and their opinions of things. To understand aright the Englishman of modern history, we must observe him as he was two thousand years ago. We must learn his ways and penetrate his thoughts. National traits of character are not

¹ Lectures on Science and Revealed Religion, Lect. i., p. 30.

the work of a day; they are the outcome of centuries of slow, persistent action. Man begins by accommodating himself to circumstances; this is the first step he takes in the formation of his manhood. Circumstances, in their turn, react upon him, his thoughts, his ways, his dispositions; this gives the final direction to character, suggests divergence from the early home-life, and creates a new type of race. In general, the nature of the soil will determine the occupations of a people; its occupations will give color and shape to its thoughts; they, in turn, will mould the expression of its literature. The native land of the old English was a land of fog and mist, of fat, muddy soil, and of slow, sluggish rivers. It was covered with vast forests. It was a land on which the sea was ever making encroachments; and in this respect it is still the same land. Witness the untiring exertions of Holland to repel these encroachments, and to recover lost ground, by her system of dykes. But in the days of which we speak there were no dykes. The result was, that at the equinoxes the whole country became suddenly submerged, and as soon the water subsided. Tacitus describes the country under one of these visitations: "The wind blowing hard from the north, and the waves, as usual at the equinox, rolling with a prodigious swell . . . the country was laid under water. The sea, the shore, and the fields presented one vast expanse. The depths and shallows, the quicksands and the solid ground, were no more distinguished. . . . The return of day presented a new phase of things: the waters had subsided and the land appeared."¹ A people so situated must needs accommodate itself to the sea, and make it yield profit in proportion to the destruction it deals. On this principle acted the old English. They not only became accustomed to the sea; they loved it; their greatest pleasure they found in sporting in its waves. Their little boats of hide danced about upon its rugged bosom as though they were things of life. Beowulf would have been considered no fit hero for an old English poem, had he not, when a youth, ventured on the stormy ocean; and so we find him in friendly competition with Brecca, striving to perform feats of valor. Hunferth speaks:

"Then on the sound ye rowed, and thence with arms
The ocean covered, and the sea-streets measured;
With hands ye gripped and glided o'er the main;
With winter's fury boiled the waves o' the deep;
While on the waters toiled ye seven nights,"²

¹ Annals, B. i., chap. 70.

² *thá git on sund reón, thær git eacor-streám,
earmum théhton, mæton mere-stræta,
mundum brugdon, glidon ofer gársecg;
geofon ythum weol, wintres wylme;
git on waeteres æht seofon-niht swuncon.*—BEOWULF, viii., 1029-1038.

But the sea was not only a pleasure for this people, it was the sole inheritance of the younger members of a family. They had no share in the land. They had to win for themselves a livelihood and a position in society. They were regarded as *wargrs*, wolves, outlaws. It is related that every five years the Scandinavians sent away their adult sons, reserving only those who were to perpetuate the family. "The wargr shakes dust on his father and mother, throws an herb over his shoulders, and with a bound clearing the inclosure of his paternal property, he seeks adventures afar."¹ There are generally others of the same age and condition to accompany him. And with light heart and cheery voice they cast their boats upon the water and make their home thereon for years to come. They live by plunder and piracy. "They overcome all who have the courage to oppose them. They surprise all who are so imprudent as not to be prepared for their attack. When they pursue they infallibly overtake; when they are pursued their escape is certain. They despise danger; they are inured to shipwreck; they are eager to purchase booty with the peril of their lives. Tempests, which to others are so dreadful, to them are subjects of joy." Such is the picture drawn of them by Sidonius;² nor is it overcolored. They were the terror of the sea. They were as cruel and fierce as they were adventurous. They only respected the fierceness and lawlessness as great as their own. They put the vanquished to death. While their neighbors, the Visigoths, were content with two-thirds of the property,³ nothing short of extermination seemed to satisfy them. It is to be expected that such a stormy life would render any other tame and monotonous. So we find them when in trouble seeking solace in the pleasures of the ocean. Thus, Ragnar Lodbrok loses his wife in death. He leaves his government and his children in care of guardians, and betakes himself to a life of piracy, "that in the society of his vikings he might drown or mitigate his sorrow for one whom he has so tenderly loved."⁴ Here are the forefathers of the Drakes and the Raleighs. This manner of living establishes bravery alone as the ideal of life. Wisdom and prudence were only secondary by side of this one quality. Sörli and Hamdir go to avenge the fate of their sister. On their way they meet their brother Erp. They ask him what help he would give them in their enterprise. He tells them that as hand helps hand and foot helps foot, so will he help them. His prudent and truly wise answer is not in accordance with their fierce mood; they slay him and repent their rashness at leisure.⁵

¹ Cæsar, Cantù., *Histoire Universelle*, vol. vii.

² Yiii., 6; Lingard, vol. i., p. 75.

³ Cæsar, Cantù., vol. vii., p. 286.

⁴ Thorpe, *Northern Mythology*, vol. i., p. 109.

⁵ Thorpe, loc. cit., p. 108.

Could a people warring in such a spirit know mercy? No wonder that Urien calls Idda and his twelve sons firebrands.¹

III.

While the vikings developed the spirit of war, plunder, piracy, and rash bravery, their brothers at home had their own peculiar way of living. But it was not altogether a lawless one. It was not as the dumb and low herd. Wherever we fall upon a number of men we find them an organized society, living together in obedience to known and recognized laws and customs, and each prepared to sacrifice to a certain extent his own ease and happiness for the public good. Such was the condition of the old English. They were divided into companies of ten men, each of whom pledged himself to obtain reparation from him who violated the common peace. This was called a *tithing*. Each tithing had for head a *tungéréfa*. Every ten tithings was called a *hundred* among the Saxons, and *wapen-tace* among the English. The hundreds were under a *géréfa*. Several hundreds composed a shire, *scir*, commanded by a *scirgéréfa*. Every man was thus bound up with every other man in mutual protection. He inherited the land to improve and defend it. To abandon it was considered a crime. The Salic Law² forbids a citizen to leave his birthplace without the consent of every other citizen in it. The Lombard Law of Luitprand pronounces penalty of death on the one attempting to leave the kingdom.³ And such, no doubt, was the universal custom in the mother-homes of these barbarians. They had a hereditary nobility; but their king seems to have been chosen from among the ablest of their chiefs, according to circumstances. Bede says of the ancient Saxons that "they have no king, but several lords who rule their nation; and when a war happens they cast lots indifferently, and on whomsoever the lot falls him they follow and obey during the war; but as soon as the war is ended, all these lords are again equal in power."⁴ This assertion might hold true of the marauding expeditions; it might even exactly represent the condition of the Teuton races at certain epochs; but it was not anciently universal. When Bede wrote these nations were in the condition of the Greeks under an oligarchy, as Corinth under the Bacchiadæ, and Athens under the Eupatridæ. But Tacitus tells us that in his day the kings were chosen from the nobility;⁵ and that dictum of Maine is confirmed by history: "With the differences, however,

¹ Flamddwyn.

² Titre, xlvii.

³ Lib. iii., art. iv.

⁴ B. v., ch. 10.

⁵ Reges ex nobilitate, duces ex virtute sumunt. Germania, ch. vii.

that in the East aristocracies became religious, in the West civil or political, the proposition that a historical era of aristocracies succeeded a historical era of heroic kings may be considered as true, if not of all mankind, at all events of all branches of the Indo-European family of nations."¹ But the kings were among the old English limited in their jurisdiction by the nobility. These met in council, in the *gauding*,² and framed the laws that were considered needful for the people.³ At a later date this same assembly will be known as the Upper House of Parliament. And among the nobility one there was who was the chosen confidant, the knower of secrets, *rûn-wita*, and the counsellor, *râed-bora*, as was Æschere that of Hrothgar.⁴ He will afterwards be known in mediæval times as the king's favorite, and in modern times as the prime minister.

The old English recognized two orders of society, the bond and the free. Possession of a certain amount of land was the indispensable condition of a freeman. "All that we learn," says Kemble, "of the original principles of settlement, prevalent either in England or on the continent of Europe, among the nations of Germanic blood, rests upon two foundations: first, the possession of land; second, the distinction of rank; and the public law of every Teutonic tribe implies the dependence of one upon the other principle to a greater or less extent."⁵ This was the animating principle of conquest among the English both in their old and new homes. He was nothing who possessed not land. Life was not worth the having without it; therefore the landless one was prepared to stake his all in its acquisition. He lives to acquire wealth and power; he acquires wealth and power to be held in estimation. For this purpose each chief has with him a certain number of companions who are pledged to stand by him under all circumstances; to fight with him shoulder to shoulder in combat; to avenge his death, and on no account to survive his fall in the fray. This was so in the days of Tacitus. He tells us that he who survived his leader survived to live in infamy.⁶ Death was considered preferable to such a life.

Wiglaf reproaches the followers of Beowulf for surviving their prince and their cowardice in not helping him to fight the fire-drake; and he adds the penalty:

¹ Ancient Law, p. 11.

² From *gau*, a canton and *dingen*, to deliberate; hence the old English word *thing*, meaning an assembly or judgment-room. Our modern hustings is *hūs-thing*.

³ Dans le prologue des lois des angles, il est dit qu'elles sont faites *omnium consensu*. Cantù. Hist. Un., t. vii., p. 308.

⁴ Beowulf, ll., 269-70.

⁵ Anglo-Saxon, vol. i., chap. ii., p. 35.

⁶ Jam vero infame in omnem vitam ac probrosum, superstitem principi suo ex acie recessisse. Mor. Germ., xiv.

"By our land's rights must each man of the tribe
Idly wander forth; then nobles from afar
Your banishment, inglorious deed, shall learn.
Far better death than live a life of blame."¹

This sentiment they brought with them to their British home. At the death of Byrhtnoth, which occurred about the year 991 A.D., many of the leaders express their resolution to die with their slain chief, while they execrate one they had seen fly. One "vowed in haughty words that he would not yield a foot's breadth of earth, nor turn his back in flight since his superior lay dead."² The free-men were divided into eorls and ceorls. In their language manhood was identified with eorlship.³ Of the eorls there were two classes; the ethelings or nobles, who enjoyed liberty, the right of holding property, and the power of jurisdiction; and the ahrimans, who were excluded from the *malls* or deliberative assemblies and cultivated the soil. They need not go to war; they were free to pay a sum of money and supply provisions in the stead. The ceorls or tributaries possess individual liberty, but they are alienated with the lands on which they live.⁴ Impoverished proprietors who found themselves unable to respond to the heriban, frequently renounced their civil rights and placed themselves under the protection of a richer proprietor.⁵ The serfs or slaves had no rights or privileges. Their master held over them the power of life and death. He was responsible for them as he was for the cattle of his field. If their master was held amenable before the law, they were to pay the fines for him. In time of war if it was considered expedient to make them fight, they were liberated, as it was only a freeman who could bear arms.

Nearly all crimes could be compensated for by the payment of a certain sum of money. The only exceptions were treason, desertion, and poison. These involved capital punishment, and the sentence was pronounced, not by the chief, but by the priest. He was the more immediate representative of the author of life and death. This sentiment might not be expressed; it certainly was implied. In case of homicide, which on account of excessive drink-

¹ lond-rihtes mót
thære mæg-burge monna æghwylc
ídel hweorfan, syththan æthelingas
feórran gefricgean fleám eowerne,
dómleásan dæd. *Deáth bið stlla*
eorla gewhýlcum thonne edwit-lif.—BEOWULF, xxxix., 5765, *et seq.*

² Death of Byrhtnoth. Conybeare's Anglo-Saxon Poetry.

³ *Eorlscipe* is manliness, courage. See Bosworth's Anglo-Saxon and English Dictionary.

⁴ Cantú. Hist. Un., vii., p. 297.

⁵ This was known as *mundebund*.

ing and the custom of always bearing arms in public, was frequent, the family of the slain man might either accept the compensation-money, *mæg-bót*, or take upon themselves the avenging of his death. The individual did not stand alone upon his own responsibility. His kin were held accountable for his acts.¹ And for every offence against person or property there was set down a fine. That against the person was called *werigeld*; that against property *widrigeld*.² These old lawmakers went into all imaginable details. According to the tooth that was broken was a man fined. For the wounding of the finger, the hand, the arm, the head, the eye, the ear, was there a graded list of fines. So too for property. Every implement of agriculture, every domestic animal, every piece of furniture had its set price, if stolen, injured, or broken. These laws they will afterwards take with them into England, and they will be attributed to Ethelbeht, or Ines, or Hlothre, or more especially to Alfred. The unwritten custom may have existed for centuries prior to the written code. Laws are not invented, they grow out of circumstances. And in fact what is English law to-day but what it was under Alfred, what it had been in the Continental homestead, a tissue of particular rules based upon precedents; these precedents finally resolving themselves into a judgment passed on a particular case? There is no science, no digest of principles. The only improvement made upon the old order of things is that the laws have ceased to be a simple relation of man to man; and instead of being administered in the name of private revenge or personal satisfaction, they are laid down for justice's sake. The history of all law resolves itself into the recording of the process of this transformation. Formerly, society did not trouble itself about the individual, once he had paid the required amount to the king and the injured party.³ Nowadays, it looks to his future good behavior. There is also a difference in the manner of proceeding. Then, the accused was presumed guilty till he proved himself otherwise; at present, the law regards him as innocent till he is proved guilty. To establish his innocence his own assertion was not enough. He got his neighbors and kinsmen to swear to the truth of a fact. In their British home, these neighbors will be set down as a fixed number; they will become the judges of the law in all important cases; and men will say that Alfred the Great organized them into a jury. We have here the germ of trial by jury, with all its advantages and disadvantages. But in the old homestead there are other means for establishing the truth or fal-

¹ Thus, Ethelbiht's laws decree that if a murderer leaves the country his kinsfolk shall pay half the fine. They are as early as 600. See Tacitus, *De Mor. Ger.*, xii.

² Grimm-*Deutschen Rechts-alterthümer*, 650.

³ Tacitus, *Mor. Germ.*, xii., *Æthelbihtes Dōmas*, § 9, Ed. Schmid.

sity of an accusation. One of the most popular and universal among the Germanic nations was the duel. In English law it is known as the wager of battle. Velleius Paterculus speaks of disputes among the Germans which were wont to be determined by arms.¹ And he further says that they despised the Roman method of settling difficulties by the decisions of a law tribunal. Nor were the early Greeks and Romans without this means of determining guilt or innocence. Long after the practice had been abolished the word in which it was expressed remained. With both peoples the same word meant both to fight and to judge or determine.² This is to be looked for among a warlike people. And when to this is added a spirit of ferocious independence, such as burned in the breast of the whole Teutonic people, we have all the conditions favorable to making the duel a most popular mode of trial. The primary idea underlying this practice was expressed by Gondibaud in his reply to Avitus: "Is it not true that in the wars of nations, as in private combats, the issue is in the hand of God? And why will not His providence give victory to the justest cause?" It is also true that to rely on God's direct interference on all occasions is to tempt Him. However, the duel pleased their savage natures; they loved to witness it; they honored the champion; the coward who craved³ for mercy they despised. This practice of the wager of battle will be introduced in the new home; it will be revived by William the Conqueror;⁴ it will be appealed to in 1612 and 1631, and will be abolished only in 1817.⁵

Another form of proving one's guilt or innocence was the ordeal of fire and water. This was universal among the Aryan nations. We find it in India. The beautiful Sita proves her innocence by fire.⁶ We find it in Greece. The messenger tells Creon that he and the watchmen were ready to lift masses of red-hot iron in their hands, and to pass through the fire, and to appeal to the gods by oath that they had not buried Polynices.⁷ To the old English, to whom fire and water were not only elements but deities, this mode of appeal had its attractions. Surely the gods would not harm the innocent one who would commit himself to their mercies, as surely would they not let pass unpunished the guilty one placing himself

¹ Lib. ii., chap. 118; Blackstone, B. iii., § 337.

² Greek, κρίνειν; Latin, *decernere*.

³ Hence the word *craven*. Anglo-Saxon *crafan*.

⁴ Not introduced, as Blackstone has it. Commentaries, B. iii., § 338.

⁵ 59 Geo. III., c. 46.

⁶ Ramayana.

⁷ ἡμεν δ' ἔτοιμοι καὶ μύθους αἶρειν χερσίν,
καὶ πῦρ διερπεῖν, καὶ θεοῦς ὀρκωμοτεῖν,
τὸ μῆτε δρᾶσαι, μῆτε τῷ ξυνιδέναι
τὸ πρᾶγμα βουλευσαντι μῆτ' εἰργασμένῳ.

SOPHOCLES, *Antigone*, 263-6.

in their power; therefore they placed confidence in this manner of trial.

Another feature of the old English, and one which they shared in common with other Teutonic tribes, was their custom of possessing their lands in common, and moving about from place to place. "In cultivating the soil," says Tacitus, "they do not settle on one spot, but shift about different places." And Cæsar describes the process: "The magistrates and chiefs parcel out yearly to the tribes and families united together such a quantity of land and in such part of the country as they deem proper, and the year after compel them to move elsewhere."¹ Thus they were taught not to become attached to any particular piece of land, lest their ambition and martial qualities lie dormant or fall into contempt. This reveals another trait in their manner of thinking. It was not this or that piece of land that was the object of their desires, it was land, property, not for its own sake, but as representative of their relative standing in their respective tribes. "The system of an annual changing," says Lappenberg, "or at least changeable possessions of land, and the custom necessarily attending it, of migrating, prejudicial as they were to the solid interests of nations, nevertheless required activity and strength of mind; the individual, too, whose home afforded him no permanent settlement would not respect that of a stranger; while piracy, ennobled by stratagem and valor, is indebted only to an established system of social order for its disgrace and punishment."² It was a system calculated to strengthen individual liberty. And everything in their customs and laws spoke of this sentiment. Each house stood apart, surrounded by a piece of land that was reserved for the use of the proprietor. No one dare enter without blowing a horn or giving some signal of his coming, otherwise he was regarded as an enemy, and was dealt by accordingly. Each village was constructed in the same manner. It was surrounded by a march or mark of land, which was regarded as sacred ground. He who would cross it, without giving a signal, was looked upon with suspicion, and his every movement watched. Everybody entering a house was received with hospitality. Food and drink were provided for him, and no questions asked till he was refreshed and rested. "To injure guests they regard as impious; they defend from harm those who have come to them for any

¹ Neque quisquam agri modum certum aut fines habet proprios, sed magistratus ac principes in annos singulos gentibus cognationibusque hominum, qui una coierunt, quantum et quo loco visum est agri attribuunt atque anno post alio transire cogunt. —*De Bello Gallico*, lib. vi., cap. 22. See also lib. iv., 1. The custom still exists in the Hochwald of Thor, except that the division is not made annually.—Lappenburg, ii., 323.

² England under Anglo-Saxon Kings, vol. i., p. 86.

purpose whatever, and esteem them inviolable; to them the houses of all are open, and maintenance freely supplied."¹ But the host was held responsible for the guest under his roof. On his departure, he accompanied him to the limits of his *vil*, not through motives of mere personal kindness or politeness, but to be sure that his guest committed no act for which he, as host, would have to suffer. In rehabilitating the old English, we must in a great measure forget the amenities of modern life, and think of a people with selfish nature uncontrolled by conventionalities. They were ferocious, and their ferociousness spoiled the good effects of the priceless liberty of which they were justly so jealous. It was a liberty totally regardless of time and place. We find the Saxon portion of the Teutonic race afterwards carrying this spirit of personal liberty with them among other nations, to the extent that the Lombards had to enact a law banishing those Saxons who refused to abide by other than their own Saxon laws.²

The men went armed, and so universal was the custom, man came to be known as the weaponed one—*wæpned*. Thus, where the modern English use the terms male and female, their ancestors of old spoke of the *wæpned* and *wifman*.³ In every public place went they in arms. Whenever they held a council, they did so armed. They looked more to the decoration of their shields than to the adorning of their persons. To lose them was a disgrace. They took the greatest pride in decorating them in variegated colors. In *Beowulf*, the shield is called a yellow disk—*geolo-rand*. They prized their shield and their sword or spear as the instruments of the sole occupation for which they lived. To war was their ideal of life. Even after death they could think of no higher form of existence than to drink beer in the halls of the Valhalla, and fight their battles daily over again. Therefore they never put forth their strength except in the battlefield. There the energy and prowess they displayed was great. Nothing could resist it when under disciplined leadership. They became furious. They bit their shields and uttered the most horrid shrieks. Then they considered themselves under the immediate protection of the god of battle.⁴ In their fury they played with life and death. War they regarded as a play. Their war-shield they called a play-shield—*plega-scyld*. And among their synonyms for war we find *æsc-plega*, the sport of lances or spears, and *hand-plega*, a contest.⁵ But the war over, they became inactive. Occasionally they would hunt. They had a hound—a *ren-hund*—of which they were very fond. But when

¹ Cæsar, *De Bel. Gal.*, lib. vi., cap. 23.

² Cæsar, *Cantù*, t. vii., p. 315.

³ Akerman, *Remains of Pagan Saxondom*.

⁴ Woden. Hence the old English word for madness, *wodnes*.

⁵ See Bosworth's Dictionary.

not so engaged, they did nothing requiring physical exertion. "The intrepid warrior," says Tacitus, "who in the field braved every danger, became in time of peace a listless sluggard."¹ They were addicted to gambling. When they possessed naught else, they staked their persons and went into bondage to satisfy their creditors. They also gave days and nights to deep drinking. As a necessary consequence, quarrels were frequent and dangerous. "Disputes," to quote Tacitus again, "as will be the case with people in liquor, frequently arise, and are seldom confined to opprobrious language. The quarrel generally ends in a scene of blood."² In such a manner of living we look in vain for a guiding principle. There is no restraint on individual impulses. Spirit is entirely subject to physical instincts. But we get insight into the germs of those vices that have been the bane of so many individuals, and brought disaster upon so many families in the new homestead centuries after.³

IV.

Here it may be asked how a people so brutalized could hold woman in reverence, and regard marriage as a sacred institution. Still Tacitus tells us so.⁴ But it is to be remembered that Tacitus is detailing the manners and customs of the Teutonic nations, not simply as a matter of history, but as a rebuke to Roman corruption. He therefore writes with more point than history warrants. In his desire to contrast he exaggerates. The Teuton of old led a life of hardship. His was a simple mode of living. He knew few of the luxuries of an Oriental or a Roman civilization. His sluggish nature retained all its innate vigor. There was in his daily life nothing to enervate it and render him effeminate. But he entertained for woman no chivalric sense of delicacy. A creature of impulses, he was incapable of restraint. He guarded her virtue simply through the motive of right and property which was vested in her. His sense of independence could not brook encroachments upon his possessions, whether of person or property. Hence he hedged woman in with laws that were as wounding to her modesty as they were derogatory to her honor. They ignored her personality. They guarded her as they would have guarded a pet animal or a fruit-bearing tree. Thus was it enacted that the freeman who presses the finger of a freewoman is liable to a fine of six hundred pence; of twelve hundred if he touches the arm;

¹ De Mor. Germ., cap. xv.

² Ibid., xxii.

³ See Pendennis and Daniel Deronda.

⁴ Quamquam severa illic matrimonia. De Mor. Ger., xviii. . . . Paucissima in tam numerosa gente adulteria; quorum poena praesens et maritis permissa. Ibid., xix.

of fourteen hundred if he places his hand above the elbow ; and so on through a grade of fines, entering into details as disgusting as they must have been futile. Nor were these laws confined to the old English and their neighbors. They were generally used throughout the Teutonic races. In the Bavarian laws, he who disarranges a woman's hair or detaches her comb is fined a certain amount.¹ Legislation on such a subject, entering into such minute details, taking such stringent measures, implies great abuse, and proves conclusively that woman was not the object of respect to the ancient Teuton which some would make her, and that she was simply cared for because she was to be the mother of the young heroes and vikings who were to perpetuate the name and the prowess of their fathers. Commenting on the punishment inflicted on the woman unfaithful to her husband, as related by Tacitus, namely, that her hair was cut, and she was whipped ignominiously through the village,² Balmes remarks : " Certainly, this punishment gives us an idea of the infamy which was attached to adultery among the Germans, but it was little calculated to increase the respect entertained for women publicly. This would have been greater had they been stoned to death."³

Be this as it may, the more we study the condition of women in those early days, the less pleasing a picture does it represent. She was the companion of man in peace and war ; she attended to all the indoor and outdoor work ;⁴ while he sat dozing in half-stupor by the fire she was up and doing ; she accompanied him to the battlefield ; she stood by his side and encouraged him in moments of greatest danger. Women were known to fight after their husbands and sons had been defeated. Thus Flavus tells us that, in a battle between Marius and the Cimbri, the struggle with the enemy's wives was not less severe than with the enemy himself, " for the women being mounted on the wagons and other carriages which had been ranged around as a defence, fought from them as from towers, with spears and pikes." And he adds that, when they were refused the privilege of being committed to the custody of the vestal virgins, " they either fell, after strangling or braining the whole of their children, by mutual wounds, or hanged themselves with ropes, made of their own hair, upon the trees and the yokes of their wagons."⁵ The reading of such a page freezes the blood in one's veins, and he asks : Could this be told of mothers ? The history and literature of all the Teutonic races answer in the affirmative. So do the Sagas of the North. Their ideal woman is one bloodthirsty, cruel, cold, heartless, and fatally beautiful. In

¹ Cæsar, *Cantù. Histoire Universelle*, t. vii., p. 379.

² *De Mor. Ger.*, cap. xix.

³ *European Civilization*, chap. xxvii.

⁴ *De Mor. Ger.*, cap. xv.

⁵ *Epitome Roman History*, iii., 3.

the Völsung Saga, Signi counsels Sigmund to destroy her own children, because he does not consider them valiant enough.¹ "The daughter of the Danish jarl, seeing Egil taking his seat near her, repels him with scorn, reproaching him with seldom having provided the wolves with hot meat, with never having seen for a whole autumn a raven croaking over the carnage. But Egil seized her, and pacified her, by singing: 'I have marched with my bloody sword, and the raven has followed me. Furiously we fought; the fire passed over the dwellings of men; we slept in the blood of those who kept the gates.'"² Such is this maiden's ideal of a hero and of life. A fancy so steeped in carnage and crime could be possessed of a small share of tenderness and humanity. Nor is the ideal of woman of the Nibelungen-lied less fierce. Brunhild forces her suitors to contend with her in the games of throwing the spear, leaping, and hurling the stone, under the barbarous penalty of losing their heads in case of defeat. She afterwards has Siegfried slain; in return, his wife, Crimhild, after brooding over her wrongs for years, revenges herself by slaying his murderer. She is possessed of as little humanity as her rival. She asks Hagen where the fatal Hoard is; Hagen replies that he never will disclose it while any of her brothers lives, whereupon she orders her brother's head to be cut off, and, holding it up, exclaims; "I bring it to an end."

"Ich bringe es zu ende," sprach das edle Weib.

"Thou hast it now according to thy will," said Hagen; "of the Hoard knoweth none but God and I; from thee, she-devil—*Valendinne*—shall it forever be hid." In her rage she kills him with her own hand.³ Not in representations like these are we to find the ideal of true womanhood. Such characters bear no other traces of their sex than the name, and woman unsexed is a monster. No surprise is it, then, to read of the English lady of primitive times cruel to her servants and slaves.⁴ The types set up for her admiration were such as belittled the tenderness and delicacy of feeling and thought that belong to true wifely, motherly, and sisterly qualities. The Edda has summed up the Teutonic estimate of woman in these words: "Praise a woman when she is buried . . . praise a maiden after she is married."⁵ This is denying her all merit. But later woman will be emancipated; her rights and privileges will be recognized; she will be restored to full liberty of action; the day will come when she will no longer be ignored as heir to

¹ Sæmunda's Edda.

² Apud Taine, vol. i., p. 27.

³ Nibelungen-lied, Ed. Simrock, p. 383. See also Carlyle's Essay on Van der Hagen's edition of this poem.

⁴ Wright, History of Domestic Manners and Sentiments in the Middle Ages, p. 58.

⁵ Hava-Mal.

her father's property, and we will read among the formulas of Marculf a deed proclaiming that, as the Lord has given a father daughters as well as sons, who love him as well as they, he sets aside the former impious custom, and wills that after death they share equally in the goods he leaves.¹ But, before this change takes place, the whole framework of society must be altered. Under the old order of things woman does not inherit because she is unable to bear the responsibilities attached thereto, for with the property inherited came also the feuds, the avenging of injuries, and the vengeance to be taken for homicide,² but in the new order, men will have other things to live for than war and vengeance. The power that will bring about that change is Christianity.

Among the well-to-do class of the old English, from the second to the fifth centuries, woman's chief occupation was, what it afterwards became in the new homestead, spinning, weaving, and embroidering. The fine for injury done the hands of a goldsmith and embroideress was great.³ These two avocations were held in esteem. It is proof that gold and embroidered ornaments were manufactured and held in request. In *Beowulf*, the palace is variegated with gold—*gold-fāh*;⁴ the boar's likeness that the men bear on their cheeks is *gchroden golde*⁵—adorned with gold; Hengist's band should supply as much treasure of rich gold—*fættan goldes*—as would decorate the Frisian race in the beer-hall;⁶ Wealthow walks forth under a golden diadem—*gyldnum beāge*;⁷ Hæreth's daughter is given, gold adorned—*gold-hroden*—to the young warrior⁸—whence we learn that men and women both used ornaments of gold. But this was after the days of Tacitus, for he tells us that the use of gold and silver was unknown to them, with the exception of those who had come in contact with Roman civilization. Every house was divided into two parts, the beer-hall or reception-room for strangers and guests, and the female apartments, exclusively used by the women. These were not always contiguous. "For others," says Wright, and his description holds true for the Continental home as well as for the British, "and for the ladies especially, little rooms were built outside, often standing apart from any other building; and the Anglo-Saxons called this room a *bur*, which in our change of language answers to our

¹ *Dulcissimæ filiæ N. N. diuturna sed impia inter nos consuetudo tenetur, ut de terra paterna sorores cum fratribus portionem non habeant. Sed ego, perpendens hanc impietatem, sicut mihi a Domino æqualiter doneti estis filii, ita sitis a me æqualiter diligendi, et de rebus meis post decessum æqualiter gratulemini.*

² Thus the Thuringian law is explicit on this point: "Ad quemcumque hæreditas terræ pervenerit ad illum vestis bellica, id est lorica, et ultio proximi, et solutio leudis debet pertinere."—Canciani. *Leg. Barb.*, tit. iii., art. 5, p. 31.

³ Lappenberg, i., 94. ⁴ L., 621. ⁵ L., 614. ⁶ L., 2190. ⁷ L., 2330. ⁸ L., 3900.

bower."¹ There they sewed, and with their servants and slaves attended to their spinning and embroidery. But they ate with the men in the large hall. When Ragnar visited his friend Öston, at Upsala, the king's daughter went around the hall presenting mead and wine to Ragnar and his men.² Rowena gives the cup to Vortigern "with all the grace and neatness that might be, according to the fashion of her country."³ At the feast given to Beowulf, where he never saw greater joy, the queen, Wealhthow, was present, and "at times surveyed the hall," while Hrothgar's daughter from time to time bore the ale-cup to the earls.⁴ And on the day of his arrival, Wealhthow greeted the men in the hall, mindful of their kin—*cynna gemyndig*—and first gave the cup to Hrothgar, bidding him be blithe, and afterwards to Beowulf and his companions. And she thanked God, most wise in words—*wisfast wordum*—that she could put her trust in any earl for comfort against crime.⁵ He partook of the cup, and in reply said that he was resolved to perform deeds of noble valor against the monster, or, if he could not subdue him, to await his last days in the mead-hall. And the poem further relates that

The woman liked the Goth's proud speech right well;
His boasting pleased the joyful people's queen;
Then she, gold-decked, went by her lord to sit.⁶

These glimpses of a bygone order of things are valuable. They resuscitate the past. We see the men and women of those old days move and speak before us. Let us approach the mead-hall and learn more of their ways.

Not very imposing looks the house. It is one story high. It is built of wood. The use of stones for building purposes is not yet known. So identified is timber with building, that the old English word for "build" is *timbrian*. You enter; but you look in vain for any of the comforts of a modern dwelling-house. There are no chairs. The luxury of a seat with a back to it is yet unknown.⁷ But you find a stool and a bench, and, if you intend staying for the night; that same bench will be your bed, with a pillow, some fresh straw, and perhaps a bear-skin. Bed-clothing was scanty in those days; nor was it much needed; the men were

¹ Homes of Other Days, p. 4.

² Thorpe, Northern Mythology, p. 113.

³ Polydore Vergil, History of England, b. iii., p. 111.

⁴ LL., 4040, *et seq.*

⁵ Thorpe's Beowulf, p. 42.

⁶ *Thám wífe þa word wel lícodon,
gilp-cwíde Geates; eóde gold-hroden,
freólicu folc-cwén, to hire frean sittan.*

BEOWULF, ix., 1282, *et seq.*

⁷ The word chair is not found in old English; it is of Norman origin.

better able to endure excessive cold than excessive heat.¹ The floor is covered with straw. Indeed, in the old English way of thinking, to strew is to straw. The words are identical.² The table is made of plain boards, pieced together in such a manner that they can afterwards be removed.³ It was called a *bórd*.⁴ At an early day the round table was used. It afterwards became the custom that each guest had a small side-table; but it was not permitted to eat alone. One of the greatest blots on a man's character would be the fact that he dined in private.⁵ You find no glass windows in this house into which we have introduced you. You perceive only eye-holes—*eág-thyrl*. The old English do not yet know the use of glass. Later, when they will have emigrated to the new homestead, and a certain Christian bishop shall arise among them, Benedict Biscop by name,⁶ they will learn its use and convenience. At present, the birds can fly through the hall in winter; not only are the eye-holes open, but the doors as well.⁷ The fire burns in the centre of the hall; there are no chimneys. Perhaps near-by is a large tree whose roots are under the floor, and whose branches cover the roof.⁸ In a prominent place is the boar's head in honor of Frey.⁹ The host occupies the highest seat, at about the middle of the table. Near him sits his wife. Upon the table are cheese, and bread, and vegetables, and meat, boiled or roasted. The meat is generally salt. Pork was a favorite dish. A servant holds the spit while each guest cuts from it a piece to suit himself. The use of forks is still unknown. Near the fire are ranged the vessels containing the beer. The beer-horn is first handed to the host across the fire. He drinks first. Then all goes merrily. Conversation flows freely. Many are lovers of social converse, haughty war-

¹ Tacitus, *Germania*, cap. vi. ² So also *strew* means a bed. See Bosworth.

³ The following riddle of the old English writer, Tahtwin, who lived about A.D. 700, tells how the table was broken up after having been used. The table is supposed to speak:

Multiferis omnes dapibus saturare solesco,
Quadrupedem hinc felix ditem me sanxerit ætas,
Esse tamen pulchris fatim dum vestibus orner,
Certatim me prædones spoliare solescunt;
Raptis nudate exuviis mox membra relinquunt.

⁴ Whence our words, board, boarding, and the like. The original of our table—*tafl*—was confined to the gaming-table. *Tæflung* meant playing at dice.

⁵ Wright's *Domestic Manners and Sentiments*, p. 19.

⁶ Misit legatorios Galliam, qui vitri factores, artifices videlicet Britanniis latenus incognitos.—Bede, *Oda Benedicti*.

⁷ Bede, *Ecclesiastical History*, b. ii., chap. xiii.

⁸ Müller, *Sagabibliothek*, ii., *Saga Völsungs*.

⁹ Kemble, *Anglo-Saxons*, vol. i., p. 357.

riors. In pleasant cities they sit at the feast and recount tales; then wine wet's the man's breast-passions; suddenly rises clamor in the company, and a various outcry is sent forth.¹ The shot makes it a point of honor to quell all disputes. At intervals the harper plays his harp. He is also a poet. He sings the soothing lay, the song serene. He recounts the tales of old. He tells of battles fought and victories won. And, as the wine or beer begins to warm the breasts of the hardy warriors who listen to his lay, they feel the spirit of war rise within them, and in fancy they fight their battles over again. Then they talk of their deeds of prowess, of their hairbreadth escapes; they laugh over their cruelties; they rejoice in their wounds, for, to their thinking, he who had received no wounds knew not the glory of living. From the life we have traced, we can infer the kind of poetry most in harmony with its sentiments. Let us examine the pieces that have escaped the ravages of time.

V.

But first a word upon their language. It is the same in which we now write. If it sounds differently, if it requires a special study to understand, it is because English is a living language, and has received new modes of expression, changed the pronunciation of old words, and, in consequence, their spelling—for it has followed the law of language laid down by Max Müller, in its twofold phase of phonetic decay and dialectical regeneration.² But Lappenberg tells us that, of the old language, "about a fifth only is to be pronounced obsolete in the present English."³ In its use of particles the old English resembled the Greek. It also had, like the same language, a certain facility of making new compounds. This facility it has mostly lost. It seems to have been transferred to its sister dialect, the German. The old English mind possessed but a small share of philosophic acuteness. It was rather blunt. It saw the surface well enough, and what it saw it expressed without circumlocution. Language, in a more civilized condition of life, seeks to veil certain ideas in less offensive words. There is no attempt of this kind among the old English. They speak as they think; and they think in the concrete. There are no abstractions, no generalizations, no metaphysical terminologies. Every word is uttered with an individualizing force. It stands for a thing. There is a certain bluntness about the language. It has no power of insinuation; it is not the language of address; it would never have

¹ Exeter Book, p. 314.

² Science of Language, vol. i., p. 51.

³ England under the Anglo-Saxon Kings, vol. ii., p. 306.

become the vehicle of diplomacy. It moves in a narrow circle of thought. The material, the finite, the tangible, it has words for; the spiritual, it can only approximate in the expression of. Such a mind, using such a language, will not be prolific in works of a philosophical character. It will make reflex acts with difficulty; it will not adequately express the sentiments of the heart. It will, properly enough, express emotion, courage, the impulses of nature, action.

1. We possess three precious relics of those old English days that give us glimpses of the literary spirit of the people who then lived. It has already been seen that no festival was complete without the gleeman and his harp. He travelled far and wide. He was everywhere received with consideration. And one gleeman, after passing through various lands, returned to his home and settled down upon his paternal estates. There he recorded his experience, told where he was, and how he was received, together with his friend, Scilling. It is thus we possess *The Scôpe, or Gleeman's Tale*. It is attributed to the fifth century of our era. The author was well liked. Often had he received a memorable present.¹ In return, he extended the praises of his benefactors over many lands—*geond londa fela*—and when to the harp his voice resounded, many high-born men, who well knew, said they had never heard better song.² Finally, he concludes with a burst of praise upon the standing of the bard with every generous prince:

“Thus North and South, where'er they roam,
The sons of song still find a home,
Speak unproved their wants, and raise
Their grateful lay of thanks and praise;
For still the chief, who seeks to grace
By fairest fame his pride of place,
Withholds not from the sacred Bard
His well-earned praise and high reward;
But free of hand, and large of soul,
Where'er extends his wide control,
Unnumbered gifts his princely love proclaim,
Unnumbered voices raise to heaven his princely name.”³

2. Another very ancient fragment of Continental song among the old English is *The Fight at Finnesburgh*. Fin, the Frisian prince, is awakened by the glare of the light caused by the firing of his palace by the Danish invaders. The poet is in sympathy with the scene. He contrasts, with no small degree of poetic art,

¹ LL., 6, 7.

² 207, *et seq.*

³ Conybeare's Anglo-Saxon Poetry. The writer takes this spirited version in preference to any translation of his own which he might make.

the stillness of the night with the woful deeds caused by the hatred of the people :

" Sweetly sang the birds of night,
The wakeful cricket chirruped loud ;
And now the moon, serenely bright,
Was seen beneath the wandering cloud,
Then roused him swift the deadly foe,
To deeds of slaughter and of woe.

" Now, beneath the javelin's stroke,
The buckler's massy circle rung.
Anon the chains of slumber broke :
That chieftain great and good,
He whose high praise fills every tongue,
First in valor as in blood,
The matchless Hengist to the battle woke."¹

Fin cries to the warriors : " Awake, my warriors ! hold your ground ; be mindful of valor ; fight in the van ; fight as one man !"² And, after words passed between themselves and the invaders, they fight. Each encourages the other. In this fragment we have none of those encouraging speeches, but in two leaves of a cycle of the eighth century, treating of the deeds of King Theodoric and his men, lately discovered by Mr. George Stephens, of Copenhagen, we find such a speech between two friends in fight : " Ætla's van-warrior ! let not thy courage fail thee to-day, for the day is come when thou art doomed to lose thy life, or thou long shalt have power among men. O Ælfhere's son ! may I never say, my friend, that I saw thee at the sword-play, through fear of any man, decline the combat, or flee to fortress thy body to defend, although many foes thy mail-shirt hew with bills, but rather that thou sought to fight beyond the limits of valor."³ No doubt, had we the whole of this poem, we would find many such, but as it stands it simply describes the fight :

Through hall did sound the din of slaughter stroke ;
The shield they could not grasp—the bone-helm lacked,—
The floor resounded till fell Garulf dead,—
Though not alone,—fell also many foes ;
The raven wheeled above, swart, sallow-brown ;
The sword-gleam flashed.

They fought five days. Never heard the poet that sixty conquering heroes behaved so well. Never did song requite as Hnaef requited his young warriors.

Then sought the vanquished train relief,
And safety for their wounded chief.

The battle of Finnesburgh was a great favorite with the old English. When great rejoicings fill the hall of Hrothgar, after

¹ Conybeare's translation, p. 179. ² LL., 18, *et seq.*

³ " Mark over border " is the original expression.

Beowulf has killed the fell monster, Grendel, no more popular song can be sung for the occasion than that of Finnesburgh. But who is Beowulf?

3. The grandest monument of old English poetry we possess is the poem of *Beowulf*. It is an epic dictated by the feelings and thoughts of "the days of yore." Those were times when personality was all; the hero counted for everything. There were no systems; no institutions for levelling up or levelling down the masses; no theory of equality; no scientific, religious, or literary proselytism. Personal energy was the lever upon which men raised themselves above their companions; and that energy was all exercised in the direction of skill in war and the performance of feats of valor and prowess. A hero according to the old English heart is Beowulf. Hrothgar builds a hall—of halls the greatest—and gives it the name of Heorot. Therein are held feasting and rejoicings; the gleeman sings; treasures are dispensed and presents made. But a grim and greedy being who haunts the moors, the fen and fastness, is envious of such joy. Grendel is he called. He enters the hall when the earls have retired to rest; rugged and fierce, he takes thirty of their number; and in his prey exulting goes to his home. Then was there much sorrow in Heorot. During twelve winters' tide did Hrothgar endure the frequent incursions of this foul fiend, till his land was despoiled of its best men, and empty stood the greatest of houses. Then was it noised abroad how Grendel waged war against this good prince and made havoc in his peaceful dominions. It came to the ears of Beowulf. He sets out with his companions to conquer the fiend. He is received with great rejoicings by Hrothgar and his queen. Night comes and the men seek their beds. When all is still Grendel arrives. There had arisen in him hope of a dainty glut. And first he takes a sleeping warrior, bites his bone-casings—his skin and flesh—drinks his blood; and having devoured him feet and hands, he takes hold of Beowulf. But soon he discovers that he has never encountered a stronger hand-grip; he grows sore afraid, and would fain return to his haunt; but the hero holds him.

These warders strong waxed wrathful—fiercer grew—
The hall resounded; wonder much there was
That it so well withstood the warring beasts—
That fell not to the earth this fair land-house.

* * * * *

And then arose strange sound; upon the Danes
Dire terror stood, of all who heard the whoop—
The horrid lay of God's denier—
The song that sang defeat and pain bewailed—
Hell's captives lay—for in his grasp too firm
Did he, of men the strongest, hold his prey.¹

¹ Beowulf, xl., 1543-1585.

The noise arouses the men; they take their swords; but no weapon has effect upon this monster. Still in his efforts to get away his sinews spring asunder; the bone-casings burst; he leaves his hand, and deathsick flees to his joyless dwelling; for he knows that his days are numbered. Next day were great rejoicings in Heorot. Thus ends the first encounter of Beowulf.

We learn nothing of the shape or size or nature of this mysterious being. That is one of the characteristics of the old English mind—and one it shares in common with all the Teutonic tribes—that it delights in the mysterious, the undefined, the horrible. In this respect it contrasts with the Greek intellect. Only the sensuous, the palpable, the thing of definite form and beauty, has for it any attraction. Its education is a constant struggle to bridge over all mystery, to cover all deformity, to give everything a name of good omen, to see but the sunshine of life. Homer describes Menelaus as wounded. He forgets the pain and anguish to compare the limbs of Menelaus, stained with gore, to the ivory tinged with purple. The image is too much in accordance with his thoughts to drop it immediately; he tells how the Carian woman lets it lie in her chamber, an object of desire to many a charioteer; but it is intended as an ornament for the king alone, a decoration to the steed and a glory to the rider.¹ The Greek did not live in a land of mist and fog, of marsh and fen and dense forest. He had the sunshine in all its brilliancy; he had a bright atmosphere and clear-cut landscape; therefore his eye was educated to color. The Kelt also was fond of color. And this is for us a fact of still greater importance; for the old English will come in contact with him after a while, and will learn from him how to appreciate beauty of color. Thus, in one of the most beautiful episodes of the *Táin Bó Chuailgne*, the fight of Ferdiad and Cuchulaind, the former says to the latter:

What has brought thee, O hound,
To combat with a strong champion?
Crimson-red shall flow thy blood
Over the trappings of thy steed;
Woe is thy journey.²

Not of wounds or of slaughter does he speak, but of the flow of the crimson blood. And when Laeg saw his weapon red-colored by the side of Ferdiad he spake these words:

O Ferdiad! sorrowful is the fate!
That I should see thee so gory and pale;
I having my weapon yet unwashed,
And thou a blood-streaming mass.³

¹ Iliad, ii, 140, *et seq.*

² O'Curry, *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish*, vol. iii., p. 431.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 459.

And in like manner, when Cuchulaind laments his death, he speaks of the blue eyes and the golden hair. Nothing of the kind read we in *Beowulf*. The man, the monster, the deed performed are all before us; but the distinct coloring, the picturesque detail, had no existence, even in the mind of the poet. But to return to the poem. The labors of *Beowulf* are not yet ended. Grendel has a monster-mother, who is bound to be revenged. This is a repetition of the northern conception of "the devil and his dam." She comes the night following and bears away the king's chief counsellor. In sorrow the king, his retainers, and *Beowulf* go to the pool which they know to be her residence. The flood boiled with blood; the folk surveyed the hot gore; the horn sang a death-song. *Beowulf* plunges in; the ocean surge received the battle-warrior; it was a day's space ere he could perceive the ground-plain. Forthwith she descried him, seized him in her horrid clutches, and to her dwelling bore the prince of rings. He aimed a powerful stroke at her with his war-bill, so that on her head the sword sang a horrid war-song. Then found he that the war-beam would not bite, and in sore straits was he; but trusting in his strength he drags the fiend to the floor; again she overthrows him; but rescuing himself from her, he perceives an old eotensish sword, the pride of warriors, the work of giants. This he wields and angrily strikes, so that it grips her neck, breaks her bone-rings, and passes through her fated body. On the ground she sank. *Beowulf* was once more triumphant. Heorot was again secure. Joy reigned; the gleeman's song was heard; the bowl went round; presents were dispensed.

The poet never forgets the mention of presents. After the great warrior he loves to sing of the generous giver. This is by reason of the nature of the bond that kept companions around their leader. They stood by him in hopes of receiving a share in whatever booty might be taken, whether on land or sea. In proportion as he was brave and generous was he popular. And it added not a little to the popularity of *Beowulf* that in his old age he loses his life in slaying the dragon, guardian of hoards, and leaving his people immense treasures. We will not go into an analysis of this part of the poem. One of the most universal traditions among the Teutonic race is that of the dragon brooding over vast treasures hidden in some cave or ravine. *Beowulf* killing the dragon will be known in England by every child as the story of St. George and the dragon, only in this instance the saint will not be himself injured in the contest. This leads us to think that *Beowulf's* adventure with the dragon does not properly belong to this poem; but that it is part of another saga cycle which has been transferred to it, perhaps by the last bard who made a new version thereof. For, be it under-

stood that the poem now known as *Beowulf* stands not as it originally stood when chanted in the forests and on the seashore of the old homestead. Much has been added; no doubt much also has been subtracted. He who wrote the version we possess was a Christian. None other could have spoken of Cain; none other would have called the people heathens; none other would have said that they knew not the Creator.¹ He was in all probability a monk. No one else could scarcely attempt to preach after this fashion: "Woe to him who shall through cruel malice thrust a soul into the fire's embrace; let him not look for comfort."² No one else would lay down so nicely the doctrine of repentance as he does in these words: It was no longer than one night when he committed more murders, and mourned not for his enmity and crime; he was too confirmed in them.³ He also has glimpses of true poetry; here is a genuine beam:

When sorrow on him came, and pain befell,
He left the joy of men and chose God's light.⁴

But who this poet-soul was, we know not; when he lived we can only conjecture. That he wrote this version of *Beowulf* after *Cædmon*⁵ had sung of the creation is certain; for to his poem he alludes in unmistakable language when he represents the gleeman singing of the origin of things: how the Almighty wrought the earth; how he set the sun and moon to give light to those dwelling on land; how he created plant and animal.⁶ It is the probable opinion that he lived about the time of Canute. There are many theories concerning the poem. Thorpe considers it "a metrical paraphrase of a heroic saga composed in the southwest of Sweden, in the old common language of the North, and probably brought to this country during the sway of the Danish dynasty."⁷ Haigh rejects Thorpe's view, considers the poem entirely English, both in scenes, incidents, and personages, and believes it to have been composed in England.⁸ Henry Morely is disposed to follow him. He says he is almost tempted to make Bowlby Cliff the ness on which *Beowulf* was buried; "Bowlby then being read as the corrupted form of *Beowulfes-by*."⁹ Kemble was at first inclined to regard the poem as historical, and so expressed himself in the preface to the text which he published in 1833. But in the preface to his translation issued in 1837, he announced an entirely new

¹ II., 360, *et seq.*

² Ibid.

³ II., 273-5.

⁴ He thá mid tháere sorge; thá him síó sár belamp,
gum-dreám ofgeaf; Godes leoht geceás.—xxxv., 4928-32.

⁵ A.D. 670.

⁶ I., 180-198.

⁷ *Beowulf*, Preface, ix.

⁸ *The Anglo-Saxon Sagas.* ⁹ *A First Sketch of English Literature*, p. 14.

theory. With Grimm, he regards it as mythic. He finds that the old Saxons called their harvest-month Beo or Bewod, after the god of fertility. This god he identifies with the hero of the poem. It is a good instance of the extravagance of the mythists. The poem will not bear out the supposition. It deals with historical personages. Some of them can be identified with well-known records. Thus, Hygelac is spoken of by Gregory of Tours, under the Frankish form of Chochilaic, just as Hülfrich is called Chilperic.¹ According to Thorkelin Beowulf was a living personage also. He assigns, upon authority other than his own, the year of his death as A.D. 340. Now, the name of Beowulf must have been popular in song and story; and as it receded in the past, to the deeds of valor of which its bearer was the author, were added others of a marvellous and mysterious character. Traditions of time immemorial were strung upon it; these were sung in the old homestead; they were remembered in the new; but the scenes of the ancestral home becoming effaced from memory, men sought in the new country to give them "a local habitation and a name." Never seeing the ness upon which the hero was buried, and a mound erected to his honor, they are only following their instincts in designating a place to which they transfer the interest vested in the old scenes. As the poem passes down from mouth to mouth, the descriptions become changed to suit the newly designated places. Such, in our opinion, was the fate of Beowulf. When the Danish dynasty held sway, such a poem was calculated to be recited with renewed interest, and at this time we conceive it to have received its present form.²

In the poem of Beowulf, especially in those parts of it savoring of the old Continental homestead, we find an absence of a spiritual and a spiritualizing ideal. Physical prowess is personified in the hero. The people are hero-worshippers. The assistance of God alluded to is an after-thought improvised by the Christian poet. No visible intervention of supernatural powers fills the narrative, as in Homer; no sentiment of chivalry or love; but the seeking of a mere selfish glory. Brute force is the ideal; Beowulf is the war-beast. It is the poem of a people living to war, glorying in battle, and dying to renew their fights and repeat their deeds of valor within the halls of Valhalla.

¹ His gestis Dani cum rege suo, nomine Chochilaicho, eVectu navali per mare Gallias appetunt. III., 3. It may be remarked with Ettmüller that all the Northern pirates were sometimes called Danes. See Thorpe, *Int.*, xxv.

² Thorpe considers the only MS. extant (MS. Cott. Vitellius, A. 15), "to be of the first half of the eleventh century."—Beowulf, Preface, xi.

VI.

Such is the literature of the old English. And now we come to their philosophy. Let it not be said that they possessed none. There is no people without a philosophy, for all have reason, all ask the why and wherefore of things. Whence came I? who made this earth? these stars? the seasons? the heat and the cold? the winds and the rain, and the refreshing springs and cooling streams? These are questions that occur to the most primitive people. And sometimes they even reflect on the more difficult issues of life and death. They ask: Why am I here? what is the motive of life? who guides, directs the actions of men? Are they the result of chance, or is there order in events? The old English reflected on all these questions, and had their answers for them. Their sagas, and still more, their mythology, are so many efforts to solve these ever-recurring thoughts. They themselves may not have suggested the solutions; in all probability they did not; from other and more distant sources did they come. They are to be found in the Scandinavian mythology of the Edda. Composed by a people who abandoned their country and sought in the cold regions of Iceland a home in which they might cling to their traditions and their gods, this book is the one certain source whence we can draw their solutions of the world-riddle. It was the common inheritance of the Angle and the Saxon as well as of the Norwegian. Malte Brun recognizes the fact, but accounts for it by supposing that the Scandinavians are descended "from a primitive race, indigenous to the countries which it still inhabits;"¹ and that it was this primitive race that peopled the South from the North. The truth is the reverse of this. The first migrations were northward. Those from the North in after ages were a reaction and a compensation of the primitive migrations. We distinguish two of them. The oldest has left its traces in the traditions of giants and dwarfs, of magical influence and communication with evil spirits. The later is that distinctly recorded by Snorri Sturleson in the Prose Edda. While the local coloring and specific naming are his, the tradition is substantially that believed by his forefathers. He tells us: "Othin had spædom, and so also his wife; and from this knowledge found he out that his name would be held high in the north part of the world, and worshipped beyond all kings; for this sake was he eager to go on his way from Tyrkland. . . . But whithersoever they fared over the land, much fame was said of them, so that they were thought to be liker gods than men, and they stayed not their faring till they came northward into that land that is now called

¹ Geography, vol. iii., bk. cxlvii., p. 1038.

Saxland;¹ there dwelt Othin long time, and had that land far and wide for his own. . . . These Asa took to them wives there within the land, but some for their sons, and these races waxed full many; so that about Saxland, and all thence about the north country they spread, so that the tongue of the Asiamen was the true tongue over all these lands; and men deem from the way that the names of these forefathers are written, that these names have belonged to this tongue, and the Asa brought the tongue hither into the north country: into Norway, into Svithiod, into Denmark, and into Saxland. . . ."² One fact underlies this remarkable passage, and it is all we are concerned with at present, that the mythology of the Æsir was universal throughout the Teutonic nations. Let us see how they questioned and how they answered on the great problems of life, creation, and thought.

They contemplated the heavens and the earth, and they wished to account for their existence. This question they solved on the same principle that the Chaldæans of old had solved it. The Chaldæan found, in two primary elements, the igneus and the humid, the source of all things; from their union did he conceive all things to spring.³ The old English imagined all things also to spring from the union of heat and cold. We are told that from Niflheim,⁴ the home of mist, issued cold, and from Muspellzheim, the home of fire, issued heat. The heat melted the ice; the drops formed thereby, through His power who sent forth the heat, received life, and a being, called Ymir, was produced. We are further told that while Ymir slept, offspring came forth from him.⁵ This account of the origin of man nearly coincides with the Hindu, which represents the various classes as springing respectively from the heads, the arms, the thighs, and the feet of Brahma.⁶ But there is a difference. Brahma is the Author of all things, while back of Ymir seems to be a Creator. In fact, Ymir is the primeval chaos. His other name is Aurgelmir.⁷

"When Ymir lived
Was sand, nor sea,
Nor cooling wave;
No earth was found,
Nor heaven above;
One chaos all,
And nowhere grass."⁸

So we are further told that Bōr's sons, having slain Ymir, carried

¹ The whole of Germany was frequently known by the old writers as Saxland.

² Foreword to the Edda. Translation of G. W. Dassent, pp. 109-111. Stockholm, 1842.

³ Lenormant, *Legend of Semiramis*, p. 62.

⁵ Thorpe, *Northern Mythology*, vol. i, p. 3.

⁷ Aur,—matter, mud, clay.

⁴ Nefl—νεφέλη—nebula.

⁶ *Manavadharmasastra*.

⁸ *Völuspá*.

his body to Ginnunga-gap—the yawning gap or the abyss of pure space—and formed of it the earth; of his blood they made the sea and fresh waters; of his bones the mountains; of his teeth and grinders and those bones that were broken, they made stones and pebbles; in the great impassable ocean, formed of the blood that flowed from his wounds, they set the earth around which it circles; of his skull they formed the heavens, which they set up over the earth with four regions, and under each corner placed a dwarf, the names of whom were Austri, Vestri, Northri, and Suthri—the four points of the compass; of his brain they formed the heavy clouds; of his hair the vegetable creation; and of his eyebrows a wall of defence against the giants; this they placed round Midgard, the midmost part of the earth, the dwelling-place of the sons of men.¹ In this manner, the saga goes on to say how sun and moon and stars received their proper places in Nature, and how the days and the years came to be reckoned. In this first lisping of philosophy the problems of time and space are considered. The heavenly origin of things is kept in view; knowledge comes from above. But there is a principle of evil in things of earth; for Ymir, the shapeless mass out of whom hill and dale, river and ocean were framed, “was evil, together with all his race.”² And this evil race dwelt in Jötenheim. They were giants and the sworn enemies of the Æsir. When Ymir was killed all the giants were drowned, save Bergelmir and his wife, who escaped in a chest, and thus continued the hateful race. Is there not here a clear reminiscence of the Deluge recorded in the Bible?

And there is another fact recorded in that Book which was not forgotten by these peoples of the North. We are told therein that in the garden of Paradise stood a certain tree on which depended the life and death, the happiness and misery, of the human race. In this mythology is it also set down concerning a tree of life. It was called Yggdrasil. It was “a stately tree, with white dust strewed: thence came the dews that wet the dales; it stands, ever green, over Urda’s well.”³ Beneath the roots of the Yggdrasil, by the well of Urd, there stands a fair hall, whence go forth three maidens, Urd, Verdandi, and Skuld. They are called Norns. They engrave on the tablet of time; they determine the lives of men; they fix their destinies. In modern language these maidens are known as Past, Present, and Future. They are the moulders of man’s destiny. Life itself is ever green, ever fresh, ever flowing; but time is all the same, determining each individual’s course. This idea of a fate influencing men, decreeing their deaths, and shaping

¹ Völuspá, see also Thorpe, *Northern Mythology*, vol. i, p. 5.

² Thorpe, *Northern Mythology*, p. 3.

³ Salmunda’s Edda. Völuspá.

their lives, was deeply implanted in the Teutonic mind. There are the Valkyriur. They are ever in attendance upon Odin. Prior to a battle they come from afar to sway the victory¹ and choose those who are to fall and dwell in Valhalla. In the myth of Frey and Gerd, Skimen sings: "My life was decreed to one day only, and my days are determined by fate."² The Christian poet who revised the poem of Beowulf was not able to rid himself of this philosophy as well as he did of the mention of the heathen gods. Thus, the hero says: Fate goes ever as it must—*gaeth á wyrd swá hió sceal*.³ But already it is coupled in the poet's mind with the idea of direfulness; he speaks of it as the grim power—*geósceafþ grimne*.⁴ His ancestors would not have so qualified it. For them it possessed nothing grim or dreadful. Death in fight was their joy and the ideal termination of life. Old age was not held in honor.

"The coward thinks to live forever,
If he avoid the weapon's reach;
But age, which overtakes at last,
Twines his gray hair with pain and shame."⁵

But the Christian poet is moving in a new sphere of thought; he stands outside the magic circle of his forefathers; the truth has made him free, and he beholds things in their true light.

The growth of plant and animal was another problem contemplated by these peoples. No vision of cell-theories floated past their mind; no doctrine of protoplasm entered their brain. Everything living and active was endowed with a personality. Nicors inhabited the running stream. Tree and plant were the dwelling of the genius that made them grow. Nature was a vast laboratory in which inert matter was transformed into vegetable and animal life by a personal being. Dwarfs were the instruments by which many changes were brought about. They had charge of the gold and precious stones concealed in the bowels of the earth. The echoes in the mountains were the answers of the dwarfs.⁶ The creation of man these peoples conceived to have been the work of three of their gods. The saga tells us that Odin, Hænir, and Lodur, meeting the ash and the elm, changed the one into a man and the other into a woman. And Odin gave them soul; Hænir, mind; Lodur, blood. Thus did these simple peoples distinguish between the material and spiritual elements in man, although they never defined what was matter and what spirit. Indeed, in spite of the

¹ Völuspá.

² Thorpe, Northern Mythology, vol. i., p. 47.

³ Beowulf, vol. i., 915.

⁴ xviii., 2472.

⁵ Saemunda's Edda. Hava-Mal. tr. W. Taylor. So, too, Beowulf, xxi., 2781-3.

⁶ Grimm, Deutsch. Myth., 421, O. N. Dvergmal. So, rock-crystal was known as dwarf-stone, *dvarg sten*, and in Denmark certain stones are still called dwarf-hammers. See Thorpe, Northern Mythology, vol. i., p. 8.

distinction in their mythology, their thoughts became too materialized. But there is one passage in *Beowulf* which has the ring of an old English idea. It asserts the supremacy of the understanding. It is a remarkable expression; for it is one of the very few that anywhere assert the superiority of spirit over matter. "Understanding, deliberation, forethought of mind," says *Beowulf*, "is everywhere best."¹ This is a thought as old as the Aryan family. In the *Hitopadesa*, or book of good advice, it is asserted that knowledge is the fountain-head of all happiness, and by a most illogical process it is shown to be so. "Knowledge gives good behavior; from good behavior one attains worthiness; from being worthy one gets to be wealthy; from wealth one reaches religious merit, afterwards happiness."² The ideas in both are of a piece with the thoroughly English maxim, Knowledge is power. That in *Beowulf* reveals the germ of modern English philosophy. The human understanding is the one theme it seems to have fathomed, from the problem of knowing discussed by Locke, to that of the unknowable treated by Herbert Spencer. And that problem, when made the exclusive one of philosophy and identified with it, has only the same outcome it has had with the Hindu mind; it will end in Nirvana; it will make nihilism the last word of English philosophy.

The question of good and evil was a puzzling one for the old English mind. It recognized the one and the other; there never was a nation without primary ideas of right and wrong; but the explanation that each people gives varies. To the Teuton, when men were first formed they were happy. But the frost-giants came among them and taught them evil. One especially, called Gullveig,³ spread avarice and the love of gain among them; and though she was thrice burned, she arose as often from her ashes, and she still lives. She was the first to cause human blood to flow, and the saga tells us that it is because of her decree that it still flows. The suffering of the good and innocent was also a difficult problem for these peoples. Life was not to them what it is to the Christian, a period of probation and meriting; it therefore never entered their minds that misery might be a boon. They cut the Gordian knot by saying that some men fell under the influence of good spirits and some of evil. Even among their gods they recognized one as actuated by wickedness. He was a spirit of craft and cunning. He was known as Loki, and was the source of innumerable annoyances to gods and men. Still he seemed to have made

¹ xvi., 2123-5.

² *Vidyā dadāti vinayam vinayātyāti pātratātām pātratvaddhanam āpnoti dhanaddharmam tatah sukham.*—*Hitopadesa*, B. I., 6.

³ *i. e.*, gold-matter.

himself necessary for their goodnesses; for when Thor loses his hammer, to Loki he goes to find it for him.¹ Philosophy was for the Northman made up of riddles. Odin undertakes to contend with Vafthrudni in learning. He approaches him in disguise. Vafthrudni tells him:

“ Know that to thy parting step
Never shall these doors unfold,
If thy tongue excel not mine
In the strife of mystic lore.”²

It is a question of life or death to answer his questions. Thus is knowledge a prize to be struggled for; if needs be, to die for.

Such is the people we have attempted to describe; we have dived into its thoughts; we have measured the beatings of its heart; we have seen how its days were passed in the mist-land of its Continental homesteads; we have contemplated the germs of important modern institutions, but we have noticed very few indications of the great irresistible nation which was in after times to play such a conspicuous part in moulding the civilizations of Europe and America. But who sees the hero in the infant child?

THE FRAMEWORK OF SOCIETY.

Theory of Social Organization. By Charles Fourier. With an Introduction by Albert Brisbane. New York: C. P. Somerby. 1876.

The Relations of the Church to Society. By F. O'Reilly, S. J. (Irish Monthly Magazine, 1876.) Dublin: McGlashan & Gill.

THERE is a harmony in nature which is exceedingly grand. It sounds forth from earth, and sea, and sky. Artists have listened to it and loved it with the wildest passion; scientists have worn their lives away in search of the keynote to its songs. Geologists hear it in the heaving of the earth's vast bosom; physicists in the light, and heat, and motion that surround us on all sides, in the clouds that gather above us, and in the storms that sweep over us; and astronomers catch its echoes as they reach them from the remotest stars. This harmony is the unceasing hymn of order which rises from the universe, like the voice of devotion, giving to the Creator His glory and His praise.

¹ Thrym's Quida.

² Vafthrudni's mal.

Now no one who has made himself familiar with the study of nature, and with the order which thus disposes all things well, has failed to perceive that in the great storehouse of beings, the radical elements of this harmony are no other than multiplicity and unity, many reduced to one. But why this multiplicity, and whence this unity? St. Thomas answers the one, St. Augustine the other:

"Dicendum est," says the Angelical Doctor, "quod distinctio rerum et multitudo est ex intentione primi agentis, quod est Deus. Produxit enim res in esse propter suam bonitatem communicandam creaturis, et per eas representandam. Et quia per unam creaturam sufficienter representari non potest, produxit multas creaturas et diversas; ut quod deest uni ad representandam divinam bonitatem, suppleatur ex alia. Nam bonitas quæ in Deo est simpliciter et uniformiter, in creaturis est multipliciter et divisim. Unde perfectius participat divinam bonitatem et representat eam totum universum, quam alia quæcumque creatura." Sum. Theol., p. i., 2 q. 47, a. 1.

And St. Augustine, speaking of that natural impulse by which all things are urged on to the formation of their respective unity, tells us that this unity is no other than society, and that the motive power which makes them seek it is the inborn love of peace and concord.

"Ipsæ enim sævissimæ feræ," says he, "genus proprium quadam pace custodiunt, cœundo, gignendo, pariendo, fœtus fovendo atque nutriendo, cum sint pleræque inso-ciabiles et solivigæ . . . ut leones, vulpes, aquilæ, noctuæ. Quæ enim tigris non filiis suis mîtis immurmurat, et pacata feritate blanditur! Quis milvus, quantumlibet solita-rius rapinis circumvolet, non conjugium copulat, nidum congerit, ova confovet, pullos alit, et quasi cum sua matre familias societatem domesticam quanta potest pace conser-vat! Quanto magis homo fertur quodammodo naturæ suæ, legibus ad ineundam socie-tatem pacemque cum hominibus, quantum in ipso est, omnibus obtinendam!"

All things, then, must balance with one another, that the multi-plicity may find the repose of equilibrium; for equilibrium is peace, and peace is the stillness of order. And just as the great planetary worlds need to be influenced by one another's attraction, to the end that they wander not too far, nor strike in jarring dis-cord with the harmony of the whole; and just as every little drop of water which helps to swell the stream, needs the sweep of the mother current to bear it on to the sea; so men, if they would give to this life the harmony of order, and move forward in peace and security to their last and common end, must lean one upon an-other; and, leaning, form the bond of social unity.

Society, therefore, is man's element. Nature made him for it, for nature alone can be the author of that which is as universal in time and place as the dwelling of man in society. The helplessness of his infancy is only nature's assertion that he needs the as-sistance of his fellow-man. For, even the beasts of the field are better able at their birth to battle for life than man is when left alone in his early childhood. Only society can protect him, only society can perfect him, only there can he exercise his inestimable privilege

of speech, and find his life varied "with gleam and shadow and a peace supreme." His heart yearns after the social throng; his faculties need it for their development; his inborn aspiration to happiness leads him on almost of necessity. Nature even forestalls the longing by giving him birth in society. Man is born a social being. Social ties bind him with his swathing bands; social loves nestle in his heart when the first rays of light nestle on his brow. It is useless to talk of "*Status Naturæ*." Hobbes, and Rousseau, and those that follow them, may labor hard as they will to rob man of one of his inherent qualities; but they will never induce him to believe, if he study himself well, that nature made him but little better than the brute, a mere savage, with none but sensible appetites, and fit only "for treason, stratagems, and spoils." For nature does not change, and such as our natural aspirations now are, such were they in the beginning. Man now seeks, and he has ever sought, the delights of peace, not the inquietude of constant strife, as Hobbes would have us believe; and how much soever Rousseau may vaunt man's so-called freedom, he can never blot out the well-drawn line of demarcation by which every thinking man is forced to distinguish liberty from license. Hobbes would make man an earthen vessel of seething passions which in their base fury boil over; Rousseau would have him be an ideal bundle of contradictions which no one can understand. The former misunderstood the nature of man because his own material mind could see nothing but matter; the latter missed his aim because the shrine of his devotion was self-will, and the truth that man is a social being by nature, was probably made dark to him because of his own misanthropy.

Relying, then, upon the conviction that man was made for society, that nature destined him to it as to the crown of his highest perfections, and left in his heart a thirst for joys which only society can alleviate, it is worth one's while to examine the nature of this source of human pleasure, looking into the elements of which it consists, seeking the mainspring whence all its efficacy comes, and gazing upon it in the light of the beautiful exemplar which philosophy holds up before us, with truth for its foundation, with harmony for its action, and with the perfection of order as the object at which it aims.

I might proceed with the course of nature, and recall to mind the gradual evolution of man's social tendencies in the family, and in the filial and servile relations which the family circle most generally involves. But this would take too long. I wish to dwell upon that more developed form of social organization, civil society.

What, therefore, is civil society? It may be called "a perfect union of men gathered together for the enjoyment of their rights,

and for the sake of the common good." Hence we find in it two elements, a multitude possessing individual rights, and an influential and effective principle, reducing all to order, making the many one, and directing the activity of that one to the end which is to be attained. Both of these elements are essential. For, just as there can be no society without a multitude, so can there be none without authority. Moreover, in their union they make an organic whole, a whole whose parts are vivified and active, a whole whose members have their own private and independent functions; for, society is not a mere mechanism in which man must lose the dignity of his personality, the father give up his relationship to his child, and the master forego his right to command his servant; but a more perfectly developed moral person, a public guardian by whom all rights are protected and strengthened, and by whom other rights are superadded even to generosity.

Now, it matters little whether the principle of authority, the life-giving element of society, be intrusted to one or to many; it matters little whether it be the birthright of the prince, or a dignity consequent upon the choice of the people; it matters little whether it be wielded with unlimited freedom by a supreme ruler, or whether it must wait in its action for the voice of general assemblies; but it matters exceeding much that it come from God, that it be the Angel of Order sent down from heaven. Rousseau would have it otherwise; as, according to him, society is something accidental to man, something which nature did not have particularly in view; it is not necessary that authority should take its origin from any other source than man's free will. Having, on the one hand, established it as a starting-point, that man is in society, not by any necessity or law of nature, but by a *social pact* dictated by his own choice; and seeing, on the other hand, that there is now in society, and has ever been, a certain element called authority, the so-called philosopher dreams a queer dream concerning its birth. His confusion arises from a confused idea of liberty. Man, he says, is so essentially free that it is not in his power to dispose of that freedom. He cannot rid himself of it even if he desires to do so. True enough, it is convenient for him to enter society, for there he will enjoy many advantages; but, that society must be such as will allow every subject to remain perfectly free and obey no one but himself. How, therefore, is such a form of society to be brought about? Behold the social problem! Now see how the moralist attempts to explain his own puzzle: Let every individual citizen give up to society all his rights entirely, without reserve. Let it be an absolute grant, a perfect concession, and let it not be made to a chosen few, but to the whole community at large. It will follow, then, that every citizen will receive back from the public fund a certain amount

of rights equal to that enjoyed by any one of his fellow-men, and will, moreover, because of the reciprocity established, receive in return as much as he has given, thus losing nothing by the concession. Hence will arise the general will of one social person possessed of supreme authority, which, though made up of many, is, in its unity, superior to all. This supreme authority cannot be taken from the people. They are essentially and necessarily the ruler, and their authority is so sacred that it can neither be represented nor limited. Princes, therefore, and general assemblies, and, in fact, all who hold authority, are only ministers and magistrates of the people. Majesty is the populace; rebellion is only a name, for it is but the just exercise of a natural right. The people, as a body, may rise up against the ruler, because he is only the keeper of their trust; an individual, however, must not complain, for his contribution to the public fund is comparatively nothing.

Such is the "social contract," a system, which, to say nothing of the evil consequences it entails, is directly opposed to the voice of nature and the dictate of order. Socialism and communism, rebellion and anarchy follow logically in its train; the first two, because all men must, in such a society, be equal, and the rights of one must not exceed those of another; the last two, because the people are the monarch and their authority is supreme. What the people say is law, what they sanction is good, what they condemn is bad. Rulers are their servants only, and must obey their good pleasure, or be deposed. How could such a society exist without constant revolution?

But this theory, moreover, is *radically* false. The very foundation upon which it rests cannot stand. What is that liberty which the lovers of this "pact" pronounce so essential to man? Do they mean that one is so necessarily free that his free will cannot become enslaved? Such freedom is readily granted. But is subjection to the law, slavery? Is the preservation of order, tyranny? Is there no objective rule of rectitude to which man must conform? Surely no man of sense would ask for a liberty which is irrational, which reason shrinks from; and yet a liberty which is opposed to authority and lawful subjection is irrational; for, reason itself tells us that we must dispose the means to the end, that we must maintain order; and what is authority but the preserver of order, and an assistant in the right disposition of means to the end.

On the other hand, if by the word "liberty" in this system is meant an exemption from all law and order, man, in his dignity of a rational creature, spurns such an attribute. It would degrade him. He would no longer be rational, he would only be licentious, provident only against the present evils incident to mere animal existence, and he might be truly said:

"Propter vitam vivendi perdere causas."

And this is not all. The social "pact" would have all men give up all their rights, completely and unreservedly, in the formation of the social body, that they may contribute an equal share. But men do not possess equal rights. All, it is true, possess equal natural birthrights, rights which spring from human nature by the mere fact of birth; but there are other rights to be considered—acquired rights—rights whose variety springs fundamentally from man's liberty, inasmuch as various free wills adopt various lines of conduct by which these rights are won. Such rights are by no means equal in all men. They are different, for instance, in the rich and the poor, in the learned and the ignorant. Hence were men to give up all, wholly and entirely, into a public fund, their contributions would be far from equal.

Moreover, the efficacy of authority pronounces against the possibility of such a contract. The origin of a thing is known from its action. In the effect nothing can be found which is not virtually in the cause. Now in the action of authority there is something which never was and never can be in the people. It is the power of putting a necessary, a riveted and binding connection between man's acts (otherwise indifferent), and his last end. Authority tells me, "do this, else you will not reach your *summum bonum*;" and by the mere command my will is morally bound, and I must either execute that injunction or forfeit my good standing in the moral order. I have no choice. The act, it is true, was not of obligation before, and I could have gone on toward my last end without performing it; but now I cannot. I must do it, for authority has made it necessary. If I neglect it I shall lose my way to my final term, because I shall be thrown off the track of moral goodness. Now has any man, or has any body of men the right to lay down conditions to me which I must observe in order to work out my destiny? Where did they get such a right? I have not got it myself, and never had it, and hence I could not put it into the public fund. I cannot say to myself, "I will make the performance of act A and the omission of act B necessary means to my last end." The objective order of morality lies before me. I did not put it there, nor can I take it away, nor change it. Only He who gave me my last end can mark out the path which leads to it. Only He can know that path and will it; and when He knows it and wills it, it is. Now, authority puts this mysterious connection in my actions, and hence this efficacious principle cannot come from the people, but must, of necessity, come from God.

Not a little striking in regard to this theory of Rousseau, is the fact that some of its adherents pronounce it one and the same with the scholastic doctrine on this point. Nothing, certainly, could be farther from the truth. For whether we consider the scho-

lastic view as proposed by St. Thomas or as offered by Suarez, there is no similarity whatever between it and the system of "social contract." As to the doctrine of St. Thomas there can be no possible misunderstanding; for, in the opinion which he holds, authority comes directly and immediately from God to the ruler. The people do not meddle with it at all; they have nothing to do but to obey it. They may choose the subject in whom it is to reside, but the authority itself comes to him directly from heaven. The plea for confusion is drawn rather from the opinion of Suarez expressed in his writings against King James of England. It is not much of a plea, to be sure, but "confusion still confounded;" for, the weak ones of this world love to lean upon the mighty, and boast of fellowship with those whom they never knew. The sum and substance of the explanation of Fr. Suarez is as follows: The perfectibility of man requires a more complete and more widely developed society than the family. Man, therefore, is social by nature. For the sake of order and unity this society must have authority, or the supreme power of ruling. Authority, considered in itself, and abstractly from this or that form of government, comes immediately from God as the author of nature, and it is by no means either *totally* or *partially* in the individual, considered as such. Nevertheless it is bestowed upon the community at large, which can, in turn, confer it upon an individual person or a general assembly, or, for some just cause, be deprived of it and reduced to the subjection of a ruler. But, in all cases, the reason of authority being granted to any one is the consent of the people, either free or forced. Civil authority, therefore, in itself, is immediately from God; but in the subject who possesses it, it comes from God through the medium of the people.

Now, there is no one who cannot see the vast difference between this theory and the "social pact" of Rousseau. According to Suarez, authority comes from God; according to Rousseau, it is a creation of man's free will. The former asserts that it is neither *totally* nor *partially* in private individuals; no, not even in the whole collection of them, unless so far as they form a community and aim at some common end; the latter, on the contrary, maintains that it is but the sum total of individual rights, and, hence, may be found partially in each and every citizen. Suarez admits that the consent with which the multitude confers it upon some one person, may be forced consent; Rousseau admits no such thing. The one teaches that the supreme power, when once transferred, cannot be recalled; the other holds that it is so essentially and unchangeably in the multitude that the people cannot rid themselves of it even if they wish. It is apparent to every one how widely different these two systems are from each other.

It must be maintained then that authority, the animating element of society, is either directly or indirectly from God; and when it is vested in the rightful subject society is complete.

But the constitution of society will help little to man's perfection, if it be not firm and constant in carrying out the design for which the Almighty intended it. The mere formation is not sufficient. The body politic must look earnestly upon the work to be done, and do it nobly. It is no easy task to shape the conduct of man. His free will is always ready to imagine that it sees fetters for its freedom. His passions are strong even under restraint; and the spirit of egotism is like a shadow over his mind. At all times he leads a double life, and he can "smile and smile and be a villain." On the other hand, authority too often loves to walk side by side with tyranny. It is but a step from the ruler to the despot, and the playground of civil authority borders upon sacred precincts where no magistrate of temporal power must intrude.

There, then, lies the circle in which civil society must move, for it is necessary that it be marked out clearly. Let us listen to the voice of reason proclaiming the dictates of order. It tells us that man is a wayfarer upon earth; that the term of his journey is a spirit land; that he must tend to it with all his might and main; that he must allow nothing to thwart him in his course; that while he is on his way nothing is good save that which helps him thither; that nothing can give him this help but the powers of his soul, knowing and loving the true and the good; and that if he fail, he alone is responsible for the failure. So far, then, as civil society is concerned I can think and wish as I please. Public powers have nothing to do directly with my interior life. If God had meant civil society to direct my conscience He would have given it the means to know my conscience, for He never asks impossibilities; He gives means for the end. But we must not suppose that society has no control over the exterior manifestations of that conscience. It certainly has. It must have a care of external order, and it has a right to know the thoughts of even my inmost mind, when those thoughts concern matters over which society has control. Hence the civil magistrate demands my oath as to the rights of my neighbor in litigation; and the criminal court bids me call heaven to witness that my testimony concerning the prisoner is true. Such matters touch closely upon my sacred, private, individual life; but as that life may at times bear largely upon external order, the guardian of that order may command my better life, for his obligation of reaching the end includes the privilege of using those means without which the end cannot be attained. The sphere, therefore, of civil society is confined immediately to man's external conduct, extending now and then to his inner life, not because of any juris-

diction over that life, but because of that action which the powers of the soul exert in shaping the destinies of the outer world.

But this is not all. Civil society must seek not only the external good, without detriment to the internal, and without intruding upon its sanctuary; but it must, moreover, search diligently after the universal good. It is supreme in its order, and intended by nature to confer upon man the finishing touch of his social perfection. It must not limit itself to the welfare of a chosen few, for it has to do not with a heap of *things* but with an assemblage of *persons*, bound by nature with the link of mutual benevolence, and singly and separately enjoying a dignity of personality which society must respect, and to whose well-being it must direct its efforts.

What, then, must we say of governments which seem to exist only to enrich those in power, and those who by money, chicanery, and deceit succeeded in putting them there? What shall we say of public men who, chosen by the people for sacred trusts, spend the wealth of society for private interest? What must be said of useless expenditures from the public fund, and taxations so exorbitant that the poor man must sell his little property because the keeping of it costs more than its value. What of compulsory education, the public school system,—base, barbaric inroads upon the private home circle and the sacred conscience? What of the enormous sums laid out in empty decorations and political pomp when thousands upon thousands of the country's best children are begging for bread? What of public railways when there is nothing to transport, and standing armies when no enemy is near? It is vain to talk of national greatness and public prosperity when no progress is discernible save that which may be found in any noisy machine-shop—a mere multiplication of wheels, and bands, and lathes, and trucks, and patent brakes, and such conversation as: “I will buy with you, sell with you, talk with you, walk with you, and so following; but I will not eat with you, drink with you, nor pray with you. What news on the Rialto?”

“ And so, from hour to hour, we ripe and ripe,
And then, from hour to hour, we rot and rot,
And thereby hangs a tale !”

It should not be so. Let authority keep within its limits, and make the people keep within theirs. Let the exercise of power be intrusted to such men as will deem the trust sacred. Let the legislative assembly be made up of such as are wise and prudent, and familiar with the public wants. Let the judiciary be learned in the law and just in judgment. Let the executive be firm in its best purpose and efficient in its action. And, above all, let officials be convinced that their life must be a life of unflinching duty to the public weal, not an idle pastime of personal pleasure.

On the other hand, subjects should remember that man is always more ready to contend for his *rights*, than for his *duties*. He forgets that duty is the very foundation of all his rights. Had he no duty to perform he would have no rights to claim, for he has no right to anything except to do his duty. Now it is authority which points out this duty to him, and it is civil authority which points out a great part of it. Civil authority is, therefore, his benefactor, and must be considered as such.

Moreover it is, as we know, divine, rendering sacred the person in whom it resides. Hence so far should subjects be from sedition and ill will, that love and reverence ought to be their main and constant attitude toward their ruler. After all, what is he but a guide to help them to reach their last end? a human guide, it is true, and, consequently, liable to weakness and error, but none the less, on that account, the magistrate of the Most High, presiding over the temporal affairs and the destinies of men.

But one can hardly help seeing, that to bring about results so desirable is no easy task. The perfection of society is something, it seems, to be hoped for and prayed for, but never to be realized. And why is it a thing so difficult? Simply because the free will of man acts unseen, lays its own plans, and matures its own projects without the slightest check or influence from without. Our higher life, the life of calculation, of forethought, and the power to foil, may be degenerate in its action. It may stoop to scheme against the law, and shirk the labors of duty, and smooth its face with the sweetness of innocence when led to the bar of justice. "The genius and the mortal instruments are then in council, and the state of man, like to a little kingdom, suffers then the nature of an insurrection." External actions of rectitude cannot long subsist unless supported by a firm and upright will. Man's internal actions, then, need a check and a spur. The unseen life which every one enjoys in the secret chambers of his own mind must be a life of order, and there must be some authority to put that order there. Civil society cannot do it, but there is a society which can. It is religion. Hence civil society cannot make one step towards stable perfection without the help of religion; for the perfection of society is unity and efficacy, and this unity must be a moral unity—the unity of love. Now the first element of moral unity is unity of minds, and this cannot be had with any stability whatsoever, unless the internal man be kept in the path of order. Nor can this be done by mere religious toleration, a complete separation of Church and State. Something positive is necessary, something active and efficient. A distinguished moralist speaking upon this point says:

"Is it not plain that a philosophy which preaches indifferentism attacks the very root and essence of true unity in society? Men grow enthusiastic over the flourishing con-

dition of commerce in its various branches, over the ingenious application of steam, over its annihilation of distance, its victory over mountain ranges and deep, dark oceans. It is all well. But if they expect more than a *physical* union and facility of communication, if they expect by these mechanical means to obtain a *moral* union, they mistake sadly. The moral order is based on the judgments of minds, and, consequently, moral unity requires a unity of judgment. But unity of judgment, in a school of mere toleration, means only that no one be contradicted. That is, it consists of a purely negative judgment. A negation, then, a nothing, forms the support of that social unity, truly a support worthy of a society which feels weighed down by the light burden of the Divine Sovereign. It is not difficult to foresee the fate of such an intellectual edifice which has less than the point of Archimedes for its foundation. Even a material tower built on solid ground must fall when the corner-stone crumbles."

It is religion then, and religion alone, which can unite the social elements, multitude and authority, in the bonds of love. No other power can effect that moral union which is so essential to society, without which the social body is a mere collection of many men working for their individual profit and respecting authority only because they fear it; but with which it is not only the final term of all man's natural perfections, not only the garden of his dearest delights, and the fair field of labors in which he is to work out his task of time, but something ennobled, something personified, aye, even deified; for with this union of love society is, as Father Tapparelli says, an image of the Trinity itself. Whatever be the relation of Church to State, whatever the rights and duties of religion in society, certain it is that the Church cannot be ignored by the body politic, nor the influence of religion be eliminated from the social throng. If civil society mean anything at all, it means a moral being constituted of a twofold element whose union is effected by a moral, not by a physical agent. Armies might march and countermarch through the length and breadth of the land; navies and flotillas might be fitted out and floated on every sea and lake and river; penal laws might be multiplied, and the hangman might hoist his gibbet on every public square; but such means could never beget the bond of moral union—the union of hearts and of minds. It would, at best, give us serfdom, not society, and the multitude would be as so many slaves that hang around the palaces of their lords waiting to do the bidding of a self-appointed master.

We cannot ignore the fact that where religion is discarded, patriotism degenerates into policy, and principle into a spirit of self-advancement, which, to great manhood, must be most contemptible. It is the logical outcome of a godless crowd. If authority be not divine, and if my neighbor was meant only to be my tool, why should I regard the one, and why should I not make effective use of the other? Am I not a man as well as he whom the wave of circumstance has washed to a higher surface? Have I not a right to win my game of wit and wisdom, if I can play upon the simplicity

of my fellow-man, or foil the thrust of my social foe? Without religion society takes the form of a motley crew, the "high thoughts of the children of God" are materialized into passions and pleasures that centre upon self, and the honest and upright are forced to bear the "proud man's contumely and the oppressor's wrong."

It is strange that men wonder at the seeming impropriety of dragging religion into the contests of civic broils! By the very nature of things religion is a part of the civic whole, and without it the civic throng would be *uncivil*. If our civil obligations are based upon the nature of society, and if society needs religion to give union between the multitude and the powers that be; they, chiefly, are civil and logical in their demands, who require some link divine between themselves and authority, before they feel constrained "to groan and sweat under a weary life." And we find it ever so.

Hardly a move is made in the political world, the world of trifles, trade, and traffic, but the holy name of religion must be dealt with as if a byword! It is forgotten that religion is the gathering up and the striking of ten thousand chords which bind the creature to the Creator, making the harmony of the world's worship; it is forgotten that religion is a thing divine, a diplomatic scheme, surpassing in its order all powers of human intelligence, and lifting man, in his littleness, to the high and glorious plane of supernatural greatness; but it is not, and it can never be forgotten, that without religion society is moral chaos. "Go and teach all nations!" said the Divine Founder of both church and society. "In thee, my Church, my spouse, I have embodied whatever religious obligations the human mind can dictate. Teach thou the nations of the earth! If they be simple in their faith, and true in their devotion, teach them that as civil societies they are the means to a glorious end, the path to a high and holy heaven; but if they be too worldly-wise and proud in their generation, and cast away thy yoke as galling, and thy burden as more than they can bear, teach them in my name that their wisdom is the fool's folly and their progress, moral corruption, social decay!" Religion is an essential ingredient of society; not an element, precisely, but an agent whose action affects the elements and their union most intrinsically; and it is but logical that those who wish to build their fortunes on the ruins of society, should mark with scorn that Church which alone is the expression of religion, and pronounce her a stumbling-block in the way of their selfish schemes.

The history of this, our native land, is urged as a proof of civil success where the service of God has been nobly ignored, and a spirit of toleration, a negative element, introduced as a substitute for positive, practical religion. But it can be seriously doubted if

such a conviction exist in the mind of any one who has studied our history in its philosophy. An able and interesting writer reviewing our centennial retrospect in the *Catholic World* for July last, makes plain the fact that our spirit of toleration, our negative bond of union, was only a conciliatory measure, acted upon in hurried and trying moments, and necessary at the time, amid so many religious factions, for that physical union of rank and file which was to withstand all armies from abroad. The very framers of our Constitution knew, in their deeper minds, that in the after time, in the periods of peace, such a link could not hold. Was their better judgment a forecast of the present hour? We cannot tell. But it seems to clear-sighted men that our social tie at present is a complicated thing; and that our bond of union is something of a Gordian knot which may yet have to be cut with a soldier's sword. God forbid a result so disastrous. But the sacred writer tells us:

"Nisi Dominus ædificaverit domum, in vanum laboraverunt qui ædificant eam. Nisi Dominus custodierit civitatem, frustra vigilat qui custodit eam." Ps. cxxiv. 1, 2.

Religion, then, is the bond of society. We must meet the emergency. False science, impropriety, and impurity of art, are against us. So-called principles of light and heat and motion are noised abroad like voices from heaven, destroying in their logical sequence all spiritual, and consequently moral life; and we are heralded as fools unless we can find wisdom in folly. We are pronounced stupid if we cannot admire what our religion teaches us to forget. Such a state of things cannot last, for though an individual may be outcast and immoral during the long years of a mortal span, society must move on steadily to its perfection, or fall suddenly into corruption and decay. And while we trust that better times await us, and that our multitude and authority may in the future be blended by something more than policy and personal profit, let us not forget that society is made up of individuals, and that the social elements will be safely and surely united, only in proportion as every individual is true to his religious duty.

THE CHURCH AND THE STATE.

THE TWO "CITIES" IN THE PRESENT AGE.

Christianity and its Conflicts, Ancient and Modern. By E. E. Marcy, A.M.
New York : D. Appleton & Co., 1867.

Essays on Catholicism, Liberalism, and Socialism. By John Donoso Cortes. Translated from the Spanish by Rev. William McDonald, S.Th.L. Dublin: William B. Kelly, 1874.

ALL the States of Europe have, in a greater or less degree, broken loose from the Church, and it seems to many that the Church is a great loser—nay, the only loser—by this deplorable fact. They imagine that in the separation that has taken place all the power, greatness, prosperity has remained with the States, and that the Church has been reduced to insignificant inferiority. This is undoubtedly the idea many men of our age have formed of her actual situation. Was it with this conviction that our previous papers on the subject were penned? Was it ever granted in them that the Church's influence has so far dwindled away that it is now almost a cipher? Did we concede that the European States acquired, by separating themselves from her, such an independent and superior standing that they have become at last masters of themselves and of the world, and reached the acme of prosperity and grandeur? God forbid that this should have been the result of our previous considerations. Nothing, certainly, was further from our mind.

To correct, however, any misapprehension of the kind, it is proper to place, face to face, the Church on the one side and the European States on the other, and see which of the two possesses more real power and true pre-eminence. A more just estimate of the actual situation of the Church will undoubtedly be the consequence of such a comparison, and the loud boasts of her enemies may be considerably lowered in tone. In the title of this paper the Church and the State are called "the two cities"—an evident allusion to the work of St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*. In order to speak correctly from the outset of what we shall say, and to have exact ideas all through this discussion, the reader must understand that the "States" are placed in antagonism to the "Church," not absolutely, not in the sense that they are already the incarnation of Antichrist, but because they are in a great degree ruled over by really anti-Christian ideas, and thus form a City opposed to

the City of God. This last assertion needs no proof. The historical facts of anterior ages, and the present bias of civil rulers in Europe, as portrayed in previous articles, are sufficient evidences of the unpleasant truth that Christian countries, so called, are ruled by men who have in fact repudiated Christianity.

Have their schemes thus far attained complete success? Have they reduced their antagonist to the position of a suppliant or a slave? Far from it, thank God! Both parties being represented under the figure of a City, it will not be difficult to prove that the Church is yet, (1) the City of God; (2) a universal City; (3) a fast increasing and prosperous City; (4) a harmonious and happy City. The European States, as at present constituted, can lay no claim to any of these characteristics, but just the reverse, and it is chiefly in these four particulars that their pretensions to having become superior to the Church will appear preposterous. In this discussion declamation must be avoided, and it is believed that none of the facts that we shall place before our readers can be contradicted or gainsaid. Warmth, however, is not declamation, and when the case is clear, proved, demonstrated, an exhibition of feeling from the heart is not a fault.

I. THE CHURCH.

1. What is, what must be the City of God? A reflex of His great attributes. Two of them particularly must shine in it—His unchangeableness and His holiness. Built by the Almighty on "eternal hills," it must be like God himself, ever ancient and ever young, and, moreover, it must be holy and perfect in its interior essence. God is absolutely unchangeable in His eternity; He is also holiness itself. The Church evidently possesses both these prerogatives, and consequently she is called His City. First, therefore, ancient and hoary as the world, young and blooming as a bride, the Church is now what she ever was. Innumerable eons, interminable ages may pass over her without leaving on her the imprint of time. As nature every spring is as young and fresh as on the first day of creation, so the City of God is ever the same which St. John announced would come down from heaven on the last day, "prepared as a bride adorned for her husband." And the reason is given by the Prophet of the Apocalypse reporting to us the words of God: "Behold I make all things new." How can the "daughter of the King," the "betrothed of the Almighty," she whom God holds constantly in His loving hands, whom the creative breath from His lips ever permeates and vivifies, ever become old and decrepit, senile and obsolete, though ever so ancient?

Yet many lying lips have uttered the words: "The time of the Church has gone; she is now too old; she will soon be dead and

buried out of sight." Who are you that give the lie to God, and pretend that what He once said can ever become untrue? Are you so blind as not to see that the Bride of Christ is yet a virgin, as sweet, and pure, and young, and fresh as on the day when she was born from the side of the Saviour hanging on the cross? Are not the words she daily pronounces over every child brought to the fount in this nineteenth century the words of a young mother with smiles on her lips and perfume in her breath: *Eplpheta, adaperire, in odorem suavitatis?* It requires a great deal of unconscious ignorance or wilful blindness not to know that this, her spell, is as powerful now to open the ears of a babe to the doctrine of Christ, by infusing faith through them, as it was when it fell on the ears of infants in the very age of the Apostles. Does she not thus renew the world by her breathing and touch? Is not every new generation of Christian children a proof that she is as young as she was eighteen hundred years ago? Go and inquire in all the great cities of this country how many thousands are thus regenerated by her every year. Judge by it how many millions you would find if you could compass the whole globe in your search. And bear in mind that most of these babes will grow up to manhood, and many of them will devote their life to God and His Church not less now than three, and four, and five hundred years ago.

But she is not satisfied with filling the atmosphere with her youthful breath, and spreading faith as a cloud charged with dew to refresh the earth. Besides the silent operation of grace which God gave to her keeping, she dispenses her blessings by her sweet voice, and her infallible teaching is as powerful now as it ever was—another proof of her perpetual youth. For it is the Church that inspires so many of her servants to devote their lives to the instruction of their brethren. It is in fact the word of the Church which issues from the lips of those innumerable instructors. Can any one imagine that their utterances convey only an effete doctrine, which was listened to, it is true, by our priest-ridden ancestors, but which everybody in this age of light laughs at and rejects? Any one who imagines this is greatly mistaken. The Christian doctrine is never antiquated and time-worn, because it is the only doctrine really adapted to human nature and to human spiritual needs and aims, which is absolutely required by our highest aspirations, and cannot be replaced by anything else in the world. If you are not fully persuaded of this, go into one of our churches whenever the Word of God is preached, and see with what avidity it is received, with what open ears it is drank in, with what beaming eyes it is approved. As a famishing man, able at last to satisfy the cravings of hunger, shows his keen appetite for the food and

drink his body needs, so likewise the mind of every man, to whatever race he may belong, rejoices to have found what his soul absolutely requires, whenever the Church's teaching is imparted to him.

And yet in this age when the prodigious development of the Church, morally, intellectually, numerically, must astonish every impartial beholder, men pretend she is old, dead, or at least dying; and in countries where she is literally covering the soil with innumerable institutions of learning, of morality, of benevolence, she is accused of being effete and worn out. Has there ever been an age since Christ came, always excepting the apostolic period, when her activity was greater, her progress more triumphant? And this is the case not only on this continent of North America. Go to Europe whence the people of this country originally came, and inquire what the Church is doing in France in restoring what was destroyed a hundred years ago. Go to England, to Germany, to what are called the Protestant States of Europe, and ask if she now is buried there after having been pronounced dead fifty years ago. Pass on then to the antipodes, to Australia, to China, to the South Seas, and see if she is not giving signs, in those immense countries sitting in the shadow of death, of all the freshness of youth and the strength of maturity. Like Christ she is evidently *heri et hodie et in sæcula sæculorum*.

Has the apostasy of rulers in this age injured her prospects and left her without hope because without earthly support? No, no; the world will finally be obliged to acknowledge that she still is young. Happy if it would learn the true reason of this, namely, that she has a spouse who constantly renews her youth by His tender embrace. That spouse is Christ Himself, who "abides with her," as he promised; who does not leave her children "orphans" but ever "comes to them," as he announced by the lips of St. John.

There is, no doubt, in this age, a great activity displayed by the world for the material welfare of mankind. The earth seems to be on the point of being renovated; but the description of this would carry us beyond the limits necessarily imposed upon us. An analogous development of facts would show that the energy manifested by the Church for the salvation of souls, is at least equal to the prodigious worldly activity now so remarkable all over the earth.

The second characteristic of the Church, on account of which she can rightly be called the City of God, is holiness. Her children know this thoroughly, as they are fully conscious that if they desire to be holy they must place themselves entirely under the gentle guidance of the Church. But men who in fact can have no idea of sanctity, since they seem to have entirely forgotten, or at least

never reflect upon, the commandments of God, on which alone true morality reposes, declare that instead of being holy she is the "mother of abominations." Men who can scarcely be said to have a conscience, because owing to their utter abjuration of the supernatural they admit of no sanction whatever for it, have pretended and still pretend that holiness does not belong to the Church, and that in point of fact her best children are no better than pagans. There even are people who have not forgotten the commandments of God, and who therefore may really have a conscience, who yet, carried away by extraordinary sophisms, assert that the sum of morality or immorality has always been about the same on earth, about the same in modern times that it was in the ante-Christian period.

But the voice of mankind, the verdict of history, innumerable testimonies rendered in all ages by the very adversaries of the Church, prove that all these assertions are either one-sided statements or absolute falsehoods. There is no need of a long discussion. A simple remark will be sufficient to settle the question beyond dispute. It is the simple incontrovertible fact that, Christ being the acknowledged exemplar of all holiness (very few persons, indeed, daring to carry profanity to the extent of impugning His sanctity) the Church continually holds up to her children Christ crucified as the pattern for them to imitate in the cultivation of every virtue. How many millions have loved Christ to the shedding of their blood, because they were so taught by their mother, the Church? How many millions, placing themselves altogether under her gentle control, in this age of cold apathy, love Christ above any human love? Yet, who can love Him without being pure, holy, a true copy of the great original? Who can imagine that in the old pagan world, or that in modern times outside of the Christian pale, there could be, or can be, anything approaching to the perfection of His sanctity?

It is true the world does not know these humble lovers of the Son of Mary. They, like the Pharisees of old, do not publish their sanctity with a trumpet. Nay, should you question them, particularly when in the secret of Christian confidence they pour the anxiety of their soul into the ear of a spiritual friend, they will tell you that they are great sinners; they will express vividly their fear of the judgments of God. The world may smile at this and pretend that it is pure hypocrisy, but they are truly in earnest, and often it is a difficult task to quiet their apprehensions and enable them to repose sweetly on the mercy of God. Now when saintly men thus tremble at the thought of the unapproachable holiness of God, will any one dare say that the holiness of the Christian is not above that of the pagan?

I put it to you, men of the world, whose intellect is undoubtedly powerful, and who are able to judge of what is true and sincere, can there be a stronger proof that holiness exists in the Church than these anxious fears of the Christian? If the pattern of sanctity placed by the Church before the eyes of her children were not the highest, do you think that the human conscience could be so sensitive and so much afraid of evil, when evil is only a shadow, as is often the case for these pure souls? Only for this reason those who never offend seriously against the commands of God can imagine and think in all sincerity that they do not deserve that God should press them to His bosom. It is certainly strange, and there is a difficulty to explain these groundless fears. But Eliphaz, in the Book of Job, has done it in our opinion when he exclaimed that "in His angels God hath found depravity"—*In angelis suis reperivit pravitatem*. Even angelic purity compared to that of God is depravity; and on this account the purest and holiest souls feel more keenly their unworthiness in the eyes of God.

Independently of this consideration, which of itself would settle the question we discuss, every candid man must admit that in the Christian Church alone a thorough moral training is gone through by all human souls subjected to her control. What was the moral training of the pagans? What is the moral training of those whose parents have altogether rejected the authority of the Church? Do they ever examine their conscience? Do they put any restraint on their passions, except so far as the maxims of the world compel them? But no one is unaware of the extreme care taken by Christian parents under the Church's advice to mould the souls of their children from the very start, so as to make them moral and pious. No one can deny that God's ministers in the Catholic Church embrace zealously every opportunity of training the young in the practice of virtue. And this priestly oversight and zeal is not confined to the young; but people of every age, every rank in society, every disposition of mind and heart, are the objects of it in season, and also occasionally perhaps out of season. But this very occasional excess so much resented by the worldly is a proof that it is active and energetic. Now, who can believe that the pagan system of leaving every one to his own guidance, and never attempting to train men morally, can produce as abundant fruits of holiness as the Christian system?

But I hear from some an absolute dissent as to my conclusion. "Whatever, it is said, may be the means taken to insure holiness in the Church, the fact is that Christians are often as bad and occasionally worse than other people. St. Paul himself found it out among the Corinthian Christians (1 Cor. v. 1), *tuiis fornicatio qualis nec inter gentes*. In every age since his time the world's history

has been the record of many crimes and a few virtues." Many other statements of a like character might be made. These few will suffice.

It is not true that the world's history has always been the same in this respect. All intelligent men recognize an immense difference between the long period which preceded our Saviour's advent and the eighteen centuries which have followed. Many books have been written on this very subject, and the demonstration furnished by them is unanswerable. But, besides this general remark, it is a fact which cannot be separated from the subject we are discussing, that whatever crimes have been committed by Christians, the Church has always reprobated them, whilst in paganism they were never publicly rebuked. When St. Paul, addressing the Corinthians, wrote the words which have just been quoted, he made the charge against one individual, but reproved the whole community for not having sufficiently punished the guilty person. In this he established a custom which forever provided in the Church a remedy against excessive corruption. There is among us, since that time, a public authority to denounce guilt and bring it under censure, which never existed and could not, in fact, exist before.

The consequence of this is very remarkable, namely, that Christian nations when they become corrupt are reclaimable. This was not the case anteriorly. Reformation is a word which has become common since that time, but which the Latin world previously never used in the sense in which it is now employed. As to the extraordinary simplicity of those good souls who believed that Luther was the first to speak of and bring on reformation among Christians, it is more to be pitied than blamed, owing to the atmosphere of cant in the midst of which they have been brought up. Even a very superficial knowledge of ecclesiastical history proves that nothing has been so common as the reclaiming of cities, tribes, and even nations, from vice and loose habits of life by zealous apostolic men, as St. Paul was. All ages of the Church, without exception, have witnessed remarkable examples of it; and the same process will continue to the end of time.

This has never happened among pagans, except when true prophets of God were sent to some of those people, on a particular reformatory mission, as Jonas to the Ninevites and Elias to the schismatic people of Israel. The reformation of pagan peoples, by their own moral efforts or under the guidance of their own pagan priests or philosophers, is a Utopia which is yet to be discovered in ancient history. Mr. Franz de Champagny thought he had found an example of it in the Antonine dynasty among the Roman Cæsars; but it can be easily proved that there was no real reformation in Rome at the time; that the few stoic philosophers of the epoch

cannot be called reformers of the nation; that the little which they did among an insignificant number of the upper classes soon evaporated under the infamous reigns of Commodus and Elagabalus; and, finally, that a great part of the change effected for the better through philosophical maxims, which came then into vigor, was the result of Christian doctrine, which was already spreading itself through the city from the catacombs. In the old pagan world the decline was constant and apparently irremediable. Holiness did not belong to it. The student of history has to go up through the ages towards the very origin of mankind to find pure morality. Morality once lost could never be recovered except through divine intervention, which did not take place for the ancients until Christ came. In the Christian Church that supreme intervention is always at hand. The Holy Ghost "has filled the universe," *replevit orbem terrarum*, and henceforth cannot be driven away. This is the source of the Church's holiness, and of the possibility at all times of her renovation. On this account there is always in the Church *regnum sanctorum cum Christo*, "the reign of the Saints with Christ," as St. Augustine said, and because of this she is to-day the "City of God."

2. For this reason likewise the Church is a *Universal City*. Her name alone proves it, for she is, and always has been, and always shall be, the Catholic Church. The meaning of this word is apparently well understood; still men do not conceive thoroughly enough its whole purport. By the strength of her Catholicity she not only exists everywhere, which is usually the only thing considered in the meaning of the vocable—Catholic; but she has the right and the duty to address all nations; she has a claim upon them all, and when she has once established herself among any of them, she keeps her place and refuses to be driven away. Less than a hundred years after the death of the Apostles it already was so; it has continued to be so ever since; it will continue to be so to the end of the world. Doubts may exist in the minds of some as to whether what we have said holds good of so early a period of the Church's history. But apart from many details which cannot be mentioned here, there is a celebrated text of Tertullian, which conclusively settles the question (*Adv. Judæos*, cap. vii.). We copy from the translation of the Edinburgh edition of 1870:

"Upon whom else have the universal nations believed, but upon the Christ who is already come? For whom have the nations believed, Parthians, Medes, Elamites, and they who inhabit Mesopotamia, Armenia, Phrygia, Cappadocia, and they who dwell in Pontus, and Asia, and Pamphylia, sojourners in Egypt, and inhabitants of the region of Africa which is beyond Cyrene, Romans and sojourners, yes, and in Jerusalem Jews, and all other nations; as for instance, *by this time*, the varied races of the Gætulians, and manifold confines of the Moors, all the limits of the Spains, and the diverse nations of the Gauls, and the haunts of the Britons inaccessible to the Romans, but sub-

jugated to Christ; and of the Sarmatians, and Dacians, and Germans, and Scythians, and of many remote nations, and of provinces and islands many, to us unknown and which we can scarcely enumerate? In all which places the name of Christ who is already come reigns, as of Him before whom the gates of all cities have been opened, and to whom none are closed, before whom iron bars have crumbled, and brazen doors been opened. . . . All these prophecies (of Isaias) have been evidently fulfilled, inasmuch as in all these places dwells the 'people' of the name of Christ. For who *could* have reigned *over all nations* but Christ, God's Son, who was ever announced as destined to rule eternally over all nations."

This passage and many others of like import have been impugned by modern critics as full of vague exaggeration. But to our mind the meaning of the passage is well defined, and Tertullian could very well have had positive information of the spread of Christianity among all the nations he names; the others are only intimated in general terms, as was proper. He is, indeed, very guarded—certainly more than usual with him—in stating openly, not that in those various countries all were Christians, but that "in all those places dwelt the people of the name of Christ."

The Church was, therefore, already actually Catholic when Tertullian wrote. Do people generally reflect sufficiently on this prerogative which is as perfectly her own to-day as it ever was? Her influence may have declined in Europe, but not an inch of her possessions has she lost. Is it not a wonderful fact that, after all the victories her enemies boast of having achieved against her, she yet is everywhere on earth, claims every human child as her own, proclaims her intention of making all nations one family, and, when driven away by force from a country, does not give up the idea of conquering it, but returns to the attack at the first opportunity, and invariably succeeds in the end?

See, too, how compact and homogeneous is this universal city, though composed of so many jarring elements. Within its folds all the races of man are comprised, and what no human ruler could do, she does with perfect ease. The supernatural dogmas of her belief and the strict code of her morality are adopted by peoples who are supposed by many philosophers to have naturally and essentially discordant principles of ethics. Montesquieu has pretended that morality changes with the latitude, and that what suits admirably northern nations cannot possibly rule those of the south. The Catholic Church proves every day that she is entirely above such a pretended discordant rule; and it is well known that what she obliges her children to believe and to do is the same for all, and she would refuse to acknowledge as her own any people who would ask the most trifling exemption in essentials. Thus her subjects are the same everywhere. The most eastern Asiatics as well as the western Europeans, the nomad Tartar as well as the scientific Frenchman, when once they are Catholics, have precisely

the same ideas on God, on the human soul, on a future life, on the conditions required to insure happiness in heaven, on everything which pertains to religion and the higher world. Is this possible, humanly speaking? Has any conqueror ever attempted it? In the whole history of mankind three or four heroes, as they are called, have conceived the thought of subduing the world and establishing a universal empire; but not one of them was ever so out of his senses as to suppose that he could impose the same belief and the same morality on all nations. Rome herself, in her dream of a perpetual and universal dominion, took good care not to attempt to establish a universal religion. Still the Catholic Church has this precisely as her great, almost only, object,—to spread the doctrine of Christ to the utmost bounds of the earth, and she does it in the most simple and natural manner. She merely places in the hands of her missionaries a catechism which they have to teach to the converted nations. Look into those apparently insignificant little books, and you will remark that the doctrine is absolutely the same, whether they are designed for the most distant tribes along the Mackenzie River, or for those who live in tropical countries along the Amazon and the Ganges.

Has this universal proselytism and absolute sway been curtailed in the least, in modern times, by the otherwise successful efforts of the enemies of the Church to weaken her influence? By no means; the reverse rather must be acknowledged as the truth. Her missions are every day expanding; new districts are constantly added to the administrative system of her hierarchy; hundreds of churches are built every year; and territories which had never before been embraced by her loving grasp are gradually invaded by her mild proselytism. Thus the Church, notwithstanding the vexations of the State, encircles the whole globe, and extends evermore her peaceful conquests. We shall soon see what figure the State makes in comparison with her.

3. This leads us naturally to consider the continual increase of the Church, at a time, too, when she is said by many to be on the point of disappearing. This will require but a few words. It would be curious, indeed, to look into this matter, had exact statistics of the number of the children of the Church been kept all through her career. It would then be possible to ascertain if there have ever been in her life periods of decrease as well as of increase. It is quite possible, for instance, that at the outburst of Protestantism, when the majority of people in the north of Europe apostatized from the faith, there may have been a sudden and considerable falling off in the number of Catholics. This is, however, doubtful, because it happened at the precise epoch when the discoveries of the Portuguese in the East, and of the Spaniards in the West,

opened the doors of the Church to a very considerable number of far distant nations who for the first time heard and received the good tidings of the Gospel. It is, indeed, very likely that, instead of a falling off, there may have been a large addition to the number of the faithful. If an impartial study of the question were made, by examining carefully its elements as found in the Christian annals, especially, say, for every fifty years during the last five centuries, we would not be surprised if the law should be found to be that of constant increase. It is certain that at this moment the children of the Church are increasing in number all over the world at a remarkable rate. That this is the case everywhere out of Europe will not be denied, when the present labors of Catholic apostles in foreign missions are strictly inquired into.

But in Europe it may be said "that the apostasy of States as States—that is, the refusal of the rulers of nations to consider the Catholic Church as a social element, except in a very subordinate capacity—must have greatly diminished the number of the faithful." We think thus far it has had very little influence. The Catholic Church never depended much on the State. Had she been like Anglicanism as regards the sources of her strength, a bill of Parliament in each of the various States would have sealed the fate of religion. But Catholicity has a Head and a foundation different from the State. When the State abjures its moral subordination to the Church, it becomes a mere *abstraction* for her. But all the units composing the religious Society of Christ are *concrete*, and know that they have a Head distinct from that of the State. Their number, therefore, cannot be seriously diminished by the State's action.

A more precise analysis of the chief elements of this question will make the true state of the case still more evident. In the strict union between Church and State, such as it was formerly, the religious body enjoyed two advantages which it has now very nearly lost. The first was the wealth, the pomp, the exterior display attendant on the honors bestowed by the State; the second was the enforcement of the ecclesiastical rule by the civil power. The average class of mankind is strongly acted upon by each of these, and it is possible that in the present *status* a number of people neglect the practice of their religion, because almost all exterior motives to it have been taken away. But have these men actually apostatized, though they are lukewarm and thoughtless? By no means. Most of them are Christians still, and remember it, at least at the hour of death. Nay, on many occasions during their lives they wake up, and religion makes the more impression on account of her exclusively heavenly character. This awakening was particularly remarkable in Paris on Easter Sunday, the 1st of

April last. A daily paper, *La France*, expressed it to perfection by saying: "Had a stranger suddenly found himself in Paris for the first time in his life on that day, at the sight of so many magnificent and vast religious edifices crowded with people from morning to night, he would have been ready to swear that the French capital was the most Catholic city in the world." Let the government in France, therefore, become yet more anti-Christian than it is, let the radical party succeed and break asunder entirely the connection of the State with Catholicity, the French people and the Parisians among them, many of them at least, will continue to be Catholic, and show it, too, as they did last Easter-day.

4. A fourth and last consideration in regard to this branch of our subject is the harmony existing among all the faithful members of the Church. Admirable spectacle offered by the Catholic religion! Whoever believes in it and practices it is in perfect communion of mind and heart with hundreds of millions of fellow-beings, among whom there is a perfect unity in necessary things—*In necessariis unitas*, as St. Augustine says.

This seems but *natural* to many good people unacquainted with the world. For is it not true that the souls of men have all been endowed with an intellect whose first principles clearly must be the same, as every sound philosophy proves? The same is true of the will of man, which has received from God the same unerring principles of morality going to form the human conscience. St. John, at the very beginning of his Gospel, states it with his usual majesty and clearness when he says that the Eternal Word is "the light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world." Yet, strange to say, every-day experience shows that the intellect of man, now at least, is exceedingly obscure, and does not unite in admitting the same first principles, and the human conscience is far from acting as if moral principles were the same for all. In the Catholic Church alone does this take place, and the consequence is evident that the Catholic Church alone enjoys the prerogative of restoring man to the right use of his natural faculties. This must be examined somewhat more in detail.

Where will you find at this day harmony of belief among men in matters of pure intellect? Donoso Cortes has admirably said in his *Essays on Catholicism*:

"You, who aspire to subjugate peoples, to domineer over nations, and exercise authority over human reason, do not declare yourselves the depositaries of clear and evident truths; above all do not produce your proofs, if you have any, for the world will not recognize you as masters, but will rebel against the brutal yoke of your evidence. Announce, on the contrary, that you have an argument which upsets a mathematical truth; that you are going to prove that two and two do not make four, but five; that God does not exist, or that man is God; . . . that the beautiful is ugly and the ugly beautiful; that good is evil and evil good; that the devil is God and God is the devil.

. . . If to the good sense of which you have given such ample proofs, by announcing the demonstration of all these things, you afterwards add the good sense of not demonstrating them at all; or if, as the only demonstration of your blasphemies and your affirmations, you give your blasphemies and your affirmations themselves, then the human race will extol you to the stars! . . . I know not if there be anything under the sun more vile and despicable than the human race outside the Catholic lines."

This is strong language which we perhaps would not have dared to use as coming from ourselves. But it comes from a greater man than we are, and, moreover, it expresses the truth; "outside the Catholic Church there is at present a perfect anarchy of thought; but within her precincts there is unanimity of belief." This anarchy of mind is still more perfectly expressed by D. Cortes in another passage of his book, where he says in substance that the absurd seems to be made purposely to suit the great intellects of our day, and the more absurd a thing is, the more readily will it be adopted, announced, and proclaimed as *the* truth, precisely because it is absurd. The consequence is that in the impossibility of agreeing on anything whatsoever, men, to live at peace with each other, have finally adopted the *golden rule* to come to a compromise on every thing, and *agree to disagree*. Sublime adage, which makes of men a society of idiots, we presume from *ἰδιώται* in Greek, for whom truth is an impossibility and common belief an intolerable burden!

But the Catholic Church has declared that three things are indispensable to man on earth, on his way to eternity. These are Faith, Hope, and Charity. The only one of these three essential requirements which is of importance at this moment is the first,—namely, Faith. By proclaiming, as revealed by Almighty God, a certain number of truths and supernatural facts which men must believe absolutely, the anarchy of the human mind is suddenly arrested, and a real society becomes possible; so that men have at last common principles and common aims. In this alone is the true source of harmony of belief in mankind. Take this away and there will remain only opinion; and opinions may justly differ, because none of them can impose absolute assent. Look around you and say if there is faith anywhere on earth except in the Catholic Church. You will not find it certainly in the Protestant sects which have all rejected the necessary dogma of infallibility, and are thus left entirely at the mercy of mere opinions. If you look for it in the Oriental churches, you will find it only in a fragmentary state, as their schism has deprived them of a continuation of the life in which they once fully participated. For they admit three or four general councils only, namely, all those held by the Church previous to their separation. Thus their very history indicates the precise time when faith became for them crystallized or rather fossilized. From that moment down there is not for them any means

of ascertaining what the Church believes. Besides, by rejecting the authority of the first pastor, they are deprived of the greatest privilege of supreme harmony, which consists in the impossibility of disunion. Any individual bishop among them can originate a sect, because they recognize above themselves only metropolitans and a national council, to whom unerrancy has not been given by our Saviour. In the Catholic Church, on the contrary, disunion is impossible as was just said, because, should any one dissent, he is by this very fact separated from the body in which the strictest union continues still to exist, and which thus cannot suffer from the apostasy of any individual. The Pope, therefore, is the keystone of the whole edifice, and as from him "unity finds its source," according to a beautiful thought of St. Cyprian, without him there can be no unity, and men remain in the condition just described by Donoso Cortes.

It is evident that the decline of the outside influence of the Church in this age cannot affect in the least the complete accord among her children secured by her constitution; and thus the Church remains the same powerful body that she has ever been. Any doubting inquirer has only to go through the various countries where Catholics are found, to convince himself of this wonderful agreement. The most remote from the centre are as firmly attached to every dogma and moral principle as those who live around the Pope himself. The doctrine taught to the most distant and rude tribes of America and Australia is absolutely the same as that which feeds the mind of the child of a refined European. And it has always been so, and it shall continue to be so to the end of time, because the Church is unchangeable, and the withdrawal of all possible worldly influence cannot deprive her of this high prerogative which God communicates to her out of His own unchangeableness. The violent outcry so prevalent in our days among men who cannot themselves have, nor even pretend to have; a permanent belief, namely, that the Church invents new dogmas, and increases constantly the number of her articles of faith, is absolutely preposterous. Whatever she defines was always believed before. She never decrees anything except when it is clearly contained in Holy Scripture or tradition. People speak as if the popes and bishops were so many politicians meeting occasionally in councils to debate among themselves what is the best in their opinion, and to declare as the truth the mere expression of a human policy! They actually imagine that the decree declaring the Pope infallible in certain contingencies is a new device of this age, to prop up the crumbling edifice of the Papacy, and replace by a bold spiritual pretension the loss of nearly everything earthly. When they are told that the doctrine of the infallibility of the Head of the Church

has always been held by the greatest number of theologians, and is clearly derived from some most striking texts of Scripture, they will not listen to you, and continue to assert that the Catholic Church is not what she pretends to be. Yet if Augustine, Ambrose, nay, Irenæus, and Clement of Rome came back on earth, they would undoubtedly recognize the Church of our day as their mother, perfectly identical with that of their own time. They all had the same idea of faith that we have; and, consequently, their belief was identical with our own. Is it not wonderful thus to see a society spread everywhere, having enjoyed so far an existence of nineteen centuries, yet animated with the same spirit, imbued with the same ideas, professing the same principles, believing the same truths, and united by the bonds of the same love? A society that is unchangeable, harmonious, powerful, and unassailable in its unity?

To appreciate more fully, however, all these high prerogatives of the Church, the City opposed to her must be examined and studied. What we call the "State" must be subjected to a thorough investigation in order to see what advantages it has derived from its supposed victories over the Church. By getting loose from her it pretends to have recovered its independence, and to be able to fulfil henceforth its destiny without interference and obstruction. It proclaims to the world the brilliant achievements that lay in store for it, and the supreme prosperity it is hastening to reach. It is as important as curious to examine these pretensions; and it will not be very difficult to uncover the nakedness of the idol, and show how empty are the boasts and how false the assertions of its deluded worshippers.

II. THE STATE.

I. In the ages of faith the State formed a part of the City of God, because it was united intimately to the Church, and made one of the elements of Christendom. But in breaking asunder those holy bonds, it has come at once to deny its subordination to God. This is a very remarkable fact. It might have apostatized from the Church, and yet remained *theist*. England appeared inclined to do so for two hundred years at least after its separation from Rome: She proclaimed herself a Christian State, and boasted even of a spirit of religion deeper and purer than could be found among "Papists." But England now, following the example of other European States, has entered upon a new path. It consists in thinking that complete indifference to any kind of religion whatever, absolute abstention from all dogmas, total forgetfulness of Christian morality as such, is the policy best adapted to secure the happiness of nations. But that this is really and in fact atheism, no one can deny; and indeed no one now even attempts to deny it. Either entire silence is main-

tained on the subject, or it is unhesitatingly admitted that the State must be godless. That this is not an exaggeration is proved by many facts, which unfortunately cannot be gainsaid, and which prove that European States are in the act at least of abjuring their former belief in God. As this is an extremely important point, it must be proved somewhat *in extenso*.

Any nation professing belief in God must admit that power comes from Him, and that subjects obey God in obeying the State. This is now spurned as a childish notion by all the statesmen of Europe, except in Russia. They all, with the exception mentioned, admit practically that power comes from the people, that human laws have no other source than the will of the majority, understood as politicians understand it, and that the citizens must obey because force obliges them to do so. This is emphatically modern atheism. Secondly, all nations which profess their belief in God necessarily attach some importance at least to divine worship. Sometimes they have a State religion which all must follow. Sometimes without going so far as this they forbid openly the avowed profession of total unbelief, and foster in all manner of ways the honor due to God by public worship assisted at by the State authorities, by contributing largely to the building of temples for public worship, to the celebration of religious festivals, to the bringing up of youth in the fear and love of God. But the States of Europe have openly discarded, or are in the act of discarding, all such proofs of their belief. There is no law anywhere proscribing atheism even as a doctrine dangerous to the State; and the controversy going on in the *Dublin Review* on that subject proves how far this is now the case. In scarcely any European State are there stated occasions for the authorities to show their faith in any manner soever. Religious ceremonies partaken in by the citizens are rather discouraged than the reverse. If the State still contributes in any way something for the expenses of worship, it is done very parsimoniously, and so as to indicate that the practice is not to continue long. As to the bringing up of youth in the fear and love of God, it is evident that this is one of the last concerns of the State in modern times. Again, a State professing to believe in God shows it invariably by its code of laws, by its prescriptions as regards births, marriages, and burials, by its preservation, as much as lays in it, of the great primitive traditions of mankind on which rests the security of society, as for instance the purity of women, the tender care of the family, the horror of atrocious crimes. All these things may seem to some not to have any connection with the profession of theism, but they are greatly mistaken. The ancient nations knew it well. They were persuaded that God must be the inspirer of good laws, that the three great epochs of human

life, its dawn, the period of sexual union, and after the body breathes its last, were to be most strictly cared for by the State, at least so far as to see that the prescriptions of religion were well observed at these three important moments of human existence, because of the peculiar rights the Creator has reserved to Himself in that regard. Finally the interests of woman and of the family, the preservation of society from crimes crying to heaven—so well guarded in primitive times—are certainly fostered by the State in proportion as it believes in God, and are, on the contrary, left to chance when God is forgotten or ignored. But every one must be fully aware that the least concern of the State in the present age is to provide that the laws respecting these matters bear the imprint of religion. The whole ceremony attending the birth, the marriage, the burial of human beings, consists in coldly registering their names. As to the family, woman, and the preservation of society from atrocious crimes—crying to heaven as the Bible says—the only prescriptions found on the subject in modern legislation regard merely unimportant material interests which have no reference to the deep views which true and sincere religion takes of these mighty subjects.

Practical atheism has, therefore, invaded the State. The invasion is not yet complete; but the decline in this direction is so rapid that if it is not soon arrested, men now living will see the day when European nations will be bowed under the yoke of entirely godless rulers. The reader is left to consider himself what will be the dreadful situation of Europe when this will have completely taken place. No one but a fool can imagine that the State will have acquired additional strength by having deliberately brought about this state of things. The State may one day require the help of the Church to repair its error. At present it spurns the Church.

But if the State is no longer one of the component elements of the City of God (having abjured Him), what can be said of holiness of life in the new state of society? The office of the State, certainly, is not to raise up the nations to a higher plane of sanctity; but a great part of that office is undoubtedly to see that society does not become entirely gangrened. And what must be the consequence of the godlessness we have just considered? Evidently, to inoculate the people with a like indifference to religious considerations in the actions of their daily life; to render them callous to the sense of duty; to take away from them the fear of God and of His judgments; to deaden their conscience, and in the end stifle entirely its voice; to leave them consequently at the mercy of their passions, and to the sole guidance of what they may imagine is their interest. When these baneful effects shall have been pro-

duced on a great mass of people it is easy to foresee the dreadful invasion of vices and crimes that will ensue. If among nations remaining to a great extent religious, and preserving the salutary fear of divine retribution, it has happened that luxury, wealth, and a great development of material prosperity have opened the flood-gates of corruption, and sped those nations on to destruction, what will it be when to all those causes of ruin, which undoubtedly exist in our day, is added the open denial of a hereafter, or at least of a strict judge and avenger of wrong? The wisdom of ages has taught us to believe that the fall of the most powerful empires of the world has invariably been due to the moral gangrene engendered by sensual indulgence and by unbelief. When both these causes of degeneracy come together the fall is always frightful and the destruction complete.

It is a patent fact that in Europe, in the present age, there is a universal aspiration for material enjoyment, and for the acquirement of wealth which procures it, together with a stolid indifference as regards the spiritual world, a sentiment becoming stronger every day; that duty is a humbug, conscience a bugbear, the fear of God a nursery tale. This deplorable accumulation of causes of ruin has certainly been fostered, if not produced, by the modern State doctrines. When the day shall arrive for the full development of the inevitable consequences, the crash will probably be one of the most terrible recorded in history.

Meanwhile, except the holiness of the "House of God," which is yet able to arrest His avenging hand, except the purity of many Christian souls unseen in the midst of corruption, wherever you turn your eyes you see the unblushing effrontery of men to whom nothing is sacred in heaven or on earth. You will find them in all stations of life, even the highest; in the *honorable* professions which formerly secured respect for those who held them; in the legislative halls where the laws of the nation are elaborated; in the mansions of those who administer public affairs, and the palaces of kings and emperors. The most pardonable of their offences are often reputed to be those which merely stop at the plundering of the people. They deserve the thanks of the community when they are satisfied with merely enriching themselves at the public expense, and do not take advantage of their high station to pervert entirely by their example public morality. Is this the road that leads to prosperity and happiness in a State? Is it thus that modern institutions merit the gratitude of mankind?

2. Perhaps, however, the State can boast of universal success in its recent undertakings, a success far more brilliant than the universality of its adversary, the Church. It is proper to examine this second point, and judge if this is not also an empty boast. At

first sight the exhibit on the part of modern governments and institutions appears to be a triumphant one. Observe in how short a time the modern doctrines have come to prevail, and how they have been adopted everywhere. The very phraseology of the system has become a universal language. They have been helped, moreover, by a multitude of investigations. Have not numerous scientists, collecting together all the newly discovered facts, endeavored to give to the whole Cosmos a meaning altogether favorable to the recent State measures? Yes, they now combine all their efforts to make people believe that God's action is to be seen neither in nature nor in man's history. They try, apparently with success, to explain by purely natural causes all that we see in the universe, even its first cause—their celebrated protoplasm—and all that has ever happened on earth from its first day. They thus justify the State in excluding God from politics, from legislation, from education, from the whole social world. We all can hear their boasts, witness their triumph, see the waves of "modern ideas" spreading farther and farther every day, so that they have attained a kind of universality which they boldly oppose to that of the Church. Not satisfied with Europe, where their cause seems to be on the point of a general acceptance, they look to the whole world beyond its limits. America, both North and South, has already caught up the cry. But America is practically European, and there would be little to wonder at if European delusions would invade the Western Continent. And go to Asia, Hindostan, for instance, and hear what the *Madras Mail* of October 6th, 1876, says on the subject of education in the *whole* peninsula:¹

"In the government schools a purely secular education is given, and no influence whatever is exerted on the religious opinions of the scholars, but the necessary consequence of a culture of the intellect, totally destitute of all moral and religious instruction, is the gradual uprooting of all religious belief in the children, and the substitution in its place of a deplorable skepticism. . . . 'Willing or unwilling,' says Sir Bartle Frere, 'we have sown the seed of a physical, intellectual, moral, and religious revolution, and who of us will dare to predict all its consequences before a new generation has passed away? . . . In India everything is in a revolutionary state. Happily for mankind this state of affairs is tranquil, often unperceived, but in spite of it it is revolution, more general, complete, rapid than the one which is now progressing in Europe.'"

Besides Hindostan, in Asia, Japan, it is well known, has been already inoculated with the godless spirit of advanced ideas. Oceania in its entirety is on the high road towards it, and the whole expanse of that ocean presents the spectacle of numberless islands whose natives are disappearing rapidly as if by magic, to be re-

¹ Taken from the *Missions Catholiques* of March 16th, 1877. The text consequently uses a different phraseology, but the thoughts are identical.

placed by a mongrel population from Europe or Eastern Asia. Even Africa is invaded by the new system of godlessness. Egypt in the northeast, Cape Colony in the south, and Algeria in the northwest, are examples.

These are facts which are often brought forward as proofs of the vitality of the new system, that it is spreading rapidly and being adopted almost universally. But this is only a superficial view, and proves nothing against the Church's real universality. The Catholic Church, in extending her empire, forms really "one family of all nations." When they have been baptized and instructed by her they have the same ideas on God, on the soul, on duty, on everything connected with the inner and higher world. They are homogeneous and harmonious. Man is moulded in his entirety. The new principles he imbibes do not foster his material interests alone by raising him up to a higher plane of exterior civilization, but develop likewise the necessary aspirations of his soul toward a happy hereafter. The new social state thus established among converted nations is favorable to their peace and happiness, and the principles inculcated by the Church form a solid basis for true virtue and a high morality.

Would it be so if the new measures introduced everywhere by modern statesmen and rulers were finally to prevail? It is evident that the civilization fostered by them is all materialistic, regards only the physical man, cannot touch his soul, and tends to an unchecked development of his passions. Can any one imagine that the whole universe will ever form "one family" under such a system as this? How can men unite in harmony when they are left entirely under the control of selfish passions? They will never regard each other as brothers. There is no brotherhood among wild beasts, and lion fights against lion when they meet by chance on a carcass to be devoured. When God is absent, when duty disappears, when conscience is dead, men are reduced to the state of wild animals, and there can be no fraternal union among them.

This is probably the reason why, in "modern thought," great respect is always paid to nationalities. The system, as it is in process of development, cannot go beyond nationalities. The Socialists alone seem in their aspirations to go beyond them. They proclaim the *universal godless republic*, which they place under the iron sceptre of an autocrat ruling over their monstrous organization. But Socialism cannot succeed in permanently comprehending the world in its monstrous embrace. Liberalism on this account seems to carry the day, and Liberalism is satisfied with nationalities, and declares itself impotent to neutralize race characteristics. The only absorption of society it proposes to itself is on the surface, regards exterior comfort and appliances, does not touch the

internal play of the passions. These will remain as wild as ever, nay, will grow wilder, by the removal, which Liberalism aims at, of the wholesome restraints of faith in those who are Christians, and of superstition in those who are not.

But, independently of these considerations, which alone would prove the deficient character of the universality which the new State measures claim, it is proper to say a few words on the help these are supposed to receive from modern discoveries in the field of science. They pretend, as we saw a few pages back, that natural causes are sufficient to explain everything in nature and in history without any intervention of God, and that politics, legislation, education, the whole social world must be constructed anew without any reference to God. "Final causes are exploded," they exclaim. This means that there is no design visible in anything, and that there is no need of a designer. With the greatest coolness they assume that this is a universal principle which has come to be accepted everywhere. Some of them, it is true, faintly protest that modern discoveries do not altogether forbid people from admitting a designer if they choose, and thus they pretend not to be atheists, or rather antitheists. (We find that this new word has just been coined.) They insist, however, that although in the abstract this is true, in a concrete sense, however, and practically, there is not anything known in nature and in history which cannot be naturally explained. Creation, therefore, according to them, is a word without meaning and should be expunged from the vocabulary; as to successive creative acts, there is nothing any longer to sustain them; and in history it may be assumed that man is and always has been the only factor. The Providence of God is no more needed. Why not, therefore, complete the system, and carry it out fully in legislation, etc., etc.? When this will have been effected, then indeed "modern thought" will have perfected its evolution, the State will be paramount in the world, and the Church may hide her diminished head.

Suppose these *agreeable* anticipations are realized, and that everything which is thus assumed as true is positively demonstrated, will it be a real boon to mankind? Every honest soul must shudder at the very idea of it. What in this case will be the rule of the State, the position of the citizen, the relations of man with man, the constitution of the family, the government of cities, the aspect of the moral world? Their development would be too horrible and shocking even to imagine. People may perhaps call this declamation. Yet the pen, though guided by the most holy indignation, would be incapable to do justice to the reality.

But, thank God, nothing of this is proved, and every word of it is false. Nature is not explicable without the intervention of God.

History supposes at its very beginning a Supreme Ruler, whose interposition is visible throughout its whole course. Politics are not left to the vagaries of man, but power comes from God in spite of popular theories. A tyrant is not allowed to do his worst without the fear of a supreme avenger of wrong. Man is not a machine, nor human society a herd of animals. Who dare say that everything is naturally explained, when everything in fact is still a mystery? The more the supernatural is attempted to be expelled, the more the sphere of mystery increases. For the admission of the supernatural is often the only way to reach an intelligible account of the most simple workings in the soul of man, as well as in the external world. Let any scientist tell us how the words of Ovid have always been considered as sublimely truthful: *Video meliora proboque; deteriora sequor*. After this, thousands of questions of the same kind offer themselves for solution without greater probability of success. But the limits assigned to this paper oblige us to speed on, since so many things remain yet to be said.

3. In speaking of the universality which the State boasts of with regard to the system of distrust and opposition it has adopted toward the Church, it is not so much the State *in abstracto* that has been considered, as the widespreading party on which it leans, and whose doctrines are a strong support to modern State measures. At this moment that party boasts loudly of its numerical strength and of the probability of its further increase. They think they have with them the intellectual world, and that the masses must follow. Their opponents are alarmed at the progress made by these doctrines during the last twenty years in Germany, England, and France. Are these fears well founded? Will the number of adherents to modern ideas of the State continue to increase until they silence all opposition, and sweep the last vestiges even of Christianity from the face of the earth?

The reflections indulged in a few pages back with regard to the remarkable increase in number of the children of the Church, during the last fifty years, forbid us to despond, or rather imperiously bid us to hope. But it is proper to examine coolly how far the hopes of the adverse party are well grounded; and in the first place it might easily be proved that there have been other periods during the last nineteen hundred years, when the apparent danger was as great, if not greater. Yet the peril passed away without impairing in the least the vitality of the Christian faith; and not unfrequently made it stronger. Like results will surely follow the storm which is now raging, and the fear will turn out to be a delusion. Mr. Mivart, in his recent *Lessons from Nature*, has depicted in the most gloomy colors the inroads of this frightful evil; and he has rendered by it a great service to truth; for previously he was thought to be

dallying with this pest. But at the end of his book he has greatly relieved the anxieties of his readers by repeated statements of the really small number of those who adhere thoroughly to these theories. Of the danger itself he is now fully aware. In his thirteenth chapter he passes in review the chief leaders of the new party in England, namely, Prof. Tyndall, Herbert Spencer, Prof. Huxley, Mr. Barratt, Winwood Reade, and others, and states pointedly the doctrines advocated by these "advanced thinkers." To give an example, the author of *Lessons from Nature* reduces the doctrine of Herbert Spencer, as expressed in the *Fortnightly Review*, for April, 1871, to the following plain and undisguised propositions:

Theism is false and absurd. Rewards and punishments in a future life are the delusions of superstition. Prayer is an absurdity, inasmuch as there is no God having any sympathy with us. There is no difference of kind, but only of degree, between the intellect of a sage, the emotions of a saint, and the psychical faculties of a mud-fish. There is no such thing as free-will; man having no more real option as to his thoughts and intentions than a leaf has to resist the action of the wind.

This is plain enough. It is well, however, to remark incidentally here that what in this paper is called the State has not yet reached the point of inscribing these articles of the new creed of atheists in its programme, and placing them openly at the head of its anti-religious catechism. But no State in Europe forbids these doctrines to be proclaimed; all of them allow its professors and endowed lecturers to teach them to the new generation, until they have come to be indorsed by State authority. They form in part the last and most radical conclusions of the principles advocated by the State itself; and all the modern axioms of politics and religion logically end in these monstrosities.

This certainly is frightful; and the reading of this work of Mr. Mivart is calculated to impress the reader with the thought that the actual position of the Church, face to face with such enemies, is perhaps worse than was the case at any previous period. But all this is greatly modified when the author comes to consider how far the evil has spread, and is destined to spread, in education, for instance. "Only a very small minority of people," he says, "will probably persist in advocating the education of children . . . in the tenets of one, as yet, very inconsiderable sect, that of the secularists, when once they fully understand that this is the result of secular or unsectarian education." Other expressions of the same author might be quoted of like effect; but we would go still further; for he speaks only of England, and we would say openly that the doctrines of the supporters of the new State measures being grounded in undisguised atheism and materialism cannot spread anywhere

to a great extent. For it is only at the end of the world, when Antichrist will inoculate the madness of his fanaticism into people deprived entirely of faith, that this may be the case. The world has not yet come to this; the great mass of mankind would certainly at this moment refuse to follow the lead of such a precious set of "advanced thinkers." How long this is to continue, and when the world will be entirely ready for the final apostasy, does not belong to the plan of this paper. It is sufficient for the purpose of our argument that the evil, in its excessive form, has not yet spread far enough to justify its boast of universality.

There is, it is true, the large array of doctrines, mainly denounced and opposed by Pius IX in his *Syllabus*, which undoubtedly the State has openly embraced, and which are doggedly sustained by a large number of men. These doctrines are embraced within the circle called by Donoso Cortes *liberal opinions*; and he has conclusively proved that they lead irresistibly to the extremest radical doctrines. It is by their help that the State has reduced the Church to the situation so often described in previous papers; and they are the arsenal out of which the most deadly weapons are procured for an unholy warfare. But these axioms of modern statecraft have been introduced surreptitiously. People have swallowed them blindly. When their purport is fully known and duly appreciated, multitudes will, it is certain, scornfully reject maxims which tend evidently to the curtailment, or rather absorption, of all liberty by an autocratic State. Those maxims have spread very extensively without being fully understood. The light of argumentation will certainly show them in their true colors; and as they lead evidently to the total denial of faith, an inexorable logic will necessarily render them at last odious to the majority of mankind.

It is to be remarked that the origin of these "advanced ideas" is of yesterday. Most of these axioms, if thus they may be styled, are not yet a hundred years old. They can scarcely be said to have acquired the right of citizenship among the friends of true liberty. They are very far from having reached the degree of universality which the maxims of the Church have enjoyed for eighteen centuries. In this respect, therefore, the State is far from competing with the Spouse of Christ. Let another hundred years roll by, and all those State maxims which seem now to have secured the assent of millions, may be despised and repudiated by the sons of their present advocates. In politics such revulsions as this are common enough to render this result far from impossible. It is, consequently, very evident that the peril which threatens the Church, from the open opposition of the State, is far from being as alarming as were many of those which the Church has lived through.

4. The harmony necessarily pertaining to the Church, owing to her divine constitution, and absolutely fostered by the spirit of faith, which makes her not only unchangeable, but likewise perfectly homogeneous, and places her out of the reach of internal strife, belonged formerly to the States of Europe in a certain degree, as forming Christendom. The common belief and identical principles of morality which prevailed everywhere, for the mere reason that they were Christian States, gave to the earthly society a semi-divine look, so that, as has been stated previously, it formed an element of the City of God. This homogeneousness is now entirely gone, and in its place discord, strife, and contention have been unfortunately introduced. At least the fatal germ of all those evils has been planted in the soil by the breaking down into fragments of the former common understanding in faith and morals. From this, that is to say from the domain of religion, the same want of harmony has passed into that of politics, philosophy, social aims, and nationalities. Into all these various aspects of the European commonwealth mental anarchy has penetrated, and to-day Europe presents to our view the unwelcome spectacle of a "City of Confusion," a real Babel, in common parlance "a bear garden." The expression is strong, but graphic, and, after the few pages which yet can be devoted to its consideration, no one, it is believed, will feel inclined to dispute its correctness. The subject is a very copious one, and we are compelled to select only a few points for presentation, and leave many others unmentioned. The first that presents itself is the political aspect of Europe; and, indeed, on this branch of the subject it will be easy to prove that the rather strong expressions which have just fallen from our pen are just and true to the letter.

To hear some people talk, it would seem that the "science" of politics had no existence in previous ages, and that during the last hundred years it has well-nigh reached perfection. It would be impossible to prove, in the very short space left us for discussion, that this is a delusion, or rather just the reverse of the truth. We must be satisfied with a short sketch of the actual state of the political world in Europe, and as there are exterior or international politics ruling the relations of various States, and interior politics having regard to the national affairs of each State, it is necessary to look into both these branches of the subject.

As to the first, Comte Franz de Champagny, somewhere in his *Césars*, has justly remarked that, since the Protestant Reformation, but chiefly in the last century, the rivalry of nationalities, that is, the hatred of peoples against peoples, has become a feature of modern society, and we are afraid that the international politics of Europe have not changed for the better since Mr de Champagny wrote.

Christendom, he remarked, had made one family, as it were, of all Europeans. It had softened down those angular asperities which generally distinguish nations from each other and place them in fierce antagonism. It is undeniable that religion alone formerly united all the nations of Europe, and formed of them a kind of commonwealth. It is the Catholic Church only that could thus induce races of so great a variety of character to coalesce in a friendly spirit, and if God had not imbued it with a pre-eminent aptitude to that effect, it would never have been called the Catholic Church. Catholicity or universality must smooth over, nay, eradicate what is antagonistic in each tribe to obtain the union of all, and this result had been clearly obtained for the whole of Europe.

But the spirit of division natural to ancient paganism has revived to a great degree, and now Europe, says De Champagny, is divided into three great antagonistic families, namely, *the Slave race* aspiring to place itself under a powerful chief—the autocrat of Russia—outside the Catholic communion, and to form a vast and threatening unity; *the German race* separating itself proudly and scornfully from its previous associations with the South of Europe like a feudal chieftain of past ages, and building its eagle's nest north of the Rhine; and, finally, *the Latin race* remaining isolated in the southern and western part of the Continent, gradually becoming disintegrated and broken up into smaller fragments, and forming itself into distinct and already opposite camps, as if the same blood did not run in their veins, as if the same civilization had not raised them up to their present position, and the same religion had not long united them and made them happy and prosperous.

It is surely on account of those divisions, which cannot but bring on universal strife, that Europe is preparing for a conflict such as the world has scarcely ever witnessed. The treasures of all those States are daily emptied, and have to be constantly replenished, in order to pay for maintaining armies comprising nearly the whole of the adult male population. Space and time prevent us from giving the exact statistics of those monstrous military agglomerations. It was recently calculated that six millions of soldiers were actually under arms, and at this moment, when a universal war is expected, the number must have been increased. Look around and see on the soil of Europe those countless legions of soldiers, numbering more than a million in each of the great States, hundreds of thousands in insignificant little kingdoms whose troops previously consisted of only a few thousand, perhaps even a few hundred men. Look likewise at the laws. Everywhere elaborate enactments are ingeniously contrived so that not a single individual under legislative control shall escape being trained up for war, and kept ready for any emergency—an emergency soon expected to

arrive. Should you continue incredulous, contemplate the material preparations actually made on all sides for the most effective and thorough destruction of life, improved arms of every description, rifles of every name and shape, enormous guns, and monstrous mortars. Count, if you can, the inventions of that kind which are patented every day. Reflect well on this, that the most scientific and thorough tests are applied to judge of their destructive efficiency. The inventors are ready to swear that nothing better can be imagined to kill the greatest number of men in the shortest possible time. Finally, look at the sea covered with ironclads, look at the land bristling with bayonets, look at the homes of citizens empty of youth, look at the numerous camps and barracks crammed with conscripts under training. You see nothing of this in this country. We had a glimpse of it a few years back, but, thank God, we see nothing of it here to-day. But at this very moment Germany, France, Italy, count nearly as many soldiers liable to be called to arms at any moment as they have men above eighteen and below fifty. And this has been going on for many years, to prepare for the fray which is now just beginning at both ends of the Black Sea.

Has the proud European mind in these days any object more worthy of its deep attention than the extirpation of the human race? Can you find in Europe any pursuit followed with more ardor, engaging a greater number of designers, inventors, perfectors, and artificers? Nobody can pretend that all this is for nothing, has no object whatever. For if this were the case the treasures of all those nations would be squandered, the majority of able-bodied citizens would be taken from their useful occupations, the activity of an immense number of men would be engaged uselessly in the pursuit of an *ignis fatuus*. Who can pretend it?

Turn now from the international to the interior politics of each European State, and we are confronted by a spectacle not less appalling, for, besides the antagonism of European nationalities, each one against all the others, there is a fierce opposition growing up in the very heart of each European nation between the State power and the subjects, the rulers and the ruled, the influential and rich classes and the poor. There is, consequently, threat of war outside, and threat of war inside. It is a terrible actualization of the Scripture text, *Foris gladius, intus pavor*. The chief cause of this last-mentioned symptom of internal strife is the spread of the doctrines which have formed the chief theme of this paper. They have reached the people in many countries; they have borne their baneful fruits among men who specially need the teachings of religion. Numerous sects of a pretended philosophy have been set on foot; innumerable books have been written to develop their dis-

organizing tenets; secret associations have been formed to give unity to those schemes. All this has been done to corrupt the people and take from them the restraints of religion. Every one has heard of the Socialists, the Communists, the Internationals, etc. For a long time Catholic writers were the only ones to fight against the threatening evil. At last others than Catholics have become aware of it. Mr. Disraeli, now Lord Beaconsfield, recently uttered a word or two on the subject, ominous enough, but far from sufficient; and, stranger still, Count Bismarck found those sectaries in his way, and acknowledged their power by the fear which he exhibited. It is known that the objects of those vast associations is for the most part to destroy society as it has existed since the establishment of Christianity, and build on its ruins a new edifice raised on atheistic and materialistic principles. To succeed in doing this war must be declared against every social institution now in existence. It is, therefore, the announcement of a universal civil strife when there are at the same time fearful international wars in immediate prospect. And the projects that are openly advocated by the new sectaries are of such a nature, that, if there were even only a partial application of them to society, it would involve a return to barbarism. The reader can form some idea of this by reading what Mr. Mivart has said in his recent book on *Contemporary Evolution*. There any one can see to what state Europe is reduced, at a time when it is generally supposed that she has reached the highest point of civilization.

The expression, "it is a return to barbarism," has been used, and this deserves a word or two of comment. It is known that the Roman empire was destroyed by barbarians in the fifth and following centuries. It may be useful and important to ask what difference there is between the dangers which now threaten society and those which then were impending over Rome? There is this, exactly: Rome, apparently so prosperous, was in fact unable to cope with the barbarians of the North. When these came they found only victims ready for immolation, a multitude of defenceless people offered to them for promiscuous slaughter. After having scourged the Roman dominions, those ferocious tribes, full of vigor and life, settled in their new country, and began a national existence on a basis very different from that from which any other previous race started. The Church was there on every spot they occupied, facing them boldly, and offering them the Cross and the Gospel. She purified them by baptism, opened the ears of their understanding by Christian doctrines, and their hearts by the sweet emotions of charity. We know what results followed, for all of us are the children of those barbarians.

But when war, interior and exterior, shall begin on the condi-

tions just summarily stated, all men will be found with arms in their hands, yea, with the most approved weapons and the most scientific processes of warfare, with an equal ferocity in the hearts of all, and a corresponding prospect of mutual and universal destruction. The Church will be there, no doubt, ready to bless whenever called upon, and in her alone will there be hope for society, exactly the same as was the case in the fifth century. But the dispositions of the new barbarians will be very different from those of fourteen hundred years ago. Mr. Mivart, who does not use this ugly word, *barbarian*, endeavors to describe the means which will be again used by the Church for the salvation of society. In this he seems to us less successful than in the other portions of his book. We would not ourselves attempt any prediction of the probable way in which society is to be restored again on a Christian basis. If we relied only on human means we would despair, and the social revolution which has now begun in earnest would seem to us destined to rush along with more and more fury, until it had accomplished its fell purpose by a universal devastation. When, for the great majority of men, revelation is a myth, the communion of earth with heaven a delusion, force is put into the place of right, paganism revived—as they already speak of doing—but in a much worse form than in ancient times, every one of the new social institutions based on the footing of perfect independence of any Superior Power, etc., etc., all human hope must be given up, and the only help which can be relied upon is that of heaven. But, fortunately, there is a passage of Holy Scripture which can restore the confidence of the most despondent, and in the eventual success of the party on which we have commented, a few phrases of the Book of Wisdom (i. 13, 59) suffice to furnish ground for the firmest hope. Here it is, from the Douai translation :

“God made not death, neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living. For He created all things that they might be; and He made the nations of the earth for health (*sanabiles*, curable); and there is no poison of destruction in them, nor kingdom of hell upon the earth.”

We must believe, therefore, that as far as God is concerned, and He is the master after all, His designs are all-merciful, and He will never suffer the existence of a “kingdom of hell upon the earth,” and consequently that those formerly Christian nations, now withered and decayed, can be healed and restored again to the possession of their pristine vigor.

This remarkable passage of the Book of Wisdom gives an adequate explanation of a most surprising characteristic of human history, which is also perceptible in every single nation, and in individuals to a certain extent. It consists in the singular fact that there is nearly always a *point d'arrêt* of corruption, to use a French

word for which there is no exact English equivalent. Gangrene once begun in the human body must necessarily go on until the whole is invaded by the virus, and death ensues. Not so in human history as a whole; not so in nations generally; not so even morally in most human individuals. The time comes when the process of decomposition is arrested and life returns. The evil is not worked out fatally to the end; but before this is reached there is a happy crisis which turns the life-stream again into its natural course.

It is on this account, we believe, that the fell doctrines of materialism, atheism, communism, and *id genus omne*, can never spread utterly and without limits. They are invariably rejected by the mass of mankind; and it is precisely when they appear to be on the point of corrupting all classes of society that they are, at that very moment, contemptuously and scornfully rejected by the good sense of all kinds of people. This is a safer ground of hope in our opinion than any philosophical system of moral weights and counterweights between the doctrines prevalent among men.

But, meanwhile, the truth must be now apparent to all readers, that if the State, as it is usually called in this paper, has any prospect of succeeding against the Church, it will not be for the good of society. These two great organisms—cities they were called at the beginning of this discussion—are evidently now arrayed against each other and engaged in a deadly conflict. The true characters of both have been portrayed as faithfully as was possible. There cannot be any doubt on which side is the promise of a long life in spite of present appearances. If any one still hesitates and doubts, he will not have to wait long before reaching a clearer conclusion. European armies will decide many most important questions besides that of Turkey; and the soundness of the basis on which the European States and their new theories rest, will soon be thoroughly tested, so that no possible doubt will be left in the minds of men.

THE RUINS OF EPHEBUS.

Discoveries at Ephesus, including the Site and Remains of the Great Temple of Diana. By J. T. Wood, F.S.A., Fellow of the Royal Institute of British Architects. With numerous illustrations from original drawings and photographs. London: Longmans & Co., 1877.

PERHAPS no discovery of the present age is more extraordinary, and certainly no history of any discovery can be more interesting, than that which forms the subject of this beautiful volume. To have brought to light, after years of patient search, repeated disappointments, and great personal risks and discomforts, the site and the ruins of one of the greatest and most celebrated Temples in the world, the Temple of the Ephesian Diana, mentioned in the nineteenth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, the temple described in detail by Vitruvius and Pliny the Elder, and now clearly and distinctly identified with their accounts, to have done this, and yet more, to have deposited in the British Museum some hundreds of extremely important and highly interesting Greek inscriptions and many massive sculptured fragments, is an achievement which it has fallen to the lot of few indeed to perform. The Temple itself had been lost sight of for seventeen centuries, and the ruins, when at last found, were covered over with alluvium twenty feet deep, brought by the adjoining rivers from the mountains in the immediate neighborhood. No one had any idea where the site of the most ancient building was, beyond a rather vague expression in Xenophon, that "at Ephesus too the river Selinus runs past the Temple of Artemis."¹ Strabo, who describes the geography of Ephesus rather minutely, as it was in his time (that of the Emperors Augustus and Tiberius), states that "on the sea border a little higher from the sea is the grove of Ortygia, through which the river Cenchrius flows, and above which stands Mount Solmissus."² He goes on to say, that "there are *on the spot* (ἐν τῷ τόπῳ) several temples, some early and some built later." Now, both the grove

¹ Xen., Anab., v. 3, S.: καὶ ἐν Ἐφέσῳ δὲ παρὰ τὸν τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος νεῶν Σελεινῶν ποταμὸς παρ᾽ ἑαυτῇ. This passage, written nearly four hundred years B.C., is the earliest historical mention of the Temple, excepting the statement of Herodotus, in i. 26, which is also of topographical importance, that between the Temple and the old city was a distance of seven stadia (the greater part of a mile).

² Strab., xiv. ch. 20, p. 640.: Remains of a second Temple were discovered, but not fully explored, by Mr. Wood close to the great Temple (p. 249). "It was raised, as we afterwards learned, on three steps, and was adorned with Grecian Doric columns and entablatures, the columns being as much as twenty feet, six inches apart."

(which is marked in Mr. Wood's plan of Ephesus as still existing) and the hill Solmissus can be identified. The latter is close to the modern Turkish village of Ayasalouk, just below which the remains of the great Temple were actually found. Mr. Wood, however, was misled by another passage of Strabo,¹ who states that the boundaries of the Asylum were extended by Alexander for a stadium (six hundred feet) towards the city, and that this distance was doubled by Antony, so as to include within the right of sanctuary a certain portion² of the city. Mr. Wood says (p. 20), "From this it appeared that the Temple could not be much more than a stadium from the city; and this passage misled me, and prevented my entertaining the idea of searching for the Temple at a much greater distance³ when I first commenced the excavations." If Mr. Wood had looked at the passage of Strabo a little more carefully, he would have seen that the Asylum extended more than *two* stadia between the Temple and the city. This Asylum or sanctuary was a belt of consecrated ground extending westward of the Temple precinct (*τείμενος*) towards the banks of the Selinus and the city beyond it. The wall of this precinct (*περίβολος*) was the first indication discovered by Mr. Wood of the true site of the Temple. As a matter of fact, "the portion of this wall which intervenes between the Temple and the walls of the city, at the nearest point, would be something more than two stadia from the southwest angle of the Temple." It would seem therefore that the city itself must have been somewhat further from the Temple than Strabo's account appears to indicate. Indeed, by the measured scale on Mr. Wood's plan it seems to us that the "seven stadia" of Herodotus⁴ are strictly correct. On the whole, the ancient accounts, though somewhat vague, were not far from the truth. The statement which ultimately led to success was that in a passage of Philostratus,⁵ in which he states that one Damianus, a rich Roman, united the Temple to the city by carrying towards it a road which descends

¹ xiv. 23, p. 641.

² So Mr. Wood renders *μέρος τι τῆς πόλεως*. Classical usage would justify the translation "a considerable part of the city." The sanctuary of the Ephesian Diana formed the subject of a special mission to Rome, described by Tacitus, Ann. III, 60-1. It was marked by boundary stones, about the placing of which important information has been derived from the inscriptions. The word "asylum" is derived from the persons and the properties of those who took refuge, not being liable to be carried off as plunder, *συλᾶσθαι*.

³ The statement of Herodotus (i. 26) cited above might have saved him from this mistake.

⁴ The "old city" stood on the slopes of the mountains, and so remained till the time of Croesus; but afterwards the town was transferred to the site near the Temple, till the time of Alexander. Then Lysimachus, finding the situation too low, made them move off to higher ground more to the west. See Strabo, xiv. 21, p. 640.

⁵ Lives of the Sophists, ii. 23. He flourished about A.D. 200, or a little earlier.

through the Magnesian Gates. This roadway, or causeway, he describes as a *stoa*, a *piazza* or covered portico, extending to the length of a stadium, and built entirely of stone. All that now seemed necessary, says Mr. Wood, was to find the Magnesian Gate, and follow the road from it to the Temple. From the words of Damianus he inferred that between the Gate and the Temple only six hundred feet intervened. Yet, on studying the site he could see no probable position for the Temple "within even a few stadia of the gate," *i. e.*, of the spot where the gate and road leading to Magnesia were likely to be (p. 21).

At length his attention was attracted on the outside of the city to "a long strip of land standing several feet above the general level of the plain between the city and the sea. At the western end of this strip an open space is reached, which would have been of all others the best possible site for the Temple. There it would have been a most conspicuous and beautiful object from nearly every house in the city, as well as from the suburbs, and from the sea" (p. 23). Neither here, however, nor in cross trenches on the raised strip of land, did Mr. Wood as yet find any indications of either portico or Temple. He then tried, of course equally in vain, excavations between the city and the sea, and on the north side of the city port and the adjoining land (p. 26). Completely at a loss, and beginning to fall short of funds, the idea happily occurred to him, that if he could obtain a grant of money from the trustees of the British Museum, or from the Treasury, to explore first the ruins of the public buildings in Ephesus, it was just possible that he might find some rude sketch or some inscription giving a clue to the site.

And so it proved. In the month of February, 1866, having obtained the necessary grant of money, Mr. Wood began his explorations of the Great Theatre, one of the largest, as it proved, in Asia Minor, and capable of seating nearly twenty-five thousand persons. The diameter of it was found to be nearly five hundred feet, and the stage or *pulpitum* one hundred and ten feet long by twenty-two feet wide. This was the theatre in which the people assembled to protest against the doctrines preached by St. Paul, and in which for the space of two hours the multitude kept crying out, *Great is Diana of the Ephesians!*¹ Here a most important and truly astonishing discovery was made. "When I came to clear the southern entrance, I found the whole of the eastern wall of that entrance inscribed with a series of decrees, chiefly relating to

¹ Acts xix. 34: Ephesus was, in a religious sense, the metropolis of Asia. The worship of the goddess was paramount, as Pausanias expressly says, iv. 31, 7: "All the cities accept it (*νομίζουσιν*), and private persons hold her in more honor than any other of the gods" (*θεῶν μάλιστα*).

a number of gold and silver images, weighing from three to seven pounds each, which were voted to Artemis, and ordered to be placed in her Temple by a certain wealthy Roman, named C. Vibius Salutaris."¹ Now in one of these decrees it is enacted that on the birthday of the goddess these images are to be carried in procession from the Temple to the theatre by the priests, accompanied by a staff-bearer and guards, from the Magnesian Gate, and on their return they are to be escorted by the procession as far as the Coressian Gate. This latter gate led from the old high town on Mount Coressus due northwards to the old road to Smyrna. The road winds round towards it from the Magnesian Gate in a westward direction. "The intention," says Mr. Wood (p. 81), "was evidently to make as complete a circuit as would enable the inhabitants of the city generally to see the images as they passed along." Both of the city gates having been found—the Coressian at the foot of Mount Coressus, which had hitherto been wrongly called Prion²—the explorations were at last fairly commenced in the right direction. Mr. Wood was now, literally, on the "high road to success." He began by clearing a large space near the Magnesian Gate. He soon came upon a road leading to Ayasalouk, and therefore (as it proved) in the direction of the Temple, "thirty-five feet in width, and paved with immense blocks of marble and limestone, very deeply worn into four distinct ruts,³ showing the passing and repassing of chariots and other vehicles" (p. 114). Along the side of this road, which soon began to assume evident marks of being a *Via Sacra*, many interesting tombs and monuments were discovered for the distance of nine hundred yards, beyond which none were found. Still no vestiges appeared of the Portico of Damianus. "There was, however, one promising feature, which I did not overlook; this was a decided *καθόδος* or descending road, similar to that described by Philostratus, where the Portico was said to begin, that is at the Magnesian Gate" (p. 117).

After exploring the road round the mountain for five hundred yards further, Mr. Wood "found the stone piers of a portico which must have been that of Damianus." He now concluded that the

¹ P. 73. It was doubtless by multiplying these images or portraits from the original statue in the Temple (which are called in the inscriptions *ἀπεικονίσματα*), and the manufacture of small shrines to contain them, that Demetrius, the silversmith, "made a great trade for the workmen." Acts xix. 24. The very curious inscriptions found by Mr. Wood are in the British Museum. That especially bearing on the subject is given (with a translation by the writer of the present article) in the appendix to Mr. Wood's work. The date of the inscription is about A.D. 104.

² In Pausanias, vii. 5, 10, and Pliny, N. H., v. 115, it is called *Pion*. But Mr. Wood sagaciously remarks that its long hog-backed ridge was called *πρίων*, "sierra" or "saw," from its jagged outline.

³ Such a road is called by Euripides *ἑκπορος ἀμαξίτης*, Electra.

portico was of great length, and that the six hundred feet of it mentioned by Philostratus as having been built of stone, was of a more ornate character than the rest. This particular part Mr. Wood believes to have been that nearest the Temple, and as that which he traced appeared to have been a kind of pent-house roofed with wood,¹ he concluded that the stone-roofed portion of it remained still unexplored.

Subsequently, however, Mr. Wood found "the remains of a portico which surrounded the Temple on at least three sides. This portico was nearly thirty-one feet distant from the lowest step of the Temple, and was twenty-five feet wide" (p. 250). It does not seem to have occurred to him that, in all probability, Damianus's portico was a prolongation or extension of this in the direction of the city.

Passing over the interesting account of the numerous monuments discovered by Mr. Wood in exploring this road, we come to a new evidence of much importance. Pausanias says that even in his time the tomb was shown of Androclus, the son of Codrus, who was worshipped as a local hero and benefactor by the Ephesians. He states that this tomb, distinguished by the effigy of a man in full armor—doubtless representing the hero himself—was to be seen "on the road leading from the Temple, near the Olympicum, and towards the Magnesian Gates."² The Olympicum (Temple of Jupiter) was not found, but the basement of an important and imposing fabric was discovered twenty-six hundred feet distant from the Magnesian Gate, and Mr. Wood had every reason to think that this was the veritable tomb of Androclus. The foundations, he says (p. 127), consisted of several courses of cushioned masonry, composed of immense blocks of white marble mounted on a plinth which formed a base forty-two feet square. The whole superstructure had been carried away, a fact indicative, we may surmise, of its superior workmanship.

The next "great stride towards success" was the finding of a still wider road—not less than forty-five feet across—with marble sarcophagi on both sides, leading directly from the foot of Mount Coressus, and, therefore, from the old or upper city, almost at a right angle, directly towards Ayasalouk. The grand object of his search now seemed almost in his grasp, but it was not destined to be quite so soon attained. He was now stopped from further exploration by the harvest, just then in its full height. A journey

¹ Precisely such structures were used round some of our English abbeys, the holes supporting the timbers being still, as at Furness in Lancashire, visible in the walls.

² Pausan., vii. 2, 9: δεικνύται καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ ἐπὶ τὸ μνήμα κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ παρὰ τὸ Ὀλυμπιεῖον καὶ ἐπὶ πύλας τὰς Μαγνήτιδας ἐπίθημα δὲ τῷ μνηματίδ' ἀνὴρ ἐστὶν ὠπλισμένος.

to Constantinople was absolutely necessary, in order to obtain a renewal of the firman for another year (p. 130). He returned, however, in a week, "with renewed power to continue the excavations" (p. 131). He now set a dozen men to dig trenches on the very spot, near a clump of olive trees, where he had before sunk a trial-hole without any satisfactory result. Now, however, they struck upon a brick wall, built with large blocks of stone and marble. He hoped this would prove to be the peribolus or inclosure wall of the sacred precinct, and the result proved him to be right. A second trench—made, however, not at random, but upon certain ingenious calculations (p. 132)—opened out most fortunately an angle of the wall, into which were built two large stones, equidistant from the angle, with duplicate inscriptions in Latin and Greek. They stated that the wall had been built by the Emperor Augustus, in the twelfth year of his consulate, and was to be paid for and maintained out of the revenues of the Artemisium and the Augusteum. "The great question," he says (p. 133), "as to the whereabouts of the Temple was now decided, six years after the search was begun." A proud moment it must have been for the distinguished explorer when he first read those inscriptions!

Tracing the course of the peribolus wall for not less than sixteen hundred feet from the angle first found, he ascertained that it went off in a due northern direction.¹ He therefore commenced sinking trial-holes within the inclosure. He first found the remains of some Roman buildings, with fragments of mosaic pavements, pertaining, as he supposed, to the dwellings of the priests. The discovery of all these buildings led him to believe that he was close upon the Temple, and he continued sinking trial-holes to the depth of twenty feet and upwards (p. 154).

It was on the last day of the year 1869, that the marble pavement of the Temple was discovered at the depth above mentioned. Mr. Wood at once recognized it as being the first piece of *thick* pavement he had found within the sacred precinct. It consisted of two layers, the upper one of rubbed white marble, nine inches thick, the lower one, roughly tooled, of gray marble, fifteen inches thick (p. 155).

Thus it proved that the Temple was built on the northeast corner of the great alluvial plain of Ephesus, which Herodotus compares with the deposits of silt in the lower valley of the Nile, and considers to be, as it doubtless is, a filled up bay of the sea.²

¹ The outer wall of the *τέμενος* in which a Greek temple stood is exactly analogous to the boundary wall of a mediæval abbey, which inclosed a large area of ground and a number of buildings grouped round the great central church.

² Herod., ii. 10: τῶν οὐρέων τῶν εἰρημένων μεταξύ ἐφαίνετό μοι εἶναι κοτε κόλπος θαλάσσης, ὥσπερ τὰ τε περὶ Ἴλιον καὶ Ἑφεσόν τε καὶ Μαιάνδρου πεδίων.

Lying between two confluent of the C yster, the Selinus and the Cenchrius, the site had been silted up to that depth in the course of many centuries. Thus the prophecy that the Temple would not be found covered by river silt has been falsified.¹

On the 6th of February, 1871, Mr. Wood made the important discovery of the base of one of the great marble columns in position. Of the immense blocks, which are now re-erected in the British Museum, a photograph is given in page 176. When first found, it retained traces of the red color with which it had originally been tinted. At length traces of the steps of the platform and more drums of columns were exposed to view. On the pavement in many places were found ashes, in some spots six inches deep, showing the destruction of the roof by fire.² Pliny says the roof was of cedar beams, *e cedrinis trabibus*, and the context shows that he believed it to be very old.³

In September, 1872, further important discoveries were made, in a very fine sculptured block from the frieze of the west front of the Temple, and the large sculptured drum of a column from one of the "column  c lat " described by Pliny.⁴ This immense block, measuring six feet in height by a little more in diameter, and weighing more than eleven tons, was found deeply buried in sand and marble chippings at the west end of the Temple (p. 189). After innumerable difficulties the huge stone was raised to the surface, nearly two months after its discovery, and conveyed to the station of the Smyrna railway.

Two photographs of the "diggings" as they appeared at this time, strewed thickly with blocks and broken drums of fluted columns, are given in page 192 of Mr. Wood's work. There is also a photograph of one of the great capitals, of which one volute remains nearly perfect (p. 197).

As the excavations proceeded, "a considerable portion of the western and southern walls of the cella of the last Temple but two was found in position. They were remarkable for their exquisite finish and the extreme beauty of the marble of which they

¹ Dr. Smith's Dictionary of Geography, i., p. 838: "The supposition that the basement of the Temple has been buried by the alluvium of the C yster is very properly rejected by Hamilton, who has pointed out the probable site." This site, in the plan of Ephesus given in the above dictionary on conjecture, is too far to the west. Hamilton supposed it was near the western extremity of the town, overlooking the marsh, which was the ancient harbor.

² A small beam of wood was found here, part of which is in the possession of the writer. It looks like the heart of the olive or the ilex tree, and is extremely hard and in very good preservation. It was doubtless the roof of the Temple when St. Paul visited Ephesus.

³ N. H., xvi.,   213.

⁴ Both these are now in the British Museum. The sculptured fragment appears to represent Hercules struggling with an Amazon.

were built" (p. 216). On clearing a large space near the cella the effects of an earthquake were seen, which had raised the pavement in one part nearly five feet above its original level.

The inner portion of the Temple, which was decorated with Corinthian pillars, Mr. Wood supposes to have been restored, if not rebuilt, in the time of Marcus Aurelius (p. 218). At p. 269 he gives a longitudinal section of the cella as he supposes it to have been, with the statue of the goddess in position. Of this statue we have many extant representations on coins, gems, and medals. It is Eastern, almost Indian, in character, and appears to have been made of wood.¹ Tradition said, as it has falsely said of many other statues, that it fell from the sky.² Certain it is, that this monster of an idol was an object of worship to all the Greeks in Asia, till St. Paul boldly taught the people that "those are not gods which are made by men's hands."³

The fortunate discovery of a short length of the lowest step at the east end enabled Mr. Wood to determine the exact length of the whole structure, measured on the lowest step (p. 246). This was four hundred and eighteen feet, the width being a few inches under two hundred and forty. Now Pliny gives the measurements of the whole area of the Temple at four hundred and twenty-five feet by two hundred and twenty-five.⁴ The coincidence is near enough (allowing for a slight difference between the Roman and the English foot, and perhaps for a slight error of transcription, ccxxv for ccxxxv), to be very interesting as one of the proofs of identity.

Mr. Wood's ground-plan (on p. 262) of the Temple, shows that on each side there was a double row of columns, each row of twenty, and a triple row at each end of eight, the inner row, next the cella, being of six, there being two pilasters in a *pronaos* with a portico, or *in antis*, as it is technically called. Now, if we count, as is quite natural, the end pillars twice, as we stand either at the front or at the side, we thus get one hundred and twenty-four. Pliny states there were one hundred and twenty-seven;⁵ but again, how easily might cxxvii have been wrongly written for cxxiv!

¹ Ebony or else vinewood, according to Pliny, N. H., xvi., § 213. It has been doubted, with good reason, whether it was originally designed to represent the Virgin Huntress.

² ἀγάλμα διοπετὲς, Acts xix. 35. The same was said of the statue of Artemis at Tauri (Balaclava in the Crimea); see Eurip. Iph. in Taur. 188; and of that of Athena Polias at Athens. The legend may probably refer to the fall of a meteoric stone at some remote period.

³ Acts xix. 26: οὐκ εἰσὶ θεοὶ οἱ διὰ χειρῶν γιγνόμενοι.

⁴ N. H., xxxvi., § 14: "Universo templo longitudo est cccxxv pedum, latitudo ccxxv." The area of the Parthenon at Athens was not one-fourth of that of the Temple of Ephesus, which was the largest of the Greek temples. (Dr. Smith's Dict. of Geography, art. Ephesus.)

⁵ N. H., xxxvi., § 14: "Columnæ centum viginti septem a singulis regibus factæ lx

Colonel Leake had conjectured¹ that the Temple had a double row of twenty-one on each side, and a triple row of ten at the two ends, thus making one hundred and twenty by counting twenty-four columns twice and adding four columns *in antis*. The conjecture, though not strictly accurate,² was extremely sagacious, and wonderfully near to the truth.

The height of the columns is given by Pliny at sixty feet, which we may fairly suppose includes both capital and base. He gives a very interesting account of the contrivance by which the architraves (*epistylia*) were raised and laid upon the capitals. A gently inclined plane (*mollis clivus*) was constructed, either of timber or earth (although his expression *exaggerato* suggests the latter), and the architraves were made to rest at first on hampers of sand, and allowed to settle gradually on the capitals by letting out the sand underneath.³ In another passage he tells us the proportion of ancient Ionic columns was in height nine times the diameter; the height of the capital was a third of the diameter, and the old rule for the height of the columns was a third part of the width of the Temple.⁴ He goes on to say, that "in the old Temple of Diana at Ephesus for the first time base-mouldings were put at the bottom and capitals on the tops of the pillars." The diameter was to be one-eighth of the height, and the base-mouldings were to extend to half the diameter; the pillars at the top to be one-seventh less in thickness than at the bottom. Mr. Wood has not referred to this interesting passage, which furnishes so exact a testimony to his great discovery. The diameter of the columns which he found being a trifle (half an inch) over six feet at the bottom, we have $9 \times 6 = 54$ for the total height of the drum, to which we have to add five feet for both base-mouldings and capital, viz., three feet for the height of the base-mouldings ("*crassitudinis dimidium*"),

pedum altitudine, ex eis xxxvi cœlatæ una a Scopa." If this number be correct, the double row of eight at each end were thus sculptured in the lower parts of the shaft (as Mr. Wood found them), making thirty-two, and the two at each entrance of the cella in the third row, making in all just thirty-six.

¹ Asia Minor, p. 346, quoted in the elaborate article on Ephesus in Dr. Smith's Dictionary of Geography, vol. i., p. 835. Mr. Wood does not appear to have consulted either this work or others referred to in the same article, viz., Hamilton's Researches or Chandler's Tour in Greece and Asia.

² We know that there were *eight*, not *ten*, columns at the ends, from an extant medal hereafter to be mentioned.

³ N. H., *ut sup.*

⁴ N. H., xxxvi., § 23: "Quæ nonam (partem altitudinis in crassitudine ima habent, vocantur) Ionicæ. Ionicis capituli altitudo tertia pars est crassitudinis. Antiqua ratio erat columnarum altitudinis tertia pars latitudinum delubri. In Ephesiæ Dianæ æde quæ prius fuit, primum columnis spiræ subditæ et capitula addita, placuitque altitudinis octava pars in crassitudine et ut spiræ haberent crassitudinis dimidium septimæque partes detraherentur summarum crassitudine." The Doric column, our readers are aware, has no base, and little more than an *abacus* for capital.

and two feet for the capital ("tertia pars crassitudinis"). The square plinth on which each column stands, with the small excess in the diameter not accounted for above, will make up the sixty feet given by Pliny as the height. Nor is the proportion of one-third of the width of the Temple far wrong; indeed, it is almost exactly right, if we take the height of the pillars *without* base or capital; for $54 \times 3 = 162$, and Mr. Wood gives the width of the Temple at one hundred and sixty-three and a few inches,—Roman feet, as we said, differing slightly from English.

Pliny says that the Temple was built on marshy ground that it might not be affected by earthquakes, nor those openings or rifts in the ground which occur in volcanic countries.¹ That this precaution was vain we have already shown. Colonel Leake suggests, as the real reason for the site chosen, that "the tall Ionic column was more appropriate for a building in a plain, and the shorter Doric column looked better on a height;" adding that "all the greatest and most costly temples of Asia, except one, are built on low and marshy spots."²

Pliny gives a curious account, which does not seem very credible in itself, that a layer of trodden-down charcoal and then another of wool was placed as a foundation for the edifice.³ Bearing in mind this account, Mr. Wood sunk four deep holes, one inside against the west wall of the cella, in which he found at a depth of about six feet a layer, four inches thick, of a composition resembling glazier's putty. Next below was a layer of three inches of charcoal, and then another of the same material and thickness as the uppermost. This, on being afterwards submitted to an analysis, proved to be a kind of mortar mixed with silica.

Proofs were found, in the different levels of the pavements, that the Temple had been rebuilt on the same site and on the same plan not less than three times, the earliest, probably, about five centuries B.C., and the latest in the time of Alexander the Great. Strabo and Pliny record the name of the first architect, Chersiphron of

¹ N. H., xxxvi., § 14: "Id solo in palustri fecere, ne terræ motus sentiret aut hiatus timeret."

² Quoted in Smith's Dictionary of Geography, *ut sup.*

³ Pliny, *ut sup.*: "Rursus ne in lubrico atque instabili fundamenta tantæ molis locarentur, calcatis ea substravere carbonibus, dein velleribus lanæ." From the results obtained by Mr. Wood, we are tempted to think that *calcatis* is a corrupt reading for *calce*, "with lime,"—"calce ea substravere et carbonibus." The point we might have looked for in Pliny's statement was, that these precautions were taken to keep the damp from injuring the Temple. But he seems to speak of laying down a kind of concrete to make a firm foundation, for which purpose wool, at all events, would have been useless. In plastering walls, it is still the custom to mix hair with the lime used. Anyhow, the finding of the charcoal, a material so unusual in any but sepulchral buildings, was very remarkable.

Cressus in Crete.¹ The second and somewhat larger edifice was set on fire and burnt by one Herostratus on the very day of the birth of Alexander the Great.² The third Temple was built by one Dinocrates, a Macedonian,³ who was also the architect of the city of Alexandria, and the money was collected from the sale of ladies' trinkets, which they voluntarily offered, and by disposing of the marble pillars of the last edifice.

It was this Temple, improved as it may have been internally in the time of some one or more of the Roman emperors, that Mr. Wood discovered; and the sculptured portions he was able to remove undoubtedly show that decadence in Greek art which marked the Alexandrine period. But Pliny, in speaking of the great antiquity of the statue of the goddess, affirms that it had never been changed, though the Temple had been restored *seven* times.⁴ In one place⁵ he assigns four hundred, in another one hundred and twenty years to the completion of so vast a building.

The most remarkable, and we believe unique, feature of the great pillars at two ends was their being carved in bold relief with groups of figures. These are the *cœlatæ columnæ* of Pliny, who says they were in number thirty-six. It is fortunate that we have representations of them, though very rude in detail, in two medals of the ages of Hadrian and Gordianus, engraved in p. 266-7 of Mr. Wood's work.⁶ By a very ingenious calculation of the reduction of the diameter in the portions discovered by him, viz., from six feet to five and a half, Mr. Wood concludes (p. 266) that the sculpture was carried up to the height of about twenty feet, and was separated into compartments by three bands. It is a doubtful point, he says; but above the sculpture the pillars were certainly fluted. Their appearance anyhow must have been magnificent, and a gift worthy of the kings, who are said to have presented one apiece.⁷ On some of the broken portions of the outer columns of the peristyle

¹ Strabo, xiv. 22, p. 640: τὸν δὲ νεὼν τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος πρῶτος μὲν Χερσίφρων ἡρχιτεκτόνησεν, εἰτ' ἄλλος ἐποίησε μείζων ὡς δὲ τοῦτον Ἡρόστρατος τις ἐνέπρησεν, ἄλλον ἀμείνων κατεσκεύασαν συνενέγκαντες τὸν τῶν γυναικῶν κοσμον καὶ τὰς ἰδίας οὐσίας, διαθήμενοι δὲ καὶ τοὺς προτέρους κίονας. See also Pliny, N. H., vii. 37, and xxxvi. 14.

² Cicero, De Div., i., § 47: "Qua nocte templum Ephesiæ Dianæ deflagravit, constat ex Olympiade natum esse Alexandrum."

³ Strabo, *ibid.*, § 23.

⁴ N. H., xvi., § 213: "Nunquam mutatum septies restituto templo."

⁵ That just referred to, and in xxxvi., § 95: "Templum Ephesiæ Dianæ cxx annis factum a tota Asia." In both he says it was built by "all Asia" (*tota Asia*). Mr. Wood (p. 623), following apparently another text, says the Temple was "two hundred and twenty years building."

⁶ In both of these the front elevation of the Temple is represented, and the statue of the goddess as it was seen in the *cella* between eight columns.

⁷ "A singulis regibus factæ," Pliny, N. H., xxxv., § 14.

Mr. Wood found "fragments of dedicatory inscriptions deeply incised" (p. 267).

Not the least interesting part of Mr. Wood's splendid and interesting volume are a series of careful drawings in perspective, in section, and in elevation, of the Temple as it stood in all its ancient beauty, the pride of Asia, and the wonder of all beholders. An architect by profession, and, therefore, thoroughly competent to draw the right artistic conclusions from comparatively small data, he has been able to present to us, not a mere fancy picture or vague conception of what the Temple might have been or ought to have been, but the actual reality, drawn to a scale from the measurements recorded by Pliny, and verified, as we have shown, by the remains found *in situ*. It was beyond question one of the largest and finest Greek temples in the world. Not less in size than a mediæval cathedral, though much more massive in outline and proportion, it must have been visited annually by thousands of worshippers from all parts of the world, votaries of the monster goddess whose effigy Mr. Wood gives us on page 269, from the statue in the Museo Reale at Naples. "Great is Diana of Ephesus!" the people shouted, when St. Paul visited that city. What has become of the Temple? No one knows. It has simply vanished. The thousands of tons of marble which composed it have been dragged away to construct other buildings, or burnt in lime-kilns,¹ and the statues and decorations of its high altar, described by Strabo as the works of Praxiteles,² have been carried off to adorn Roman villas in another land. The great folding-doors of cypress wood, which, Pliny tells us,³ after standing four hundred years were as sound and fresh as if they were new—where are they? We cannot exempt from blame the intemperate zeal of the early Christians, who were as eager to obliterate the shrines of idols as the Protestant reformers, under Henry and Elizabeth, and the Puritans, in the time of the Commonwealth, were to destroy the works of the Catholic architects of the Middle Ages. The iconoclasts in the reign of Theodosius the First⁴

¹ One of these Mr. Wood actually found on the site of the Temple (p. 238). Close to it he came upon "an immense heap of small marble chippings standing ready to be thrown into the kiln."

² Strabo, xiv. 23, p. 641: τὸν δὲ θεῶν βωμὸν εἶναι τῶν Πραξιτέλους ἔργων ἅπαντα σχεδόν τι πλήρη.

³ N. H., xvi., § 215: "Valvas esse e cupresso et jam quadringentis prope annis durare materiem omnem novæ similem."

⁴ A. D. 378. "It was in his reign that the formal destruction of paganism took place, and we still possess a large number of the laws of Theodosius prohibiting the exercise of the pagan religion, and forbidding the heathen worship, under severe penalties, in some cases extending to death." (Smith's Classical Dictionary of Biography, etc.)

would be little likely to spare such a temple as that of Ephesus. Fire and earthquake, human greed and human eagerness to destroy, levelled that proud building to the earth; water and earth brought down from the mountains made it a tomb. How marvellous its sudden resurrection in a volume which brings it, as it were, upon our drawing-room tables!

We have left ourselves but little space to describe the many objects of interest discovered by Mr. Wood on the site of the old city in his explorations for the Temple. Of these, perhaps none is more interesting than the finding the tomb of St. Luke, whom one tradition affirmed to have been buried at Ephesus. Enough was found of its remains to furnish a restored design of the whole, which Mr. Wood has done at page 58. It is a remarkably graceful edifice—a rotunda with a domical roof, and surrounded by sixteen detached pillars. He considers it to belong to the latter end of the third or the beginning of the fourth century, and supposes that the relics of the Evangelist had been translated from outside the city and placed in this tomb, and he was encouraged in this idea by finding a sculpture of an ox, the symbol of St. Luke, surmounted by a cross. The tomb stood in a quadrangle one hundred and fifty-three feet across, surrounded by a colonnade, and paved with white marble (p. 58). With great good feeling Mr. Wood declined to explore for any human remains.

A curious object was a stone basin found in the forum. It was fifteen feet in diameter, and raised on a pedestal. It may have held the water for sprinkling the floor of the Temple,¹ but Mr. Wood supposes it was employed in the baptism of converts in the third and fourth centuries, and he remarks that, if so, immersion could not have been practiced (p. 32), the basin being very shallow.

Of the Theatre we have already spoken briefly. The Odeum, or Music Hall,² on the southern slope of Mount Coressus, not far from the Theatre, which was on the west side, was excavated, and not only were some fine pieces of statuary recovered, and the whole plan of the stage and the proscenium made out, but several inscriptions of interest were brought away. One of them is a letter (or edict) of the Emperor Hadrian to the people of Ephesus,³ commending to them the election of one Lucius Erastus as a member of the council. The "immense number of large blocks of stone and marble which had fallen from the superstructure had blocked

¹ ἀπορραντήριον, Eur. Ion., 435.

² Athens also had its *Odeum*, built by Pericles. It was used, according to Hesychius, for the recitations of rhapsodists and for lyric contests; but we know from Aristophanes that it was occasionally used as a law-court.

³ Given in Mr. Wood's Appendix, Inscriptions from the Odeum, No. 1.

up all the entrances, covering the stage and the adjoining passages" (p. 45).

Another great building cleared out was the Stadium,¹ near the Coressian Gate on the northwest side of the city. Mr. Wood considers it to have been built in the time of Augustus. Its total length was eight hundred and fifty feet, by upwards of two hundred in width. Along both sides and the circular end were tiers of seats, of which "every fragment has been carried away." At the western end was an open columniated screen in two tiers, and the bases of the lower columns were found in their original position (p. 98).

Other buildings were found, establishing in a very interesting manner the similarity between at least two Ionic cities, Athens and Ephesus. The Prytaneum, or Town Hall (or possibly the Senate House), was identified in "the remains of a very fine stone building about two hundred and fifty feet square," in the forum near to the Great Theatre. The solid piers of masonry, of which many remained, were "particularly well built of large blocks of marble" (p. 102). The Pnyx, or meeting-place of the popular assemblies, on a swampy ground to the north of the city, had its rock-cut *bema* or platform and steps ascending to it, strongly reminding Mr. Wood of the Pnyx at Athens in the time of Pericles.²

Ancient Greek cities were, as a rule, conspicuous for their public buildings and public squares, *ἀγοραί*, but very deficient in that principal feature of modern towns, the costly and spacious houses of the inhabitants. They lived, as a rule, in open-door life, and all their interests, religious and political alike, centred in public meetings and public ceremonies. Their suburbs were adorned with costly tombs; but no vestige of a Greek house, in the ordinary sense of the word, or corresponding to the Roman *domus* or town mansion, has ever been found on a really ancient site. They were doubtless constructed almost entirely of wood on a low basement of stone or brick. Hence, Sir Charles Fellows explains, "the total absence of even the trace of the residence of the people in the ancient Greek cities, as the materials would not endure for half a century; the public buildings alone remain to point out the extent of the cities."³

We have still to speak briefly of what is really, perhaps, the most valuable and interesting part of Mr. Wood's discoveries, the Greek and Roman inscriptions, which together exceeded in number four

¹ Like the Roman circus, most cities of importance had a racing-ground for horsemanship, chariot-driving, and foot-races. There was one at Athens on the south bank of the Ilissus, for a description of which see Wordsworth's *Greece*, page 224.

² It may be added that both Athens and Ephesus had a Temple of Jupiter Olympius.

³ *Travels and Researches in Asia Minor*, p. 315. London, 1852.

hundred. Such a "find" was never made on any ancient site; and though many of these are imperfect and mutilated, and the majority of a late date, that of the Emperors Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, and Marcus Aurelius, still they throw great light on many obscure points in the history of those Emperors, and in the topography and political constitution of the city. Especially interesting is the occurrence in them of many of the terms in the nineteenth chapter of the Acts,¹ and a considerable list of names of persons, tribes, and local games, hitherto unrecorded. One inscription, found near the River Cäyster, some two miles to the north of Ayasalouk, dates nearly four centuries before our era, and is singularly perfect and plainly legible as far as it goes. It is a very curious document, referring chiefly to regulations respecting the interest on borrowed money. One short extract from the translation supplied by Mr. Wood, from the pen of the learned Provost of Eton, Dr. Goodford, will give our readers an idea of its nature. We seem to be reading from a page of a modern law book.

"If any, while pledging real property to one party, have raised money upon it from others, as though it were unincumbered property, by deceiving the latter lenders, then the second lenders shall be allowed, after getting quit of the original creditors according to the money-rate allowed during the common war, to keep the property; and if there be anything further due to them on the property, the creditor shall have the right of recovery from all other property of the debtor, in any way he may be able, without being liable to any penalty; and if this too be mortgaged, the right of recovery from the mortgaged property shall be the same as in the case of those who mortgage land with a bad title."²

Mr. Wood has published a selection from these inscriptions, with an English translation on each opposite page. The work of deciphering and explaining Greek inscriptions is almost a science in itself, and it will doubtless be found that some mistakes have been made in the rendering as well as some errors in the transcription. The complete editing of these must be left to future scholars. Meanwhile the author has rendered to literature a service, the memory of which will be recorded in history.

¹ Such as *γρομματαὶς*, *Ἀσιαρχοὶ*, *νεωκόρος*, etc.

² Our classical readers may possibly be curious to know that "to mortgage land with a bad title" is *μετῶρα ἐγγυᾶσθαι*.

THE BLUE LAWS OF CONNECTICUT.

The True Blue Laws of Connecticut and New Haven, and the False Blue Laws invented by the Rev. Samuel Peters, to which are added Specimens of the Laws and Judicial Proceedings of other Colonies, and some Blue Laws of England in the reign of James I. Edited by J. Hammond Trumbull. Hartford, Conn.: American Publishing Co., 1876, 12mo., pp. 360.

CONNECTICUT has long chafed under the stigma of having held among the American colonies a bad pre-eminence for the narrowness and illiberality of her early laws, which were not only subversive of all personal liberty, but marked by extreme cruelty. For more than a century this code has been known as the Blue Laws. A *History of Connecticut* by the Rev. Samuel Peters, an Episcopal clergyman, rather a satire on the colony than a serious work, full of exaggerations and absurdities, gave what purported to be the famous Blue Laws. From the year 1781, in which this work appeared in London, it has been the source from which all drew who wished to turn the shafts of their ridicule on the State.

To redeem the honor of their commonwealth, the citizens of Connecticut gave in a popular form some of the early legislation of the colonies which blended to form Connecticut. Silas Andrus, long a publisher of cheap books, sold throughout the country by peddlers when there was little local book trade, issued in 1822 a small volume entitled, "The Code of 1650, being a compilation of the Laws and Orders of the General Court of Connecticut; also the Constitution or Civil Compact entered into, and adopted by, the towns of Windsor, Hartford, and Wethersfield in 1638-9, to which is added some extracts from the Laws and Judicial Proceedings of New Haven Colony, commonly called Blue Laws."

The Hon. R. R. Hinman, Secretary of State of Connecticut, thought it not beneath him to contribute to the same class of literature, and accordingly issued, in 1838, "The Blue Laws of New Haven Colony, usually called the Blue Laws of Connecticut, Quaker Laws of Massachusetts, Blue Laws of New York," etc. This was the New Haven Code of 1655, reprinted from the very rare London edition of 1656.

The Hon. J. Hammond Trumbull, who has, like Hinman, held the office of Secretary of State, a well-known historical student, and one of the few who have had the zeal and courage to study with thoroughness and scientific purpose the languages of our

Indian tribes, comes forward now to do battle for his State in the volume before us.

His work consists of an introduction, in which he shows the general severity of the criminal laws of England and other countries in the earlier part of the seventeenth century, and especially the cruel treatment of witches, as an element to be taken into consideration in estimating the early laws of New Haven and Connecticut. He then discusses the unpopularity under which Connecticut long suffered, and treats of Peters's work and the genuine laws of the two colonies, their various editions, and the recent use of the Peters Code by writers of the present day in England and America.

He gives in full the First Constitution of Connecticut, 1639; the Capital Laws of the same colony in 1642; the Code of 1650; various Laws and Orders of Court; the Fundamental Agreement at New Haven, 1639; the New Haven Code of 1655; Laws, etc., of New Haven Courts, 1639-1660; Peters's Blue Laws; and then, by way of contrast, laws and judicial proceedings of New York, Virginia, Maryland, Massachusetts, and England.

Most of the documents for a consideration of Connecticut's real position are thus before the reader in a single volume, and as that State is not likely to have her case argued by one better versed in her history than Mr. Trumbull, or of greater ability as an advocate, we may well consider this as her final plea before the great court of appeal, the good sense of the world.

The question then is: Has he entitled Connecticut to an acquittal of the charge on which she has so long been arraigned, of having surpassed the other colonies in intolerance, in a Draconian severity of laws, and in her disregard of personal rights?

Underlying all the subject are principles to be settled. In the first place, did the settlers of Connecticut and New Haven retain their rights and duties as British subjects, and were they amenable to the English laws, or were they men subject to no authority, free to form such compacts for their social order as to them might seem fit? Did the exigency in the latter case give them absolute right of life and death over all who gainsaid their enactments?

Nothing in the first constitution of Connecticut, or the laws enacted under it, nothing in the New Haven fundamental agreement, or its code and judicial action, acknowledges in the slightest degree the existence of any power or sovereignty to which they owed allegiance. The binding character of the unwritten English constitution, and of its written law, was completely ignored. Like Moreau, when he refused to pay his tax and went to jail, they seemed to say: "I simply wish to refuse all allegiance to the State, to withdraw, and stand aloof from it effectually."

Formed at a period when in the mother country revolution was

assailing the whole system of civil government, as well as the ecclesiastical fabric which, on England's revolt from the Catholic Church, the monarch and parliament had established, the colonists of the valley of the Connecticut ignored absolutely the civil and ecclesiastical government of England, and acted as if they owed no allegiance as British subjects. It may well be questioned whether they could thus free themselves from all obligations as subjects. At a later date, when the old order was re-established in England, the Connecticut colonies hastened, under the instinct of self-preservation, to recognize a paramount authority, and to seek its indorsement and its expression in a charter as the basis of their colonial government.

Though they troubled themselves not at all about any duties as British subjects, and under the charter sought to avoid discharging them, they certainly admitted their existence. Their powers to make compacts for self-government were, therefore, from the first, such only as resulted from the exigencies of the case, the non-exercise of the governmental functions in America by the recognized authority, and hence were subordinate to, and could not be exercised in violation of, the laws of England. From no principle inherent could they derive the power of life and death, and exercise it, except as temporarily replacing the lawful authority of the English law until such time as it was duly established, and as a matter of course they could never exercise it in direct opposition to the laws of England, or to punish what the laws of England enjoined.

Virginia was established with the full and complete recognition that the settlers were still British subjects bound by the English laws, to be enforced and maintained so far as their altered condition and new associations rendered it feasible.

In Maryland the case was the same, and though some now think the history of that colony something to be garbled and distorted at will, we cannot but respect the doubts and scruples of the early Catholic settlers on this very point. Under their charter every freeman attended the Assembly; but as this body acted under the British government, and would be called upon to enforce, more or less, its laws, which often militated directly against the doctrines and discipline of the Catholic Church, many of the Catholic settlers were perplexed how to act. Could they take part in legislation to enact what they could not but hold sinful? The position was new, and several cases of conscience arising from it were submitted to Catholic ecclesiastical authority to know what, under the circumstances, they could do as Catholics without sin, and what, as Englishmen loyal to their own country, they must do. It never entered into their minds, or the minds of their clergy, to hold themselves absolved from all allegiance, free to make any rules and

laws that seemed good unto them, and to enforce them even by the death penalty.

The Connecticut and Massachusetts colonies ignored and evaded the English laws and the duties of the colonists as subjects, Maryland and Virginia acknowledged them. The Massachusetts colonies acted in direct violation of the patents under which they settled, while Connecticut could excuse herself from at least that inconsistency.

No one can read the authentic documents given by Trumbull without admitting that they were designed to establish a system in utter disregard of the English law, and in many points in direct opposition to it, forbidding men to do what it was their absolute right as British subjects to do, and compelling them to do what no English law, and no necessity of their colonial condition, required.

Can any portion of a community thus isolate itself from the rest, and ignore the laws of the country, and establish a government exercising power of life and death over its members? The cases of bands of robbers and of secret societies are analogous, and it is not easy to draw a logical distinction between their position and that of the leading New England colonies.

But it may be said that the founders of these communities were highly moral men, actuated by noble principles, and that they acted for the advancement of human freedom. This indeed is the argument put forward in nearly all our current works bearing on American history, most of which emanate from the New England school; it is put forward really against the tacit charge of the illegality of their original institutions. The morality of setting aside all the laws of one's country, of arrogating exclusive sanctity and the absolute certainty of doctrine, with no proof of consecutive title to a deposit of faith, or of a special mission supernaturally attested, is very questionable. The Pharisees, standing on still stronger ground, were absolutely condemned; we find them direct opponents of truth, and while we find that our Lord converted the thief, and the harlot, and the publican, the Pharisee seemed proof alike to His doctrine, His example, and His miracles. The assumption of superior morality, were it perfectly established, would not justify their course. The noble principles that actuated them were simply self-preservation and freedom from restraint.

The claim that they acted for the advancement of human freedom, though put forward persistently, is so utterly absurd that, while repetition has made many undoubtedly think it true, thoughtful men must really laugh in their sleeves when they put forward this fine phrase to tickle the ears of the multitude.

The freedom which these men sought was freedom from all influence of the laws of their own country; freedom to make their

own will absolute law in a portion of the national domain ; freedom to exclude from it all who would not submit to a series of unauthorized rules which they chose to enforce. It was simply the freedom of a robber band, for secret societies seldom claim absolute territorial sway. The only freedom they conceived was freedom to do their own will, to defy the laws of the State in bulk, to enforce their own will on their fellow-subjects, or expel them if they refused to submit.

Every Englishman had by birthright a free right to settle in the colony and enjoy there the benefit of the English law. To say that it was freedom to deny his right to settle or to enforce upon him any other system of law is utterly absurd. Every act of a colonial body that, without absolute necessity, prevented a British subject from doing any act that he might lawfully do in England, was an invasion of his freedom. The early Massachusetts laws and those of the Connecticut colony which were based upon them, restricted the liberty of British subjects in a host of instances. How can any sensible man pretend that they established greater freedom? They made the whole system an oligarchy by restricting the right of freemen to those who were admitted members of the Church which they established. When Milford took in six settlers who were not in church fellowship, it alarmed all the towns. The preamble of a resolve made at the General Court, held at New Haven, October 23d, 1643, says explicitly, "Whereas this plantation at first with general and full consent laid their foundation that none but members of approved churches should be accounted free burgesses, nor should any else have any vote in any election, or power, or trust, in ordering of civil affairs, in which we have constantly proceeded hitherto," etc.

The General Court ordered that in future none but church members should be admitted freemen in any town ; that these six should never be chosen to the office of deputy or any colonial position, nor vote at any time in the election of magistrates.

The only approved churches were those organized on the Congregational system ; all others, the Church of England included, were non-approved. The Church, in each town, was a society, admission to which depended on the will of a majority of the members. No member of the Established Church could acquire the right to vote except by renouncing his own Church and applying for membership in the Congregational body, taking his chance of obtaining admission, for he had no definite right to membership. Can this in any just sense be called freedom? The claim that these colonies did aught for civil freedom is utterly untenable. The claim that they ever established or dreamed of establishing religious freedom is equally so, unless we concede that relig-

ious freedom means the right to set up peculiar theories of faith and church discipline, and compel your neighbors to accept them. Now though some people call this religious freedom, is it anything different from religious intolerance and persecution?

This Koranic enforcing of religious views on others is inherent in Protestantism, and will live with its life, die with its death. It is scarcely strange therefore that its adherents sometimes mistake its real character. From the outset of the so-called Reformation down to the Falk laws, we see it clearly marked. Nowhere was freedom given to those who chose to adhere to the old faith to retain their churches and practice their religion according to the dictates of their own conscience. To suppress Catholic worship, seize Catholic churches and institutions, break up Catholic religious orders or confraternities has always been deemed right, and even at this day every attempt of the kind finds ready sympathizers in this country. Whether this is compatible with freedom or justice they never stop to inquire; the only train of thought seems to be, that anything that will cripple the Catholic Church and advance Protestantism must be right. As this came to be a sort of axiom in regard to Catholics, it was an easy step for the New England colonies, with their established Church, to apply it practically to fellow Protestants, though logically the Quakers, acting on their own private judgment, had the same right to hang the Puritan that the Puritan had to hang Quakers.

Religious liberty in the sense of acknowledging a right in each man or body of men to worship God according to his or their church discipline, and to act up to their own standards of belief without forfeiting any of the rights enjoyed by their fellow-citizens, never was established in any New England colony. Toleration of anything but Congregationalism was declared to be "an evil egg." Roger Williams, driven from Massachusetts for his extreme opinions, and where he displayed especially his utter hatred of the Catholic religion by insisting on the removal of the cross from the English flag, founded a colony which experience had taught him to make more free than those he left; but even he denied to Catholics the right of religious freedom.

The Dutch in New York allowed the public exercise of no religion but the Calvinistic according to the Dutch form; Virginia refused to allow Catholic settlers, and enforced English laws against dissenters from the Church of England.

Not one of these colonies can claim to have established religious freedom. The honor belongs to Maryland, and at a later period to the influence of James in New York and Pennsylvania. That the principle of religious freedom should emanate from a Catholic lord proprietor, have been embodied in his charter, taken up by his

Catholic settlers, and through their influence embodied in a law in the very last moments when they were allowed to exercise the rights of freemen, has been of late a source of great chagrin to many. Feeling that the claim of religious liberty for New England is no longer tenable, they try at least to deprive Catholics of the glory. Hence the sophistries of Rev. E. D. Neill, who has been persistently harping on the subject. The matter must be taken up by some of our writers and treated from a true historic standpoint, for it has gone so far that Mr. Bancroft, in the Centennial edition of his *History of the United States*, has suppressed the tribute he had eloquently paid for nearly forty years to the Catholic colonists of Maryland, in order to, throw disparagement upon them under the guidance of Neill. Cavil as they may, the idea of religious freedom in Maryland originated with Lord Baltimore, and was by his instrumentality embodied in his charter, as it was in his instructions; it was fully accepted and sustained by the Catholics while a minority, and after they became a majority in Maryland; it was the final act, we may say, of Catholic ascendancy; while religious intolerance, penal laws, and an established Church marked the advent of the Protestants to power. Another Catholic, James, Duke of York, in the laws he adopted for the colony of New York, and in the legislation there under his influence, showed a great advance on most of the other colonies in civil and religious liberty, as his fall was followed by the enactment of penal laws and the establishment of the Church of England. Under his aid his friend, William Penn, who shared his views, established in Pennsylvania a religious freedom which put to shame the pretensions of New England.

The claim of Connecticut that in her irregular action she established civil and religious liberty must fall to the ground as a mere dream, and cannot alter our judgment as to her right to ignore the allegiance due by her people to the British law.

We can now proceed to examine what the legislation of New Haven and Connecticut actually was. Peters was not the first to draw attention to it.

The strange system of law prevailing in Connecticut attracted notice in other parts, although the laws were not generally printed or diffused. As early as 1705, Colonel Heathcote, of New York, wrote: "They have abundance of odd kinds of laws to prevent dissenting from their Church." (*N. Y. Doc. Hist.*, iii., p. 14; *Doc. Hist. P. E. Church*, i., p. 9.) Smith, in the continuation of his *History of New York*, alludes to the Blue Laws as being a topic for wits, humorists, and buffoons. He adds: "The author had the curiosity to resort to them, when the Commissaries met at New Haven, for adjusting a partition line between New York and

Massachusetts in 1767; and a parchment-covered book in demi-royal paper was handed to him for the laws asked for, as the only volume in the office passing under this odd title." (*Smith's New York*, vol. ii., p. 93.)

"Most American readers," says Palfrey, "have heard of the 'Blue Laws' of New Haven, which have been precisely described as making 'one thin volume in folio,' embracing the following among other provisions: No one shall travel, cook victuals, make beds, sweep house, cut hair, or shave, on the Sabbath day. No woman shall kiss her children on the Sabbath or Fasting day. No one shall read Common Prayer, keep Christmas or Saint days, make minced pies, dance, play cards, or play on any instrument of music, except the drum, trumpet, and jewsharp. Every male shall have his hair cut round according to a cap."¹ Mr. Trumbull on his title-page and elsewhere characterizes the whole as "The Blue Law Forgeries of Peters," yet this is scarcely accurate. Peters has not manufactured the whole out of his own imagination; he perverts and exaggerates in some cases, and probably invents in others, unless we charitably suppose him to have copied from some loose abstract of the laws given him. Peters himself does not profess to quote; he says: "The laws made by this independent dominion and denominated *Blue Laws* by the neighboring colonies, were never suffered to be printed; but the following sketch of some of them will give a tolerable idea of the spirit which pervades the whole." He does not profess to cite the acts, but to give a sketch of them, and details forty-five. For the very absurd ones cited by Palfrey we find no trace in the genuine laws given by Mr. Trumbull, although the Common Prayer would undoubtedly fall under the New Haven law against heresy (*Code of 1656*, p. 224), that against "Prophanation of the Lord's Day" with its death penalty (p. 253); and in Connecticut would be covered by the decision of 1658 (p. 158).

It may, however, be worth noting that there is a "chasm in the records of New Haven colony between April, 1644, and May, 1653, which leaves us in uncertainty," says Palfrey, "whether the Code of 1656 was the first essay of the kind," and he inclines to believe there was one in 1648 or 1649. If it were not, the colony was ruled under vague laws drawn from the Old Testament, as each magistrate chose to apply them. Prior to 1656 two persons, Goodwife Basset, at Stratford, in 1651, and Goodwife Knapp, at Fairfield, were executed as witches in the New Haven colony, the first of the terrible series of executions for witchcraft in New England.² But we should scarcely know the fact in either case, for the records

¹ Hist. New England, ii., p. 32, n.

² New Haven Records ii., p. 77.

have entirely disappeared, had not a woman of some little sense, a Mrs. Staples, examining the body of one of the victims at the grave, asked them to show her the pretended witch teats, and declared the body to have no marks that she or any other woman had not. For this she was accused by Roger Ludlow of being a witch, but being a woman of spirit she induced her husband to bring an action of slander against Ludlow. The record of this suit gives all the details known of the two witch trials, but others may have taken place and the records been similarly suppressed. In August, 1653, Elizabeth Godman was accused of being a witch, brought up again in 1655, and imprisoned. . . . Davenport preached against witches in 1653, so that doubtless a law was passed. After the code Thomas Mullener was arraigned in 1657.

The absence of some of these records has at least a very suspicious look.

The settlers claimed a divine authority for their laws: "Yet civil rulers and courts, and this General Court in particular, are the ministers of God for the good of the people."¹ This is Peters's first article. The title *Appeals* in the New Haven Code of 1656 shows that, as Peters next states, there was no appeal from the General Court or Assembly.² That the governor was amenable to the people, as he states, will scarcely be questioned. His fourth article asserts that the governor had only one vote, except a casting vote when the Assembly was equally divided. In Connecticut he seems to have had only a casting vote (p. 57). The code of the latter colony authorizes his next clause that the governor could not dismiss the Assembly of the people.

Peters asserts that "conspiracy against the dominion shall be punished by death." In the Code of 1656 we read: "If any person shall conspire and attempt any invasion, insurrection, or public rebellion against this jurisdiction, or shall endeavor to surprise or seize any plantation or town, any fortification, platform, or any great guns, provided for the defence of the jurisdiction or any plantation therein, or shall treacherously and perfidiously attempt the alteration and subversion of the frame of policy or fundamental government laid and settled for this jurisdiction, he or they shall be put to death." Numb. 16; 2 Sam. 18; 2 Sam. 20. Of Peters's next two clauses one is simply a reiteration of this. "Whoever attempts to change or overturn this dominion shall suffer death." The other, "Whoever says there is a power and jurisdiction above and over this dominion, shall suffer death and loss of property," has apparently no authority among extant laws.

"Judges shall determine controversies without a jury." This

¹ Trumbull, p. 184-85, Code of 1656.

² P. 191.

was the Connecticut rule for cases under forty shillings; and in all cases the judges had the option to call a jury of six or a jury of twelve, who required only a two-thirds vote for a verdict (p. 99).

Peters next says: "No one shall be a freeman or give a vote, unless he be converted, and a member in full communion of one of the churches allowed in this dominion." Mr. Trumbull notes: "The law only required membership of some one or other of the approved churches of New England." Palfrey (vol. ii., p. 8) goes further: "In Massachusetts and New Haven the discretion of the freemen as to the admission of new associates was limited by a standing rule of exclusion for all but such as had been received into full communion with some church." This gave by no means a fair idea of the real fact. Palfrey by the very general term "some church," would lead his readers to suppose that any Christian denomination was meant; and even Trumbull, citing the words of a law, gives the same impression to some extent. But the word "approved" was not in the sense of "generally recognized." What it meant is seen explicitly on p. 220, Ecclesiastical Provisions: "Nor shall any person being a member of any church, which shall be gathered without such notice given and approbation had, or who is not a member of some church in New England, approved by the magistracy and churches of this colony, be admitted to the freedom of this jurisdiction."

It was not, then, the churches generally approved, but approved by the magistrates. No new church could be organized but by their consent; no one coming from elsewhere could be allowed to settle or vote unless he showed membership in some New England church they approved. Should the minister of that church have taught anything not pleasing to the New Haven magistrates, these would refuse to admit a member of that church to political rights.

Hollister, in his *History of Connecticut* (i., p. 435), gives a better idea of the spirit of the whole legislation: "They looked with extreme jealousy upon the encroaching power of Popery, and many of them regarded Episcopacy as only a modified form of Catholicism. As they had been to such pains to enjoy their own opinions, they knew no other rule than the characteristic one of that age, exclusiveness, or, if that would not avail, coercion. They resolved to keep out all religious sects from their limits, or if they ventured to cross the border, to compel them to conform. They determined, too, that if it were possible, the very festivals as well as modes of worship that were associated in their minds with oppression and arbitrary power, should be suppressed, and that other public days should be substituted."

A law of the colony punished non-attendance at church by a fine (p. 220); and in Connecticut, at least, a fine in such a case

would forfeit a man's right to vote until the magistrates saw fit to restore him (p. 136). The consequence of this was to throw the management of the churches into the hands of a few, and to this few, a minority of the male inhabitants, the government of the colony was secured. Lechford, in 1640, estimated that three parts of the people of the country remained out of the church,¹ and such was the burden thus devolved upon a few that some church members, quiet men who aspired to no public office, declined to become freemen.²

The Connecticut colonies derived their laws from those of Massachusetts, whose Body of Liberties was compiled by Nathaniel Ward. What his disgusting bigotry and intolerance were, may be seen in his *Simple Cobbler of Aggawam*, and yet his code was the model for those of Connecticut.

The next clause given by Peters: "No man shall hold office who is not sound in the faith and faithful to this dominion; and whoever gives a vote to such a person shall pay a fine of £1; for a second offence he shall be disfranchised." There is no trace of such an act.

The next: "Each freeman shall swear by the blessed God to bear true allegiance to this dominion, and that Jesus is the only King." This was evidently suggested by the clause regarding the oath of fidelity in the Code of 1655, and the form of the oath given, which is simply to the colony and not to the king (p. 185). The acknowledging of royalty only in our Lord is similarly drawn from the same source: "Though they humbly acknowledge that the supreme power of making laws and repealing them belongs to God only, and that by Him this power is given to Jesus Christ as Mediator (Matt. xxviii. 19; John v. 22)."³

Peters's next clause: "No Quaker or dissenter from the established worship of the dominion shall be allowed to give a vote for the election of magistrates or any officer." This certainly states what was absolutely the fact.

"No food or lodging shall be afforded to a Quaker, Adamite, or other heretic. If any person turns Quaker he shall be banished, and not suffered to return but upon pain of death." The actual wording of the law as given by Trumbull is: "It is ordered that no Quaker, Ranter, or other heretic of that nature, be suffered to come into, nor abide in this jurisdiction, and if any such rise up among ourselves, that they be speedily suppressed and secured for the better prevention of such dangerous errors." This was the law of 1657.⁴ How far Peters's description of it varies from the actual interpretation given to it, cannot be positively determined, but on

¹ Lechford's Plain Dealing, 73.

² Mass. Records, ii., pp. 38, 208.

³ Trumbull's Blue Laws, p. 184.

⁴ Laws, etc., New Haven Colony, Trumbull, p. 295.

the 26th of May, in the year following the passage of the law, we find Humphrey Norton arraigned as a Quaker.¹ A work issued in 1660 by this persecuted sect, entitled *A Declaration of the Sad and Great Persecution and Martyrdom of the People of God called Quakers, in New England, for the Worshipping of God*, says: "Twenty-two have been banished upon pain of death; three have been martyred; three have had their right ears cut; one hath been burned on the hand with the letter H." On this Palfrey, in his *History of New England* (ii., p. 485, note), remarks: "The one case of branding in the hand mentioned in the declaration, etc., was, I suppose, that of Humphrey Norton, in New Haven Colony." As the law says nothing of branding, it shows how wide a discretion the courts used in inflicting penalties in special cases, and that in fact cases were not tried by existing laws, but by what was really law made and enforced during a trial. Connecticut had similar laws against Quakers.²

The brand H was one evidently made for heretics in general, and we can scarcely conceive that it was used only on this occasion. The opposition to Baptists in Connecticut is all the more remarkable because both in that and the New Haven colony infant baptism was rapidly dying out; the baptism of the children of church members being permissive rather than peremptory, and doubts being entertained whether the children of such as were not church members could be admitted to baptism at all. Fifty years later Munson, one of the first Church of England ministers to enter Connecticut, wrote that many were admitted to communion as members who had never been baptized, and the Episcopal clergyman claims to have baptized, in the eighteenth century, the very first white child born in the colony in the seventeenth, who had grown to hoary age untouched by the waters of regeneration.

Peters's next statement would be interesting, to Catholics at least, if it could be substantiated. "No priest shall abide in the dominion; he shall be banished, and suffer death on his return. Priests may be seized by any one without a warrant." Mr. Trumbull says there was nothing like this in the code, meaning apparently that of 1656, and refers to such a law in New York, the law of 1700, and to the Virginia anti-Catholic laws; but Plymouth had a law against priests at an early day, Massachusetts later, and when even Rhode Island made a distinction against Catholics, it would be rather surprising if neither of the Connecticut colonies ever passed a penal law against priests. But no such law has yet been traced. A Jesuit was in Connecticut in 1651, and another about twenty years later.

¹ New Haven Records, ii., p. 217, 233, 291, 363, 412.

² Connect. Records, i. 283, 303, 324.

The next alleged law as to licensed ferrymen, does not appear on the records, but has nothing really objectionable. Then follows a series of laws which draw on Peters the strongest denunciation. "No one shall run on the Sabbath day, or walk in the garden or elsewhere, except reverently to and from meeting." "No man shall travel, cook victuals, make beds, sweep house, cut hair, or shave on the Sabbath day." "No woman shall kiss her child on the Sabbath day or fasting day." "The Sabbath shall begin at sunset on Saturday." Peters cites the case of an Episcopal clergyman harassed in 1750 by petty prosecutions for violating the Sabbath, but Mr. Trumbull says stoutly: "It is needless to add that the 'Episcopal clergyman' and his trial are as apocryphal as the 'Blue Law' which he violated." Whether Episcopalian historians have found anything to support the charge, we do not know. Yet it is certain that the Sabbath was held to begin at sunset on Saturday (see *Laws and Orders*, 1647, p. 286), and that all offences against the Sabbath were strictly punished. Some village Dogberry may have carried his construction to absurd lengths, but we must consider most of what is here given by Peters as actual statute law, to be fictitious. An old Connecticut man, Daniel Barber, a soldier in the Revolution, says: "The manner of keeping Sunday in Connecticut was strict, and as rigid as the Jewish Sabbath. . . . The general family discipline was such that small children were not allowed to walk abroad in the fields or gardens, or to gather grapes or any kind of fruit, excepting such things as were necessary for the kitchen. If in case of necessity they were sent to the field, they were charged to walk softly, and make no noise. Children, of course, took but very little pleasure in being told that it was Saturday night, and that they must stop their play, and go to bed early."¹ The clauses numbered 22, making the taking of an ear of corn, theft; 23, adjudging any one guilty if accused of trespass at night, unless he cleared himself on oath, cannot be substantiated by any laws now known. The next: "When it appears that an accused has confederates, and he refuses to discover them, he may be racked," opens up a new question whether torture was ever used in Connecticut, or elsewhere in New England. Its use was not yet wholly discontinued in England, and it prevailed in New Netherlands under the Dutch. Mr. Trumbull says positively that it was never resorted to in New Haven or Connecticut. As there is no trace of any such enactment in the laws of those colonies, nor any allusion to torture in any, this statement of Mr. Trumbull has the greatest weight in inducing us to condemn Peters here of falsification.

¹ Barber, *History of my own Times*.

The succeeding acts are not important; 25 prohibits sales of land, except by leave of the selectmen; 26 authorizes the appointment of guardians for the estates of drunkards; 27 prescribes the punishment for lying. The last of these enactments is found in full in the New Haven Code of 1656.

Peters's next is: "28. No minister shall keep a school," meaning evidently a minister of the Church of England. No such law appears, but it seems probable that no one of that character would have been permitted to open a school.

Education received early attention in Connecticut. The provisions of the Connecticut code of 1650 are curious under several points of view. They show that the founders of that colony had no idea of separating religion from education.

"Forasmuch as the good education of children is of singular behoof and benefit to any commonwealth, and, whereas, many parents and masters are too indulgent and negligent of their duty in that kind, it is therefore ordered by this Court and authority thereof, that the selectmen of every town, in the several precincts and quarters where they dwell, shall have a vigilant eye over their brethren and neighbors, to see first, that none of them shall suffer so much barbarism in any of their families as not to endeavor to teach by themselves or others, their children and apprentices so much learning as may enable them perfectly to read the English tongue, and knowledge of the capital laws, upon penalty of twenty shillings for each neglect herein; also that all masters of families do once, at least, catechize their children and servants in the grounds and principles of religion; and if any be unable to do so much, that then, at the least, they procure such children and apprentices to learn some short orthodox catechism without book, that they may be able to answer the questions that shall be propounded to them out of such catechisms by their parents, or masters, or any of the selectmen, when they shall call them to a trial of what they have learned in this kind.

"And further, that all parents and masters do breed and bring up their children and apprentices in some honest lawful calling, labor, or employment, either in husbandry or some other trade profitable for themselves and the commonwealth, if they will not nor cannot train them up in learning to fit them for higher employments. And if any of the selectmen, after admonition by them given to such masters of families, shall find them still negligent of their duty in the particulars aforementioned, whereby children and servants become rude, stubborn, and unruly, the said selectmen, with the help of two magistrates, shall take such children or apprentices from them, and place them with some masters for years, boys till they come to twenty-one, and girls to eighteen years of age complete, which will more strictly look unto, and force them to submit unto government, according to the rules of this order, if by fair means and former instructions they will not be drawn unto it."¹

This enactment is the evident source from which Peters drew his "38. The selectmen, on finding children ignorant, may take them away from their parents, and put them into better hands at the expense of their parents." The last clause being entirely unauthorized.

The same Connecticut code, under the head of schools, has this curious enactment:

"It being one chief project of that old deluder, Satan, to keep men from the knowl-

¹ First Code of Connecticut, Trumbull, pp. 78-9.

edge of the Scriptures, as in former times, keeping them in an unknown tongue, so in these latter times by persuading them from the use of tongues, so that at least the true sense and meaning of the original might be clouded with false glosses of saint-seeming deceivers, and that learning may not be buried in the grave of our forefathers in church and commonwealth, the Lord assisting our endeavors. It is therefore ordered by this Court and authority thereof, that every township within this jurisdiction, after the Lord hath increased them to the number of fifty householders, shall then forthwith appoint one within their town to teach all such children as shall resort to him, to write and read, whose wages shall be paid either by the parents and masters of such children, or by the inhabitants in general, by way of supply, as the major part of those who order the prudentials of the town shall appoint; provided that those who send their children be not oppressed by more than they can have them taught from other towns."¹

The colony of New Haven did not make a general law till 1657, when we find this:

"It was propounded that the Court would think of some way to further the setting up of schools, for the education of youth in each plantation, for though some do take care that way, yet some others neglect it, which the Court took into consideration, and seeing that New Haven hath provided that a schoolmaster be maintained at the town's charge, and Milford hath made provisions in a comfortable way, they desire the other towns would follow their example, and therefore did now order that in every plantation where a school is not already set up and maintained, forthwith endeavors shall be used that a schoolmaster be procured that may attend that work, and what salary shall be allowed unto such schoolmaster for his pains, one-third part shall be paid by the town in general as other rates, the good education of children being of public concernment, and the other two-thirds by them who have the benefit thereof by the teaching of their children."²

The next Blue Law given by Peters covers the establishment of a state church. "29. Every ratable person who refuses to pay his proportion to the support of the minister of the town or parish, shall be fined by the Court £2 and £4 every quarter, until he or she pay the rate to the minister." Connected with which is the very absurd one which he gives later on, and in which he embodied all the New England dislike of the Church of England: "35. No one shall read Common Prayer, keep Christmas or Saints' days, make minced pies, dance, play cards, or play on any instrument of music, except the drum, trumpet, and jews' harp."

That all other Christian bodies were prevented from organizing as churches in Connecticut except by consent of the magistrates and elders is evident (*Trumbull's Blue Laws*, p. 220), and this consent would evidently be refused to all but Congregational churches. This we know in fact. The early struggles of the Episcopalian in Connecticut furnish ample evidence on the point, and the cases all occurred after Connecticut was governed by a Royal Charter, and formally recognized the fact that it was subject to English law. Prior to the apparent protection given by that charter no Episcopalian would have dreamed of attempting to organize a church.

Early in the last century, when the Rev. Mr. Munson, from New

¹ *Ib.*, p. 128-9.

² *New Haven Colony Laws, etc.*, Trumbull, p. 295.

York, in 1707, entered the colony to meet and minister to some English emigrants who belonged to the Church of England, and also to confer, it would seem, with some of the old stock who had grown weary of the tyranny of the standing order, his visit was regarded as a dangerous step. Consultation followed as to the course to be adopted, and we soon see the result. When Munson reached Stratford on a second visit, he was met by the magistrates, who read a document to him threatening him and his companion, Colonel Heathcote, "with fine, if they proceeded to worship God or administer the Sacraments otherwise than what was agreeable to the law of this colony."¹

The act which they sought to enforce ran: "There shall be no ministry or church administration entertained or attended by the inhabitants of any town or plantation in this colony distinct and separate from and in opposition to that which is openly and publicly observed and dispensed by the approved ministers of the place." Rev. Mr. Munson remarks: "The sense and force they put upon them . . . is plainly thus to exclude the Church from their government as appears by their proceedings with me, so that hereby they deny a liberty of conscience to the Church of England, as well as to all others as are not of their opinion, which being repugnant to the laws of England is contrary to the grant of their charter."²

The real earlier laws both of Connecticut and New Haven required all to contribute to the salary of the Congregational minister of the place. "This Court . . . do order that those who are taught in the word, in the several plantations, be called together, that every man voluntarily set down what he is willing to allow to that end and use; and if any man refuse to pay a meet proportion, that then he be rated by authority in some just and equal way; and if after this any man withhold or delay due payment, the civil power to be exercised, as in other just debts."³ This was a very curious style of ordering people to do things voluntarily, and even compelling them.

In New Haven the particular court in each plantation, the deputies, constable, or other officer, for preserving peace "shall call all the inhabitants, whether planters or sojourners, before them and desire every one particularly to set down what proportion he is willing and able to allow yearly while God continues his estate, towards the maintenance of the ministry there. But if any one or more, to the discouragement and hindrance of this work, refuse or

¹ Hawkes and Perry, *Doc. Hist. P. E. Church, Connecticut*, i., p. 33 and 42. ² *Ib.*

³ Connecticut Code, Order Oct. 25, 1644, Trumbull's *Blue Laws*, p. 113.

delay, or set down an unmeet proportion, in any and every such case the particular court so shall rate and assess every such person, etc."¹

This was rigidly enforced, and after members of the Church of England began to have service of their own, they were still compelled to pay their quota to the support of the Congregational minister. And no matter how ignorant or objectionable the man might be who could obtain the position of minister, all the Congregationalists in the place had to contribute to his support and attend his services. For this last point was also a matter of law. Says the New Haven Code :

"And it is further ordered, that wheresoever the ministry of the word is established within this jurisdiction, according to the order of the Gospel, every person according to the mind of God, shall duly resort and attend thereunto, upon the Lord's days at least, and upon days of public fasting, or thanksgiving, ordered to be generally kept and observed. And if any person within this jurisdiction shall, without just and necessary cause, absent or withdraw from the same, he shall, after due means of conviction used, for every such sinful miscarriage forfeit five shillings to the plantation, to be levied as other fines."²

This was not a dead letter. It was constantly enforced. Nearly a century after its enactment we read that Episcopalian people in 1740 were hauled to jail for refusing to attend Congregational meetings.³ Even during the Revolution, in 1778, as Rev. Daniel Barber relates, his father, while on his way to an unauthorized religious meeting held by a Sergeant Dewey, was arrested and tried for a breach of the Sabbath. The prosecution insisted "that Sergeant Dewey's meeting was not such as the laws of Connecticut acknowledged and approved of, that is of the standing order," and Barber was fined twenty shillings and costs.⁴

The reader may think this New England system utterly dead and gone, and that the writer, a dry-as-dust antiquarian, is merely parading a lot of old bric-a-brac, queer and quaint and curious, but let him rub his eyes and take up, instead of a musty old book, *A Yankee in Canada*, by Henry D. Thoreau, as splendid a specimen of a heathen as even New England ever produced. The book was issued by Ticknor & Fields, in 1866, and is not ancient. In a paper therein on "Civil Disobedience," Thoreau says: "Some years ago the State met me in behalf of the Church, and commanded me to pay a certain sum toward the support of a clergyman, whose preaching my father attended, but never I myself. 'Pay,' it said, 'or be locked up in the jail!' I declined to pay, but unfortunately

¹ New Haven Code, 1655; ib., p. 221.

² New Haven Code, Trumbull's Blue Laws, p. 220.

³ Hawks and Perry, Doc. Hist. P. E. C. Conn., i., p. 173.

⁴ Barber, History of my own Times, p. 10.

another man saw fit to pay it. . . . However, at the request of the selectmen, I condescended to make some such statement as this in writing: 'Know all men by these presents, that I, Henry Thoreau, do not wish to be regarded as a member of any incorporated society which I have not joined.' This I gave to the town clerk, and he has it."¹

Now, there are really men outside of lunatic asylums who will talk of the religious freedom established in New England, and deny, and cheapen, and obscure the just claim of Lord Baltimore and the Catholic settlers of Maryland and of James II. to having endeavored to establish religious equality in America, but certainly they cannot be called sane on this point.

The history of the growth of the Episcopal Church in Connecticut is to us of peculiar interest. When clergymen of the Church of England penetrated into the colony from New York they found a few Episcopalians, recently from England, anxious to have service in their own form, their children baptized, marriages performed before a clergyman instead of a magistrate; but besides these, there were many who, tired of the cast-iron tyranny of the standing order, began to think that anything their fathers had suffered from the Church of England was little compared to the thralldom in which they lived. Wherever an Episcopal congregation was gathered, some of the best old New England stock joined. Fines and prosecutions followed; clergymen visited their flocks by stealth, and rode off pursued by selectmen; but the Connecticut Episcopalians were New England men, and as stubborn as their persecutors. Then the standing order began to reason, finding force of little avail. The Episcopal clergy had no state power or social influence to support them as in England or even Virginia and New York. They had to meet the Congregationalists squarely. The consequence was that they had to fall back further and further towards Catholic ground, and they thus became extremely High Church, while in other parts, as New York, the inclination was to approach the Calvinistic bodies. After the Revolution, Connecticut was the first to seek a bishop, and Dr. Seabury was consecrated by the Episcopal bishops in Scotland, and was so full of old ideas that he actually wore a mitre, something that no other Episcopal bishop in America has ever done. He was so High Church that Bishop Provost, of New York, long refused to recognize him as a bishop. Middletown became a centre of his school, and from it came to the Church the Rev. Mr. Kewley and the Barbers, early in this century. Then Dr. Jarvis, who was like a bell and a finger-post, directing others the way he did not go, really gave an impulse here contemporane-

¹ P. 140.

ous with, but distinct from, the Tractarian movement in England, which led many highly cultivated Episcopal clergymen into the Catholic Church, among others the present Archbishop of Baltimore.

Thus strangely have the Blue Laws of Connecticut contributed to the good of the Catholic Church in this country. To a philosophic mind it is curious to note, too, how this very opposition of Episcopalian to Congregationalist preserved the latter in Christianity, while in Massachusetts, where there was no antagonistic element, the Christian idea in Congregationalism died out, and Unitarianism, Transcendentalism, and Pantheism have become the systems to which the leading men give their adhesion.

To return to the Blue Laws. Peters gives as his 31st a sumptuary law, forbidding gold, silver, or lace trimming. This was probably derived from a Connecticut law of 1641, reviving an earlier law (6 Trumbull, p. 151), and directing the constables to summon before the court any who exceeded their condition and rank in their apparel.

The next, on selling debtors, and that which follows, punishing kindling a fire in the woods with death, are exaggerations of acts actually in the codes (p. 229, etc.). The same may be said of that on cards and dice.

The 36th: "No gospel minister shall join people in marriage. The magistrates only shall join in marriage as they may do it with less scandal to Christ's Church," conveys rather the general theory than the precise words of any law. Marriage was held to be simply a contract under the control of the State, with which the Church had no concern. "They married without a minister, and buried the dead without a prayer," says Bancroft (i., p. 465). The idea of civil marriage, now so much in vogue with the infidel governments of Europe, originated on the bleak New England coast, and was first practiced there. It was in direct collision with English law, and undoubtedly all children born in New England would have been deemed illegitimate in England if the matter had been strictly construed. Several laws recognize marriage as being specially the affair of the civil magistrate. The first Connecticut Code (p. 124) says: "Every new married man shall likewise bring in a certificate of his marriage under the hand of the magistrate which married him." The New Haven Code of 1655 (p. 242) was more explicit: "No man unless he be a magistrate in this jurisdiction, or expressly allowed by the General Court, shall marry any persons, and that in a public place, if they be able to go forth, under the penalty of five pounds fine for every such marriage." Under the title of Records it also provides "that every new married man (if married within this jurisdiction) shall bring in the certificate thereof, under the hand of the magistrate or officer that married him."

It will be noticed that these laws, like the laws in France, Germany, Italy, etc., involve the absurdity of making marriage merely a contract between two parties, and yet make a magistrate *perform* a contract to which he is not a party. The Church, logical as they are absurd, recognizing in her sacrament the contract of the parties, holds that they are the ministers of the sacrament as well as parties to the contract. The magistrate can be simply a witness, and attest officially the contract entered into before him; he cannot make a contract for other people or perform or confer it. Thus these departures from the Church are equally departures from common sense.

Another of Peters's laws connected with marriage: "No man shall court a maid in person or by letter, without first obtaining consent of her parents; £5 penalty for the first offence, £10 for the second, and for the third, imprisonment during the pleasure of the Court," seems ludicrous, yet it had a foundation. The first code of Connecticut and the orders of 1643 contained a provision prohibiting "any one, male or female, not being at his or her own dispose, from making or giving entertainment to any motion or suit in way of marriage, without the knowledge and consent of those they stand in such relation to" (p. 106), while the New Haven Code imposed a fine of forty shillings on any one who should "endeavor to inveigle or draw the affections of any maid or maid-servant, whether daughter, kinswoman, or in other relation, for himself or for any other person, without the consent of father, master, guardian, governor, or of the nearest magistrate, whether it be by speech, writing, message, company-keeping, unnecessary familiarity, gifts, or in any other way." The penalty for a second offence was £4; for a third, fine, imprisonment, and corporal punishment.

Several of the other laws, as given by Peters, have some foundation, as those against fornication, adultery, that requiring married persons to live together, etc., but the last ludicrous one is a clear reference to the term roundhead: "Every male shall have his hair cut round, according to a cap," or, as he explains elsewhere, a pumpkin-shell, for which no trace of foundation can be found.

Now, reviewing Peters by the real acts, it is hardly possible to call Peters's Blue Laws forgeries, for too many of them have a real basis. They were not all the coinage of his own brains, but they lead one irresistibly to the conclusion that he never saw the genuine legislation, but derived his knowledge of them from current tradition or popular theories as to what they were. Had he read them himself and quoted merely from memory, there are some that he would not have overlooked and might have summarized

still more ludicrously. Some such abstracts of these laws may have been handed around in writing as jokes.

He would certainly have introduced the Connecticut law against "taking any tobacco publicly in the street, highways, or any barn-yard, or upon training days in any open places," or "drinking," *i.e.*, "smoking any but Connecticut tobacco" (p. 151); and a law like the former in New Haven, 1655 (p. 292), where smoking about the house or farm is also prohibited, under penalty of sixpence a pipe or the stocks. The provision preventing any young man living by himself, or living in any family except by consent of the town (pp. 149, 258), would have given him similar opportunities, and so would many other orders of the General Court, while doubtless a little research in the acts of the particular courts would have much increased his stock of quaint and odd legislation.

We have, by contrasting Peters's Blue Laws with the real enactments published by Trumbull, shown that Peters cannot be cited at all as authority; that many of his clauses are palpable inventions, and that though others are traceable to real laws, they are given so inaccurately as to be of no value. Though many writers here and in England have heretofore quoted them in good faith, this can no longer be excused. They must be thrown aside absolutely, and the *History of Connecticut*, in which they were first published, take its place with Knickerbocker's *History of New York* as a satire on the colonial condition of two neighboring commonwealths, one the work of a man of English origin ridiculing the Dutch, the other that of a Tory clergyman of the Church of England ridiculing the Whigs and Congregationalists of his own State, which had expelled him.

The character of the Connecticut and New Haven laws at their best is not such as to command our highest admiration. Ecclesiastical tyranny, the disregard of personal rights, the State intermeddling in all the concerns of life, mark them at every page.

Mr. Trumbull endeavors to mitigate the sentence which the enlightened spirit of the nineteenth century must pass on them, by arraying examples from other colonies. New Netherlands used torture, and punished murder and unnatural crimes with death, refused Lutherans, Baptists, and Quakers the public exercise of their religion, and punished Quakers severely; and New York, under English rule, passed a penal law against Catholics in 1700 and in 1707 prosecuted Presbyterian clergymen, and in Dutch and English times supported Protestant ministers and built Protestant churches by general tax; but, as we have elsewhere remarked, the only efforts made there in favor of freedom were those of the Catholic Duke of York. He shows, too, the severity of the Virginia laws, beginning with 1611, their rules for enforcing religious con-

formity and compelling attendance at church, her penal laws against Catholics, some only of which he cites, as well as against Quakers. As to Maryland, he has to admit that mutual toleration was established and maintained; and he might have noted the decision in Fitzherbert's case, where that clergyman directly claimed that "Holy Church" in the charter and acts of 1638-39 meant any duly organized Christian church, and the decision of the Court sustained his interpretation. During the whole period of Catholic influence, down to 1649, he finds nothing to cite as a counterpoise to Connecticut legislation, except the enactment against blasphemy in 1649. That subsequently to that time under Protestant rule, penal laws, State Church, supported by the taxes levied upon a large minority and in some counties a majority, who were compelled to build the churches and support the ministers of their Protestant neighbors, merely shows that this course seems to be inherent in Protestant communities. As long as Catholic influence prevailed in New York and Maryland, there was, as Mr. Trumbull really shows, a decent respect for the opinions of their fellow-men, less general severity, a broader and more Christian feeling in legislation; that this is associated in our colonial annals with Catholicity, is and ever will be our highest pride.

In many points the Connecticut laws were based on those of Massachusetts and Plymouth, and in some cases were passed at the direct request of the Commissioners of the United Colonies, in which Massachusetts had a preponderating influence.

Mr. Trumbull might easily have extended these comparative quotations, especially on the point of religious intolerance. He might have shown us the early Plymouth law against Catholic priests; have shown us Georgia founded with the express condition that no Catholic settlers were to be allowed. He might later still have shown New York in adopting her Constitution, embodying what is now appealed to as establishing religious equality by some who ascribe the honor to Mr. Jay; but had he quoted from the debates in the Convention, he would have seen Livingston and Morris fighting the battles of religious freedom, and Mr. Jay not only opposing it, but finally succeeding in putting the article in the Constitution in such a form as to exclude Catholics. And it really did. It was a Dead Sea fruit, fair enough without, but under it a naturalization law passed excluding Catholics, and a test oath was introduced which, for at least thirty years, excluded Catholics.

He might have shown North Carolina retaining similar legislation to very recent times, and one New England State, New Hampshire, still depriving the Catholic citizen of the rights his fellow-citizens enjoy.

He cites the severity of English laws in the reign of James I.;

but their cruelty from the time of Henry VIII. down to modern times would require a volume. He quotes Burn, an English legal writer, who says: "Every cruelty short of scalping was practiced on the English poor." In fact the poor in Catholic times were provided for; the overthrow of the monastic institutions really gave to court favorites estates which had been rented out at low rates, and the revenues of which had been used to give employment and aid to the poor. This change impoverished thousands, and the law then began to exterminate the poor to rid itself of the burden it had created.

But the severity in England cannot justify the severity in a new community where industry had a full field for its exercise. Nor can the action of the other colonies affect our consideration of the abstract question, especially when in other colonies, under Catholic and Quaker influence, we see something higher, and nobler, and better.

Taking the whole subject together, we cannot praise Connecticut legislation as a whole, either in view of English or Colonial law, or on its own merits. Shown at its best by Mr. Trumbull, it was narrow, exclusive, tyrannical, based on no sound views of human nature or Christianity. There was nothing in its oligarchic principle that was truly republican, nothing to mould a people for a great commonwealth. New England has become what she is, not by such laws, but in spite of them, by the assertion, to a greater or less extent of the real manhood of her people.

MR. R. W. THOMPSON ON THE PAPACY AND THE
CIVIL POWER.

The Papacy and the Civil Power. By R. W. Thompson. New York:
Harper & Brothers.

IT is questionable whether the general diffusion of elementary knowledge, and rapid intercommunion of thought among mankind, effected by the inventions of printing, the motive power of steam, and the generation of the electric current can be rightly credited with all the advantages claimed for them by modern self-complacency. A deluge of information has overspread the lands, but it is very shallow, and its tendency has been rather to drown right reason than to fertilize it. The very boasting of the age is a sign of the prevailing ignorance. It is only smatterers who fancy they know everything. Ripe knowledge is almost invariably accompanied by humility, and readily acknowledges how little, after all, the merely human knowledge of even the wisest of us amounts to.

There is no avoiding this. There can never be a scientific discovery that will be able to alter the nature of things. As long as man is man, true science, ripe scholarship, and sound reasoning can only be the heritage of the few. But nowadays the illiterate multitudes are taught to claim an equal power with those privileged few to form judgments on all topics that arise. The appeal is made to them as if they constituted a competent tribunal; and, whether in religion, science, morals, or history, they are made the victims of "strong delusion to believe a lie." Now, it is the blue-glass humbug that is foisted on them. Anon, they are taught from the professional chair of a learned university that there are no such things as right and wrong, and that what are called crimes and virtues are independent of volition, and result necessarily, as effect from cause, from the formation of the brain. In the domain of morals they are taught that the control of the passions, and obedience to authority, are violations of the liberty of the individual, and that the dignity of human nature should be satisfied with nothing less than an independent, self-sufficient individual autocracy; in that of history, that the Popes were tyrants, Luther and John Knox apostles of religion, and such men as Garibaldi, of whom it is impossible to decide whether his mental or moral organization is the lower, are heroes; and in that of religion, that its highest obligation is that every one should believe and do that which is true and right in his own eyes.

The Papacy and the Civil Power is not behind the age in its pretentious emptiness. There is in it just enough show of acquaintance with books to impress the minds of such people as are likely to be its principal readers with the notion that the writer is a learned man, and more than enough malice to satisfy the most passionate hater of the Christian Vicariate.

It affords us no pleasure to have to give so uncomplimentary a description of a work written by a gentleman, who has been recently appointed to an important government office by the present occupant of the Presidential chair of the United States. It would have been more to our taste to have been able to recognize the merits of an erudite and well-reasoned work, and to have met its arguments with the consideration they would, under such circumstances, have merited; but Mr. Thompson's book is not of that class, and truth must not suffer through the desire to avoid giving pain, nor must justice be sacrificed to courtesy.

Perhaps the least prepossessing feature of Mr. Thompson's book is, not its one-sidedness alone, but its insincerity. He puts forth the most exaggerated claims to superior impartiality and fairness, on the strength of his being a Protestant.

"In the claim of impartiality and fairness" are his words, "in all such matters (the dogmas of the Catholic Church in so far as they have been employed to influence the civil power and action of governments) the advantage is on the side of the Protestant. Roman Catholic writers are led almost universally, by the very nature of their Church organization, into intolerance and dogmatism. They are always ready to assume, without investigation or inquiry, that whatsoever the papacy has done or taught from the beginning is unerringly right and true. . . . Not so with the Protestant. He appeals to reason, examines history for himself, weighs both evidence and argument, and exercises his own intelligent judgment in separating right from wrong, truth from falsehood; while the papacy demands implicit and passive obedience—the entire submission of the whole man by the sacrifice of all his sense of personality."

Before going on to show how far Mr. Thompson fulfils these high pretensions, we may delay a moment or two, in order to note from the specimen culled from his preface the kind of qualifications he brings to the consideration of the important subject of which he treats.

Instead of Protestants having superior claims to impartiality and fairness because of the dogmatic certainty of the Catholic faith, most people would decide precisely the reverse. When people are in possession of truth which is absolutely certain because revealed by God, and when they are equally certain that that faith must infallibly triumph, because God has promised that it shall, surely they can better afford to be impartial and fair in the consideration of all questions connected with it, than people who are doing battle for their own private opinions, the bantlings of their own brain. All facts justify this argument. Protestants, as a rule, are far more in-

tolerant in the advocacy of their various religious whimsies, at all events, in their contradiction of Catholic truths, than Catholics in their advocacy of dogmas of truth which they know have been revealed from heaven. History and contemporary events agree in their testimony to this effect. There needs but a hint of the horrors worked at Rome by the German Lutherans under the traitor Constable Bourbon; of impoverished, bleeding, depopulated Ireland, with her three centuries of brutal Protestant persecution; of Scotland, wherein scarce a lay Catholic was left, and not a minister of the religion of the people, by a needy and base nobility, covetous of the property, of religion, and the poor, aided by the coarse and scurrilous lampooning of a degraded priest; of England, too, where for three centuries the ancient faith was not suffered to show its face. As regards the age in which we live, it is sufficient to ask:

Where is the Catholic country on the round earth in which the people of other religions have been treated as the priests, religious, and laity of the "Grand Old Church," as Mr. Thompson justly terms her, are being treated in Protestant Germany and Switzerland? Our "fair and impartial" author does not hesitate to adopt the ridiculously hypocritical pretext for these scandalous persecutions, that Catholics in those countries are rebels against the civil power. Switzerland may be passed over in silence, as unworthy of serious notice. There it was an open, violent Freemason assault on religion generally, as well as on the Catholic Church, in which all concern for legal form and observance was laid aside. But in Germany, every one knows, Mr. Thompson included, and every honest man acknowledges, that the position was expressly made for Catholics. Laws were hurriedly passed by a despotic government, under the glamor of intoxicating military successes, which it was known the conscience of Catholics would not permit them to obey, in order to force upon them an unavoidable attitude of opposition to the law. The temptation of Catholics does not lie at all in the direction of intolerance, or of partiality and unfairness in their estimate of facts and subjects connected with their Holy Faith. They have not a shadow of a doubt or of an uncertainty about the exact and precise dogmas of truth which God requires them to believe and to mould their lives upon, on peril of the loss of their souls. They know that God revealed those dogmas by His only begotten Son, present on earth in a human body as Head of the Church; and that, since His ascent into heaven and the descent of the Holy Spirit, He preserves them and will preserve them until the end of time, by him whom He made His vicar in the headship of that portion of His mystical body which is still militant on earth.

It is strange how completely at sea Protestants, and unbelievers

generally, are as to the very meaning of the word intolerance. They denounce us Catholics when we tell them that the Catholic confession is the only true Christian faith; that whatever professed Christian doctrine differs from it ever so little is false, *on that account*; that if we are to be saved by what we believe, it is impossible God should have left us in doubt as to what that belief is by which we are to be saved, and without any authority to declare infallibly what we are to believe; that Protestantism is false both in its matter and method: in its matter, because its statements are conflicting, and because they differ from those of the Church; in method, because instead of obedient subjection to authoritative teaching, which is essential to faith, it is the proud assertion of private opinion, human reason raising itself up against its divinely appointed teacher, which is the exact opposite of faith. But this is not intolerance. It is the mere assertion of our conviction that our faith is a divine revelation. It is not intolerant to assert positively that there is a God, and that whosoever says there is not is a fool. The fact is, when Protestants accuse us of intolerance on this score, they logically deny, in many cases without intending it, that the Christian faith is a divine revelation. They are in the meshes of "a strong delusion," invented by the Old Serpent to lead man to the fancy that he can cheat God out of the humility He demands as a requisite to salvation, and that he can attain heaven by the very pride which originally cost him Paradise and immortality.

It is *too great tolerance*, we repeat, which is the great snare of Catholics. The Catholic religion is the only one—and no stronger testimony to its divine origin exists,—which provokes the bitter hatred and hostility of all who reject it, and more particularly of the worst of mankind. "This is the truth, and the *only* truth—walk ye in it!" Hence those whose faith is weak, or temperament timid, or charity lukewarm, are tempted to compromise and make concessions, not unseldom to an extent perilous to religion. Indeed this very circumstance has called into existence what may be called "a party," to which the name "Liberal Catholic" has been injudiciously¹ conceded, whose perniciously tolerant principles His Holiness has several times formally condemned.

¹ This careless concession by Catholics of names to things which are the very opposite of those they rightfully designate, affords another illustration of the too tolerant temper which the certainty of their faith is apt to nourish in Catholics. To term a deed that equals, if it does not surpass, in criminality the betrayal of Christ by the arch traitor Judas, "the Reformation;" ministers of sects calling themselves Christians, who do not even pretend to an apostolic succession, "bishops" and "priests," or the sects "churches," and so on, is, in a sense, a denial of the faith. We have heard it urged in apology, that the adoption of these euphemisms for crimes and misnomers of things does no practical harm, since all Catholics know them to be misnomers. But this does not meet the difficulty. "Words are to hide our ideas" is an irony on the

Protestantism, on the other hand, is from a similar necessity of the case, intolerant, partial, and unfair in all subjects connected with the Church, her history or doctrine. It is not denied that there have been writers who would claim the name of "Protestant," in so far as the word means "not Catholic," who have displayed a tolerant, fair, and impartial spirit in treating of the doctrines and practice of the Church; Keith, for example, or Macaulay, or Tytler, or, pre-eminently, that most engaging of historians, Ranke, who nearly equals in impartiality our own Audin. But it has been at the expense of Protestant principles. For, just in proportion as a man is a sincere and fervent Catholic, is he tolerant, fair, and impartial, and so just in proportion as he is a sincere and fervent Protestant—protester, that is, against the Catholic Church, for that is the meaning of the term—is he the reverse.

Protestantism, when the gates of the Sanctuary were first closed against it, when it was cut off from the fellowship of the faithful, by reason of the leprosy of apostasy with which it was befouled, was possessed by a quasi-religious mania. In its ravings, the infallible and indefectible Church, founded on Peter, was the harlot of the Apocalypse which deceiveth the nations. Rome—Christian Rome—was that city Babylon of whom it was written, "*Facta est habitatio dæmoniorum, et custodia omnis spiritus immundi, et custodia omnis volucris immundæ et odibilis. . . . Exite de illa populus meus; ut ne participes sitis delictorum ejus, et de plagis ejus non accipiatis. Quoniam pervenerunt peccata ejus usque ad cælum, et recordatus est Dominus iniquitatum ejus. Reddite illi sicut et ipsa reddidit vobis; et duplicate duplicia secundum opera ejus; in poculo quo miscuit, miscete illi duplum.*" Hostility to the Catholic Church is thus a

insincerity of men, not an axiom of truth. To use names which imply the very opposite of what we mean seriously, on important matters, is falsehood. If I call Judas Iscariot "a patriot" or "liberator of the human race," who is to suppose that I *mean* "an abject traitor?" If I call a great historical event "a reformation," who is to suppose that I *mean* the greatest calamity inaugurated by the greatest criminal of modern days? A priest is a man endowed with stupendous supernatural powers, whose exercise is generally necessary for the eternal salvation of the human being; a bishop is a yet more exalted member of the Christian hierarchy, because he confers those powers, and, by delegation from Christ's Vicar, the jurisdiction necessary for their exercise. By what principle of truth or common honesty can I call Protestant ministers by those titles when I know they have not a shadow of a pretence of a claim to them? Besides, it is not so certain that the judgment of the Christian multitude is not confused, nor their knowledge darkened, nor even their faith weakened by this wholesale free-and-easy concession of false titles and names of persons and things. But if it were, we have all the multitudes of Protestants to consider, whose conversion should be a consuming desire of our souls. It is impossible but that they should be misled by this adoption by Catholics of their terms. The devil is never more successful than when he presents himself as an angel of light. Surely every Catholic should shrink from helping him on with his disguise!

ratio existende of Protestantism. Upon no other principle has it any right to exist at all. If Protestants are consistent with their own principle, it is their *duty* to be intolerant of Her. The coarse lampooning and gross abusiveness of Luther were suited only to the atmosphere of the rum-shop he was in the habit of frequenting. No decent publisher in these days would allow his name to be affixed to such low and calumnious ribaldry as defiles the pages of John Knox's history of his own times. The very street *gamins* would be above employing such voluble abuse as is contained in the book of Homilies of the sect established by law in England, a series of discourses containing an authorized exposition of the doctrines of that sect for the use of its ministers. And Messrs. Harper & Bro., of New York, keep up a supply of the article in the day in which we live, slightly subdued to suit the less violent temper of the times.

Nor are partiality and unfairness, even to falsehood, in matters connected with the Church less characteristic of Protestantism than intolerance of Her. No one now doubts that in order to lend a shadow of plausibility to the Protestant theory of the Catholic Church, it was indispensable to have recourse to wholesale lying; and the so-called *reformers* lied without stint. It is only an unvarnished statement of fact to say that Protestantism was born of a lie, was cradled in lying, was brought to maturity by lying, and now, that a general diffusion of information is exposing the deception, it is rapidly disappearing. Indeed, save amongst a multitude of uninstructed old women, mostly of the feebler sex, it can scarcely be said to have any further existence *as a religion*. All the robuster minds, which insist on an intelligent conviction, excepting such as have submitted to the Church, are practically materialist, and either avowedly or tacitly disown a divine revelation.

For a striking and vivid illustration of the point we are insisting on, viz., that a temper of tolerance of people in error—not of error itself—of impartiality, and fairness, is a natural result of the dogmatic certainty of the Catholic faith (we have made no allusion to its being also the supernatural outgrowth of the charity which is its vivifying principle), let any one sufficiently acquainted with history, and especially Scotch history, if he would form a competent opinion on the subject, read first Knox's *History of the Reformation in Scotland*, and then, bearing in mind that those bishops were dignitaries of a religion which had been that of their country ever since its evangelization, and which was being violently dispossessed by a needy and traitorous nobility, whose chief agent and tool was a degraded priest, with whose character¹ and ante-

¹ It will be found amongst the publications of the Bannatyne Club, Edinburgh.

cedents the Catholic bishops were acquainted, read any one of the Episcopalian annalists of contemporary events, Leslie's, for example. The pages of the former he will find stuffed with coarsest abuse of the highest personages of the realm, more particularly of the young queen and her admirable mother, Mary of Guise; from end to end of the latter, he will not find so much as one harsh epithet addressed to the criminals who had rebelled against their fair and youthful sovereign, assassinated the ablest and the most patriotic statesman Scotland had ever known, and were endeavoring to stamp the faith of their fathers out of their land.

The line taken by Mr. Thompson in his most disappointing work has thrust upon us the necessity of treating this part of the subject at some length. With a legal adroitness to be expected rather from a pettifogging attorney than from an impartial investigator, such as in his preface he represents himself to have been, he endeavors to invalidate by anticipation any Catholic reply to his production; which an impartial criticism compels us to pronounce a bulky jumble of errors, misrepresentations, and ignorance, of the most startling description. He represents us Catholics as incompetent witnesses in our own case. He endeavors to put us altogether out of court. What are his reasons? Let us hear him:

"In the claim of impartiality and fairness in all such matters (the dogmas of the Catholic Church in so far as they have been employed to influence the civil policy and action of government), the advantage is on the side of the Protestant.¹ Roman Catholic writers are led, almost universally, by the very nature of their Church organization, into intolerance and dogmatism. They are always ready to assume, without investigation or inquiry, that whatsoever the papacy has done or taught from the beginning is unerringly right and true. They do not employ their individual reason or judgment to examine for themselves, but are content to accept whatsoever is announced by ecclesiastical authority. Since the recent decree of the Pope's infallibility, this authority is all centred in him. He is made incapable of error in all that he has declared, or shall hereafter declare, in the domain of faith and morals, and every member of the Church wins equal infallibility for himself only by the acceptance and promulgation of this doctrine.

"Not so with the Protestant. He appeals to reason, examines history for himself, weighs both evidence and argument, and exercises his own intelligent judgment in separating right from wrong, truth from falsehood. While the papacy demands implicit and passive obedience—the entire submission of the whole man by the sacrifice of all his sense of personality—Protestantism encourages and develops this sense by treating every individual as endowed with the faculty of reason, and as possessing the right to employ it for himself. Manifestly, he who does not do it is mere clay in the hands of the potter."

This passage may be taken as an average specimen of the acquaintance with the subject of which he treats, the consequent clearness of thought, and the cogency of argument, which dis-

¹ What advantage in these respects is on the side of Mr. Thompson we shall presently see.

tinguish this "tolerant, fair, and impartial" Protestant writer. If this be the result of his "appeal to reason," "examination of history for himself," "weighing both evidence and argument," and "exercising his own intelligent judgment in separating right from wrong, truth from falsehood," of which he so magniloquently writes, we can only say that it is impossible to overstate the advantage it would be to the writer himself, and to any he may influence, if he were "mere clay in the hands of the potter." One stumbles over a really clumsy error in nearly every line. Immediately after the statement of the proposition, we are confronted with the vulgar confusion of intolerance with dogmatism which we have already animadverted upon. Of course Catholics are dogmatic in the confession of their faith. How could that faith be a divine revelation without being dogmatic? Protestantism is not a divine revelation because it is not dogmatic. The Catholic faith is dogmatic because it *is* a divine revelation. No doubt a dogmatic divine revelation is intolerant of error, in the sense that the very statement that it is a divine revelation is at the same time a statement that whatever contradicts it is false.

But Mr. Thompson condescends to avail himself of the popular misapplication of the word. It may be he shares in it himself, for his knowledge appears to be but scant and superficial. Originally employed by Protestants as a term of reproach for the dogmatic certainty of the Catholic faith, its meaning has been gradually changed into that of forcing the Christian faith down unwilling throats, in season or out of season, *vi et armis*. But this is an offensive signification, alike unjust and untrue, and one which the Church utterly repudiates. She knows that the truth she teaches cannot be advertently rejected without the loss of the unbeliever's soul. It would, consequently, be inhuman of her not to use every means and all means that may be expedient to insure the acceptance of that truth by every living creature. But the means she employs are limited by that consideration. She does not profess any respect for the license of private opinion on subjects out of private opinion's competence; and wherever she had the power, and it should otherwise, in the interest of charity, be expedient, she would hinder by legal penalties the *teaching* of unbelief. But she would never deem it expedient, for it is opposed to her doctrine, to attempt to force the conscience of any one. She might, where she had the power and it was expedient, visit apostasy with penalties, because she would thus be helping weak and unstable souls to persevere. But she would never seek to force any one to believe. *Cui bono?* It would not be faith if it were not voluntary. Faith is a moral choice, although the gift of God; and an involuntary moral choice is not in the categories. There is here, no doubt,

certain intolerance, but it is not the intolerance which unbelievers and Mr. Thompson have in their mind when they charge it upon the Church. She is the divine teacher commissioned by God to teach men the truth by which they are to be saved, and intolerance of any hindrance to their acceptance of her teaching is the fruit of the divine charity which is her life. Unbelievers are perverse in denying this. It is a logical inference. It is true that unbelievers cannot be intolerant in this sense. Not any religion, school, or philosophy pretends to say, "This is God's revealed truth; whatsoever contradicts it is false." Intolerance of any differences of opinions on their part would consequently be the arrogance of pride and headiness of self-conceit. But unbelievers should not charge the Church with pride, because they themselves are not in possession of infallible truth.

But the utter confusion and vagueness of thought, incorrectness of expression, and ignorance of the subject on which Mr. Thompson writes, exhibited throughout the passage we have quoted, are not less remarkable than the writer's deficiency in the argumentative faculty. What does he mean by asserting that Catholics "are always ready to assume, without investigation or inquiry, that whatsoever the papacy has *done* or taught from the beginning is unerringly right or *true*?" There is not a Catholic in the wide world goose enough to maintain either of these propositions. Does not Mr. Thompson profess to have by him the decrees of the Vatican Council!—there is nothing to hinder his having them, anyhow—and has he to be taught at this time of day that the infallibility of the Pope has nothing whatever to do with anything he may do or have done? Also that everything Popes may have taught is not necessarily infallible, but only what they may have taught under the precise limitations prescribed by the Council. Their infallibility is, as it were, an infallibility *quoad hoc*. The limitations are three-fold, unless we regard the fourth as a limitation. I. That the Roman Pontiff must speak in discharge of the office of pastor and doctor of all Christians. II. It must be by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority. III. It must be a doctrine regarding faith or morals. And the fourth is, that he must define the doctrine to be held by the Universal Church.

In the use Mr. Thompson makes of this doctrine throughout his work it is impossible, without doing violence to every instinct of probability, to believe him to be in good faith. Thus much he appears to know and to admit, that the Pope's infallibility is limited to questions of faith and morals. Here, however, it is possible for him to be in good faith. Even Mr. Gladstone, a ripe scholar and hard thinker, has allowed his reasoning powers to be so dwarfed by vindictiveness as to share this ridiculous travestie of the gifts of

infallibility. That illustrious statesman,—*quam mutatus ab illo!*—he too infers from the Vatican definition of infallibility the absolute serfdom of Catholics—mind, heart, and conscience—to the Papal authority. He argues that only the “dregs or tatters of human life” can escape from the domain of faith and morals, and that, because obedience is expected of them in “the domain of all that concerns the government and discipline of the Church,” “every convert and member of the Pope’s Church places his loyalty and civil duty at the mercy of another.” Mr. Thompson, with the wonted extravagance of scantily informed persons in this hoax of 700 pages he has palmed on the literary world—for which whether we note the complete ignorance of history and of the subject he writes on it displays, its stolid repetition of stale and oftentimes refuted accusations, or its poverty of thought and senility of argument, it is little more—carries this ridiculous *non sequitur* of Mr. Gladstone out of all limits of common sense. It is the refrain of his burlesque indictment of the Church of all ages. He chants it forth at every step in monotonous iteration; and on the strength of it he labors in the teeth of facts staring him in the face, to force upon the more ignorant of his readers, with as small concern for mutual peace and brotherhood as for truth or reason, the odious conclusion, that all the Catholics of this republic, who constitute about one-fifth of the entire population, are bound by their faith, whether they like it or not, to work for the subversion of the political institutions of the country. Mr. Gladstone did not, of course, carry out his inference to such a preposterous extent as this, but he did argue quite as illogically, that the doctrine of Papal infallibility places “the loyalty and civil duty of Catholics at the mercy of another;” but even this he afterwards repudiated. The inexorable logic of Father Newman forced upon him the reluctant acknowledgment of the unreasonableness of the proposition which his unmanageable temper had led him to propound.

It is but a poor compliment to a man of the mental calibre of Mr. Gladstone to compare with him the author of the volume we are criticizing, who carries on to a yet more ridiculous extent the illogical extravagance into which a moment’s petulance had betrayed the latter. His notion of Papal infallibility is, that every time the Pope opens his mouth he is infallible. According to it, were he to forward a presentation copy of his own work to Pius IX, and his Holiness were to reply, acknowledging the receipt of the pasquinade he had done him the honor of forwarding to him, and thanking him for the amusement it had afforded him, Catholics would have to receive the letter not only as right and true, but as an infallible utterance. An alleged letter of St. Leo to the Emperor Maximus he quotes as an infallible pronouncement. “It is here

given," he says in a footnote on page 270, "that the reader may see the sentiments of the papacy, expressed by one of the greatest of the *infallible* Popes." The italics are Mr. Thompson's. And this is only one out of a whole multitude of equivalent instances.

But even this is not enough to satisfy his malevolence against the Church of Christ. Ignoring, with the jauntiest nonchalance conceivable, the decree of the Vatican Council which defines the doctrine, he writes on the monstrously absurd assumption that infallibility is ascribed by it to the very actions of the Pope. There is something so incredible in this stupendous absurdity that we feel bound to show that Mr. Thompson is really guilty of it, by quoting one or two illustrative passages out of the many scattered throughout his work. He asserts this senseless proposition roundly in the passage we have already quoted: "They (Catholics) are always ready to assume, without investigation or inquiry, that whatsoever the papacy has *done* or taught from the beginning, is *unerringly right* and true" (p. 4). The italics in this quotation are ours. In the rest of the passages we shall quote, they will be Mr. Thompson's. At page 100 he informs us that those Catholics "who, without belonging to the Order (the Society of Jesus) had been educated by it, were constrained to approve the act (of its dissolution by Clement XIV.) because it was done by an *infallible* Pope, who could not err." At page 105 he writes of the rehabilitation of that glorious apostleship of the faith of Christ. He "announced that, notwithstanding all that Clement, an *infallible* Pope, had said and done, it would henceforth (thenceforth?) be considered an act of 'audacious temerity' for any one to 'oppose' *his infallible* decree." Now it is notorious that every Catholic is at liberty to condemn the suppression of the Jesuits by Clement as an ill-judged concession to a set of self-seeking despots. Every Catholic is equally at liberty to regard it as a timely yielding to avert greater calamities, and its restoration by his successor as an act of evangelical wisdom and justice. But it needs the combined ignorance and malevolence of this unscrupulous compiler of second-hand thoughts, and second and third-hand perversions of history, to maintain that the doctrine of Papal infallibility requires Christians to believe that either of these Popes were "*infallibly right*" in what they did, or that these or any other Popes were or are infallibly right in any action whatsoever, excepting in so far as an *ex cathedra* declaration, as defined by the Vatican Council decree, may be considered an action.

At page 275, deriving, as usual, his historic lore from an unscrupulous calumniator of the Church, he alleges that Boniface II. "convened a council in the Church of St. Peter at Rome, and had a decree passed allowing him to designate his successor. Having secured this extraordinary power, in violation of the universal prac-

tice of the Church, he appointed one whom he required the bishops to recognize 'by oath and in writing.' This was, of course, infallibly done, without the possibility of error. But another council was soon after convened, and this decree was set aside, when Boniface cast his own infallible (!) bull into the flames."

We are not for the present concerned with Mr. Thompson's history. We are limiting ourselves for the moment to the notion of the doctrine of Papal infallibility he has, or affects to have, and the use he makes of it.

At page 365, after representing, still on the authority of Cormenin, the efforts of Gregory IV. to make peace between the weak son of Charlemagne, who had succeeded to the Frankish portion of his dominions, and his children, as fiendish and absolutely motiveless expedients for providing a justification for the excommunication of Louis, he writes: "Thus he succeeded in drawing away the troops from the Emperor, and after the Pope left the camp they went over to Lothaire, who made Louis prisoner, deprived him of his crown and royal robe, and made himself Emperor of the West and King of France, all of which was directed and consecrated by this base and perfidious Pope, whose conscience was not bound by either vow, pledge, or oath, however solemn. He was, nevertheless, *infallible!*"

Now this lying caricature of a holy Pope *might* have been deserved. However improbable, it is not impossible. This perversion of history might have been as true as it is false. But had it been so, can we believe Mr. Thompson to be sincere when he affects to believe that it would disprove his prerogative of infallibility? But we must not transfer Mr. Thompson's work to our pages. *Quantum sufficit.*

There are times when he writes more like a madman than a man in his sober senses. At page 115, in a passing notice of an able appeal to Americans by Father Weninger, S. J., entitled *Protestantism and Infidelity*, we find the following passages:

"From such men liberalism finds no quarter. They exhibit nothing higher or nobler than that supercilious air of imagined superiority which roots out every generous faculty of the mind, and leaves its possessor an object of mingled pity and contempt. . . . Here is a foreign priest, sheltered by our laws, who clenches his fist and shakes it in our face, daring to tell us that we will (?) 'do better' to let the car of the papacy, with Jesuit conductors, roll unresistingly over us, for if we do not we shall be punished, after the manner of Galileo, for our excesses of religious hatred."

All this raving because Father Weninger, not caring for the nonce to avail himself of the *tu quoque* arguments, had suggested to Protestant controversialists the prudence of being somewhat chary of producing the case of Galileo in proof of the alleged persecuting spirit of the Church, lest Catholics should "be forced" in their turn

"to inquire into their own excesses of religious hatred,"—a poor specimen of which we hinted at in the commencement of this article. Yet only on the preceding page he had professed the readiness of all Protestant Christians "to meet Catholic apologists" in the field of fair discussion.

But even this looks almost tame and rational by the side of the following from his criticism of the same writer, which is the last quotation illustrative of Mr. Thompson's qualifications for the work he has attempted, with which we shall amuse our readers :

" His overanxiety to assail Protestantism rendering him oblivious to the fact that his own Church, and the Order to which he belongs, *both* teach that popes and priests may sin, and yet remain the *infallible* representatives of God ; and may be guilty of all the impurities of life, and yet administer *infallibly* all the Sacraments of the Church." (The italics are our own.)

So much for Mr. Thompson's intelligent appreciation of the doctrine of Papal infallibility !

In reply to the ridiculous use he makes in this last quotation, of what is really a Catholic doctrine, we would merely ask him in passing : Was the commission of the famous British Admiral Nelson null and void because he was one of the unchastest of men ? Would all the ministerial acts of the late President have been invalidated if all the charges made against his moral character had been true ? It would indeed be a sorry lookout for us humble Catholic laymen, who are trying hard to serve God and save our souls, if all the absolutions we suppose ourselves to have received, and all our communions, have been invalid because of the unworthiness of the human beings through whose consecrated ministration God communicated them to us. That may do for Protestantism, whose ministers have nothing to communicate but "talkee, talkee," but not for the Church whose ministers convey "the new life," the gifts of the Holy Ghost, forgiveness of sins, and the very Body and Blood of Christ to the faithful.

Mr. Thompson may object that he cannot be expected to be versed in all the subtleties of Catholic doctrine, and that he announced at the beginning of his book that he "had not undertaken to discuss mere points of religious doctrine, or to treat of the dogmas of the Roman Catholic Church, except in so far as they have been employed to influence the civil policy and action of governments." Be it so ; but, not to insist here on the fact that there are no subtleties in the obligatory faith of Catholics, will he inform us how he can possibly know the effect of a doctrine, of which he is so profoundly ignorant, on the civil policy and action of governments, as we have shown him to be of the doctrine of Papal infallibility ?

This gentleman's argument is so vague, loose, and confused, and

at the same time, as is generally the case with such argumentation, so exceedingly ponderous, that it is not easy to give a comprehensible sketch of it. According to our lights, however, it is somewhat such as the following :

His mind would appear to be possessed with a *notion*—for it has neither the precision nor the consequence of a “belief,” or even of an “opinion”—that there are two religious phenomena which civil society has to deal with ; one, a Christian organization, which, in its present actual form, is the Roman Catholic Church, whose influential principle and animating spirit is “ultramontanism” or “Jesuitism ;” the other, a school of thought, which, because its fundamental and inspiring idea is a protest against the Roman Catholic Church, has received the name of “Protestantism.” Respecting the former, he apparently adopts the nonsensical “view” of what is called the “high-church” party, in the English Episcopal sect, that the true and pure Church of Christ survived only about four centuries. Closing his eyes upon the, one would have thought, not unimportant fact of the wholesale persecution of Christians all over the world throughout almost that whole period of time, he assumes that the “early Church,” as the “branch-theory” Christians call it, or, as Mr. Thompson styles it, “that grand old Church,” was in complete harmony with the civil power. Here Mr. Thompson is as inconsistent with himself as are all writers who write from the “Protestant standpoint” (p. 3) of passion and prejudice, instead of from an unbiassed love of truth. For if the imperial and local persecutions of the first three or four centuries of the Church are no proof of the antagonism between it and the civil power during those ages, by what pretence of reason can he allege her modern persecution by German despotism as a proof of any such antagonism now ? The Anglicans fix, we believe, upon the Council of Nice as the event which suspended the existence of “the early Church” until that auspicious moment when Henry VIII., in a sudden zeal for adultery, superseded the spiritual authority of Christ’s Vicar throughout his realm, and substituted for it his own paternal and patriarchal jurisdiction, recalling thus to a renewed existence that “early Church,” which had disappeared from human view for eleven centuries, in the form of the Reformed Protestant Church of England, under the headship, first of Pope Henry VIII. and afterwards of the reigning sovereigns of that kingdom.

Mr. Thompson adopts the “view” of the high-church Anglicans as to the time at *about* which “that grand old Church,” like the celebrated slave of Pythagoras, bade farewell to human ken, and began to assume the form of “Ultramontanism” or “Jesuitism ;” but he considers the endowment of the Holy See with temporal Lordship by the great Christian empire as the proximate cause. From that

moment, according to him, a spirit opposed to Christianity—a spirit of ambition and worldly pride—took possession of “that grand old Church,” or as, in this connection, he calls it, “then the only visible sign of Christianity” (p. 283). Upon this subject, however, he departs somewhat from the high Anglican “view,” and is not a little cloudy in his own. For in another chapter he seems to date the claims of the Holy See to temporal power from the moment, some four centuries afterwards, when Pepin, the Frankish monarch, ordered the territory on the Italian peninsula which he had recovered from the Lombards “to be surrendered to the Pope in the name of the See of Rome” (p. 330). Whether, however, Mr. Thompson would date the disappearance of “that grand old Church” from the benefaction of Constantine or of Pepin, the next point of his argument, in so far as there is any order in an argument so inextricably confused, is that from one of these events, or both, arose those claims to ecclesiastical supremacy and temporal power, which have been successfully urged “by fraud and usurpation,” through, in round numbers, the fifteen centuries on the one hypothesis, and the ten on the other, which have since passed, until the culmination of those claims in the Syllabus and the Vatican decree of Papal infallibility, and the complete metamorphose in “Ultramontanism” or “Jesuitry.”

Having thus proved to his own complete satisfaction, *apparently*, on the strength of a motley array of a multitude of historical scraps collected from the most rubbishy authorities, most of them anti-Catholic, and which he offers to the reader as historical testimony, that the existing faith and organization of what was once “that grand old Church,” are the product of fraud and usurpation, Mr. Thompson proceeds to the one object of his indictment, namely, to arouse a spirit of enmity and hostility against all those citizens of this republic who are members of what the *New York Herald* truly described a few weeks ago as “the largest Christian denomination on earth,” in the breasts of as many of the rest of the community as will allow themselves to be influenced by his absurd but malevolent representations. For this purpose he labors to prove that the actual Catholic Church, both in its faith and organization, is essentially, actively as well as passively, in conflict with the political constitution of these States, the inference being, that since the State cannot suffer to exist within it a power which is compassing its overthrow *delenda est Ecclesia*.

It must not be supposed that what argument there is in this work is presented in the regular and logical form we have given to it. On the contrary, it is an *olla podrida* of arguments, based for the most part on false premises, and illogical both in substance and in form. The writer tells us in his preface that “such

are his habits of thought,—possibly from professional training,—that he has taken but little for granted; but, in order to exercise an intelligent judgment as far as possible, has examined and weighed all the evidence within his reach, as he would that bearing upon any controverted point about which he can have no personal information.” This, however, is merely the exordium of a lawyer who endeavors to prepossess the jury he is addressing with a sense of the sincerity of his convictions, and the soundness and competence of his judgment, in order that they may be disposed to *take all he urges upon them for granted.*

It is, indeed, easy enough to detect the effects of his “professional training” throughout the whole of this wordy indictment of the Catholic Church. There is nothing in it at all resembling the solid learning and important weighing of evidence of an honest and able judge. We need only an ingenious *ad captandum* concoction of evidence so as to make out the strongest case against the defendant. He has pressed into his service Catholic doctrines, which, either from ignorance or design, he distorts to suit his purpose, as we have shown in the use he makes of the doctrine of Papal infallibility. From modern history he culls every incident which can be made to tell against the Catholic religion. When, as is mostly the case, facts fail him, he avails himself of inventions; and as his own knowledge of history is too limited to admit of his trusting to his own inventions, he draws *ad libitum* on the inventive resources, not of Protestant writers only, but of free-thinking and ostentatiously anti-Catholic writers, such as Michelet, About, etc. For his principal supply of this second-hand ware he seems to have depended chiefly on Cermenin, a Freemason, who, commencing life as an Imperialist under the first Napoleon, first opposed and then accepted office under every succeeding form of government. From this writer, who wrecked in his *History of the Popes* whatever reputation he had earned by his professional writings, he quotes no less than a hundred and two times, although even he, with the best will in the world to avail himself of every misstatement having even the slightest appearance of plausibility, is forced to admit at times the untrustworthiness of statements which he nevertheless quotes.

Mr. Thompson is not adroit enough to conceal the animus that inspires him, nor his own consciousness of the weakness of his cause. The most disreputable evidence of this is the disingenuous expedient he has constant recourse to, of quoting the calumnious statements against the Church and misrepresentations of history of anti-Catholic writers, and then constantly insisting that his authorities are Catholic, with such tiresome iteration as in itself to

provoke a suspicion in the reader's mind that were the fact so it would not need such constant repetition. Thus he serves Cormenin,¹ thus Dupin, who was deposed from his chair at the Sorbonne for Jansenism, who attempted a reconciliation with the English sect at the cost of the sacrament of Penance, religious vows, the Lenten Fast, the supremacy of the Holy See, and the celibacy of the clergy, he himself having broken his own religious vows in regard to the latter. Thus he serves About, whom he calls a *Gallican* Catholic, the editor of a revolutionist newspaper, and a pronounced "anti-clerical," to use an epithet now popular with anti-Catholics. Thus, too, even Michelet, if our memory does not betray us.

In the course of his labored arraignment of the Church of all the ages, a number of side issues are raised which would require a volume to refute. In fact, he traverses the whole area covered by the faith and discipline of the Church, prying here and there and everywhere, if so be he may, by all means or any means, find aught whereby to conjure up an anti-American phantom under the abused nickname of "Ultramontanism" or "Jesuitry."

To follow him over all this ground would be obviously impossible in the pages of a periodical. Neither would it be desirable, if it were practical. The bulk of his statements consists of re-served-up follies of Protestant writers of the uninstructed class, which have been disposed of times out of number. We shall therefore devote the remainder of this paper to exposing one or two more of the most startling of his doctrinal absurdities, giving a specimen of his historic lore, and sketching succinctly the actual relation, in these days, and especially in this country, of the Church to the civil power.

We must bear in mind Mr. Thompson's threefold object in his attempt to institute a distinction between "that grand old Church" and the same Church as she now exists, which he describes as "Ultramontane and Jesuitical." He appears, however, in the confusion of his thought, to be under the impression that "that grand old Church" is, after all, by no means extinct, but exists in the persons of a large number of the laity, who are overridden and tyrannized over by an "Ultramontane and Jesuit" hierarchy. In which supposition we should have to look for what survives of "that grand old Church," in the "condemned liberal Catholic party," a

¹ He incautiously lets out in a footnote at p. 367 that the disingenuity and untruthfulness of this expedient is advertent and deliberate on his part. He admits by implication that he quotes him as an authority opposed to Catholic testimony. His words are: "In the chronological table of the Popes published by *the Church*, they make Leo IV. Pope up to A.D. 855, and Benedict III. his successor. But did he die in 853, as *Cormenin* asserts, or live until 855, as the *Papists* assert?"

view quite original, and in which he will not find many adherents. He aims evidently at fostering a spirit of discontent with their rulers in the minds of such Catholics as are infected with the revolutionary principles of the age, at making it appear that his violent, and ridiculous attack is not upon the Catholic Church but upon what he calls "Ultramontanism" or "Jesuitism," and at inciting a people proud of their toleration of all religious opinions to open hostility to the Church, on the pretext that such persecution would not be directed against the Church, but only against a system of "fraud and usurpation" which takes the name of the Catholic Church.

Perhaps the most foolish of all the propositions, by the help of which Mr. Thompson hopes to effect his object, is that "the papacy demands implicit and passive obedience; the entire submission of the whole man, by the sacrifice of all his sense of personality" (p. 4). Again at p. 76 we read: "Thus the personality of the believer is merged in the superior personality of the Pope." These bold assertions may be taken as average specimens of the random manner in which he discourses of serious subjects. His "professional training" may have made him more or less of a proficient in *ad captandum* appeals to the ignorance, passions, and prejudices of his fellow-creatures, but it has not improved his reasoning faculty. He either does not know, or, if he does, he ignores the elemental law of logic, that an equivocal term in either of the premises vitiates an argument. *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. If the meaning of the subject of a proposition is uncertain, it means nothing; and from nothing nothing can be inferred. The word "personality" is an equivocal term with a vengeance. If his proposition had been: "The worthless personality of a Mason who has broken the secrecy by which he is bound disappears inevitably and without mercy from the offended craft," no fault could have been found with it, because the context in which the term "personality" occurs fixes its meaning. But in the proposition we are criticizing, and which the author uses for the purpose of exalting Protestantism at the expense of the Universal Faith, it has simply no meaning at all; whereas, if any definite and correct meaning be assigned to it, the proposition is as hopelessly false as any proposition can well be.

The "personality" of a man is the possession, in their maturity, of all the faculties necessary for the guidance of his actions as a responsible being. A leaf, or a tree, or a flower, or a mosquito, has not "personality." It is true, no two leaves, or trees, or flowers, or any two of the lower animals are identical; but this is individuality, not "personality."

If there be one thing which more strikingly than another char-

acterizes the teachings of the Universal Church, it is her respect for the human personality thus understood. If Mr. Thompson can supply a more clear and accurate definition, we invite him to do so by all means. Even his *bête noire*, the Society of Jesus, whose priceless and self-sacrificing services to the highest interests of mankind all over the earth, he labors to obscure in the untutored balderdash of his nonsensical denunciation, rigidly as it requires the surrender of the individual will of its members in obedience to superiors, stops short at the "personality" of the individual. Amongst the questions demanded of the candidates for the Order is the following (*Constitution of the Society of Jesus*, part 3, c. i.; *Inst. Soc.*, t. i., p. 373; *Exam.*, c. 4, § 29; *De l'Existence et De l'Institut des Jesuites*, par Le R. P. de Ravignan): "Are you determined to obey your superiors, who stand in the place of God towards you, in all things wherein *your conscience would not be wounded by sin?*"

There is not a priest in the Catholic Church, even of the most moderate theological attainments, who would not unhesitatingly counsel a penitent that the salvation of his own soul is his first concern, to the exclusion, if necessary, of every other anxiety; and that the salvation of the souls of others can only come second to it.

The truth is, all this talk of "the personality of the believer merging in the superior personality of the Pope" is sheer, unmitigated twaddle, and it is extremely difficult not to believe that Mr. Thompson knows it be so. What must we think of an educated man, a member of a learned profession, gravely maintaining so childish an argument as that the *infallible* Pope condemns some of the principles on which, according to Mr. Thompson, the American Constitution is founded; and, inasmuch, as the infallibility of the Pope is a *de fide* doctrine, all American Catholics must be disloyal citizens? Mr. Thompson ought to know, what we have already urged, that the Papal infallibility is only *de fide* within the limits assigned to it by the definition itself, which does not even lay it down that the Pope is infallible in all his utterances even within the domain of faith and morals, but only when, within that domain, he speaks as pastor and doctor of the Universal Church.¹ Mr. Thompson shows that he has no confidence in his own arguments, by admitting that the bulk of the Catholic laity are as loyal citizens as the followers of other religions. We suspect, however, that readers possessing common sense will be more impressed by the testimony of things *as they are* than by Mr. Thompson's assertions of what they ought to be consistently with his own hypothesis.

¹ The writer purposely abstains from the use of scientific or technical phraseology. He addresses merely the common sense of the ordinary reader, and endeavors to write only what all such may readily understand.

He accounts for the actual discrepancy in the following manner:

"While assigning these purposes to the Pope and his hierarchs, however, we should not fail to keep in mind the distinction between Roman Catholicism, as a system of religion, and the papacy as an all-absorbing religio-political power, founded upon human ambition. Nor should we forget that distinction which exists to a great extent, especially in the United States, between intelligent Roman Catholic *laymen* and the priesthood."

Rather, we should bear in mind that a man who makes assertions in flat contradiction of universally recognized facts deserves an epithet which politeness forbids us more plainly to specify. Here is a writer foreign to the Catholic Church, who has never drank of her spirit, who knows nothing of her inner life, nothing, or next to nothing, of her doctrine and discipline, gravely putting forth a gratuitous invention which is contradicted by facts so obvious as to admit of no denial nor explaining away. This very fabulous distinction has been alleged by the German Attila as a protest for the most brutal persecution with which the Church has been visited since the days of her baptism in blood, if we except the short demoniac outbreak which preceded the French empire, and the three hundred years' persecution of Irish Catholics by Protestant England. Yet, never in the history of the Church was there a time when the complete union of the Catholic laity with the priesthood, and of both with the Holy Father of the faithful, was more strikingly manifested. The hundreds and thousands of pilgrims, laics, priests, bishops, who flock by hundreds and thousands, day by day, at an infinite cost of time, toil, and money, to pay their loyal homage at the foot of the pontifical throne, and to pay to the pastor and doctor of the Universal Church this striking tribute of their affectionate sympathy in his brave defence of that supremacy of the Holy See, which the world calls Ultramontaniam, give the lie to the preposterous distinction attempted by Mr. Thompson.

We fear, however, that we must turn the tables on Mr. Thompson. Not only is it not contradicted by manifest facts, but it is strictly and literally true, that the doctrines of "the spirit of the age," or "modern ideas," or "the spirit of progress," or whatever the proper name be by which we are to call the prevailing political and moral heresy, do demand "the entire submission of the whole man, by the sacrifice of all his sense of personality." We will take the "craft" of Masons, for example, that powerful—for evil—or-organization, which, as far as present extent goes, may be considered as universal as the Church, and which is the great propaganda of modern ideas. A candidate for admission into that society is obliged to bind himself by a solemn oath that he will never reveal secrets, of the nature of which he knows nothing before the oath is taken; and he makes over his life, which is not his to give, to the un-

known chief of the society as the penalty of breaking it. More than this, his oath binds him to obedience to superiors in all that concerns the welfare of the order, so that if he should be selected to take the life of a *brother* for revealing Masonic secrets, he is compelled to obey, or forfeit his own life. If this is not "the entire submission of the whole man, by the sacrifice of all his sense of personality," we know not what is. The Society of Jesus leaves the personality of its subjects free, for they are not bound to obey in anything that is against their conscience. The obligations of a Mason may compel him to become a murderer; and no one can commit murder with a clear conscience. In good sooth, all the moral instincts and obligations which go to make up a human personality, those of a husband, father, son, brother, or friend, have to yield before the superior obligation of the welfare of the "craft." The tenderest ties of relationship will not excuse any one for refusing to carry out the behests of the society.

The political philosophy of that arrant knave and many-headed deceiver, "the spirit of the times," or as it dubs itself with grotesque complacency, "modern enlightenment," of which Masonry is the parent, demands a similar merging of the personality of *every one, believer in it or unbeliever*, in the State. Its babble about liberty of conscience and toleration of all religions is the veriest humbug imaginable. It is forward enough to tolerate, or to encourage rather, any amount of private speculation on a subject which is beyond the competence of human reason, and wherein there is *no assertion* of "personality." But let the personality assert itself, and precisely there where its living force is the most unquenchable, in the conscientious convictions of dogmatic and most certain religious belief, its most solemn obligations are required to conform to the State indifferentism, which is miscalled toleration. The education of the child by the parent, the creation, so far as rests with him, of the "personality" of his offspring, is taken out of his hands by the State, which forces him, by all the power it can exert, to be an outraged spectator of the moulding of his child to those principles of religious indifferentism which can only be professed by individuals to their eternal ruin. The rod, which an inspired writer tells us it is a neglect of parental duty to spare, is rudely snatched from his hand, and he is prevented by the intolerant and tyrannical usurpation of the State from bringing up his children in that spirit of reverence for constituted authority, without which not only cannot a man be a good Christian, but he cannot be a gentleman, nor even a civilized being.

In that most holy and tender relationship on which civilized society hinges—that union of man and wife which symbolizes the mystical union between Christ and the Church—the State even yet

more violently endeavors to submerge in itself the personality of the citizen. The sacramental, and therefore indissoluble, nature of the sacred tie, belief in which is a part of the necessary faith of a *real Christian*, it wholly ignores, nay, it makes laws to which it demands the submission of all the citizens which falsely deny it, treating marriage as a civil contract which it can make and unmake at its will. This is a power beyond any the Pope ever claimed. Christ's Vicar on earth as he is, and supreme within the domain of faith and morals, he does not pretend to encroach on the human personality.

In States where these principles of "modern enlightenment" have had full swing, so violent have been the usurpations of the "personality" of Catholic citizens in particular, that persecuting edicts have been obliged to be enacted in the vain hope of compelling its absolute surrender to the State.

When Mr. Thompson calls the preaching of the Gospel by the Church in discharge of the divine commission—"Go ye and teach all nations. . . . He that believeth and is baptized shall be *saved*, and he that doth not believe shall be *damned*"—demanding the merging of the personality in the Pope, he does not know what he is talking about. It is, on the contrary, an invitation to the noblest, freest, and most august assertion by the individual of his personality. "Because you have seen Me you have believed, Thomas. *Blessed* are they who have not seen, and yet have believed."

Another of Mr. Thompson's flagrant allusions, on the strength of which he hopes, if he really believes what he writes, to create a prejudice in the minds of the American people against the Church is, that it is obligatory on Catholics to believe that every other form of government but the monarchical is unlawful. He maintains this ridiculous proposition throughout his work, and with the confident assurance which almost invariably characterizes the writings of men who are not versed in the subject on which they write. The following two quotations will be sufficient to satisfy our readers that we are not ascribing to his pen follies it has not traced:

"According to the *teachings of Rome*, governments *de facto* are those which have been established by the people upon the overthrow of the kingly authority, which is considered *the only legitimate authority*. Governments *de jure* are such as are based upon the law of God, *with kings at their head*, who shall obey the Pope as the highest authority upon earth. In this view all Roman Catholic *monarchies* are governments *de jure*, and therefore legitimate, while all popular republics are governments *de facto*, and therefore illegitimate" (p. 580).

Again:

"Recognizing no other form of government *except the monarchical as consistent with the divine law*, Pope Pius IX. and his hierarchy do not hesitate to declare, in the face of the world's progress, that every other form of government is revolutionary and usurpation" (p. 585).

It is really humiliating to have to reply to such childish twaddle as this. The Church has no teaching whatsoever as to the form of secular governments. She has not even a preference for any particular form. She is profoundly indifferent whether it be an absolute monarchy, an oligarchy, or a republic. She teaches only that it is the first duty of every government to aid her in her work of saving souls. Every Catholic is completely free to advocate whatever form of government he prefers, and every good Catholic will prefer that civil polity by which this duty is most faithfully discharged.

The only civil government which has sincerely and completely obeyed this fundamental obligation of all governments in modern days has been a republic—the little republic of the Equator. The government of this country is *de facto* incapacitated from following so noble an example, in consequence of a large majority of the citizens being unbelievers. But it does the next best thing. It conscientiously preserves for the Church a fair field and no favor, which is all she can expect under existing circumstances. It does not, of set purpose, impede her in her work of saving souls, as is done in Italy, Switzerland, Germany, England, Mexico, France, and other countries, monarchical and republican. The only exception to this is the public school system, and this is not an advertent impediment thrown in her way by the State. The few infidel doctrinaires who propagate the principles on which it is founded, have succeeded in persuading the unreflecting multitude that a merely secular education is the greatest boon that can be conferred upon a citizen, and they have made the State provide one for them. The result has been a general demoralization not to be met with in any of the old European monarchies. This demoralization will continue increasing until, very probably, all in whom the moral and religious principle is not extinct will join the only Christian community with a creed and a morality, and the Church will be asked to undertake the conduct of the public schools for the salvation of the State. Then would begin to return among our youth reverence of parents, of age, and of constituted authority; chastity and modesty would begin once more to be regarded as virtues; between man and man once more fair dealing and scrupulous integrity would begin to be held in more honor than the possession of wealth, and honor and patriotism in the administration of public affairs would begin to be preferred to dishonest self-seeking and personal advancement. Already has the State shown a disposition to make the system as acceptable as possible to Catholics, and it need not be doubted that it would go farther in this direction, but for the "sectarian" efforts of such noisy and empty clamorers as Mr. Thompson and his like. The various impediments offered to the

Church by President Grant in the matter of the Indian missions and in other ways, do not diminish the force of what we have here urged. They were the proceedings of an individual only—a mere soldier—who labored to further the self-seeking and hypocritical aims of Methodism at the expense of the principles of the Constitution, of which he was the supreme executive. His unconstitutional policy, in other matters as well as this, have not been indorsed by the American people.

Before taking a farewell of this portion of Mr. Thompson's preentious rhodomontade *de omnibus rebus et quibusdam aliis*, we will dispose of all his stage rant in laudation of modern "views" in the domain of political and social philosophy by one quotation from the works of one of the greatest of German linguists, scholars, and thinkers, a Protestant throughout the longer period of his life, but whose profound erudition, aided by a disposition which enabled him to co-operate with the grace of God, led him subsequently into the fold of Christ.

We will first, however, give a specimen or two, selected at random, of Mr. Thompson's stump oratory, and with which his book is interlarded from the beginning to the end.

"The two systems stand in direct antagonism with each other. The Protestant has separated the State from the Church; the papal proposes to unite them again. The Protestant has founded its civil institutions upon the *will of the people*; the papal proposes to reconstruct and found them upon the *will of the pope*. The Protestant secures religious freedom; the papal requires that every man shall give up his conscience to the keeping of ecclesiastical superiors. The Protestant develops the faculties of the mind by inciting the spirit of personal independence and manhood; the papal crushes out all this spirit by its debasing doctrine of passive obedience and submission. The Protestant has put the world upon a career of progress and prosperity; the papal desires to arrest the career, and turn it back into those old grooves which have led so many nations to wreck and desolation" (p. 53).

We have faithfully retained in this quotation Mr. Thompson's amusing distribution of capital letters. It will be seen that Protestantism—that grand system of progress backwards, three centuries old—he honors invariably with a capital letter, but the insignificant Papacy, and the servant of the servants of God himself, he equally invariably fobs off with a little p.

"It (Protestantism) saved religion by separating it from the corruptions of the papacy, and thus providing for the world a purer and better form of Christianity; it saved society by breaking the sceptres of kings and popes, and elevating the people to the point of asserting and maintaining their natural right to liberty" (p. 58).

"By their (the framers of our American institutions) training in the school of Protestantism they were imbued with the courage to defy both the authority and the machinations of those who claimed the 'divine right' to govern. Their careful study of the history of nations (?) enabled them to comprehend fully the necessities of their condition. They realized how abject mankind had become in those countries where Church and State were united (they have, however, been united in Protestant England

ever since the apostasy of Henry VIII.), and with this experience to guide them, signalized their efforts to frame a new government by dissolving this union as an unnatural and corrupting one" (pp. 67-8).

"At the times when these examples were set, the bulk of the European people were in a state of profound ignorance, and it was essential to the 'divine right' of absolutism that they should be kept so, for in their ignorance they were taught by ambitious, cunning, and corrupt priests to believe that the pope was *equal to God*. (The italics are Mr. Thompson's, as if to emphasize this clumsy falsehood.) While this delusion lasted they dared not resist a king or priest, however tyrannical, who had the pope's indorsement, for that would have been considered a violation of God's commands, and punished by excommunication and anathema. Hence these kings and princes were careful to obtain this indorsement, and the popes were equally careful to see that the light of intelligence was shut out from the popular mind, so that by a continuance of the delusion they could share between themselves the government of the whole civilized world. They must be bold and presumptuous men who ask us, as these Jesuit missionaries do, to exchange the present condition of our affairs for that they so fondly picture—to undo what the people, acting for themselves, have so nobly done in resistance to misgovernment and tyranny, and plunge in blind submission, and at a single bound, back again into mediæval times" (p. 126).

"With this distinct explanation of the politico-religious faith promulgated by the infallible popes, and sanctioned by a general council, before us, we can fully understand the Encyclical and Syllabus of Pius IX., and should be at no loss to tell what Archbishop Manning meant when he said, '*the hated Syllabus* will have its justification,' and 'would have saved society!' Its justification will be found in the complete wreck of all the Protestant and non-Catholic nations whose people are to be saved from themselves by being made the degraded and miserable subjects of the papacy. And then, when the Jesuit shout of gratified revenge shall go up from Rome, and the *débris* of shattered popular government shall be lying all around, the temporal sword will be drawn 'at the will and pleasure of the priest,' and he who shall dare to question that all this is the will of God, will be racked in every limb by the tortures of the Inquisition, or consumed by its re-kindled flames" (p. 224-5).

But enough of this doting. Let us hear what Frederick Schlegel has to say about the subject.

"In the transition from the Carovingian to the Capetian dynasty, we should not forget that the monarchy was not strictly hereditary in any German State, but was for the most part merely elective; and it was only he who had proved himself a valiant, prudent, and powerful defender of his nation that became the man of the public choice. Royalty was then considered more in the light of an office, a charge, a peculiar calling, than of an inheritance or patrimony. The general idea of the Christian empire was a universal protectorate over all Christian nations and countries—a mighty central dominion founded on justice, while the great connecting and pervading power of the whole system was supposed to reside in the perfect unity of religious principles. When this religious unity was destroyed, the whole political edifice fell to pieces; and in the struggles of later times, the artificial relations founded on a mere mechanical balance of power on a republican equality of states, without the foundation of Christian or any other solid principles, have furnished, as experience has shown, but a very bad substitute for that old Christian brotherhood of the European states and nations, and have, in the general subversion of Christian morality, produced a sort of polite disorder and refined anarchy" (*Philosophy of Hist.*, by F. von Schlegel, Lect. xii., *ad finem*).

If it be impossible for even the most indulgent charity to excuse Mr. Thompson's perversions of Catholic teaching on the plea of ignorance, what shall be said of the gross fictions which he would palm upon the reader as history? We had hitherto thought that

John Knox's autobiography—for such in fact is his *History of the Reformation in Scotland*—to be the most lying history in existence. He has found a superior. Mr. Thompson possesses an even greater facility for misrepresenting and for inventing facts, and he is deterred by no scruples about the truth of his material, nor even by the obvious improbability of his statements to any ordinarily informed reader. He has evidently himself never been a student of history, so that all the knowledge he has is second-hand; and even for this second-hand information it is clear to us that he is indebted to the lower class of Protestant controversialists. Who but such ever heard of such historical authorities as Cormanin, on whom he chiefly draws, Dr. Cumming, Fox, Gilbert, Fry, etc.? And yet again, his quotations from these even he has evidently borrowed from some obscure book of Protestant controversy, for he constantly uses in his footnotes, absurdly enough, the learned word *apud*. Thus we have *apud* Gillet, *apud* Cumming, and so on. We do not say that he never borrowed from more respectable authorities, but it is only when he supposes they help him to make out his case, or he can make them appear to do so. It would be idle to specify any particular passages in support of our criticism; we can only imitate his learned style, and inform the reader that they are to be found *apud* Thompson *passim*. To refute them by historic evidence would require a work longer than his own, if it were worth the while. We will, however, give a few specimens of our author's historic lore.

There is one species of falsehood which crops up in almost every page of this foolish production. It is that of ascribing to the actions of saints, popes, bishops, religious orders, kings, and historic personages generally, without a shadow of a proof, and upon his own mere *ipse dixit*, as if he were merely chronicling what is universally admitted, the basest motives—motives which wholly change the significance of events. Is there a perverse and vicious monarch seeking to tyrannize over his people, it is the Pope using him as the instrument of his ambition. Does an Archbishop defend the liberties of the people against royal insolence, it is still the Pope wishing to create disaffection between the sovereign and his subjects. Pious kings who live in accordance with their faith are “imbeciles;” immoral betrayers of it are heroes and champions of liberty. If an outraged people rise in defence of their religion, they are “insurrectionists” moved by priests and monks, rebels, and what not. At the same time if an unbelieving monarch persecutes the faithful, he does so “with tears in his eyes,” or he has to deal with “ambitious and proud ecclesiastics.”

His whole account of the Society of Jesus—his *bête noire*—is prolonged and, we are compelled to say, advertent falsehood. The

Order is not exempt from error, nor are all its members saints. We must look for human infirmity there as elsewhere. But its services to religion and to the race are inestimable. Few in number, the services they have rendered to the cause of education cannot be overestimated. They devote untiring and self-sacrificing zeal to the salvation of souls, according to their motto, *ad majorem Dei gloriam*. Wherever blood must be shed in this holy enterprise, there shall we meet with Jesuit missionaries and Jesuit martyrs. Do the world, the flesh, and the devil rise up in unholy insurrection against the Church of the living God, the Jesuits are its first and foremost victims. On the banks of the Paraguay they founded, of savages whom, at the sacrifice of many Jesuit lives, they had converted to the faith of Christ, a *freer republic* than any "modern enlightenment" ever dreamed of; where the affairs of life were conducted in mutual love, where crimes were almost unknown, and where temporal prosperity kept pace with the innocence of the citizens—a veritable Utopia. Forbidden by the constitution of the Society from accepting ecclesiastical dignities, no views of personal advantage can impair the merit of their untiring toil, mar their lofty purpose, or divert the singleness of their aim. Of such sort is the Order which a writer who professes "fairness and impartiality" describes as an organized *secret* (!) society—"the most secret society on earth" he calls it—laboring in collusion with the Pope, to bring mankind into a condition of "abject slavery." This glorious Order, founded by a converted soldier who gave up a brilliant position and all worldly hopes and goods for the love of Jesus and of his fellow-creatures, of which such men as St. Francis Xavier, St. Aloysius, St. Stanislaus, were the product, he charges with the murder of a Pope, with teaching immorality, with "subverting the morality of the Gospel, and substituting their immoral maxims for religion," with endeavoring to destroy all the "fundamental laws which form the basis of all states and governments!"

This is enough to give the reader an idea of the kind of stuff of which his historical appreciation consists. We will now, in conclusion, single out a few of the multitudes of instances of his so completely falsifying historical incidents in support of his fabulous indictment of the indefectible Church of Christ, that they become sheer inventions and fictions. Whether the inventions are his own, or he has borrowed them from some of the vulgar repertoires of anti-Catholic slander which play so important a part in keeping up the Protestant delusion among the uninstructed multitude, and of all of which *The Papacy and the Civil Power* may be regarded as an elaborate compendium, it is not for us to decide. The criminality is alike in both cases.

At p. 98 he deliberately asserts, writing of the suppression of

the Society of Jesus by Clement XIV., with as unshrinking positiveness as if it were admitted fact, that "by this act of condemnation such a degree of odium was stamped upon its character that the people everywhere held it in execration;" that "the expulsion of the order from France, Spain, Portugal, and Sicily,—all Roman Catholic governments,—the hesitation of Clement, his careful and deliberate investigation of the charges made against it, and the overwhelming proofs which forced him to conclusions he had manifestly endeavored to avoid, all go to show *an amount of turpitude which is without parallel elsewhere.*"

At p. 100 we read: "The Jesuits, by the immoral tendency of their doctrines, and *the many enormities perpetrated by them against government, society, and individuals*, had become so unpopular throughout Europe that their suppression gave great and almost universal satisfaction." And again at p. 102: "On account of the *extreme contempt* in which they were held in all the Roman Catholic States, they were compelled to seek refuge elsewhere. *Their iniquities were so great and were so well understood that there was not a single Roman Catholic government in Europe that would tolerate them.* They found shelter only within the dominions of Fred-eric the Great of Prussia and Catharine of Russia."

Now Mr. Thompson might have learned from any reputable Protestant historian, that the suppression of the great Society by Clement XIV. was due exclusively to the political pressure of a family of kings who wished to deprive the people¹ of the only defence against their tyranny, the Papacy, by gathering into their own hands the spiritual as well as the temporal supremacy. It was the old struggle which the Church had maintained at intervals and in different kingdoms, ever since the time of Charlemagne, and the Jesuits, who were indifferent to themselves and cared only for "the

¹ It is worth the while to note here one of the absurdest of the many absurd inconsistencies, not only with the facts of history but with himself, into which Mr. Thompson rushes in his blind and venomous hatred of Christ's Holy Church.

The gravest of all the charges which he brings against the Jesuit Order, as it is most extravagantly absurd, and the one on which he looks to making it the most obnoxious to the American people, is that it holds as an article of faith that all civil institutions except monarchical ones are illegitimate; and that it and the Pope are engaged in a conspiracy to overthrow republican institutions throughout the world. This is the refrain of his dismal jeremiad. He recurs to it again and again throughout his work with all the bombastic iteration of stump oratory. Yet here we have him making it a proof of the iniquitous doings and principles of the Order that they had made themselves obnoxious to all the kings of Europe; whilst the only Pope of whom he treats, for whom he has no words but praise, because he suppressed the Society of Jesus, is precisely that one whose veneration for the kingly office was carried far beyond that of any Pope who ever lived, and should have made him in Mr. Thompson's eyes, had his bitter hatred of the Catholic Church allowed a spark of consistency to remain within him, a greater criminal than all the Popes put together.

greater glory of God" and the salvation of souls, saw the imminent danger and would not budge an inch. True, the peace of Christendom was threatened, but it was by the Bourbons, not the Jesuits. To charge it on them is precisely the same as the course adopted by the secret societies in the present day, who, in Catholic countries in Europe, organize mobs of rowdies to attack pilgrims on the way to their devotions or processions of the Blessed Sacrament, or other religious processions, and then accuse them of causing public disorder. The predecessor of Clement positively refused to purchase peace at the price of injustice. If Clement yielded at last to the threats and bluster of the Bourbon autocrats, it was not that he believed himself to be doing an act of sovereign injustice, but because his mind was involuntarily biassed by the coldness of feeling, to express it very mildly, which he shared with his Order towards the Jesuits, chiefly on account of differences of opinion, not, we need scarcely say, on *de fide* doctrine, but on questions of scholastic philosophy. The Society yielded to the decree of the Pontiff with uncomplaining obedience. The Bourbons have been driven *forever* from their thrones and kingdoms, with the exception of a lad of a branch of the family not entitled to the throne, who has been allowed quite lately to have the show of reigning in Spain; the Jesuits were restored after a very short interval, and enjoy at this moment greater influence and consideration than ever.

At p. 108 Mr. Thompson has the effrontery to give the following as a quotation from the "provisions of the constitution of the Society of Jesus:" "No earthly authority can involve an obligation to commit sin, mortal or venial, *unless the superior command it in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ.*" The italics are Mr. Thompson's, but we also wish to direct especial attention to the words. He gives them in inverted commas as the very words of St. Ignatius, pledging thus his truth as a writer to that effect. Now the *real* words of St. Ignatius, translated literally by the celebrated Father Ravignan, are as follows:

"Dans toutes les choses auxquelles l'obéissance peut s'étendre avec charité (c'est à dire *sans péché*) soyons aussi prompts et aussi dociles que possible à la voix des supérieurs, comme si c'était la voix même de Jésus Christ notre Seigneur; car c'est à lui que nous obeissons dans la personne de ceux qui tiennent pour nous sa place. . . . Portons-nous donc avec grande promptitude, avec joie spirituelle et persévérance à tout ce qui nous sera ordonné, renonçants par une sorte d'obéissance aveugle à tout judgment contraire; et cela dans toutes les choses réglées par le supérieur, et *ou il ne se trouve point de péché.*"¹

¹ To the extent to which obedience may be rendered *with charity* (that is to say, *without sin*), be as attentive and as docile as possible to the voice of superiors, for it is Him we obey in the person of those who *stand in his stead* towards us. Let us, then, be forward to obey whatever may be enjoined upon us, with spiritual joy and perseverance, renouncing by a kind of blind obedience every conflicting opinion, and that in everything laid down by the superior, *and where there is not sin.*

The last specimens we shall quote of the inventive fertility of this writer, in so far as the Jesuits are concerned, are the following:

"The passions of the order were of course aroused to exceeding violence, even to such an excess that the pope himself, although the *infallible* (Mr. T.'s italics again, as though the meaning of an infallible Pope were a Pope who cannot do anything wrong or hold any mistaken opinions) 'Vicar of Christ' did not escape their vengeance. They published malicious libels against him, charging that he had been guilty of simony in procuring his election, and calling him by the opprobrious name of *Anti-christ*" (p. 101).

It is the practice of the Jesuits not to defend themselves against calumny. Following the example of Him whose sacred name they bear, they are "dumb" before their detractors "as a sheep before its shearers," and we challenge Mr. Thompson to bring forward a single passage from any Jesuit writer in confirmation of the above statement. Again:

"Although one of the articles of their constitution forbade the members of the Order from the acceptance of any dignity, and another recommended holy poverty as the bulwark of religion, yet there were among them twenty-four cardinals, six electors of the empire, nineteen princes, twenty-one archbishops, and one hundred and thirty-one titular archbishops, and their aggregate wealth amounted to £40,000,000 sterling, the enormous sum of \$200,000,000."

Neither Mr. Thompson nor any one else out of the Order has the means of knowing the value of the possessions of the Jesuits, and in retailing this improbable statement he must think people are easily duped, to accept it without any proof, but on his mere *ipse dixit*. But if it were true as it is fabulous, what violation of their rule of poverty would there be in it? It would not have altered their daily rule of life, nor would a cent of it have gone into the pocket of individual Jesuits. No Jesuit—and our assertions are made on the strength of personal knowledge—can call even a suit of clothes his own. It is true, as Mr. Thompson says, the rule of the Order forbids a Jesuit to accept ecclesiastical dignities; and he cannot do so unless bid by his superiors. Nor is such a command ever given except under circumstances of urgent necessity and duty. It would be very difficult to disprove Mr. Thompson's statement, nor does the burden rest on us of doing so; but, looking at its innate, absolute improbability, and at the utter disregard of truth manifested throughout his work, and in the absence of a particle of proof, we denounce his list of Jesuit dignitaries as an impudent fabrication.

It would be impossible within the limited space at our disposal to give even a mere naked list of one tithe of the extravagances and absurdities which this writer perpetrates in the name of history, and this with an unwinking complacency, untroubled with a doubt or a misgiving, for all the world as though he were infallible and speaking *ex cathedra* himself. Of the Emperor Constantine he writes (p. 250-51): "Although he convened the first Council

of Nice, *dictated the most material part of his creed*, and *made it the measure of orthodoxy* by his imperial decree, yet he deferred his own baptism and union with the Church until just before his death, in 337, when he received baptism at the hands of an Arian and heretical bishop. He was, therefore, never a Roman Catholic at all, but according to the present teachings of that Church *was always a heretic*, and not a Christian, unless a man can possess both characters at the same time." (See also pp. 286-87.)

There are nearly as many errors as words in this sentence. It is possible for a man to be a Roman Catholic in intention. A man is not necessarily a heretic for deferring his baptism, nor for being baptized by a heretic.¹ The sacrament is as valid administered by a heretic as by the Pope himself. Constantine did not *dictate* any part of the creed defined at the Nicæan Council; nor did he *make it the measure of orthodoxy*, unless supporting the definition of the Church by the secular arm is making it the measure of orthodoxy. He deferred his baptism from an overwhelming horror of the guilt of sin after baptism; to which his busy and warlike life and the glittering seductions of his exalted position exposed him, and he, improperly, no doubt, deferred his baptism in order that he might carry his baptismal robe spotless before the throne of his Redeemer, not unmingled, it may be, with a lack of courage to renounce sin. But that Constantine was not a Catholic by conviction, was never a Catholic at all, and that the immense services he rendered to the Church, and the deference he paid to her, are altogether to be ascribed to "worldly motives," and to a policy of worldly ambition, Mr. Thompson, at any rate, is not a likely person to convince us.

At p. 436 we find: "These legates called two synods, one of which met in Mercia, and was attended by King Offa in person; and the introduction of this papal code *as the law of England* was, under his influence, consented to. . . . Into what a condition of humiliating degradation, therefore, was England dragged down when the *nation* and *people* were laid at the feet of the papacy!" This of a time when the southern half of what is now England and Scotland was occupied by seven or eight different tribes of invading Saxon pirates, each with its separate king, or chief, and before there was such a place as England in existence! It is not before the year 800 that England begins to give any sign of its existence on the political horizon.

Altogether, Mr. Thompson's historical information is in the

¹ His baptism by Eusebius of Nicomedia, which Mr. Thompson adduces as a universally acknowledged historical fact, is now generally held to be apocryphal. No *proof* exists that he was ever baptized at all. Neither is proof forthcoming that he was never baptized.

highest degree original, and is so irreconcilably at variance with what we have hitherto innocently received as history, that either his or ours must be a myth. At pp. 436-39, he informs us that the Saxons did not drive Christianity out of Britain. The mission of St. Augustine must consequently have been a work of supererogation. That after the Saxon conquest, Saxon and Briton, pagan and Christian "mingled together in friendly association, so as to impress each other with their respective sentiments and opinions!" That "their (the Saxon) religion was pagan; yet after their conquest of England, there is no evidence that they ever interfered with that of the native Britons until after their kings yielded to the influence of Rome!" To what event he refers he does not tell us; and with a gravity which is quite comical, he makes this statement in the teeth of the fact that all that remains of the British religion and hierarchy had been driven to take refuge in Brittany and at Bangor; and that the latter were exterminated at a blow by the Mercian chief, because they prayed for a disaster to the pagan arms. And he himself speaks of these very clergy at Bangor (p. 473) as "the first martyrs to religious liberty!" We had always supposed that the Normans were of the Teutonic race, and had originally, together with the Saxons, issued from the neighborhood of the Baltic. Not so Mr. Thompson. To him we are indebted for the original, indeed, unique ethnological discovery that the Normans belong to the Latin race, and that the effort of their kings "to eradicate all the Saxon influences in England, as far as possible, and substitute for them those of Norman origin," arose not, as has hitherto universally been supposed, in order to supplant the Saxon dynasty and customs in the affections of the people, but "to bring the country under the influence of the principle prevailing among the people of the *Latin race* in preference to those of *Teutonic* origin!"

After this, we may bid farewell to Mr. Thompson and his history. Before finally parting with him, however, we must quote if it be only a couple of examples of deliberate and calumnious misrepresentation for which the utmost stretch of charity can find no possible excuse:

At pp. 346-7 he represents Pope Adrian I., in a bull of excommunication of the Duke of Bavaria, as declaring "that the Franks were *absolved in advance* from all crimes they might commit in the enemy's country; and that *God commanded them*, through his Vicar, to violate girls, murder women, children, and old men, to burn cities, and put all the inhabitants to the sword."

This is evidently a wicked and calumnious gloss of his favorite Freemason author, Cormanin, but Mr. Thompson gives it as the *ipsissima verba* of the Bull, asserting as much in a footnote wherein

he is again for the dozenth time guilty of the falsehood and duplicity of giving Cermenin as *Catholic authority*.

"Such a bull as this," he writes, "would seem almost incredible, if it were not found in the history of a Roman Catholic author!"

Precisely the same disgraceful fraud he perpetrated in the following alleged letter from Benedict XIII. to his legates (p. 552):

"You will immediately recruit new troops to recommence hostilities, and to wash out, in the blood of the Hussites, the opprobrium with which your name is covered. Let no consideration arrest you; spare neither money nor men. Believe that we are acting for religion, and that God has no more agreeable holocaust than the blood of his enemies! Strike with the sword, and when your arm cannot reach the guilty, employ poison, burn all the towns of Bohemia, that fire may purify this accursed land; transform the country into arid steppes, and let the dead bodies of the heretics hang from the trees in greater number than the leaves of the forest" (p. 553).

The following he gives as the very words of a letter of Martin V. to Stanislaus V., King of Poland:

"Know that the interests of the Holy See, and those of your crown, make it a duty to *exterminate the Hussites*. Remember that these impious persons dare proclaim principles of equality; they maintain that all Christians are brethren, and that God has not given to privileged men the right of ruling the nation; they hold that Christ came on earth to abolish slavery; they call the people to liberty, that is, to the annihilation of kings and priests. While there is still time, then, turn your forces against Bohemia; burn, massacre, make deserts everywhere, for nothing could be more agreeable to God, or more useful to the cause of kings than the extermination of the Hussites."

He puts into the mouth of one of the holiest of the Popes—St. Gregory VII.—*on his deathbed*, the following words. Lest it should be thought incredible that any writer of these days should be so idiotic and false as to affix his name to such a statement, we quote the sentence with which he introduces them.

"After many varying fortunes, Gregory was enabled to drive the anti-Pope Clement from the throne, but he soon sunk under the tremendous load which pressed upon him, and in the year 1085 died, *uttering these words*: 'No, my hatred is implacable. I curse the pretended Emperor, Henry, the anti-Pope Guibert, and the reprobates who sustain them. I absolve and bless the simple who believe that a Pope has power to bind and loose'" (p. 406).

We have done with Mr. Thompson and his pasquinado. We had noted a multitude of other passages illustrative of his ignorance and untruthfulness. Our space has limited us to the few we have made use of. They are, however, sufficient to satisfy any one of ordinary intelligence and honesty that Mr. Hayes's Naval Secretary has neither the knowledge nor the dispassionateness of judgment, nor the regard for truth, requisite to form any opinion worth a moment's consideration upon *The Papacy and the Civil Power* generally, or in this country specifically. He has wasted a certain amount of time and pains, only to add a fresh contribution to the reeking pile of anti-Catholic libels.

We entered on the task of criticizing this worthless production in the sincere intention of treating it with all the courtesy and consideration in our power. We were fully prepared to find any number of those blunders which are inevitable to those not illuminated by the Faith, and those we should have endeavored to meet with calm and dispassionate argument. So early, however, as at the end of the preface, we began to fear we had to do with an ordinary anti-Christian railer rather than with a scholarly and dispassionate thinker; and we had not read a quarter of the book before we were so assured of the writer's *mala fides*, as well as of the remarkable ignorance it displays of history and of the subject of which it treats, as to conclude that the work did not merit any serious notice. The author, however, informs us in his preface that it "is not designed for the instruction of the educated classes, who have the means of making like inquiries for themselves. It is intended for *the people*, who, in the main, are without these means, and who are the final arbiters upon all public questions." This should have made him more conscientious; it appears to have made him less so. And, remembering the mischief that could not but be worked amongst people unable to detect his misrepresentations, ignorance, and false reasoning, we thought that a few pages would not be wasted in exposing his untrustworthiness and the worthlessness of his work.

We had intended to close our review with a few observations of our own upon the relations of the Catholic Church and the Constitution of the United States towards one another respectively. The length to which this paper has already extended has put this out of our power. The subject is important enough to require an article of itself.

THE PAPAL POWER AND ROMAN FORGERIES.

Roman Catholicism, Old and New, from the Standpoint of the Infallibility Doctrine. By John Schulte, D.D., Ph.D., Rector of Port Burwell, Ontario, Canada. Toronto: Belford Brothers, Publishers, 1876.

IN our last article we examined and refuted the arguments of Dr. Schulte against the infallibility of the Church. And as, by his own acknowledgment, the infallibility of the Church logically implies Papal infallibility, there would be no necessity for our pursuing the subject any further. Nevertheless, to redeem a promise then made, we devote a few more pages to his book. But instead of following him through his historical inaccuracies, or rather perversions of historical truth in regard to a few Popes, whose decisions he parades as conflicting and contradictory,¹ we prefer to take up an accusation, most foul and untrue, which he brings against the whole line of Pontiffs who reigned during more than six centuries, or about one-third part of the Christian era, viz., from the beginning of the sixth down to the compilation of the Decretum by Gratian, about the middle of the twelfth century. This is no other than the charge of systematic forgery, forgery not only encouraged but practiced by the Roman Pontiffs, with a view to bring about a recognition of the claims of the Papacy to temporal sovereignty and universal dominion. Let us hear Dr. Schulte.

"The next great step towards universal dominion made by the Pope, was his investiture with temporal sovereignty. Indeed, we may say that he possessed no real spiritual dominion until after he became a temporal prince. The Papacy was the outgrowth of favoring circumstances. . . . Not content with giving gold and silver, they (the converted barbarians) manifested their superstitious veneration for the clergy by conferring upon bishops, churches, and monasteries feudatory rights over whole provinces, cities, castles, and fortresses. This unwonted accession of wealth and power began with their head, the Roman pontiff, who not only gladly received, but claimed it as a right, adducing proofs from Scripture, and forged documents of former territorial donations. The temporal power of the Pope had its real origin in the unjust aid which Pope Zachary afforded to Pepin in dethroning Childeric, King of France, and usurping the crown for himself. Pepin, in order to attach to himself the powerful pontiff, freed him from the yoke of the Lombards, and conferred on him sovereign rights over the

¹ These pretended disagreements or contradictions between certain Papal decisions, have been long since triumphantly exposed and refuted by Cardinal Orsi in his answer to the *Defensio Cleri Gallicani* of Pseudo-Bossuet (we can give him no other name, for though the work was originally from the pen of the great Bishop of Meaux, he began it with great reluctance, then became ashamed of it and suppressed it, and having been found amongst his posthumous papers was distorted and falsified by his Jansenist nephew, and then published in its present form, with (perhaps) the false date of Luxemburg, 1730); by Zaccaria in many of his polemical works, especially those against Febronius; by the Ballerini Brothers, Marchetti, Cardinal Gerdil, and others.

Roman dukedom. . . . Nothing contributed more to the enlargement of the papacy than the investiture of the Pope and bishops with temporal sovereignty, for the Pope had now the means of enforcing his spiritual claims" (pp. 254, 255).

"From the time that it (the papacy) acquired the first beginnings of temporal sovereignty, we have to look upon it as a political institution, and to explain almost every step in its career on political grounds. Its history exhibits the worst features of intrigue, and the most unblushing knavery, displayed chiefly in the forgery of documents to sustain its enormous pretensions" (p. 256).

"It was not to be expected that so thorough a change in the government of the Church could be made without a certain amount of opposition. The bishops of Rome were aware that their word and authority alone were not sufficient to introduce the new order of things. They knew that they must produce ancient documents by which they might justify their course, and as there were no such documents in existence, they forged them" (p. 257).

First of all, that the Pope's spiritual has any dependence upon his temporal power, is one of those assertions which, by dint of repetition, may impose on helpless ignorance or wilful bigotry, but which will not stand the test of historical investigation. It is true, indeed, of some churches, that their spiritual headship is intimately connected with temporal rule. Of the Russian, for example, where since the days of Peter the Great a Permanent Synod, at the beck of its imperial chairman, dictates dogma and discipline for subservient millions; of the Anglican, too, where articles of faith and church government have passed from the royal hands of boys and women¹ into the keeping of the lay court of Arches. It is true of all churches founded by men. But it is not true of the Catholic Church and her Head, who have received their high commission, not from man, but from Him to whom "all power is given in heaven and in earth" (Matt. xxviii. 18). The exercise of papal power is no less conspicuous and wonderful in the early centuries when the pontiffs were the subjects of Pagan or Christian emperors, than in the middle ages when they possessed a small territory, and all Europe was Catholic. It is, no doubt, a noble and cheering sight to behold the Henrys, Fredericks, and other mediæval monsters crushed, for the welfare of religion and society, by judicial sentence of the Gregories and Innocents. But the real power of the Holy See shines out perhaps more brilliantly when seen in a Victor

¹ The Edwards and Elizabeths, to say nothing of so many royal profligates, of whom we have not seen the last in George the Fourth of that name. That noblest of women and queens, Mary Tudor, was on Anglican principles the true Head of the English Church; and putting together the Anglican maxim, "The king can do no wrong," and the Lutheran article of political faith, "*Cujus est regio, ejus est et religio*" (whoever owns the land, owns its religion), we see no pretext of logical reason why Anglicans should complain of the fires of Smithfield. If she had done nothing more than send to the scaffold the Cranmers, Latimers, Ripleys, and one or two more of such faithless traitors and hypocrites, it would have been well; but the wholesale execution of offenders of the lower class perpetrated in her name, and in many cases without her knowledge, by her renegade courtiers, who had no religion but that of their royal master or mistress (as it chanced to be), has cast its baleful shadow over her otherwise spotless memory.

(A.D. 198), who, from his hiding-place in the catacombs, threatens the disobedient churches of Asia with excommunication; in a Celestine (A.D. 431), who sends his legates to the general council with instructions that they are to abide no discussion, but sit there as judges of the assembled fathers;¹ in a Leo (A.D. 451), who, with a stroke of his pen annuls the canons of a general council;² in an Hormisdas (A.D. 519), who demands and obtains from the Eastern churches full unreserved submission to the decrees of his predecessors against Acacius, as the only condition on which they could be freed from the ban which had lain heavily upon them for more than thirty years.³ Yet these pontiffs, while speaking out with

¹ "Auctoritatem Sedis Apostolicæ custodiri mandamus: Siquidem instructiones quæ vobis traditæ sunt hoc loquuntur, ut interesse conventui debeatis; ad disceptationem si fuerit ventum, vos de eorum sententiis JUDICARE debeatis non subire certamen." (Ep. Cœlestini Papæ ad Legatos, Concilior, Collectis, tom. iv.) "We command that the authority of the Apostolic See be maintained: for this is the tenor of your instructions, that you be present at the assembly; but if any discussion arise, you are not to enter the lists as disputants, but as JUDGES of what they (the bishops) shall say." This charge of St. Celestine to his legates is a most valuable document. It was unknown to Baronius, Bellarmine, and all our early Catholic controvertists, and was published for the first time by the great Gallican antiquary, Stephen Baluzius. In his preface to the first publication of Celestine's letter, Baluzius justly says (we quote from memory, and give his meaning without vouching for the words), "Cardinal Baronius, in his Annals, claims that Pope Celestine I. displayed the fulness of his authority in the whole proceedings at Ephesus. What would he not have said, had this document been brought to light in his day!"

² "What the bishops have agreed to we scatter to the winds, and by authority of St. Peter we utterly annul in all its bearings." "Consensiones Episcoporum . . . in irritum mittimus, et auctoritate Beati Petri generali prorsus definitione cassamus" Ep. cvi., ad Pulcheriam Aug. Opp. S. Leonis ed. Ballerini, Venetiis, 1753, tom. 1, col. 1157. These lofty words, which even now at the distance of fourteen centuries excite our admiration, could have proceeded only from an inherent consciousness of supreme power.

³ In the eighth volume of Labbe and Cossart's Councils, republished by Mansi (Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, Venice, 1759-92), may be found all the documents connected with this affair. See especially the plaintive touching letter of the Eastern churches to St. Hormisdas, pleading for mercy on the ground that they ought not to be made suffer any longer for the sin of their fathers. There is no brighter chapter in the history of Rome's supremacy, than the extinction of the Acacian schism and the reconciliation of the Eastern Church with the Holy See under St. Hormisdas. Never did the See of Peter triumph more successfully over the jealousy, stubbornness, and perfidy of the Eastern patriarchs. Even the Lutheran, Schroeckh, is compelled to admit this, though he does his best to explain it away. "Er (Hormisdas) hatte wahrscheinlich diesen elenden Sieg, DEN GRÖSSTEN WELCHEN NOCH EIN MANN VON SEINER WUERDE ERFOCHT, der furchtbaren Stimmung vieler tausend Missvergnügten von den niedrigsten Klassen und Gesinnungen aus den Zeiten des vorhergehenden Kaisers zu danken, welche die neue Regierung schonen musste" (Christliche Kirchengeschichte, Leipzig, 1793, vol. 18, p. 541). The triumph of the Holy See, if "the greatest yet obtained" by one of its occupants, can scarcely with decency be called a "sorry" one. "Sorry," rather, or "shabby" is, we think, the proper epithet for the Wittenberg professor's attempt to belittle the strength of Catholic public opinion at that day, which compelled the Byzantine Court and Church to bow in submission to the will of the Holy See.

such royal energy, and exacting obedience from high and low, enjoyed no temporal rule. In our own day, Pius IX. has been robbed of his States by sacrilegious violence; but the whole world can bear witness that he has thereby lost no portion of his spiritual empire. Right-minded, honest men outside of the Church look with respect and admiration upon the mysterious power of this feeble, old man, who, at home, cannot command the service of a tipstaff, and whose voice nevertheless is obeyed throughout Christendom; who to all outward appearance is more of a prisoner than a monarch, and yet counts in every class and in every clime millions of willing and faithful subjects. Wicked and evil-minded men likewise (and they abound here as well as in Europe) give their reluctant share of testimony, and confess this wonderful power by the language of hate, scorn, ridicule, and frenzied declamation with which they assail it, and by the fear, real or pretended, which makes them hold it up as a phantom to evoke hostile legislation against the Catholic Church.

The Pope's temporal rule came to him in the order of Providence as the safeguard and warrant of his independence, that he might be truly free, and might be known as such in his government of the Church. But what guarantees his freedom in the use of his power need not be confounded with the source whence that power is derived. In all civilized nations, that possess legislative assemblies, human law has provided certain rights and immunities that serve to protect members of the legislative body in the discharge of their functions. But what would be thought of the shameless sophistry that should pretend to find in these privileges and immunities the origin of their law-making power? The States of the Church were admirably adapted to the purpose for which God granted them to His earthly representative. They were just sufficient to secure his independence; not large enough to gratify or encourage his ambition, or excite the fears of other princes whom he might hold in check by earthly interests, were he a formidable potentate or a dangerous neighbor. Had the Popes been ambitious of mere temporal lordship, they might in the middle ages have added to their territory by repeated conquest and negotiation, and extended their sway over the greater part of Italy. But a higher power than themselves guided their temporal as well as their spiritual and moral action in the world's history; and if in the long and venerable line of Pontiffs, extending over eleven hundred years, from Stephen III. to Pius IX., any one of them ever entertained such mad, ambitious scheme, it was either thwarted by the wisdom of his counsellors or overruled by the direct intervention of Providence. It is no idle phrase or rhetorical fancy, but an axiom full of truth and deep meaning, that Peter yet lives and

reigns in his successors, not only guiding and strengthening their faith, but shaping and controlling their earthly fortunes. Christ, our Lord, promised that He would be with the Apostles, and consequently *they* with Him, in their successors down to the end of time. Now every Apostolical See has perished but that of Rome. The accomplishment of His promise in its full literal sense is, therefore, reserved to St. Peter alone, who, with and through Christ, yet lives and reigns in his Roman successors. The Popes, as a rule, never have had an army sufficient to defend their own States from violent aggression or domestic rebellion. Hence so many of them have been conquered, imprisoned, and exiled by Roman nobles and petty Italian tyrants, or by such formidable invaders as were the sovereigns of Germany and France. And, as if Divine Providence wished to show unmistakably the difference of the two powers, temporal and spiritual, in the Pope, and that there is between them no mutual relation of cause and effect, the Pontiffs who have given to the world the most signal and successful examples of an extraordinary use of spiritual power, were precisely those who were most helpless and unfortunate in their temporal sovereignty. Such was the case of Gregory VII., one day bringing rebellious monarchs to his feet, and the next—defeated, exiled, and dying in a strange land. Why should we again recall the case of the present Pontiff? His power is as hateful and formidable to the greatest monarchy of Europe as it is to the “gates of hell,” over which his triumph is assured by the words of Christ in St. Matthew; and yet he is but a prisoner in his own Vatican and living on the alms of the Christian world. What then can be more unfounded than the assertion of our author, that the Pope’s investiture with temporal sovereignty enlarged the Papacy, because “the Pope had now the means of enforcing his spiritual claims?” (p. 255). What earthly means has Pius IX. of compelling the confessors of the Faith, who languish in German prisons or in hopeless exile, to bid defiance for conscience sake to Prussia’s unjust, unchristian legislation, and maintain intact their religious allegiance to Rome? None, surely. But the fact is there, clear, undeniable, and staring in the face the astonished irreligious world of our day! They could have ease, honor, and temporal rewards, if they would only fall down and worship Bismarck and his State-God; but St. Peter, or Christ rather, though again “a captive in His vicar,” raises a warning voice, and they welcome chains, exile, even death if need be, rather than falter in their loyal obedience to Peter’s successor. Let the enemies of the Catholic Church explain this, if they can. It will not do to pile up such contumelious words as superstition, ignorance, bigotry, ultramontanism. From men who boast of their homage to reason, which they have lifted up to the

place of God Himself, we are justified in demanding, not unmeaning words, but a *rational* explanation.

What Dr. Schulte says of the converted barbarians, who were full of "superstitious veneration," which in their ignorant bigotry they had transferred from their Druidical to their Christian priests, may do well for untutored Anglo-American ears. His lay namesake (from whom all his historical lore is borrowed), Dr. Schulte of the "Janus," would never have dared use such language before his enlightened countrymen, the descendants of those same "barbarians," some of whom have wasted their treasures of historical erudition and comparative philology in the fond attempt to trace back the national *Kultur* to the remotest antiquity.¹

Dr. Schulte is quite mistaken, or rather tries to mislead his readers, as to the origin of the temporal power of the Pope and bishops. They were under Heaven the rescuers and savers of human society and civilization, which but for them, as all candid Protestant historians are not slow to acknowledge, would have been hopelessly engulfed in barbarism and anarchy. It was not the grasping ambition of popes and bishops that dragged the people under their yoke; it was a feeling of gratitude and a lively perception of their own real interests that induced them to welcome the sway of the clergy in preference to that of sanguinary lay lords and rapacious barons. Guizot, after recounting some singular traits of wisdom and benevolence which marked the government of Pope St. Gregory, adds the general remark: "It is easy to understand why people were at that time eager to place themselves under the dominion of the Church; lay proprietors were certainly far from showing like solicitude for the well-being of the occupants of their domains."² Nor can there be any room for wonder that the happiness of "living under the crozier" should have passed into a proverbial saying.³

¹ "Le but des Allemands, nous l'avons déjà dit, est de faire parvenir directement sur leur sol et la langue et la civilisation. En repoussant la maternité de l'Inde, ils se prétendent les frères immédiats des envahisseurs de l'Inde. Pendant qu'une portion de leur race descendait vers le sud, eux apportaient la civilisation aux contrées d'occident." (Les Traditions Indo-Européennes et Africaines, par Louis Jacolliot. Paris, 1876, p. 91.) What immediately follows is quite characteristic of the French infidel who displays his patriotism by his vulgarity. "Sous prétexte de science, les gens du pays de la bière ne solevent qu'une vulgaire querelle de race." These idle prattlers of the Simon and Gambetta school make a show of abusing Beer-land, but need not be trusted on that account. In their heart of hearts these blatant mock-patriots worship Bismarck, and to-morrow would betray their country to him without shame or regret, merely because he is the prince of the anti-Catholic world.

² Cours d'Histoire Moderne, tom. iv. p. 259. The feudal system (though without the name) had already begun in Europe.

³ "Unterm Krummstab ist gut wohnen." This proverb held good even among the ecclesiastical principalities of Germany down to a late epoch, down to the days of the Hontheims, Erthals, and Dalbergs, when the sees became (under the growing influence of the age of *Kultur*) nests of Jansenism, unbelief, immorality, and oppression of the

As regards the Pope in particular, nothing could be more upright and honorable than the manner in which he became a sovereign; nor is there any European potentate whose claims can compete for justness with those of Rome's Pontiff. The willing homage of a people whom he had saved and protected made him the ruler of temporal as well as of spiritual subjects, and would have warranted his title to sovereignty, even had a Pepin or a Charlemagne never existed. It is quite a common mistake to suppose that their worldly authority originated with these two French benefactors of the Holy See. Nothing could be more false. It antedates the epoch of these monarchs by many centuries, and its traces are everywhere visible on the pages of preceding history. Though nominally subjects of the court of Byzantium, the Popes had been for ages the actual rulers of Rome and its adjacent territory; and it was only when compelled by the force of circumstances, which would admit of no other line of conduct, that they added the name of sovereignty to its real substance, which they had all along possessed. That they were conscious of their true position before the world, is evident from the fact that for centuries before Pepin or Charlemagne the Holy See (or the Court of Rome, as our Gallican and Protestant friends love to call it, and it may well be so called in this connection) exercised one of the most incontestable rights of sovereignty by maintaining habitually a resident ambassador¹

people. See Wolfgang Menzel's *Geschichte der Deutschen*, Stuttgart, 1855, vol. iv. p. 232. As a rule, the mitred princes who brought about this unhappy change were "enlightened" Catholics of the Dollinger and Schulte pattern, and most bitter enemies of the Holy See. They caused more grief to the paternal heart of Pius VI. than the French infidels of the Red Republic, who brought about his exile and death in 1799. But Divine vengeance has its appointed hour even for guilty priests and prelates, who raise their parricidal hands against the successor of St. Peter. Their "sacred" principalities were swept out of existence in 1806, by the ruthless hand of the modern Attila.

¹ The technical name of the representative of the Holy See at that day was the *Apocrisiarius* (*Ἀποκριτάριος* a derivative of Romaic form from *ἀπόκρισις*), used constantly by Theophanes, Cedrenus, Nicetas, and other writers of Byzantine history in the sense of "ambassador." *Ἀπόκρισις*, which was originally "an answer" (*responsum*), came by degrees to signify, in the court-language of Constantinople, not only the prince's answer or rescript to memorials from petitioners, but any and every kind of message, decree, or mandate from supreme authority. Hence the bearer of these messages or mandates was called *Apocrisiarius*. "Id porro nominis inditum Legatis quod *ἀποκρισεις* seu responsa Principum deferrent. *Responsa* enim non modo rescripta Principum ad supplicantium libellos, sed etiam quævis decreta et mandata appellabant." (Du Cange, *Glossarium Mediæ et Infimæ Latinitatis*, Parisiis, 1840, tom. i. p. 316, sub. v. *Apocrisiarius*. This is Firmin Didot's splendid edition, which contains all the additions of the Benedictines, of Carpentier, Adelung, and others, and was superintended by G. A. L. Henschel.) Justinian himself (Nov. 25) attests that the name of *ἀποκρισεις* was given to the imperial decrees by his predecessors. Unfortunately the silence (*invida taciturnitas*, if we may use the Horatian phrase) of the old Church annalists, has deprived us of the names of the Papal ambassadors at Constantinople before the days of St. Sylverius (A.D. 536), with whose reign the list now known begins. But this

at the imperial court of Constantinople, who on special occasions was replaced, as in all civilized countries in our own day, by envoys extraordinary. And this consciousness speaks out with noble indignation in the letter of St. Felix III. (A.D. 484), who rebukes the faithless emperor, Zeno, for having violated the first principles of international law (*jus gentium*) by his ill-treatment of the papal legates.¹

St. Gregory the Great (and no one can doubt his word) affirms distinctly that had he wished to do so, he could have easily exterminated the whole Lombard race.² Indeed his whole course of action towards the Lombards, whether in concluding terms of peace or making preparations for war, plainly shows that he felt his position in Italy to be that of a sovereign prince.

The aid given by Pope Zachary was neither unjust (as Dr. Schulte calls it) nor was it the real origin of the Pope's temporal power. The French prince merely proposed to the head of Christendom a case of conscience, as many, both kings and subjects, have done since that day and before it. St. Zachary answered it, as he was bound to do by his character of moral teacher of his children throughout the world; and it would be hard to discover wherein lies the injustice of his decision, unless we blindly assume as a first principle that the Pope must be always in the wrong. Had he decided, on the contrary, that a prince may actually possess royal power but must not assume the name of king, would not Dr. Schulte and Janus, from whom he draws his inspiration, have pronounced the decision not only unjust but ridiculous?

The grant of sovereignty to the Pope did not originate with Pepin. It is a very remarkable fact that in the dealings of the French monarch with Pope Stephen III., Zachary's immediate successor, we never find mention of conferring sovereignty or bestowing territory. The terms used are always those of *giving back* and *restoring* what belonged of right to the Roman Church, *justitia beati Petri*, as the quaint language of that age expressed it. And if the word *donation* ever occurs, its meaning is immediately explained

silence does not disprove their existence. Among those who held this honorable position at the court of Constantinople was St. Gregory the Great (A.D. 584), before his elevation to the Papedom. What shows in a remarkable way both the ecclesiastical and civil sovereignty of the Holy See is that these ambassadors were selected from the order of Deacons; yet in spite of this inferior rank, in all ecclesiastical assemblies, because of the See they represented, the place of honor was yielded to them by all priests and bishops, and even by the haughty patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria, and Antioch.

¹ He complains that in the person of his ambassadors had been violated that "sacrosancta libertas legatorum" which is respected even by nations that have neither civilization nor religion. Ep. ad Zenonem in Mansi's Councils, tom. viii., col. 1065.

² Ep. 47.

as implying *restitution*.¹ Why, then, should the Pontiff not "claim as a right" what had been wrested from him by the violence of the Lombards and won back by the victorious arms of Pepin?

But the Pope "adduced proofs from Scripture." Proofs of what? Of his right to temporal dominion? It needs a bold face to assert this. Stephen III. in his hour of distress invokes the aid of Pepin, and, as might be expected from the chief bishop of the Christian Church, mingles occasionally with his cry for help the language of Scripture. But it is the language of exhortation, not of argument; much less of argument on behalf of his claims to temporal authority. And besides Scripture he adduces "forged documents of former territorial donations." This has been stated, likewise, by his guide and master, Janus, but without a shadow of proof. Let them produce, if they can, the passage from Stephen's letters, where he appeals to the false donation of Constantine. For this is the document Dr. Schulte refers to, though his rhetorical pen has amplified it into the plural number. And this same document, as he tells us elsewhere (p. 258), "was concocted at Rome² in order to induce Pepin to concede temporal sovereignty to the bishop of Rome." It is strange that such a ponderous weapon should have immediately lost favor with those who forged it for a purpose, to which they never applied it. Stephen III. ignores it altogether. In his letters to Pepin he appeals only to Pepin's reiterated promises, and more than once to a deed of donation (or restitution) signed by his own hand.³ But it will be said that at least Adrian I., in 774, quoted the donation of Constantine in one of his letters to Charlemagne. This is distinctly stated by Gibbon and by Janus. But they forget that Pepin's donation, which cannot be denied, had existed for some twenty years, and therefore the object of quoting the other could not possibly be to induce Charlemagne "to concede to the Pope temporal sovereignty," for this he already possessed. It is only a hasty, superficial perusal of Adrian's letter that has led to this charge

¹ See the letters of Stephen III. to Pepin and to the French Lords in Mansi's Collection, tom. xii. col., 534-555. The expressions constantly recurring are "*Sanctæ ecclesiæ restituere jubeatis*:" (Bid them restore to Holy Church); col. 547: "*Civitates et loca restituenda confirmastis*:" (You assured me of the restoration of the cities and places); col. 550: "*Justitiam B. Petri . . . per donationis paginam restituendam confirmavit bonitas vestra*:" (Your kindness assured me that what belongs of right to St. Peter, would be given back by your deed of donation), *ibid.* What is also worthy of attention, he identifies the Roman Church with the Roman State. "*B. Petro sanctæque Dei Ecclesiæ vel reipublicæ Romanorum reddere*" (To restore to Blessed Peter and the Holy Church of God or to the Roman Commonwealth), etc., *ibid.*

² This is a gratuitous assertion, unsupported by any tittle of evidence. The conjecture of Baronius, that it came originally from a Greek hand, is not so unlikely as it has appeared to some writers.

³ "*Donationem vestra manu firmatam*" Stephani Ep. vii., ad Pippinum, apud Mansi l. c., col. 551.

against him. He is urging Charlemagne to make good his promises, and to have certain portions of his patrimony restored which had been wrested by the Lombards from the Holy See. To this purpose he alleges in quite general terms the example of Constantine, who had "exalted and glorified the Roman Church, and given her power in these parts of Italy."¹ All this Adrian might have said with truth, even if the false donation had never existed. For it is an acknowledged fact in history that Constantine, after his conversion, bestowed upon the Roman Church many valuable estates; and these princely possessions, under the gradual growth of the feudal system, as we have seen, by natural development became so many sources of baronial rights or territorial sovereignty. So that, even pushing the meaning of the word "power"² to its utmost rigor, Hadrian was substantially correct. But it must not be forgotten that mediæval writers apply the "usus loquendi" of their day to facts and personages of former ages. Thus Dante has no difficulty in giving the name of "Baron" to St. Peter, and even to St. James, to point him out as the spiritual prince of the Spanish nation.

E la mia Donna piena di letizia
Mi disse: mira, mira; ecco il Barone,
Per cui laggiù si visita Galizia.³

Any one who will take the trouble to consult Du Cange's *Glossary of Mediæval Latin*,⁴ will readily find that the word "potestas" in the language of that day had a wide range of meaning, and denotes many things, from a king or prince (rex, princeps) down to revenues, rights, privileges (vectigalia, jura, privilegia, etc.) Again, amongst its other significations is found that of the "honor or office of a magistrate," in which sense it occurs as far back as the days of St. Augustine. Now, if Constantine (as even Gibbon acknowledges) made magistrates of all bishops by conferring on them judicial power, this must have been true in a far higher sense of the chief bishop of Christendom. Whatever its meaning, the statement of Adrian is incontestable, and to suppose it based on anything but historical truth, would be absurd. But he does not quote the example of Constantine only. He alleges "many emperors, patri-

¹ Mansi, tom. xii., col. 820.

² Potestatem in his *Hesperia* partibus largiri dignatus est, l. c.

³ Paradiso, cant. xxv., 16-18. Carey, rather unhappily, spins out the saintly "Baron" into a "peer of mickle might."

My Lady, full of gladness, spake to me;
Lo! lo! behold the peer of mickle might,
That makes Galicia thronged with visitants

For the same name applied to St. Peter, see Canto xxiv., 115.

⁴ Glossar. Med. et Inf. Lat., tom. v., pp. 378-380.

cians, and God-fearing men" who had bestowed lands and possessions on the Roman See, "of which donations" (he adds) "we have the records deposited in our sacred archives of the Lateran."¹ It were but a waste of time and parchment to appeal to those donations and their record, if he had known the donation of Constantine, which covered the whole ground. And even if he had alluded (which we deny) to this false document, where is the proof that he knew it to be a forgery? How many Catholics in the middle ages devoutly believed that clumsy forgery, the fable of Pope Joan! Are we to take for granted that they believed, and gave it currency, knowing it to be false? May not men in an uncritical age honestly believe in the genuineness of some documents which will one day be exploded as spurious by the progress of historical science? Or are the Popes moral outlaws, in whose behalf no such possibility must be pleaded?

Dr. Schulte gravely tells us that the "history of the Papacy exhibits the worst features of intrigue and the most unblushing knavery, displayed chiefly in forgery" (p. 256). And that there may be no mistake as to the chief actors, he goes on to repeat the assertion in this fashion: "Forgery was not a new art to the Roman Pontiffs. They had forged documents before the ninth century and had been successful. Rome had been habituated to it by a long series of systematic fabrications extending back to the sixth century" (p. 258). Before examining the charges in detail, we submit a general remark. Against whom is this monstrous accusation by Dr. Schulte hurled? Against the holy zealous men, without whom neither he nor Janus would know any difference between the true God and Woden; the men who commissioned Augustine and Boniface, Willibrord and Kilian; the men to whom England and Northern and Central Europe are indebted for their Christianity and their civilization! Not against degenerate Cæsars in the West, or imbecile Byzantines in the East; but against a long and venerable line of princes of the Church, whose sacred character, lofty position, and the reverence in which they were held by all Christendom might, even humanly speaking, be considered a protection from temptation to commit low and degrading crimes! Many of them died in the odor of sanctity, praised and blessed by an admiring world, and their names have been inscribed in the Calendar of Saints. Such were, in the sixth and seventh centuries, Sts. Symmachus, Hormisdas, Felix IV., Agapetus, Gregory the Great (with the second and third Gregory, heirs of his name and greatness), Eugene I., Vitalian, Sergius I., Zachary, and others too numerous to mention. Some of them (as St. John I., St. Sylvester,

¹ Mansi, xii., col. 821.

St. Martin I.) made the sacrifice of liberty and life for religion, and are honored as martyrs. Nearly all of them were illustrious for zeal, learning, and the exercise of the Christian virtues, if we are to trust the accounts of their contemporaries in preference to the malignant diatribes of pamphleteers in the nineteenth century.

The only lamentable exception in this glorious catalogue of six centuries is afforded by a few Popes, intruded by force or fraud into the See of Peter during the tenth century. They were very few,¹ and historical criticism has reduced the number, proving how much reason the Church has to hail with joy, instead of fearing, as they say we must, the progress of historical or other science. Catholics, no less than Protestants, have been the innocent victims of historical deception; and not a few Popes now stand blameless before the world, who were consigned to perpetual ignominy by the saintly and learned Cardinal Baronius. He, and the rest of our early historians, who wrote before the hidden lore of mediæval annals had been drawn from its hiding-places by antiquarian research, lacked correct sources of information and were misled by the scandalous gossip of the only chronicler they had access to. And yet these few Popes, not more than half a dozen, even according to the mendacious Luitprand,² become under Dr. Schulte's magical art of multiplication the Popes who filled the Holy See for two entire

¹ Indeed, in the whole list from St. Peter to Pius IX., there are perhaps not even six who can be set down as unworthy occupants of the See. But even were there a dozen or more, what was said out of humility by St. Leo the Great would ever remain true: "What St. Peter received from Christ never fails, even in the unworthy heir of his authority."

² Luitprand was for a long time the only historical source for the Popes of the tenth century, and imposed his slanderous fables upon the credulity of Baronius and other Catholic writers. Historical science since then has rescued from the mire of his foul aspersions and restored to their due honor the names of several Pontiffs (those in particular of Sergius III. and John X.), whom he had so bespattered with filth that even the devout Baronius heaps upon their heads the most opprobrious epithets. Luitprand gave a very significant title to his history when he called it by the name of *Autapodosis* (Retribution), and intimated plainly enough that his intention in writing was to exalt his friends and put down his and their enemies. *Sentire quæ velis et quæ sentias loqui* (Think what you please and say what you think) may be the right maxim in political matters for the citizen of a free commonwealth, but we cannot allow it to be elevated into a law for the writing of history unless it be first stripped of its ambiguity. For the Luitprands and Villanis, and their modern imitators, the Guicciardinis, Mosheims, Milmans, and others, its only meaning seems this: Believe what suits you and color it to suit your readers. One of the men (Schroëckh, *Kirchengeschichte*, vol. xxii., p. 238), like young Troilus of old,

Infelix puer atque impar congressus Achilli,

has the boldness to enter the lists against Muratori in order to defend Luitprand's veracity! The Wittemberg professor is true to the great tradition of anti-Catholic history. Whatever has been said against the Pope, no matter by whom, is true; if it is not, it ought to be, and let no man dare question it.

centuries. He says that after Nicholas I. (who died A.D. 867) "a blight seems to have fallen upon the Papacy for the next two hundred years. With scarcely an exception, the Popes of *this period* were so many monsters, not men" (p. 259). But genuine history tells another tale. In all these two hundred years (A.D. 867-1067) there were but two that can be justly called bad Popes and both intruded, viz.: John XI. (931-936) and John XII. (955-964). Of the former, it may be said that his moral wickedness, or weakness rather, was more the result of *duress* than of bad will, as he was completely under the sway of his powerful relations; and his sinful compliances with breaches of church discipline were exacted from him, while he was shut up in a dungeon for the greater part of his Pontificate, by his brother Alberic, who held unjustly the temporal lordship of the Roman States. John XII. we cheerfully give up to Dr. Schulte and his lay namesake of "Janus." He was a bad Pope, the shame and disgrace of the Catholic Church; and they seem to prize him far more highly than our Clements, Gregories, Innocents, and other great Pontiffs who have astonished and edified even the unbelieving world. Let them, then, take him and make the most of him; though there is little doubt that even *his* wickedness has been exaggerated by Luitprand. The conduct of Stephen VI. (or VII., A.D. 898) need not be discussed, as it is uncertain whether he was a legitimate Pontiff or not. But, granting his legitimate election, the indignity with which he treated the corpse of his predecessor, Formosus, may have been discreditable even to the rude barbarism of that iron age; yet it was rather a cruel straining of the rigor of law, a high-handed violation of social decency, than an offence against faith or morals. The plea alleged for the act was ostensibly an honest one,—the necessity of punishing disobedience to the canons of the Church; but it was perverted, pushed to the extreme by an error of passionate judgment, which involved, however, no decision of dogma or moral law.

All the rest of these Pontiffs were men of irreproachable lives and did what they could in that barbarous age to maintain the purity of church discipline amongst clergy and laity. Some of them were canonized saints (as St. Leo IX.); others shone like brilliant lights of science and letters in those dark days (Benedict V., Gregory V., and Sylvester II.); not a few of them (to instance only the intrepid Marinus) were worthy of a place by the side of the illustrious Popes of early centuries. Yet all these worthy, venerated Pontiffs, "with scarcely an exception," are, under Dr. Schulte's pen, metamorphosed into "unblushing knaves and so many monsters, not men!" Is this, we ask, candor and fair-dealing? Would Dr. Schulte speak in this strain of the line of Mohammedan caliphs? We are sure he would not. What must even the non-Catholic reader

think of this bitter, unchristian zeal which in its eagerness for triumph, heedless of the Apostle's warning (Rom. x. ii.), will consult neither knowledge nor common honesty? Is not the "insane frenzy" with which the very mention of the Papacy inspires him, the best commentary on what he himself says elsewhere of anti-Catholic polemics?

"They (Catholics) look upon us with suspicion when we meet them in the arena of theological disputation, AND WELL THEY MAY. Do not our best Protestant controversialists seem to become inflated with bigotry and seized with an INSANE FRENZY, so soon as they enter upon the field of controversy with Roman Catholics? Is it not the settled custom to apply to the Pope and the Roman Church the MOST OPPROBRIOUS EPITHETS?" (p. 38).

Why this should be so, we leave to Dr. S. to explain, if he can, or rather if he will, for we think he knows. By his own confession this bigotry, this insane frenzy is not occasional but permanent, not the exception but the "settled custom." "Settled customs" in dress, in conversation, and in other matters of the social world, are like fashions, and may depend on whim or caprice; but in the moral world they must have a deeper origin and must be traceable to some law. If they are phenomena that are surprising in appearance, they cannot be so in reality. They must have a cause which either philosophy or religion will satisfactorily explain. What is it in our case? A casual outburst of passionate feeling springs from sudden anger; habitual reviling can only proceed from deep-rooted hatred. But whence comes this hatred? The answer to this question was given more than two thousand years ago by the common-sense of a pagan; and when we add that he was an African,¹ we say perhaps what will entitle his opinion to more respect in the minds of some. It is this: "VERITAS odium parit"² That

¹ Years ago, pent up within the narrow walls of a beleaguered city, we used to hear occasionally wonderful stories about the "intelligent contraband." He was a myth, we fear; but the true type of him may be found in Terence, who emerged from the slave into the freedman by his own merits (*ob ingenii ac formæ elegantiam*). His very name was either the kindly gift of his master, the Senator Terentius Lucanus, or the standing witness to posterity of the freedman's gratitude.

² Publius Terentius (*Afer*.) *Andria* I., i. 41. One of the Fathers of the Church says that these words of the poet came almost from divine inspiration. Speaking of "the settled custom" of the pagans and apostates of his time to revile Catholic Christianity (for there was then no other), and habitually assail it "with the most opprobrious epithets," he indignantly exclaims: "Tanti et tam pertinacis odii quam potissimum causam esse dicamus! Utrumne VERITAS odium parit, ut ait poeta quasi divino spiritu instinctus." *Lactantius, Divinar. Institut., lib. v., cap. 9.* (For this so great, so obstinate hatred, what cause can we assign? Is it that the TRUTH begets hatred, as the poet says in words almost divinely inspired?) Tertullian, another African, says likewise of Christian Catholic truth: "Plane olim, id est semper, VERITAS odio est" (Long since, aye always, they have hated the truth). *Apolog., cap. 14.*

the truth should beget hatred sounds like a paradox, but is undeniable. Truth when *subjective* (to use the terms of the school), when it has once entered and reigns in the mind, cannot produce this effect; but when it is merely *objective*, when from without it merely flashes upon and strikes a mind diseased, it obtains neither welcome nor entrance, but simply vexes and exasperates. Naturally, indeed, the soul of man loves and seeks the truth; but if morally perverted, she will disown and hate it, especially when it is of the supernatural order. So, too, the human eye, by natural instinct, loves the light and courts its presence; but when diseased, shuns it and abhors it. Who does not recall the beautiful line in which Virgil paints the dying Tyrian queen first seeking heaven's light, and then repelling it with pain and anguish:

Quæsit coelo lucem ingemitque reperta.¹

How widely different is the estimate formed of the Popes of the dark ages by such illustrious Protestant writers as Voigt, Hurter,² Gfrorer, Leo, and Ranke, candid and learned men, who—while (unhappily for themselves) rejecting our doctrines as unfounded and irrational—do not consider themselves bound on that account to outrage with calumny and insult the venerable fathers and heroes of our Church, but will gladly recognize and honor virtue and worth, even when met with in the Pope of Rome. Leo,³ for example, has no hesitation in acknowledging that, if the sacredness of the marriage tie has been saved to modern Europe, she is indebted for it to the Popes—those very Popes on whose heads Dr. Schulte has rained such wholesale condemnation. Since the sanctity of marriage is the basis of the family, and since well or ill-regulated domestic polity reacts necessarily on the welfare and the very life of the State and civil government, it is evident that from Leo's acknowledgment those maligned Pontiffs were the savers of social and political civilization. It turns out, therefore, that these venerable men upon whom, in defiance of history, truth, decency, and even common gratitude, anti-Catholic bigotry pours out its venomous gall, denouncing them as "knaves and monsters, not men," deserve instead universal respect as the chief benefactors of mankind. And, limiting our comparison only to sacred things, what was the crusade of Heraclius against Chosroas to regain the Sacred Wood on which was wrought our redemption, or Godfrey's "pious arms and

¹ This apposite passage has been applied more than once to unbelievers; by none more happily than by Cardinal Polignac, who has imitated it in his elegant Latin poem entitled *Anti-Lucretius* (Paris, 1752).

² Hurter, after having published his great historical work on Innocent III., became a Catholic. Prof. Gfrorer has, we believe, followed his example.

³ *Geschichte von Italien*, vol. i., p. 258, quoted by Hefele in his *Beiträge zur Kirchengeschichte*, Tübingen, 1864, vol. i., p. 232.

glorious conquest" in winning back from the Paynim the "great Sepulchre of Christ,"¹ compared to the rescue of the Christian family from Pagan or Mussulman slavery and degradation!

Ranke is not very indulgent, sometimes not even just to the Popes. Yet he is not blind altogether to their merits and greatness. Occasionally he eulogizes this or that Pope of the centuries that came immediately after the so-called Reformation, but in the following passage he bears witness in his own way to the moral grandeur of those very Popes whom Dr. Schulte stigmatizes as knaves and monsters.

"Whatever may be the opinion we form of the Popes of the earlier ages (Ranke is speaking of them with respect to Reformation times) of the Church, we must admit that they had always great interests in view: the guardianship of an oppressed religion, the conflict with paganism, the diffusion of Christianity over the nations of the North, the foundation of an independent hierarchical power. The ability to conceive, to will, and to accomplish some great object, is among the qualities which confer the greatest dignity on man; and that it was that sustained the Popes in their lofty course."²

The "forgeries" of which Dr. Schulte, blindly copying Janus, has thought fit to make special mention, are the following; the italics are his own:

"To glorify the Roman See, spurious *Acts of Roman Martyrs* began to be compiled at the beginning of the sixth century, and were produced from time to time afterwards for some centuries. For a similar purpose the story of the *Conversion and Baptism of Constantine* was invented, to make Pope Sylvester appear to have been a worker of miracles. About 514 the *Acts of the Council of Sinuessa*, the *Legend of the Pope Marcellinus*, and the *Constitution of Sylvester* were forged, to prove that no one could judge the Roman See. The *Gesta Liberii* and the *Gesta of Sixtus III.* were fabricated in defence of these Popes. The works of St. Cyprian were interpolated to suit the pretensions of the Roman bishop. The *Liber Pontificalis* was another forgery, commenced in the sixth century and continued afterwards. It was devised to prove the *Acts of Roman Martyrs*, to confirm the existing legends and emperors, and to exhibit the Popes as legislators for the whole Church. After the middle of the eighth century the famous *Donation of Constantine* was concocted at Rome, in order to induce Pepin to concede temporal sovereignty to the Bishop of Rome. Other fabrications appeared soon after-

¹ "L'armi pietose: il gran Sepolcro di Cristo: il glorioso acquisto," world-known phrases from the opening stanza of Tasso's "Gerusalemme Liberata." Some fastidious critics object to the "pious arms;" and there have not been wanting fastidious *crus-canti* who disliked the original expression (*armi pietose*). But we defy the conceited infidel world, which applauds the "*thinking bayonets*" of the brutal Corsican, to find any rule of rhetoric or consistency which forbids our associating with weapons the name that belongs of right to the gallant hearts and brave hands that wield them. That arms may be "pious" or "impious" according to their use has been ere this made known to the Napoleons, Cavour, and Bixios before a Tribunal, where deadly sin is judged not by laws of rhetoric but of eternal justice.

² Ecclesiastical and Political History of the Popes of Rome during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Translated by Sarah Austin. Philadelphia, Lea & Blanchard, 1841. Vol. i., p. 46.

wards, for the purpose of persuading Charlemagne and his successors to confirm and enlarge the temporal power" (p. 258).

From the words of our author one would imagine that there was some such collection as the *Acts of the Roman Martyrs*. There is not, never was such a book. What is now known by the name of *Roman Martyrology* was so called by our converted pagan forefathers for the simple reason that their religious literature, like their religion itself, came all from Rome. There was in every church from the earliest times a book containing the record, more or less ample, of those who, in that city, or See, or province, had sealed their testimony for Christ with their blood, and were thence called *martyrs*. From it the life of each martyr used to be read during the Divine office in the church on the annual recurrence of his festival.¹ This we know from the best sources. It is attested of the Acts of St. Polycarp in the Life of St. Pionius,² and of the Acts of Sts. Perpetua and Felicitas by the great Augustine.³ Of the authenticity of these narratives there can be no doubt; for, whenever it was not absolutely impossible,⁴ the official record was obtained from the public notaries or from the Proconsular or Præsidial Acts,⁵ and incorporated in the martyr's "Passio" or account of his sufferings and death. Some of these pagan documents have come down to us in full, those, for example, of the Proconsul Galerius Maximus, under whom St. Cyprian suffered martyrdom. But Rome's *Martyrology*, as it came to be called afterwards, was naturally different from that of other countries. She was the head and centre of Christendom, and to her came continually accounts of all weighty matters which concerned the welfare or history of local churches. Amongst these could there be anything more important than the sufferings of a confessor or the death and triumph of a martyr? The Roman Church, therefore, in virtue of Catholic communion, inscribed in her annals, and honored the name and memory, not only of her own martyrs but of those sent to her from other churches. Thus we know that she

¹ His *natalis* or birthday was the name given by the faith of our pious forefathers to the day on which the martyr was released from prison and torments by death. There is a symbolic beauty in this seemingly unnatural or contradictory interchange of names, which may commend it to the admiration even of those who profess Christianity outside of the Church.

² Acta St. Pionii, in Ruinart's Acta Martyrum Sincera et Selecta, p. 12. St. Polycarp suffered martyrdom in the year 166; St. Pionius in 250.

³ Serm. 280. The martyrdom of these celebrated saints took place about the year 203.

⁴ Nothing else was ordinarily needed than a bribe or the connivance of some pagan official. Christian gold was freely used in those days for more than one holy purpose. From the gaoler it secured access to the dungeon of the martyr, from the executioner it purchased his remains and saved them from desecration.

⁵ Acta Proconsulis and Acta Præsidis.

gave all honor to St. Cyprian almost immediately after his martyrdom at Carthage. The Popes, from the very beginning of the Church—and the beginning of martyrdom was simultaneous—used every care to gather the history of those Christian heroes who shed their blood for the faith. And what is said in the *Liber Pontificalis* of Pseudo-Damasus, viz., that St. Clement (A.D. 100) and St. Fabian (A.D. 250) divided and subdivided the city into regions or wards, and appointed in each special notaries to collect the *Acts of the Martyrs*, must surely rest on some good basis of tradition.

Far from forging *Acts of Martyrs*, the Popes of every age have shown the utmost anxiety to keep such counterfeits from the hands of the Christian world. When Pope Gelasius, in the Roman Council of 494, says that the Roman Church, according to ancient custom, shows her special caution (*singulari cautela*) in not reading the history of the early martyrs (*Gesta primorum Martyrum*), he either means that the Roman Church, unlike the churches of Christendom, did not read them during Divine service, or he is denouncing some special compilation which bore that name. Baronius¹ inclines to the former opinion, but the reasons alleged by Gelasius seem to point in the other direction, for he says that these *Gesta* were compiled “by nameless authors, some of them by faithless and others by unlettered men; nay, some of them are reported to have come from the hands of heretics.”² It is not to be imagined that the reading of such stuff would be tolerated by any Christian Bishop, much less by the supreme guardian of Christian faith and morals. Yet, surely the Roman Church could not have been without genuine official “Acts” of such martyrs as Popes Fabian, Cornelius, Lucius, Stephen, and Xystus (who are all commemorated as martyrs by their contemporary, St. Cyprian, whose writings have never been questioned), or of Sts. Lawrence and Sebastian, Agnes and Cecilia, whose fame filled the whole Christian world, and to whom churches had been erected in Rome more than a century before Pope Gelasius was born. To mention only one

¹ In his “*Tractatio de Martyrologio Romano*,” prefixed to his annotated edition of that work, Venetiis (apud Guerillum), 1615, p. 5.

² See the *Decretum De Libris Recipiendis* with all its variant readings in Mansi's Councils, tom. viii., p. 155. Chifflet is certain, and Mansi inclines to the belief, that this council and decree belong to the days of Pope St. Hormisdas (A.D. 514–523). This would bring it down to the very epoch of forgery, invented by Schulte and Janus. St. Hormisdas must have been “a monster” of folly as well as of iniquity to issue a decree against unauthorized legends of martyrs, while he was secretly busied in the manufacture of legends of his own, which necessarily could have only an underhand, unauthorized circulation. But the Pope, of course, is an exception to all rules; and must be at the same moment, in any and everything that he does, the silliest of fools and the keenest of knaves.

case, owing to the perpetual intercourse going on between the churches of Carthage and Rome, the latter must have been well acquainted with Pontius's Life, or "Acts" of St. Cyprian, and the Proconsular Acts that accompanied them. Did these documents all perish at one fell stroke? Baronius, we think, goes a little too far, when he supposes that all, or nearly all, of them were swept out of existence by the cruel ravages of persecution under Diocletian. Surely tradition, in some cases the testimony of eye-witnesses, the memorials preserved in the catacombs or saved in other parts of the empire, would have furnished a means of restoring or reconstructing them.¹

In any case the Decree of St. Gelasius shows how zealous was the Roman Church and its ruler to prevent the circulation of false or unworthy *Acts of Martyrs*. And more than three hundred years after Gelasius, Adrian I. wrote to Charlemagne that the Roman Church tolerates no *Acts of Martyrs* that are not by approved authors (*sine auctoribus probabilibus*).²

From the glib way in which Dr. Schulte speaks of the *Acts of Roman Martyrs*, the credulous crowd for whom he writes will naturally conclude that he is thoroughly acquainted with their compilation and contents. But the well-informed reader will judge otherwise. Whenever he is not inaccurate he owes it to his namesake, the layman, whose words parrot-like he repeats. But when he ventures to leave his guide and trust to himself, he reveals a want of ordinary information, which excites a feeling that partakes more of wonder, shame, and pity than of anger. Will it be believed that this Doctor of Philosophy and of Theology is actually unacquainted with the difference between the *Annals of Baronius* and

¹ Pope St. Damasus (A.D. 366-384), who adorned 'with poetical inscriptions all the chief shrines and churches of Rome, was evidently well acquainted with the history of previous Roman martyrs. When he was young, there were yet living those who had seen with their own eyes the horrors of Diocletian's persecution; and he himself gives some particulars which he had learned from the executioners of that cruel tyrant. As he tells us in one of his poems, mentioning some incidents of a martyrdom:

Percussor retulit Damaso mihi, dum puer essem.

("As the headsman told me, Damasus, while yet a child." Carm. XXIV, de SS. Marcellino et Petro in Collect. Omnium. Poetarum Pisauri, 1766, tom. v., p. 93. The sacred poetry of the Collectio Pisaurensis is most wretchedly edited. After what Sarazini and Merenda have done for the Roman edition of 1754, the text of St. Damasus yet needs an editor.) True, in his beautiful lines on St. Agnes, Damasus appeals to fame (common report or tradition, *Fama refert*); but a poet's words must not be scrutinized too narrowly. St. Jerome, who was his friend and secretary, tells us, on the other hand, that the name of St. Agnes was celebrated by the tongues and pens of all nations. In the poem of St. Damasus on this Holy Virgin Martyr may be read one of the most exquisite lines ever inspired by the Christian muse.

² In Baronius, loc. cit.

the *Roman Martyrology*, and honestly believes that they are one and the same book! Hear his own words:

"And as if this were not enough, Cardinal Baronius, the Jesuit Church historian, who received authority from the Pope¹ to re-edit the *Roman Martyrology*, manipulated the work in a truly Jesuitical manner, correcting those portions that might engender suspicions dangerous to papal absolutism and infallibility, and adding from spurious documents anything that might tend to the glorification of the papacy. In fact, THIS WORK, the *Annals of the Church*, compiled by this talented and laborious Jesuit, forms a vast repertory of spurious passages and fictions" (p. 278).

We feel quite sure that in all the colleges of Rome there can be found no schoolboy of fourteen or fifteen years, who does not know that Baronius was no Jesuit, but a disciple of St. Philip Neri, or who would be so stupid as to confound the small quarto of the *Roman Martyrology*, which he hears read daily in the dining-room,² with the large, voluminous folios of the Cardinal's *Annals of Church History* which he only looks up to with timid reverence on the shelves of the library. How came our Roman Doctor to make this disgraceful blunder? Is it possible that apostasy is not only a cloud to darken the understanding, but a relentless sponge likewise that wipes away all traces of literary treasure from the memory? At all events, we have in Dr. Schulte an additional proof that as "murder will out," so, too, the ignorance that ventures on speech must betray itself sooner or later.

That Cardinal Baronius, far from altering and manipulating history "in a truly Jesuitical manner," was impartial and candid even to excess, we have already seen from the almost unpardonable docility with which he accepts and retails all the slanders of Luitprand against the Popes of his time. Hefele well remarks:

"Cæsar Baronius has contributed in no ordinary degree to establish the evil reputation of the tenth century. . . . The blame that he must bear is at the same time an honorable proof of his love of truth. Though a decided Ultramontane and ever ready champion of the Papal See, yet he has not only gathered up with conscientious exactness all the evil said of the Popes in his original sources, but in so doing has shown himself too credulous, choosing rather to break his cudgel over the head of many a Pope (über manchen Papst den Stab gebrochen) than to turn the sword of criticism against the authors of those slanders."³

¹ It was at the request of Cardinal Sirletus that he added notes to the new edition of the *Martyrology*, merely to elucidate some critical questions raised on the appearance of the former edition. The famous "Annals" he wrote by desire, or rather by express command, of his religious superior, St. Philip Neri, in order to vindicate the truth of Catholic history from the wicked, heretical calumnies of Flavius Illyricus and his fellow-laborers, the Centuriators (as they are called) of Magdeburg.

² In Rome, and throughout the whole Catholic world, in all seminaries it is customary to read every day during dinner a portion of the *Roman Martyrology*. In the Lutheran seminaries of Germany a like practice is, or used to be, observed. The reading-book, however, has been changed, and the *martyrology* has been replaced by that most edifying book, the *Tisch-Reden*, or *Table-Talk* of Luther.

³ Hefele; *Beiträge zur Kirchengeschichte, Archæologie, und Liturgik*. Tübingen, 1864. Vol. i., p. 228.

Janus, with guarded phrase, says that these *Acts of Roman Martyrs* were forged "in the interests of Rome." Dr. Schulte, always tripping when he wanders away from his guide, says "to glorify the Roman See." Now we defy any one who has read the documents alluded to under this name to come honestly to this conclusion. Dr. Schulte, it is evident, has never seen, much less perused them. There is in them no studied reference to the majesty and power of St. Peter's successor, no mention of the privileges that were conferred on his See. They were compiled by unwise zeal merely with a view to exalt the courage and constancy of some few martyrs (who happened to live or die in Rome), by exaggerating the torments which they suffered, by adding prodigies and wonders that were not in the original account, by amplifying a few sentences of the martyr or his judge into regular speeches; in a word, by embellishing pure tradition with the meretricious aids of rhetoric and fancy. The motive of the compilers may have been praiseworthy, but it did not justify the means they used. Yet this weakness of human nature stands out conspicuous from the very first ages of the Church; and we see very soon after the Apostolic times pretended "Acts of St. Peter," "Acts of St. Paul" (to which may be added others of St. Philip, St. Thomas, etc.), the *Circuitus Petri*, the *Itinerarium Clementis*, and similar productions. What was done for the Apostles at the beginning was done subsequently for martyrs and saints. Many of these fictions (based always, which must not be forgotten, on fact) no doubt had their origin in blind, unreasoning devotion, in zeal for the honor of God's saints, which was not, however, as the Apostle would have it, "according to knowledge." This was, to give one example, the case of the priest in Asia Minor, who put in circulation a pious romance regarding the joint Apostleship of St. Paul and St. Thecla (*Acta Pauli et Theclæ*). When arraigned and deposed for the fabrication, his only plea was that he had done it out of love for St. Paul.¹

But there were others who were actuated by less worthy motives. These were heretics, who sought under cover of such forgeries to spread their errors more widely and securely amongst devout and unsuspecting readers. The Fathers of the Church, both in the East and in the West, in every age, have denounced heretics as addicted to this infamous practice. Indeed, from the first day that heresy appeared in the Church, forgery appeared by its side as its

¹ Confessum id se amore Pauli fecisse. (Tertullian de Baptismo, cap. xvii.) St. Thecla is one of the most venerated saints in all the Eastern, especially the Greek, churches. She was the protomartyr of her sex, as St. Stephen was amongst men. The Fathers of the Church, both East and West, Saints Gregory of Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Zeno, Maximus, etc., have made her the subject of their praise. This shows that the counterfeit always presupposes and proves the reality.

natural sequel and ally. It began by forging Gospels; it then forged Acts of Apostles and Martyrs, Decrees of Councils, and writings of the Fathers. Nor has it changed with time or the course of ages. Even at this day it is true to its first love. To pick out one of a thousand examples, who does not remember how some thirty or forty years ago two well-known Anglicans, fellow-clergymen of Dr. Schulte, that shone amongst the brightest lights of Exeter Hall (Rev. Dr. McGee and Rev. Dr. Todd), deliberately forged and gave to the world in its pretended Latin original a Papal Brief, from Gregory XVI. to the Bishops of Great Britain and Ireland? And even though convicted, they would not confess, until the forgery had accomplished its end. This was not excess of love for God or His Saints, as was the case with the simple priest of Asia Minor, but the amiable intent of arousing Protestant wrath and hatred against their innocent Catholic fellow-subjects. Nor have we ever heard that this base conduct lessened in the slightest degree the credit and good standing of these two men with their brethren of the Anglican clergy or laity. Whence it would seem to be a fair, legitimate inference that the English Church approves and admires, or certainly does not disapprove and condemn, the crime of forgery, provided it be employed "in the interests" of the English Church and "to glorify" Anglicanism.

The story of the *Conversion and Baptism of Constantine*, which Dr. Schulte next singles out for attack, cannot be reconciled with the positive assertions of Eusebius of Cæsarea, and is therefore undoubtedly a fiction, as Catholic critics have shown long ago. But it is more edifying, more worthy of the first Christian emperor than the account of Eusebius; and this sufficiently explains its origin and the facility with which it crept into general belief. That Constantine should have put off his baptism till the hour of death, and then should have received it at the hands of an Arian bishop, seemed a blemish on the character of the great monarch who had first lifted up Christianity to the throne of the Cæsars. And it was this blemish that the compiler of the *Acta Sylvestri* sought to wipe away from the memory of Constantine. How well the story commended itself to the Christian heart is evident from the fact that it was soon adopted by the Greeks, and, in spite of their own Eusebius, has found a permanent place in their Menologium.¹ The notion that the tale was written "to make Pope Sylvester appear to have been a worker of miracles," shows little acquaintance with the Catholic belief of all centuries. And that belief springs from

¹ This is the name given by the Greek Church to the martyrology. In it St. Sylvester is commemorated on the 1st of January, not on the 31st of December, as in the Latin Church.

no capricious sentiment of human origin; it is based on the words of our Lord Himself (Jo. xiv. 12). Miracles have always been accounted an ordinary sequel, no less than a proof, of sanctity. And the sanctity of St. Sylvester has been recognized by the universal Church from the day of his death to our own time. What was, then, more natural than to adorn with miracles the legend of one whose surpassing holiness was known from tradition to all the churches? It was not Sylvester the Pope, but Sylvester the Saint to whom these miracles were attributed.¹ If the writer meant to "glorify" any one, it was Constantine rather than the Holy See.

Next we come to the Acts of the Council of Sinuessa, the Legend of Pope Marcellinus, and the Constitution of Sylvester. These are, no doubt, apocryphal; but the germ of the fable is not to be sought on Catholic soil. The Legend grew out of a Donatist calumny, which represented that holy Pontiff as yielding to torments under Diocletian, and saving his life by betraying the sacred books and sacrificing to the gods. Three other Popes, Melchiades, Marcellus, and Sylvester, all of whom are venerated as saints in the Catholic Church, were accused by the Donatists of the same abominable crime. St. Augustine² calls these calumnies simply incredible, and defies his adversary, Petilian, to offer any proof. Though St. Augustine brands the charge as one which nobody can believe, Schrœckh³ thinks there must be some truth in it, or the accusation would not have been preferred by Petilian. The great holy Doctor, Augustine, unworthy of belief in comparison with an obscure Donatist! Why not put it plainly and give us at once the enthymeme: Petilian is an enemy of the Holy See, therefore his veracity may not be questioned. Religious error may vary from one age to another, but never changes in its hatred of Rome; and fourteen hundred years form no barrier to the mutual love and sympathy of Donatist and Lutheran. How true are the words of Pope St. Agatho in his letter to the Emperor Constantinus Pogonatus, adopted by the Fathers of the Sixth Ecumenical Council and incorporated in the Acts of their Fourth Session! "*Sancti quidem Doctores venerati atque secuti sunt (Apostolicam Sedem); hæretici autem falsis criminationibus ac derogationum odiis insecti.*" "The holy Doctors have always held it (the Apostolic See) in reverence and clung to it; while heretics have ever persecuted it with their slanderous falsehoods and hateful calumnies."⁴

¹ The Greek Menologium likewise mentions his thaumaturgic fame, calling him "a great worker of miracles" (*magnus patrator miraculorum*, as Baronius translates in *Not. ad Mart. Rom. die 31 Dec.*).

² St. Aug. de Unico Bapt. Contra. Petil. cap. xviii.

³ Kirchengeschichte, vol. v., p. 57.

⁴ Mansi's Councils, tom. xi., Col. 239.

The writer of the legend, unacquainted, it would seem, with the true history of Marcellinus, and adopting the Donatist calumny as a fact, is puzzled to account for the Pope's subsequent martyrdom and *cultus*. Knowing *a priori* that to become a saint and martyr after his fall he must have repented, in order to give all possible *eclat* to his hero's repentance he invents the Council of Sinuessa,¹ where before two hundred bishops Marcellinus confesses his crime, proclaims his unworthiness to sit in the Apostolic chair, asks for judgment, and is told by the bishops that it does not belong to them to judge him who holds the chief See. "Prima sedes a nemine judicatur." Dr. Schulte, treading in the footsteps of Janus, would have us believe that the Legend and Acts were forged about 514, in order to give currency to the axiom: No one can judge the Roman See. But *cui bono*? What was the use of trying to insinuate a principle which already all openly believed and professed? Dr. Schulte was unlucky in fixing his date. For twelve or thirteen years before that time the maxim of Church law which he thinks the forger sought to introduce had been solemnly proclaimed by the united bishops of France and Italy. Amongst the latter were the bishops of the chief cities, Pavia, Milan, and Ravenna, which even then (being the residence of the monarch, as it was afterwards of the Exarchs) was beginning to set up its pretensions against Rome.

The occasion of this solemn declaration was the Council held at Rome in 502 by permission of Pope Symmachus, in order to dispel the accusations made against him by the anti-pope Laurentius. Its Acts furnish a splendid proof of the Pope's supremacy. The bishops of the provinces of Aemilia, Liguria, and the Venetian territory refused to come when summoned by Theodoric, and only consented to attend when assured by him that Symmachus had agreed to submit his case to investigation by the council. They say, in their letter to the king, that they knew well that the primacy (*principatus*) of St. Peter, the ordinance of Christ our Lord, and the voice of General Councils had given to the Roman See special power over all the churches, but they had never heard that "its occupant was subject to the judgment of his inferiors."² The *Libellus Apologeticus* of Ennodius, Bishop of Ticinum (Pavia),

¹ This is in the supposition that the legend was framed by a Catholic; but it is by no means impossible that the writer may have been the same Donatist who invented the calumny and then coined the synod in order to have the Pope's acknowledgment of having been a *traditor* (betrayer of the Sacred Books). The very expression "*prima sedes*" smacks of the language of Africa, the stronghold of the Donatists.

² "*Nec antedictæ Sedis Antistitem minorum subjacuisse iudicio.*" This with all the other documents and acts of the Council may be found in Mansi's Collection, tom. viii., p. 247, et seq.

which was approved by the Council and inserted in its Acts, declares that "God will have the cases of other bishops settled by human tribunals; but the judgment of this (Roman) prelate He has unquestionably reserved to Himself."¹ The bishops of Gaul were still more indignant at what they considered an outrage on the inalienable rights of the successor of St. Peter. Though they had learned that the issue of the Council was favorable to Symmachus, it did not alter their opinion. For they had not been made aware of the fact that Symmachus himself had authorized its proceedings from the beginning to the close, and thus legitimated what otherwise would have been schismatical presumption. Hence, they thought it their duty to censure the hardihood of the bishops who had ventured on such a rash, dangerous course. They commissioned St. Avitus, Bishop of Vienne, to write to Rome in their name, and protest on their behalf against the action of the council. St. Avitus says in his letter, amongst other things, "It is difficult to understand upon what plea of reasoning or of law a superior can be judged by those who are beneath him. . . . In the case of other bishops, if anything be wrong, it may be remedied; but if the Pope of Rome is to be put upon his trial, it is no longer one bishop but the Episcopal Order itself that is threatened with destruction."²

The principle that the Pope "judges all and is judged by none" did not originate with the Roman Council of 502. We find it distinctly laid down by Pope Gelasius in 495, as even Janus is forced reluctantly to admit. (He can only console himself by saying that the Pope's language is an *insult* to the Greek Church. What, then, must he think of St. Leo the Great tossing to the winds their 28th canon of Chalcedon?) It is also clearly stated as the law of the Church by Pope Boniface in 422,³ and by his predecessor, Zosimus, in 418.⁴ Did these Popes learn their lesson from the forger, yet unborn, of 514? Or was it the tradition of their See that had come down to them from St. Peter and was acknowledged by all the churches? We assert, without fear of contradiction, that there never was a time in the history of early Christianity when any one ventured to dispute this well-founded maxim of Christian jurisprudence—not

¹ *Aliorum forte hominum causas Deus voluerit per homines terminare. Sed istius (Sedis Apostolicæ) præsulem sine quæstione suo reservavit arbitrio. Ibid.*

² *Non facile datur intelligi qua vel ratione vel lege ab inferioribus eminentior judicetur In sacerdotibus ceteris potest, si quid forte nutaverit, reformari. At si Papa Urbis vocatur in dubium Episcopatus jam videbitur, non Episcopus vacillare. Ibid.*

³ *Epist. ad Rufum Thessalonicens.*

⁴ *Ep. XII. ad Aurel.* This and the preceding epistle may be found in Mansi's Collection under the head of the respective Pontiffs. One of the advantages of this edition is that it contains all that is good in the Benedictine, Constant's Collection "*Epistolæ Roman. Pontificum.*"

coined in the sixth century, but dating from the days of St. Peter, Linus, Cletus, and Clement—the Holy See judges all and is judged by none. The framer of the legend (be he Catholic or Donatist) did not invent the saying; he only transcribed it. The same observation applies to whoever wrote the *Constitutum Sylvestri*, of which Dr. Schulte knows nothing and very prudently gives only its name. Its authorship is impossible to determine or even to guess at with any chance of probability. It is not so difficult to invent facts and succeed in having them accepted as true. But it is an utter impossibility to invent principles of faith or law, entirely at variance with the prevailing system of religion or jurisprudence, and succeed in convincing its adherents that these forgeries have always formed an integral part of the system. It is only the men who habitually sneer at Catholic faith that are fond of swallowing such huge absurdities.

As regards the *Gesta Liberii*, here again the first seeds of the fable must be looked for in the prolific field of heretical forgery. That Pope Liberius prevaricated in any way, that he ever signed any formula of those that are known as *Sirmienses* (of Sirmium), much less that he fell into or sanctioned any error against faith, is historically impossible. His return to his See was the basis of all these more or less extravagant charges. But the reasons assigned for his return by the best historians,¹ viz., the hatred of the Roman people against Arianism, the hostile attitude of the clergy and laity of Rome to Felix, who had usurped the place of Liberius; the tumults and seditions caused by the presence of the intruder, which culminated in his final expulsion from the city; and finally, the prayers and entreaties of the noble matrons of Rome who interceded with the emperor—all these are sufficient to explain why Constantius reluctantly² recalled Liberius from the exile to which he had been condemned because of his unflinching orthodoxy, in which, by all accounts, he persevered to the very end of his life. These reasons make it quite unnecessary to suppose that it was any betrayal of Catholic truth, or unworthy compliance of any kind, that secured his pardon and restoration to the Roman See. When he came back the Roman clergy and people received him with every sign of joy and enthusiastic welcome,³ which, consider-

¹ Sulpicius, Severus, Sozomen, and Theodoret. Cassiodorus is often added, but he lived later, and is only the echo of the two last mentioned.

² *Licet invitus*, says Socrates. Hist. Eccl., lib. ii., cap. 37.

³ Even those of his contemporaries (amongst others, St. Jerome in his Chronicle) who were deceived by the report of his fall from orthodoxy, inconsistently add that he entered Rome in triumph. The style of the passage in which St. Jerome states the fact is to all appearance his own; and it is more reasonable to suppose that the Saint was misled by popular report than to accuse copyists of interpolation.

ing their well-known detestation of Arianism, is utterly irreconcilable with the hypothesis that his treachery to the true faith was the price of his recall from exile. But from the days of Simon Magus fraud and slander have always been the choice weapons of heresy; and none ever surpassed the Arians in skilful use of them. Ever on the alert for means, fair or foul, to serve their party interests, no sooner did they hear of the return of Liberius than they sought to turn it to account by misrepresenting its cause. They gave out that exile had broken his obstinate spirit and opened his eyes to Arian truth. They spread the rumor far and wide, from the Persian Gulf to the Pillars of Hercules. And the better to impose on the simple and good, with ingenious toil they forged and circulated letters in the name of Catholic bishops, piously bewailing or angrily denouncing the fall of Liberius. This is the origin of the apocryphal letters (called fragments) of St. Hilary, which Gallicans loved to quote and which anti-Catholic zeal has not yet given up. The wicked report reached Athanasius as he was going into banishment, and added a fresh pang to the sufferings of the noble confessor. It penetrated the deserts of Palestine and wounded the heart of the holy Doctor, St. Jerome. So that, after all, we have to thank heresy for the falsehood, which the unskilful compiler sought to remedy by additional fiction.

The *Gesta Sixti* (or Xysti) *III.* records the acts of a chronologically impossible council, in which that Pope was accused of crime by a certain Bassus, and acquitted. In matter and style it is a clumsy fabrication, too contemptible for notice, and one is at a loss to discover any earthly motive for the forgery. Xystus III., predecessor of St. Leo the Great, was not only a saint but one of the great Pontiffs of his age,¹ and needs no apology. Heretics who, it seems, cannot help slandering the Holy See, brought a malicious charge against him while yet alive. The Pelagians claimed him as a patron of their heterodox opinions on grace and original sin. But he proved the falsehood of the accusation so triumphantly as to elicit from the great St. Augustine a warm letter of congratulation. These heretics dishonored him in life; it was reserved for orthodox ignorance to dishonor him after death by this pretended justification.

¹ The magnificent Basilica of St. Mary Major as it now stands (all but the portico) and the beautiful mosaics which adorn the majestic nave, and are yet admired in the fifteenth century of their existence, bear witness to the munificence of Xystus; and the brief inscription which records the gift attests the modesty as well as the good taste of the Father of his people: *XYSTUS EPISCOPUS PLEBI DEI* (Xystus, Bishop to God's people). These mosaics were a true Scripture-book, representing the facts and personages of both Testaments. They had the honor of being quoted in a General Council (Nice, A.D. 787) as witness to the Roman (and therefore Catholic) belief in the lawfulness of images.

The interpolation of the works of St. Cyprian is also alleged as another of the Pope's forgeries. Let us first narrow the question down to its just limits. It is a question of one passage, and one only, in the saint's book, *De Unitate Ecclesiæ*. St. Cyprian's works are not unlike those of other authors, and there is no reason why they should be exempt from the fate that has overtaken so many ancient writings and even the Holy Scriptures themselves. In those days when books were preserved and multiplied, not by the speedy art of the printer, but by the patient toil of the copyist, it would often happen that in the process of repeated transcription, glosses, marginal notes, etc., would at last creep into the text and find there a permanent place. He must be a novice in Biblical criticism who does not know that the doxology ("For thine is the kingdom," etc., Matth. vi. 13) is no part of inspired Scripture, but a marginal gloss that has made its fraudulent way into the Greek and Anglican Bibles. All Protestant scholars now admit this. May not the same have been the case with St. Cyprian's book? The expressions "*Primatus Petro datur*" and "*Qui cathedram Petri deserit, etc.*," are evidently but the expansion or explanation of the saint's previous words, and therefore (if they be indeed additions, which not all will allow)¹ it is perfectly legitimate to consider them as mere glosses, that gradually by innocent error have found their way from the margin into the body of the text. The added words, if such they are, state two things which agree perfectly with this and other passages of St. Cyprian and with the sense of all antiquity. Why, then, suppose them forged and twisted into the text with evil intent?

The first of these things is, that the primacy was given to St. Peter; the second, that no one can abandon the chair of Peter without leaving the Catholic Church. It will scarcely be denied that St. Cyprian admits the primacy not only of St. Peter but of his successors, and this not only in other writings and letters of his, but in the very passages that precede and follow the gloss, if such we must call it. This even Mosheim confesses, though he takes immediate revenge on the saint by accusing him of inconsistency and contradiction. The allusion is, no doubt, to the subsequent quarrel with Pope Stephen. But who does not know that the best of men may, in an unguarded hour, say or do something inconsistent

¹ They are rejected, as a matter of course, by the Calvinist Goulart and the Anglican Fell in their editions of St. Cyprian, and omitted as doubtful by Baluzius and Maran. But they are retained in the edition of the semi-Calvinist Rigaltius, and (strange to say) are confidently quoted in the Circular Letter of the famous Gallican Convénicle held at Paris in 1682. The first public use (that we know) of the words was by Pelagius II. in his letter to the Bishops of Istria (Pelag., Ep. ii. ad Epp. Istr.) in Mansi's Collection, tom. xi.

with the principles they have ever professed and for which they would lay down their lives? The other point contained in the disputed words is, that Catholic communion and communion with the Holy See are one and the same thing. This was a standard principle acknowledged from the beginning of the Church by all; by none more frequently or more earnestly than by St. Cyprian. For example, addressing Pope St. Cornelius, he speaks of the exertions he has used "to make my fellow-bishops recognize and adhere to thee and thy communion, THAT IS, the unity of the Catholic Church."¹ And again, writing to Antonianus, he uses nearly the same phrase, "to hold communion with Cornelius, THAT IS, with the Catholic Church."² Hence it is that St. Ambrose used to say, "Wherever Peter is, *there* is the Church."³ And the same saint, in his discourse on the death of his holy brother, Satyrus, to prove how scrupulous was the deceased in matters of Catholic faith, relates how Satyrus, having arrived in the course of his journey at a certain place, and having some reason to suspect that the congregation was not strictly orthodox but infected with Arianism, in order to satisfy his conscience and discover the truth, applied the proper test. He went immediately to the bishop of the city and asked him whether he was one in doctrine and communion "with the Catholic bishops, THAT IS, with the See of Rome."⁴ And there are a thousand such examples. How, then, could the insertion in the text of a few words containing a doctrine held for centuries by the universal Church, minister in any way to the "pretensions of the Roman bishop?" And by what law of historical criticism⁵ is it allowed to put forward the bold assertion, unsupported by any proof, that the interpolation is due to Rome, to the Pope, and, as the unblushing Janus adds, to Pelagius II.? Where would have been the improbability of supposing that the copy used by Pelagius in his letter to the bishops of Istria, was one of those in which the gloss had come to be incorporated with the text? But neither probabilities nor evidence must be allowed to stand in the way when the Pope is to be maligned.

The *Liber Pontificalis* is nothing but a collection of biographical sketches of the Popes, written at different times, and which

¹ Te et tuam sedem ID EST Ecclesiæ Catholicæ unitatem. Ep. xlv. ad Cornel.

² Cum Cornelio ID EST cum Ecclesia Catholica communicare. Ep. lii. ad Antonian.

³ Ubi Petrus, *ibi* Ecclesia. Ambros. in Psalm I., num. 30.

⁴ Utrum cum Episcopis Catholicis ID EST cum Romana sede conveniret. In Obitu Satyri Fratr., i. 47.

⁵ This is often only a specious name to veil *historical malignity*. Without going back to the book on Plutarch on Herodotus, we have a very readable treatise on the subject over a hundred years ago by the celebrated Appiano Buonafede. It is entitled *Della Malignità Istorica Libri Tre*, Bologna, 1757. It is directed against the Venetian Janus (Sarpi) and his French translator, Le Courayer.

naturally grow in length as they approach later times. It begins with St. Peter and ends with Stephen VII. (about 886), whose life is unfinished. Its authors are uncertain. The early portion is not by Damasus, to whom it was anciently attributed; nor must Anastasius Bibliothecarius be credited (as modern writers generally have done) with the lives of the Popes from the sixth to the ninth centuries. If the author of the first part really wrote in the sixth century, and made use of spurious documents, there is no reason to suppose any other explanation of it than his lack of critical knowledge. The assertion that the book was compiled or forged by a Pope of that century, as Dr. Schulte says, is simply beneath notice. That it was forged to exhibit the Popes as "legislators for the whole Church" is mere unfounded assertion, or rather reckless calumny. The writer could not have represented them in any other light; for genuine, undisputed history shows them to have been such in the Eastern and Western Churches from the very beginning. It would be a much more rational inference to conclude that the author was the Papal Sacristan or an officer of his Treasury, and that his object in writing was to show the wealth of the Roman Church in her sacred vestments, church ornaments, and landed possessions; for he seems to pay special attention to the enumeration of these objects. It is an old and true saying:

Navita de ventis, de tauris narrat arator.

Of the donation of Constantine we have said enough already. It was not all a forgery, for it rested on a strong basis of fact. It was an awkward, bungling attempt to invest with formal shape, mature life, and completeness of detail, that which had but an indistinct, embryotic existence. The donation may have been "concocted at Rome," though there is no historical ground for the assertion. But the discovery made by Janus, that it was concocted by a clerk, within the walls of the Lateran, betrays only the romancer, whose potency of genius enables him, unseen, to see and overhear all, to enter at will through closed doors, into sealed cabinets, to pry into the inmost recesses either of the human heart or of the Pope's palace. It is surely beneath the dignity of the dispassionate historian. Wherever the document may have originated, its purpose, most certainly, was not that of inducing Pepin "to concede temporal sovereignty to the Bishop of Rome," since he ALREADY possessed it. Instead of believing bad Catholic testimony, why should not Dr. Schulte listen rather to an honest Protestant witness, one who was long a brilliant light of his own Church? The late Dean of St. Paul's will teach him that Pope Gregory the Great (A.D. 590-604) was a temporal ruler, and that his sovereignty came to him neither from forgery nor other unworthy art.

"In the person of Gregory, the Bishop of Rome first became, in act and in influence, if not in avowed authority, a temporal sovereign. Nor were his acts the ambitious encroachments of ecclesiastical usurpation on the civil power. They were forced upon him by the purest motives, if not by absolute necessity. The spiritual sovereignty fell to him as abdicated by the neglect or powerlessness of its rightful owners."¹

The other "fabrications" which were to coax Charlemagne to enlarge his father's grant, are well entitled to the name, but not in the sense intended by the writer. They are simply the wicked coinage of Janus's brain, and never had an existence elsewhere. They are utterly unknown to history. They have never been quoted, mentioned, or in any way hinted at in the correspondence between Charlemagne and Adrian, or his successors, nor by any chronicler of that or a subsequent period. One should have his own hands clean if he would have us listen with patience to his railing against "forgery."

The subject of Nicholas I. and the Pseudo-Decretals is too vast to be dispatched in a few words; and, independently of Dr. Schulte or Janus, may afford matter for future discussion. They had no more to do in giving to the Holy See her supremacy and infallibility than had the conquests of Tamerlane or of Genghis Khan. We would only remark that the belief, real or pretended, that an obscure forgery of the ninth century, succeeded instantaneously in reversing all the maxims, principles, and practices of the day, in overthrowing the entire framework of Church legislation and doctrine, and replacing it by another wholly different, without outcry, without serious opposition, is belief in a miracle, or rather in an impossibility. And such belief comes with exceeding bad grace from the enlightened men who habitually reject and sneer at the best attested miracles of Church history.

¹ History of Latin Christianity including that of the Popes. By Henry Hart Milman, D.D., Dean of St. Paul's. New York, 1860. Vol. II., p. 73.

BOOK NOTICES.

1. HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. By *Dr. Friedrich Ueberweg*. Translated by *George S. Morris, A.M.* With additions, by *Noah Porter, D.D., LL.D.* 2 vols., pp. 561, 487. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1876.
2. LEHRBUCH DER GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Von *Dr. Albert Stöckl*. Mainz: Verlag von Franz Kirchheim, 1870. 1 vol., pp. 851.

The first of these works has been for some time awaiting a notice at our hands. The reception of the second reminds us of the fact, and we forthwith hasten to review them both together. Dr. Ueberweg's book is quite a popular manual among students and professors of philosophy. To the latter it is indispensable, on account of the exhaustive bibliography attached to each author's name. The best and most trustworthy editions of philosophical works are pointed out. The author seems to have spared no pains to render the work a standard reference-book. In the part treating of Scholasticism he seeks to be fair-minded. Indeed, as a rule, he attempts to give a plain, impartial skeleton of the various systems and doctrines he meets, without interpolating any opinion of his own. If he has remarks to make, as when commenting upon the paralogisms of Spinoza, he makes them in footnotes, so as not to interfere with the outline he places before the reader in the text. The main question here is, How far is that outline a faithful transcript of the system it traces? In order to answer this question satisfactorily, we must test the philosophic temper of the author.

Dr. Ueberweg has a clear, acute, philosophic mind. His definition of philosophy shows that he possesses a correct conception of it; and, it may be added, that this is the first essential for a historian of philosophy. "Philosophy," he says, "is the science of principles." This definition goes nearer to grasping the essence of philosophy than any other the reviewer is acquainted with. Dr. Stöckl squares his definition with his subject-matter. He regards it as an effort of the mind to raise itself to the last analysis of things, considered in their causes; or, to use his own words, it is "the effort to penetrate, by way of discursive thinking, to the highest and last causes of all being—*das Streben, auf dem Wege des discursiven Denkens zu den höchsten und letzten Gründen alles Seienden durchzudringen*" (p. 1). We always prefer a definition taken objectively. There is more truth in it; for it aims rather at giving us the essence of a thing than the mere subjective impression. This definition of Dr. Stöckl tells us of a struggle of the intellect, and an effort to rise higher than surface impressions. But that is not philosophy. For this reason we give preference to Dr. Ueberweg's definition. As the crucial test of a philosopher is in his definitions, let us try another in each of the books under review.

Dr. Ueberweg defines history from a subjective and an objective standpoint. "History, in the objective sense," he says, "is the process by which nature and spirit are developed" (p. 5). We do not think that this is history at all. It may be the organic law of humanity or society, and as such it may form the subject-matter of history, but it is not history. History is a record. Therefore what the author gives as the subjective sense is the only definition of history. "History, in the subjective sense," he says, "is the investigation and statement of this objective development." Dr. Stöckl, in defining the history of

philosophy makes the same objective and subjective distinction (*Lehrbuch*, p. 3). We regard the practice as a pernicious one. It does not clear up one's ideas; it only tends to mystify. Regarding anything subjectively and objectively is only looking at two aspects of it. But it has many more aspects besides. Every different standpoint will give a new aspect. Studying a thing under its various aspects may help us to understand it partially, and to describe it partially, but it will not give us the comprehension of the thing as a whole. For that we must look at it as it simply is.

Another defect we notice in Dr. Ueberweg as a historian, is a lack of versatility of mind. He seems unable to put himself in the place of the philosopher whose system he lays before us. He describes from outside. In this respect he is surpassed by Dr. Stöckl. The latter is, for this reason, not so dry, and writes with a freshness that attracts. On some authors, as Jacob Böhme, for instance, he is much fuller and more accurate. Indeed, he understands the whole subject of mysticism much better than does Ueberweg. And in the whole history of philosophy there is none more difficult. The terminology is strange, and the use of words is peculiar. Thus, in the analysis of Böhme's system Stöckl gives his conception of God in Böhme's own terminology. Therein we read that God is an everlasting Nothing—*er ist ein ewiges Nichts* (p. 567). On the face of it this reads like pure atheism, a total denial of God. But nothing was farther from the conception of Böhme. The Catholic Tauler did not so understand the expression, nor did blessed Henry Suso, and no doubt both of them frequently made use of the expression long before Böhme was born. The expression is descriptive of that mystical state of the soul when it has, in contemplation, ceased to have sensible images of any kind before its mind's eye, and feels itself plunged into a vague indeterminateness, an abyss of calm, that no word can better express than Nothing. Then the soul feels it is holding mystic communion with God. Therefore seeking this state was commonly called seeking the Nothing. We learn that a clergyman, who is himself a philosopher of merit, is about to translate this volume of Stöckl's. We would call his attention to this part of the book, and suggest the propriety and necessity of adding explanatory notes. Besides, Stöckl himself is here to be followed with caution.

And what has here been said of the difficulty of apprehending the mediæval mystics applies with equal force to the ancient pagan philosophers. Here, too, Ueberweg shows his want of versatility. He carries with him everywhere his scale of German transcendentalism, and weighs in it Heraclitus and Pythagoras with the same weight with which he tests Kant or Hegel. He imagines them exercised over the same issues which occupied his own life, while in all probability such ideas never entered their minds. For this reason it seems to us that he places a forced interpretation on several passages in these ancient writers. The leaders of philosophic schools, in Greece especially, took pleasure in making the major part of their teachings esoteric, and for this purpose they veiled them in cabalistic terms. Think you the "fire" of Heraclitus was a literal fire? Neither are we sure of the real import of the teachings of Parmenides or Pythagoras. These are preliminary questions that every historian of philosophy ought to study. In neither of the works before us do they seem to have been taken into consideration to any determinate extent, and in Ueberweg less than in Stöckl.

To Dr. Ueberweg's work are added two appendices. One is by Noah Porter, on English and American philosophy. It is a fresh and agreeable sketch, but it lacks the accuracy of Ueberweg. We do not think

the author appreciates and does justice to the late Doctor Brownson and his philosophy. The influence of *Brownson's Review* upon American, and especially New England, thought, has not been fully recognized as it should have been. And, for a gentleman of Noah Porter's standing, it is somewhat surprising to see him use that vulgar shibboleth, "Romish." However, the sketch of Italian philosophy by Signor Botta is still more objectionable. We learn from the appendix that the Signor was a "Professor of Philosophy in the Royal Colleges of the University of Turin." Perhaps the fact of his having been a professor in more than one college at the same time accounts for his unphilosophic habits of thought. He seems to have a certain acquaintance with the language and methods of some schools of philosophy, but he has neither depth nor acuteness. The traditionalism of Padre Ventura he calls scholasticism. He undertakes to give the principles of the *Civiltà Cattolica*, and he sums them up in supposed propositions drawn from the Syllabus of 1864, without reference to their bearings and connections. We submit to the Signor that the condemning of errors is one thing, and the establishing of principles another and a far different thing. This last is what is within the legitimate sphere of the history of philosophy. We must say that Signor Botta has marred an otherwise useful book. We cannot recommend it to our Catholic colleges. It is to be hoped that the *Lehrbuch* of Stöckl will soon appear in an English dress. It is more convenient, if not more erudite, than Ueberweg's.

THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY. By Herbert Spencer. Vol. I., pp. 704. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1877.

This volume is intended by its author to form part of a system of synthetic philosophy. This is soaring into the highest regions of philosophy. None but superior geniuses attempt the work of synthetic philosophy. Gioberti had an intellect adequate to the task; so had Pierre Leroux; so had Hegel; but these men abused their talent, and their philosophies remain so many wrecks floating upon the sea of thought. Has Herbert Spencer also a genius adequate to the task? We think not. Littré has said that Herbert Spencer was no metaphysician, and we agree with him. He has tact for natural science; he has a certain amount of power of classification; he has great control over language, and facility in inventing terminology, but he lacks philosophic acuteness. Synthetic philosophy requires a principle binding together into a united whole all the various parts. This is what Herbert Spencer has nowhere in his philosophy. He makes all things subordinate to the theory of evolution; but a theory is one thing, a principle is something far different. His early training in the school of Comte gave him the advantage of a new starting-point; it placed many things before him in a novel light. He improved the occasion, and made divergencies enough from his master to draw upon himself the abuse of the Positivists, and to come to be considered the founder of a new school in philosophy. The broadest difference between himself and Comte lies in the fact that whilst the latter merges the individual in humanity, the former merges both individual and humanity in the Cosmos. In details, he reproduces many of the Positivist doctrines, among others that treated of in the volume under review.

In fact, Herbert Spencer in this and his other volumes on the same subject, is only filling up the outline sketched in a masterly manner by Comte. It is Leibnitz who said: *Le présent est gros de l'avenir*. This principle is true enough, and on its misapprehension did Comte build

up his system of sociology. He conceived all results of a political or social movement as necessarily happening, which is far from being the case; whereas he ought not to have gone further than the dictum of Montesquieu, that the same causes acting under the same circumstances ought to produce the same results. In consequence, the doctrine of free-will is, in his opinion, and Herbert Spencer coincides with him, a fictitious belief, based upon one's ignorance of the laws of sociology. For this reason he classifies the new science with the natural sciences. "Now," says he, "that the human mind has established celestial physics, terrestrial physics, whether mechanical or chemical organic physics, whether vegetable or animal, it remains for it to terminate the system of the sciences of observation, by establishing social physics" (*Philosophie Positive*, I., p. 22). Accordingly, he divides it into social statics, or the laws of social coexistence, and social dynamics, or "that continuous succession seen in the whole of humanity—*cette succession continuë, envisagée dans l'ensemble de l'humanité*" (ibid., t. 4, p. 263). And Herbert Spencer takes the same materialistic view of social science. He has a special treatise on social statics. But in the present volume he shifts his basis of discussion from physics to physiology. Such a mode of reasoning is only analogy. Now, it is a problem that seems never to have entered the brain of either Mr. Spencer or M. Comte, how far, if at all, analogy can be made the basis of any science.

Can the *aná-lógos* ever take the place of the *lógos*? And if not, does not all the reasoning of both Mr. Herbert Spencer and his master topple to the ground? Not that there may not be constructed a science of sociology. But we fear neither Positivist nor Cosmist can give it an adequate expression. They begin at the wrong end. They defy history and tradition and the noblest instincts of human nature.

Principles of Sociology is occupied with subjects of moment and interest. The first 400 pages are devoted to the explanation of the "Primitive Man," physically, emotionally, and intellectually considered. Therein are we served up an account of how we came to think we have such a thing as a soul, and what led us to believe in a future life and in a Supreme Being. We must confess we found the dish rather insipid, not on account of the matter presented, but rather because of the cooking. There is too much hash for our stomach. True, Mr. Spencer felt that the whole was rather difficult to swallow, so he added some condiment in the shape of an insult to the intelligence of Catholics, by making their belief in the Real Presence a criterion of incongruity of reason (p. 185). Here is a taste of the intellectual food Mr. Spencer prepares for his readers. It is an attempt to account for the origin of worship. Of course, you imagine the author dealing with man's sense of the mysteriousness of nature and the hidden powers that control its energies. But that is an antiquated hypothesis. Herbert Spencer has a span-new one. It is a genuine ghost story. "The awe of the ghost," he says, "makes sacred the sheltering-place of the tomb, and this grows into the temple; while the tomb itself becomes the altar. From provisions placed for the dead, now habitually and now at fixed intervals, arise religious oblations, ordinary and extraordinary—daily and at festivals. Immolations and mutilations at the grave pass into sacrifices and offerings of blood at the altar of a deity. Abstinence from food for the benefit of the ghost develops into fasting as a pious practice; and journeys to the grave with gifts become pilgrimages to the shrine. Praises of the dead and prayers to them grow into religious praises and prayers. And so every religious rite is derived from a funeral rite." (P. 446.) Now is not this a sweet tidbit of evolutionism? Well, grant Mr. Spen-

cer his premises, and you will be compelled to take it all down, and absurdities still greater. If man has developed from the lower forms of life—if the most degraded conditions of savage life are the primitive states of society—if language is a human invention, and law and order the result of experience, slow and gradual—and Church and religion institutions of fictitious value—then—. *If!* This is the last word to which an analysis of Mr. Spencer's position reduces him. His whole system hangs upon that word *if*. And the misfortune is, he has disciples who upon that same word—frail, slender, untrustworthy though it be—hang their eternal destiny. For this reason, *Principles of Sociology* is a pernicious book. It furnishes scoffers at religion with many new and telling points.

Herbert Spencer and Auguste Comte both belie history when they represent the savage as the type of primitive man. He is representative rather of the old age of society. It is an historical fact that no nation by its own individual efforts ever raised itself out of the savage state into civilization; that is the work of education. It is also an historical fact that no language, be its imperfections what they may, ever changed its essential grammatical structure for that of another, no matter how rich in idiom and expression. And when we study the beginnings of Oriental history, we look in vain for a barbaric period. "Egyptian civilization," says Mariette Bey, "manifests itself to us fully developed from the earliest ages, and succeeding ones, however numerous, taught it little more." (*Aperçu de l'Histoire d'Egypte*.) Renan expresses the same opinion. And speaking of China, Ferguson says: "At the earliest period at which Chinese history opens upon us, we find the same amount of civilization maintaining itself utterly unprogressively to the present day." (*History of Architecture*, I., p. 83.) We assure the reader that there is not a single fact in the *Principles of Sociology* that cannot be explained, not by supposing, but by remembering, the fact that the savage life is the old age of society, and its degraded and inane state is like that into which old persons fall when they are said to enter on their second childhood.

INTRODUCTIO IN SACRAM SCRIPTURAM ad usum Scholarum Pont. Seminarii Romani et Collegii Urbani, auctore *Ubaldo Ubaldi*, Presbytero Romano, SS. Literarum Prof. Vol. I., *Introductio Critica*, Pars Prima. Romæ: ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1877. Large octavo.

This is a volume extorted from him, as the author assures us, by the importunity of disciples and friends. And if ever importunity might be called tolerable, and more than that, praiseworthy, it was surely so in this case. Many of our clergy who had never seen Dr. Ubaldi before, learned to know and admire him during his short visit to our shores some two years ago in the company of the Papal Ablegate, Monseigneur Roncetti. If they will only read this book, in which he gives out the treasures accumulated during years of study, they will know him better and admire him still more. It is a work of singular excellence, and with the learned world will confirm and add to the high reputation which he has long enjoyed as professor.

Dr. Ubaldi (p. 9) refuses, and justly, in our opinion, to follow the practice of German Biblical scholars, who restrict to *Biblical Criticism* alone the name of "Introduction to Sacred Scripture." As the name indicates, it should include everything that *introduces* or leads the way to the study and understanding of Scripture. Why appropriate to a part what belongs rightfully to the whole? Hence Dr. Ubaldi aptly

divides the Introduction into three parts. The first, Biblical Criticism, which establishes the value and authority of the Scriptures so as to make of them a trustworthy source or witness to which the theologian can confidently appeal when he wishes to prove religious truth or refute human error that rebels against it. The second is Hermeneutics, which lays down the law of interpretation, viz., the only true method by which it can be lawful to explain and understand the Sacred Text; for it is evident that a code which contains the New Law, viz., the Faith which the Christian world has to believe and the Ordinances which it must obey, requires some fixed standard of interpretation, and must not be dependent on a capricious system, or rather want of all system, as is now the case with non-Catholics generally, whether so-called believers or professed unbelievers. The third part is known as Biblical Archæology, and comprises those aids which are derived from the manners, customs, geography, etc., of the Jews and their neighbors; in a word, from what are called Jewish Antiquities. This part Dr. Ubaldi proposes to omit, considering that the student may find it sufficiently well treated by Glaire in his Introduction, and in a special volume by Ackermann, who revised and corrected the rationalizing tendencies of Jahn. This we regret, as many travellers from the time when Glaire and Ackermann wrote, down to the late English Archæological Commission, have thrown fresh light on many subjects, and have made some discoveries of interest, if not of importance, in the topography of Jerusalem and other places in the Holy Land.

Besides (and this remark we respectfully recommend to Dr. Ubaldi's attention, should he ever reconsider his plan and decide to give his pupils the elements of Biblical Archæology, either as a part of the introduction or in a volume apart), would it not be well to include in this third part, or in an appendix to it, some account, however brief, of those discoveries made by Egyptian and Assyrian scholars which confirm the truth of the Scripture narrative? It may be said that a commentary would be a more appropriate place in which to mention, under their respective passages, those things which have been illustrated or vindicated by the researches of Egyptology and Assyriology. True: but such a commentary does not now exist, nor is it likely to be written soon. And when it does appear, it is not likely that among the few who may purchase it will be found any seminarian. The same may be said of the learned works in which these researches are unfolded; they are generally academic essays or society records, inaccessible to students and to most of our clergymen. We only venture the suggestion on the ground that our students ought to have *some* knowledge of these things; and, if they do not get it at this point of the course, they are not likely to get it afterwards. And, after all, the very name of Biblical Archæology seems to favor its introduction at this period of Bible study. A brief summary (thrown into an appendix, if you will) is all that can be expected, and will be sufficient to give them what they need to know on a subject of much importance. If they feel interested in the study, as will be the case with some, they will pursue it afterwards with the aid of the best sources.

Professor Ubaldi subdivides his first or "critical" part of the Introduction into three sections, the first of which discusses the human or *historical* authority of the sacred books, the second their divine or *canonical* authority. The third is called the *critica verbalis* or verbal criticism of the text, and examines the amount of authority that attaches to the smallest portions, and even to the very words themselves of the sacred text. With this volume the author concludes the first section, so that

we may expect from him not only a second but perhaps a third volume. We sincerely hope that no fear of being considered diffuse or prolix will prevent him from giving us a full and complete introduction. Our theological students need such a classbook, and Dr Ubaldi is just the writer to provide it. If too large for small seminaries or a limited course, it can be abridged, and the author hints in the Preface that he may some day, if necessary, reduce the present work into a compendary form. But for our collèges and large seminaries, and for the clergy who have leisure to study, a book is needed which will exhibit and refute the latest objections made in the name and under the pretext of science against the book of God's Revelation. These enemies of Holy Scripture are coming forward daily with new weapons, new modes of attack, and we have only to fight them on their own ground and with the weapons of their own choosing.

Dr. Ubaldi has done this well; and we need only refer to his chapters on the Mosaical account of the creation and of man's origin. He ably refutes the geological systems invented by irreligion to throw doubt or discredit on the statements of the inspired historian. He is thoroughly acquainted with all that is objected from the ages of stone, brass, and iron, the lacustrine dwellings, etc., and disposes of them in a satisfactory way. We might add his treatment of the so-called fragmentary hypothesis, and how he confutes it not only on intrinsic grounds, but by insisting on the important point that while pompously prating about Jehovistic and Elohist fragments, no two rationalists scarcely can agree in fixing the authorship of this or that fragment.

This is one of the best and at the same time most tangible arguments against these men of false science, and ought to be pressed against them not only in this but in all other matters, in which their impiety lifts up its blasphemous mouth against God and His teaching.

Dr. Ubaldi's style, it may be added, is clear and lucid, and even elegant, as far as is compatible with the didactic form which he is compelled to use.

LIVES OF THE SAINTS, compiled from authentic sources; with a Practical Instruction on the Life of each Saint, for every day in the year. By F. X. Weninger, D.D., S. J. Vol. II. New York: P. O'Shea, Publisher, 1876. Royal oct., pp. 837.

We have already in a previous number called attention to the first volume of this most useful work. There can be no better book to put in the hands not only of Catholics but of those also who are outside of the Church. Many (more, indeed, than is generally supposed) are in this sad condition *vizio parentum*, by fault of their progenitors rather than their own. They have no blind hatred of the truth, and if they have prejudices contracted from a narrow education, are willing to discard them when better informed. For such "men of good will" there is no better book than the *Lives of the Saints*. Controversy has in it almost of its very nature something that tends to embitter and exasperate; to throw a man on the defensive, especially where the case is weak, puts him upon his mettle, and too often encourages pride and obstinacy. But the argument of example, appealing gently and silently through the pages of a book, succeeds far better not only in convincing but, what is more important, in persuading. It finds its way to the heart, and with God's grace often proves irresistible. The reader discovers by imperceptible but sure degrees where holiness, that unerring mark of the true church, is to be found. In other churches there is much talk about holy life, and its maxims are laid down, for the better class in books,

for those of the vulgar sort through the pulpit and the religious newspaper in a jargon that is not unfrequently revolting to good taste as well as to true piety. But how many go beyond the theory or its jargon? The mediocrity of outward goodness, the godliness which shows itself that it "may be seen of men," is the highest summit to which they seem able to aspire. Humility, the foundation of all Christian virtue, is as unknown to their speech as to their practice, in its Christian acceptance. The word has for them the same idea that *ταπεινότης* and *humilitas* had for the haughty Roman and the corrupt Greek of heathen times, "want of spirit, cowardice, abjectness of soul," and nothing more. Love of the cross is essential to sanctity, for sanctity consists in following Christ, and the way in which he walked was the way of suffering and self-abnegation. He tells us that they alone are perfect who resemble their Master; and to the young man who sought a higher holiness than the bare observance of the Ten Commandments he made answer, "If thou wilt be perfect . . . come, follow me" (Luke vi. 40; Matt. xix. 21). Where are the footsteps of those who tread the pathway of the cross, to be found outside of the Church? Where are we to look amongst non-Catholics for the tests of self-denial proposed in the New Testament, the fasts and vigils, the penances, the voluntary austerities preached and practiced by St. Paul (1 Cor. ix. 27; 2 Cor. xi. 27)? It would be well if they were merely unknown; but, what is worse, they are denounced and derided as relics of ignorance and superstition.

On the other hand all these features of holiness that love to take up the cross and follow Christ, are easily recognized in the Catholic Church and the innumerable saints that adorn her calendar. And even those who are strangers to her belief, who with no unworthy disposition read the glorious lives of the martyrs, confessors, virgins, and other saints, must soon come to admire them. Admiration will beget affection; and if God's grace is not thwarted, if it is allowed to have its way, the result cannot be long doubtful. They will begin to sigh for and crave, and will end by obtaining fellowship with those great saints through the communion of that Church which alone could be the mother of such patterns of holiness.

This, it may not be denied, is only an indirect use of books like the one before us, and not the one primarily intended by the compilers. Nevertheless we have dwelt on it, because we fear it is too much neglected and much good thereby lost. To one who manifests a wish to inquire into our doctrines and practices, a Catholic friend or neighbor will usually hand a copy of Milner, Wiseman, Manning, or other controversial writer, and think that enough has been done by placing their powerful arguments in the hands of the inquirer. But very often it is not enough. Argument may convince, but example attracts. While the intellect is beginning to yield assent, the heart likewise must be wrought upon and moved. Milner and Wiseman must be supplemented by *Lives of the Saints* and other devout reading.

Of course the principal use of such books, and the main object of their authors is to make Catholics acquainted, as they should be, but unfortunately are not, with the lives and actions of those great and holy men who have shed their lustre on the Church of Ages. We are all anxious and insist that our children should know everything connected with the lives of our Revolutionary heroes. And in fact, when called up and questioned, they can give plentiful and minute details of what was done by the Washingtons, and Franklins, the Waynes, Putnams, and Allens, the Sumters, and Marions of Revolutionary fame. But how much do they know of the holy martyrs, Laurence and Vincent, of

the apostles of the North, Augustine and Boniface, of the great modern restorer of church discipline, St. Charles Borromeo? Such ignorance is a shameful reproach to them, but more to the adult generation. If other churches had any of our saints, they would carefully impress their glorious deeds upon the tender mind of every Sunday-school child. At best, they have only a few counterfeits; yet they make the most of them. We have the genuine coin, and yet far from prizing it as we should and giving it circulation, we allow it to lie unheeded or buried in the earth. How can the Catholic duly honor and imitate saints, of whose existence in general he has a vague idea, but knows none of them in particular? Yet it was for this that God has given us the saints.

F. Weninger did not intend to write a critical history of the saints. Hence, he has no difficulty in using occasionally those legends which the pious fancy of our forefathers used to interweave with the strictly historical account of some early and mediæval saints. The publishers promise an additional volume of saints recently canonized or beatified, by the same author.

ELEMENTS OF ECCLESIASTICAL LAW, compiled with reference to the Syllabus, the Constitution "Apostolicæ Sedis" of Pope Pius IX., the Council of the Vatican, and the latest Decisions of the Roman Congregations. Adapted especially to the discipline of the Church in the United States. By *Rev. S. B. Smith, D.D.*, formerly Professor of Canon Law. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1877. 8vo., pp. 261.

This book of Dr. Smith is intended as the first of two volumes which will constitute a treatise on canon law, adapted to the needs of theological students in this country, where, as many say, and some really think, there is no canon law. Nothing could be more unreasonable than this assertion, and the author plainly shows it. We have the whole common law, and as much of statute law as our circumstances will allow. Dr. S. gives proof of much reading and a careful study of the subjects which he discusses. He does not shrink occasionally from freedom of speech, but there is nothing in the tone or temper of his remarks, as far as we have read, that any one could reasonably object to. If the author intended it for a textbook for seminaries, why did he not write it in Latin? The habit now coming into vogue of writing theological textbooks in the vernacular is not to be commended for many reasons. Besides, it is a breach of time-honored discipline, and one novelty is too often the mother of many others. As it is, the author has to fall back often on Latin, and fills his pages with it, so as to prove a stumbling-block to some readers.

BESIDE THE WESTERN SEA: A collection of Poems. By *Marie* (Harriet M. Skidmore). With an introduction by the *Most Rev. J. S. Alemany, D.D.*, Archbishop of San Francisco. New York: P. O'Shea, publisher, 1877. 8vo., pp. 534.

No one can open Marie's book and read a page or less without feeling the better of it, for it is true poetry. Oh that all those who are weary and heartsore with the perusal of the false, maudlin lays that first charm, then pervert, and finally sicken with disgust the children of the world, would take up this book and read it! As soon as they opened its pages they would find themselves in a new world. Its sweet and holy strain would attune their hearts to something higher and better than they ever knew before.

How few Catholics were aware that we possessed such a poet as Marie until the publication of her volumes! She has creative fancy, lofty thought, harmonious numbers, happy choice of words—everything that makes the poet. And she has another unailing test of true poetry. The

simplest and most ordinary things become under her pen things of grandeur and dignity, and what causes this is not stilted metaphor, nor grandiloquent phrase, but the quiet magic of one or two words. If she have a defect at all, which we will not admit, it may be this: the splendor of her poetic atmosphere is perpetual, and the rich vesture in which she decks her fancies is gemmed with almost regal profusion.

The very first poem which our eye fell upon in opening the book at random gave us a high idea of Marie's power. It was "The Precious Blood" (p. 203), and when we saw the light, lilting metre in which such a lofty theme was to be sung, we feared that its solemnity would be impaired, perhaps lowered to the point of desecration. Let any one read it, and see how unjust was our fear. We should like to give a specimen of her style, but know not how to discriminate in our selection, so we choose the first piece that comes to hand. She is speaking of Christ's Spouse, the Church, and the poem borrows its title from its last line:

THE BRIDE THAT NEVER GROWETH OLD.

Not hers the life that waxeth old,
Its face and form of earthly mould.
Not hers the beauty carved from clay,
That bears the brand of dark decay.
She dwells in youth's immortal prime,
Nor dreads the ruthless hand of time,
For never can its touch erase
The radiance of her royal face,
Nor spot nor wrinkle e'er may blight
Her cheek of bloom and brow of light.
Her life-spring flows from source divine,
Her form is truth's eternal shrine:
No clinging trace of earthly clod
May mar the beauteous bride of God!
E'en when the primal curse began
To work its woe on fallen man,
She came, in types yet veiled and dim,
To trace the heavenward way for him.
She dwelt in Israel's lonely tent,
In long Egyptian banishment;
On crimson sea, o'er desert drear,
She cheered his path of gloom and fear, etc.—P. 153.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF DISTINGUISHED MARYLANDERS. By *Esmeralda Boyle*, author of "Thistle-Down," "Felice," etc. Baltimore: Kelly, Piet & Co., 1877. 8vo., pp. 374.

A good readable book in pleasant style, and containing two hitherto unpublished letters of General Washington. The fair authoress does not pretend to give a collection of all the worthies of Maryland, but only a selection from each class, civil and political, literary, military, etc. The period extends from the foundation of the colony to our own times, and includes those who distinguished themselves in the earliest period as well as some noble souls who gallantly threw themselves into the death-struggle of our own day.

DE DEO CREANTE. Prælectiones Scholastico-Dogmaticæ quas in Collegio SS. Cordis Jesu ad Woodstock maxima studiorum Domo Soc. Jesu in Fœd. Americæ Sept. Statibus habebat A.D. MDCCCLXXVI.—VII. *Camillus Masella*, S. J., in eod. Coll. Studior, Præfector et Theologiæ Dogmat. Professor. Woodstock, Marylandiæ: Ex-Officina Typographica Collegii, 1877. 8vo., pp. 935.

We regret that the late hour at which we received these *Prælectiones* prevents us from noticing them as we should wish in this number. We

can only recommend it to the clergy as an excellent treatise. From a note on the flyleaf we see that it can be procured from Rev. F. M. McDonough (treasurer), Woodstock College, Howard County, Md.

SHAKSPEARE, FROM AN AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW. By *George Wilkes*. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1877. 8vo. pp. 471.

This work abounds in just and acute critical remarks on Shakspeare. Had the author taken pains to inform himself thoroughly upon Catholic doctrine and Catholic usages, and had he rid himself of his prejudices against the Church, he would have written a better and a more useful book. The book seems to have arisen from the absurd controversy concerning the authorship of the Shakspearian plays. The author takes issue against those who hold that Lord Bacon wrote them, and lays stress upon proving two points: first, that Shakspeare was a Catholic, and secondly, that he was not a people's man. For these two reasons he argues that Shakspeare is not a proper universal manual for American democracy and American Protestantism. He certainly proves that all Shakspeare's better instincts and sympathies were Catholic. Alas, for Shakspeare! Now that it is a proved fact that he is a Catholic, is it not time for a certain individual who writes anti-Catholic articles for a certain anti-Catholic *weekly*, to begin to vilify him? And, in the meantime, Mr. Wilkes might find leisure to prove that King James's Bible was translated with some inaccuracies from a Catholic Bible; we think it would help to settle the question of the use of the Bible in the public schools. Afterwards, he might show how the Book of Common Prayer is, the greater part of it, a translation of the Catholic Mass-Book, with some few changes to suit the fashions of the day. Then, he, or somebody else, could show how far Milton is indebted to the Catholic Cedmon, the Catholic Avitus, and the Catholic Audreini, for the excellencies in his *Paradise Lost*. A new book might then be made from all these, composed of what is exclusively Protestant in them. It would be a very small and a very uninteresting book. In good truth it is too late for Mr. Wilkes, or anybody else, to begin to quarrel with an author because he is a Catholic. For the last decade of centuries we have been living upon Catholic thought, and whatever is worth preserving in the most decidedly Protestant writers has its roots in Catholicity. It were far more graceful to accept the situation.

ITALIAN MASS, for two voices. Arranged and published by *Edwin F. McGonigle*. Philadelphia: J. M. Armstrong, Musical Typographer, Philadelphia, 1877. 4to., pp. 32.

This Mass, for which in its new form of arrangement we are indebted to the patient labor of Prof. McGonigle, possesses two qualities that are its highest praise. In the first place it has a charming simplicity; and next its harmonies, however sweet, never fall short of that grave, solemn character which befits all that is to be sung, or said, or done during the celebration of the Sacred Mysteries. As it is for two voices only and can be easily learned, it is admirably suited to chapels, country churches, and small choirs, that from want of numbers, or of skilful training, or of sufficient opportunity to practice, cannot attempt pieces of more elaborate composition. In saying this, however, we are merely recommending the Mass as easy and simple, not derogating from its merits. On the contrary, it is certain that if this Mass were properly sung in the grandest of our cathedrals by a large number of the best-trained singers, it would fill with delight the ears of the assembled thousands, and

awaken deep religious feeling in their hearts, provided always that they be Christians in some degree and not mere fashionable worldlings or *dilettanti* who despise all music that can afford to dispense with screaming and trilling, with the *gorgheggio*, the *tosse di capra*, and other fanciful points of difficult execution. Such persons are, for the most part, as ignorant of music as they are innocent of devotion.

The present Mass was intended, no doubt, by the composer to be sung, not by a few, but by many male baritone voices. It is *then* that its holy harmonies obtain their due expression and come out in all their intrinsic beauty. Whoever listens to it performed under these conditions, is almost tempted to believe that the solemn majestic tones of many organs have been, as it were by sudden magic, transformed into so many intelligent, articulate voices, to utter the praises of the Most High in a way not altogether unworthy of His Divine majesty. And he who has thus heard it once will never care to hear again what is called fashionable sacred music in the House of God.

SUMMA SUMMÆ, scilicet Summæ Theologicæ Divi Thomæ Aquinatis Analytico-Syntheticæ Synopsis. In usum scholarum clericalium ad mentem Divi Thomæ in questionibus occurrentibus, præsertim philosophicis, certius citiusque aperiendam, necnon ipsius Summæ et gratiorem et utiliorem reddendam confecit ac edidit T. J. O'Mahony, in Sac. Theol. et Jur. Canon, Doctor, etc. Dublinii: apud M. H. Gill et Filium, 1877. 8vo., pp. 108.

St. Thomas is the great model of theologians, and his works an immense treasure-house, whence endless stores may be drawn by patient study. Indeed, it is not too much to say, that one becomes more and more of a theologian in proportion as he learns to appreciate what has been written by that great Doctor. Foremost among his works is the *Summa*, which soon after its appearance became, and remained for ages (what Peter Lombard's *Sentences* had been before), the textbook of all the schools, to be elucidated but never replaced by the teacher's commentary. The study of the holy Doctor's works, after having declined during the last two centuries, has begun to revive in our day; and the many editions published of late, not only of the *Summa*, but also of other works by the old divines, go far to show that the scholastic form of theology is fast recovering the favor it once enjoyed, and which seemed to have passed away forever.

The work of Doctor O'Mahony is a proof that this revival of scholastic fervor and of the study of St. Thomas, has spread from the schools of the Continent of Europe to those of Great Britain and Ireland. The "synopsis" (of which this is only a first instalment) must be of the greatest advantage to every student of St. Thomas, for it is a complete guide to the Saint's doctrine, not alphabetical, nor in the language of the compiler, but by order of matter, and everywhere in the very words of the angelic Doctor himself. It is a work which required great skill and no little labor, and those who carefully use it will soon learn how much they owe to the patient zeal of the learned professor.

THE LIFE OF CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS. By Rev. Arthur George Knight, S. J. The Catholic Publication Society. New York, 1877.

Father Knight has done a meritorious work in putting forth this volume. The real character of Columbus has been greatly misunderstood. Justice has been scarcely done him as a navigator and discoverer, and that, too, tardily; but his character as a pure, virtuous man, a sagacious, prudent, and firm administrator, a consistent, devout, heroic Christian,

have never, before the publication of this book, been properly placed before the English reader.

Father Knight has successfully vindicated the character of Columbus in all these respects. He shows clearly that Columbus was far more than a bold, adventurous, and skilful mariner, and a diligent and successful student of geography and kindred physical sciences; he proves that he was no mean theologian, that he possessed eminent ability as a legislator and administrator, and was, both by nature and by grace, well fitted to be a leader and ruler of men, and, what is of more consequence, a Christian of devout and saintly life.

Father Knight brings to view what is ignored in all other English biographies of Columbus we are acquainted with, that an ever-present and pervading sense of a divine mission filled his mind; that it was the all-powerful motive of all he did, led him to persevere despite repeated discouragements and disappointments, and sustained him under a weight of false accusations, ingratitude, ill treatment, and calumnies, that otherwise would have crushed him.

The work is written in pleasing style; the statements on controverted points are supported by references and documentary evidence or other sufficient proof, so that it is not only an interesting but a valuable contribution to the history of the discovery of the New World.

FORTHCOMING WORK BY FATHER THEBAUD, S. J.—We are glad to learn that *The Church and the Gentile World at the First Promulgation of the Gospel*, by Father Thebaud, will soon be published. It will be a most interesting book, and will bring out or put in clearer light some facts in the history of Christianity and the Church which have been unknown or overlooked till our day. See a fuller account on advertising sheet.

CORRESPONDENCE.

WE have received from the estimable author of *Monotheism* the following letter, in which he unfolds the plan and purpose of his book, and invites all fair, intelligent judges to read, weigh, and decide upon it accordingly.

VERY REVEREND SIR: In page 654 of your *Review* (number for October, 1876) there occurs the following passage:

"We cannot escape from the necessity of being painfully aware of the generally lamentable inadequacy of the attempt on the Christian side to point out to an honest inquirer the hand of God visibly guiding the nations during the long checkered reign of this 'Gentilism,' the latter years of which were marked by so deplorable an alienation of the nations from the truths of the original Revelation. Father Thebaud speaks of his own work as being of *so vast and exalted a nature as to inspire with fear the heart of any one who should make the bold attempt.*"

This passage was followed by the promise, in some future number of the *Review*, of a contribution towards this very work, which is really a part of the debt that Christian science and learning owe to the great multitudes of people who, through the prevailing vast spread of popular knowledge, are now able to pick up smatterings of information on nearly every imaginable subject, that they may at least not be left to grope about in their own helplessness without the aid of some kindly hand stretched out to lead them out of their errors.

. . . In the meantime, however, the general duty above described as the

debt which Christian science and learning owe to the vast multitude has made a little step in advance, the value of which awaits the verdict that I hope in a reasonable course of time will be pronounced upon it. The step in question is the publication in a separate volume, of an argument by which it is shown what a large amount of strictly historical evidence has survived the lapse of time ; which requires that the early history of the city of Rome, as commonly understood and taught, should undergo a most important rectification, according to which this one chosen city of the world, which is before the eyes of all the nations of the earth at the present moment as the centre of Christian unity for all the people of the earth, was by no means the idolatrous city from its first origin which it is commonly represented as being.

This much being explained, the following seven headings contain an outline of the course pursued in the investigation :

I. That except Rome had received the knowledge of Monotheism from the Hebrew people, the continuity of the Divine rule of government as regards the preceding imperial powers would be broken off in a manner for which no sufficient reason appears.

II. That ample evidence exists to prove not only the possibility of Rome thus obtaining the knowledge of Monotheism, but the necessity the city was under of making Monotheism the foundation of the political state.

III. That the Christian testimony beginning with St. Paul, is clear and precise, that Rome in the beginning did possess the knowledge of Monotheism, and that she acquired it from the Hebrew people.

IV. That the literature of the Augustan age was under an insuperable necessity to conceal the truth of the early Monotheism of the city.

V. That in spite of this necessity the classic literature contains a superabundance of evidence confirmatory of the Christian testimony.

VI. That on the application of two most searching tests, each issues in the clearest result, thus proving that the political state of Rome was originally founded on the Monotheism of the Hebrew people.

VII. That otherwise it would be found a simple impossibility to reconcile the known characteristics of the rise and growth of the Roman sovereignty over the world with the Christian belief in the Divine rule and government over the events of history.

The above is necessarily a very imperfect outline of the contents of the volume, but, imperfect as it may be, it still, I hope, contains sufficient evidence that I have not raised the question in any other than a very serious way, and that it quite entitles me to say to all who have leisure time to study and examine the question, Gentlemen, what is your verdict ? Is the city of Rome guilty of the sin of idolatry from her first origin, or is she not guilty ?

. . . . I may, I hope, count upon your kind co-operation in making known to the readers of the *American Catholic Quarterly Review* the existence of the volume containing the above-mentioned evidence respecting the city of Rome, and in conveying to them my very respectful invitation to the effect how much I desire that they should take a foremost part in giving the American verdict on the question which it has been given to me, at least to put into the way of being in due time laid before the judgment of all the various nations of the world, all of whom we may not fail to observe have an equal right to a voice in the verdict to be given.

I remain, Very Reverend Sir,

Your very faithful servant,

HENRY FORMBY.

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THE NUNCIO AND TWO VICARS APOSTOLIC.

ADDA, LEYBURN, AND GIFFARD.

ON the 3d of July, 1687, a procession was seen slowly winding along the streets of Windsor and passing through the gates of the royal castle. It was long since such a cortege had been seen in England, and the singular spectacle gave rise to various emotions. Great multitudes had flocked to the town, and it was impossible for them all to find food and lodging. Many carriages emblazoned with arms stood by the roadside all day, while the lords and ladies in them waited for the show. Even among them there was every variety of opinion, no less than among the foot passengers who had toiled along dusty roads. There were some who, strong in their Protestant and Puritan feelings, regarded this exhibition as an ominous tempting of the Almighty, and could scarcely repress the bitter words and execrations which they thought meet for expressing their indignation. There were others who looked on with transports of delight, believing it to be a prelude to the liberty, if not the ascendancy, of their long-persecuted faith. A Catholic king was on the throne, a Catholic queen was his spouse, and he was not ashamed or afraid to profess his loyalty to the ancient creed.

The procession did not appear till late in the afternoon, and it was headed by the Knight Marshal's men on horseback. A long train of running footmen followed, and then a royal coach, in which sat Ferdinand, Count of Adda, Archbishop of Amasia, and Papal Nuncio at the court of James-II. He was dressed in the purple

proper to his office, and a bright gold cross glittered on his breast. The equipages of the principal courtiers and ministers were swollen in number by the coaches of Cartwright, Bishop of Chester, and Crewe, Bishop of Durham, whose arms and liveries caused no small disgust in the minds of Protestant beholders.

Two months before, Adda had been consecrated as Archbishop, *in partibus*, by the king's express command, in the chapel of St. James Palace. The officiating prelates were Leyburn, of whom I shall have more to say presently, and two bishops from Ireland. The public were admitted through open doors, and even Puritans, anxious to secure the royal favors, were found among the spectators. The queen, in the evening, received a large number of favored guests in her own apartments, and, Adda being there in his episcopal attire, James fell on his knees before all his courtiers and implored a blessing. We shall have reason to see in the sequel that if the king had been more consistent in his private conduct, if he had not outraged the laws of England, which he had solemnly engaged to observe, and if he had, without the smallest sacrifice of principle, been less demonstrative in the outward observance of his religion, he might have promoted its interests enormously, and left to subsequent rulers an example of toleration, justice, and prudence. Had he listened to the advice he uniformly received from Rome, this would have been his course; a course no less creditable to himself than fortunate for the nation. His secret immoralities probably lay at the root of his insane mode of government, perverted his judgment, and engendered in his mind the presumptuous hope of atoning for habitual violation of the moral law by outward zeal for the Church whose precepts he transgressed.

The consecration of Adda, though a striking ceremony, was eclipsed by the procession of which I have spoken. It is impossible at this distance of time to say what illustrious converts were present at the pageant. But we can easily guess the names of several amongst them. There may have been seen Cecil, Earl of Salisbury, whose descendant has lately been the ambassador of England at the conference in Constantinople on the Eastern question. There too may have been Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough, general, courtier, and diplomat, now old and infirm. William Wycherley, the writer of comedies, may have been looking on, and near him one better known to posterity and more highly appreciated, John Dryden. He, too, would have advised his majesty to take moderate measures, for we find him saying in one of his letters, "Oh that our monarch would encourage noble idleness by his own example, as he of blessed memory did before him. For my mind misgives me that he will not much advance his affairs by stirring."

Severe as Lord Macaulay's strictures are on many of the Catholics who surrounded King James, he has a good word to say for Adda in several parts of his history. He was, he wrote, sent to London charged to inculcate moderation both by admonition and example. He was not possessed of eminent abilities, but had a mild temper and courtly manners. He did not at first assume a public character, but passed for a foreigner of rank whom curiosity had brought to London. He was treated with high consideration and appeared daily at court. He did all in his power to diminish the odium inseparable from the office he filled, and to restrain the rash zeal of his royal master, declaring that nothing could be more directly injurious to the interests of the Church than a rupture between the King and his Parliament. In all this he was amply seconded by Dr. Leyburn, and supported by Pope Innocent himself. The interesting dispatches of Adda, copied from the Papal archives, are preserved in the British Museum, and afford abundant testimony as to the real nature of the advice which James received from his ecclesiastical superiors. They were all impressed with the necessity of his keeping on good terms with his Parliament if he expected to advance his religion and retain his throne.

Father Petre, indeed, a Jesuit of great influence at the royal court, appears to have been less moderate in his counsels, but then he did not speak with the same authority as the nuncio and Leyburn. There is reason to believe that the King intended to confer upon him the Archbishopric of York, and kept the see unoccupied several years for that purpose. But no Jesuit could be appointed bishop without a dispensation, and Innocent XI could not be induced to grant such a dispensation to Father Petre.

The patience of Lord Castlemaine, the English envoy at Rome, became exhausted, and he complained bitterly that no countenance was shown at the apostolic see to him and the Marshal d'Humières, the ambassadors of the two Catholic kings of England and France. He bluntly declared to the Pope that unless he had reason to expect a change of measures he would immediately quit the papal court, to which Innocent returned the laconic answer, "*Lei epadrone.*" He desired his nuncio, however, to demand satisfaction from the King for the insult offered to him by the ambassador. James recalled Castlemaine to England, but gave him a place in the council. By means of Rinaldo d'Este the King renewed his solicitations in behalf of Father Petre, not now that he should be made an archbishop, but that he might receive a cardinal's hat. In the meantime he named him Clerk of the Closet, and he was authorized to take his seat among the privy councillors.

In one of his dispatches Adda terms the King's quarrel with the Parliament *una gran disgrazia*, and repeatedly hints that his majesty

Four years later, George Blackwell was appointed Archbishop of England, by letter of Cardinal Henry Caietan,*Cardinal Protector of that kingdom, and this was done by command of Clement VII. Owing to the exceptional character of the times, many faculties were granted to him which are commonly restricted to bishops, and twelve assistants were to aid him with their counsels. He was particularly warned not to exceed his faculties, not to publish laws or statutes, nor to fulminate censures against laymen, nor to suspend or deprive of faculty any priest without consent of the Cardinal Protector.

It would be foreign to my purpose to go into the minute history of the Church during the Archpriesthood of Blackwell and his successors, or I might show how a new trial of Catholic loyalty presented itself in the person of the appellants, who maintained the lawfulness of subjection and obedience to the queen, to which some of them added the compromise of frequenting Protestant temples and churches. George Blackwell himself, the Archpriest, fell into the trap, but it did not save him from persecution, for he was arrested and forced to confess himself Archpriest and Superior of the Priests on the English Mission. Though he tried, by abject submission to the ruling powers, to screen himself from suffering, he was deprived by the Pope of his office of Archpriest, and died in prison in 1613.

At the period of Blackwell's deprivation, five years before his death, he was succeeded by George Birkhead or Birket—the proper names of that period are variously spelled—and he received faculties which enabled him to deprive all priests who had taken the oath to the queen and failed to make satisfactory amends for betraying their Master's cause. He ascertained, however, by strict examination, that only twenty priests out of five hundred, scattered through England, had taken the oath. Extraordinary powers were given to Birkhead's successor, William Harrison, and his brief, dated July 11th, 1615, said, among other things: "*Sit ordinarius Anglorum et Scotorum, cum omni potestate quam habent ordinarii in eorum diocesisibus.*" His term of government ended with his death, in 1621, in the reign of James I, when the Gunpowder Plot was still fresh in the memories of men and served to exasperate them against all whom imagination connected with it. By his advice and earnest solicitation the rule of the Church was intrusted to a Vicar Apostolic. William Bishop was selected for this purpose. He was a very remarkable character, and not free from inconsistencies. A convert from Protestantism, he had embraced the Catholic religion when there was every worldly reason for avoiding it; left the University of Oxford, together with his estate, relations, and country. Then he returned to England to encounter bitter persecution, was

confined as prisoner in Gatehouse, and after release and a second exile from his native land, came back as Bishop and Vicar Apostolic to rule the Church. In this capacity he exceeded his faculties, and, accounting himself a true ordinary over the kingdom "and equal to the Pope," divided it into portions, and to each portion assigned an archdeacon, as head over all Catholic priests and laymen within his district. He also instituted rural deans, subject to the archdeacons, and five vicars-general, in different parts of England. The archdeacons, rural deans, and vicars, composed what was called a Chapter; but the weak point in the whole business was, that although Dr. Bishop wrote frequently to Rome for confirmation of his acts, neither Gregory XV. nor Urban VIII. ever granted him the least encouragement, nor recognized in any way the presumed rights of the Chapter. "The Chapter of the English Church," consisting of twenty-four canons, besides the members already mentioned, with its capitular seal bearing the image of St. Thomas of Canterbury, was therefore a fond delusion. Dr. Bishop, however, died regretted, and though he had published a "Protestation of Loyalty" to Queen Elizabeth, he did not betray the interests of the Church. His death occurred in 1624.

In the following year Richard Smith, Bishop of Chalcedon, succeeded as Vicar Apostolic. It was the year in which Charles I. came to the throne and began that course of absolutism which cost him his kingdom and his life. Dr. Smith was, unfortunately, rather like the King in his love of arbitrary proceedings. He gave much displeasure to the Pope by his indiscretion, and turned the minds of many priests and laymen against him by insisting on things unreasonable. He ordered, for example, that no one should hear confessions unless approved by himself, thus reviving an angry contest between the regulars and their bishop. He forced the laity to pay an annual pension for support of himself, his clergy, and parish priests, and commanded them to receive his ministers and officials, though by doing so they brought themselves into peril of treason. These facts prove how difficult it is to rule the Church in times of persecution. Though the blood of martyrs be the seed of the Church, the period when their blood is shed, and more especially the period when Catholics are persecuted without being actually brought to execution, are times of great internal disturbance and lawlessness. It was found necessary to put a stop to Bishop Smith's mode of governing. The sentiments of the Holy See were conveyed to him through the nuncio in Paris and the Queen of England's confessor, and though upon this admonition Dr. Smith relinquished many of his pretensions, he was detained in France, and ultimately resigned his office. There were at this time about 150,000 Catholics in England, but, owing to the se-

reasons they were not granted. Philip Howard, indeed, brother to the Earl of Norfolk, was actually appointed to the vicariate in 1672, but his briefs were kept back by express desire of the King. He had been recommended to the Holy See as one who, though a Dominican, never failed to entertain due esteem for the secular clergy, and possessed many qualities difficult to find in any other person. He was of a noble family, and closely connected with the King, whose favors he enjoyed. His life was exemplary, and he had no small amount of learning, zeal, application, and prudence. He was obedient to the Apostolic See, averse to the pretended Chapter, of pleasing and moderate behavior, and altogether separate from court interests and politics.

The number of Catholics in England had, by this time, risen to 200,000, and the priests had multiplied in proportion. They had for many years been deprived of the sacrament of confirmation, and there were difficulties in the way of procuring consecrated oils from abroad for sacramental uses. There were 230 secular priests in various parts, according to a report of a commissioner named Negretti; 120 Jesuits; 80 Benedictines; 55 Franciscans; a few discalced Carmelites; and a few Dominicans. But, for these and other reasons, the presence of a bishop was earnestly requested, and of all the missionary priests in England none was considered so eligible as Father Howard. He was sprung from the noblest houses of Britain, being grandson, on one side, of an Earl of Arundel, and on the other of a Duke of Lennox. His position in her majesty's household, was one of trust and confidence, having the direction of the masses said in her royal chapel. He endeavored to gain for himself and his colleagues increased liberty in the discharge of ecclesiastical functions, and on one or two occasions caused displeasure in the King's mind by his zeal for making converts. At functions and vespers in the Queen's chapel, he used to sit by the gospel side of the altar, with two assistants, and habited as a prelate, with a rochet. The masses were celebrated with music, and the chapel was almost an open church.

All the efforts made to secure the vicariate for Father Howard failed of success. Again and again his friends were disappointed, and even when the necessary briefs were obtained the King caused them to be delayed in their execution. He was greatly detested by the Protestants, both on account of the many persons whom he succeeded in reconciling to the Church, and because he promoted the royal proclamation in favor of liberty of conscience, made in March, 1672. Perhaps, too, the conspicuous position he occupied in the palace as "my Lord Almoner" excited their spleen. When in charge of the Queen's oratory, at Whitehall, he enjoyed an annual stipend of 500 pounds sterling, with 500 pounds additional

for his table, and 100 pounds for the requirements of the oratory. The fact of his having printed some bulls of indulgence, granted by the Holy See, brought him into danger of being prosecuted for treason, and, seeing that his enemies were determined to bring the matter before Parliament, he thought it better to obtain the King's leave to retire to the Continent.

While residing at Bornhem he was created a Cardinal, and was generally called the "Cardinal of Norfolk." At the king's request he was also made Cardinal Protector of England and Scotland, though his majesty had not thought it expedient that he should reside in the kingdom as a Vicar Apostolic. Though he had a palace of his own in Rome and apartments in the Vatican, with a pension of 10,000 scudi from the Pope, he chose the claustral life of the Dominican Convent of St. Sabina, where, to the time of his death, he shared the humble fare of the friars in the common refectory.

To the best of his power he opposed the arbitrary proceedings of James; for, as Lord Macaulay says, "neither his own wrongs nor those of his house had so heated his mind as to make him a rash adviser. Every letter, therefore, which went from the Vatican to Whitehall recommended patience, moderation, and respect for the prejudices of the English people." He was bitterly disappointed when he found that the Duke of York, by succeeding to the throne, imperilled instead of advanced the Catholic cause in England. He heard without pleasure of a papal nuncio being received at court, and of four Catholics, one of whom was a Jesuit, being called to the Privy Council. Innocent XI. shared, as I have already intimated, the alarm felt by Cardinal Howard. He looked coldly on Castlemaine, the English ambassador at Rome, and sought rather to strengthen the spiritual condition of his flock in England than to obtain for them the less solid advantage of political power. Though he firmly refused to countenance the appointment of Father Petre to the Archbishopric of York, he was willing, as we have seen already, to appoint Vicars Apostolic, and place the conduct of the matter in the hands of the nuncio, Adda. The revolution which soon followed showed how correct his forebodings had been. It is certain that if the nuncio and Dr. Leyburn had not shown wisdom and moderation, William of Orange would have exercised much greater severities.

I have little more to say of the Count of Adda. He consecrated Dr. Bonaventure Giffard in the Banqueting Hall at Whitehall, on Sunday, April 22d, 1688; and, at St. James's, where the King had founded a convent of fourteen Benedictine monks, on Sunday, May 6th, of the same year, he consecrated Dr. Philip Ellis, who had been selected for the Western Vicariate. He warmly recommended

Matthew Prichard as a Vicar Apostolic, and accordingly, in 1713, Father Prichard became the second Vicar Apostolic of the Western District. The present Pope, Pius IX., in a Letter Apostolic, relative to the restoration of the Hierarchy in England, made honorable mention of Adda, the Nuncio, as having divided England into four districts, the London, the Western, the Central and the Northern, to be governed by Vicars Apostolic, fortified with the necessary faculties and with the proper power of Ordinaries.

In the month of September, 1669, the Abbate Oandius Agretti, a Canon of Bruges, and Minister Apostolic in Belgium, arrived in England on a special mission to examine into the condition of ecclesiastical affairs. The report which he drew up is particularly interesting, and entitled *Relatio dello stato Religione Cattolica in Inghilterra*. In one part of this important document he wrote some observations which may serve to introduce Bishop Leyburn (or Leyburne) to my readers, but it must be remembered that what I am about to quote was written sixteen years before Leyburn was, on the relation of the Cardinal of Norfolk, elected to be Vicar Apostolic of all England.

"On the invitation of Father Howard, Signor John Leyburne came from the country to speak to me. He is an active man, attached to the faction of the Capitulars, who even proposed him for Bishop of England. All speak well of him, and think he has no equal for ability for the post of President of Douay College, inasmuch as he is noble, learned, of good manners, skilled in languages, and experienced in the college, where he was Vice-President. I proposed him to the Internuncio as substitute for his uncle, and now I understand from your Lordship that your Eminence has chosen him for the said Presidency of Douay, and I believe your selection will be daily more and more applauded. Dr. Leyburne evinced before me great submission to the Holy See, although he desires not the Presidency, inasmuch as he is placed more commodiously in the house of Viscount Montagu, who, they report, has great affection for him. The said Signor John Leyburne, when speaking of the Chapter business, went so far as to tell me several times that whenever the Holy See resolves on suppressing the Chapter, the Capitulars will obey promptly and blindly, although he showed himself fully persuaded that the Chapter was validly erected and likewise confirmed by the Holy See."

When Leyburn arrived in London, in October, 1685, the King had been only eight months on the throne. From him, Leyburn received every welcome, a lodging in Whitehall, and a pension of 1000 pounds a year. He came in company with the Nuncio Adda, and Lord Macaulay gives him credit for some learning, a rich vein of natural humor, and for being "the most cautious, dexterous and taciturn of men." "He seems," the historian adds, "to have behaved on all occasions like a wise and honest man." Hanagan in his *History of the Church in England*, says that "Leyburn was as unobtrusive in manner as he was diminutive in person."

In 1687, he visited the northern counties to administer confirmation. It was nearly 60 years since a Catholic Bishop had appeared in England and nearly 150 since any one had travelled unmolested

circumstance tended to mitigate the trials he would have had to undergo when the Protestant Prince of Orange was called to the throne. When the revolution broke out, both Leyburn and Giffard were seized at Feversham on their way to Dover, and were actually under arrest when the King himself was brought into the same town. They were committed to prison, Leyburn being sent to the Tower. He was incarcerated during two years, and suffered during his confinement. Prisons at that time were more comfortable and unhealthy than they are now, and those who were detained in them long lived in the valley of the shadow of death. After his release, Leyburn was permitted to remain in England, and he resided in London in a private and unostentatious manner. His life was prolonged through the reign of William III.; indeed he did not die until Queen Anne had been some months on the throne. His age was advanced beyond the usual lot of man, and in his eighty-seventh year, being unable any longer to discharge the duties of the Vicariate, a coadjutor was given him in the person of Dr. Witham.

Before giving such particulars as I have been able to collect regarding Dr. Giffard, it is necessary that I should recall the circumstances which led to his instalment as President of Magdalen College, Oxford.

There was no act of the reign of James II., which brought him more into disfavor with his subjects and turned their eyes and hearts more towards his son-in-law, William of Orange, than the forcible expulsion of the Fellows from Magdalen College, and the intrusion of a Catholic president. It is true that the college was founded in Catholic times and for Catholic purposes. It is true that when you enter its venerable inclosure you are struck by the statue of William of Waynflete and the other founders, with their patron saints, beneath canopies of exquisite workmanship. There is King Henry III., Mary Magdalen, and the Baptist. There is the ancient stone pulpit in the corner of the court, where the anniversary sermon used to be preached on the festival of St. John the Baptist, while the court was decorated with green boughs to remind the hearers of his preaching in the wilderness. The oriels, the crypts, the corridors, the refectory, the chapel, with the saints and prophets emblazoned on the panes, the screens, the panelling, the mullioned windows, the stalls, the paintings, and the rolling thunder-music of the high-built organ, all remind you of days long, long past by, when faith reigned among the people without opposition or doubt, and outward manifestations of inward belief were replete with the most varied forms of artistic beauty.

Even what was modern in the College was in harmony with what

ing their graceful antlers beneath luxuriant branches in the park, the lazy waters of the Cherwell creeping between pollard willows, the kine lying at ease, the bees and butterflies dreamily sipping the honeyed flowers, seemed intended to favor meditation and lead the mind away from all that is frivolous and transient. The statutes of the College marked it out as the residence of the Kings and Princes of Wales who might honor the university with their presence. Edward IV. and Richard III. had held their courts there; Prince Arthur, eldest son of Henry VII., and Henry, eldest son of James I., had been members of the College. Reginald Pole, the last Archbishop of Canterbury, had studied there, and in the time of the civil war the Fellows had been remarkable for their attachment to the royal cause. The College still continued to be enormously wealthy, and the Fellows were empowered by the statutes to elect their own president. Sometimes, indeed, they had listened to a recommendation conveyed in royal letters, and shown respect to the wishes of the sovereign.

Musing on these things, so far as his narrow mind was capable of reflection, James II. conceived the idea of engrafting upon Magdalen College a Catholic president, with a view ultimately of using it as an instrument for the restoration of the proscribed faith. But this effort was such as carried with it the reprobation of all just-minded men, for James had promised in the most solemn manner when he came to the throne that he would do nothing in violation of the law and of the rights and liberties of the Established Church.

The first candidate who appeared on the scene was one of the Fellows, named Dr. Thomas Smith, an Oriental traveller and scholar, once chaplain to the embassy in Constantinople, and a high Tory. When the office of president became vacant, in March, 1687, he hoped to obtain it by a royal letter, and he looked to Parker, the Bishop of Oxford, as the means by which the royal letter itself might be procured. But what was his disappointment to hear from his episcopal patron that the King would recommend no one who was not a friend to his majesty's religion. Smith was unable to demand the royal favor on this score, and his claim therefore ceased to be preferred. A royal letter arrived recommending one Anthony Farmer to the choice of the Fellows. But Farmer was in every respect disqualified. He had never been a Fellow of Magdalen or New College; he was certainly not a man of moral life, but just the reverse, and he was a Catholic. As a Roman Catholic he was doubly disqualified, both the law of the land and the rules of the College forbidding his election. The day arrived for the decision, and the Fellows chose rather to brave the King's displeasure than to violate their trust. They elected John Hough, a highly respectable and virtuous member of their community, and their boldness did

not fail to provoke the wrath and resentment of the Stuart sovereign.

Early in June the Fellows of Magdalen found to their cost that they were living under a government to which liberty was unknown. They were cited to appear before the high commission at Whitehall. There they encountered the most brutal of judges, the most venal of chancellors, Jeffreys. He bullied, as he alone could bully, the five Fellows sent as a deputation. But the depositions concerning Farmer's immoral conduct were not to be refuted, and the commission, with all its wish to gratify James, was obliged to declare the election of Farmer void. And here the matter rested till in the month of August a royal letter was received at Magdalen recommending Parker, Bishop of Oxford, to the Fellows as President. Parker had not declared himself a Catholic, but was undoubtedly favorable to the Catholic religion. Under other circumstances the zeal of the King for the advancement of those who professed, embraced, or encouraged Catholicism would have been highly commendable, but under the conditions which I have pointed out, and with which all students of English history are perfectly well acquainted, his conduct indicated the utmost infatuation. It must be remembered also that in his arbitrary proceedings at Oxford especially, he was acting in direct opposition to the advice he received from the most virtuous and influential Catholics near his court. Leyburn in particular warned him of the disastrous results which must follow inflaming the minds of his Protestant subjects by openly endeavoring to force Catholicism on the seats of learning and only training schools which the Protestant clergy possessed.

In Cambridge a Benedictine monk, who presented himself with royal letters for the degree of Master of Arts, was rejected because he refused to sign the Thirty-nine Articles, and the Vice-Chancellor was dismissed from his office for having dared to refuse what he had no legal power to grant. But the assault on the Protestant privileges of Oxford was more systematic and violent. The Master of University College, Obadiah Walker, who declared himself a convert, was authorized to retain his position in defiance of the laws. A Roman Catholic, named Massey, was presented by the crown to the Deanery of Christ Church, and now in 1687 the King was resolved to make a serious incursion on the rights and liberties of Magdalen College. Though obliged to give up his nominee, Farmer, the royal autocrat persisted in declaring the election of Hough to be null, and recommended Parker, the semi-Catholic Bishop of Oxford, to the Fellows. But they were inspired with a spirit of resistance which could not easily be subdued. The King

was of all others the most objectionable. The Fellows refused to ask pardon for having done what they believed to be their duty, and they were all condemned to expulsion. The commission pronounced them incapable of ever holding any ecclesiastical preferment, and such of them as were still laymen were declared incapable of receiving the clerical character. In these proceedings there was not a shadow of law, justice, or humanity. They rendered the royal cause more than ever unpopular, and raised up a spirit of resistance among the enemies of Magdalen itself, who refused to go through their academical exercises, now that they were deprived of their lawful governors. Many of these also were expelled, but the impoverished Fellows received supplies from every quarter, the King's own daughter, the Princess of Orange, subscribing £200.

Parker, the Bishop President, died a few weeks after attaining his unenviable post, and the King then, in spite of the dissuasion of his Catholic advisers, converted the College into a Catholic seminary. Bonaventure Giffard, then Bishop of Madura *in partibus*, was appointed president. Mass was celebrated in the chapel. Twelve Catholics were admitted as Fellows, and Smith himself, who had played such a truckling part, was expelled. The flame of disaffection was fanned all over the country, and from the date of this deplorable transaction the fate of James II. was sealed.

It is not easy to say what reasons prevailed with Dr. Giffard to induce him to accept the office into which he was intruded. The responsibility of the act certainly rested with the King, and if that monarch was arbitrary and violent in his acts, other sovereigns before him—Henry VII., Edward VI., Elizabeth—had not scrupled to spoliage the Church and persecute the clergy in a manner even more violent. James, moreover, was not one who would lightly submit to be contradicted, and his offer of the presidency of Magdalen to Dr. Giffard may have had the force of a command which it would have been dangerous to disobey. Perhaps, too, Dr. Giffard thought that God was bringing good out of evil, and the recovery of another College of Oxford from the grasp of the Protestants was a matter for thankfulness, an occasion to be improved. I do not say that any or all these reasons together are quite satisfactory, but there may have been other circumstances, with which we are not acquainted, that weighed with Dr. Giffard and induced him to accept a dignity which could not but expose him to the hatred of the vast majority of the English people.

Bonaventure Giffard was the second son of Andrew Giffard, Esq., of Chillington, near Wolverhampton. His mother, Catharine Gif-

administered comparatively in peace the affairs of the Midland District during the entire reign of William. He watched from a distance, with mingled feelings of hope and disappointment, the struggle of the Jacobites against the Protestants of Ireland, heard of the defeat of James on the banks of the Boyne, the capture of Cork and Kinsale by Marlborough, and the pacification of Limerick, putting an end to the Irish rising in favor of the Stuarts.

The year after the death of William III., in 1703, Dr. Giffard was removed from the Midland to the London District, and he took charge of the Western District also from 1708 to 1713. The Stuarts were still exiles, or rather the Stuarts in the direct line, for Queen Anne herself was, like Queen Mary, her sister, a daughter of James II. by his first wife, Anne Hyde. Her reign was principally marked by the successes and triumphs of Marlborough, and though many cruel statutes against Catholics had still the force of law, they were, for the most part, left unmolested. But Bishop Giffard was a marked man, and could scarcely expect the immunity enjoyed by others of his brethren who had not been chaplains to King James and Presidents of Magdalen College. It was not long after his removal to the London District that he began to experience danger and persecution. On February 7th, 1706, he wrote to Cardinal Sacripanti, Prefect of the Propaganda, saying: "I have been for sixteen months tossed about, *agitatus*, by continual perturbations and perils, so as scarcely to find anywhere a place to rest in with safety, *ut vix ullo in loco consistere mihi tutum fuerit*." During more than a year he found refuge from his persecutors in the house of the Venetian ambassador, and was able by that means to discharge his duties towards his flock. Daily worship was celebrated in the ambassador's chapel, to the great comfort of Catholics, and for these services to the cause of religion, the ambassador, Francis Cornaro, received through the Propaganda the thankful acknowledgments of the Holy See.

I cannot do better here than give some passages from one of the letters of Dr. Giffard, which has been preserved. It is dated October 7th, 1714, about nine weeks after the death of Queen Anne. It will show the condition of Catholics in England at the time when George I. ascended the throne.

"Since the 4th of May (1714), I have had no quiet, have been forced to change lodgings fourteen times, and but once have lain in my own lodging. Besides the severe proclamation which came out on the 4th of May, three private persons have been, and still are, the occasion of my troubles. The first, some fallen Catholics, who in hope of the great reward of one hundred pounds, informed and procured warrants for me, Mr. Joseph Leveson, and some others. The second is Mottram, who, being expelled from the University of Cambridge for his immoralities, got into Spain: there

ever, and now, to gain money for his wicked courses, is turned *priest-catcher*, and has got warrants for me and others. The third is one Barker, turned out of Douay, for his ill behavior, received at Rome, made priest, and sent hither, but always of so scandalous a life that no persuasions or endeavors could reclaim him, nay, with much expense we sent him to our good community in France, where he was presently so infamous, especially for being frequently drunk, that they turned him out, and now being returned, follows Mottram's tread. A few days ago he took up Mr. Brears, and has been in search of me and others; so I am obliged to lye hidde as well as I can. I may truly say what was said of St. Athanasius, '*Nullibi mihi tutus ad latendum locus,*' where I am obliged often to change my habitation. I have endeavored to procure a little lodging in the house of some public minister, where I could be secure from the attempts of these wretches, but could not effect it. My poor brother (Andrew Giffard), though much indisposed, was forced, by the threats of an immediate search by Mottram, to retire into the country, which so increased his fever that in seven days he died. An inexpressible loss to me, to the whole clergy, and to many more.

"My services to Mgrs. Bianchini and Marcolini. They saw my little habitation, poor and mean, and yet I should think myself happy if I could be permitted to lodge there. However, *gloriamur in tribulationibus*, I may say with the apostle, *in carceribus abundantius*. In one I lay on the floor a considerable time; in Newgate almost two years; afterwards in Hartford jail; and now daily expect a fourth prison to end my life in. I have always envied the glory of martyr, happy if God in his mercy will let me have that of a confessor. . . . Mottram took up Mr. Saltmarsh, but by a good providence he got from him. The continual fears and alarms we are under is something worse than Newgate. It is also some mortification for an old man, now seventy-two, to be hurried from place to place. God grant me eternal rest.

I am yours, B. G.

"Monsignor Santini sent me the *Constitution* (Unigenitus) from Brussels, and it happened to come just as the proclamation came forth, so that all I could do was to signify it to the superiors of the regulars and to some few of the clergy. When circumstances permit I will proceed further. At least nothing shall be wanting that prudence allows of. Too forward a zeal in such things may provoke the State, and occasion great mischief. The posture of affairs at present obliges us to be very cautious. I thank God the Catholics have behaved themselves very well of late, so that the new severities cast upon us have not been deserved by them. The only thing the State now complains of is the great number of Irish priests who came in upon us at the first publication of the peace. The provincials of all regulars, except the monks and Carmelites, are gone out of England."

In 1715, Prince James landed at Peterhead, in Scotland, to claim the crown of England. His standard was joined by many Scottish chiefs, but the defeat at Sheriffmuir proved fatal to his cause, and he was compelled to return to France. Among his adherents who were taken prisoners was the Earl of Derwentwater, to whom Bishop Giffard wrote, February 20th, 1716, an interesting letter, exhorting him to place his trust in God's mercy, and consoling him with many divine promises. He would fain have attended the Earl at his execution, but that was not permitted. In that same year, the Bishop, being now seventy-four years of age, representations were made to the Holy See that it would be well to grant him a coadjutor. He, himself, however, felt quite equal to the discharge of his episcopal duties, and had no wish to have an assistant forced upon him. He

ported his remonstrance. When the matter came to be thoroughly investigated, it appeared that all the solicitation for a coadjutor had been brought about by an ambitious priest who desired the episcopal dignity for himself. Four years later, Bishop Giffard felt more keenly the incursion of old age, and was constrained to apply to Clement XI. to provide him with aid, and to be pleased to appoint Father Henry Howard, brother of the Duke of Norfolk, to that office. He set forth the qualifications of Father Henry Howard, which were of the highest order; but he is not to be confounded with Philip, Cardinal Howard, also a missionary priest in England, of whose interesting and eventful career the writer of this furnished a sketch to the *Union Review* for May, 1868. Father Howard did not live to take in hand the pastoral staff. He caught a fever while laboring among the sick poor of his flock, and died in November, 1720. Bishop Giffard wrote of the event in these terms: "My comfort was very great in hearing Mr. Henry Howard was established my coadjutor and successor. All things were got ready for his consecration, when it pleased the Almighty to visit him with a great fever, occasioned by a violent cold taken in running up and down after some poor people, and this has taken him from us, to the inexpressible loss of this poor church, of all the clergy, and of me in particular; and as all, both nobility and gentry, rich and poor, clergy and regulars, were highly pleased in his being made choice of to succeed me, so is there a general lamentation. But our losses are his gains, for I am confident he is a glorious saint in heaven. Such charity, such piety, has not been seen in our land for a long time. This day, November 28th (O. S.), the body is carried down to Arundel Castle, attended by the duke, his two brothers, Lord Stafford, Lord George Howard, Lord Aston, and several others. You will all pray God to support me under this great affliction, and direct me to what may be most to His service and support of this poor church."

In March, 1721, Benjamin Petre was appointed coadjutor to Bishop Giffard, in the place of Henry Howard, the deceased Bishop of Utica *in partibus*. Thirteen years afterwards, in 1734, when George II. ruled in name, and Walpole was really king, Bishop Petre had to write to Lorenzo Mayes, the Roman agent of the English clergy, announcing the death of Dr. Giffard, at the advanced age of ninety-two. He died at Hammersmith, near London, and is thus mentioned by his faithful coadjutor in the letter to which I have just referred: "The most worthy Vicar of London, exhausted by his apostolic labors and by advanced age, for ten months past has slowly, by little and little, been wearing away, and that to such a degree of weakness as to be no longer able to cele-

Holy Communion, displaying an exemplary devotion and fervor of spirit. On the first of November last, he was attacked by a violent fever. To his latest breath he exhibited most tender affection towards God and towards the faithful under his care. He surrendered his soul to his Creator, amid the lamentations of surrounding friends, on the 12th of March, the feast of St. Gregory, the great apostle of England. He was in the ninety-second year of his age, and the forty-sixth of his Vicariate."

The tomb of the aged prelate has been discovered in the old churchyard of St. Pancras, and a copy of the inscription was obtained from Chillington, and published in *Notes and Queries*, in September, 1867. I have subjoined an English version of the Latin :

Under this stone are joined the ashes
Of two brothers, most united in their lives,
Bonaventure Giffard, E. M. V. A.,
And Andrew Giffard, P.,
Who, born of an illustrious family in the county of Staffordshire,
Gave themselves entirely,
Even from their early years,
To piety towards God, and charity to men.
They were therefore exceedingly dear to the good,
And though often exposed to the persecution of the wicked,
Preserved an unblemished reputation among all.
They experienced abundantly all the goods and the ills
Which fall to the lot of those
Who love the pursuit of virtue, understanding and science.
Their bodily strength at last failing,
Amid the grief of others,
They, themselves, joyfully closed their eyes on this world,
To open them in a better.
Go, reader, and spend in like manner what remains of life ;
Thus will you best show your gratitude to them for their lives,
And thus, also, you will make them rejoice in their death.
Farewell, for thine own and for their sake,
Remember often those
Who passed away happily.
Bonaventure, born A.D. 1642, died March 12, 1734,
The other, born two years later, died September 14, 1714
May they rest in peace.

In his *Biographical History of England*, Noble thus speaks of Dr. Giffard : " He was much esteemed by men of different religions, and especially by those who were most intimately acquainted with his character." He left his heart to Douay College, where it was buried with an appropriate inscription. Two of the sermons which he preached at Court were printed: one on the infallibility of the

pleasure on the other side of the Atlantic. They are culled from a variety of different sources in the by-paths of English history, and they will, perhaps, be not the less welcome because they are not easily accessible to all.

POSITIVISM AND EVOLUTIONISM.

System of Positive Philosophy. By Auguste Comte.

First Principles. By Herbert Spencer.

Principles of Biology, 2 vols. By Herbert Spencer. London: Williams & Norgate, 1864.

The Origin of Species. By Charles Darwin, A.M., F.R.S., etc. Fourth edition.

System of Logic. By John Stuart Mill.

‘MODERN thought’ has acquired a prestige. Of that there is little doubt. It is heterodox. Of that its advocates are proud. They find no small degree of pleasure in exciting the spleen of the conservatives, and challenge the *odium theologicum* with all the boastful and ostentatious delight of schoolboys engaged in an act of daring. They “point with pride” to the great progress in the natural sciences, which has been made since “modern thought” has engaged the attention of men. *Post hoc, ergo propter hoc* proves conclusively that such an advance in intellectual development is ascribable solely to the fact that the great minds of this age have divested themselves of all belief in a God. Similarly, Protestantism diffused the blessings of education. Similarly, Great Britain sprang into importance immediately upon the introduction of tobacco into that island. The brilliant conceptions of the master spirits who are now pointing the direction in which we shall evolve, are not to be hampered by the formal logic of the ignorant scholastics; but, if you desire true logic, logic in its essence, the best illustrations of religious conformity with it are to be found in those works on Evolution, which are now being thrown forth to enlighten a world which pined so long for philosophers who could be depended upon for truth positive and unmistakable. Greatest of all among the many blessings which are diffused around us is the

which the little minds of past ages propounded their insensate doctrines. True it is, that down through the dark perspective of the past, there may be seen to glimmer one or two lights whose brilliancy might venture to sustain a modest comparison with the many irradiations which, in this glorious nineteenth century, beam from every quarter where the spirit of the age obtains.

There is my Lord Bacon. He is continually referred to with pride, in the English-speaking world. Were he living now, there is little question that he would be accorded a seat of honor, immediately behind Darwin, Huxley, Spencer, and Tyndall. It is even possible, nay, probable, that the British Association for the Advancement of Science would listen with deference to any suggestions which he might see fit to make respecting the solution of "that problem of problems, viz., how to yield the seemingly irrepressible religious sentiments of mankind reasonable satisfaction." True, privilege would cease to be privilege were he to branch off into a protest against the incomplete inductions of which he might deem his brothers of the present wondrous age guilty. The world has moved since Bacon's day. Deference would be paid him by the leaders of thought; but he would have to rest content with such fulsome expressions of admiration of his process of induction as they might vouchsafe to accord him. He could not be suffered to quarrel with the validity of any of their processes of investigation. Mankind were in their leading-strings in Bacon's time; and strict adherence to the canons of induction did very well then. But, since that epoch, the British schoolmaster has been very widely abroad; and a certain license to depart from the stricter rules is now judiciously allowed, since experience has shown that it would have been impossible to give the grand principle of Evolution the noble and majestic swing which now characterizes it, had not the leaders of progress exercised a wise discretion in ignoring those of Bacon's rules which would have defeated the objects so desired by the friends of enlightenment and progress. The sin of the "greatest, wisest, meanest of mankind" has been followed by retribution most dire. His soiling of the judicial ermine has been now amply atoned for by that comical conceit which his followers of this age indulge in, when they fancy that the mere accumulation of facts to sustain a preconceived principle, is alone sufficient to stamp them his disciples.

The fact is that this is by far too fast an age for "the heirs of all the ages" to stop to fulfil the requirements of the Baconian philosophy. They collect facts in quantities and numbers most surprising; and, in so doing, they complacently fancy that that is all which the most enlightened philosopher of the seventeenth century

them. They merely collect them. Further delay of their grand march to the shores of the Unknowable would jar most painfully with that noble, that divine instinct which impels them ever onward. Their foregone conclusion is, that Evolution is the principle into which all knowledge is reducible. The facts which they allege have been positively shown to be covered by Evolution are, to the number which they declare Evolution to be capable of explaining, in the proportion which a pebble on the shore bears to the sands of the ocean. It is hence manifest that Bacon's rules are not suited to the direction which this progressive age has taken. Plato's mode of procedure would accord much better with the aims in view. Of what use, then, are facts? it may be asked. Of what use is Bacon? Facts, it may be answered, are useful in so adorning their gossamer structures as to dazzle the imaginations of those who are not yet *en rapport* with the spirit of the times. And Bacon? Well, it is always politic to have some great name, surrounded by the glamour of the past, to swear by.

A fact is inconsistent with intellectual retrospection, according to the Evolutionists. It must, by its very nature, be used either as a mere initial point to their movement onward without halt, or as a resting-place on which they may descend for a moment to recuperate their synthetic energies. They never peep behind a fact. The grand impulse which urges humanity forward will not allow of it. They never question a fact as to the principle which governs it. That would be impolitic. It would imply a doubt of the truth of Evolution. Darwin has discovered a grand fact: that the variation of animals and plants is due to Evolution. One of those little souls in whom the germs of progress have not as yet evolved from the simpler to the more complex, stays him for a moment, and innocently inquires, What is Evolution? Why, variation, of course, is the reply, with all that deference to ignorance and bigotry, which it so becomes souls like his to simulate, that have attained to such a high degree of development. The poor conservative looks troubled; he is not yet satisfied; he has never read Plato, so he is not prepared for the reception of such wealth of knowledge; he is puzzled; the germ of progress within his contracted soul is but now quickening with the first thrill of that noble impulse which, under a favorable environment, will impel him onward to the goal of the Unknowable.

"Modern thought" has lately met with a crisis in its fate, which its exponents had not sufficient sagacity to anticipate. Like every other system of philosophy, or of religion whose *credenda* for the esoterics and for the exoterics are mutually contradictory, it has

was all very well to declaim against metaphysics; to deprecate the discussion of absolute *a priori* ideas; to praise the process of induction; to frown down discursive reasoning; to exalt Bacon, and to decry those of opposite modes of thought; to counsel the pursuance of methods of research to which natural scientists had ever resorted; to disclaim any premeditated desire to obtrude religious discussions into their inquiries; it was all very well to proclaim that the relative order, and the relative order alone, was their concern; it was all very well to do all these things, and still direct modern thought, and reduce all knowledge to the one, all-presupposing principle of Evolution, when the ignorance and prejudice of disciples were to be counted upon, or when the imputation of inconsistency was to be apprehended from those only whom they could arrogantly declare to be beyond the pale of rational controversy. But, when a disciple, whose scientific orthodoxy, and whose hearty concurrence with the aims professed by the exponents of "modern thought" could not be for a moment questioned, marshalled and co-ordinated into an approach to coherence all the dicta, theorems, rules, methods, and formulas upon adherence to which these leaders so ostentatiously plumed themselves, the position of affairs naturally grew perplexing and inconvenient in the extreme. The policy to be pursued at such an unforeseen juncture, it would have taxed the ingenuity of a Machiavelli to have devised. The problem grew the more complicated by reason of the favorable reception which had been extended to this philosophy, in the first flush of sympathy which had been given expression before time had been taken to gauge the effect which it might have upon those ulterior objects which these leaders had in view.

Previous to the conception of Comte's system of philosophy, it had been the complaint of those who affected to be concerned solely about the progress of the natural sciences, that the absolute and the relative were studied with but little discrimination. They complained that conceptions peculiar to one order obtained, ineffectually challenged, in the other. They complained that the progress of the natural sciences was greatly impeded by the constant intrusion of principles amenable to no ascertainable rules, of arbitrary dogmas, and of their infinite and untold corollaries. They regretted (with a pathos which was touching) that even minds peculiarly scientific were characterized by a marked impress taken from metaphysics. They counselled the most rigorous adherence to the process of induction. They counselled that no reliance be placed upon the results of discursive reasoning. They deprecated any

the formation of tentative hypotheses which were to be employed with caution, and regarded with distrust until the phenomena in hand had been interpreted in every detail by the most rigorous and complete induction. But deduction was to be allowed to take no flights into regions where it was impossible for induction to follow. They disclaimed any concern either for or against religion. They desired the relative to be alone within the scope of their inquiries. They contrasted those methods which met with their approval, with those in vogue among the metaphysicians; and rejoiced in the fact that all which they claimed as the results of their methods was positive, certain, and in favorable comparison with the products of metaphysicians, whose test was the harmony between ideas, rather than the congruity between such ideas and realities positively ascertained by induction to be objective. They contended that these criteria for which they longed, would render them conversant with no other knowledge than that of the relative. But they would not presume to determine whether or not there was such a thing as the absolute. The absolute would simply lie outside of their scope. They conceded that these criteria, being the outcome of the exclusive pursuit of relative knowledge, could not serve as standards by which to judge of the absolute. They would desire it only to be admitted that it would not be just to question the soundness of these criteria within their legitimate province. All they asked was that metaphysics, and all principles which preclude the possibility of verification by observation and experiment, should not be obtruded upon their valuable time and attention.

They declared that the truths of the natural sciences had approximated, and were ever approximating, those degrees of probability which warranted the insistence on that high degree of proof of which mathematical truths are susceptible, called demonstration. The requirement of such proof (they alleged) would preclude all possibility of error, and give to science positive results. It would preclude mere theorists from claiming the award of science upon crude hypotheses, supported only upon degrees of probability, which impress men differently according to the bias and constitution of their minds. It would preclude metaphysicians from entering the scientific arena, and would prevent those interminable, heated disputes which those not abreast of the age threatened to carry on until the crack of doom without any result. They conceded that all the departments of natural knowledge were not as yet susceptible of this high order of proof. But, they said that all give promise, in a degree tallying with the order of their develop-

pending such development of the sciences, all such theories and hypotheses, wherein metaphysical or moral proofs enter as factors, should be deemed neither competent nor satisfactory.

These were a few of the most prominent principles which the leaders of modern thought now and again intimated with a view to commend their aspirations to the approbation of the thinkers of the age. Taken with the limitations expressed and implied, there was little in this shadowed system which was *malum in se*. The object proposed seemed to be the establishment of a scientific code which should have for its aim the development solely of the natural sciences. All those who concurred in the object proposed, or who addressed themselves to the study of the subjects contemplated, were to be governed by certain rules and tests which were to be the criteria by which their collaborateurs in the same fields of inquiry were to judge of the success of their researches. Whatever conformed to the requirements of the code was to be accepted as part of the approved body of natural philosophy. But whatever was rejected as not in conformity with the stipulated conditions was not therefore to be pronounced false. The decree was, to be, merely that it came not within the purview of the code. Beliefs, dogmas, convictions, estimates of degrees of probability, were neither to be approved nor condemned. They were to be considered merely without the jurisdiction of this scientific court of inquiry. Every philosopher was to be allowed recourse to any method of procedure which he might fancy. No judgment was to be passed by this natural philosophy upon his conclusions, save by implication, where an alleged certain, tangible result conflicted inevitably and unequivocally with an equally positive and definite result which had fulfilled the requirements of the code. But this conflict or incongruity was not to be asserted when it had to be proved by a chain of reasoning, any link of which failed to be equally positive and definite. When, however, a product professed to be the outcome solely of the natural sciences, it was to be received or rejected as it would be found to fulfil, or not fulfil, the tests which convention had fixed as conclusive.

This apportionment of the field of thought, and the selection of a particular domain, would not have been reprehensible if carried out consistently. The systems of law which govern our social, municipal, national, and international relations, are framed upon a similar plan; and our freedom, physical, religious, and intellectual, is not in the main impaired by the fact that the rules and regulations they prescribe do not cover the whole ground of our necessities. Our courts of law have systems of pleading and of evidence, which wholly ignore without questioning many of our most dearly

ignore them, it is not inferred that they call their validity into question. They lie simply beyond their scope. This system of natural philosophy for which the advocates of modern thought affected so to long, would most likely have been an advantage to the interests of truth, if developed and practiced with consistency. But consistency, alas! is a jewel whose brilliancy is allowed to shine at the pleasure of the Evolutionists. When its rays are not isochronous with the energy of Evolution, its magnitude dwindles like a variable star until the last trace of its light is lost amid the grand effulgence of the central sun of progress.

The habits of thought which then obtained among even the most advanced scientists were felt to be unsatisfactory. The more astute thinkers were sensible of the illegitimacy of many of their methods of discovery, and gave frequent expression to the desire for a system shorn of what they felt to be impediments to true progress. They added no small increments to the development of such a system by the occasional successful elimination of a discordant element. Such an element, however,—eliminated as it was,—would shortly be seen occupying a conspicuous position in some grand, inverted, pyramidal structure, whose apex rested on an ill-defined fact, whilst its base towered with such grandeur and majesty amid the clouds of metaphysics as to prove conclusively (*sic*) that the doctrine of an all-wise Providence is beneath the consideration of those ambitious to keep pace with the progress of the age. If this slight architectural defect was commented upon invidiously, if it was pointed out that their darling principle which reared this magic structure so high was, upon their own showing, one of those metaphysical entities which they affected so to scorn, they would then inveigh against those ignorant schoolmen, who had given such an impress to the world of thought, that even they, "the heirs of all the ages," could not as yet divest themselves of metaphysical tendencies. They grieved that they were not as yet capable of devising an efficient remedy. They had no doubt that a true system would correct several of the details; but they were equally convinced that in the main proportions they were correct; and that the glaring incongruity between dogma and science would be as manifest as it was now, when one or two of the less important details was not just what might be desired. They saw indistinctly the outlines of this true system. It lay vague and undefined in their minds. Of its scope and of its relations they had but an inadequate perception. They lacked the philosophical acumen and the comprehensive grasp of thought requisite for it to be wrought into coherency and distinctness. Or, rather, their philosophical acumen and comprehensive grasp of thought were not then available for

of differentiation by which the ideo-motors, sensori-motors, and the excito-motors of the chimpanzee had evolved into that perfection of organic structure known to the world as a member of the British Association for the Advancement of Science.

It was desirable, however, that some one whose sympathy with "modern thought" was unquestionable, should address his attention to the elaboration of this longed-for system. It was not only desirable, but positively necessary, to have some well-established and clearly defined criteria, by reference to which the legitimacy of any theory would be susceptible of ascertainment. Theorems had multiplied infinitely, and the need of a logic by which to test them was badly felt. Some one was now required to give intelligible and systematic expression to a phase of thought of the value of which all were now sensible. The natural sciences and metaphysics had been too long amalgamated, and the age was now ripe and the minds of men sufficiently enlarged for their divorce. Too many inconveniences attended their further union. The division of labor, the efficiency of which obtains as well in the world of mind as in the world of matter, counselled their separation.

Propitious to the demands of the times, the "philosophy" of Auguste Comte appeared. The mode of thought which had so long been the desire of the evolutionists was then given expression. It was wrought into the nearest approach to a system of which the subject by itself was susceptible. It challenged the attention of the disciples of progress, and commanded their sympathies so fully that in an amazingly short period of time it classed them all as ardent advocates. They flattered themselves that a genuine love for scientific methods, and a profound conviction that it alone of all systems met the requirements of the age, impelled them to adopt it. It addressed itself to all the needs of their scientific minds. The ill-regulated convictions by which they had been previously swayed, had become coherent and definite; and the decrees of science which had been before but feebly maintained could now be pressed with vigor, strengthened as they were by their indisputable claims to recognition and obedience. True it was, that they recognized in Positivism a powerful agent for the dissemination of views which the unenlightened called heterodox. But that one of their motives for advocating the system, it was of course politic to keep in the background. Positivism spread with such rapidity that half a decade after the death of its illustrious propounder, there were few among the exponents of enlightenment who had not given in their adhesion to the system. Every theory

conformity to the positive process of discovery. The comportment of the guiding spirits of the age toward those who refused to avail themselves of this valuable deposit of truth gradually grew less bitter. We are at a loss to conjecture the cause. It may have been that they felt it becoming in them who walked amid light, to be lenient towards us who still plodded on through the valley of the shadow of ignorance. Or, it may have been that Comte had revealed to them the beauty of that ideal polity, for which philosophers had ever vainly hungered, and which the Church alone had come near realizing. Still, the tone assumed towards those without the pale of Positivism was enjoyably patronizing, and we were regarded with a compassion so unaffected as to be richly amusing.

But soon a change came over the spirit of their enthusiasm. A sentiment of distrust in the worth of Positivism crept into their minds. In spite of the confusion in which Comte had managed to envelop his "philosophy," one thing was sufficiently plain; and that was, that it was divisible into two distinct parts. The one was a body of theorems. The other formed what purported to be a system of logic. This was eventually seen; suspicion began to grow, and it was felt that the logic of the philosophy rendered it advisable to curb the enthusiasm with which it had been received. After their admiration of it had sufficiently subsided to allow them to forecast the effect which the growth of Positivism would have upon their own lucubrations, they were appalled to find that the effect would be the toppling over of their own magic structures reared so high. Comte's theorems, embodying as they did all the aims, the aspirations, and the previsions of a true child of "modern thought," found full favor with them. But Comte's logic—aye, there was the rub.

They had espoused Positivism, because of their sympathy with the spirit that had propounded the theorems. Those theorems took up by far the major portion of Comte's work; and, set off as they were by the subtlety and poetical fervor of such a soul as Comte's they could not fail, with persons of kindred convictions, to absorb the greater attention. These theorems negated the idea of a sentient First Cause; they breathed a contempt for the doctrine of final causes; they ridiculed the belief in interpositions of Divine Providence; they assumed the relativity of all knowledge; they postulated the universality of the reign of law; they abounded with blank negations of all which Christians hold most dear; they projected the turning of the pyramid of society topsy-turvy, the subversal of that civilization which ages have crystallized and tested; they dethroned God and prepared the way for the estab-

perstition, kingcraft, and priestcraft were displayed in the darkest colors; the irrepressible "religious sentiments of mankind were given reasonable satisfaction" by the deification of Humanity, and a *cultus* prescribed which boasted of its superiority, in every detail, to that of the Catholic Church.

These theorems, hideous in all the beauty of the rankest Atheism, suited the Evolutionists exactly. Their love for the principles thus seemingly positively inculcated urged them to the adoption of Positivism. But, unfortunately for them and for Comte, the French philosopher had not seen fit to follow the example of his English friends, and base the truth of his views upon his mere *ipse dixit*. He had a logic; and he declared that however plausible his charming theories were, they were yet amenable to that logic, and compelled to abide by its decrees. His logic declared—and Comte himself declared—that all those theories which commended themselves so favorably to every disciple of "modern thought," were not Positive, and could lay no claim as yet to admission into the body of Positive philosophy. They were merely tentative hypotheses, to be received by a Positivist only provisionally. They had not fulfilled the requirements of Positive logic. They partook of the Positive character, only inasmuch as their propounder hoped that they would, eventually, be able to withstand the application of his logical tests. In the elaboration of these theories his position was an anomalous one, and he recognized it as such. He was working in the twofold character of a Positive philosopher illustrating his views of what a Positive philosophy should be, and ascertaining and defining its conditions; and of a speculative scientist, eager to obtain appreciation of his ingenious conceptions. But, elaborate though his theorems were, he still admitted that they had yet to be proved. He concedes everywhere throughout his works, what his logic proves,—that the doctrine of the relativity of all knowledge is merely an empirical doctrine. He intimates, with equal consistency, that the universality of the reign of law, his classification of the sciences, and his theory of the three stages of progress—the theological, the metaphysical, and the Positive—are all in the same category, all empirical, and not to be assumed as Positive until they have all passed through the prescribed probation. Each doctrine implied in his theorems would have to be proven by the canons both of induction and deduction, before Positivism would incorporate it into the body of the philosophy. Positivism would not affix its binding seal upon any principle, however beneficial it might be to the interests of science, unless the most rigorous induction had suggested and sanctioned it; and it had, in addition, been tested and confirmed by deduction founded on an

main which it was assumed to govern. No philosophical formula could be Positive, under the existing state of our knowledge, which affected to embrace the whole subject-matter of natural philosophy. Positivism demanded that induction and deduction should proceed *pari passu*, verifying and correcting each the other; generalization should mount upon the generalization immediately below it, which itself should have previously become Positive. Positivism, according to Comte, allowed a little latitude. It did not wholly proscribe the exclusive use of either form of logic. It suffered it; provided such a course was accompanied by a full and humble recognition of the fact, that the product was to be regarded as merely tentative. In the pursuit of an investigation, when it would become difficult to employ anything but induction, then induction might lead; but it would have to be constantly kept in mind that this was only tolerated, only allowable provisionally. Deduction should follow, verifying the result in every detail, before that result could be predicated with Positive certainty. And so, *vice versa*, where deduction leads the van; not only results, but every premiss, together with all its far-reaching implications, should be confirmed by the results of induction, before Positivism would recognize its own. Comte availed himself of this privilege which his philosophy accorded him, and revelled in the formation of theories which essayed to subvert the foundations of religion and of society. He never deemed those theories Positive. He only contended that they were so plausible, that little remained in their way of becoming Positive. But he was moved to righteous anger by the bigoted scruples of men who would not kindly abolish the existing social structure, and allow him to prove the truth of his theories by a few experiments on the foundations of society.

The Evolutionists had yearned to have the scope and the limitations of their mode of thought defined. They were now defined, and they awakened to the fact that the only pleasure of which they were capable lay in transgressing those limitations. How would they be able to prod the orthodox with taunts and sneers, if they were to be confined to their legitimate sphere? Heterodoxy would lose all its charm under such constraint. And, even within the bounds prescribed, all their prestige would be gone. If the decrees of Positivism were to be enforced, how were they to keep up their reputation of being alone in possession of the truth, with the hundreds and thousands of eager, inquiring souls who looked up to them with faith and confidence for rescue from the deep slough of ignorance and superstition? To what a discount would fall that air of dogmatism upon which they now depended for maintaining

rated as only tentative hypotheses. Before their dearly cherished doctrines could be positively asserted as true, their progressive intellects would have to await a development of the sciences immeasurably more advanced than exists at the present time. How could they, who had availed themselves of the dominant habits of thought to achieve their personal celebrity, concur in a revolution, however salutary, which would dismantle and raze those gaudy scaffoldings which had secured to them the admiration and the awe of the disciples of Progress? What was to become of that magnificent principle of Evolution which joined and explained all the phenomena of the universe, if the canons of Positive logic were allowed to obtain among scientists? Positivism, it was clearly seen, would not rest satisfied, as proof of Evolution, with the fact that a few pigeons, horses, sheep, and cows presented modifications of an improved character. The phenomena adduced would shine out in all their glaring disproportion to the monstrous principle sought to be educed from them. Positivism would require them to define the mystic meaning of that word, Evolution, which had heretofore so kindly rid them of all responsibility to reason. Positivism would suggest the advisability of instituting an inquiry into the sustaining power of this tortoise which upholds the elephant which upholds the universe. It would demand some warrant for assuming no limit to variation, besides the gratuitous presumption which they have seen fit arbitrarily to establish. It would compel them to mate Darwin's *dictum*, "with species in a state of nature rudimentary organs are so extremely common, that scarcely one can be mentioned which is wholly free from a blemish of this nature;" with that other *dictum* of his, that favorable modifications are attributable to "a spontaneous variability which we in our ignorance call Evolution;" and to recognize the legitimate issue of such a match. Positivism would demand, that a tentative hypothesis should be formed under the supposition that all favorable variations are due to the mere regain of characters which had been previously lost by the species under adverse conditions of nature. It would demand, that what they term Evolution should be distinguished, with scientific precision, from the scientific law of Reversion, or of Atavism, which implies a limit to variability. It would demand, that Evolution should be based on scientific knowledge—not as it confessedly is, on scientific ignorance—before they should be suffered to wing their flight to measure the bounds of the Knowable with a tape-line of such questionable correctness. It would imbue them with more taste for analysis than would be consistent with their assumption of infallibility. It would clip the wings of their

pervious to the superstitions of men who refuse to bend the knee to that unknown god yclept Evolution. It would contrast the magnitude and importance of their principle of Evolution, and of all it pretends to solve, with the miserable paucity of ill-digested facts which have been adduced to prove it; and remorselessly dub it Platonic. It would recall them to the fact, that the order of human knowledge is from the external to the internal. It would develop all the absurdity of a system of thought which pretends to give an *a priori* cognition of all the phenomena of the universe. It would show up in its true colors, their subjective craving after system. It would assure them that a conviction evolved from the depths of their inner consciousness, however strong, is not scientific knowledge. It would inform them, that mere observation and experiment does not constitute science. It would prevent them from saying that, because the immensity of the range of Evolution precludes the constant use of observation and experiment, the subjective harmony of their ideas becomes an infallible criterion of the truth of their conclusions. Positivism would sap the very base of their system, and would bring home to them the conviction that any logic,—however deficient,—founded on an analysis of the processes of thought which have led to the discovery of the truths of the natural sciences, cannot fail to possess a symmetry and harmony adequate to the explosion of any theory which essays to make Science conflict with the truths of Revelation.

The prospect was not alluring. Wooed and won by their sympathy with the negations assumed by the theorems, our English friends had allowed themselves to be seduced into such an indorsement of Positivism as threatened to ring the knell of Evolutionism. The grim irony of their situation was exquisite. It is with a melancholy sense of amusement that we recall the comportment of these leaders of "modern thought" in the presence of this dilemma. They saw the thin air into which their system of Evolution would dissolve under the touchstone of such a logic. They had sworn allegiance to Positivism; but most unwilling grew their subjection. They chafed, but more in sorrow than anger. They were too far gone for rage. Their case seemed hopeless. They did not see why they should continue their allegiance; but they conceived themselves bound to do so; forced, conglomerated, crowded onwards, irresistibly impelled by fate, logic, and Comte. They cavilled, they demurred as in ordinary; they sidled, they shuffled, they half stopped, they turned an eye to all the little outlets of escape. There

Much eye had they to their pet theories ; shrewd backward glances at the advisability of formally forswearing their longings for Positive criteria ; not a little apprehensive of the probability of a retrograde phase in the progress of Evolution, and a sudden rush of avoidance. It was a superfluous clutter, and they felt it ; but an Evolutionist finds it more difficult than any other organism to accommodate himself to a logical *habitat*. Being out of his pale, he is in the highest state of wonderment and inaptitude. He is sluggish, obstinate, opinionate, not very bright ; has no desire then for Progress. Think of him in a multitude, forced to progress logically, and wondering whether he shall be constrained to recognize a goal other than the Unknowable. Judge by this of the talents of Comte. The whole formed ample *materiel* for "an Iliad of evils." When all the consequences which attended the acceptance of Positivism had dawned upon them, they grew circumspect. They ceased their lavish praise of the system. They cudgelled their brains to devise some expedient by which to extricate themselves from their unpleasant predicament. They could not consistently attack the logic, for that was in perfect harmony with those criteria which they had, time and again, shadowed forth as the great *desiderata* of modern science. They all at once ceased to be actuated by the laudable desire to remedy the abuses of the existent habits of thought. They suddenly learned that prejudices in favor of logic were vulgar, and did not exactly suit the pure atmosphere of "modern thought." That standard which judged of the truth of a theory by the degree of rude violence which it offered to religious convictions, had long served them in good stead, and would amply suffice for all their logical necessities, without recourse to Positivism. The exigencies of Evolution did not require the employment of such an inconvenient tool as logic. It became them to regard with disdain that consistency which the enemies of Progress would force upon them to its prejudice. They had loved Positivism for its negativism ; but since its negativism would not presume to be Positivism, they would retain its negativism, and wash their hands of the rest of Positivism. They were loath to have any other logic than the tests of their own *dicta* ; and even those they esteemed it unkind to impose at junctures when the interests of Progress counselled the employment of others improvised for the nonce. The canon of interpretation which they had found most reliable, was the beautiful sense of the true with which they ever chanced to be inspired upon confrontation with a difficulty.

ties, absent in mortals not so fully evolved. They attained their conclusions by a felicity of intuition—a sort of polarity towards truth—which precluded the necessity of a logic; and which it was presumptuous in others to attempt to formulate. They had no quarrel to make with Comte. They would credit him with good intentions. But they would take his will instead of his deed. Those narrow intellects of the Middle Ages were answerable for his innocent mistake. It showed how well-nigh impossible it is to eradicate the taint of metaphysics. In this prevailing deference to logic and regard for consistency—into which it should be candidly confessed they themselves were led for a time—they could discern the still lingering traces of the influence of the medical schools. The time has gone by when it was advisable to cramp the intellect in the formalities of logic. It was possible that Positivism would not sustain Evolutionism. But let every Evolutionist only be true to the impulse of that cosmic energy which throbs so imperiously within his pineal gland, and in the end Evolution will display a self-compensating balance which will harmonize all those little discrepancies which grovelling souls now take such a malicious pleasure in pointing out.

Such were the reflections in which the master Evolutionists indulged during the crisis. They saw that the safeguard of their brilliant hypotheses lay in the continuance of that bizarre mixture of incongruous methods which they were once wont so to deplore. They had the power to stay for awhile the effects of Positivism. They formed, in England, an admirably organized mutual admiration society—a coterie of philosophical censors—to which all the scientific societies of Great Britain are in beautiful subordination. The degree of estimation in which a writer and his works should be held by every true Briton, is fixed and adjusted by this conclave, which deigns, at stated periods, to gather the sense of the exoterics at the meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. They are accordingly able to dictate the dominant tone of English philosophic thought: so they damned Positivism, by the faintest praise, to that oblivion into which, in England, it is now quietly and steadily sinking. All those “liberals,” who think through the medium of a few set phrases, such as “natural selection,” “survival of the fittest,” “instability of the homogeneous,” etc., were assured that Positivism was not just “the thing.” That sufficed!

tems (alike favored by the same intellectual class), we shall at some convenient opportunity develop for the consideration of our readers. Now and then, a glimmering of the truth in this matter seems to break in upon the self-complacent benightedness of the English "liberal" mind. But, philosophical opinion is there too completely gagged, for any such adumbration to effect the current tone of thought. John Stuart Mill, who towered head and shoulders above his fellows, in vain essayed to imbue them with a little of the tincture of consistency. But, as Mill was an analytic philosopher whose cast of thought would not suffer him to develop a system which could bear comparison with all the all-comprehensive synthesis of Spencer, they would not hearken to his voice; and he himself (English-like) allowed himself to be inspired with distrust of his own views, when he observed how completely the *sensus communis* of England was captivated by the system of his friend.

Here, in America, we see with pleasure that the tone of heterodox thought bids fair to rise superior to that which prevails in England. The intellects of this country are not to be led away by the specious theories of English philosophers. Spencer, Huxley, and Tyndall may possibly be able to draw successfully upon their incredulity; but, when an equal draft is likewise made upon their credulity, it is most likely to return dishonored. Americans have all the generous feelings which are so prone to be seduced by pleas of freedom of thought. They have all the sensibility to sentiments inspired by the idea of Progress. But their imaginations are too well toned to be blindly credulous. When they ask for Progress, they will insist that they be presented with the genuine article, not with a spurious counterfeit which gives the lie on its face to that which it would fain represent. They will no more feel themselves constrained to accept "modern thought" because they love progress and enlightenment, than they now deem it incumbent on them to become Red Republicans and French Communists, because they are American Democrats. They have all the French perception of what is consistent, without the French susceptibility to the charm of brilliant and specious theories really not trimming with the canons of truth. If they cannot be brought to listen to the voice of the Church, they at least will have the manhood to abide by the logic which they may find to be the outcome of their own mode of thought; to recognize its limitations; to confine themselves therein; and to substitute for that humiliating deference to English thought, which has so long prevailed, a supreme contempt for men who could

been left stranded as wrecks, to point a moral and adorn a tale, were infidels; whilst those who have achieved the results to which "modern thought" points with such egregious complacency, were men with whom the fear of the Lord was the beginning of wisdom.

A CATHOLIC POET OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

"And when I'm lost in death's cold night,
Who will remember now I write?"

SO wrote William Habington, nearly two centuries and a half ago, foreboding, perhaps, the neglect which was so soon to settle on his name. His was not a genius of that robust and cheerful temper which calmly forestalls the verdict of posterity and usurps immortality as its birthright, the royal purple of the sovereigns of song. His premonition, if such it were, had speedy fulfilment. So popular during his lifetime that no less than three editions of his poems were called for in the short space of five years, he seems, upon his death, to have dropped out of notice as quietly and quickly as a pebble tossed into a stream.

So far as we can learn, not even a single bubble of elegy—and a prodigious quantity of such "airy nothings" the drowning poets of his day were wont to set afloat, to show for a little where they had sunk in the Lethean river—marked his exit. Prof. Henry Morley indeed has conjectured, in the preface to his collection of ballads, entitled *The King and the Commons*, that the epitaph he discovered on the fly-leaf of an original edition of Milton, and which he ascribes to that poet, may have been meant for Habington, "whose character," he says, "as the author of the purest love poetry written in the time of Charles I., Milton would have appreciated" in spite of Habington's Catholicity. Gladly would we believe it if we could; a God-speed from John Milton would surely be worth a score of *vales* from lesser bards. But since the epitaph is dated in 1647, and Habington did not become a subject for the obituary muse till 1654, the difficulties seem too great. Without a wail from one of his tuneful brethren, our poet lapsed into oblivion.

Yet Milton might fitly have sung him, for he was his debtor.

"The same expression, as Mr. Bowles observes, occurs with the same rhymes, in an elegant triplet of an obscure poet, John Habington, *Castara*, edit. 1640, p. 8 :

'The nymphes with quivers shall adorne
Their active sides, and rouse the morne
With the shrill music of their horne.'

As *l'Allegro* was first printed in 1645, it is easy to see which is the borrower, even if Milton were not known for a very cateran of letters. But what we chiefly wish to point out is that so accomplished a scholar as Thomas Warton, as late as 1791, knew of William Habington only at secondhand as an "obscure poet," whom he miscalls John.¹ This is not so surprising, however, if, as the *Theatrum Poetarum* says, in 1675 his poems were already forgotten.

Thus neglected, Habington was left till the beginning of the present century, to meet then from the pilgrims who came, first straggling, then flocking, to the shrine of our elder muse, a grateful, if wondering recognition. It seemed odd to find so many genuine poets in that Bæotian (or, as they themselves had said, Cimmerian) darkness beyond the Restoration, wherein, indeed, a few fixed stars were known to twinkle, but so remote and of so faint a ray, that their light was barely visible to the poetic astronomers who sought them through Mr. Addison's telescope at twopence a peep. It looks almost as though time, jealous for his favorites, turns down the page of his record on which many an imperishable work is written, that it may come with a fresher zest to a more discerning generation. The age which made Dryden and Pope its literary idols and Johnson the high-priest of its criticism, found little to relish in the writers of Elizabeth and the first two Stuarts. Their mental reach, their vigor of thought and virility of style, their depth and comprehensiveness, their native force of genius, in a word, whatever in a writer may be measured by purely intellectual standards, that age, indeed, could by such standards measure,

¹ Warton, it is true, was not so strong in the poetry of this period as in that of some others. The *Bibliographia Poetica* calls his *History* "ingenious but frequently inaccurate." It is by no means unlikely that Milton knew and esteemed Habington. The *Theatrum Poetarum* is supposed by Warton to reflect the critical opinions of Milton, Phillips's uncle. In it Habington is mentioned as "the author of poems which came forth above twenty years since under title of *Castara*, the feigned name, no doubt, of that humane goddess who inspired them; but better known by the history of the Reign of King [Edward] the Fourth, in which he hath a style sufficiently florid, and perhaps better becoming a poet than historian. . . . In respect of his poems they are almost forgotten. He may be ranked, in my opinion, with those who deserve neither the

and fairly enough appraise. But the thousand shy beauties of poetry, that lurk between the lines like flowers between the files of corn; the delicacy, the grace, the exquisite simplicity of the earlier singers; the airy loveliness of fancies that flecked, like summer clouds, "the heaven of their invention;" the untamed and unfettered luxuriance of imagination, that like some glowing tropical vine, clinging about a giant tree, wreathed and often hid their sinewy strength of thought; the subtle, indefinable aroma of poetry that must be felt and cannot be analyzed, the aroma of *Lycidas*, of Lodge's *Rosaline*, of Marvell's *Garden*—these things eluded the rules of Boileau, and the precepts of Aristotle's *Poetics*, and the demonstrations of Bishop Hurd, as the ethereal splendors of a rainbow would mock the sculptor's chisel.

The two eras were not in unison, that was all. Ears attuned to the key of Pope's

"All are but parts of one stupendous whole
Whose body nature is. and God the soul,"

or Young's

"This midnight pomp,
This gorgeous arch with golden worlds inlaid,
Built with divine ambition,"

could not catch the haunting harmony of

"The cloud-capped towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
Yea, all which it inherit shall dissolve,
And like this unsubstantial pageant faded
Leave not a rack behind;"

could not taste the "linked sweetness" of

"Valleys low where the mild whispers use,
Of shades and wanton winds, and gushing brooks,
On whose fresh lap the swart star sparely looks."

Johnson estimated the weight of Shakspeare's genius in a criticism admirable for precise conception and accurate adjustment of intellectual values. Yet to Johnson Ariel and Puck were aliens, speaking a foreign tongue; the forest of Arden, the kingdom of Oberon were unknown lands. He could sneer at *Lycidas*¹ and *The Progress of Poetry*, but he could not understand them; and he deliberately put forth an ordinary passage from Congreve's *Mourning Bride* as the finest in English poetry. No wonder that for such an age Gray and Collins "swept their golden lyres" in vain.

¹ " *Lycidas* is a good test of a real feeling for what is peculiarly called poetry." Hallam Lit Hist. iii. 270.

But presently came the reaction. People grew tired of the daintily balanced lines, the sweet monotony of couplets, the cold glitter of antithesis, the artificial sentiments to match the artificial metre. The world was stirring in its sleep; new and strange ideas were abroad; a wind of change came blowing across the sea, cold and bracing, sweeping away remorselessly many sacred cobwebs of conventionality, bearing with it rich, unfamiliar, or half-forgotten odors of freedom and freshness and the dawn. A new order of thought was coming into play, which the powdered and periwigged poetry of Queen Anne could ill interpret or satisfy. It was as though a man who had long dwelt contentedly by the side of a smooth canal, sleeping in the shadow of trim poplars, should be suddenly seized with an overpowering sense of the freedom and gladness and beauty of a mountain brook, an irresistible longing to gaze upon its wild loveliness and drink its clear cold waters. Poets began to draw their inspiration from nature rather than society, from Urania's eyes, no longer from Belinda's looking-glass; readers of poetry began to wonder dimly if those older poets they had heard of, might not fill this uneasy yearning; a few resolute lovers of poetry plunged boldly into the wilderness of black-letter and folio and struck an unexpected mine.

Among the rest who then came to the surface was Habington. The first to draw attention to his merits seems to have been the indefatigable Sir Egerton Brydges, in the *Censura Litteraria*. In Volume VII., of the same work, Nichols gave, from the *Athenæ Oxonienses*, a fuller account of the poet's life and family, together with a generous estimate of his writings. With judges of poetry he soon made his way, until at length his newborn credit was clinched by the admission of the *Castara* into Chalmers's well-known collection. In 1812 our poet gained the still more gratifying honor of a separate issue at Bristol, judiciously edited by Charles Elton, the translator of Hesiod. The enterprise does not appear to have had the fortune it deserved, for copies of Elton's edition, fresh from the bookseller's shelves, are by no means scarce. Within a year or two, the *Castara* has been once more republished in Mr. Edward Arber's admirable, and, indeed, elegant series of cheap fac simile reprints of early English literature, for which every student is indebted to him.

Thus brought before the public, Habington was not long in attracting the notice of the critics. Their judgments, on the whole,

and Ellis included in their various collections specimens of his writings, with more or less discriminating praise. The *Retrospective Review* alone denies him any merit, in a notice which is really curious for its partisan injustice. With the writers of that able but prejudiced periodical, Habington's faith was not a passport to favor.

Nevertheless, it cannot justly be said that the *Castara* is known. At least, to borrow Mr. Aubrey De Vere's remark in the preface to his *May Carols* (where he calls it a noble poem), it is much less widely known than its beauties deserve. To the general reader of poetry, Habington's name, if it be recognized at all, comes with a much less familiar sound than Carew's, or Lovelace's, or Waller's. Yet to Habington Sir Egerton Brydges accords more intrinsic merit than to either Lovelace or Carew, while Park thought that, "as an amatory poet he possesses more unaffected tenderness and delicacy of sentiment than either Carew or Waller, with an elegance of versification very seldom inferior to that of his more famed contemporaries." Nothing is, of course, more common than for critics to be led astray by caprice or individual taste, and the discoverer of an unknown poet feels often much the same sense of ownership, the same temptation to exalt his find, the same duty of defence, as if he were the Columbus of a new world. Yet, that such judgments have been deliberately recorded by critics of acknowledged repute, indicates that the author who called them forth may claim our notice on literary grounds alone. But his religion is a further reason why to Catholic readers he should be better known than he is. Habington is, in all respects, a Catholic poet, not only like Lodge, a Catholic, who chanced to be a poet, or like Pope, a poet who chanced to be a Catholic, but rather like Aubrey de Vere, one in whom faith and genius are so interfused and blended that he seems to be a poet because he is a Catholic, and a Catholic because he is a poet. In a man of Habington's nature, his religion is not a social form or a sentimental fancy, but a deep and pervading influence in his life and work. In this dual character, the poet of the *Castara* comes to us, inviting a special sympathy, and, as we trust the reader will find, clothed with a special interest.

Both his faith and his turn for letters were fairly his by birthright. On both sides he came of a stock which had long been stanchly, even aggressively, Catholic; on both sides he counted authors in his ancestral line. In each capacity his father was known for he

exploded the "Gunpowder Treason" before its time; and her ancestor, *temp.* Henry VIII., Henry Parker, Lord Morley, called "the learned," was a voluminous author, leaving behind him many MS. translations, chiefly of religious works, besides "several tragedies and comedies whose very titles are lost."¹ His descendants under Queen Elizabeth were noted for their resolute adhesion to the Church. More than once a Lord Morley is recorded as imperilling life and fortune by leaving England against the Queen's express commands, when no longer permitted to live there in freedom of conscience, which, in the noble words of the Earl of Arundel, taken on a similar flight, "luy emportait plus que quarante mille d'escus de rentes et belles maysons, et autorité du premier seigneur d'Angleterre."²

It was in this spirit that Habington's people through all that time of bitter trial and temptation kept their faith whole and untainted. They married Catholic wives, they brought up Catholic children, they spent their substance and risked their lives to restore England to the Church. The perilous cause of the English missions found in them its most ardent well-wishers and upholders. They were the first to welcome the missionary, when in disguise and danger he set foot on his native soil, to be, so long as he pressed it, an outlaw and a fugitive among his countrymen; they were the first he turned to for help and hiding, when almost hunted down, and never in vain, though such aid meant death to the harbinger. Their houses were even constructed expressly with a view to such ticklish entertainment. In Nash's *History of Worcestershire*³ (which is based on MS. materials left by the poet's father), will be found an account of the "hiding holes," or "Priest's holes," as they were often called, at Hendlip, the seat of the Habingtons. "The access to some was through the chimneys; some had on the outside the appearance of great chimneys." Through long tubes leading to other parts of the house, food, generally in the form of soup, was conveyed to the fugitive, who often lay immured for days. In the "spacious times of great Elizabeth" (spacious for all but Papists and Popish priests), these hiding-places were seldom empty, and so artfully were they built that in January, 1606, the two Jesuits, Fathers Garnett and Oldcorne, accused of taking part in the Gunpowder Plot, baffled during twelve days and eleven nights the strictest search, yielding at last only to hunger. For that service the owner of Hendlip, the poet's father, was condemned to die, and actually underwent a lingering imprisonment.

¹ Walpole's *Royal and Noble Authors*.

Such a record, backed by their ancient descent, their culture, and what for those days, before fine and imprisonment reduced it sadly, must have been their wealth, gave the Habingtons a position of no little consequence among the Catholic gentry of the time. Their family connections show that, untitled as they were, the proudest houses in England did not disdain their alliance. The poet's mother, as we have seen, was the daughter of Lord Morley. Her maternal grandfather was Sir William Stanley, Lord Mouteagle, of the junior branch of the great house of Derby, and third in descent from that gallant Edward Stanley who won his spurs and his lordship together, where his brother found an earldom, on the bloody field of Flodden. The poet himself married a daughter of Sir William Herbert, the first Lord Powis, who stood in a very similar relation to the Earl of Pembroke.¹ William Habington could claim kinship with the foremost noblemen of his time. His wife's uncle was that "stout old earl" of Northumberland, whom the Gunpowder Plot sent to the Tower "to convert," says Lingard, "that abode of misery into the temple of the Muses," and to share with Endymion Porter the somewhat uncertain honor of being the Mæcenas of the age; her grandfather was that other less lucky Earl of the same house, for whom the Tower proved a tomb instead of a temple. Imprisoned for being a Catholic, Hatton caused him to be murdered in his cell. It was given out that he had committed suicide by shooting himself through the heart with three slugs. But Raleigh directly charges Hatton with his murder in a letter to Sir Robert Cecil, where he assumes Hatton's guilt as a fact well known to both. See Lingard's reasoning (viii., 202), which Mr. Froude by no means meets. Finally, Mrs. Habington's cousin was that Earl of Pembroke who had the honor of being Sir Philip Sidney's nephew. Habington himself was a cousin of the Earl of Shrewsbury, and, as we have seen, a distant connection of the Earls of Derby. He counted many distinguished names besides among his kin.²

We have not dwelt on these dull genealogical details without a

¹ His father was the younger son of the first Earl of Pembroke of the Elizabethan creation. He was consequently first cousin to his namesake, William Herbert, the third earl, supposed by many, on doubtful grounds, to be the "W. H. the only begotter" of Shakspeare's sonnets.

² Among these, if we accept the ingenious conjecture of a writer in the *North British Review* (July, 1870), may, perhaps, be included the most distinguished name of that or any other time in England. According to this writer, Shakspeare's mother, who was an Arden, probably claimed descent from Ralph Arden, of Alvanley, in Cheshire, who married Catherine, daughter of Sir William Stanley, of Wootton. The

purpose. They help to point one of the striking morals of the time. It was not because, but in spite of, their illustrious alliances that the Habingtons clung so steadfastly to the faith of their fathers. Of almost all the great Catholic families at this period, we have but one story: the chiefs fell away, while their followers, as a body, stood fast. Untitled Howards and Percys, Herberts, Talbots, Stanleys, Digbys, were obstinate in "recusancy" long after the heads of their respective houses, yielding to the threats or the flatteries of the court, had conformed. The Catholic nobility, under Elizabeth and James, unhappily furnished few counterparts to that heroic Earl of Arundel already mentioned, who, condemned to die for his faith, is thought to have been poisoned in the Tower; or to that stanch Earl of Shrewsbury, honorably distinguished as one of the only two peers¹ who had the hardihood to vote against the Supremacy Bill in the first year of Elizabeth's accession. This was Francis, fifth Earl, and last Catholic of his line. A member of Queen Mary's privy council, his abilities both in the field and in the cabinet had been so marked as to offset even that objection, and, so to speak, to force Elizabeth to keep him among her own advisers; "but," says Lodge, "his steady adherence to the faith of his ancestors probably obstructed his further advancement." No such "uncourtly sincerity," as Burke calls it, was permitted to stand in the way of his descendants. His son, who is chiefly known to fame as the Queen of Scots' gaoler, was so loyally Protestant² that he must needs break in with a brutal scoff upon his prisoner's dying devotions on the scaffold, and his grandson, in turn, had so bettered the paternal zeal as to make public prayer in the council chamber that "he might never live to see the day when toleration should be granted to Catholics in England."³ It was a fitting answer to such an imprecation, that in less than four years thereafter, he who uttered it dying childless, his earldom passed from his own line to that of a Catholic kinsman. Not more singular and crushing was the rebuke administered by unforgetting Time to Burleigh's cruelty and Salisbury's malice, when the grandson of the one, the son of the other, became a priest of the fold they had harried so ruthlessly.

¹ The other was Viscount Montagu, the same gallant nobleman who, to dispel all doubts of his loyalty, on the approach of the Spanish Armada brought into the field "a band of horsemen commanded by himself, his son, and his grandson, thus perilling his whole house in the expected conflict."—Butler's *Memoirs of the English Catholics*, ii., 11.

² Mr. Froude, ix., 438, calls him half a Catholic. This is unjust. The man, or

The defection of the Earls of Shrewsbury was paralleled in every other Catholic peerage of the time. However these worldly-wise lords may have held to the old religion in secret, outwardly, at least, they burned incense to the idols, and feigned a compliance with the new. But their followers, who had not indeed their temptations, scouted their subservience. While the Earl of Derby was painfully balancing between his conscience and his courtly credit, half the Stanleys in England, his own son among the number, were working for the deliverance of the unhappy Queen of Scots. Reckless of the wavering or yielding of their chiefs, Percys, Howards, and Herberts throughout the land were boldly braving, or unflinchingly enduring, the worst penalties of recusancy. The Catholicity of the Talbots, in spite of the perversion of their leaders, continued so stubborn as to trouble seriously the repose of those canny lords. Under date of May 29th, 1573, we have Gilbert Talbot, afterwards seventh Earl of Shrewsbury, writing thus pathetically to his father, the sixth Earl: "Mr. Wilson showed me some part of the confession of one that said he knew Mary Queen of Scots hated your lordship deadly because of your religion, being an earnest Protestant, and all the Talbots else in England all Papists, she esteemeth of them very well; and the Queen did verily believe all we Talbots did love her better in our hearts than the Queen's Majesty." So sorely must such a bruit have disturbed the selfish and time-serving spirit of Mary's gaoler. But none the more did he succeed in winning those of his name to his own way of thinking. His nearest kin at this time, the Talbots of Grafton and Longford, were strong Catholics, and remained so. George Talbot of Grafton, to whom the title passed in 1617, had in the previous year founded the Jesuit College of Liege, and "procured for it by his influence a settlement of the interest of 200,000 florins from the Duke of Bavaria." Dr. Thomas Talbot was a Jesuit, and president of the College of Louvain, of which Liege was an offshoot. Nor when the title was again transferred, on George's death unmarried, to John Talbot of Longford (whose mother was a Habington, the near relation of the poet), did its religion again change. Indeed, with perhaps a few intermissions, the earldom of Shrewsbury continued to be a Catholic peerage until the extinction of the Grafton and Longford line within the present century. In 1743 the then Earl was a Catholic priest.

But a more striking, as well as a more touching, proof of the fidelity with which the rank and file of the Talbots clung to their ancestral creed, is to be found in the lists of the sufferers for recusancy. There the name figures again and again—a truer patent of

Durham for the crime of "reconciliation, and harboring and assisting priests." So, too, among the recusants "given to be made profit of"¹ to James's favorites, we find John Talbot of Grafton allotted to the Lord Hay, afterwards Earl of Carlisle, and Mr. Talbot of Bashall to Sir Thomas Morrison. In the same lists, it may be remarked, *en passant*, are many names which figure in Habington's poems; for instance, Mr. Brundenell, no doubt the father of the R. B. to whom one of the poems of the *Castara* is dedicated, and who was afterwards Earl of Cardigan, and (a more sorrowful distinction) the father of that wretched Countess of Shrewsbury, who is said to have held Buckingham's horse, disguised as a page, while he slew her husband, Francis, the tenth Earl, in the famous duel behind Montagu House. Here, too, we find also assigned to the Lord Hay, Mr. Audley, "who married the sister of the Lord Windsor," whose brother was one of the Gunpowder Plotters, and to "Mr. Leviston of the Bedchamber, Sir Edward Stanley." Both Windsor and Stanley figure in the *Castara*.

It will thus be seen that it was not the example of their great connections which kept our poet's family firm in the faith. Doubtless the tough Saxon fibre in their blood had much to do with this constancy.² They came, as has been said, of an ancient house, the prototype of many untitled Catholic families in England, whose long descent a patent of nobility would cloud. The poet's immediate ancestor was Richard Habington, or Abington, or Abingdon, of Brockhampton in Hertfordshire, who traced his pedigree beyond the reign of Henry III. to Philip, or Richard de Abington, or Abingdon, lord, perhaps of the district whence the present town of Abingdon takes its name. It may be noted in passing, that about this time John Abington was Abbot of Tewksbury. Richard Habington (as for uniformity we shall call him) had, among other children, two sons, Richard and John, with whom alone we need concern ourselves. Eleanor, the daughter of the former, married Sir Thomas Baskerville, "who could boast of the blood of the Planta-

¹ "Giving to make profit of," refers to one of the worst of the many intolerable oppressions under which English Catholics then groaned. It meant simply that the person to whom a recusant was so given, was empowered to collect for his own benefit the numberless fines and forfeitures imposed on Papists for almost every act and omission of their lives, and which amounted often to a practical confiscation of their estates. To give but one instance out of many: for absenting himself from the Protestant service, a recusant was subject to forfeit to the crown all his goods and chattels, and two-thirds of his lands. No wonder my lord Hay was able to spend, as Clarendon says, "£400,000 in a very jovial life," say \$2,000,000, equal to at least \$10,000,000 now.

genets," and whose "most ancient and honorable name" is inscribed on the roll of Battle Abbey. Not even the blood of the Plantagenets, however, was any shield for recusancy, since we find, in 1587, Walter Baskerville returned to Burghley for exclusion from the magistracy because his wife was a recusant. There are few names connected with our poet that are not to be found in the honorable roll of those who, in one way or another, suffered for conscience's sake. Eleanor Baskerville, the daughter of Sir Thomas, married John Talbot of Grafton, and became the mother of John, tenth Earl of Shrewsbury, and of George Talbot, our poet's cousin and bosom friend, whose early death he laments in the *Castara*.

John Habington, the poet's grandfather, was born in 1515, and died in 1571, his life extending through a great part of four reigns, embracing the most momentous epochs in English history. He was under cofferer or treasurer to Elizabeth, whose favor he seems to have enjoyed. He was, according to Holinshed, "an officer of good credit in her highness's house, and for manie advancements was bound to say, God save Qu. Elizabeth." Among other marks of her royal bounty, she was pleased to stand godmother to one of her under-treasurer's sons, a compliment which at a later period helped, we are told, to save that favored individual's head. John Habington seems to have been employed in public affairs during the preceding reign likewise, and was perhaps one of the officials holding over, like the Earl of Shrewsbury; or, it may be, retained through that nobleman's influence. In the earl's confidence and correspondence he certainly was, and held by him in esteem. So much may be gathered from the letter in Lodge's *Illustrations*, 1, 347, addressed by Habington to the earl, then Lord President and Lieutenant of the Northern Marches, wherein, writing from Berwick under date of October 15th, 1557, he begs the earl to hasten "the ships laden with corn and victuals" in the tone of one who has the trust and favor of his correspondent. Francis, the fifth Earl of Shrewsbury, was then one of the richest and most powerful noblemen in England. He could scarcely have foreseen that in little more than half a century his title would have passed from his own descendants to the blood of his Berwick subordinate.

John Habington was twice married. By his second wife, Catharine, the daughter of John Wykes, of Morton-Jeffreys, he had two sons, Thomas, the poet's father, and Edward, born "at his manor-house at Thorpe, near Chertsey in Surrey." In 1563 he bought, and ten years later rebuilt, Hendlip; "a curious old seat," says Nicholls in the *Censura Litteraria*, "beautifully situated about four miles from the city of Worcester." It was destined to a painful celebrity in connection with two of the most famous events in

to see one of his sons suffer the cruel death of a traitor, and the other condemned to an imprisonment that might at any moment be cut short by the headsman's axe or the assassin's dagger. The Tower, in the sixteenth century, was an unwholesome residence even for subjects of the royal clemency.

Thomas Habington was born August 23d, 1560, and at the age of sixteen entered a commoner at Lincoln College, Oxford, a circumstance which, by bringing him within the scope of Anthony à Wood's curious and valuable record, gives us a fairly full story of his career. It was one of strange haps and perils, and presents a thrilling picture of the life of a Catholic young gentleman of the time. At the university Thomas Habington remained three years, leaving then without a degree, doubtless as Donne afterwards left both Oxford and Cambridge in succession, because his religion prevented his taking the prescribed oaths. From Oxford Habington was sent, about 1579, to the universities of Paris and Rheims, then the usual resorts of Catholic youth, "where," says Wood, "after some time spent in good letters, he returned into England, and, expressing or showing himself an adherent of Mary Queen of Scots, who plotted with Anthony Babington against Queen Elizabeth, was committed prisoner to the Tower of London, where, continuing six years, he profited more in several sorts of learning than he had before in all his life."

Wood dismisses thus briefly an episode upon which, not only as it involved in a supreme degree the fortunes of our poet's family, but as being in itself one of the most romantic and tragic passages in English history, we may permit ourselves longer pause. How far Thomas Habington was himself implicated in the famous Babington plot for which his brother suffered death, and which led directly to the sacrifice of a nobler victim, the Queen of Scots, it is not easy to say. From Wood's language it might be inferred that his known sympathy for the Scottish queen and his near relationship to one of the convicted conspirators, were the main grounds of his arrest. From the fact that he was not executed nor apparently even tried, we may justly suppose that the government failed to find against him even the flimsy evidence which sufficed in those days to send a Catholic to rack or gibbet. Yet the chances are that he was at least privy and consenting to so much of the design as looked to the rescue of Mary. Returning to his native land at the age of twenty-one or twenty-two, an ardent Catholic, high-spirited and enthusiastic, he found his coreligionists groaning under

age, was a captive in the hands of her deadly foes, entrapped by infamous treachery, detained in shameless defiance of every law, subjected to constant humiliation and outrage, in hourly danger of assassination. She was a woman, yet young and beautiful, suffering and persecuted; the loveliest and most unhappy princess in Christendom. Here was every incentive to waken youthful gallantry, to kindle manly indignation. It would not be strange if Habington eagerly espoused her cause. It was secretly or openly the cause of half the kingdom, of the best and bravest of its youth.

In his brother Edward, Thomas Habington found a kindred spirit. "He was," says Wood, "a person of a turbulent spirit and nature;" but the criticisms, either literary or personal, of that "tasteless though useful drudge," as Brydges calls him, are not to be taken too literally. Edward Habington was already "a member of an association of Catholic young gentlemen in London," a sort of Elizabethan Catholic Union, whose object was to further the cause of the Church, and especially to receive and care for missionary priests. To their headquarters, "at the house of Mr. Gilbert, one of their number, in Fetter Lane" came, on their arrival in 1580, the Jesuits Campion, Emerson, and Parsons, and there, no doubt, the two brothers met Anthony Babington, destined to be the evil genius of the little band. He appears to have been a headstrong impetuous youth, equally ambitious and unscrupulous, but ill-balanced, reckless, and vain, without either the craft, the decision, or the coolness requisite for a conspirator, one above all who must cope with the wily Walsingham. "A brainless youth," Edward Habington styled him, "of a proud stomach and an ambitious mind."

He had but little difficulty in drawing his associates into the design, so far at least as to secure their consenting silence, if not their active help. In that electric atmosphere, full charged with conspiracy, a band of fiery young men burning with a sense of intolerable wrong, needed but a spark to inflame them from protest into action. The plot in its first and only shape, so far as a majority of the conspirators had to do with it, included two objects, the rescue of the Queen of Scots and the restoration of the Catholic ritual. Babington and Savage, a soldier from Alva's army, seem from the first to have meditated the assassination of Elizabeth; a villainy, the responsibility for which the former upon his trial cravenly attempted to fasten upon another of his accomplices, Ballard, a priest. To this part of the scheme there is no reason to believe either of the Habingtons privy.

How the plot was foiled by Babington's recklessness and Wal-

Thomas Habington was arrested at Hendlip; Edward was taken hiding in a haymow in Hertfordshire. On the trial, which occupied the 13th, 14th, and 15th of September, 1586, Babington, the guiltiest of the party, alone bore himself like a traitor and an assassin, accusing all of his confederates freely, but striving chiefly to fix the blame upon Ballard, obviously in the hope to curry favor with his priest-hating judges. "Yea, Mr. Babington," answered Ballard, with composure, "lay all the blame upon me, but I wish the shedding of my blood might be the saving of your life. Howbeit, say what you will, I will say no more."¹ The others behaved with dignity and courage, no easy matter for men in such a situation, facing almost certain death, deprived of counsel, and arraigned before a court organized to convict and licensed to insult and outrage. One of the prisoners, Travers, accused of travelling in company with a priest, his chaplain, for that was then high treason in "merrie England," answered, "'If he be a priest I honor him for his priesthood.' And he said little else as one that seemed not to care what evidence came against him, but was resolute to be hanged." Gage, "a sound Papist," asked by Chief Justice Manwood why he fled to the woods, "stoutly and fiercely answered, 'for company.'" "In no sort guilty," pleaded Tilney, 'no more guilty than you are;'" and afterwards reproached with the oath he had taken as a gentleman-pensioner of the Queen, replied that he was not a Catholic when sworn, "but I am one now, for which I thank God most heartily." Both Tilney and Habington defended themselves with an energy and acumen which must have extorted the admiration even of their ruthless judges.² All the prisoners, fourteen in number, were found guilty, many on the suspicious evidence of Babington, or on confessions extorted on the rack.

And then occurred a scene seldom witnessed in a court of justice. The first solicitude of these noble youths was not for their lives, but lest their deaths might wrong their creditors. Most of them were men of wealth, but their property was of course by their conviction confiscated to the state. Said Tilney, "I owe in London about £200 or £300, and I beseech your honors to procure my friends to pay it for discharge of my conscience." "I owe some sums of money," said Jones, "but not very much, and I have more owing me; I beseech that my debts be paid with that which is owing me." Charnock begged that "six angels, which such a one had of him, might be delivered to his brother to pay his debts."

¹ Howell's State Trials, I, 1143.

² They were perhaps law students, as some of the others may have been. As Cath-

Said Travers, "I never committed any treason, and for my religion I will die in it; only I owe £4 or such a matter; I beseech you it may be paid out of the profits of my lands." And Habington's first thought was for his sister: "Only this one petition to my good lords I make: I have one sister whose preferment also hath miscarried, wherefore if it might please her majesty with the revenues of my lands in some sort to provide for her; if I live I will endeavor to be thankful, and if I die I will pray for her."

Surely these were traitors of an uncommon kind. Even Hatton, the chancellor, who presided, was moved to burst forth, "O Ballard, Ballard, what hast thou done? A sort of brave youths otherwise endued with good gifts, by thy inducements hast thou brought to their utter destruction and confusion!" Had the reproach been addressed to Babington it would have been just. But the play would have been unpopular without its wicked priest.

Under the beneficent rule of good Queen Bess the condemned were seldom let languish. Judge and hangman went arm in arm; sometimes, indeed, it was not easy to tell them apart. On the 20th or 21st of September the prisoners were taken in detachments of seven to the sickening slaughter which was then the penalty of high treason in England. Drawn on hurdles to St. Giles in the Fields, they were there hanged, drawn, and quartered, the executions at the Queen's special and most womanly request "being protracted to the last extremities of payne in them," and the victims cut down and mutilated while still alive. They died, even to Babington, redeeming by his death his conduct on the trial, in the same noble and manly fashion, "making profession of Catholic faith," and in some instances praying for the Queen's conversion. There was as usual a Protestant minister on the scaffold, whose zeal outran his sense of decorum. "Seeming to school Tilney in points of religion differing from those he held," the latter answered with a tranquil scorn which must have pierced even the zealot's hide: "I came hither to die, Doctor, and not to argue." Habington was subjected to the same outrage. "Being urged by Doctor White to be of a lively faith, he answered 'he believed steadfastly in the Catholic faith.' The Doctor asked him what he meant 'for I fear me,' said he 'thou deceivest thyself.' He answered 'that faith and religion which is holden in almost all Christendom except here in England.' This done he willed them not to trouble him

we may ascribe it either to want of proof against him, or to the unmistakable repugnance of the people to a continuance of the slaughter.¹ Queen Elizabeth did not so readily condone even less serious offences in her godsons as Sir John Harrington experienced. At all events, our poet's father was spared to become his father, going to prison instead of to the scaffold. We have seen with what literary employment he beguiled the weary hours of captivity in the Tower, that grim Lucena of many a laboring Muse, from the somewhat hoarse Polyhymnia of Sir Thomas Smith's Psalms to Sir Walter Raleigh's intrepid Clio. When Habington emerged, in 1594, the Queen of Scots had long been beheaded at Fotheringay, the Armada had been destroyed, the power and hopes of the Catholics were crushed. There was no inducement to renew efforts, the dangers of which he had so vividly realized. He retired to Hendlip, the manor of which had been settled upon him by his father,² "took to wife Mary, the daughter of Edward Parker, Lord Morley, by Elizabeth his wife, daughter and sole heir of Sir William Stanley, knight, Lord Mounteagle," and devoted himself to surveying Worcestershire, and making "a collection of its antiquities from records, registers, evidences, both private and public monuments, MSS. and arms." "Part of this book," says Wood, "I have seen and perused, and find that every leaf is a sufficient testimony of his generous and virtuous mind, of his indefatigable industry, and infinite reading." Other fruits of his learned leisure were *The Antiquities of Worcestershire*, of *The Cathedral Church and Bishops of Worcester*, and, his only published work, a translation into English of the Epistle of Gildas à Britain, entitled *De Excidio et Conquestu Britanniae*, with an ample preface, 8vo., London, 1638. This was born of a second imprisonment which he underwent because of the celebrated Gunpowder Plot.

Before this, according to Gough, he had an active part in the Earl of Essex's conspiracy. Of this charge, however, there is no proof, and it seems but an idle surmise, based on the absurd hypothesis that Essex's rebellion was another "Popish plot," and the fact that Lord Mounteagle, Habington's brother-in-law, was one of the little company who shared in the mad defence of Essex House.

For suspecting him of complicity in the Gunpowder Treason there is more apparent ground. His wife is said to have written the warning letter to Lord Mounteagle which led to the discovery of the plot and two priests, F. Garnett Provincial of the Jesuits

unjustly hanged for it, were taken at Hendlip House, as mentioned above. Yet neither fact is conclusive, and by many historians Francis Tresham, Mounteagle's brother-in-law, and one of the conspirators, is held to be the writer of the letter. Wood asserts this positively in his sketch of Tresham, but as he very impartially makes the same assertion of Mary Habington in his sketch of her husband, we are not much enlightened. Bishop Williams is said by Bishop Kennett to have been shown at Hendlip "the very table whereon was the letter wrote to my Lord Mounteagle," and Dr. Nash says he found there many letters and papers wherein the plot was mentioned, besides a portrait of Percy, one of the conspirators,¹ and another reputed author of this much fathered epistle. It seems unlikely, however, that a man of middle age with the tastes and habits, let alone the chastening experience, of Thomas Habington, should have engaged in an enterprise of such peculiar atrocity, limited to half a dozen desperate men. Failing more definite proof, he may safely be acquitted of any further complicity than sheltering two fugitive priests, as little guilty as himself.

That, however, was crime worthy of death in the panic which followed the plot, and Habington, condemned to die, owed his life to the intercession of his brother-in-law, Lord Mounteagle. It is not impossible that his implication in the Babington conspiracy may now have helped his case instead of hurting it, as would naturally be thought. James is said always to have favored the partisans of his unhappy mother. In the *Basilikon Doron* he admits that the "followers of his persecuted mother had ever been the most faithful of his own servants." It is a pity he did not show more of this filial feeling in his lifetime. It was certainly not apparent when he permitted her murder to go not only unavenged, but almost without a protest—it is too horrible to believe, with some writers, that he connived at it²—or when he chose for his first favorite Carr, or Kerr, the villainous Earl of Somerset, son of that brutal Ker of Faudonside, most ruffianly of the ruffianly band who murdered Rizzio at Mary's feet, and fixed on her unborn son that stigma of poltroonery which is the sole miserable palliation of his baseness.

But though Habington again narrowly escaped the halter, he had to undergo another long imprisonment in the Tower. As before,

¹ *Gent. Mag.*, lxvii., 30.

² According to Froude, Archibald Douglass, James's ambassador at the court of Elizabeth, in 1587, favored the execution of Mary (xii., 368). If this is the same Archibald Douglass who was a ringleader among the murderers of Darnley, his attitude

he solaced himself with literary labors, composing the translation of Gildas already referred to, and perhaps beginning the history of Edward IV., which his son completed. No doubt, too, he was made free of that worshipful company which the eccentric Earl of Northumberland, imprisoned for the same offence, gathered about him, and which included Sir Walter Raleigh, Allen, the friend of Selden, Dee, the astrologer, and Hariot, "the universal philosopher," all versed in quaint and curious lore. To the acquaintance thus begun a lively fancy might trace the marriage, already by destiny contracted, between Habington's infant son and Northumberland's unborn niece, the inspiring genius of the *Castara*.

How long the imprisonment lasted is uncertain. Wood calls it lingering, and the earl was confined for thirteen years.¹ Habington is said to have been once more indebted to the good offices of his brother-in-law for his release, which was coupled, however, with the condition that he should not leave Worcestershire. The rest of his life he gave to books and the rearing of his many children. He lived to see his eldest son happily married, to read his *Castara* celebrating that joyful event, and to behold his brother's prophecy fulfilled in the horrors of civil war. "At length," says Wood, "after he had lived to the age of eighty-seven, he surrendered up his pious soul to God at Hendlip on the eighth day of October, 1647, and was buried by his father in a vault under the chancel of the church at Worcester."

The space we have given to the life of Thomas Habington, the reader, we trust, will not begrudge. It was a typical life of the English Catholic of his time, full of perilous adventures and hair-breadth escapes, altogether more romantic and picturesque than that of his poet son. We should judge him to have been a youth of generous enthusiasm, a manhood of resolute convictions, an old age of quiet usefulness and unaffected piety. His learning was apparently considerable, and his antiquarian researches were the foundation of Nash's *History of Worcestershire*, and to a less degree of Gough's *Topography*.

Of William Habington, personally, we know much less. Like many a greater poet, he lives for us only in his books, and his uneventful life, unlike his father's, made no ripple on the political current of the time. The few particulars we have are derived from Wood's scanty and, as it were, grudging recital. "Ordinary poets,"

as D'Israeli remarks, "Wood always treated scurvily." It must be owned though, that to a place in the *Athenæ Oxonienses* William Habington has no proper claim at all, never having been a student of the famous university. He comes into Wood's narrative on sufferance, holding by his father's skirts, and we should perhaps be thankful for what we get without falling foul of honest Anthony. Wood professes to get his materials from William Habington's son Thomas, and his account, as far as it goes, is no doubt trustworthy.

The poet was born at Hendlip on the fourth day of November, 1605. Others, led away no doubt by the obvious coincidence, make his birthday the fifth of that month, the day of the Gunpowder Plot. Surely an inauspicious beginning for a poet! The year was more fitting, being that in which Waller, Davenant, and Sir Thomas Brown saw the light.

In the education of his son, Thomas Habington proved anew the stanchness of his religious convictions. In spite of the heavy penalties decreed against it, William was sent to the Jesuit College at St. Omer's, and afterwards, following in his father's footsteps, to Paris. In the first of these he doubtless imbibed that knowledge of the classics which lends to his writings so much of what Lowell calls "the faint delicious aroma of association," and which the good fathers were then, as now, famous for imparting. If Wood is to be believed, some effort was made to induce the young poet to assume the habit of the order. It is not unlikely that Habington, whose writings show him to have been naturally of a serious and contemplative bent, may himself have inclined to a religious life. Whatever his inclinations or inducements, however, he yielded to neither, but finishing his studies at Paris, returned to England, "being then," says Wood, "arrived at man's estate." Here he continued his education under the personal direction of his father, "by whom he was instructed at home in matters of history," to which were doubtless added the lighter graces of the time, "and became an accomplished gentleman."

Meanwhile the young scholar found leisure to study "other matters," in which the guidance of fathers is less often asked, and their precepts, be they ever so sage, as seldom followed. Our meagre records do not acquaint us at what masque or hawking party or courtly minuet, the bright eyes of Lucy Herbert first opened to him "the sweeter books in lover's looks," to which from that time forth he seems to have given assiduous study. The story of his wooing we can read in and between the lines of the *Castara*. It is

sweet solitudes, and smile, if they smile at all, over its fond excesses in kindliness, not in scorn, will find in it something of the perennial charm that freshens the weariness of life as the dew the fading rose. It was the fashion of the day for lovers to do their wooing in verse, and Habington followed it most loyally. Not only his mistress's eyebrow, but her frown, and her smile, the dimple in her cheek, the house where she lived, the roses in her bosom, kindled his willing muse to a thousand amorous fancies. If she prayed or if she sang, if she sighed or if she wept, if she took a journey into the country or came back, if she lifted him to the seventh heaven of rapture by looking at him, or plunged him into the deepest abysses of despair by looking another way, the event demanded at once to be chronicled in immortal verse, together with a glowing description of the portentous natural phenomena, the elemental convulsions which from time immemorial have marked these unprecedented episodes in the love-faring of youthful poets. As sometimes happens, the lady who was the object of this melodious homage, appears to have been more impressed by it than her prosaic parents. Here and there in the poems are hints of parental cruelty, not, we may imagine, of a very unrelenting sort. The course of true love was fretted with just enough of trouble to keep it fervent, but on the whole it ran more through sunshine than through shadow. In one place Habington contrasts his friend Brudenell's fortune with his own:

"While you dare trust the loudest tongue of fame,
The zeale you beare your mistresse to proclaime
To th' talking world; I, in the silent'st grove,
Scarce to myselfe dare whisper that I love."

And the reason for this difference in their fates, he hints, is his friend's superiority in wealth and fortune:

"Thee, titles, Brud'nell, riches thee adorne."

In a *Dialogue between Hope and Feare*, the latter reminding him of this bids him

"Checke thy forward thoughts and know,
Hymen only joynes their hands,
Who with even paces goe,
Shée in gold, he rich in lands."

That may do for the young lady, says Fear, but there are other folks who have a say in the matter :

" Yet obedience must prevaile ;
They who o're her actions sway,
Would have her on th' ocean saile,
And contenne thy narrow sea."

Hope retorts boldly :

" Parents' lawes must beare no weight,
When they happinesse prevent,
And our sea is not so strait,
But it roome hath for content."

Whereupon Fear takes another tack, and would have him consider the number of the lady's adorers, and who is he forsooth, to be preferred :

" Thousand hearts as victims stand,
At the altar of her eyes,
And will partiall she command
Onely thee for sacrifice !"

But Hope is equal to the situation, and with true lover-like modesty clinches the argument :

" Thousand victims must returne ;
She the purest will designe ;
Choose, Castara, which shall burne,
Choose the purest, that is mine."

Other passages hint at a certain restraint on the intercourse of the lovers. The luckless swain, debarred from visiting his idol in her residence at Seymors—her papa having desired her, perhaps, to be no longer at home to that young Master Habington, and instructed the footman not to take his card when he called—is fain to content himself with a very lenten fare of looks and sighs :

" See, he from Marlowe sends
His eyes to Seymors. Then chides th' envious trees,
And unkind distance."

He consoles himself that

" Though sad fate deny
My prophane feet access, my words shall fly."

To this end, he takes the Thames into his confidence.

" Swift in thy watr'y chariot, courteous Thames,
Haste by the happy errour of thy streames

With that sublime faith in the elements characteristic of lovers and poets, he enlists the wind as his Mercury:

“ Banished from you, I charged the nimble winde,
My unseen messenger, to speake my minde
In amorous whispers to you.”

Or, “leapes into the chariot” of the same complaisant spirit:

“ Who ’ll hurry me till I approach the faire
But unkind Seymors,
Viewing this prodigie, astonisht they,
Who first access deny’d me, will obey,
With feare, what love commands—”

a still more direct suggestion of opposition from the lady's father. We find another intimation to the same effect in a poem addressed to Lord Powis, after the marriage, to which he seems to have given a reluctant assent:

“ The reverend man by magicke of his prayer
Hath charmed so, that I and your daughter are
Contracted into one. The holy lights
Smil'd with a cheerful lustre on our rites,
And everything presag'd full happinesse
To mutual love, if you'll the omen blesse,
Nor grieve, my lord, 'tis perfected.”

And he goes on to excuse himself by throwing the blame on fate, adding rather prettily:

“ In virtue there's an empire. And so sweet
The rule is, when it doth with beauty meete,
As fellow consul that of heaven they
Nor earth partake who would her disobey.
This captiv'd me. And ere I question'd why
I ought to love Castara, through my eye
The soft obedience stole into my heart.”

For the daughter of a baron, and the granddaughter of an earl, one who united the blood of the Percys and the Herberts, Lord Powis may fairly have looked forward to a more brilliant settlement than her marriage with a commoner of impaired fortune and clouded name. Yet the match after all was not so unequal. Habington too, was of distinguished lineage, and his estate, though

Catholic nobleman.¹ And though at first sight his father's implication in the Gunpowder Plot might seem an offset to greater merits than these, yet, waiving the fact that the son-in-law of a Percy could not well raise that objection, strangely enough as we should deem it, even those actually convicted and executed for the crime left no legacy of infamy to their children. For example, Sir Everard Digby was one of the most conspicuous of the Gunpowder conspirators, yet his son, Sir Kenelm, though to the disadvantage of his descent he added the no less grave offence of being reconciled, after James himself had taken the trouble to see that he was brought up a Protestant in the royal wardship, stood high in that monarch's favor, as well as in his son's. The truth is, that assassination, even on the wholesale plan, was then, and up to a much later period, practically recognized as a legitimate engine of political warfare. They who would gauge by our present standard of morality the opinion held of such attempts in the time of Elizabeth and James, make little account of human progress, especially in point of respect for human life.

But, as already intimated, the paternal opposition evidently went no farther than dissent, and by no means savored of coercion. A certain Lady F. appears to have been useful to the young couple in this strait, and she is repaid with a eulogy which recalls Steele's charming compliment to his wife, "that to love her was a liberal education."

"Castara cries to me: 'Search out and find
The mines of wisdom in her learned mind,
And trace her steps to honour: I aspire
Enough to worth when I her worth admire.'"

At length, however, true love triumphed over all hindrances, and the poet's constancy was rewarded with the hand of his Castara. He thus celebrates the joyful event, referring again to the obstacles which had retarded it:

"This day is ours. The marriage Angell now
Sees th' Altar in the odour of our vow
Yeeld a more precious breath than that which moves
The whisp'ring leaves in the Panchayan groves.
View how his temples shine, on which he weares
A wreath of pearle made of those precious teares
Thou wepst a Virgin, when crosse winds did blow,
Our hopes disturbing in their quiet flow.

¹ This branch of the Herberts seems to have remained Catholic for many generations. In the celebrated "Popish Plot," the then Lord Powis was one of the Catholic noble-

But now Castara smile. No envious night
Dares interpose itself, t' eclipse the light
Of our cleare joyes. For even the laws divine
Permit our mutual love so to entwine,
That kings, to ballance true content, shall say:
Would they were great as we, we blest as they."

At his marriage Habington was probably in his twenty-eighth year, for there is a poem on the anniversary of his wedding in the second part of the *Castara*, which was first printed in 1634. The lady of his choice seems to have been in every way worthy of him. Winstanley speaks of her in his *Lives of the Poets* as a lady "of rare endowments and beauty;" and Habington himself, it may be presumed, draws her portrait in his prose "character" of a mistress prefixed to the first part of the *Castara*. A very charming portrait it is, and sets in a most attractive light the poet and his wife. For this reason, and because it is a good sample of Habington's prose style, we quote it.

"A MISTRESS.

"Is the fairest treasure, the avarice of Love can covet; and the onely white, at which he shootes his arrowes, nor while his aime is noble, can he ever hit upon repentance. She is chaste, for the devill enters the Idoll and gives the Oracle, when wantonnesse possesseth beauty, and wit maintaines it lawfull. She is as faire as Nature intended her, helpt perhaps to a more pleasing grace by the sweetnesse of education, not by the slight of Art. She is young, for a woman past the delicacie of her spring, may well move by vertue to respect, never by beauty to affection. Shee is innocent even from the knowledge of sinne, for vice is too strong to be wrestled with, and gives her frailty the foyle. She is not proude, though the amorous youth interpret her modestie to that sence; but in her virtue weares so much Majestie, lust dares not rebell, nor though masqued, under the pretence of love, capitulate with her. She entertaines not every parley offer'd, although the Articles pretended to her advantage: advice and her own feares restraine her, and woman never owed ruine to too much caution. She glories not in the plurality of servants, a multitude of adorers heaven can onely challenge, and it is impietie in her weaknesse to desire superstition from many. She is deafe to the whispers of love, and even on the marriage houre can break off, without the least suspicion of scandall, to the former liberty of her carriage. She avoydes a too neere conversation with man, and like the Parthian overcomes by flight. Her language is not copious but apposit, and she had rather suffer the reproach of being dull company, than have the title of Witty, with that of Bold and Wanton. In her carriage she is sober, and thinks her youth expreseth life enough, without the giddy motion, fashion of late hath taken up. She danceth to the best applause but doates not on the vanity of it, nor licenceth an irregular meeting to vaunt the levity of her skill. She sings, but not perpetually, for she knows silence in woman is the most perswading oratory. She never arriv'd to so much familiarity with man as to know the diminutive of his name, and call him by it; and she can show a competent favour: without yeelding her hand to his gripe. Shee never understood the language of a kisse, but at salutation, nor dares the Courtier use so much of his practised impudence as to offer the rape of it from her: because chastity hath writ it unlawfull, and her behaviour proclaimes it un-

tenant to a cottage, and familiarity with greatness (if worth be not transcendent above the title) is but a glorious servitude, fooles onely are willing to suffer. She is not ambitious to be prais'd, and yet values death beneath infamy. And Ile conclude (though the next synod of Ladies condemne this character as an heresie broacht by a Precision) that onely she who hath as great a share in vertue as in beauty, deserves a noble love to serve her, and a free Poesie to speake her."

That is a tribute of which any lady surely might be proud, though to our modern ways it has in it something of the sting of a rebuke. Not less captivating is the pretty picture of a wife, though that, too, may not altogether please the ladies with missions, who clamor from the rostrum for the dignity of womanhood and the emancipation of the sex.

"A WIFE.

"Is the sweetest part in the harmony of our being. To the love of which, as the charmes of Nature inchant us, so the law of grace by special priviledge invites us. . . . She is so religious that every day crownes her a martyr, and her zeale neither rebellious nor uncivill. Shee is so true a friend, her Husband may to her communicate even his ambitions, and if successe Crowne not expectation, remaine neverthelesse uncontemned. Shee is colleague with him in the Empire of prosperity; and a safe retyring place when adversity exiles him from the World. She is so chaste, she never understood the language lust speaks in, nor with a smile applaudes it, although there appeare wit in the Metaphore. Shee is faire onely to winne on his affections, nor would she be Mistris of the most eloquent beauty; if there were danger, that might perswade the passionate auditory, to the least irregular thought. Shee is noble by a long descent, but her memory is so evill a herald, shee never boasts the story of her Ancestors. . . . Shee is much at home, and when she visites 'tis for mutuall commerce, not for intelligence. Shee can goe to Court, and returne no passionate doater on bravery; and when shee hath seene the gay things muster up themselves there, she considers them as Cobwebs the Spider vanity hath spunne. Shee is so generall in her acquaintance, that shee is familiar with all whom fame speakes vertuous; but thinkes there can bee no friendship but with one; and therefore hath neither shee friend nor private servant. Shee so squares her passion to her Husbands fortunes, that in the Countrey shee lives without a froward Melancholly, in the towne without a fantastique pride. . . . She is inquisitive onely of new wayes to please him, and her wit sayles by no other compasse than that of his direction. . . . His vertues are her wonder and imitation; and his errors, her credulitie thinks no more frailtie, than makes him descend to the title of Man. In a word, shee so lives that she may die; and leave no cloude upon her Memory, but have her character nobly mentioned."

Still more delightful is the poetical description of *Castara*, which closes the first book, and which well deserves Nichols's ardent commendation as "a poem so simple, so chaste, harmonious, and happy, as to exceed my powers of praise."

"THE DESCRIPTION OF CASTARA.

"Like the Violet which alone
Prosperes in some happy shade;
My *Castara* lives vnknowne,
To no looser eye betray'd.
For shee's to her selfe untrue,
Who delights i' th' publicke view.

"Such is her beauty, as no arts
Have enricht with borrowed grace.
Her high birth no pride imparts,
For she blushes in her place.
Folly boasts a glorious blood,
She is noblest being good.

"Cautious she knew never yet
What a wanton courtship meant:
Nor speaks loud to boast her wit,
In her silence eloquent.
Of her selfe survey she takes,
But 'tweene men no difference makes.

"She obeye's with speedy will
Her grave Parents wise commands.
And so innocent, that ill,
She nor acts, nor understands.
Womens feete runne still astray,
If once to ill they know the way.

"She sailes by that rocke, the Court,
Where oft honour splits her mast:
And retir'dnesse thinks the port,
Where her fame may anchor cast.
Vertue safely cannot sit,
Where vice is entron'd for wit,

"She holds that dayes pleasure best,
Where sinne waits not on delight.
Without maske, or ball, or feast,
Sweetly spends a winters night.
O're that darknesse, whence is thrust,
Prayer and sleepe, oft governs lust.

"She her throne makes reason climbe,
While wild passions captive lie.
And each article of time,
Her pure thoughts to heaven flie:
All her vowes religious be,
And her love she vowes to me."

Readers of Wordsworth will trace, in the first stanza above quoted,
an interesting parallel to the lovely lines on the death of Lucy:

*"A violet by a mossy stone
Half hidden from the eye!
Fair as a star when only one
Is shining in the sky.*

"She lived unknown."

With such a wife, a fortune ample for his needs, and his reputation as a poet already established, with such tastes as were his, and full scope for their contentment, our poet's life could scarce be otherwise than happy. But happiness, alas! in individuals as in nations, means the negation of history, and consequent despair of chronicler and biographer. Of the rest of Habington's life we can only conjecture that it was passed in "lettered ease," and the cultivation of his favorite pursuits; in the tranquil enjoyments of a country gentleman of position and culture, varied by a taste now and again of more stimulating pleasures in court and city; in the society of his wife and children, and the intercourse of congenial friends. His acquaintance was large, and embraced many of the most considerable personages and foremost wits of his time. Among the former he counted Endymion Porter, Sir Kenelm Digby, Lord Windsor, the rear admiral of the fleet which brought Charles from Spain, the Earls of Shrewsbury, Cardigan, Argyle, and Sterling, the last-named himself a poet of no mean rank; among the latter, Ben Jonson, Lovelace, Shirley, Sir Aston Cokayn,¹ and doubtless all of the prominent writers of the day. His verses on the *Jonsonius Virbius* on Jonson's death are by no means the worst in that collection, and he contributed commendatory poems in Latin and English to Shirley's *Wedding* and *Grateful Servant*. No doubt he assisted at more than one jovial wit combat in the Mermaid or the Mitre, and tossed off many a bowl of sack or canary with waggish John Cleveland, or gentle Massinger, or him of the learned sock. Though naturally given to retirement and study, he was by no means an ascetic. He knew the *dulce desipere in loco*, and he could within bounds enjoy a good dinner and a merry company. One of his poems gives an amusing account of such a banquet, where—

"The wealth
Of the Canaries was exhaust, the health
Of his good majesty to celebrate,
Who'll judge them loyal subjects without that."

In another he bids a friend to join him "in so rich a sack,"

"That of this wine should Prynne
Drink but a plenteous glass, he would begin
A health to Shakspeare's ghost."

¹ Sir Aston, another Catholic poet, would perhaps resent the discrimination which makes him a wit instead of what he esteemed himself, a "considerable personage." To some extent he was both, though his baronetcy was disputed. One of his epigrams to Sir Kenelm Digby gives a hint of Habington's poetical acquaintance.

But he was one of the "not unwise,"

"Who of such delights can judge, and spare
To interpose them oft."

At the court he must have been equally at home, and had he striven for it, could no doubt have obtained preferment. So much his family alliances would have insured, and he must, besides, have shared to some extent the countenance and favor of Charles the First, if, as asserts Wood, his history of Edward IV. was written and published at that monarch's request. His tragi-comedy of "The Queene of Aragon" was acted at Whitehall, in 1640, before the King and Queen. Many of the poems of the *Castara* are dedicated, after the fashion of the period, to names of historic celebrity. Indeed, to turn its pages—nor is this the least of its charms—is like walking through a picture gallery of that elegant court "whose magnificence," says Gifford, somewhat hyperbolically, "though modern refinement may affect to despise, modern splendor never reached even in thought." Here smiles upon us the laughing loveliness of that bewitching Countess of Carlisle, "the Erinnyes of her time," who turned the heads of half the statesmen and all the poets of the day, and whose praises French Voitures and English Wallers vied in singing. There a rival enchantress, Clarendon's "lady of extraordinary beauty, and as extraordinary fame," challenges our admiration: the famous Venetia Digby, whose husband, the eccentric Sir Kenelm, is thought to have poisoned her with a cosmetic of his own invention, designed to heighten her charms. Now we have Lord Powis storming and "swearing he'll turn rebel if Strafford is king," or, in more pious mood, talking my lady Caernarvon into giving up card-playing and dancing of a Sunday; again, the testy Earl of Northumberland astonishes the worthy citizens by driving abroad with eight horses, because that upstart Buckingham had presumed to parade six. A poem to Lord Windsor recalls the stately tournament where his ancestor, with Sir Philip Sidney, Sir Fulke Greville, and the Earl of Arundel held the lists against all comers in honor of the Virgin Queen's expected marriage to Anjou; another to the Earl of Argyle, contrasts with that scene of splendor the gloomy northern scaffold where the murder of the gallant and ill-fated Montrose was at last avenged. Judging from such evidence as this, the poet was as "well seen," as old Anthony would say, in courtly circles as in the humbler, but perhaps more

quire of Muses," than to "the shine of kings." Like Shirley,

"He had never learned that trick of court, to wear
Silk at the cost of flattery ;"

and the quiet pleasures of his country home, sanctified by the love of his Castara, and brightened by the presence of his children, were no doubt a grateful relief from the unquiet pomp and pageantry of Whitehall. The wit, the brightness, the *urbanity* of the town, he could value and enjoy to the full ; but he grew speedily tired of its selfishness, greed, and clamor.¹ He says as much in an "*Epistle to my noblest friend, J. C.*" (who may have been Cleveland, or one of the Comptons, with whom he had family ties, Walter Compton having married his sister Mary), which even the *Retro-spective Review* is compelled to praise as "fervid, noble, and natural :"

"I hate the countrie's dust and manners, yet
I love the silence. I embrace the wit
And courtship flowing here in a full tide,
But loathe the expence, the vanity and pride."

In all probability, too, another, if not a stronger reason, for his withdrawing from the court was the dissatisfaction which all thinking men, even of his own party, were beginning to feel at the arbitrary conduct of the king. Like Falkland, whom in character he must somewhat have resembled, he could see the justice of the claims put forth on behalf of the people, while withheld by every tradition of race and creed from taking up arms against the sovereign. Happier than Falkland, his circumstances were not such as to force him to the painful alternative of choosing between two sides, neither of which he could conscientiously support ; and, in the civil commotions which soon followed, he bore no part. Langbaine speaks of him as a gentleman "who lived in the civil wars, and slighting Bellona, gave himself entirely to the Muses." But there seems no ground for Wood's insinuation, "that he did run with the times, and was not unknown to Oliver the usurper." That Cromwell may have sought his friendship, as he did that of Sir Kenelm Digby, and other men of virtue and ability not of his own party, is by no means unlikely ; nor is it hard to believe that Hab-

In Elton's words, "He was a Roman Catholic; and it was not likely that he should side with the Presbyterians; he was full of courtly loyalty, and it is quite improbable that he should pass to the extreme of republicanism." Whatever may have been his relations with Cromwell, he did not live to enjoy or profit by them, for he died on the 30th of November, 1654, one year after the establishment of the Protectorate, and was buried in the family vault at Hendlip. He left one son, Thomas, and one daughter, Catherine. The latter married Thomas Osborne, Esq.,¹ and the former dying unmarried, closed the poet's direct line. The historic manor-house went to his nephew, Sir William Compton. If we are not mistaken it is still in existence.

"History," says Nichols, "has preserved but little of his character, but while nothing contradictory of them is recorded, we have a right to deduce the color of it from his writings. From these he appears to have been distinguished for connubial felicity, for a love of retirement and study, and for the elevation and dignity of his sentiments." To this it may be added that he was sincerely and deeply religious, and by the test of his writings again, a strict Catholic. Some of the best of his poems are the religious ones in part fourth of the *Castara*, which is prefaced by the "character" of a "Holy Man," who, according to the poet,

"Is onely happie. For infelicity and sinne were borne twinnes; or rather like some prodigie with two bodies, both draw and expire the same breath. Catholique faith is the foundation on which he erects religion; knowing it a ruinous madnesse to build in the ayre of a private spirit, or on the sands of any new schisme. His impietie is not so bold to bring divinitie downe to the mistake of reason, or to deny those misteries his apprehension reacheth not. His obedience moves still by direction of the magistrate; and, should conscience inform him that the command is unjust, he judgeth it nevertheless high treason, by rebellion to make good his tenets, as it were the basest cowardize by dissimulation of religion to preserve temporal respects. He knowes human policie but a crooked rule of action: and therefore by a distrust of his own knowledge attaines it: confounding with supernaturall illumination the opinionated judgment of the wise. In prosperity he gratefully admires the bounty of the Almighty giver and useth, not abuseth, plenty; but in adversity he remains unshaken, and like some eminent mountaine hath his head above the clouds. . . . Fame he weighs not, but esteemes a smoake, yet such as carries with it the sweetest odour, and riseth usually from the sacrifice of our best actions. Pride he disdaines when he finds it swelling in himself, but easily forgiveth it in another: Nor can any man's errour in life make him sinne in censure, since seldome the folly we condemne is so culpable as the severity of our judgment. . . . When he lookes on other's vices, he values not himselfe virtuous by comparison, but examines his owne defects and finds matter enough at home for reprehension. . . . He is ever merry, but still modest, not dissolved into undecent laughter, or tickled with wit scurrilous or injurious. He cunningly searcheth into the virtues of others and liberally commends them: but buries the vices of the imperfect in a chari-

¹ As if worldly greatness would cling to the Habington name, even after death, the

ments. These lines, we do not write from a prejudicial motive, but in the cause purely of natural science, and at the same time to show that, although the theory of evolution was designed to destroy catholicity, it on the contrary is not in opposition to the teachings of the Catholic Church, and that the blow intended for the Church falls back on its enemies.

Prof. Huxley deserves great credit—and no one can deny it to him—for his researches in the natural sciences and particularly in biology; he is one of the leading naturalists or rather physicists of the present time, but this does not excuse him from confining himself to tenable theories, as well as to natural facts. Before entering into discussion with him, it will be well for us to remark, that what we are going to say may not be entirely deserved by the Professor in his three American Lectures on Evolution, but at the same time we must remember that all the views and statements criticized are implied in those lectures, though not openly expressed in them; and the careful student of Huxley can detect the materialist, skeptic, and fatalist of another time and place, the philosopher of Edinburgh and Belfast notoriety.

The first line of the Professor's first lecture strikes the keynote of the Huxley doctrine of Evolution. He says:

"We live and form a part of a system of immense diversity which we call nature," etc.

True, man forms a part of nature, but not in the sense in which Mr. Huxley uses that word. Man consisting of body and soul, has also two natures—an animal and a spiritual,—and therefore man cannot belong to nature, as Mr. Huxley understands the word nature. Prof. Agassiz says of man's nature: "He (man) may sink as low as the lowest of his type [in his animal nature *i. e.*, that part of man which connects him with the animal kingdom], or he may rise to a spiritual height that will make that [his soul] which distinguishes him from the rest far more the controlling element of his being than that [his body] which unites him to them."

Evidently, Mr. Huxley intended by his statement to imply that man, body and soul, belongs to nature, and must have been therefore produced by natural causes, *i. e.*, by evolution guided by chance. An absurd conclusion.

The lecturer goes on stating:

"But we must recollect that any human belief, however broad in basis, however dependable it may seem, is, after all, only a probable belief, and that our broadest generalizations are simply the highest degree of probability."

If human belief or certainty be only a probability, then certainty and probability are identical, which would be as much as to say,

We do not see any reason, and the Professor does not give any, why we should not extend our certainty about the constancy of nature into the past? Where and when did these laws come into existence? And who gives these new laws of consistency now? Is it only now that nature works with design? And have all animal species till now been produced by chance? If events at any time in the past, did not follow a constant order, then they must have followed a constant disorder; or, in other words, this must have been brought about by chance; blind chance or haphazard; which necessarily precludes the workings of Divine Providence. Our view of the creation of the present state of the world is that God in the beginning created this world with a variety of creatures on it; that He instituted those laws, which rule the whole universe, and that the present state of the world has been brought about by the constant agency of those laws guided by the infinite Providence and goodness of God; or in other words we believe in derivative creation.

What these laws are, no one can know except the Creator, and to whom it pleases Him to reveal them.

The evolutionists of the school of Darwin and Huxley merely think they know them, one saying that the present state was brought about by "natural selection," *i. e.* cross-fertilization, the other by evolution, *i. e.*, by slow and progressive modifications from the original type, and that these original types themselves were produced from dead matter by natural causes and not by an omnipotent creator.

As to the assertion that we cannot deny absolutely that there was a time when relations of cause and effect were not fixed and definite, then they must have worked blindly, which would preclude a divine intelligence in God's laws, *i. e.*, instituting laws without determining the effects of those laws—without design. Just as if a man should construct a machine, without knowing what purpose it would serve, and having finished it, should set it to work, to produce thousands of different purposes; a ridiculous idea, for every one knows that if a machine is to produce a complicated object, the constructor of that machine must first put into it a great deal of fixed intelligence, so to speak. Mr. Huxley in denying that the relationship of cause and effect is fixed and definite, would lead us to infer that a sewing-machine can, or could at some time past, be used to thresh wheat as well as to sew cloth. The relation between a sewing-machine and sewing is fixed and definite, and was always so, whilst the relation between the sewing-machine and any other effect from another machine necessarily cannot exist, for threshing cannot be done by any other than a threshing-

clude with the utmost certainty that the man has been wounded, and is dying, in consequence of a wound inflicted by that implement."

But we cannot see that circumstantial evidence, as stated further on, is better in the case to which Professor Huxley refers than testimonial, if had in a sufficient degree. To him, and to many others rejecting Holy Writ, testimonial evidence may be of no use in explaining the origin and the continual course of nature; but to the Christian, or rather the Catholic—or, if you wish, to any true philosopher—testimonial evidence is of very great moment in this case.

Mr. Huxley then enters upon the process of testing the different hypotheses by circumstantial evidence. He has easy work to refute the hypothesis of the eternity of the world's duration. A very good and credible proof of this untenable hypothesis the Professor gives in the following words:

"For in order to testify to the eternity of duration you must have an eternity of witnesses, or an infinite series of circumstances, and neither of these is attainable."

He then takes circumstantial evidence, and tests the hypothesis in order to find out whether it is tenable or not, which last, of course, he finds to be the case, from the circumstances connected with the stratifications in the earth's crust; if nature were eternal, then these stratifications should be without end; but we find that below the silurian age stratification ceases. Therefore, the circumstantial evidence, according to Professor Huxley, shows that nature is not eternal. He concludes his testing of this first hypothesis with the following words:

"The hypothesis of the eternity of the present condition of things may therefore be put out of court altogether."

It seems, if we are not mistaken, that the Professor is not quite consistent in his paragraph concerning "the eternity of the world's duration." For at one time he speaks about the hypothesis of the eternity of the world being untenable (and this is what he starts to prove), but the conclusion to which his argument is directed is only that the eternity of the *present condition of things* is not a tenable opinion, or in other words he holds that evolution of the higher species from the lower, or the modified from the unmodified, cannot be carried up to eternity, but that there was a time when evolution began. This he tries to prove from the gradually higher developed fossil remains, from the lowest formation up to the last period. But be this as it may, neither the one nor the other can be accepted, *i. e.*, we can neither accept evolution from eternity, nor from some

in disproving Milton's view he does not by any means disprove the history of creation as given by Moses. For example, there are a great many theologians and Fathers of the Church who do not accept the view of Milton at all (and here we would call to memory the statement of the Professor in the first part of his lecture, that he declares his knowledge of only three hypotheses concerning the origin of matter). The view of Milton concerning the six natural days cannot be that of Moses, for these days may be understood—and so they are by many Fathers of the Church—as long periods of time, long enough to allow those formations on the earth's crust. This, however, is not our view of creation; we prefer another. The days spoken of in Genesis cannot be taken as natural days (the Miltonic view), nor are they to be taken as extremely long periods, for with God there is no time. Moses did not enumerate the appearance of the different created beings in their natural succession, but according to the four elements of the ancients, *i. e.*, first light, then air, then water, and lastly the earth; therefore, in our opinion, Moses cannot mean any fixed period of time by the expression, days.

St. Augustine speaks of the difficulty of explaining the meaning of the word day. He says: "Of what kind these days are it is difficult, nay, impossible to conceive, and how much more so to explain." "*Quis dies cujusmodi sint, aut perdifficile nobis, aut etiam impossibile est cogitare, quanto magis dicere.*" (De Civ. Dei., xi., c. 6.)

But it was clear to him that we cannot understand by this term natural days, for he says, "We see that these days now have an evening because of the sun's setting, and a morning because of the sun's rising, but those first three days of creation are not determined by the sun, which is said to have appeared on the fourth day." "*Videmus quippi istos dies notos non habere vesperam nisi de solis occasu, nec mane nisi de solis exortu; illorum autem priores tres dies sine sole peracti sunt, qui quarto die factus refertur.*" (Ibid., xi., c. 7.) It was for this reason that St. Augustine did not accept the words, "And it was evening and morning," in their literal meaning, but regarded "evening" and "morning" as synonymous with "cessation of creating one thing, and commencing the creation of another." His words are, "*In illis enim diebus, quibus omnia creabantur vesperam terminum conditæ creaturæ, mane autem initium condendæ alterius accipiebamus.*" (Genes. ad lit., L. iv., c. 18, n. 32.) The word day, according to this, means therefore, that these days were not natural days of twenty-four hours, neither are they to be taken as long periods, since they imply no time, but that they mean simply so many divisions of work. That God has created the world in six days means that the work of creation is divided by Moses,

But let us pass to his second lecture, in which he continues to clear the ground for the direct and demonstrative evidence of evolution. This lecture is written in a very attractive manner, and but few things in it bear the stamp of materialism or atheism. The first paragraph, however, concludes as follows :

" And I confess that I had too much respect for your intelligence to think it necessary to add that that negation [of the Miltonic hypothesis ?] was equally strong and equally valid whatever the source from which that hypothesis might be derived, or whatever the authority by which it might be supported."

We consider the source of this argument, and we are satisfied with simply denying it. Is not Mr. Huxley ashamed of this argument ? Evidently this latter allusion is meant for the Bible, and it is just as evident that it is intended in an inimical way. Although Prof. Huxley is generally represented as one who holds the Bible in veneration, the passage above quoted goes to prove the contrary. But he has no reason to reject the Bible because of its being the source or authority of the Miltonic view of the order or state of things of the creation ; he cannot reasonably object to the source, because of the wrong interpretation, given by Milton or any one else, of the facts contained in it ; such a course of procedure, if followed even with regard to scientific truths, would inevitably lead to confusion, as there is scarcely any truth that may not be misinterpreted when viewed from a wrong standpoint.

Further, in asserting that that negation is equally strong and valid, no matter what may be the weight of authority or the strength of the arguments to the contrary, the Professor assumes a position which he cannot maintain, for how can he know whether in the course of time, stronger arguments may not be brought forth than those which he has refuted ? Of course, we also reject the view of Milton, because natural facts seem to be not in accordance with it, but as soon as his view is proved to us in a sufficiently well-grounded manner to set aside our arguments against it, we would at once accept the Miltonic view of creation. What would Mr. Huxley say of a man who, after he has proved to him the theory of evolution in such an authoritative way, that the other would be fully convinced of its truth, would still reject it, maintaining that his negation was equally strong and valid, no matter with what authority and cogency the Professor's theory was proved to him ?

" I further stated," continues the lecturer, " that according to the hypothesis of evolution, the existing state of things was the last term of a long series of antecedent states, which when traced back would be found to show no interruption and no breach of continuity."

But, Mr. Huxley, why should this law of evolution stop now ? Just now, when its action is most needed to prove the truth of the

age? Then the difficulties of Cuvier, and those added by the Professor himself, and in this case his own tongue shall plead against him, as in the case of the *terabratala*. The globigerina, the beryx, the lingula, and scorpion, belong he says, to that class of evidence which he calls indifferent. That is to say, "they may afford no direct support to the doctrine of evolution, but they are perfectly capable of being interpreted in consistency with it."

Further on the Professor says:

"I insist upon the defect of the geological record the more, because those who have not attended to these matters, are apt to say to us, 'It is all very well, but when you get into difficulty with your theory of evolution, you appeal to the incompleteness and the imperfection of the geological record,' and I want to make it perfectly clear to you that that imperfection is a vast fact, which must be taken into account in all our speculations or we shall constantly be going wrong."

Yes, let us take this "vast fact" into consideration, but not exclusively in favor of the theory of evolution, as evolutionists are wont to do when pushed for proofs. When questioned about the missing links of one or another of the different species, they invariably back out with the answer, "Well, geology does not make it known because its record is incomplete." It is not so, because it is not so. The cow crossed the road, because she crossed the road. We would then respectfully ask the Professor to complete first his geological record at least for one species, or else we shall have to reject his conclusions for want of solid premises on which to base them, to reject them as idiosyncratic notions, until there is at least some tangible proof on which they may be accepted.

The Professor states also that the causes of variations are not known, but that although the causes are unknown, this does not interfere with evolution, and here he rejects Mr. Darwin again, who maintains that evolution is carried on by natural selection or as others say by the struggle for life.

Well, we might ask, how can he maintain that such and such a species is the effect, or cause, of such and such another species, when he is not able to trace the species through the variations or causes which he maintains—absolutely maintains, without any proof whatever—it has undergone? Of course he will deny the relation between cause and effect, and thus get out very easily. With regard to this matter we may say with Dr. McCosh: "True, this may not be for the purpose of his lecture, but it must be cleared up before we can clear up the subject of development."

Although the Professor acknowledges that geology does not give decisive evidence as to the changing of one animal form into another, he again comes with the candid argument that the record

surely show (not any too surely) the missing links; yes, it would be so, if it were so. He dwells for a considerable time on the resemblances and affinities between birds and reptiles, citing some forms of animals to link the reptiles to the birds. All this is a good study, and helps to show the varieties of different classes of animals; for example, that there may be reptiles with wings and birds with real teeth; but, that there is a genetic relation between the winged reptile and the toothed bird remains to be proved, just as much as it remains to be proved that man comes from the frog or the ape because of a few analogous structures in him.

If it is proved satisfactorily that the archeopteryx was actually developed into a bird we shall have no objection to reptiles being developed into birds, and we will admit the evolution of some animal forms from pre-existing types; but until these proofs are forthcoming, the Professor might as well attempt to force the theory that man is developed from a goose, simply because the latter walks on two legs and has toes, as is the case too with the former.

This idea would not be any more idiotic than that we have been criticizing, and the Professor might for want of better proof say that one of the learned ancients defined man as "a biped without feathers." If the archeopteryx be a link between reptiles and birds, then the bat is either a link between the reptile and bird or between the bird and the mammal. But every one knows that the bat is as much a true mammal as the flying squirrel, and the flying squirrel as much so as a horse or a cow. The whale is also a mammal, although having the exterior appearance of a fish; but we cannot say that the whale is a developed fish, for gills would be more favorable to the whale in his surrounding condition than lungs. We must, therefore, come to the conclusion that exterior similarity does not prove a genetic relation, and because the archeopteryx resembles in some exterior parts a bird, it does not follow that it is not a true reptile, no more so than that the bat and the whale are true mammals. So it does not follow at all, that the archeopteryx must necessarily be a link between the reptile and the bird. And with this conclusion we pass on to the Professor's third lecture.

In his first and second lectures Mr. Huxley was only preparing the road for what he is pleased to consider direct proofs (?) of evolution, and all we had to do was to show the insuperable difficulties in his way. Now we are no longer to act on the defensive, merely parrying the feints of the Professor; he has in his third lecture thrown off the mask, and there is no alternative left us but to pierce him in some of the many vulnerable points in the armor of casuistry in which he has encased himself. It is evolution or

Next, the Professor enters largely into the description of the limbs and teeth of the horse, and shows what skill he possesses when dealing with pure natural facts. To everything he says relative to this we have no objection, for he shows a clear mind engaged in its proper studies. He then passes to an enumeration of the typical characteristics of the mammals. He says, for example, that the unmodified mammals have five toes, and, because the present variety of horse has *not* these five toes, therefore it must be evolved from the type of the horse or mammalian which *had* five toes. But how can Professor Huxley know that the unmodified mammalian must have had five toes. We would ask him for his proofs, for surely in this case his premises are assumed, and remain to be proved. But suppose we should take Mr. Huxley's statement in regard to the assumed unmodified mammals for granted, and should ask him if the typical horse had five toes, while the present horse has but one real and two abnormal, could then the present horse have been evolved from the primitive horse? Is it not rather a retrogradation from it, and is not this fact in itself contradictory to the vital principle of evolution? For the evolutionists begin everything with the most simple and end with the most complex. For example, evolutionists pretend to trace man back to a gelatinous mass, out of which they develop a medusa, a mollusk, an articulate, then a fish, a newt, a frog, a reptile, a bird; then the typical mammal, as an ape, and finally appears man—complex man. But man has five toes and five fingers, and, therefore, according to Mr. Huxley's own words, he must be a typical mammal, and being a typical mammalian, he cannot have been evolved, but must have come directly from nature.

Next he says:

"In this succession of forms you have exactly that which the hypothesis of evolution demands;" we answer: Not by any means. And again: "An alternate hypothesis is hardly conceivable, but the only one that could be framed would be this, that the Ancheterium, the Hipparion, and the present horse had been created separately and at separate epochs of time. For this hypothesis there can be no scientific evidence, and it is not pretended that there is the slightest evidence of any kind that such successive creations have ever taken place." Mr. Huxley contents himself here with a simple denial of Mr. Mivart's urged successive or derivative creation; let him prove, however, that it cannot be. For how can he reject this subject when he has not studied it? For our part we would take the side of derivative creation, having great authorities in its favor. This derivative creation means that God created many species of animals, not *in actu*, miraculously, but in *potentia*, derivatively,

he asserts that the unmodified mammals have five toes. But this is what the Professor has first to prove, in order to be able to conclude that our present horse had five toes in ages gone by; and it would be clear that it must have come from such a form. But, instead of proving, he assumes that the typical horse had five toes, and then concludes with certainty that our present horse is developed from such an assumed horse, because the present horse has only one real toe whilst the unmodified horse should have five! And next, "*post hoc ergo propter hoc*," he maintains that the *equus* of the recent period was developed from the *Pliohippus* of the Pliocene and the *Pliohippus* in turn from the *Protohippus* or (*Hipparion*) of the Pliocene, and this in turn from the *Miohippus* or (*Ancheterium*) of the Miocene, and the latter from the *Mesohippus*, and this lastly, from the *Orohippus* of the Eocene, simply because their fossil remains are found in such an order in the strata from the Eocene to the recent period. Now what would Mr. Huxley say if we remarked that Aristotle lived before Pliny, but Pliny before Albert the Great, and Albert the Great before Cuvier, and Cuvier before Huxley, therefore Mr. Huxley must be a lineal descendant of Aristotle, because of one accidental attribute, *i. e.*, the being an expert in natural science. This would be ridiculous; as is also Mr. Huxley's argument. This animal existed after that, therefore this animal must have been evolved from the one preceding. Absurd!

And now let us examine a little this doctrine of evolution. In a religious point of view, no one need be alarmed, for it is not in contradiction to Catholicity, at least not in so far as the general theory of evolution is concerned. It is no more in opposition to the doctrine of the Catholic Church, than is the Copernican theory or that of Galileo. A little patience will clear the ground. Had they had patience with Galileo, there would never have been so much trouble, but the imprudence of Catholic theologians, and, even more, the false coloring of the Protestants wrought this dispute up to the large proportions which it once possessed. And about the vexed question of Galileo we say that he was no more a victim of Catholics than of Protestants; for they more than the Catholic theologians impelled the Pope to the action taken. This is a fact testified by the Protestant historians. Galileo was a victim of the scientific and political party zealots of those times. But you may object, why then did the Church forbid his doctrine, and place his book on the Index. To this we answer, that the Church acts wisely and like a mother, in forbidding books that would endanger morals or weaken faith, and therefore she allows only those to read them, who are able to judge for them-

(whether by Mr. Darwin's natural selection or according to my hypothesis) [Mr. Mivart's hypothesis of *derivative creation*] was in no opposition to the Christian faith as to the creation of the organic world."

By derivative creation Mr. Mivart does not mean evolution, but means that doctrine taught by theologians such as Suarez, that the different species of animals were not created all at once *in actu*, but that they were in existence in God's conception of the world, and were therefore in possible existence and created so, *i. e.*, they were created *in potentia* to be brought forth, when the suitable conditions should present themselves. And this God chose should come about by the action of natural laws.

This strange doctrine to many may seem difficult of acceptance, yet it is supported by a great many theologians of the highest authority. We name only St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, Albertus Magnus, Denis the Carthusian (1470), Cardinal Cajetan (1530), Melchior Canus (1560), Cardinal Noris (1673), Tonti (1714), Serry (1720), Berti (1740), and many others down to the present day.

In regard to creation St. Thomas says :

"With regard to the creation of the world it is of faith that the world has been created, and this all admit. But the manner and order of creation is not of faith if not *per accidens*, in as far as it is given in Holy Scripture, of which there are several expositions" (2 Sent., Dist., 12 : 9, 1. u, 2).

To the ignorant, science and religion seem to disagree at the present time, but only to the ignorant or those who are prejudiced; that is, those who endeavor to make science conflict with religion, but who, when not falsifying one or both, can never succeed.

Between science and religion there cannot be any contradiction. Science, the volume of creation, is the best commentary on the volume of Revelation, and the greater our knowledge of both the more we are enabled to perceive that they both come from the self-same Creator, for it is impossible to find a vestige in the one to contradict an expression in the other.

We hope that from the present controversy in regard to evolution, a conclusion will come forth, that is neither on the one hand irreligious nor on the other unscientific.

Evolution, so called, conflicts with religious principles, when the former is pushed beyond its legitimate bounds, and when evolutionists attempt to prove that man, body and soul, is developed from the ape, which is simply absurd. Evolutionists or any other scientific men or philosophers can reach the soul in no other way than through the teachings of revelation; to go beyond this is simply scientific lunacy. But the attempt to prove the evolution of the body from some lower animal is not more antagonistic to the Bible

HUNTING SITTING BULL.

THE poor wounded claimed my first care.¹ They were lying on the hot dusty hill under inadequate shelter, and steps were at once taken to remove them to my cooler, pleasanter camp on the creek-bank below. The majority of them had to be carried, and there was not a single stretcher or litter in the command. These had therefore to be improvised. A quantity of the light teepee poles were collected from the Indian camp, and by means of these, old pieces of canvas, and blankets, a number were made, and by night all the wounded were carried down the steep slope of the bluffs, across the creek, and down to our camp, the men working by relays.

The Seventh Cavalry remained upon the bluffs during the night, and early the next morning moved down to the scene of Custer's conflict, to perform the mournful duty of burying the remains of their slaughtered comrades. This would have been an impracticable task but for the discovery, in the deserted Indian camp, of a large number of shovels and spades, by the aid of which the work was performed.

The formidable question of the transportation of the wounded now came up and had to be met. The mouth of the Little Big Horn to which point the steamer "Far West" had been ordered, was some twenty miles distant, and couriers had been dispatched to communicate with her, ascertain if she had reached there, and warn her to await our arrival. In the meantime, we set to work to construct the necessary litters with what rough material could be collected. Lieutenant D., of the Second Cavalry, volunteered to construct *horse*-litters out of rough cottonwood poles, rawhide, and ropes, but the process proved a very slow and tedious one, and other details were set to work collecting teepee poles and manufacturing hand-litters out of them and such old canvas as was to be had. Late in the afternoon, but four or five of the horse-litters had been finished, and the necessary number was completed with hand-litters. But on trying the mules in the horse-litters (all of them animals taken from baggage-wagons, unused to carrying packs, and sore from their few days' service under the saddles), most of

¹ NOTE BY EDITOR.—[At the conclusion of his article in the April number of the REVIEW for the current year, entitled "Last Summer's Expedition against the Sioux," the writer of this article, General Gibbon, described the appearance of the battle-field (as he found it forty-eight hours afterwards), where General Custer and his gallant comrades were slaughtered, and the rescue of the surviving portion of Colonel Reno's command. Without introduction or preface, General Gibbon continues his narrative as

warriors of another large camp which before the fight had formed a junction with it, by coming up from the south, in which direction, as we afterward learned, General Crook had had his fight on the 17th, only eight days previous to Custer's battle. The concentration of superior numbers, thus effected, demonstrated very clearly that the Sioux leader, whoever he was, was not lacking in those strategic ideas justly deemed so valuable in civilized warfare. From these indications it would appear that, after the check given General Crook on the 17th, the whole hostile force concentrated against Custer, who by an almost unheard-of rapidity of movement had precipitated himself against their main camp. We know absolutely nothing of the details of the conflict, as relates to that portion of the command under Custer's personal supervision, but so soon as his part was annihilated, the whole hostile force turned upon the balance of the command, and laid siege to that upon the bluffs, where it was closely confined until the afternoon of the next day, when, upon the approach of our column, the whole Indian force decamped.

From the top of the peak, overlooking Colonel Reno's position, an observer could see far down the valley of the Little Big Horn, and the Indians probably had early news of our approach, and no doubt knew of our coming when we were fifteen or twenty miles away.

They were doubtless much elated by the total annihilation of Custer's part of the force, and made repeated and persistent efforts to complete their victory by destroying the rest of the command. But these were manfully and desperately resisted, and the Indians, incumbered with their camp equipage and families, doubtless felt no desire to continue the struggle with fresh troops, although these numerically were only about as strong as the force they were then fighting. Our arrival, therefore, was opportune; although, had it been possible to anticipate it by thirty-six or even twenty-four hours, the result doubtless would have been even more satisfactory. As it was, we were joyfully hailed as deliverers, and many did not hesitate to express the opinion that but for our arrival they would all have shared a common fate. This was especially noticeable in the wounded, who appeared to feel that they were stepping from death back to life again. Poor fellows! an impression had, in some way, gained a footing amongst them during the long weary hours of the fight on the 26th that, to save the balance of the command, they were to be abandoned. Hence, *their* joy at our arrival can better be imagined than described. I have seen in the course of my military life many wounded men, but I never saw any who endured suffering, privations, and the fatigue of travel, more patiently and cheerfully than those brave fellows of the Seventh Cavalry.

cated, and on the river just below its site, and at the most southern point on the curve, our present camp is situated. Close by us are two such fords as I have described, and crossing one of these we move up the right bank of the stream which here runs nearly due south: On our right is the wooded bank of the river, the intervening space between the cottonwood trees being filled up with brushwood. On our left the valley opens out into a grass-covered prairie, fringed on its southern side, and again on its western side, where the stream curves to the north again, with timber and brushwood. Riding along up the stream we come to the point where, after cutting the bluffs skirting it on the north, it turns sharply to the south. Here the ground commences to rise before us in gently sloping hills separated by little valleys, one of which seems to lead in about the direction we want to take. Just before this valley joins the valley of the river, the bottom has been cut into a gulch some eight or ten feet deep, and this is filled with brushwood nourished by the moisture of the rain-water, which doubtless cut out the gulch. Struck with the fact that this little valley seemed to be a natural outlet from the scene of the fight, and the possibility that individuals might have sought shelter in the gulch on their way to the timber below, we closely examined the place up to the point where the gulch headed, but found no "signs." As we proceeded up the valley, now an open grassy slope, we suddenly came upon a body lying in the grass. It was lying upon its back, and was in an advanced state of decomposition. It was not stripped, but had evidently been scalped and one ear cut off. The clothing was not that of a soldier, and, with the idea of identifying the remains, I caused one of the boots to be cut off and the stocking and drawers examined for a name, but none could be found. On looking at the boot, however, a curious construction was observed. The heel of the boot was reinforced by a piece of leather which in front terminated in two straps, one of which was furnished with a buckle, evidently for the purpose of tightening the instep of the boot. This led to the identification of the remains, for on being carried to camp the boot was recognized as one belonging to Mr. Kellogg, a newspaper correspondent who accompanied General Custer's column. Beyond this point the ground commenced to rise more rapidly, and the valley was broken up into several smaller ones which lead up towards the higher ground beyond. Following up one of these we reach a rolling but not very broken space, the ground rising higher and higher until it reaches a culminating knoll dominating all the ground in the immediate vicinity. This knoll, by common consent now called Custer's Hill, is the spot where his body was found surrounded by those of several of his officers and some forty or fifty

which, as it runs off to join the valley of the Little Big Horn, far below, is seen to be fringed with brushwood, and an examination of this discloses the presence of innumerable pony tracks. More to the right, and beyond the little valley which borders on the north the straight ridge referred to, the ground rises into another ridge, and beyond this, as far as the eye can reach, extends a mass of rough broken "bad lands." Had we only known what dread secret those bad lands were hiding, we probably should have been able to perform the mournful duty of interring the remains of our twenty-five or thirty missing comrades. But we knew nothing of this then, and, turning our horses' heads, rode slowly along the top of the main ridge, stopping now and then to examine the place where some poor wounded animal, struggling in its death throes, had worked its way down the slope to the valley below. Arrived at the end of the ridge the ground opens out where several other ridges join it into a kind of level platform. Here evidently a severe struggle took place, for the bodies of men and horses are thickly strewn about. Moving to the far edge of this irregular plateau the ground is seen to fall away in a gently sloping valley towards the ford over which Custer is supposed to have attempted a crossing. I have stated that the top of Custer's Hill dominates over the whole surrounding country. Standing upon that he must have had a full view of the struggle taking place around him, and of the Indian village lying at his feet, but not within his power. And when forced back by overwhelming numbers, only to find the valley behind filled also with yelling hordes of savages, he must, whilst straining his eyes in that direction from which alone help could come, have recognized when too late the courageous-born error he committed in dividing his force in the presence of so numerous an enemy.

The body of our poor guide, Mitch Bouyer, was found lying in the midst of the troopers, slain, as the Sioux had several times reported they had slain him, in battle. He was a half-breed Sioux, and they had often tried to kill him. He was the protégé and pupil of the celebrated guide Jim Bridger; was the best guide in this section of the country, and the only half-breed I ever met who could give the distances to be passed over with any accuracy *in miles*.

The bodies of all the officers but two were found and recognized, and those of all the men, except some twenty or thirty, accounted for. The probable fate of these will be hereafter referred to. By the burial-place of each officer was driven to the head a stake, in the top of which a hole was bored, and in this was placed a paper having upon it the name and rank of the officer.

On leaving the battle-ground we bore obliquely to the right, and

mounted a hill overlooking the mouth of the Little Big Horn to look for the steamer. She was nowhere to be seen. Then, in accordance with their instructions, they started down the Big Horn to find her, following the bank of the river up and down over the deep gulches which all along the right bank lead into that stream. But their anxious search was without avail, and finally, late in the afternoon, they reached the mouth of the river, communicated with our supply camp there, obtained some food and forage for their horses, and the next morning started back up the Big Horn, and early in the afternoon when they rose the hill at the mouth of the Little Big Horn, a glad sight met their eyes, for there lay the steamer moored to the bank. They were quickly on board, and there learned that the officer in charge of the boat, uncertain as to whether or not he had reached the mouth of the Little Big Horn, directed the captain to run further up the river, which he did for about ten miles, and during the absence of the boat our couriers reached the point where they expected to find her. Resting on board the boat for an hour, the two indefatigable riders mounted their horses again, and finally reached us after a ride of about one hundred and forty miles in the course of forty-eight hours. Their names deserve to be preserved in the records of the campaign. One of them was an orderly of mine, Private Goodwin, of the Seventh Infantry, the other, Bostwick, the post-guide of Fort Shaw. They had a wonderful story to tell us of a Crow Indian, named "Curly," whom they found on the boat, who asserted his escape from the Custer massacre, who had given many particulars of the fight, and even drew a rough map of the ground. The story of this man was found on examination to be consistent and intelligible, and the faithful fellow had ridden from the battle-field, immediately on his escape, to the mouth of the Big Horn, and not finding General Terry there, had followed up the stream to the boat, where he carried the first news of Custer's disaster. There is nothing very remarkable in the fact that a friendly *Indian* should have succeeded in making his escape from the general massacre in the midst of the turmoil of battle, however difficult it might have been for a single *white* man to do so, and Curly removed any lingering hope that any of the troops escaped, by stating that when he left, a party of twenty-five or thirty of our men had succeeded in getting away into the hills, several miles distant, but that they were entirely surrounded by a numerous band of Indians; that he could hear the firing there when he left, and that they were undoubtedly all killed. He described how he threw his blanket over his head, pretended to be a Sioux, and even fired his pistol towards the body of a dead soldier, as the Sioux were doing, and then slipped away from the fight.

could have gone directly to it, but this we were debarred from doing by the ravines and broken ground, and as the moon went down and the darkness increased, it began to look as if we were not going to reach the boat that night, after all; but the prospect of halting within sight of our harbor of rest, bivouacking on that bleak hill, with such scant accommodations for the wounded, prompted to renewed efforts.

The column was now halted, and in company with a staff officer I rode forward to try and pick out a way. I was soon compelled to dismount, but we finally succeeded in making our way down to a lower level, and whilst going towards the light were hailed by a challenge. In answer to our call, "Who are you?" came back the welcome words, "Captain B., of the Sixth Infantry" (the officer in charge of the boat), and in a few minutes he was mounted on my horse and on his way back to the head of the column, whilst I reached the boat and started men out to build fires along the route. They were all up and expecting us, on the boat; and the lower deck, inclosed with canvas, was prepared with beds to make our wounded as comfortable as possible. It was now long after midnight, the side of the hill was soon ablaze with a line of fires, and by the light of these the litters made their way down, and when dawn commenced to streak the eastern sky, our poor patient sufferers were comfortably at rest on the deck of the "Far West."

The next day she started down the river, and on the second day thereafter I reached the Yellowstone with the command, and, being ferried across the river, went into camp around our supply train. Here we remained until the 26th of July, receiving in the meantime supplies from down the river by steamer, and mails from Fort Ellis by small boat and carriers. Communication with the main Crow camp near Pompey's Pillar was opened, and on the 7th a party from there brought us the first news we received of General Crook's fight on the Rosebud on the 17th of June. It was carried to the camp by the Crows who were with General Crook's force in the battle, and two days afterwards we received further news about the fight, in a mail brought by scouts from the mouth of Powder River.

*General Terry had been very anxious for some time to communicate with General Crook, and a message was dispatched to the Crows to try and induce them to go through, but none could be found willing to take the risk, although a large reward was offered. Their horses were tired, and they wanted to be with their families, they said. The real reason was, they regarded the trip as too hazardous, from the large number of Sioux known to be in that part of the country. Hearing of what was wanted, one of our citizen

teamsters came forward and volunteered to carry a dispatch through. He possessed one thing in an eminent degree—a full knowledge of the law of trade so far as regards supply and demand. For knowing the demand was great, and the supply of couriers small, he thought he had a “corner” on couriers, and placed a very high estimate on his services, demanding in the first place fifteen hundred dollars. Being informed that this would not be paid, he dropped to six hundred, and the use of a horse, a rifle, and a field-glass. On the evening of the 4th of July he was put across the river, and four days afterwards he was back to us without horse, rifle, glass, hat, or shoes, and with a wonderful story of his narrow escape from Indians, and his vain attempt to cross the Little Big Horn on a raft, in which attempt he had lost everything. As his account was not very clear, and the Little Big Horn was known to be an insignificant stream in which it would be difficult to find water enough to float a raft, his story was looked upon with suspicion, and it was even strongly insinuated that he had never left the timber on the south side of the Yellowstone. Volunteers from my command were now called for to go through to General Crook, and in answer twelve men came forward and offered their services. Amongst them were the two men already mentioned as carrying the dispatches to General Terry by boat down the river on the 27th of May, Evans and Stewart, and with them came a third belonging to the same company, Bell, Company “E,” Seventh Infantry. I called all these twelve men up, told them what was required, what risks would probably have to be run, and questioned each in regard to how he proposed to make the trip. I knew nothing of the qualifications of any of them, so far as their knowledge of woodcraft was concerned, a knowledge so essential to a successful trip through an entirely unknown region. But the answers and bearing of the three men, all from one company, and proposing to go together, finally decided the matter in their favor, and they were told to get ready at once. Evans and Stewart were both tall, gaunt, lank specimens of humanity, and looked as if a hard day's ride would use them up completely. Bell was short, and more stoutly made. All of them appeared to be very quiet men, did not light up at all in conversation, and exhibited no enthusiasm whatever. Evans was apparently the leader of the party, and to him I gave full instructions as to how he was to travel. I also placed in his hand a section of a map of the country he was to pass over, marking upon it the supposed location of General Crook's camp. He looked at this in a stolid sort of way, and I began to think he did not even know the object in giving it to him. But he quietly stowed it away in his pocket, and after he came back to us, told me with a little smile he believed he could go anywhere in an un-

known country if he had a map to travel by. They all three provided themselves with moccasins, so as when on foot, to make Indian instead of white man's "sign," and being provided each with a good horse, rifle, plenty of ammunition, and three days' rations, they were put across the river on the afternoon of Sunday the 9th, being accompanied some miles up the valley of Tullock's Fork by a company of cavalry, which, as night came on, left them to pursue their perilous route, and for sixteen days we heard not a word of news in regard to them.

On General Terry's invitation, some fifty or sixty Crows came down and joined us, and with them came back all the scouts who had left us the morning we heard of the Custer disaster. They all appeared much mortified at their conduct, especially as the Crows who had remained with us had been given a number of Sioux ponies picked up on the trip, which they had exhibited to their companions as trophies of the expedition. I was satisfied on talking with them that their defection was entirely due to the white interpreter who was with them, and who did not return until some time afterwards. Soon after their arrival four of them were induced, after considerable persuasion, to start for General Crook's camp with a duplicate of the dispatch sent by the three soldiers, and on the 17th, having in the meantime "prepared their *medicine*," they set out, and we heard no more of them for eight days.

The weather during the summer's operations became a matter of comment with all. Accustomed as we were to the exceedingly dry climate of Montana, where, during the summer months, anything more than a slight sprinkling of rain is almost unheard of, and the sound of loud thunder almost unknown, we were unprepared for the perfect deluges of rain which repeatedly overwhelmed us, and seldom selected our camps with any reference to water, regarding each rainfall as a phenomenon not likely to be repeated. Our present camp was located in the flat open bottom between the river and the bluffs, through which last, just above camp, a large dry gulch ran, having at its mouth a quantity of large driftwood. Where this gulch opened out into the valley the waters in times past, instead of cutting a channel out of the soil, as is usual, seem to have been in the habit of spreading themselves over the whole face of the valley. On the afternoon of the 13th we were visited by a severe storm of rain, accompanied by heavy thunder and lightning, and the next night a terrific rain commenced falling, and during nearly the entire night the whole atmosphere was lit up by vivid flashes of lightning, and resounded with constant peals of thunder. As daylight approached, a stir was heard in camp, and it soon appeared that all the campground, except a few elevated points, was under water, and the men busy removing their bedding

the brave fellows as so many more victims to the barbarous contest. When, therefore, on the 25th horsemen were reported as appearing on the bluffs south of the river, every one was on the alert as to who they were; for they might be either hostiles, taking a view of our camp, or couriers from General Terry, who had gone down to Powder River some days before. Scarcely any one entertained a hope that they were our absent couriers. They soon showed us they were not hostile, and coming down to the bank of the river a boat was sent over to meet them. Then a hope was expressed that they might be our absent men, and as the boat neared the opposite shore the conduct of the crew was narrowly watched through our glasses, for although some of the strangers were seen to be Indians at least two were recognized as white men. When the boat finally reached the shore, and the men in it were seen to cordially grasp the hands of the two white men, we felt sure they were our long-absent couriers and brought us news from General Crook, and when they landed on our shore and presented me with dispatches from General Crook I greeted them almost like men risen from the dead. Bell's horse had broken down on the trip, and Evans and Stewart only returned, accompanied by the Crow scouts, who had also succeeded in getting through to General Crook's camp. The modest recital of these men of their trip through a region swarming with hostiles, was interesting in the extreme. Their conduct was, enthusiastically, commented upon by the whole press of the country, and the Department commander published a highly complimentary order, thanking them for their services.¹ The news they brought decided the plan of our future operations, and two days after their return we commenced the march to the mouth of the Rosebud, where for the present was to be our depot of supplies. The hostile Indians were evidently still in the vicinity of General Crook, near the base of the Big Horn Mountains. We could no longer use the Big Horn River as a line of supply, for the waters were falling, and soon that stream, as well as the Yellowstone, adjacent, would be impracticable for steamboats. Hence the necessity of a depot and starting-point lower down the latter river. Besides which, the valley of the Rosebud could be made practicable for wagons, and led in the direction of the location of the hostiles and of General Crook's position. Starting on the 27th the command joined General Terry at the Rosebud on the 30th, he in the meantime having proceeded there by steamer, to locate the supply camp and the reinforcements known to be coming up the river.

Our new camp was in a flat sandy bottom interspersed with groves

¹ They afterwards received "medals of honor" from the War Department for their services

arrived, the movement across the Yellowstone commenced on the 3d, and was completed on the 7th, and the following morning the movement up the Rosebud commenced; the command having been divided into two parts, one of cavalry the other of infantry, the latter composed of the battalions of the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Twenty-second. We started at 5 A.M., but the day was exceedingly hot and our march was very slow, as heavy parties had to be constantly engaged repairing the road for our wagons, so that we made only between nine and ten miles. The next day the weather turned very cold, overcoats and fires were comfortable, and we made only nine miles and a half after working all day on the road.

Crow scouts had been sent out on the 8th to try and communicate with General Crook, but they showed great reluctance to go far from the column, and on the 10th came running into the command uttering loud yells and saying the Sioux were coming. The scene was striking, and soon became exciting. Along through the valley, here wide and open, our straggling train was making its way flanked on each side by a line of infantry skirmishers. The advance had just passed over a hill from the top of which a good view of the surrounding country was presented. The Crows in parties of twos and threes came riding down the valley at full speed, uttering the most piercing yells, and every now and then circling around to announce the enemy in sight. They presented every appearance of running away, and nothing could stop them until they had passed considerably to the rear of the advance troops. But on the top of the hill where I was standing they met their packhorses, extra ponies, conducted by their squaws and the hangers-on of the camp, and now was seen the object of their hasty retreat. Leaping from his panting steed each warrior commenced to strip for the fight. Shirts, leggings, saddles, etc., were rapidly pulled off and thrown upon the ground, to be hurriedly picked up by the now equally excited squaws, who, with loud cries, packed them away on the backs of the already loaded horses here, there, or anywhere, and in an incredibly short space of time the men, mounted barebacked and rifle in hand, were off like the wind for the front again. On our right was the brush-fringed bed of the stream, beyond which the ground sloped gradually up towards a high ridge which ran obliquely across our front towards a point projecting out into the valley. Beyond this point where the stream (if that can be called a *stream* which is composed of stagnant pools of dirty alkali water) appeared to bend to the right, the Indians pointed excitedly to a column of smoke or dust rising above the hilltop. Whilst looking at this and speculating as to what might be causing it, my attention was attracted by two horsemen coming

also our wagons after taking from them the pack-mules and supplies needed for the trip. The force for patrolling the river started that afternoon, and the next morning our long column stretched itself out to the eastward on the Indian trail.

The well-organized pack-train of General Crook's column, with its skilled packers and trained mules, excited our admiration and envy as the well-broken animals trotted along to the sound of the bell tinkling in their front. This bell was certainly to them "good medicine," for no well-trained pack-mule will ever permit himself to be beyond the sound of that bell, and it is only necessary to sound it to assemble every mule belonging to that particular train. Very different was it with the packs belonging to the Dakota column. Most of our mules were draft animals, and had never been packed before. Our saddles were of an inferior kind, and our packers, the men themselves, generally without any experience in what is always a very delicate and skilful operation. Each individual mule had to be led by a soldier, and the obstinate traits of the animal as developed under the new and novel circumstances of the work he was called upon to perform, would have been amusing had they not been so costly. They took anything but kindly to the loosely fastened, rattling packs, threw their heels into the air, their packs over their heads, and, having thus relieved themselves from boxes of hard bread and sacks of bacon, in several instances galloped back to the wagon train, testifying by their loud and characteristic brays as they rejoined their comrades, their preference for pulling, over packs. I saw one poor fellow going down a very steep hill, his pack almost touching his long ears as the loosened fastenings permitted it to slip forward. At last, tired of his disagreeable burden, he added to the mischief by kicking up behind. The load was in such a condition as to need just this additional incentive to take its departure, and with a bound a box of hard bread broke loose, and, striking upon a corner, went rolling end over end down the steep descent until, hitting a rock harder than its contents, the box flew into a number of pieces, and a layer of "hard tack" was strewed for twenty yards down the slope.

We crossed the high rolling divide separating the Rosebud from Tongue River, and crossing the latter stream proceeded some miles down its valley. The guides report a separation in the trail, but that of a large portion still leads down the valley, and most of the country has been recently burnt over, whilst smoke of still burning fires are seen to the eastward. We found, however, a spot where the grass was green and luxuriant, and bivouacked for the night in it. By the order regulating the movement, no canvas was permitted, no cooking utensils except tin cups, and no clothing or blankets except what each officer and man carried on his person or

rain. The next day he was carried in the same way to the mouth of Powder River, and placed on board of a steamboat.

We still followed the Indian trail down Powder River, but twelve or fifteen miles from its mouth the trail suddenly turned to the eastward, and now our guides and scouts seemed to be in still greater doubt than ever regarding its age or, in other words, our proximity to the Indians. There were no indications leading to the belief that we were anywhere close to them, and whilst scouting parties were sent far ahead on the trail, the command marched to the mouth of the Powder to obtain supplies, more especially forage for our animals, many of which were becoming worn down and weak from hard travel and the lack of sufficient food.

The mouth of the Powder is a bleak, desolate region, with poor grass, much of which had been burnt off by the Indians, but by scattering the command along the valley some grazing was obtained, and, with what grain we could get, our horses and mules began to pick up their strength. Here we remained a week, our wagon train and supplies being brought down in the meantime from the mouth of the Rosebud. Of these seven days, we were deluged during three with heavy rains, notwithstanding our promising bow on the 16th.

During the latter part of this march our Crow allies began to show signs of impatience, and a desire to leave us and return to their tribe. This, in view of our future operations, and their excellent qualities as scouts, would prove a serious loss to us. But they had already served a longer time than they had originally engaged for, and it was difficult to see if they demanded their discharge how it could be refused.

One day, seated with my back against a post, pencilling a letter, the whole delegation, squaws and all, approached the spot, but with no interpreter, and whilst I was wondering what was going to take place, the party formed a circle round me and the leader advancing, gravely took my cap from my head and placed it in my lap, solemnly placed one hand upon my scalp as though blessing me, and with the other grasped my hand, shook it and retired. This ceremony was performed in solemn silence by each of the warriors belonging to the band, and I came to the conclusion that they were going to leave us, and were desirous of securing my scalp upon my head for the future. An interpreter being summoned, they expressed through him their desire to return to their people to make provision for the coming winter, by killing buffalo for their women and children, and I found that the ceremony they had gone through signified a *petition* that I would grant their request and discharge them. They expressed great and sincere devotion to our service and a desire to join us again in fighting their enemies, the Sioux. I promised to intercede with General Terry in their favor,

ply of clear water in large pools, and the whole command enjoyed a hearty breakfast with coffee, for without the latter a soldier's breakfast is but a poor concern. Then, after a halt of a couple of hours, the march was resumed in a direction due north. The day was intensely hot, and both men and animals suffered a good deal for want of water, but we succeeded in finding some small pools from which the men eagerly drank and filled their canteens. During the day the scouts reported buffalo in sight, and this was cheering news, for the presence of buffalo not only indicates the existence of water in the vicinity, but is a pretty good sign generally that Indians are not far off, just as the presence of a commissary train in time of war indicates the near presence of troops. The vicinity of buffalo, however, brought us a torment in the shape of immense numbers of buffalo-gnats, which swarmed around us like bees, stinging men and horses in a way which rendered both almost frantic with pain. As the day approached its close, anxious search was made for water in every direction. The few spades with the command were produced, and with these and the invaluable trowel-bayonets carried by some of the men, holes were dug in the low places where water evidently had been at no very distant period. Not a drop, however, rewarded our labors, and our thoughts began to be seriously directed towards another dry camp, when one of the scouts reported the glad tidings of water in a ravine a mile or two ahead. That the summer's rain had left a supply of water in the country was encouraging, not only in reference to the practicability of passing through the region with a command, but in regard to the probability of finding Indians there, and raised hopes that, after all the long delay, an effectual blow might yet be struck.

The next day our march to the north was resumed over a high rolling country, well covered with rich pasturage, and we began to encounter game in abundance. Hundreds of antelope flocked around the column, and crossing a high divide we came in sight of herds of buffalo. But they were quietly feeding, and showed no indications of the proximity of Indians. Still farther to the north rose a high broken ridge of hills forming the divide between us and the Missouri River, and near this the trail of which we were in search was supposed to run. As we advanced the buffalo became more numerous, and finally the command was halted in a little valley, and permission given for the men to obtain a supply of fresh meat, of which they stood greatly in need.

Now commenced one of the most exciting scenes ever witnessed in the western country. Groups of horsemen moved out in different directions towards the herds quietly feeding on the neighboring hills. At first but little attention was paid to the approaching horsemen; for the buffalo is not usually a very watchful animal,

and horses is seen to bar their way, and half dead with fright they wheel and scatter. Look out, now, for yourself, for the hunters are as mad as the hunted, and where men are rushing about with cocked revolvers in their hands there is no knowing where the bullets may go, and one which misses a buffalo may bury itself in you. Bang! bang! go the pistols close to your ear, as the frightened animals rush past you, their long tongues lolling out, and bellowing with fear, and as the field of conflict clears away, several black carcasses are seen lying on the ground close by the column of troops. The herds disappear over the hills, a distant shot is heard now and then, and the buffalo hunt is over, with enough fresh meat lying around us for a week's supply. This is quickly cut up and packed away upon our mules, and the command resumes its march, with the means, if required, of making a longer scout than was at first proposed. A detachment of cavalry is sent off towards the divide to the northward, to examine the trail, whilst the main column turns to the eastward, to camp late in the day at some stagnant water-pools, the strong smell of buffalo from which calls forth comments about living on buffalo *straight* in every form. The next day we still continued the eastward course, and were re-joined by the detached cavalry, which found the trail, but with no indications that it had been recently used, so that if any Indians have crossed to the north of the Yellowstone we are still ahead of them, and may yet strike them lower down. Scouts are now kept well out from the column, but failing to discover any signs of Indians, the command was again turned to the southward on the 31st, a large cavalry force being sent still further to the eastward, to definitely decide the question as to the presence of any Indians in that direction, and on the 3d of September, the whole force was once more concentrated on the Yellowstone near the mouth of Glendive Creek, it being now certain that no considerable body of Indians had gone north, and every one being anxious to hear whether General Crook had been any more successful on the south side of the river than we had been on the north. It was expected that General Crook's troops would come in to this point for supplies, but several days passed without hearing from them, and at length a dispatch came by courier to say that he had found the Indian trail divided, and that he was going to strike still further to the east and southward.

Our stern chase had thus proved a long and fruitless one, and we had no longer even a shifting objective point to move against; for the Indians had doubtless divided their forces in the wilderness to the south of the Yellowstone, and could at any time concentrate again or remain scattered, according to circumstances.

Orders had been received for the establishment for the winter of

civilized!), whilst the troops engaged have not even the poor consolation of being credited with "*glory*," a term which, upon the frontier, has long since been defined to signify being "shot by an Indian from behind a rock, and having your name wrongly spelled in the newspapers!" Hence, if the American people do not wish to spend money they should not go to war. Doubtless many well-meaning people will say, "That is all very well, but how are you going to avoid it?" This question I will answer by asking another. How do you ever avoid war? It can be avoided sometimes by the exercise of a spirit of concession and justice, a spirit directly opposite to that which has universally characterized the treatment of the red man of this continent by the American people. You cannot point to one single treaty made with the Indians which has not at some time or other been violated by the whites, and you can point to innumerable instances where the Indian has been most outrageously swindled by the agents of the government; and the great wonder is, not that we have had so many wars but that we have had so few. The Indian, although a savage, is still a man, with probably quite as much instinctive sense of right and wrong as a white man, and quite as sensible as the latter when wrongs are perpetrated against him. *He* argues in this way: The white man has come into *my* country and taken away everything which formerly belonged to me. He even drives off and recklessly destroys the game which the Great Spirit has given me to subsist on. He owes me something for this, but generally refuses to pay. Now and then, as we find his settlements closing in around us, we succeed in getting him to promise us a certain yearly amount of food and clothing, that our wives and children may not starve or freeze to death, but when his agents come to turn these over to us we find the quantity growing less and less every year, and the agents growing rich upon what was intended to feed and clothe us. We try to reach the ear of our "Great Father" to tell him of our troubles, and how his agents defraud us, but *he is so far away that our words do not reach him*. We cannot see our wives and children starve, and year by year the danger becomes greater from the constant encroachment of the whites, who insist upon settling upon the land guaranteed to us by solemn treaty. Let us go to war and force back the settlements of these intruders, or if we must die, let us die like men and warriors, not like dogs.

Let the great people of America say whether or not the Indian is logical in his savage way, or whether or not the premises from which he argues are sound. None will dispute that his country has been overrun, and taken from him for less than "a mess of pottage;" and few will deny that the game on which he depends for subsistence is recklessly destroyed by the white men, so that in a

this for a time, and by such temporary triumphs as the Fetterman and Custer massacres postpone the fatal day, but ultimately the result will surely come, and as day by day and year by year the white settlements close in around his hunting-grounds, he is gradually becoming aware of his approaching doom. In the meantime he occupies a vast territory of comparatively unexplored country, into which the troops are obliged to seek him when active hostilities open. Of the geography of this region the troops are almost completely ignorant, and are not unfrequently entirely at the mercy of incompetent guides, not only in their movements, but for the discovery of what is absolutely necessary to the success of such movements—water. Civilized warfare is conducted upon certain well-established principles, in which good maps of the country operated in constitute a very important element. In addition to which there is always a stable "objective point" to every campaign which the commander knows cannot be suddenly changed to some other place, and elude his combinations, as an Indian village does. To the Indian, every foot of the country he is operating in is as familiar as are the paths of our flower gardens to us. He has travelled and hunted over it from childhood, knows every path, every pass in the mountains, and every water-hole, as thoroughly as the antelope or other wild animals which range through it. He knows exactly where he can go and where he cannot, where troops can come and will come, and where they cannot, and he knows the points from which he can safely watch the whole country, and give timely notice of the movements of troops, and direct those of his own camps so as to avoid an encounter, or concentrate to meet one. The best horseman in the world, he can, on his fleet little pony, the speed of which is a matter of wonder to the white man, pass over incredible distances in the shortest time, his mode of life accustoming him to any amount of fatigue, and the greatest deprivations in the way of clothing and food. A piece of buffalo-meat strung to his saddle, and the lightest possible amount of clothing, suffices him day or night for weeks and even months together. With eyes, ears, and even nose always on the alert, like any wild animal, he will discover signs of an approaching enemy more quickly and more certainly than can any white man, and will read the signs he meets with, as a scholar will read the page of an open book. He scents the smoke of a fire from a distance, and at early dawn will patiently watch from some prominent peak, as motionless as a bronze statue, the columns of smoke which at that time of day rise like pillars in the still clear air, and tell him whether a large force is preparing its breakfast, or some small scouting party is out looking for his village. If his quick eye encounters horse-tracks, he can tell with unerring certainty how many are in the

THE RELATIONS OF THE CHURCH AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

TWO causes, all but invincible, contribute to make the above-named subject nearly unintelligible to the bulk of the community. One of these is, the inevitable misapprehension of Catholic doctrine by writers outside of the Church, even such of them as are the most conscientious and the most unbiassed. The other is, the falseness even to absurdity of the prevailing political philosophizing of the day.

The former is no reproach to non-Catholic writers, nor do we make the statement in the faintest tone of depreciation. It is, as has been already implied, inevitable. The subject-matter of Catholic doctrine is supernatural; it is supernaturally taught; and, as it is supernaturally believed, so it is supernaturally apprehended. So remarkable is the ignorance of it exhibited by those who have not the illumination of the faith, even in an age like this when every literary clown would stare into the ark, and all subjects, however high or however recondite, are discussed without reverence or diffidence by people who have no qualification whatever for discussing them, that it affords in itself a not unimportant testimony to the genuineness of the Church's claim to be the only divinely appointed depositary and guardian of Christian truth. Even the controversialists of the ritualistic sect of Episcopalians, many of whom do make a conscientious study, as far as in them lies, of Catholic doctrine, and some of whom make a certain progress in it, continually display so complete a misunderstanding of it as admits of no other solution than the one we have named.

The palpable absurdities of the current political philosophy are, however, as it appears to us, a reproach to the age, as well as to the individual thinkers who are beguiled by them.

On the supposition of the truth of Christianity, there has ever been, and there ever will be, a preternatural influence systematically laboring to obstruct the progress of that truth in the minds, hearts, and lives of mankind; and the more violent its manifestations the stronger is the proof it contributes to the truth of the faith which provokes its hostility. Its first mode of attack was the inspiration of separate heresies. Then, when it had failed "all along the line," and all Christians were united in that One Fold wherein alone the faithful have bodily communion with their risen Lord, it adopted the formidable expedient of making the very unity itself of the faith its auxiliary in weakening the moral hold of Christian virtue on the corrupt human heart. The moral revolt which followed, deposed revealed truth from its infallible and all-obligatory authority,

truth. We should, however, deeply regret if we were, on this account, to be betrayed into an arrogant or dogmatic tone in treating the subject we have here proposed to ourselves, or any other, indeed, outside the pale of obligatory dogma; and this for two principal reasons: one, because such a tone would be contrary to the Catholic or Christian temper, and the other because human reason, unaided, is so feeble a faculty that the most practiced and exact thinkers are never secure against drawing the most incorrect conclusions from premises, true even to infallibility.

It will simplify matters if we affix its real worth to the general proposition laid down at the beginning of the Declaration of Independence. The passage has been as much abused as has the text of Holy Writ itself, by "right-of-private-judgment Christians," and as has the practical working of the Constitution framed by the leaders of the only revolution the world has seen wherein the most scrupulous political purist can find nothing to condemn.

Taken as it stands, unqualified and unexplained, not only is it not a "self-evident truth," but it is not true at all, "that all men are created equal." The proposition is in point of fact unmeaning. In what sense are John and Tom equal? Equal in what? In physical proportions, in robustness of health, in mental qualities, in power of will, in propensity to vice, or virtue? Scarcely any, if any, two men are created equal. Neither are "all men created equal" in rank, dignity, station, or authority. The son is not the equal of the parent, nor the younger children of the first born, nor is youth the equal of old age.

The high-minded gentlemen who attached their names to this celebrated state paper were not, most of them, at least, men of extraordinary intellectual calibre. They made no pretensions to philosophy or learning, and it is probable that they themselves had no very definite idea in their own minds of what they meant by the assertion, it is a "self-evident truth" that "all men are created equal." The spirit of anarchy had not yet beguiled mankind in its disguise of light, nor was recurring revolution considered the healthiest condition of civil society.

If ever there were a great political event which was self-justificatory, and did not appear to stand in need of any apology, it was the assumption of national independence and sovereignty by the American colonies of Great Britain. Yet in their excess of caution, the leaders of that patriotic movement considered that, in spite of the imperious necessity which forced them to unsheath the sword of independence, they were under the necessity of justifying themselves before the civilized world for having recourse to so violent and exceptional a remedy as a revolution.

It must have been intolerably galling to a high-spirited people to

fruitlessly, their case was complete; they needed no further justification, they had proved beyond controversy that the withdrawal of the allegiance of the colonies from the parent government, and their assumption of national independence and sovereignty, were both a right and a duty. On the supposition that they deliberately intended to deliver themselves of an axiom of political philosophy, when they stated "all men are created equal" to be a "self-evident truth," they jeopardized the justice of their case upon a proposition which not only admits of contradiction, but which, in any general sense that can be ascribed to it, is obviously untrue, which is, in point of fact as it stands, unqualified and unexplained, unmeaning. This would be an imputation on their common sense which we do not think they deserve.

Such being the case, it clearly remains for us to assign to it such meaning as it admits of; and the meaning which, all the attending circumstances being taken into consideration, was most probably the one they had in their minds, in the context in which it appears. Nothing is more certain than that the meaning assigned to it by philosophical anarchists of the present generation was the farthest possible from the minds of the practical, respectable, and patriotic authors of the document in which it appears. Far from them was the pernicious design of stripping governmental authorities of all moral authority, vitiating the principle of obedience, and reducing the subordination of parts of the body politic, the wholesome and essential gradation of rank, honor, usefulness, and necessity, to a dead level of impossible equality. Had that been their intention, never would they have taken so much pains to conciliate the favorable opinion of mankind for a revolution so justifiable and even necessary.

This fact, taken in connection with the propositions which follow the one in question, makes it clear that they purposed to assert nothing more than that neither the law of God nor of nature has endowed any man, or any family, or class of men, with an imprescriptible right of ruling over their fellow-men in civil communities by their own absolute will, a statement which is now little more than a truism, although it was the Catholic Church which first taught it expressly and distinctly to mankind. Indeed, the whole theory of government was an inexplicable riddle before that divine revelation of the highest truth which has made known to us the end of man, the majesty of his destiny, his final individual responsibility, and the true significance of his probationary state of being. To this day it remains an equally inexplicable riddle to all who abjure the paramount authority and reject the teaching of the Church.

We must not forget, besides, that the assertion we are criticizing

does not occur in the Constitution, nor even in the Declaration of Rights, but only in a document devoted exclusively to the justification of the American colonists for having employed, in order to rid themselves of unbearable oppression, so extreme a remedy as revolution. If it occurred in a preamble to the Constitution, and we were compelled to regard it as an advertently proposed political axiom on which the Constitution of the country was founded, and by which it was everywhere to be interpreted; if, furthermore, it were necessary to read it in the light of those anarchical teachings with which the plotting *philosophuli* of the age have beguiled a materialistic generation, we fear we should have to admit a serious, if not an insurmountable, difficulty of reconciliation between the principles of the Church and those of the Constitution of these States. But there is not so much as a pretence for such a hypothesis, as we trust we have shown as conclusively as the case admits of.

It will simplify matters if we state, at the outset, that we do not propose to ourselves in the treatment of our subject to use any of that *οικονομια* which is nevertheless at times highly desirable in the handling of delicate subjects. We do not think the present is one that demands it. On the contrary, we think that the interests at stake will be best consulted, and the impartial consideration of our non-Catholic readers more readily conciliated, if we discuss it with the utmost possible frankness. It is far from our intention in this article to propose an impossible thesis, and to endeavor to maintain that our political Constitution is in perfect harmony with the Christian theory of government, or is precisely that with which the Church would have provided us if she had been charged with the duty of framing it for persons, all of whom were her children, entirely faithful and obedient. Such a government is impracticable in the absence of fitting subjects. Were all Christian men, lay and cleric, *good* Catholics, no ruler would be needed other than the common Father of the faithful, no magistrates other than the priests, and a police would be superseded by the soul-elevating *sweet* charities of the confessional. But this would be heaven anticipated on earth, and far from having reason to expect any such exuberance of virtue in the progress of the age, we are rather bid to look for the diminution of the faithful amongst the children of men as the "Second Coming" draws near. The two civil polities that have come the nearest to the Church's theory of government have been the Republic of Ecuador under the martyred president, Garcia Moreno, and, to a remarkable and pre-eminent extent, the Jesuit Reductions of Paraguay.¹

¹ The Evil Spirit grudged Almighty God so precious a homage, and his creatures so

The Religion of the Church and the Contribution of the O.E.D. 701

Two considerations in this context cannot be too much insisted on. One is, that Christianity is essentially a revelation of government. This almost self-evident truth, little as it has hitherto been insisted on, issues from the very objectivity of its faith and worship. What it precisely is not, is what is claimed for Christianity by Protestantism, namely, a subjective supernatural influence acting unintermediately upon the individual, so as to make him independent of learning and obedience, and to make himself sufficient for knowledge and moral guidance.

The second consideration is, that the Church has no reason to anticipate, nor is it a part of her duty to insist on, at any time before the consummation of the ages, the complete adoption of her polity by peoples and nations. Its normal type was revealed in her infancy, when "*omnes qui credebant erant pariter et habebant omnia communia*," and when two of the citizens of the holy republic, who had broken its fundamental laws, received capital punishment at the decree of its supreme earthly executive, and is perpetuated in the religious orders, a demoniacal travestie of which is attempted in Communism. The prophecies that speak of her, lead her to expect anything but a career of progressive triumph. Her career is to be exclusively militant, in the course of which she is to be for the greater part worsted. She is to propagate the truth which God has commissioned her to teach mankind, by the martyr principle of charity. She is to adapt herself to the uttermost extent, short of compromising the obedience of faith, to the existing institutions, customs, and even prejudices of mankind wherever she is permitted to have a footing. Toleration, of aught short of denial of the faith, is one of her cardinal rules of action. She has to become all things to all men if so be she may save some. Not her mission is it to ride roughshod over the minds and hearts of men, and force an unwilling subjection to her unwelcome yoke. She is His minister, who demands the willing and cheerful obedience of love, not slavish subjection to burdensome forms. She has to conform even to human infirmity, and suffer some of the *arcana* of her infallible deposit to remain in abeyance, in order to gain the obedience of love to what is essential for the safety of souls; as God conceded an earthly monarch to His chosen people, although their perverse demand involved, not indeed a denial of Himself as the One True God, but a foolish preference of a civil polity over His own direct, immediate, and paternal rule.

much beatitude in this world over which he is permitted to have so much power, and these innocent, happy, and flourishing communities were utterly destroyed by the intrigues and violence of a very able and energetic minister, but perhaps one of the most infamous and unscrupulous who ever presided over a country's destinies.

power that can be named, "not only in this world, but also in that which is to come;"—in other words, not only temporal but spiritual—is claimed. And, when passing into heaven, He could not personally administer on earth the universal supremacy of rule and government over beings whose powers during their time of probation were not able to see Him as He is, He commissioned a particular individual with His full spiritual powers on earth as visible head of His body, the Church, instructing him that his decrees as supreme source of jurisdiction would be respected even in the eternal counsels, and have the same force as if pronounced by Himself, that "whatsoever he should bind upon earth, it should be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever he should loose on earth, it should be loosed also in heaven." Is it reasonable, then, is it common sense, to maintain that there is any rule, or authority, or dominion, throughout the whole moral order which can be rightfully exempt from, and wholly independent of, that supreme jurisdiction of the Vicar of the King of kings?

But what is right, true, and perfect, and what is practicable as men are, are two different things. If all men were genuine, earnest, and fully instructed believers, even although their lives fell very short of the sublime standard of Christian perfection, there would be no conflict of jurisdictions; secular authority would find at once its guide, its strength, and its sanction in the spirit-informed charity of the confessional. The proper aspect of the question is not that of a conflict of jurisdiction at all. The supreme and universal jurisdiction of the Church is very real, but it is *indirect*. It does not offer itself as the competitor of civil, any more than it does of parental, authority. It is the superior of both, but in a different order. Its operations are in the domains of conscience, free-will, and individual responsibility. Hence its indirectness, hence its gentleness. "The Church has never intended," says Cardinal Antonelli in reply to a querulous remonstrance of the French government on the subject of the Vatican Council, "and does not now intend, to exercise a *direct* and *absolute* power over the political rights of the State. She has received from God the sublime mission of conducting men, whether regarded as individuals or associated in society, to a supernatural end; she has, therefore, in virtue of this mission, the power, and is under the obligation of duty, to judge of the morality and of the justice of all acts, whether external or internal, in their relation to the natural and divine laws. Since no act, whether prescribed by supreme power, or whether it emanates from the free action of the individual, can divest itself of the character of morality and justice, it comes to pass that the judgment of the Church, though falling directly on the morality of the acts, *indirectly embraces all those things with which this morality is allied.*"

almost his own creator; put it absolutely in his power to form himself for the state which he deliberately chooses as his forever; so absolutely that God has deprived Himself of the power of forcing the momentous choice, so that not one of the condemned will be able to complain that his demoniac condition is not his own act and deed, whilst the blessed in heaven will have the blissful consciousness that the love of God, which constitutes their ecstasy, has been of their own deliberate act and choice.

In spite of the utmost aversion to speak harshly of the opinions of those who differ with us, we are unable, we own, to restrain the expression of our indignation at the shallow stupidity of the *soi-disant* philosophy which confounds this godlike liberty of the individual, revealed by the Church, with emancipation from teaching and obedience, and with absolute individual independence and self-sufficiency.

There exists no such thing as an independent human being. The various members of the human body, from the most important and honorable to the most seemingly insignificant and ignoble, are not more mutually dependent on one another than are the individuals of the human race. That race is not a mere congeries of human units, every one marked off from every other by a sharp line of demarcation, inclosing a separate destiny, completely shut out from and independent of the rest.

Physically, not one of the species of the animal creation, not even the birds, are so dependent as the animal man. He is not one whit less so in his higher faculty of reason. Whilst, what is very much more noteworthy and remarkable still, his very moral being wherein he stands before his God a responsible individual, with the two alternatives proposed to his own single, absolute choice, the despotic creator of his own eternal being for weal or woe, is also dependent. The young of no animal is so helpless as a human infant. The whole stock of knowledge possessed by most of us we have received from others—from parents, teachers, and from books. Let any of us take to pieces any portion of our knowledge; if we scrutinize accurately its origin, we shall discover that we have received all we know; that the application of what we have been taught, and its development, is all with which we can credit our own personal experience; and that any *strictly original knowledge*, any that we have, unaided, taught ourselves, is, in the case of almost all of us, nowhere. So universally and so inevitably is this the case, that our very intellectual existence may be said to be the result of teaching, as much as our physical being is of generation. Like the latter, too, the process is generative. Hence, although at first we are altogether dependent on oral teaching, the bulk of the stock of knowledge possessed by mankind is traditional.

And when we come to the principles of right and wrong, to the intelligent end of action and life, and discipline of the will, although, when as fully informed as his surroundings admit of, every individual is singly responsible for his actions to the extent of his knowledge and of his opportunities, he, nevertheless, is absolutely dependent on teachings for the elemental principles of his moral life, and, to a certain limited extent, dependent on a bias communicated to it by perverse teaching and example.

This last case is met in the Church's system, partly by the charitable solution of the irresponsibility of "invincible ignorance," which is no doctrine, however, but only a charitable hope; partly by the terrible solution offered by St. Paul (Rom. ix., 18-23): "*Ergo cujus vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat. Dicis itaque mihi: Quid adhuc queritur? Voluntati enim ejus quis resistit? O homo, tu quis es qui respondeas Deo? Numquid dicit figmentum ei qui se finxit: Quid me fecisti sic? At non habet potestatem figulus luti, ex eadem massa facere aliud quidem vas in honorem, aliud vero in contumeliam? Quod si Deus volens ostendere iram, et notam facere potentiam suam, sustinuit in multa patientia, vasa iræ, apta in interitum, ut ostenderet divitias gloriæ suæ in vasa misericordiæ, quæ preparavit in gloriam.*"

The truth is, the normal condition of the human race is one of pupillage. It is self-sufficient for nothing. Disobedience and independence are *unnatural*. From the first, we have to be taught how to sustain our physical life. From the most elemental ideas which feed our infant mind to the subtlest processes of reason, and the most comprehensive accumulation of facts, we depend absolutely on teaching. For the rudest and most fundamental principles of right and wrong, as much as for the sublimest principles of ethical perfection, our souls depend absolutely on teaching. Parents are as much teachers as rulers. Their jurisdiction involves an inseparable combination of both. Those who neglect either office leave half the duty imposed on them by nature undone. Under certain conditions, for a certain time, and for sufficient reasons, they may associate others with themselves as deputies in the discharge of this, their twofold office; but those who altogether neglect it must be content to be described as *unnatural* parents. It cannot be complained that there is any lack of recognition in these days of the teaching-duty of parents; but the sciolism, if we should not rather say the perverseness, of the age refuses its assent to the equally indispensable portion of the parental jurisdiction,—an illogical and irrational displacement of first principles, which has supplied it with a pretext for prostituting the majesty of the law to the demoralizing work of taking the whole parental jurisdiction out of the hands in which God and nature have placed it, and transferring

it to the State, a power which can find, neither in nature nor in the divine revelation, the slightest claim to its exercise.

This, then, is the Church's jurisdiction. It is the parent's jurisdiction raised into the supernatural order. She is the Mother of the great family of families. She is the Mother of us all; and God Himself is her spouse. "*Et accedens Jesus locutus est eis, dicens: 'Data est mihi omnis potestas in cælo et in terra. Euntes ergo docete omnes gentes, baptizantes eos in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti: docentes eos servare omnia quæcumque mandavi vobis.'*" (St. Matt. xxviii., 20.)

"And Jesus coming, spoke to them, saying: 'All power is given to me, in heaven and in earth. Go ye, therefore, teach all nations; baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, *teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you.*'"

"*Dixit ergo eis iterum; Pax Vobis! Sicut misit me Pater, et ego mitto vos. Hæc cum dixisset, insufflavit; et dixit eis: Accipite Spiritum Sanctum; quorum remisieritis peccata, remittuntur eis: et quorum retinueritis, retenta sunt.*"

"He said to them, then, again: Peace to you! As the Father has sent Me, I, too, send you. When He had said these things, He breathed on them, and He said to them: Receive the Holy Spirit. Whose sins you shall forgive they are forgiven them; and whose you shall retain they are retained."

Here, then, is the Church's commission! The fulness of the office is hers. She is to teach and to rule. That office is limited to no place or people. It is Catholic or universal. The whole human race is her family—*omnes gentes*. No nation, people, or individual is exempt from the obligation of receiving and *obeying* her teaching—"teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you." This august office of universal parent, teacher, and ruler of "all nations," she holds from the direct commission of God himself. The subject of her teaching is supernatural, as is the object of her rule, for it is the final end of man. It is not of her mission to teach physics, or geography, or mathematics, or book-keeping. As universal teacher, she is under no obligation of teaching any science or any knowledge which, at the fall, the human being was sentenced to gain by hard labor, because none of that knowledge is necessary for the salvation of the soul. Yet the whole curriculum of merely human learning must be subordinated to her more momentous teaching, in so far that nothing that contradicts the latter can be taught without guilt. Error in secular learning is of no serious consequence whatever to the human being. Indeed its history is little more than a succession of corrected errors. But to err from the faith is to forfeit eternal life and lose

the immortal soul. It is no disadvantage to a man in the presence of God to be ignorant of everything taught in State schools. The "foolishness of the Cross" is all he absolutely need know there. On every subject whatsoever, taught by merely human teachers, every one is entitled to hold any opinion he pleases which does not trench on the faith. But the opinion of no one is asked as to the teaching of the Church. No one can have any opinion but hers if he would be saved. All mankind have merely the plain duty of observing all things whatsoever Christ commanded her to teach them—"docentes eos servare omnia quæcumque mandavi vobis."

It is quite clear, from the preceding description of the Church's mission that, far from there being any necessary antagonism between her and secular government, of whatever form, she is, in virtue of her very essence and nature, if we may so write, the unflinching and invariable auxiliary of all lawfully constituted authority. She crosses the path of none of the functions of civil rule which do not hinder her mission of universal teacher. No temporal sovereignty incurs her opposition which does not place her in the alternative of disobeying its behests or those of God, and even then it is only a passive resistance with which she asserts her duty of obeying God rather than man. That resistance is one of duty, not of wounded pride, nor even outraged interest. Consequently she does not betake herself to conspiracy or revolution. She declines compliance, and takes the consequences. She resists by suffering; and she vindicates her cause by blessing, not revenge.

Again, the sanctions of civil rule are so different from those of the Church, that in the absence of a perverse and tyrannical purpose of the former to impede her mission of saving souls, there can be no clashing of jurisdiction. The State legislates for the community; she never takes into account the individuals; she neither has, nor can have, any regard for the liberty of the individual. Its sanction is brute force. It makes no pretence of informing the conscience or forming the will. It looks only at the actions, and visits them unswervingly with certain fixed penalties—loss of property, of bodily liberty, or of life, as the case may be. Every citizen is compelled to surrender so much of his personal freedom for the common weal. But the Church never infringes the godlike liberty of the individual. She teaches him the commands of God, and she teaches him *how* to observe them, but she leaves it absolutely to his own free choice whether he will obey or disobey them. Yet she aids him in an obedience from which his lower nature recoils, by telling him of the spiritual and future rewards or punishments which await respect or contempt of her instructions; but she subjects breaches of her law to no present disadvantage. She enforces no involuntary compliance with her teaching by physical compul-

sion. Does one of her children err, she imparts her forgiveness, teaches him how to avoid a similar error in future, and strengthens his will by supernatural aids which God has placed in her keeping. The State cares nothing for the heart. Its only business is with the actions. The Church keeps a mother's eye ever on the heart; she concerns herself about the actions only in so far as they are an indication of the state of the heart.

So far all is clear, and we do not see how any reasonable objection can be taken to what we have urged. All seems to be easy enough on paper, yet in practice it must be admitted that difficulties do occur. They may mostly be traced either to the incapacity of the secular authority to understand what constitutes a serious impediment to the Church's mission of saving souls, or to the impatience of the civil magistracy of any subordination whatsoever, even to the most benign moral influence. At times, however, it arises, as in Germany, Switzerland, Mexico, and, we may add, Italy at the present moment, from a deepseated animosity against the Church and her doctrines.

In all these cases the Church has to yield, more or less, according to circumstances. Her guiding principle is, then, expediency. "All things are lawful to me," writes the great Apostle of the nations, "but all things are not expedient." There is one point at which all concession must ever cease, and that is when an attempt is made to oblige her to cease "*docens omnes gentes omnia quaecumque Christus mandavit illæ.*" Her answer to the civil authority must then be that of the Apostles to the Jewish authorities who forbade them to teach any more in that name, "*Obedire oportet Deo magis quam hominibus.*"

It is difficult to say in respect of which the Church is most misjudged, whether for her unflinching courage, when to yield would be to betray her mission, or for her yielding, when that seems to be expedient for the salvation of souls. In the one case she is charged with disaffection and turbulence, and that mostly by men in whose eyes loyalty is a superstition, and obedience the virtue of a slave. In the other there is scarcely a limit to the accusations that are heaped upon her. She is "jesuitical," which in modern popular phraseology means insincere, sly, and overreaching; she is adopting a politic course through fear of modern "progress" and modern "enlightenment;" she is covetous of this world's goods, and fears to forfeit her temporal possessions; or she is self-seeking, and ambitious of worldly influence and power. It is on this last charge that the changes are rung with a monotonous, persistent, and senseless din that is at times deafening. She is represented as a grasping and ambitious tyrant, seeking by a world-wide organization to get the bodies and minds of men into her power, to subject them

absolutely to her lordly and capricious will. And the multitude of unreasoning *gobemouches* who constitute our modern "public," seem to take supreme delight in repeating this ridiculous accusation. The gross absurdity of these charges seems to escape them. For it requires a certain amount of moral obliquity, as well as dense stupidity, to believe that a society of men, such, for example, as the Jesuits, professing a religion whose fundamental principle is the abnegation of worldly power and advantage, and whose special vows bind them to obedience to it, so complete that they cannot accept any dignities even of the Church of which they are members, is engaged in deep conspiracy against the rights and liberties of their fellow-creatures. How much more so when the Universal Church is the object of accusation—that Church whose divine Head appeared on earth in the position of a carpenter, was executed as a felon, and chose His Apostles from the humblest ranks of life—that Church by whom "to the poor the Gospel has been preached" for nearly two millenniums—that Church which has revealed to mankind the sublimest principles of individual liberty, and which chanted at the conception of the Son of God, and has ever since been chanting, the noble canticle, "*Quia respexit humilitatem ancillæ suæ; . . . Fecit potentiam in brachio suo; dispersit superbos mente cordis sui. Deposuit potentes de sede, et exaltavit humiles. Esurientes implevit bonis; et divites dimisit inanes!*"

But our affair is not with persons who can entertain such extravagant improbabilities. It cannot be concealed that there is in these days a large class of men, and not unseldom there are among them men of high mental attainments, and even at times of fair morals, who are inflamed with a passionate hatred of the Church. It is not for us to judge them. There is One who judgeth. But our controversy is not with them. They are not amenable to reason. There are, however, not a few, and especially in this country, moderate, right-judging men, men at once of candor and discernment, who are really anxious to get at the right of things amidst the mass of misrepresentation with which the question of the relation between Church and State is surrounded. It is such we address.

Already, as we hope, we have urged enough to satisfy men of this temper that there is no necessary antagonism between the Church and the State; that, on the contrary, the Church is, of her very nature, even when there is not the least political connection between the two, the State's most powerful auxiliary. We have, however, admitted that, although the two jurisdictions are separate and distinct, having different ends and different sanctions, difficulties do practically occur. They are, however, to be ascribed to the infirmities of human character, rather than to any irreconcilability of the two powers; and, since one of the powers is invariably pre-

pared to yield, up to the utmost limits of expediency, they admit of harmonious solution wherever avowed hatred of Christ and His Church does not commit the State, as in Germany, to a war of extermination. So far, as to the general relations between the two powers. We propose to devote the remainder of this article to showing that, in the particular case of this country, the impediments the Church cannot but have to encounter in the assertion of her discipline amidst the prevailing unbelief are likely to be fewer and less serious, and more easily arranged, than under any other of the existing civil polities of the earth.

In this contest, what has been urged as to the mission of the Church must not for a single moment be lost sight of. It is an appeal rather to the moral sense of mankind than to the individual judgment. She teaches man the noblest exercise possible of his absolute freedom of will. Faith in the revelation of Christ, although the gift of God, is on the part of the individual a moral choice, a supreme act, and so long as it is persevered in, a habit of virtue; just as life is the gift of God, but it is absolutely in our power to make what use of it we please. A compulsory faith is no faith at all. The most rigid arrest of the will, if done under compulsion, or for worldly advantage, would lose its merit. It simply would not be the evangelical virtue at all. The impartial reader will then readily admit that the advantage is not on the side of the Church when she is established as the religion of the State.

When the profession of the faith is the universal custom, when an individual would be singular, or would even lose consideration by rejecting it, there is proportionately less chance of that absolute liberty of choice which constitutes the merit of faith. It is well for the State when Christ crucified is officially acknowledged, officially honored, officially worshipped by it. By officially we mean as an integral, fundamental part of its polity or constitution. So happy a state of things can only have originated in the unity of faith of the citizens. It is then the spontaneous expression of the general faith and general charity. It is impossible not to covet a state of things so beneficial. In a private family the union of hearts is hindered, through a difference of religious belief, by an impassable gulf, and the abyss of separation is profounder in proportion to the zeal with which the respective beliefs are held. In a State, too, nothing is so conducive to domestic peace, nothing binds together the citizen, with so close and affectionate a tie of common loyalty and patriotism, as unity of faith. The public action, began in God and ended in Him by august function of adoration and worship, receives a sublime significance which raises it above the mere busy trifling of animals who live only for seventy years, to the intelligent working of immortal beings achieving

can be named. The very spirit of the Constitution must be violated before it could be made unacceptable to Catholics. It would be absurd to deny that every sincere American Catholic would wish most devoutly that all his fellow-citizens were united in the faith of the Church. To bring all men into her fold, is the object of her working; it is her mission, her *ratio existendi*. But, in point of fact, the number of unbelievers in our country far exceeds that of Catholics, and the Church can desire no more favorable position for herself, none in which she can more effectually perform her mission of saving souls, than that in which every citizen can, without let or impediment, exercise his godlike liberty of choice, and in which she herself is at liberty, without let or impediment, fully to inform every citizen as to the choice he has to make.

In almost all states there has ever been a class of the community whom religion has had most to dread. It was ever thus. "In the period immediately preceding the Persian conquest," writes a distinguished German philosopher and scholar, "the caste of warriors, that is to say, the whole class of the nobility, were decidedly opposed to the monarchs, because they imagined them to promote too much the power of the priesthood." So, writing of ancient India, he remarks: "It has also been conjectured that the caste of warriors or the princes and hereditary nobility, possessed originally greater power and influence; and that it is only by degrees the race of Brahmins has attained to that great preponderance which it displayed in later times, and which it even still possesses. We find, indeed, in the old epic, mythological, and historical poems of the Indians, many passages which describe a contest between these two classes, and which represent the deified heroes of India victoriously defending the wise and pious Brahmins from the attacks of the fierce and presumptuous Cshatryas." "Among the Egyptians, the Etruscans, the Greeks themselves," writes M. Guizot, "the order of warriors, for example, has struggled against that of priests." "The revolution that took place in Gaul," writes M. de Laurentie, "overthrew only the political power of Druidism; but instead of the priests the nobility assumed the power."

The arrogant violence with which the feudal barons of the middle ages seized on ecclesiastical dignities, and the worldliness and license of manners they introduced, did more to corrupt the Church, weaken her spiritual influence, and give universal scandal than any one cause that can be named.

Without the interested aid of the German nobles, the Lutheran folly had been snuffed out as easily as the snuff of a smouldering candlewick. The French cynic would have mocked in vain, and Paris would not have been turned into a city of devils, but for the skepticism and depraved morals of the French nobility.

The itching palm of every Scottish noble had been polluted with English bribes, or Scotland would never have become a prey to the barbarous superstition that has infected her ever since.

But for the spoils of religion and the poor, with which Henry VIII. bought the base acquiescence of his caitiff nobles, England might still have been "merrie England," and the "Isle of Saints;" and, at this very day, the return of that country to the Catholic faith is not a little hindered by the needless fear of many of the "great houses" lest they should, at some time or other, be called upon to make restitution of the possessions so ill-gotten by their ancestors.

The reason of this is on the surface. The subtle and profound pride of the human heart wants not the provocation of privileged birth to provoke its animosity against the wholesome restraints respected by the rest of mankind. Men born into their life in a condition of superiority—of wealth, rank, influence, and power—when this privilege accrues to them, not in isolated instances, as it were accidentally, but as members of a particular caste or order, cannot resist the ridiculous fancy, not even if they are Christian nobles and otherwise of good dispositions, that the rest of their fellow-creatures whose birth does not bring with it to them these advantages, are an essentially inferior order of beings; and it is easy to understand how unpalatable to such a class must be a religion of humility and self-denial, which teaches them that their apparent advantages of birth are adventitious and unreal; and that, far from evidencing any essential superiority of those, to whose lot they fall, over those who lack them, their tendency is exactly the reverse. Let us not be misunderstood. We are not mere demagogic declaimers, nor are we mere prejudiced revilers of aristocratic institutions. An hereditary nobility is in this age a political anachronism. But more than this, it is in one sense at variance with the whole temper and spirit of the Christian revelation. Under the law of types and shadows which claimed the obedience of the children of Israel, the dignities of government went down in rigid lines of lineal descent. When the shadows disappeared beneath the midday light, the hereditary principle went with them, and places of rule fell to any one, from whatever class, according to merit, by a spiritual succession.

We have before observed that this is the *truth* of rule and government. It is the normal constitution, so to speak, of the Church. But it supposes all subjects to be good Catholics—a condition of things we are not led to expect. Consequently, in the actual condition of mankind, and practical state of human affairs, a polity in which an hereditary nobility constitutes one of its most powerful institutions may derive therefrom splendid advantages which coun-

terbalance to a great extent its repugnance to the dignity of the human individual as revealed by Christianity. The Church in process of taming the northern tribes of Europe made an exquisite use of it in the short age of chivalry. But her softening influences lost in time their paramount ascendancy; the brute passion of arbitrary power spurned the gentle yoke of Christian submission, and the courteous graces arising from devotion to the Mother of God yielded to the bane of privileged birth. In all these questions which concern the practical regulation of the passions, tempers, and dispositions of men thickly collected together in communities of civil life—nay in those which affect only their economical interests—mere theory outside of revealed truth is valueless. Every one knows that written constitutions, from that of Lycurgus downwards, have never been worth the parchment on which they were engrossed. You cannot fit a constitution on a people like a suit of clothes. To offer any prospect of durability, it must be the outgrowth and development in practice, of their customs, temper, tastes, mental and physical peculiarities, in short of their whole inner being. Several generations must pass away before we know what the Constitution of our country really is. The framers of the written Constitution laid down a few fundamental principles, and contrived a simple organic structure, just enough for it to start from, but they were not foolish enough to suppose themselves capable of anticipating what would ultimately be the expression of the political life of a great nation, then in its infancy. It is well it was so. Already it has survived two catastrophes. A more complicated machinery would have gone to pieces beneath the crash of the conflicting interests of North and South, so inveterate that the sword was obliged to be their arbiter. The scandal of the recent Presidential election put a strain on the Constitution which no final, letter-bound Constitution could have borne.

It is after this fashion our judgment must be formed of an hereditary nobility as a political institution. Undoubtedly the whole Christian theory, if we may be permitted such an expression, is against it, as well as the whole Christian tone and temper. But this does not condemn it to immediate extinction, because, practically, we cannot take Christian—that is, Catholic—subjects alone into consideration; for they are not likely ever to constitute even the majority, before the Second Coming. So, too, an hereditary nobility is, even more pronouncedly still, at variance with modern political theories, so much so as to make it neither more nor less than an anachronism wherever it exists.

On the other hand, it presents itself to us amidst the blaze of brilliant surroundings. Ancestral glory, palatial castles, armies of retainers, sumptuous appointments, the state of princes, hospitality

on a lordly scale, high achievement, personal prowess, and, for a time at least, the more winning graces of the noblest conceivable civilization ; patriotic when patriotism did not seriously affront its interests, and not unseldom a benefactor on a grand scale to the external development of the Church.

On the whole, however, no true Catholic—however biassed in favor of an hereditary nobility or dazzled by its glories—can refuse to admit that it has ever been the worst enemy with which the Church has had to contend in the development of those gentle, hidden, and austere virtues which go to make up her inner life.

It will thus be readily understood that, far from there being any foundation for the ridiculous assertion that there is a necessary and essential hostility to American institutions on the part of the Church, and that she is perpetually conspiring to undermine and destroy them, just the reverse is true. A Constitution, one of whose fundamental provisions is : “ No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States ; and no person holding any office of profit under them, shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state,” must be infinitely more congenial to her spirit, and favorable to the untrammelled discharge of her august mission, than the Constitution of a country wherein hereditary nobles have diverted a portion of her consecrated possessions to the support of an heretical sect which they have made the established religion of the country, and have appropriated the rest to themselves ; or of a country whose nobles support the enemies of religion in their efforts to hamper the free action of the Church, and hinder her mission of saving souls to the extent that appears to them necessary in order to save their own inherited titles, rank, and possessions.

After all, however, there is not a single fundamental principle of the Constitution which more profoundly conciliates the loyal devotion of Catholics, than the jealousy it displays of the least encroachment on the individual dignity of the humblest citizen by usurped, or still more, by legalized privileges, of wealth, birth, or even official rank. Far from wishing to substitute monarchical appanage or aristocratic exclusiveness for equality of mutual observance and deference among the children of God, to nothing could the Church be more ready to devote her loyal energies, since nothing can be more profoundly in harmony with her own spirit, than to render this principle of the Constitution as thorough and effective in its practical working as, for the present, it is otherwise—little better indeed than a gigantic fraud.

The only organized community in which this principle is enshrined in its integrity is the Catholic Church. There it has been

in living and *healthy* operation for nearly two millenniums. What are communism, what democracy—democracy, that is, as translated nowadays—but this beautiful principle thrown into a false and heretical form?

Speak, ye frothy declaimers against the despotic and liberty-hating spirit, the monarchical and aristocratic proclivities of that sweet mother of liberty whose cradle was in Bethlehem, "*parvulus in millibus Israel*," is it not amidst the shavings of a carpenter's shop in his youth, at the close of his career in early manhood on the cross of a felon, on the point of taking with him to paradise a penitent thief executed at His side, that you must look for her founder and lawgiver? Did the accident of birth throw that meek maiden of Galilee who called Him son, beneath an earthly coronet? That august twelve, His greatest ministers, the most illustrious men who ever trod this earth, what was the rank of life from which they came? Has not one of them told us, under the inspiration of God's holy spirit, of the Church's mission, of the very vocation itself of Christianity: "*Quia non multi sapientes secundum carnem, non multi potentes, non multi nobiles: sed quæ stulta sunt mundi elegit Deus ut confundat sapientes; et infirma mundi elegit Deus ut confundat fortia; et ignobilia mundi et contemptibilia elegit Deus, et ex quæ non sunt ut ex quæ sunt destrueret; ut non gloriatur omnis caro in conspectu ejus?*" And was it over the high-born, the rich, the princes, and great ones of the world that those divine hands were raised in gentle benediction when he said, "*Beati pauperes*"—and not in condition only, but what is even yet more—" *Spiritu; quoniam ipsorum est regnum cælorum?*"

The pledged enemies of the Church have their reply to this. "We admit," they say, "that of such sort are the principles with which the Church commenced her career, and that if her present action were consistent with them there could be no fear of collision between her and the powers of the world; but she has since developed into a worldly and self-seeking power which finds itself in continual opposition to modern views of political liberty."

But we say that modern views—that is, the current and popular views of the day—of political liberty are false, mischievously false; that, in them, liberty is used as another name for anarchy, and that their practical results can only be political despotism and moral slavery of the most abject kind. The Church is opposed to these as a moral influence, as a religious teacher, not as a rival power.

What there is of truth in the above allegation is as follows: There is the normal condition of the Church as the incorporation of very truth; her polity in perfection; her theory as it were. It existed for awhile as her normal type or pattern of government, during those earliest years when every one of her subjects was

ganized system of "lobbying," wherein nothing is considered but personal interests, and those of the country are all but ignored. In truth, the very name of politician has sunk into such contempt, that no one of any credit or standing will have anything to do with what ought to be the ambition of the *élite* of the nation.

The administration of justice is perhaps the worst of all the civilized states of the world; there is not a Christian nation in which life, liberty, and property are so insecure, not one in which the lives and liberties of the citizens are more helplessly at the mercy of the brutal, and, indeed, murderous violence of a practically all but irresponsible police.

As to the executive, only the last Presidential election exhibited the strange spectacle of an overwhelming majority of the nation thwarted in its choice by brute force backing the most shameful fraud. This failure may be only temporary, for it is due to causes which admit of removal. But, anyways, the motives, aims, and objects remain in the organic structure of our government. There they are in the written Constitution. And we maintain that, far from there being any antagonism between them and the spirit, and teaching, and objects of the Church, there is no other existing Constitution whose fundamental principles are more in harmony with the latter.

Existing under the protection of a government based on principles of which, in their true and noblest form, the Church was the original revealer to mankind, under which she enjoys more freedom of action in the discharge of her high mission than under any other on earth, she can only be animated by the desire, in common with all who love their country, of seeing its principles successfully carried out. We can confidently assert that there is not a Catholic citizen, lay or cleric, who is not actuated by this loyal and patriotic motive.

No! That august mouthpiece of the spirit of the most holy God who first taught men their grand attribute of liberty, who first taught them their end—not that of an unchecked prolapse of animal degradation to the untold anguish of eternal consciousness of death, but of progress, through the perseverance of a free moral choice against spiritual enemies and the allurements of evil, to the untold ecstasy of eternal consciousness of life in the immediate presence and love of God—is no friend of privileged families, of exclusive classes, of despotic governments, of the tyranny of force. She is the champion of the fullest measure of individual freedom, of the universal equality of justice, of the immunity of no individual, however highly placed, from the obedience due from the rest to law, of equal privileges and equal rights. There can be no antagonism between her and a civil polity which asserts those prin-

are "pigeonholed," that judges deliver judgments and juries return verdicts at which the country stands aghast. Through this, too, it is that the public indignation falls flat before these outrages on justice which demoralize the country, destroy confidence between man and man, and make life, liberty, and property alike insecure. For, how can criminals be tracked through the darkness of the deepest night—the night of secret oaths, secret signs, and oath-bound conspirators?

Acquiring boldness from impunity, the general indifference, and its own overbearing influence, this society openly violates the fundamental principle of the Constitution—which forbids even to Congress the power of instituting a titled class, nay, of decorating a single individual with a title of nobility—and has instituted a knightly order, the members of which it dresses up in a uniform and decorates with a baronial title.

Of itself this piece of ridiculous mummery is of too frivolous a description to be treated as a serious charge. Yet, taken with the rest, it adds weight to the accusation, we bring against all secret societies, that their whole organization temper, and spirit are diametrically opposed to the fundamental principles of the Constitution of the United States, that the great scandals that have recently issued from its practical work must be ascribed to them, and that, if their influence prevails, this, our justly prized Constitution, will come to nought.

The Church has ever condemned these pernicious organizations. All of them, of whatever kind, are under her solemn ban and anathema. And in nothing does she show herself more conservative of the institutions of the country, than in this. Forbidding them everywhere, on other grounds, as the general foe of humanity, her censures upon them in this country are of special import, as checking, to the extent of her power, the growth of an evil which can flourish only to the utter depravation of the energy, healthy action, and even existence of the American Constitution.

SYRIAC GRAMMARS.

Elements of Chaldee, Syriac, Samaritan, and Rabbinical Grammar. By John G. Palfrey, D.D., Professor of Biblical Literature in the University of Cambridge. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1835. 8vo., pp. 44.

The Elements of Syriac Grammar. By the Rev. George Phillips, B.D., Fellow and Tutor of Queen's College, Cambridge. Second edition, with amendments and additions. Cambridge: Printed at University Press. London: J. W. Parker. 1845. 8vo., pp. 208.

Syro-Chaldaica Institutiones seu Introductio Practica in Studium Linguae Aramaeae a P. Martin, Theolog. Doctore, etc. Parisiis: Maisonneuve et Socc. 1873. 8vo., pp. 101.

Grammatik der Syrischen Sprache mit Vollständigen Paradigmen, Chrestomathie und Wörterbuche für akademische Vorlesungen und zum Selbststudium bearbeitet von Friederich Uhlemann. Zweite überarbeitete und vermehrte Ausgabe. Berlin: Jonas, Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1857. Large 8vo., pp. 276. Chrestomathy and Lexicon, pp. lxiv., 63.

Uhlemann's Syriac Grammar, translated from the German by Enoch Hutchinson, with a Course of Exercises in Syriac Grammar, and a Chrestomathy and Brief Lexicon prepared by the translator. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1855. 8vo., pp. 367.

The Same. Second edition, with additions and corrections. Same place and publishers. 1875. 8vo., pp. 459.

THE field of Syriac grammar and philology has been very much enlarged since the day when it was first opened to the astonished gaze of Western students by Theseus Ambrosius, of Pavia, in the first half of the sixteenth century.¹ It is in great part to the zeal for the study and diffusion of Scripture, and to the piety of this humble Religious,² that we are indebted for the first

¹ *Introductio in Chaldaicam Linguam.* . . . Theseo Ambrosio autore. Papiæ, 1539. In another note we give the title in full.

² Hoffman, in the Prolegomena to his Syriac grammar (Halle, 1827, p. 36), we know not why, calls Ambrosius a lawyer (*Theseum Ambrosium juris consultum*). That one should be a J.U.D., or "Juris Utriusque Doctor," the same as LL.D., or Doctor of Laws, presupposes his theoretical knowledge of canon and civil law, but does not make a lawyer of him. Nor are members of religious orders in Italy ever allowed to practice in the courts, either ecclesiastical or civil. We know a learned and worthy divine who presides and teaches in one of our American seminaries. He has the title of J.U.D.; but if asked his profession, he never would reply that he was a lawyer. A man's title is one thing, his profession another. Ambrosius was no lawyer, but a Religious. He belonged to the Canons Regular (*Canonici Regulares Lateranenses*), who trace their origin in a general way to St. Chrodegang, Bishop of Metz, who lived about the middle of the eighth century. They wear the surplice or rochet, not only in church,

introduction into Europe of Syriac literature, as well as for the printing of the first Syriac New Testament in the Western world. And this is how it came about. Amongst those who came to Rome in the year 1514 to take part in the General Council of Lateran under Leo X., was the Syrian priest Joseph Kuri (Acurius), with Moses, a deacon, and Elias, a subdeacon. After having satisfied his devotion by visiting the shrines of the Eternal City, Joseph manifested his desire to celebrate the Holy Sacrifice according to the Eastern rite. But this the authorities would not allow until the Syriac missal he intended to use had been examined, and its entire orthodoxy ascertained. The cardinal of Santa Croce,¹ who

but as part of their regular costume, and on that account are known in Italy as *Rochettini*. Any one who has visited Rome must remember seeing them in or about the Church of St. Peter's Chains (San Pietro in Vincoli), the same in which is to be seen the colossal statue of Moses, by Michael Angelo.

Was it an oversight in Hoffman, or had he any object in substituting *lawyer* for *Religious*? We know not, and therefore will not arraign his motives. But we have read too much not to know that it is a settled habit, a systematic policy of many writers outside of the Church carefully to ignore the literary and scientific merits of Catholics. And when supereminent worth, or historical necessity, compels mention of a Catholic's name, his religion is passed over in silence; or should his country reveal too plainly his creed, something is gained by not letting the reader know that he was a monk or a priest. To give one example out of a hundred, Kenrick, in his "Phœnicia," having occasion to speak of the two greatest Phœnician scholars that Europe has ever possessed, Bochart and Movers, describes them almost in the same breath as "Samuel Bochart, Protestant minister at Caen," and "Dr. Movers, Professor in the University of Breslau." If it was necessary or expedient to inform the reader that Bochart was a Protestant minister, what harm could there be in letting him know also that Francis Movers was a Catholic priest? But there *is* harm, for such candor would tend to undermine the great hereditary anti-Catholic tradition that "nothing good can come out of Nazareth." How many readers are conversant with the great names of such scholars as Muratori, Tiraboschi, Lanzi, etc., or of such lights of natural science as Spallanzani, Piazzi, the discoverer of Ceres, Haüy, the father of crystallography, not to mention a score of others, and yet never have learned that these men were priests or Religious? And of the writers who know it, how few would like to hint it to their readers? May we not justly designate this studied silence, these cautious suppressions, by the phrase of Horace, *lividas obliviones* (Ad Lollium, lib. iv.)?

¹ There have been cardinals of the noble house of Santa Croce, but not in the days of Leo X. The patron of Ambrosius, by common usage of the time, derived his name, not from his family, but from his titular Church of Holy Cross, the Sessorian Basilica. He was Bernardin Carvajal, a Spaniard of great reputation and ability, who became cardinal in 1493, and died in 1522. Seidemann, in his appendix to Luther's Letters (Berlin, 1856, pp. 604 and 654), states that this is the Santa Croce referred to in Luther's two letters to Spalatin, of August 23d and August 31st, 1520, which are found in De Wette's collection (Luther's Briefe, vol. i., pp. 480 and 482). The last quotation must be incorrect, as on turning to page 482 we find a very brief letter to Spalatin that contains no allusion to the cardinal. The other letter, on page 480, gives the substance of a letter which Luther was preparing "*ad S. Crucem*" (so he calls him), in which he requests him to act as umpire (*causæ componendæ sequester*) between himself and his opponents. It probably was never published, and De Wette is mistaken in inferring the fact of its publication, from the following letter on page 481, which warrants no such inference. It seems strange that Luther should select a Spaniard for arbiter of

had given hospitality to the Syriac strangers in his palace, intrusted the charge of examination to Ambrosius, who then happened to be living at Rome, and who had some acquaintance (not much, as he modestly confesses) with Hebrew, the Chaldee (of Daniel and Esdras), and Phœnician.¹ By going over each word singly in daily conferences with Kuri and his companions, and with the aid of a Jew skilled in the Hebrew and Arabic tongues, the indefatigable perseverance of Ambrosius enabled him to triumph over all difficulties. The orthodoxy of the missal was vindicated, and Kuri was empowered to say mass in the Holy City after his own rite.

But this investigation led to another and more important result. The linguistic appetite of Ambrosius had been whetted by this constant philological intercourse with his Jewish assistant and the Syrian clergymen, and under the guidance of the latter he began to devote himself to a wider and more profound study of the Syriac language. The fruit of these labors was the compilation of the Grammar which, after having had to wait a long time and overcome a thousand difficulties, he published at his own expense, in the year 1539.² He also gave himself up with unwearied energy to the task of collecting MSS. that he might be enabled to publish, and thus save for posterity, the Bible, or as much of it as possible, in the language consecrated (to use his own words) by the most holy lips of Our Blessed Lord while dwelling amongst men. He had the

his case. Were it a German dignitary of the Church, the choice would seem more natural. Now we find in Moreri's Chronological List of Promotions to the Cardinalate, a certain John (neither his family name, nor the year of his death is given) whom Alexander VI. raised to that dignity in his ninth promotion of candidates in the year 1503. He was assigned to the titular Church of Holy Cross, Carvajal having been meanwhile, perhaps, elevated to the grade of Suburbicarian Bishop. Of his nationality nothing is said; but from the fact that he was ambassador of the Duke of Saxony to the Holy See, it is likely enough that he was a German. May not this have been the cardinal chosen by Luther?

¹ It is hard to conceive what Ambrosius means by "*Elementa Punica*," unless it be the deciphering, with the aid of Hebrew, of the Punic fragments of the *Pœnulus*.

² The book is one of extreme rarity, and in all probability is not to be found in any of our libraries. Hoffmann (*Proleg. ad Gram. Syr.*, p. 42) gives the title thus: "*Introductio in Chaldaicam linguam, Syriacam atque Armenicam et decem alias linguas. Characterum differentium alphabeta circiter 40 et eorumdem invicem conformatio. Mystica et Cabalistica quamplurimum scitu digna. Et descriptio ac simulachrum Fagoti Afranii. Theseo Ambrosio ex comitibus Albonesii I. U. Doct. Papiensi, Canonico Regulari Lateranensi ac S. Petri in Cœlo Aureo Papiæ Præposito Authore, 1539.*" And in the end, "*Excudebat Papiæ Joan. Maria Simoneta Cremonensis, in Canonica Sancti Petri in Cœlo Aureo. Sumptibus et typis authoris libri. Anno a Virginis partu 1539. Quinto Kal. April.*" The *phagotum*, which he describes in the fifth chapter, was a musical instrument invented by his uncle Afranius, and probably resembling the "*fagotto*," or bassoon of modern Italy. From the title-page we learn further that his family name was Albonesi, and that he was provost of a church in his native city. Assemanni having occasion to mention Ambrosius, most unaccountably calls him *Viterbiensis*, that is, of Viterbo in the Papal States. (*Bib. Or.*, I., 535.)

interest of undefiled religion and to the pious zeal of a cloistered student, Europe is indebted for its first acquaintance with the Syriac grammar, and for the first appearance in print of the Holy Books in that venerable language.

The elements of Syriac are taught in one or two, perhaps, of our American Catholic seminaries. In our Protestant schools of divinity we do not know that this study is cultivated to any extent, if at all, outside of New England. Yet the language and literature of Syria have grown into such importance of late years, and have made such wonderful progress in Germany, France, Belgium, and England, that American scholarship, if it cannot compete with that of the Bickells, Lagardes, Martins, and Curetons, should at least blush to remain so far behind as to be unable even to appreciate and enjoy their labors. It is true, indeed, that we have no libraries rich in manuscripts like those of Rome, Florence, Milan, Paris, and London, by the editing of which our scholars may purchase or add to their renown. But the study of Syriac, if more widely spread and more assiduously cultivated amongst us, would confer greater advantages than mere honor and reputation, which, after all, can only be the reward of the few. Catholics and non-Catholics should study it as one of the most important hermeneutical aids to the correct understanding of the Hebrew text in the Old Testament. For the interpretation of the New it is simply invaluable, being the language¹ in which our Lord spoke and taught His disciples. It is, further, the language which the Apostles spoke habitually and from

the generosity of the Emperor Ferdinand I. Though the printed copy bore on its face the title of "New Testament," it omitted the Deutero-Canonical books, viz.: the Second Epistle of St. Peter, the Second and Third of St. John, that of St. Jude, and the Apocalypse. The Apocalypse was afterwards published from Scaliger's MS. by Ludovicus de Dieu, at Leyden, in 1627, and the remaining Epistles from English MSS., by Pocock, also at Leyden, 1630. And thus was the Syriac Pshitto, or Simple Version, made complete. The Apocalypse and Epistles added by Lud. de Dieu and Pocock do not belong, as some have supposed, to the Harklean Recension nor to the Philoxenian Version, but to the Pshitto, though added by a later hand. Cf. Gustavus Bickell, *Conspectus Rei Syror. Literar. Monasterii*, 1871, p. 6.

¹ We know and admit all that may reasonably be alleged in favor of the Syro-Hierosolymitan dialect. No doubt it was the one used by the people of Jerusalem and its adjacent territory. But this does not militate against the assertion made in the text. Was not our Lord, like His Holy Mother, who trained His infant lips to human speech, brought up in Galilee, of which the dialect differed as much from that of Jerusalem as both did from the language of the learned at that day? Considering the peculiar genius of the Semitic tongues, in which the vowels have no such importance as they have in those of the West, it is no exaggeration to say that these two dialects were not as far apart from each other and from the standard language, as are Neapolitan, Bolognese, Milanese, and Venetian, compared with one another, and with the written tongue of modern Italy. These, it must be remembered, and the same is true of the dialects of the ancient world, while differing from the common speech, have a special grace and elegance of their own, and are not to be compared for an instant with the rude barbarisms which separate Yorkshire, Lancashire, Sussex, Dorset, Wiltshire, etc., from the polished society of the

their infancy; the language with which Divine inspiration clothed their thoughts before they sat down to convey them through a Greek channel to the infant churches.

Men who are fond of learning may devote themselves to the study of what is best and holiest from widely different motives. In Germany those Rationalists who are simply non-believers, or destitute of religion, study Syriac as they do Hebrew, Sanscrit, or the Polynesian tongues, merely to gratify their philological tastes; and if this betrays a lamentable want of Christian faith, it argues no impiety. Those among them who are unbelievers, or positively irreligious, undertake the same study with the wicked view of discovering new weapons, if possible, against Revealed Truth. On this side of the Atlantic a Doctor of Divinity finds an inducement to the study of Syriac in the consideration that "it is the sacred dialect of that interesting people, the Nestorians."¹ The interest

English capital. Such of our Lord's words as have been sacredly preserved by the Evangelists—the *Tlitho Kum(i)* of Mark v., 41 (in our Bibles, Talitha Cumi), the *Etpatahh* of Mark vii., 34 (corrupted into Epheta, Gr. *Eppatha*), and His complaint on the cross, *Lmono shbakton(i)*, or as pronounced by the Eastern Syrians, *Lmana shbakton(i)*, (Lamma sabacthani, Matth. xxvi., 46. The verse which is there given from Ps. xxi., 1, has in its original Hebrew quite a different word, *azavtani*, with Ain for its first radical)—sufficiently show that our Lord spoke Syriac, and quoted the Divine Word of the Old Testament in the same language.

¹ Rev. Calvin E. Stowe (in his commendatory notice prefixed to Hutchinson's translation of Uhlemann's Syriac Grammar). Was not Syriac, also, "the sacred dialect" of the apostles and their immediate successors, and by them used in the celebration of the divine mysteries? Was it not "the sacred dialect," as well as the mother-tongue, of the great St. Ephrem, St. James of Nisibis, St. Maruthas, St. Isaac, and of an innumerable multitude of Syrians who lived and died true Christians long before Nestorius was born? No doubt; but they were all given to Mariolatry (which they had inherited from the primitive Church), and therefore must not aspire to such respectable company as that of the Nestorians. Had the Syrian heretic Bardesanes, instead of the few scraps preserved by St. Ephrem and Eusebius, left behind him some work in which the Virgin Mother of God was reviled, we feel satisfied that Rev. Dr. Stowe would have found him more interesting than any Father of the Church, and would have discovered in his book another inducement to the study of Syriac. To speak only of our own times, is not this same language at this day "the sacred dialect" of the Jacobite or Eutychian heretics, who, being estranged from the Holy See, might be supposed to have some claim on Dr. Stowe's sympathies? Unquestionably; but for all this they are unworthy of his sympathy, they awaken in him no interest. Why is this? There can be but one answer. Though in a state of revolt against Rome, yet their devotion (*idolatry* he calls it) to the Mother of God falls not a whit behind that of the Roman and Greek churches. To honor Her, then, whom the Great King has deigned to honor, is the unpardonable sin, the "sin unto death," for which not even the most virulent hatred of Rome and her Pontiff can ever atone. Is such sentiment tolerable, even in nominal Christianity? It is simply Satanic, and could only have its origin from the one who lies bruised and writhing under Her heel. How much more farseeing and logical, if not laudable, is the theory of the High-Church Anglicans, Ritualists, and Dollingerites, who wink at the Mariolatry, saint-worship, and other "superstitions" of the Eastern schismatical churches out of consideration for the one great point, their deepseated hostility to the centre of Catholic unity?

that the New England divine takes in the Nestorians would, we fear, be found upon examination to spring mainly, if not solely, from the fact that their blasphemous doctrine dishonors HER whom "all generations shall call blessed." The Christian who is sincere, whatever his creed, should have but one ruling motive for seeking acquaintance with the Syriac Scripture, viz.: to secure an important auxiliary in determining the literal sense of Holy Writ. But for us Catholics who worship God not only "in spirit and in truth," but with the whole outward man, who have been taught to give Him the homage of all our senses, and to make even of material things so many helps to devotion, there are other strong inducements. There is for us an ineffable sweetness in hearing and repeating intelligently not only the interpreted words, but the very identical articulate sounds which were hallowed long ago by the lips of our Blessed Redeemer. We recite daily the *Magnificat*, the canticle in which the Blessed Virgin sings of the "great things" that God, the All-powerful, had wrought in her; and her words, even through the medium of Latin or English, stir our inmost hearts. But how much warmer and more lively the emotion of the soul, how much sweeter the *mel in ore*, and *melos in auribus* (to use the expressions of St. Bernard¹), could we read, or recite, or hear those inspired words, not only according to their sense, but in the selfsame sounds that fell upon the ears of the enraptured Elizabeth when the blessed lips of the Bride of Light² gave utterance to that glorious outburst of deep humility and triumphant thanksgiving! But it is not our purpose to dwell on, what no one will venture to deny, the importance and excellence of the study of Syriac, viewed in its relations either to Scripture exegesis and kindred branches of sacred science, or to the mere quickening of Christian devotion. Nor do we wish to enlarge, as might be done, on the gain to dogmatic theology and Church history resulting from the many valuable documents which it has brought, and is daily bringing, to light from hidden or long-neglected archives. Catholic teaching and tradition have only been strengthened, as must necessarily always be the case, by these discoveries; and our knowledge of the condition and vicissitudes of the Church during many centuries in Mesopotamia, Syria, and Arabia, has been in many ways corrected and wonderfully increased. And what a vast and most interesting field of research and discovery in Biblical and profane archæology is opened to the Syriac scholar, if it shall be definitely ascertained

¹ "Honey in the mouth, and melody to the ear."

² Calath Nuhro, a favorite name for the Blessed Virgin in the Liturgy of the Church of Antioch. She is styled there, also, the Mother of Light (*Emeh d nuhro*), Mother of Glorious Light (*Emeh d nuhro gajo*), and Mother of Light Everlasting (*Emeh d nuhro mtumoio*). See *Off. Fer. Syrorum. Romæ*, 1853, pp. 434, 445, 463, 474, 492.

vowels, save where they are absolutely required for pronunciation, or for the purpose of modifying the root, and producing a new meaning. In view of this comparison between the difficulties of either language, might it not be wise policy, in all seminaries or learned institutions where both are taught, to begin with the study of Syriac, and after this is sufficiently mastered, to pass on to Hebrew? The garden of Semitic language and literature, though naturally somewhat difficult of access to the Western wayfarer, is nevertheless attractive and tempting to the Christian scholar, and has in it many pleasant and flowery paths where one may ramble with delight once he is fairly inside. But why should the approach to it be made horrid and repulsive, and its very entrance choked with the thorns and briers of Hebrew vowel-points?

Taking it then for granted that there are some amongst our students and clergy, especially amongst professors in seminaries, who have either begun or are willing to begin the study of the Syriac language, or who having acquired it themselves are not unwilling to share their knowledge with others, the question naturally arises about the best means of prosecuting such study; in other words, what are the most suitable text-books that one may either take up for himself or give with his own comment and explanation (as a teacher should always do) to his disciples? We therefore think it not amiss to say a few words which possibly may be of some trifling use to them in their undertaking, or help in some way to determine their choice. While we give our opinion and speak our convictions frankly and conscientiously, we do not pretend (to use the words of Cicero¹) that what we say is to be held as coming from the tripod of Pythian Apollo. We are only *homunculus unus e multis*, one of the crowd bringing his mite to contribute to the common benefit. And for this purpose we shall begin with the grammar which is the corner-stone of all language, and discuss in the first place those which are within ordinary reach of the American student.

I. Palfrey, in his grammar, has compressed into twenty-four pages the elements of two languages, the Biblical Chaldee and the Syriac. And this he has done well and accurately enough, considering the small space into which he has gathered all that is absolutely necessary for the beginner in Syriac grammar. It is, we believe, a peculiarity of this author that he calls the sixteenth letter of the alphabet (the Ain of the Hebrews) by the name of Gnain. Is this correct? For the sake of avoiding obscurity or equivocation, it is

¹ Ea quæ vis, ut potero, explicabo; nec tamen quasi Pythius Apollo, certa ut sint et fixa quæ dixerò, sed ut homunculus unus e multis probabilia conjectura sequens. (Tuscul. Quæst., 1, 9).

certainly better than the name Ee or E, generally given it in grammars, but which in no way represents the force of the letter. Its sound is a peculiar one, belonging only to the Semitic languages, and of all their guttural sounds is the most baffling to the tongue or throat of a European. It is far more difficult than that of the *murdhanyas* or cerebral letters of the Sanscrit. Mr. Hutchinson¹ says, "Ain has always a feeble sound. . . . An Arabian would pronounce it as a sort of vowel sound, like *a*. It is a kind of soft breathing." Feeble and soft, indeed! If Mr. Hutchinson but heard this dreadful sound emitted from the throat of a Syrian or Arab, he would change these gentle epithets for harsher ones.

The Ain in the Semitic mother-tongue (of which the Arabic, perhaps, may stand for eldest daughter or next representative) must have had two sounds, one purely guttural, the other with an obscure sound of G superadded. The distinction between them is still preserved in Arabic by two distinct letters, named Ain and Gain. But in the other branches of the family, Hebrew, Chaldee, Syriac, etc., it seems to have been gradually lost, and at this day neither difference of character or pronunciation, nor diacritical point is left to enable us to know one from the other. Yet that this distinction was known to the learned Jews from tradition, even after Hebrew had become a dead language, is manifest from the different way in which the Seventy have transliterated them in proper names containing one or the other of these sounds. Thus mere Ain is generally omitted, as in Ammon, Amalec, Amri (Omri in Hebrew and the Anglican version), Amos, etc., while the Gain is replaced by G, as in Gaza, Gomorrha, etc. The Gain, however, as discovered by the transliteration of the old interpreters, or by comparison with the Arabic, is very rare in Hebrew and Syriac, compared with the other pure guttural. It seems, therefore, unfair that the solitary character yet remaining should have appropriated to it the name of Gain or Gnain. It is true that in some of the Rabbinical schools of Europe, Jewish children and other disciples are taught to give this guttural the sound of NG in the English words, *hang, ring, long*.² But this is not approved of by other Jewish teachers. Moreover, it is absurd, for nasal and guttural sounds are not one and the same thing. To call it Ain will serve every necessary purpose.

¹ In his Exercises and Chrestomathy appended to his translation of Uhlemann's Syriac Grammar, p. 258.

² Alting, in his Hebrew Grammar, or "Fundamenta Punctuationis Linguae Sanctae, Francofurti, 1730," calls this letter Ngai, and (p. 6) mentions approvingly the opinion of Peter Martini, who says that Ain is GN at the beginning of a syllable, and NG at its close. This is the best edition of Alting's Grammar, and has appended to it Otho's Syriac, Rabbinical, Samaritan, and Ethiopic grammars, all of the same date, 1730. Hoffmann, Uhlemann, and Wenig mention only the Syriac Grammar of 1701. Wenig has 1702, but we take it for a misprint.

Palfrey's Grammar is not adapted to every beginner, because he presupposes a knowledge of Hebrew which all may not possess, and which is by no means necessary for the study of Syriac. On the contrary, the natural order of going from what is easy, or rather from what is less difficult, to that which is more so, would be that the student of Hebrew should have acquired some knowledge of Syriac beforehand. Besides, the book, small as it is, is rendered somewhat difficult by having the rules for Chaldee and Syriac mixed up together. Not that there is any confusion, for the rules of each are distinct enough, but the Chaldee takes the pre-eminence, and the Syriac is made, as it were, subordinate to it. So that the beginner who wishes to learn Syriac only, will not find it an easy task to pick out and master what is the sole object of his study, without the aid of a teacher. But for one who already possesses Hebrew and Biblical Chaldee, the book is useful enough, and will prepare the student to avail himself with ease and profit of the more copious stores of Michaelis, Hoffmann, Uhlemann, and others.

The only serious inaccuracy in this book occurs where the author is treating of the regular verb. He says (p. 19) that "before a final guttural or Rish, A takes the place of U or E." As to the E, let it pass for the present. But his mention of U in this connection shows his meaning to be that in case the last radical should be a guttural or R, the Imperative and Future of the first active (Peal) must substitute A for U under their second radical. Uttered in this general way, the assertion is highly incorrect. And what is not a little strange, Uhlemann falls explicitly into the same mistake. He says, "not only the Imperative, but the Future of verbs med. E (*i. e.*, having E under the middle radical),¹ and of those having the third radical a guttural, take A."² And this he repeats after a few pages: "They (verbs with guttural or R for third radical) take in the Future and Imperative Peal A instead of U."³ Tychsel, in his *Elementale Syriacum*,⁴ makes even a worse mistake when he ex-

¹ This is false on account of its generality. For some with E under second radical take U. Ex. gr. *sged* to adore, *kreb* to approach, *shetk* to be silent, make in their future *nesgUd*, *nekrUb*, *neshtUk*.

² Syriac Grammar, translated by Hutchinson, second edition, p. 57.

³ Ibid., p. 63. Uhlemann has here added a parenthesis, which Mr. Hutchinson has neglected to translate. We give it from the second German edition, the same which Mr. H. follows in the second edition of his translation. "There is found, however, a future in U from *tbah* (*h* here stands for Ain) in the Harklean version of Luke vi., 30, and in the Act. Mart. cxvi., 4." These last numerals must be incorrect, for we have examined the Acta Martyrum of Assenmanni, the book referred to, at the place indicated, and can find there no future of *tbah*, or any other verb ending in a guttural. It is true, however, that *tbah* makes the future *netbuh*, when it means *obsignabit*, but it is *netbah* when the verb means *demergetur*. After all it would seem that Uhlemann incorrectly considers this verb an anomalous exception to the general rule.

⁴ Olai Tychsel, *Elementale Syriacum* Rostochii, 1793, p. 16. This little book is

tends this rule to verbs that have R or a guttural for the second radical. His modifying term "*plerumque*" lessens, but does not mend the error in the least. Phillips is neither correct nor consistent. On page 81 he lays down the rule with the same broad generality as Palfrey or Uhlemann; on page 85 he modifies it by adding "for the most part." Yet even this is not quite correct. Others, too, have made the same mistake. Christian Benedict Michaelis, in his "*Syriasmus*,"¹ states the point with accuracy, viz., "the verbs above mentioned have sometimes A, sometimes U." We need scarcely say that Martin lays down the rule briefly and correctly (p. 19). Even Ludovicus de Dieu,² two hundred and fifty years ago, gives this point of Syriac grammar with surprising accuracy for one so warped by his devotion to Hebrew philology. So does Hoffmann³ in his Grammar (§§ 56, 64), though in the former paragraph his language is ambiguous, and may have misled some who read him only superficially. But in the "*Adnotationes*" to § 56, and in the text of § 64, he lays down the true doctrine most clearly, and brings examples of some twenty verbs which take U in the Imperative and Future, though having R or a guttural for third radical. He might easily have added twenty more. And he might have added, too, the special case of a verb like *tbar*, to break, which has A in its Future (*netbar*), but U in its Imperative (*tbur*). We do not remember seeing this noticed in any grammar or lexicon,

even smaller than Palfrey's, but it has a good Chrestomathy, better than its Lexicon. It contains valuable extracts, some of them inedited, nearly all of them new and interesting, even to advanced scholars, while a few of them would puzzle the graybeards of Mossul and the Libanus.

¹ Reprinted at Rome, with a few judicious notes and additions, under the simple title of "*C. B. Michaelis Grammatica Syrica*, 1829." This is an unexceptionable text-book, and has been used in the schools of Rome for the last forty years and more. The edition is, we believe, now exhausted. Our reference is to pp. 25, 52, and 62 of this edition.

² *Grammatica Linguarum Orientalium, Heb., Chald., et Syr.*, Lugduni Batavorum (Elzevir), 1628, 4to. See Lib. iii., Chap. II, pp. 200, 203. This is a splendid work, and were it not for some slight tincture of Hebrew and Buxtorfian prejudices, would be one of the best. What constitutes his chief merit is, that he has fully recognized the worth of the Roman Maronite grammarians, and especially Amira, whom he carefully follows. Indeed, it may be truly said that the more closely a writer treads in the footsteps of Amira, the less danger is there of his falling into error or inaccuracy. The great orientalist, Erpenius, made a compendium of Amira, and it is to be regretted that he did not live long enough to publish it. It was probably the irksome task of transcription that prevented any one else from undertaking the task of posthumous publication. For Erpenius had set down all the strictly Syriac portion, paradigms, examples, etc., in the Hebrew character, with which the learned world was then more familiar than with the Syriac. Amira, who was an alumnus of the Maronite College in Rome, published his grammar in that city in 1596. He was afterwards made Bishop of Edessa, and finally Patriarch of the Maronite nation, and died in 1644. See his brief *Life* in Assemani, in *Biblioth. Orient.*, i., 552.

³ *Grammat. Syr.* Halæ, 1827, pp. 174, 176, 188.

and therefore confirm it by an example or two. In his fourth Parænesis or Exhortation to Penance, speaking of the devil's snares which have entrapped the soul, St. Ephrem says: "In Thy mercy break them (tbur enun), and like a bird I shall be set free."¹

All these errors, especially among older writers (whom moderns blindly repeat), have arisen from the prevalent notions of the intrinsic excellence of Hebrew, its priority, and the consequent influence it must be expected to exercise on the other Semitic tongues. But these notions are partly groundless, partly exaggerated. For the Hebrew does not hold the place of mother, but of sister, and indeed younger sister, to such languages as the Syriac and Arabic. It is then an idle assumption to pretend that the laws of Hebrew euphony must be applied to these two languages. Different peoples have different notions of euphony. The Greek cannot bear that M or N should be immediately followed by R; he must insert a B or a D respectively between them before his ear is satisfied. Hence the *ανδρος* for *αυρος* shortened from *ανερος*. Hence he turns the Hebrew vale of Mamre into Mambre, and the Aryan *amṛta* (the death-repelling food of Gods) into ambrosia.² An N before an S is intolerable to him, and Clement (Clemens) and Valens are not admitted to Greek citizenship until they have been debarbarized and made to answer to a new name, Klemes or Ouales (*Ἀλλημης Ουαλης*). But the Syrian or Hebrew does not share all these prejudices. He hears no cacophony in M before R, as the words he daily or most frequently used bear witness, emro, a lamb; hhamro, wine; temro, eyebrow; mimro, poem, and a hundred others.³ Yet the Syrian (perhaps the Hebrew too) finds N before S or R unpleasant to the ear, and when practicable, he expunges it before the one, allows it to melt into the latter. Thus Clement and Constantine are known to them only as Klimis (to the English ear Kleemees) and Kustantinos; and the Henry of the Crusades is registered in their chronicles as Herri.⁴ The immediate origin of

¹ St. Ephrem Opera, vol. iii., p. 388, l. 19, cf. Ibid., p. 398, l. 27. These two passages are also indicated by Bickell in his Glossary to St. Ephrem's Carmina Nisibena, first published by him at Leipsic, 1866, p. 69. Two other examples may be found in the prayers that accompany the little "Laudate" in Thursday's Tierce in the Maronite office, Rom. ed., 1830, p. 305 (edition of 1863, p. 350, l. 15), and again, in the hymn of St. James of Sarug, which ends the Tierce of Wednesday, p. 244 (edition of 1863, p. 278, l. 11). The latter hymn is used in the Breviary of the Church of Antioch, at the close of Monday's Tierce, Off. Fer. Syror. Romæ, 1853, p. 156.

² The change began with *θνητος* (mortal) which is nothing else than the Sanscrit part, *mṛtas* (MORTUUS of the Latins) dead, and with A *privativum* *amṛtas*, *αμβροτος* (for *αμοτος*) not dead, undying, immortal.

³ All participles, for example, of the second active, where the first radical is R, as Mraimo, exalted, and (as a name of God) the Most High.

⁴ The English and Italian betray their weakness in the same word, Harry, Harriet, Arrigo.

this special error about the last vowel of the Syriac future lies in the absurd notion of the old Hebrew-worshippers, that the theory of Patahh furtivum must extend to the Syriac. No vowel, unless it be of the A sound (long or short) can stand before a final guttural in Hebrew. But Syriac euphony is not so choice or exclusive. On the contrary, every vowel is welcome in such case but one, viz., E. Words like *shbihh*, glorious, *sohh*, extulit, movit se, *ruh*, spiritus, are almost innumerable in this language.

II. The next grammar that deserves some notice is that of Mr. Phillips. It may not be out of place to make a few observations on this book, of which some of those readers in whose interest we write may possess a copy, for we have seen copies of it in our book-stores. Mr. Phillips has done his work generally well. He has had the prudence or good fortune to choose for his guide Amira, or what amounts to the same, Isaac Sciadrensis, Amira's disciple.¹ Hence he is correct in his rules for letters, nouns, and verbs (with the exception noticed above), and in his Syntax; and without being too minute and prolix, gives the full amount of what a student ought to get out of a grammar. We will not quarrel with him for changing the name of the "emphatic" state of nouns to that of "definite;" though changes of received terminology in grammar ought not to be made without a weighty reason, but we think it injudicious to throw out the long used term "suffix" and substitute "affix" in its stead. It would be better to consider "affix" as a general term, including under it prefixes and suffixes, according as the added syllable is placed in the beginning or at the end of the word. It is thus used by Prof. Haldeman in his excellent work on affixes.² Whenever Mr. Phillips leaves his guide and falls back on his own resources, he is careless, loose and slipshod, and incorrect, above all in his translations, and gives rise to a doubt at times whether his mistakes proceed from a want of care or a want of knowledge. Let us see a few examples.

On page 13 he gives "Baja," he *was* consoled; it should be with active meaning, "he consoled." Page 126, the preposition Ssed (more correctly Sseid; he prints it by mistake Sscir) is translated *against*. It never has such meaning; it is identical with the Latin *pene* or *apud*. Page 127, he translates phelgut nechさい, "*division* of my goods" It should be "*half* of my goods;" and is taken (what Mr. P. seems never to have suspected) from Luc. xix., 8, where Zachæus, in compensation for possible fraud, promises to restore one-half of his goods. Page 184, Shbuk(u) robe(i)n, "*Allow both to*

¹ Grammatica Syriaca, Romæ, 1636.

² Affixes in their Origin and Application. By S. S. Haldeman, A.M. Philadelphia: 1855. This is a learned and valuable book, that has not been sufficiently appreciated.

is rendered "my house is *desolate*." Here case, gender, person, and the causative conjugation are all lost sight of. *Bait(i)* is not nominative and feminine, but accusative and masculine (as he himself had already stated in these very Exercises, p. 178), and *ahhrebt(i)* is not third person masculine, of the first voice, but of the third active, second person and feminine (as the *jud otiosum* plainly shows). The true rendering is this: "Thou (O woman!) hast made desolate (or hast ruined) my house." *Mpharsio* (p. 195) is explained "he extendeth or pointeth." He adds that it comes from *phras* (to extend). It is not from *phras*, but from the quadriliteral *pharsi*, to lay bare, disclose. The participle from the context has a future sense and must be Englished "He (God) will disclose." In his last extract (p. 202) from Bar-Hebræus (or his continuator) Mar Jabaloho (My Lord Adeodatus or Deusdedit they would have said in the Western Church) is called a "Kathuliko shbihho." This Mr. Phillips (misled perhaps by the Latin translation in Assemani B. Or., II., 266, who wrote only for intelligent readers) translates ridiculously enough "a laudable Catholic!" The old Jacobite, we fear, would have lowered his brow and shrugged his shoulders, had any one in his time paid him this unmeaning compliment. *Kathuliko* amongst the Eastern heretics is not the name of a creed, but of a Church dignitary, like Bishop, Maphriano, and Patriarch. Among the Eastern Christians, who are Catholics, *i. e.*, in communion with Rome, the grades of *Kathuliko* and *Maphriano* are as unknown as they are in the churches of the West. What the Syriac writer wished to say, was simply this: "Mar Jahaloho, the worthy Primate, gave orders for the honorable burial of Bar-Hebræus," etc.

Another ludicrous blunder occurs on p. 196, in a passage taken from the Fables or Facetiæ of Bar-Hebræus. It tells of a man whose house was broken into by thieves, who stole everything in it and left nothing but the *srigto*. And what was this? Mr. Phillips gravely tells us in the note that it means "the roof." To leave nothing but the roof, they must have, besides the contents of the house, carried off the walls and the floor. The Syriac fabulist never wrote, never gave a chance to infer from what he had written, any such absurdity. *Srigto* is not "the roof" but "a mat," the simple, portable bed¹ of the Easterns. The writer's mistake is explained possibly and probably enough, in this way. Phillips took this anecdote from the Chrestomathy of Kirsch, to which a Lexicon was added by Bernstein in the ed. of Leipsic 1836. He consulted Bernstein's Lexicon for *srigto*, and found these meanings: "Textum,

¹ The mat (*matta* in mediæval Latin) was anciently the name in monasteries for a bed, and is the origin of our "mattress."

intextum aliquid, storea, strages, *i. e.*, stragulum, etc." He took the first, and either with his eye or in his mind confounded it with *tectum* (roof). At the end of the same fable *blo agro* is translated "reward hath decayed." There is a verb *blo* or *bli*, to decay, but it is not found here. *Blo* is compounded of the preposition Beth, in or with, and *lo*, not; literally *with not*, that is without. It is the same as *Dlo*, but not so common. *Blo agro*, therefore means *without reward*. On page 198 the phrase *Trissai shubliho* is explained "those persons or things worthy of praise." It means simply "the Orthodox," as (with the arrogance peculiar to all heretics) the Eutychians style themselves. The Greek schismatics do the same; and if we were to seek a parallel case nearer home, we should readily find it in the sects whose proud name intimates that they alone profess the Gospel of Christ. *Trissai shubliho* means "right in opinion," and is the literal translation of the two words (*ορθος* and *δουξα*) of which *Orthodoxy* is composed. The Syrians have also naturalized the Greek term, and "those of the true faith" are called in their Missal and Office¹ *Orthodocse*, and with anomalous plural form *Orthodocsu* and *Arthodocsu*.

A remark or two on his notes on St. Ephrem and we have done with Mr. Phillips, about whom we had not anticipated saying so much. The last extract in his Grammar is a hymn of the great Doctor of the Syrian Church, taken (as Mr. Phillips might have stated, since he has given it a new heading) from the third volume (p. 129) of the Roman edition of St. Ephrem's Works. In the sixth stanza *lhoshon* is not "utility" but a participle, *availing*, *useful*, and in the plural feminine (used for the neuter) preceded by *lo*, is "un-availing, worthless things." In the same stanza *mahbarto* (*h* for *Ain*)² is rendered *instrument*. For this there is no warrant in the root *hbar* (with *Ain*) *transiit*. "Mahbarto" seems to be a road or passage for transportation by land or water. And this is not far from the meaning given by Castell, "transitus, pons," but unaccompanied by any example. Yet taking it literally as the immediate derivative of the participle of *Aphel* ("he or that which carries across, carrier"), it would be hard, in the absence of aught positive to the contrary, to deny the meaning given to it by Ambarachi³ in the Roman edition,

¹ See Maronite Office, Rome, 1830, p. 405 (ed. of 1863, p. 466, l. 5). Maronite Missal (printed in Rome about the middle of the seventeenth century), pp. 84, 95, 182, 200, 212.

² In the absence of Syriac type there is no means of letting the reader know when *Ain* occurs, as it has no representative in the European alphabet. Our only alternative has been to put *h* instead of it, and notify the reader each time that it stands for *Ain*. But this is tedious and unsatisfactory. Some writers represent it by a kind of inverted comma or sign of aspiration; but to introduce this into the middle of a word is awkward.

³ He is often called *Petrus Benedictus*, and during his lifetime was generally known as *Father Benedetti*. These are translations of his Syriac name *Mbarach*, which means "blessed."

though it be found in none of our printed dictionaries. He translates it *cymba*¹ (boat); and he is great authority. Perhaps it is yet more general in its signification, "any means of conveyance or transportation," and this would cover boat, bridge, etc.

To part on good terms with Mr. Phillips, we will say that his translation of the difficult word *Malhe* (*h* standing for *Ain*) in the third line of the first stanza, is just what the root and the context require. He renders it "blind, sordid, ignorant." We may drop the third meaning and stick to the first without condemning the second. Yet he has great names against him. Bernstein is for excluding the word altogether, and replacing it by the word *Kalohe* (with *Ain* for third consonant), funditores (slingers). But this change is unnecessary, unsuited to the context, and violates the metre. Hence it is justly rejected by Bickell in his Glossary,² sub. v. Bickell says that Ambarachi and Hahn translate it by *cæcus* (blind), and this he does not approve. Under the root made up of the three elements, M, L, and *Ain*, Castell gives but two words, *Malho*, albugo, and *Mloho*³ "lema, sordes in oculo." Now Bickell thinks that these meanings do not warrant the translation "*blind*" in the passage of St. Ephrem. He would rather give it the sense of "vilis, stultus, nequam," from two cognate Arabic words. It is, indeed, with great diffidence that the writer ventures to dissent from the opinion of this great Catholic scholar. But even apart from the authority of the Roman editors of St. Ephrem, and of Zingerle,⁴ there is no good reason why the meaning of *blind*, or something to the same effect, should not be inferred from the clue given in Castell's dictionary, and confirmed by Bar-Bahlul's MS. Lexicon. It cannot be denied that it is not uncommon in Syriac to designate the noun and its *immediate* adjective by the same word. Thus Caphno is *hungry* and *hunger*; Hheshuco is *dark* and *darkness*; Phshito *branching* (outstretched) and a *branch*; Marho⁵ (with *Ain*) *ill* and

¹ The closest rendering in Latin of Mahbarto would be "transportatrix," as the Syrians having no neuter use in its stead the feminine. No name could be more expressive of a boat, and in fact a certain class of boats goes by a name very like it (transports).

² See page 52 of Glossary in "S. Ephræmi Syri Carmina Nisibena additis Prolegomenis et Supplemento Lexicorum Syriacorum. Primus edidit, vertit, explicavit Doctor Gustavus Bickell, Lipsiæ, 1866." This is a large and important accession to St. Ephrem's Poems, and edited with the care and learning that such a work demands.

³ Castell gives this word without vowel-points, but Thomas Novariensis (from whom he quotes it), in his Thesaurus, Rome, 1636, page 39, points it with double Zkopho, *Mloho*. Bickell has *Meloho*, but this is, perhaps, an error of print.

⁴ "Gesänge gegen die Gruebler, aus dem heiligen Ephräm gewählt und metrisch aus dem Syrischen uebersetzt von P. Pius Zingerle, Innsbruck, 1834." He translates *Malhe* "die Blinden."

⁵ May not *Malho* be in some way connected with *Marho*? Or, to put it plainly, are they not variant forms of the same triliteral Semitic root? The interchangeableness of L and R runs through the Semitic as well as the Indo-European languages. Thus

illness. Then, since Malho is disease or *weakness of the eyes*, what is there to prevent the same word from meaning also *weak-eyed*? It suits the context well enough, for the Saint is inveighing against the *Bossuye* (or Searchers, as he most aptly calls heretics, the ever-seeking, never-finding inquirers after Truth, according to the Apostle, 2 Tim. iii., 7), who attempt with their feeble eyes to gaze on Uncreated Light, and scrutinize the mysteries of God, instead of accepting them with humble faith as the Christian should. The root MLH (3d rad. Ain), as we now find it in Syriac, has but one meaning, and that implies disease of the eye. This meaning, then, is the one that must be applied to the passage of St. Ephrem, unless the context absolutely forbid such application. In this case, and in this case only, can it become lawful to search out another meaning in the cognate languages. Does the context forbid our giving the word this meaning? It does not; on the contrary, explained in this way, the passage has an easy, natural meaning. Bickell is scarcely exact when he says that Ambarachi translates Malho by *cæcus*. The word or phrase used by the Syrian Jesuit is "qui oculis caligabant." Now, *caligare* in good Latin (and Ambarachi was ambitious in this respect) means to be short-sighted or dim-sighted, like *cæcutio*. And even had he used the word *cæcus*

in Hebrew we find *almanot* (palaces) and *armanot*; in Syriac, *arimalto* (widow) by the side of the Hebr. *almana*; and in both, the primitive biliteral portion of the root, aMAR, or eMAR (dixit) identifies itself with the root MAL (locutus est) of MALal and MAlel. That the same root should express, according to its variation in form (MARho or MALho), disease in general, or disease in a particular form, need not surprise any one who is in the least acquainted with the gradual growth, the fluctuation, the final establishment, or the falling off and decay of certain meanings in the words of every language. Terms of general signification come to lose their generality either by process of time, or by migration and dispersion among those who retain the language, and become specific; or what oftener happens, the generic and specific meanings divide the word between them, one retaining the original, the other seizing on the variant form, and sometimes peaceably interchanging their possessions. Thus, for example, the primitive Aryan roots signifying *wood* and *tree* (represented in Sanscrit by *daru* and *druma*), have come down through the later offshoots of Aryan stock with their generality much impaired and diminished. In the Teutonic family it has been preserved to some extent, as in the Gothic *triu* (arbor), and in our English *tree*. In Greek these roots show themselves under various forms, *δρῦς*, *δρῦμος*, *δῶρον*, and (with reduplication and nasal epenthesis) *δένδρον*. Of these, *δρῦς* (like its Celtic sister) and *δρῦμος* have dwindled down into *oak* and *oak-grove*; *δένδρον* retains its general notion of *tree*; *δῶρον* ranges from the highest possible generality down to the narrowest point, signifying "wood, tree, beam, ship-timber, ship, wooden spear, wooden javelin," and (widening back again) "spear and javelin of any kind." And it happens not unfrequently that in two languages born of the same mother a term which retains its general meaning in the one acquires a special meaning in the other. In the German and English, both sisters of Teutonic stock, for example, this has happened to the words *Hund* and *Dogge* (Hound and Dog). Each of these words is generic in one language and specific in the other. Their "dog" is not known to us outside of the chase; whilst our general term designates for them only the "bulldog."

(blind), it is well known that (like *blind* in English) it is not unfrequently taken in a limited sense.

We subjoin the first six stanzas which contain the words that have been the subject of remark. They will not displease the reader, though the translation is far from doing justice to the noble simplicity of the original. The metrical arrangement of the lines (five to the stanza) has been retained from Phillips's Grammar.

I.

The Standard¹ of Truth
That was set up in the Scriptures
Has been abandoned by the short-sighted men
Who have begun to hurl (their darts)
Against the Lord of the Watchers.²

II.

This is the Standard,³
That the Father is One
And Undivided;⁴
That the Son also is One
And Incomprehensible.⁵

¹ "*Nisho* may mean sign, scope, mark, standard" (*i. e.*, banner), etc. Hahn translates *vexillum*; Ambarachi *symbolum* and *meta*; Zingerle *ziel*, and insists that it can have no other meaning. The meaning "*meta*" may be favored by the third stanza, but "banner" suits well the second, where the Christian standard, or its device rather, is explained.

² Vigiles, as the Vulgate calls it in Daniel. The "Watchers, Watchers on high, Heavenly Watchers, Watchers of Light," are constantly used in the Syriac liturgy as synonyms for Angels. They stand on the watch-towers of Heaven, and keep an incessant lookout, not to guard the safety of God's throne, but to befriend and succor our poor humanity, and to discover the first symptoms of repentance in the sinner awakened by grace, that they may circulate the joyful tidings through the heavenly Jerusalem (Luc. xv., 10). The name in Syriac is the same as that found in the original (not Hebrew, but Chaldee) of Dan. iv., 10, 14, 20, where our Bible agrees with the text, but the Anglican (like the Syriac) begins the chapter with verse iv. Michaelis, in his notes to Castell's Syriac Lexicon (Göttingen ed., p. 649), asserts that Angels must have been distinguished from Watchers as far back as the time of St. Ephrem. This he gathers from an old life of the Saint (in Assemani's B. O., vol. i.), which says that "he was buried by the Angels and Watchers." But the inference is not just. "Angels and Watchers" is a cumulative form of expression, and is used frequently at this day in the Syrian Liturgy by those who hold that Watchers and Angels are only different names for one and the same thing. It means Angels in their twofold capacity of *Malache* and *Hire* (Messengers and Watchers). Michaelis further thinks that it was from Daniel's name of "Watchers" (the etymology of which he has been the first and only one to doubt) that the Church derived her doctrine of Angel Guardians. Quite an ancient and respectable origin, it would seem!

³ Most of the errors of that day turned on the Trinity and Incarnation.

⁴ The Syriac "*Dlo phulogo*" is literally "without division." F. Zingerle thinks it ought to be rendered "without doubt," and "*phulogo*" may have that meaning.

⁵ Lit. inscrutable.

III.

The Standard is clearly seen,
It is set up in the light;
And yet the fool shoots
His random¹ arrows
In the midst of darkness!

IV.

Let ceasing (of speech) be
The end² of the eloquent;
And let silence be
The end of the Searchers
Into things hidden.

V.

Let the mouth learn
How it should speak,
And then³ let it speak
Lest it have to repent
After it has spoken.

VI.

Let it first learn,
And then it may teach;
Lest it be likened
To a boat⁴ freighted
With worthless wares.

¹ *Blile*. Phillips has retained *Blaille*, a typographical error of the Rom. edition.

² Mr. Phillips says that *thhum* means *between*. We cannot accept this statement on his authority. It means "end, limit." The sense is clear enough; the end of all eloquence, of all pretended scientific investigation on the part of God's enemies, must necessarily be the silence of defeat. But whether the future of the text (*nehwe*) be used for the subjunctive as we have taken it, or merely future, we will not decide. Either makes good sense.

³ *Achen*. It is singular that this little word has not yet made its way into any Lexicon. We have consulted in vain those of Castell with the additions of Michaelis, of Bernstein, Roediger, Zingerle, Bickell, and Martin. It does not seem to occur anywhere in the Bible. Castelli (Göttingen ed., p. 35) has *Achen* and *Achno*, with *Olaph* between *Caph* and *Nun*. But this *Olaph* is a mistake of the print for *Achzen*, *Achzno*. In all the passages quoted by Castell (*Prov.* xxiii., 7; xxv., 14, 25; *Eccl.* xxvii., 19; and *Rom.* v., 18), *achzno* is found. *Achen* might be a prolonged form of *Aich* (with *jud* elided, just as *achzno* comes from *aich* and *zno*), but more probably is *chen* "deinde" with prosthetic *Olaph*. Another example of *achen* may be found on page 239 of a poetical treatise on Good Conduct (*Ctobo d'Shaphir Dubore*), written long ago by John, a Chaldee monk of Mossul, and printed at Rome, in 1868, in Chaldee characters. He says: "First work out in thy mind the hidden things (mysteries of religion), and *then* (*w'achen*) become a teacher." The sentiment is very like that of St. Ephrem.

⁴ F. Zingerle, in his translation, favors the idea of "a crossing" or "bridge." He says:

Dass er nicht sey
Wie ein Uebergang
Für Ungeziemendes.

them "set out and proceed prosperously" on the way. If they feel disinclined (which he fears will be the case with many), let them follow their bent, and settle down comfortably in their old state of sluggishness. Even so, the effort they have made will have done them no harm.

M. Martin's book is worthy of all praise, not only for the motives that inspired him to write, but also for the way in which he has accomplished his purpose. It is a model of brevity, only forty-seven pages being devoted to what is strictly grammar. The rest is made up of Preface, Chrestomathy, and Glossary. But in this short compass he has given everything that is really necessary. The author, however, does not look upon his work as perfect; all that he modestly claims for it is, that it will serve as a preparation or introduction to the larger works of Hoffmann, Uhlemann, or others who have written full, elaborate treatises of Syriac Grammar. It is unnecessary to say that M. Martin never dogmatizes, never states anything of which he is not certain. Hence his rules are precise and accurate; in them he has done his best to be concise, but there is no confusion, no looseness, no inaccuracy. The only inexactness that we have seen—and it is slight enough, regarding the form of expression rather than the substance—occurs on page 50, where, speaking of the verb *Slek*, he says that the first letter, Semcat, is treated like the Nun (in Pe-Nun verbs). This is a *lapsus linguae*, for it is not the first radical (Semcat), but the second radical (Lomad), that is dropped in the Future and Aphel of this verb; and it bears more resemblance to a verb of the "geminantia Ain" order than to one of the Pe-Nun class. Or it may be said to borrow its anomalous tense and third Active from the obsolete *Nsak* (ascendit), cognate with the Chaldee *Nesak* found in Daniel. Any one is welcome to hold this opinion, provided he do not make of it a dogma from which none may dissent (as Michaelis arbitrarily does in his notes to Castell's Lexicon, p. 599).

One of the things that has pleased us most in M. Martin's book, is the courage with which he has ventured to discard the old technical names of the conjugations derived from *phal* (with Ain for middle radical), and substitute in their stead names borrowed from the paradigm *ktal*. He has not done it everywhere so as to make it a fixed practical rule, but he does it occasionally (as on pp. 18, 20, 50, 59, 60), that the reader may become accustomed to it by degrees. Though the desirableness of this change must have occurred to many a student and teacher before now, yet so far none has seen fit to introduce it. If ever innovation in technical language was lawful and necessary, it is so in this case. And we hope to see the day when the Paels, Ethpaals, Aphels, etc., will be driven out, not only from Syriac, but from Hebrew grammar. They were

originally intended, and may still be useful, for Easterns who can pronounce, and recognize when pronounced, the middle Ain; but for the Western student they are more a hindrance than a help. Even the rarer conjugations would be more reasonably called Kaitel, Katli, Kartel, etc., for these exhibit to the eye or ear the second radical that is missing or unpronounced in Paiel, Pali, Parel, etc.

M. Martin's Chrestomathy is valuable, but too hard, we fear, for *Selbststudium*, as the Germans call it. Yet the Glossary, though aiming at the utmost brevity, is as full as could be desired. All the extracts given (with but one exception) are inedited pieces drawn from the National Library of Paris and the British Museum. Besides the difficulty of the language, to translate them properly so as to get at their complete meaning, presupposes too much knowledge of the East, its sects, their history, etc. But used under the guidance, and with the explanations of a professor, the Chrestomathy would be a most excellent book for a class. The first of the inedited extracts—though not of the Apostolic age, nor the production of Dionysius the Areopagite, whose name it bears—is confirmatory of the old traditions that have been cherished from time immemorial in the Roman Church, about the martyrdom of SS. Peter and Paul on the same day, their affectionate parting before being led to their different places of suffering, the choice of St. Peter to be crucified with his head downward, that with his dying breath "he might kiss the place of his Master's feet" (p. 64). To conclude, M. Martin's little work is good even for one who wishes to study by himself; but for one who has a competent teacher to assist him, it will be doubly valuable.

We have no space left to speak as fully as we desire of Uhlemann's Grammar and its miserable English translation. This must be reserved for another number, in which something also remains to be said on the present state of Syriac lexicography.

BOOK NOTICES.

BIBLIOTHECA SYMBOLICA ECCLESIAE UNIVERSALIS. The Creeds of Christendom, with a History and Critical Notes. By *Philip Schaff, D.D., LL.D.*, Professor of Biblical Literature in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. Three vols. large 8vo. Vol. I. The History of Creeds, pp. 941. Vol. II. Greek and Latin Creeds, pp. 557. Vol. III. Evangelical Protestant Creeds, pp. 880. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1877.

Nothing could be more instructive and useful in more than one way to the Christian student than a collection of all the creeds that are to be met with amongst the various bodies that profess Christianity. To contemplate this motley array of human, avowedly fallible expositions of Divine teaching, side by side, affirming, denying, sometimes retracting and amending their predecessors, sometimes couched in ambiguous language that may be interpreted as one pleases, contradicting each other in a thousand ways—all this is, indeed, a lamentable, but, withal, a profitable sight. There could be no better, no more luminous or terrible commentary on the words of Our Blessed Lord, preserved for us by the inspired wisdom of St. John, "Other sheep I have that are not of this fold: them also I must bring, and they shall hear My voice, and there shall be made One Fold and One Shepherd" (John x., 16). "Not for them only do I pray, but for them also who through their word shall believe in Me. THAT THEY ALL MAY BE ONE, as Thou, Father, in Me and I in Thee; THAT THEY ALSO MAY BE ONE in Us, as We also are One. And the glory which Thou hast given Me, I have given to them, THAT THEY MAY BE ONE as We also are One; I in them and thou in Me, that they may be made PERFECT IN ONE, and that the world may know that Thou hast sent Me" (John xvii., 20-23). Inconstancy, and vacillation in opinion, and change from one belief to another, are the necessary fruits of that weakness of the understanding and perversion of the will, wrought in our nature by Adam's deadly sin. And none knew it better than He whose handiwork we are, and who "knoweth our frame," and who came to undo the evil effects of the primeval sin and curse by His redemption. He, therefore, in the days of His flesh, when about to found His Church or congregation of believers, with earnest supplication besought His Heavenly Father that unity of faith might be her special and abiding portion, and might likewise be to the world a proof of His own divine mission, and of the divine character of the Church He was about to establish. Did His prayer fail of effect? Was that petition, the anxious nature of which may be gathered from its repetitions, uttered on the very eve of that death which He was to undergo out of obedience to His Father, thrust aside by that same Father as inexpedient or unworthy to be heard? Or will any one presume to say that His own Sacred Heart did not fully and most ardently desire that which He sought with His lips? God forbid! The Christian soul instinctively revolts at the bare mention of such blasphemous suppositions. We believe and know that "He was heard for His reverence." Unity of faith has ever been the undisturbed inheritance of His True Church, while inconstancy, uncertainty, and shifting creeds have been in every age the inevitable portion of those who pretend to teach in Christ's name, but are not His, for He knows them not; the self-appointed messengers who run, but have not been sent. And the other part of His prayer has also been heard, viz.: that unity of doctrine should be to mankind a standing proof of the di-

vine mission of Himself, and of that Church which was to perpetuate His work after His departure from this world. This unity it is that has proved a landmark of salvation to thousands who were tossed about by every wind of doctrine, at the mercy of every billow in the tempestuous sea of private judgment. Through God's mercy this unity of faith in the true Church caught their attention; they recognized her at once as the Church for which Christ had prayed, and they entered her communion that they might be one with Him. And as unity of belief proves the divinity of Christ's religion, so disunion and discord in belief are the sure mark, and, at the same time, the reproach, and scandal, and condemnation of the pretended Christianity that not only tolerates them, but insults heaven by vaunting them as proofs of Gospel liberty. The heathen is a far more enlightened judge of these things, and laughs to scorn the religion that is held out to him as divine by men who contradict each other in their teaching. Have we not heard English and American ministers writing home in a spirit of anger, rather than of due shame and sorrow, that their attempts to convert the heathen were completely nullified by the appearance on the same scene of missionaries sent by a rival sect? And have not some of them, with a cunning that smacks more of the world than of the Gospel, proposed as a remedy for this scandal that each denomination should have a missionary ground of its own, inaccessible to others, and thus rob the heathen of all chance of finding out that the religion offered him as coming from God is made up of a hundred discordant and contradictory creeds? We say nothing of the morality of this remedy, which proposes to the distant stranger a system of religion as divine, and lest he should reject it if thoroughly known, conceals from him a substantial part of it, hides the ulcerous spot which at home is vaunted as its distinctive feature. Oh that their eyes could be opened to see things honestly and truly as they are! Instead of hiding the truth they would sink into the ground for shame at the thought that an ignorant savage understands far better the meaning and spirit of the dying Saviour's prayer than those who call themselves enlightened Christians.

But it is not pagans only who are led by innate common sense to abhor the scandal of conflicting creeds among those who call themselves Christians. Even in the number of those who, in the sixteenth century, were foremost in rending the unity of the German Church, not a few retraced their steps when they saw the havoc made by the principles they had incautiously adopted, and came back to pillow their aching heads on the bosom of Catholic unity. And of those whom the cruel restraints of intellectual pride, sensuality, worldly position, and other circumstances, prevented from taking this step, we possess volumes of confidential utterances, divulged since their death, in which they express their feelings of shame, grief, horror, and even despair, in witnessing the religious strife that was raging all around them. What one of them (Sarcerius) says of himself, "The dissensions in the (Lutheran) Church are eating my heart and life away," was true of a thousand others. In fact, many of them died of grief and heartbreak, as their disciples and friends distinctly state; many others of what the doctors of that period called *melancholy*, but which, no doubt, was the same thing as broken heart; many lost their reason; others finally laid violent hands on themselves to escape the religious chaos they themselves had created. The number of those who, retaining their senses, died in despair may be guessed from occasional statements made by the Reformers and their friends, but will never be known till the last great day of final judgment. Of those victims of the so-called Reformation, whose fate is known from the records

of their contemporaries, the number is sufficiently great, and has been strangely overlooked by modern inquirers friendly or hostile to that religious movement. Of course we should scarcely expect that such facts would be paraded, or even honestly stated, by the professed panegyrists of the Reformation. But some might be expected to deal with it impartially as a matter of mere statistics.

The want of unity, which they themselves had rent asunder, forms the perpetual burden of confidential complaint between the leading Reformers and their friends. They are longing for death as a deliverance in almost every letter; they congratulate themselves and each other on the death of friends and relatives who have been snatched away from the wicked turmoil of religious strife. Many of them sigh for the last day, the end of the world, to anticipate their own death, and save them from the horrors of unbridled license in religious opinion and daily life. Even one of the heads of the new sectaries, the wily, doublefaced Melancthon, who, in public, put on a bold countenance against Popery, in his private letters, where he unbosoms himself to his friends, gives us the true state of his mind. These epistles, some of which were suppressed, others shamefully mutilated by Lutheran zeal in former editions, have now been published entire by the impartiality of the rationalist Bretschneider, in whose collection, styled *Corpus Reformatorum*, they occupy several volumes. They are a perpetual Jeremiad on the religious discords and dissensions brought on by the Reformation. He says that the waters of the Elbe could not furnish tears enough to bewail the divisions in faith of the new churches. And this is a favorite saying of his, for he repeats it in one shape or another a score of times in his correspondence. When the *History of Sleidan* first appeared, in 1555, to the great delight of all Protestant Germany, he sullenly refused to join in the chorus of universal approbation. He writes to a friend whom he could trust, that he "cannot praise the book because it tells of the scandalous changes of religion, and is only a dressing up of evil deeds in fine words. In it there are many things that ought to be buried in everlasting silence. If he could have his own way he would never allow the young generation to get a knowledge of those religious changes which only reveal to the world our madness and our misery."

But the juxtaposition of the various creeds of religious sectaries in contrast with those of the unchanging Church of Christ is not only useful for moral and religious instruction, but has also a great dogmatic and historic value. It enables the student to trace the rise and progress of those heresies that have made necessary new additions to the orthodox creed, and to discover the tortuous, winding ways of religious error that is ever dogmatizing, ever shifting, changing, correcting, and contradicting itself. The Catholic Creed of Nice, Ephesus, or Chalcedon, does not differ substantially from that of Trent; the latter would not have differed even in words from the former, had it not been for the new errorists that rose up to disturb the peace of the Catholic world by contradicting what had been devoutly believed for fifteen centuries. But heretical creeds are merely the representatives of private judgment, and must, therefore, necessarily change and keep changing, not only in form, but in substance. Thus the Augsburg Confession of 1530 was twice amended and substantially changed by the very men who first wrote it. The Creed of 1540 differs in essentials from that of 1530, and it would be a very pertinent question to ask how much of either is believed at this day in Germany.

These three volumes show an amount of patient toil, learned research, and general erudition, which are very creditable to Dr. Schaff. He

shows an acquaintance with many subjects which are, we fear, a *terra incognita* for most of our American divines of his own or other denominations. But while we pay due homage to the doctor's literary ability, we cannot praise the temper and spirit of that portion of the book which is strictly his own. Polemical discussion should not, and need not, be introduced into a work of this kind. It could, we feel sure, be compiled in such an impartial spirit that no one could complain of misrepresentation. A Catholic theologian could have done it with very little pains; a German divine, whose Protestantism has developed into Rationalism, one of the school of Bretschneider or De Wette, could (and we believe would) execute such task with faithful impartiality. But from the average Protestant divine, as we know him by experience, it would be scarcely fair to expect that he should forego the chances which such a book offers of dealing random blows against Popery. Dr. S. has, perhaps, an additional motive for dipping his pen in gall. They say that at some former period he was suspected of "Romish tendencies." Whether this charge was founded on knowledge of his opinions, or resulted merely, as is too often the case, from his having committed the unpardonable sin of treating Catholic doctrine with some show of honesty and impartiality, we have not learnt. But a suspicion of the kind, just or unjust, seems always to impose on its victim the necessity of protesting in season and out of season against Rome and her doctrines. The more virulent the tone of his protest, the better his hope of re-establishing his claim to orthodoxy. This is the way in which we account for, and excuse, the bitter language with which Dr. Schaff assails the Catholic Church, her pontiffs, doctrines, discipline, in fact her whole history. It is a sad thing that a man of his culture and learning should be thus compelled to vindicate his Protestantism at the expense of his better knowledge, and of the convictions derived from years of careful study. But whilst we pity the cruel necessity that compels him to inveigh against Rome, we think, and respectfully suggest to the reverend author, that such invective should be confined within the legitimate bounds of rhetoric. It should not stray beyond these limits. It should not lead him to pervert facts, or color assertions with a view to mislead his readers. Why should he tell us (vol. i., p. 174) that St. Irenæus "sharply re-proved" Pope Victor I., when he probably had before him on his desk a copy of the historian, to whom we are indebted for all that we know on this point, and who distinctly says that the saint "in a becoming way admonished" Pope Victor (*decenter monuit*)? Or why, to have a fling at the "Filioque," should he remark (vol. ii., p. 58) that Assemani was "a convert to Romanism?" He might with equal truth say of Cardinals Antonelli, Bezzarri, and Riario, of our day, or of the whole Italian people of the thirteenth century, that they were converts to Romanism. Again (vol. i., p. 269), to lessen the authority of a wrong-headed Reformer, Flacius Illyricus, it is slyly remarked that he was a convert from Romanism. The drift of the remark is plain enough, but where is its point, or even its common sense? Were not Luther, Melancthon, Bucer, Brentius, Zwingli, Calvin, and all the rest of them "converts from Romanism?" There are a good many other loose and unfounded assertions of Dr. Schaff which we have not room to notice, but shall probably do so in a future number.

Before closing, we would say a word about the translations used by the author. We have not been able to read them over and compare them with the originals. But the names of Waterworth and Manning are sufficient guarantee for the faithful translation of the Tridentine and Vatican decrees. A single glance at Krauth's translation of the Augsburg Con-

fession, which Dr. Schaff has placed by the side of the Latin original, has led us to suspect that the entire version may not be what it ought to be, a faithful reproduction of the original. If there be anything in which accuracy is indispensable, it is in translating a confession or formula of faith. Now we invite the reader's attention to the following passage of the Confession (vol. i., p. 6).

"In eventum ergo talem, quod in causa religionis dissensiones inter nos et partes amice et in charitate non fuerint compositæ, tunc coram V. C. M. hic in omni obedientia nos offerimus ex superabundanti comparituros et causam dicturos in tali generali, libero et Christiano Concilio de quo congregando . . . conclusum est."

"In the event, therefore, that the dissensions in the matter of religion between us and those of the other side shall not have been amicably and charitably settled, we hereby, in all obedience, though not thereunto bound, do pledge ourselves in your Majesty's presence, that we shall be forthcoming, and maintain our cause in said general, free, Christian Council, which it has been decided to summon," etc.

Now hear Dr. Krauth's version, in which he mixes up times and tenses, past, present, and future, and shows plainly that he does not understand what the writer, or Princes subscribing, intended to say. We italicize the words in which he has missed the sense of the original.

"As the event, therefore, *has been*, that in this matter of religion the differences between us and the other party *have not been settled* in friendship and love, we here present ourselves before your Imperial Majesty in all obedience, and in more than mere obedience, ready to COMPARE VIEWS and to defend our cause," etc.

And this, we are told, is English modelled after the style of the seventeenth century. Who in that age ever heard of the quiet modern phrase "to compare views?" Or in what Latin Dictionary did Dr. Krauth ever find that *comparituros* means "to compare views?" This is a mistake for which a schoolboy would receive a good reprimand, or something worse, in the good old days when the *ferula* was something more than a figure of speech. *Comparituros* is not exactly the word that a Bembo or a Sadolet would have used, but it is substantial German-Prot-estant Latin from *compareo*, to *appear*, and not from *comparo*, to *compare*, as Dr. Krauth imagines. The event the Princes contemplated was in their minds a possibility; Dr. K. makes it out a fact. They did not then and there *present themselves* to maintain, etc., as Dr. K. would have us believe; they only *pledged themselves* to *appear afterwards*, should it be necessary. Dr. Krauth is a dignitary in Church and State, and has high-sounding titles appended to his name. All we can learn from them is this: A man may be a Doctor and Professor of Theology in a Northern State, and a Provost in one of its universities, and yet be unable to translate a few plain sentences of easy Latin!

MESMERISM, SPIRITUALISM, ETC., HISTORICALLY AND SCIENTIFICALLY CONSIDERED.
Being Two Lectures delivered at the London Institution, with Preface and Appendix.
By William C. Carpenter, C.B., M.D., LL.D., F.R.S., etc. New York: D. Appleton & Company. 1877.

The two lectures which make up the larger part of this book were prepared and delivered, as we learn from its preface, at the invitation of the Directors of the "London Institution." Mr. Carpenter says, too, that he acceded to their invitation "with the understanding" that he "should treat the subjects proposed purely in their scientific and historical aspects, my purpose being to show first the relation of what

seems to me essentially an epidemic delusion, to epidemics more or less similar, which have at different periods taken a strong, though transient, hold on the popular imagination; and secondly to point out how completely the evidence adduced by the upholders of the system fails to afford a scientific proof of the existence of any new Power or Agency capable of antagonizing the action of the known Forces of Nature." Mr. Carpenter's lectures, it appears, were satisfactory to a large portion of those to whom they were addressed. For he says that they are now published "in consequence of many representations" that they "might be advantageously brought under the notice of a wider circle than that of their original auditors." Yet it is evident that they were not satisfactory to all his auditors, inasmuch as he says, rather complainingly, in his preface, that "Mr. A. R. Wallace, speaking from the Chair of the Anthropological Section, addressed me in the following words: 'You expect us to believe what *you* say, but you will not believe what *we* say;,' and the same distinguished naturalist has since publicly accused me of 'habitually giving only one side of the question, and completely ignoring all facts which tell against my theory.'" In reply to this, Mr. Carpenter says: "I have no other 'theory' to support than that of the constancy of the well-ascertained Laws of Nature; and my contention is, that where apparent departures from them take place through human instrumentality, we are justified in assuming in the first instance either *fraudulent* deception, or *unintentional* self-deception, or both combined, until the absence of either shall have been proved by every conceivable test that the sagacity of skeptical experts can devise."

Subject to a qualification or proviso similar in general intention to that contained in the last clause of the passage quoted, though somewhat modified and differently expressed, there is nothing in the proposition for which Mr. Carpenter contends, to which reasonable objection can be made. It is questionable, however, whether, as the proviso stands, it would be accepted as reasonable by any person who stood outside of the school of scientists to which Mr. Carpenter evidently belongs. There are no limits to skepticism, as there are none to credulity, in regard to matters either of religion, or of material science. Skepticism as little befits an impartial searcher for truth, and as little qualifies him to certainly find it, as does incredulity. As his proviso now stands, it looks too much like an effort on Mr. Carpenter's part to "beg the question," and assert the non-existence of any other natural powers or agencies than those now known, simply because scientists have not discovered any others, and, still more, an effort to "rule out of court" the question whether in any instance spiritual or preternatural agencies may not have something to do with these "apparent departures from the constancy of the well-ascertained laws of nature." It strikes us as a fair illustration of how dogmatic some of our "skeptical experts" can be, even while decrying and denouncing dogmatism. It would have been more in accordance, we think, with logic and the reason of things, if Mr. Carpenter had phrased his proviso in some such form as: "Until the absence both of *fraudulent* deception and of *unintentional self-deception* has been proved by the severest tests which impartial, experienced, and sagacious persons can devise."

Turning now to the body of the work, we find that Mr. Carpenter abandons in his lectures his seeming purpose of contending that *all* phenomena, however strange, that involve, or seem to involve, a departure from the constancy of the well-ascertained laws of nature, must be pronounced to be the results of either "*fraudulent* deceptions, or of *unintentional self-deceptions*," unless they fulfil the conditions of his pro-

viso. His native good sense saves him from entering directly upon any such unreasonable and impossible undertaking. With the exception of a few pages at the commencement of the book, of which we shall speak hereafter, and some matter in the appendices, Mr. Carpenter confines himself in the main body of his work to an exposure of the means by which so-called Mesmerizers, Spiritualists, etc., etc., commonly trick and delude those who are foolish and wicked enough to visit their exhibitions or séances. He passes under review "Mesmerism," "Odyllism," "Electro-Biology," "Mesmeric Clairvoyance," "Spirit-rapping," "Table-turning," etc., etc. He shows very conclusively that in the instances which he cites, the occurring acts or phenomena, supposed to be supernatural or spiritual by most of those who witnessed them, were explainable as the action of natural agencies, or else were imaginary, existing only in the minds of persons who had been deceived either by others or by themselves, or by both. He gives a history of repeated detection of frauds and tricks practiced by "mesmerists" and "spiritualists," of extraordinary instances of self-deception, and of the power of imagination, of excited conditions of the mind, and of exceptional physiological conditions of the body in producing effects commonly supposed to be impossible of production by human or natural agencies. If the author had confined himself to this, he would have produced a book that would have been useful in helping to disabuse the public mind of certain erroneous physiological notions, and strengthening the distrust and ill repute which justly attaches to "Spiritualists," *et id omne genus*. In this connection, however, we may say that we are strongly of the opinion that the position which persons generally occupy in relation to "spiritism," etc., depends much more upon their moral and religious character than upon their knowledge or ignorance of the extent to which fraud, deception, and all kinds of charlatanism enter into these mesmeric and spiritualistic exhibitions. Persons who have a proper moral sense will keep away from them, whether they know, or not, of the numerous instances of falsehood and deception that have been proved against them. On the other hand, persons not under the influence of this moral sense will attend those exhibitions, no matter how frequent and complete be the exposures of the fraud and dishonesty that enter into them.

But Mr. Carpenter does not confine himself to the work of exposure referred to, and to the conclusions legitimately deducible from the instances he cites. He goes beyond them, and in doing it violates logic, and lays himself open, too, to the charge of intentional indirection and dishonesty. In the first place, from the particular instances he mentions, he insists that it may be legitimately inferred that *all* apparent departures from the known laws of nature are only fictitious appearances, the results either of fraud and deception, or of "excitation" of mind. In other words he deduces from a certain number of particulars a universal conclusion. In the second place he passes entirely beyond the purpose stated in his preface, and, by insinuation and indirection, endeavors to infuse into the minds of his readers his own disbelief of the existence of any other powers or agencies than those which belong to the natural world. Utterly forgetting or disregarding "the understanding" that he "should treat his subject purely in its historical and scientific aspects," and that "his contention was that where apparent departures" from "the constancy of well-ascertained laws of nature" took place "through *human* instrumentality, we are justified in assuming either fraudulent deception or unintentional self-deception, or both combined," until the absence of both shall have been clearly demonstrated—forgetting and

disregarding these declared purposes, Mr. Carpenter, almost at the outset of his first lecture, sneeringly refers to "a Christian Father" who "goes on to tell how when Simon Magus was borne aloft through the air in a winged chariot, in the sight of the Emperor, the united prayers of the Apostles Peter and Paul, prevailing over the demoniacal agencies that sustained him, brought him precipitately to the ground." Mr. Carpenter adduces this account as parallel to, and of the same character with, an account of a "Mr. Horne sailing in the air," and a statement of eleven nameless persons declaring that "Mrs. Guffy was conveyed through the air in a trance by invisible agency from Highburyport to Lambs Conduit Street," and then says: "Of course if you accept the testimony of these witnesses to the aerial flights of Mr. Horne and Mrs. Guffy, you can have no reason whatever for refusing credit to the historic evidence of the demoniacal elevation of Simon Magus, and the victory obtained over his demons by the two Apostles."

Mr. Carpenter then goes on to gather together under one head, as belonging all to the same class and character, demoniacal possessions, no matter how strongly attested, the "ecstatic revelations of Catholic and Protestant visionaries," "the flagellant and dancing manias of the Middle Ages," etc., etc., which "have since been almost paralleled at Methodist 'revivals' and camp meetings." All these alike, he thinks, "if time permitted," it "would be my (his) endeavor to show were merely particular instances in "a long succession of epidemic delusions, the form of which has changed from time to time, whilst their essential nature has remained the same throughout, and that the condition that underlies them all is *the subjection of the mind to a dominant idea*." The convenient excuse of want of time comes in fortunately for Mr. Carpenter, to save him from adducing any proof of his assertions, but it does not deter him from repeating those assertions from time to time, in the form of indirect affirmation or insinuation. After a few other remarks he returns again to the subject, and asserts (again without attempt at demonstration or proof) that the general belief of men in preternatural and supernatural agencies "may be plainly traced (I think) to the emotional longing for some assurance of the continued existence of departed friends, and hence of our own future existence, which *the intellectual loosening of time-honored beliefs in the immortality of the soul has brought into doubt*."¹ Scattered through the work are numerous similar sneers and insinuations against the belief of Christians in spiritual and supernatural agencies, and in the appendices are like references to miracles, included by Mr. Carpenter in the same class with mesmeric and spiritualistic phenomena.

It is not our intention to follow Mr. Carpenter through his lectures in detail. What we have said and quoted from him shows sufficiently the character of his work. He starts with the implied assumption that no powers or agencies exist other than those which belong to the material world. Consistent with the spirit of skepticism which rules him, he sneers at all evidence to the contrary. Assertion on his side of the question is equivalent with him to proof, while evidence on the other side goes for nothing. Of course, argument with such an opponent is time spent to no purpose. He passes by as utterly unworthy of consideration the evidence of Catholic history to the reality both of miracles and of demoniacal possessions, the recorded testimonies of priests, bishops, theologians, and saints, whose integrity, acuteness of mind, and learning cannot be called into question, and whose names are revered,

¹ The parenthesis in the quotation is Mr. Carpenter's, the italicizing is our own.

and will ever be revered, by all who hold in honor truth, honesty, and intellectual pre-eminence; he sneeringly alludes "to the solemnly attested proofs recorded in the proceedings of our law courts within the last two hundred years, . . . to the belief in witchcraft, then accepted not only by the ignorant vulgar, but by some of the wisest men of the time, such as Lord Bacon and Sir Matthew Hale, Bishop Jewel and Richard Baxter, Sir Thomas Browne and Addison," and summarily and contemptuously "rules out of court" their testimonies, also, as unworthy of regard. Yet he professes, at the outset of his lecture, that he will treat the subject "*historically* and *scientifically*." If an utter disregard of the plainest rules of logic be scientific, Mr. Carpenter may justly claim that his method may be thus characterized. As for his method being "historical," the only ground on which he can claim this character for it, is that he utterly ignores historical evidence. Sages, philosophers, men learned in material science as well as theology, were all fools, as regards the subject under discussion, previous to the latter portion of the seventeenth century, and all the accounts of miracles and demoniacal possessions, during the mediæval times and previous ages, are referred to only in the way of sneering ridicule. As for miraculous, and demoniacal or spiritualistic manifestations nowadays, they are all alike, either frauds, or explainable by the hypothesis of unconscious mental "excitation," "hysteria," "coma," "subjective sensations," etc., etc.

If Mr. Carpenter had examined with the care and thoroughness which a truly scientific treatment requires, the facts connected with the belief of Catholics, that diabolical operations are not only possible, but do actually take place, and, under certain circumstances, are not unfrequent, he would have discovered that the Christian Fathers whom he contemptuously sneers at, while firmly believing in both the possibility and the actuality of diabolical manifestations were, at the same time, perfectly familiar with the fact that counterfeits of them were not unusual, due either to intentional fraud and deceit, to unintentional self-deception, to an excited mental condition, or to one or another of the many physiological causes which Mr. Carpenter mentions; just as there always have been, and are to-day, imaginary or counterfeit miracles, "lying wonders," of the existence of which the Church Fathers, and the Apostles before them, have always been aware, and against being deceived by which, and seduced into error, they have given frequent warning. Of these facts the Church is fully aware. She has rules and tests, methods and processes for determining between the supposititious or pretended, and the real, far more searching and exhaustive than any which Mr. Carpenter and his "Sadducee" scientists can apply. It is no part of the Catholic faith to give immediate and indiscriminate credence to the tricks of every charlatan who pretends to be a miracle-worker or to have the power of producing preternatural apparitions or operations. Of all this Mr. Carpenter seems to have no knowledge, and yet had he studied his subject with the industry and care necessary to treat it historically, he would not be unacquainted with it.

Mr. Carpenter's logic, as we have already intimated, is very defective. Because numerous counterfeits of diabolical operations have been proved, therefore, he argues, all are counterfeit. As well conclude that because numerous counterfeit coins are in circulation all are counterfeit. The very credence given to counterfeits depends on the antecedent and concurrent existence of the genuine coin. Mr. Carpenter seems never to have thought of this. His whole argument, moreover, assumes that there are no spiritual beings or powers, and consequently that the warnings in the Sacred Scriptures, and those of the Church against dealing

Following the Logic is an important chapter on the Division and Definition of Sciences. In this chapter the nature, scope, and design of philosophy and its subordinate sciences are discussed and clearly defined. Following this is an "Analytical Catechism," into which is condensed in the form of question and answer the substance of the previous chapter.

The second portion of the work, or Metaphysics, is necessarily, and in accordance with its subject, less elementary, though the author still has evidently kept in view the requirements of a class-book, and has, much more than is usually done in text-books, covered the ground of an entire course of Metaphysics. The same method which characterizes the Logic is adhered to by the author as far as the subject-matter permits in the Metaphysics. Recognizing the necessity in reasoning against skepticism or rationalism, of some common starting-point, he starts from the conceded fact of *the validity of reasoning*. The analytic method is then applied to oppose broad skepticism. The author's aim may be thus explained: No man is an idealist or skeptic in the beginning, for when he divests himself of his *realism*, it is by a process of *reasoning*. His skepticism is then positive, and *reasoning* a valid thing. This must be conceded by the most universal skeptic, else he could not part with his native realism, and adopt the opposite. The patent fact of reasoning, therefore, is taken, as we have already remarked, as the basis of the work, and is decomposed; and the whole course to the end is a progressive, broad analysis of *reasoning*. The reader will observe that this course begins only with the "Analytical Catechism;" the Logic which precedes this being elementary and preparatory.

The Metaphysics is divided into two principal parts, Psychology and Ideology. The progress of investigation and exhibition is conducted in this wise: The mental faculties are separately specified and examined, and thus the constitution of the entire mind is ascertained and established, after which the practical operation of the mental faculties and their interplay is explained, and their coördination as a system. The limitation of the human mind thus becomes definite and known, and is no longer a vague possession of ignorance. Thus understanding will always indicate to a thinker what are the productive paths of inquiry, and what are the paths that must of necessity lead to nothing.

The second part of the Psychology treats of the nature of the human soul, and the first feature in which it differs from the body, viz., simplicity, is brought out by a clear demonstration that all thought, either in complex idea, in judgment, or in reasoning, is unified in one perception. What is termed "synthetic unity of thought," that is, rigorous unification in its subject of thought compounded of elements, can only take place in an absolute simple.

The Ideology is a departure from the Ontological way of thinking common in our schools, and disabuses the mind of some errors by pointing out certain terms as *ideas* that are commonly thought to be *things*. We may have a very complex way of viewing a very simple object, and every different view is a different idea, not a different part of the object. The ideology treats as a specialty only a few of the most highly abstract ideas, such as are commonly treated ontologically. These are the "Categories," and are distinguished as ideas essential to the intellect, without which we could not do our thinking. They are demonstrated to have their origin in realities; and, being common to all men, there is in every mature mind the materials out of which to build a knowledge of God and the creation. For ignorance of these great truths there can never, therefore, be pleaded a want of knowlegeable material. This part of the

Ideology concludes with a brief exposition of Transcendental Philosophy and the key to its refutation is furnished.

The second part of the Ideology is an application of the ideas whose reality was demonstrated in the first part. Here the *real* relation of *cause and effect* is carried back through an indefinite series to a beginning, which is shown to be a *real* cause, that is, not itself an effect. This first cause, thus discovered as the absolute, is developed into the infinite. The author's treatment of this difficult subject, about which so much confusion of thought has gathered, is very happy. It is brief and simple, but exhaustive and conclusive.

After this follows a treatment of the religion of reason, without reference to the doctrines of any particular Christian denomination. The God reached by human reason is explained to be not a thing of sense or imagination, but a synthesis of pure abstractions. He is real and simple in himself, but complex to our apprehension, which can view Him only according to its own composite nature. The intelligible parts, so to speak, or attributes, are distinguished from the unintelligible, and are explained as being not truly parts of the object but complexities of the subject that contemplates with a complex mind. The attributes which we regard as belonging to God are creatures of our minds, ideas that are entirely inadequate and that must necessarily be so, since we can form them only from limited experiences and by limited powers. As far as they go, they express the truth as regards our understanding, but not as regards its object, who is simplicity itself, absolute and immutable.

Our proneness to pass intellectual judgments upon God, and the readiness of our wills to reproach Him for misconceived injustice, both of which are sources of skepticism, are explained as springing from a misconception, wherein our ideas of human moral virtues derived from knowledge of men are applied to Divinity whose nature is inconceivable and immutable. The mind, in this part of the work, is made to soar amongst high abstractions, some of which are negative, and the value of these negative ideas is explained. They are commonly termed negative attributes, such as eternity, immutability, etc., and are not real additions to the Divine substance. The value of the ideological treatment of these important subjects becomes here most clearly apparent.

It has been our aim to confine ourself simply to an exhibition of the general plan and method of the work, without criticizing or discussing it. We remark, however, that in the portion of the work last mentioned, the errors of Locke, Hume, Reid, and Kant respectively, are referred to, and briefly but clearly and happily refuted, while, at the same time, full justice is done in showing how, in some respects, they cleared the ground of other pre-existing errors, and prepared the way for sound and more correct ideas.

The last article or subject treated on is *The Cosmos*. The author commences with a definition of the universe that corresponds with the most advanced physical science, and the whole article is little else than an elaboration and illustration of the definition. After criticizing other definitions and showing their insufficiency, the author gives his own definition, viz.: that the universe is "*the complete totality of material existences SIMULTANEOUS AND SUCCESSIVE.*" The most radical Evolutionist could not frame a definition with larger liberality than this. The subject of Evolution is thus at once opened up, the treatment of which is carried on metaphysically, the author contending that metaphysics alone can properly handle the subject, that ideas can penetrate farther than sense or imagination into the arcana of matter, and that physical induc-

tions in this direction are but empty assumptions. The universe, in its elements, in its developments, in all its forms and orders of existence, is maintained to be a system according to design, not an aggregation according to chance. The introduction into this discussion of what constitutes *chance*, and what the evidence of a *subjective* order, appears to be novel in some respects, but is clear and convincing. It is very abstract, but that is due to the difficult nature of the subject itself.

The "Conclusion" embraces a general summary of the leading points made by the author, and the definitions made in the chapter entitled "Division and Definition of the Sciences" emerge again clearly to view on the final page, as developed and illustrated by the entire treatment of the subject-matter of the book.

Disciples of the various existing schools of thought, of course, will differ in opinion as to the correctness of some of the author's positions and conclusions, but will agree, we think, that the book is a valuable addition to our philosophic literature.

GOD THE TEACHER OF MANKIND. A Plain, Comprehensive Explanation of Christian Doctrine. By Michael Müller, C. S. S. R. Vols. I. and II. (in one volume). New York, Cincinnati, and St. Louis: Benziger Brothers, Printers to the Holy See. 1877.

This work is an expansion and explanation of Father Müller's "Intermediate Catechism, No. 3, for High Schools and Academies."

His design, and the method he has adopted in carrying out that design, may be gathered from the following remarks in the Preface: "Being desirous to contribute my mite to meet and withstand the mischievous activity of the emissaries of Satan, to rear the edifice of Christian knowledge on its own secure and solid basis—the true teaching of its divinely commissioned teachers—I have, to the best of my ability, arranged in order, expounded, I trust with clearness, and sustained by argument, the entire economy of religion, comprehending as it does the whole substance of doctrinal and practical religion. As, in imparting instruction of any sort, the method and manner of communicating it are of considerable importance, so, in conveying instruction to the people, the method and manner should be deemed of the greatest moment. As to the method, I have been guided by St. Augustine, who says in his treatise, 'Manner of Teaching the Ignorant,' 'The true method of teaching religion is to begin our account of religion from the creation of all things in a state of perfection, and develop the whole history of Christianity down to the existing period of the Church, and through the Church down to our own time;' in other words, to show how Almighty God, from the beginning of the world, has always been the teacher of mankind through those whom He first taught in person, and then commanded to teach others in His name and by His authority."

In carrying out this plan, Father Müller treats in Part I. of "The Enemies of the Church." The first enemy noticed is heathenism; the second, heresy. These are very briefly referred to. He then takes up and exposes the third enemy of the Church, under the title of "Freemasonry." In the chapter devoted to this subject he shows, at length, its real objects and designs, its lies, its ceremonies, its oaths, how the oaths are administered, the obligations and scope of its oaths. He takes up the addresses and formal declarations made to the public by leading Freemasons, analyzes them, exposes their concealments and falsifications, and exhibits the actual working and effects of the system upon society, government, and religion. He shows that Masonry is one of the wicked progeny of children to which Protestantism has given birth, that "it

origin of the universe, the mystery of life, the necessity of worship, miracles, spiritism, the corruption of primitive traditions, the economy of the Jewish religion, scientific objections to the book of Genesis, chronology, the antiquity of man, geology, prehistoric times, the Messiah, the Gospels, the early spread of Christianity: such are some of the main points through which, in the First Part alone, sweeps the course of argument. The Second Part—on the Church established by Christ—was easier to handle. Here was needed judicious selection of proofs long since grouped in their proper order, rather than originality of arrangement, and here, too, is visible a gift with which the author seems especially blessed. He knows how to be brief and where to stop.

The author wisely leaves the reader some brainwork to do. In cases where a windy composer would have blown an absurdity into bubbles right and left, exhibiting the emptiness of its rainbow lustre, F. Jouin says all in a pregnant sentence or paragraph, and surely it is the very triumph of a writer to make him who reads say: "He might have made more of this."

The style is simply transparent. Whether F. Jouin writes in Latin or in English, you are taken up not with the expression—it is even quite possible for you to forget what language he is speaking—but with the thought. Crude neologisms are carefully shunned, smart tricks and acrobatic feats of language still more so; just enough of archaic phraseology is sprinkled here and there to denote a man whose favorite authors are of the classic mould.

In these days of self-assertion and captious advertising, we should not dare to predict a large sale for any work, albeit excellent, unless we knew pretty exactly how many runners, and peddlers, and popular booksellers had been supplied at a liberal discount. And yet we do not believe that any conscientious teacher of higher catechism, or any one who has to deal with misinformed doubting souls, can afford to do without F. Jouin's book. He himself says nothing of the kind. Without apologizing himself, as some do, into a nonentity, he simply keeps in the shade. In fact, he takes good care to tell you in the preface that his work is by no means necessary for those who wish to make an act of faith. He intends it for young men in colleges; but we have no doubt it will be held in high favor in the better class of convents, though there are some things in it which few men, walking encyclopædias excepted, can develop in such a way as to do justice to the author's suggestions.

Had we not received the work so late it would have called for a more extended notice with appropriate quotations; as it is, we can only direct attention, among so many valuable hints and topics, to the masterly proof that "the principle of Causality is objectively real" (p. 17), to the chapter on Miracles (p. 56), to Chapter XI., on the Mosaic Cosmogony, and to the strictures on Gibbon's causes of the rise and establishment of Christianity (p. 196), where the line of reasoning is not at all the same as that which Dr. Newman has so ably drawn out in his *Grammar of Assent*. In the Second Part we would recommend the Figures of the Church and their explanation (pp. 227, 235), where a real wealth of texts is neatly distributed; the Unity of the Church (p. 246), Simultaneous Catholicity (p. 259), the Notes of the True Church (p. 275), the Inquisition (pp. 305, 309), the successor of St. Peter in the Primacy (p. 341), the paragraph on Bad Popes (p. 360), and, above all, the last chapter, of which Encroachments, the Deposing Power, Toleration and its limits, Catholic Liberalism and its fundamental error, are the most striking features.

A Table of Contents, with headings of chapters and sub-headings

of sections, and a copious Alphabetical Index, add not a little to the handiness and general usefulness of the work.

THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS IN THE PORTUGUESE DOMINIONS. By *Rev. Alfred Weld*, of the Society of Jesus. London: Burns & Oates. 1877.

Everything which throws light on the causes of the persecutions of the Society of Jesus has ever had in one country or another, and sometimes in all countries, to endure, is valuable. History is constantly quoted against that society, the fact that it has been and is the object of general hatred is employed as evidence that it deserves to be hated. Yet nothing can be more fallacious than such a method of reasoning. It has been the lot of the most faithful children of the Church, the most zealous and exact followers of Christ in all ages, to be calumniated, reviled, persecuted. The great Orders of St. Francis and St. Dominic were assailed by bitter enemies, the holy Apostles were held up to reproach as the vilest of men, and our divine Lord who showed the path to the highest Christian virtue, and exemplified it in Himself, led the way, too, in suffering reproach and enduring the extremity of agony that men could inflict, and has left us the warning that as men persecuted Him they would persecute His followers also.

Father Weld's work is an important contribution to existing materials for forming a correct and just judgment respecting the opposition to the Society of Jesus during the last century. It examines and lays bare the motives, events, and causes which brought about the expulsion of the members of the Society of Jesus from the Portuguese dominions. It shows clearly from official and other documents, some of which have only recently become accessible or brought to light, that the Jesuits were innocent of the charges made against them; he points out the steps and means by which Pombal rose to power and gathered into his hands all the reins of government, flattering and deluding the luxurious and weak king, Joseph I., with a show of obsequious respect for his person and wishes, but really ruling him and bending him to his every behest and purpose; he traces the growth in Pombal's heart of jealousy and hatred of the Society of Jesus, and shows that Pombal recognized in that society an opponent to his ambitious schemes, and one that must be removed and destroyed before they could be consummated; that his dreams of wealth to be drawn from South America demanded for their realization, as Pombal supposed, the destruction of the Reductions or Indian communities the Jesuits had formed in South America.

The history of the Reductions is succinctly but clearly sketched, the savage and degraded condition of the Indians originally, sunk in the lowest depths of heathenism and cannibalism, the complete transformation wrought by the Jesuit Fathers in their character, the laborious and self-denying lives of the missionaries, the hardships and dangers they encountered in their expeditions into unexplored regions in search of heathen savages whom they converted and brought from time to time to reside within the limits of the Reductions, the needless and useless compulsory migration of the Christian Indians from the Reductions, the injustice and cruelties practiced upon them by Portuguese and Spanish colonists of South America, and the officials of the Portuguese government, the unsuccessful search for gold, the unavailing efforts of the Jesuit Fathers to protect the Indians, the combination of Pombal with the Jansenists in calumniating the Jesuits, the false accusations brought against them, the plot to implicate the Jesuits in a conspiracy to assassinate the king of Portugal, the libellous pamphlet published against them,

their expulsion from Portugal and the Portuguese dominions beyond the sea, the trials and sufferings to which they were exposed, their patience and humility and heroic fortitude, their arrival at Civita Vecchia and their kind reception in Roman territory, the imprisonment of Father Malagrida, packing the inquisition, Father Malagrida's trial, the ridiculously false charges on which he was arraigned, his condemnation and execution, Pombal's prison system, the horrible cruelties suffered by the imprisoned Jesuits—all these are graphically described, and the truth of the statements made is shown and proved by incontestable evidence. Following the chapters treating these subjects is a concluding chapter, in which are described the death of the king, the opening of the prison doors and release of an immense number of long incarcerated persons of every rank and condition, the fall of Pombal, his trial and condemnation, the sentence of death recorded and remitted, his death.

The work is a triumphant defence of the Jesuits in Portugal and the Portuguese colonies, and all the more so from the calm, moderate, and impartial manner in which the investigation is conducted. Its value, and at the same time its power of conviction, is increased by numerous references to original and official documents, and the copious quotations made from them.

MISCELLANIES. By *Henry Edward*, Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1877.

This volume of the miscellaneous writings of Cardinal Manning well exhibits the fruitful and versatile character of his mind, as well as the variety and extent of his learning. It consists of twenty-four pages, embracing subjects as different as it is possible for them to be, yet all treated with that clearness, and directness, and force, which characterize Cardinal Manning's writings and discourses. The volume opens with "A Discourse"—entitled "Roma Æterna"—delivered "before the Academia of the Quiriti in Rome, on the 2165th Anniversary of the City, April 21st, 1863," and very appropriately closes with a paper, or rather treatise, upon "The Independence of the Holy See," composed and first published during the current year, to which are appended the Allocution of His Holiness, Pope Pius IX., on the persecution of the Holy See, and of the Church in Italy, delivered before the Sacred College of Cardinals, March 12th, 1877 (with an English translation), and the letter of Cardinal Simeoni, addressed to the Apostolic Nuncios, on the action of the Italian government with respect to that Allocution.

Between these papers, commencing and concluding the volume, are twenty-two others, consisting of articles contributed to the *Dublin Review*, lectures delivered before the Catholic Academia in England, discourses to Catholic Associations, lectures to Mechanics' Institutes on Progress, and on the Dignity and Rights of Labor, letters to the Right Hon. Edward Cardwell, M.P., on the Visit of Garibaldi, to Earl Grey on Ireland, to His Grace the Archbishop of Armagh, Primate of all Ireland, five articles refuting accusations of heresy made by Dr. Nicholson, of the "Church of England," on account of a sermon of the Archbishop upon the worship due the Sacred Heart of Jesus, and showing that objections to the devotion necessarily involve heresy as to the incarnation, articles, written by request for the *Daily Telegraph*, on "The Church of Rome," and papers on "Cæsarism and Ultramontanism," "Ultramontanism and Christianity," "Christianity and Antichristianism," "The Pope and Magna Charta," "Philosophy without Assumptions." Among the papers we have not mentioned is a very interesting and

learned one, "The Demon of Socrates," read before the "Royal Institution," January 26th, 1872; another, in which the different theories that have been held, or are now in vogue, on the relation of Church and State, are discussed; another, in which the relation of the Church to science and politics is exhibited; and three papers, each very beautiful, on Father Faber, Cardinal Wiseman, and Frederick Ozanam.

To attempt to speak of any of these papers in detail, or to indulge in quotations from them, would extend this notice far beyond the space it is designed to occupy. But we cannot refrain from remarking that the introductory paragraphs of the letter to His Grace, the Archbishop of Armagh, form as perfect a specimen of graceful epistolary composition as we remember ever to have met with, while the body of the letter, as well as that to Earl Grey, show fulness of knowledge as regards the religious, social, and economical condition of Ireland, joined with a warm and deep interest in her progress and improvement.

Cardinal Manning touches nothing that he does not elucidate. There is a directness, as well as clearness and strength, in his writings that make even profound and difficult subjects, when treated by him, comprehensible by thoughtful persons of ordinary education.

NEW LANDS WITHIN THE ARCTIC CIRCLE. A Narrative of the Discoveries of the Austrian Ship "Tegetthoff" in the years 1872-1874. By *Julius Payer*, one of the Commanders of the Expedition. With Maps and numerous Illustrations from drawings by the author. Translated from the German with the author's permission. New York: D. Appleton & Company. 1877.

Public interest in Arctic explorations has not by any means passed away since the return of the *Alert*, and *Discovery*, and the report of their commanders, "Impossible to reach the North Pole." Even accepting this, which many, however, are not at all prepared to do as a settled fact, the importance of Arctic exploring expeditions is not destroyed, scarcely diminished. It is one thing to reach the North Pole, quite another and different to explore the regions in its vicinity. And by their exploration many questions, not only interesting, but important, in their relations to geography, hydrography, magnetism, and climatology, and kindred sciences remain to be settled, upon which careful observations in the Arctic regions will throw much light.

The Austro-Hungarian expeditions, of which the work before us is a narrative, aimed rather at furthering the last-mentioned objects, than at making a sudden dash for the Pole. After thorough discussion of the routes and results attained by previous explorations, and the difficulties they encountered, it was thought that the seas between Spitzbergen and Novaya Zembla presented the fairest prospect of attaining valuable results. Many considerations favored this conclusion; besides, the remarkable fact that those seas were almost unknown to science, was of great weight with those to whom the duty of maturing the route and plan of the expedition was committed. It was determined, however, to send out first a pioneer expedition in a small sailing vessel called the *Isbjörn*. On its return it brought back a favorable report, and on the 13th day of June, 1872, the main expedition left Bremerhaven in the *Tegetthoff*, a small steamer, with twenty-four men, officers and crew, on their adventurous voyage, all solemnly "renouncing, by a formal deed," "every claim to an expedition for our rescue in case we should be unable to return."

Their "ideal aim was the northeast passage," their "immediate and definite object was the exploration of the seas and lands on the northeast coast of Novaya Zembla." The work before us tells the story of

subject, and the hostile, and, in some instances, penal, legislation enacted against them. He shows the feebleness of the Church in this country at first, as regards numbers and material resources, and its slowness of growth, and then exhibits in contrast its present condition, closing with some pertinent remarks upon the future prospects of the Church and her relation to the prosperity of the people of the United States.

In three well-considered papers the "Influence of Catholicity and Protestantism on National Prosperity" are discussed under the several heads of Wealth, Education, and Morality. "The Persecution of the Church in the German Empire" forms the subject of another paper, replete with important facts which clearly exhibit the real animus and insidious designs of the imperial government of Germany against the Church. Three other articles entitled "Prussia and the Church" trace the progress of Catholicity in Prussia from its first introduction into that country, its relations to the State at different times, and its present position and prospects. Incidental to the main purpose of these last-mentioned papers, but closely connected with it, are a number of interesting and valuable references to the condition of Protestantism, and its action at different periods in the history of Prussia. A trenchant *exposé* of "German Journalism" follows these papers, after which, and concluding the volume, we have a well-written paper, abounding in beautiful thoughts on Religion and Art.

Bishop Spalding is widely known as a graceful and thoughtful writer, and a perusal of this volume will show that his high reputation in this regard is not undeserved.

A LIFE OF PIUS IX. DOWN TO HIS EPISCOPAL JUBILEE OF 1877. By *Rev. Bernard O'Reilly*. Second edition. New York: P. F. Collier, Publisher. 1877.

This work, as we learn from the preface, has grown out of a desire long cherished by the author to trace the causes, and hold up to public view the machinations and conspiracies that have culminated in the recent sacrilegious spoliations and usurpations, and have "left the Holy Father nothing but the uncertain freedom of his prison in the Vatican."

The author tells us that from 1831 it has been his habit "to read everything that could throw light on the state of Italy, and enable him to trace out the causes of the chronic discontent and unrest" to which her peoples have been a prey. From this the general design of the work may be inferred. The main portion of it is occupied with a history of the Pontificate of Pius IX. from its commencement, in 1846, to the eighteenth centenary of the martyrdom of Saints Peter and Paul, in July, 1867. From 1867 down to the Episcopal Jubilee the author becomes more succinct in the treatment of his subject.

Father O'Reilly describes at considerable length, and in detail, the plots and conspiracies of the infidel revolutionists of Italy and surrounding countries, their intrigues with the rulers of different European nations, and the manner in which the mutual distrust and jealousies of those nations were made instrumental in furthering revolutionary schemes. Much light is thrown upon these subjects by copious quotations from official documents and from circulars, some public, others secret, sent forth by the leaders of the revolution.

The ecclesiastical acts of the Holy Father are also narrated, and the work is enriched with frequent quotations from Papal Allocutions and similar documents. It is written in flowing and attractive style; its descriptions of scenery and pen-portraits of distinguished personages add

to the interest of the narrative. As regards typographical execution, it is a fine specimen of beautiful workmanship.

A POPULAR LIFE OF OUR HOLY FATHER, POPE PIUS IX. Drawn from the most reliable authorities. By *Rev. Richard Brennan, A.M.*, Pastor of St. Rose's Church. New York, Cincinnati, and St. Louis: Benziger Brothers. 1877.

The author does not claim that his book is a history of the Pontificate of Pius IX. His aim is to make the Catholic public "familiar with the glories and trials, triumphs and humiliations," of our present Sovereign Pontiff, "to portray his life as it has been, and still is, thank God, adorned with the fairest virtues that have ever graced the soul of an occupant of St. Peter's chair." Father Brennan's book, therefore, is rather a biographical sketch than a history of Pius IX. In giving it this shape and character, the author has shown, in our opinion, excellent judgment, and produced a work calculated to do great good. While a clear understanding of the history of the life of our Sovereign Pontiff in his official relations up to the present time is important, yet there is another point of view from which it may be studied and exhibited with salutary and edifying effect. Father Brennan portrays with brevity, but admirable clearness, the private and public life of our great and glorious Pontiff from early childhood down, virtually, to the present time, its many and great vicissitudes, truthfully and graphically recounting "a story of exalted virtue, of meekness, firmness, humility, self-respect, patience, courage, faith in God, devotion to the Blessed Virgin, unbounded charity towards all men." The most important official acts of the holy Pontiff, also, are treated briefly, but in such way as to bring out their deep significance and importance.

LIGHT: A series of simple, entertaining, and inexpensive experiments in the Phenomena of Light, for the use of students of every age. By *Alfred M. Mayer and Charles Barnard*. New York: D. Appleton & Company. 1877.

This book is one of an excellent series of works entitled *Experimental Series for Beginners*, published by Messrs. Appleton & Co. Its design is stated in its comprehensive title, which we have copied in full. The experiments which it describes are interesting, and some of them beautiful, and well calculated to engage the attention of children and beginners in the study of nature, and not only to instruct them in the phenomena and laws of light to a certain extent, but also to excite an increased interest in the study.

The materials required for the experiments are of the cheapest and most common description, and may be found in almost any dwelling-house or bought for a small sum of money in any town or city. According to a statement in the preface, all the experiments may be performed at a cost not exceeding fifteen dollars. The directions for the construction and arrangement of the apparatus are simple and easily understood.

This work, small as it is, fills an important place in scientific literature. It enables almost any boy or girl to become an experimenter as well as student, and is a great aid to a teacher who has no apparatus, and wishes to train his pupils to become exact observers.

THE AGE OF ANNE. By *Edward E. Morris, M.A.*, of Lincoln College, Oxford. Head Master of the Melbourne Grammar School, Australia. With maps and plans. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co.

This book is one of a series entitled *Epochs of Modern History*. Its author in its preface disclaims all pretensions to originality. It is simply

an effort to work into such shape as will be available for pupils in higher schools the results of the historical researches of others.

Judged by the author's statement of his purpose and object, it is a success, setting forth in a succinct, clear, and interesting manner the leading events of the history not only of England, but of Europe generally, which transpired during the reign of Anne, Queen of England. Its value is increased by a number of maps, which show clearly the great changes in the territorial limits of different European countries, brought about by diplomacy or force of arms, from the Peace of Ryswick, in 1697, five years before Anne ascended the throne, to the close of her reign and life in 1714. It was a period of constant agitation, of contention between the two great parties into which the English people then were and ever since have been divided, of continual intrigues among European nations, and of almost incessant hostilities. These are all very clearly summarized and brought to view by the author in this work.

HE WILL COME, or Meditations upon the Return of the Lord Jesus Christ to Reign over the Earth. By *Stephen H. Tyng, Jr., D.D.* With an introduction by *Stephen H. Tyng, D.D.*, Rector of St. George's Church, New York City. New York: Mucklow & Simon, publishers. 1877. 12mo., pp. 212.

This is a reproduction for modern tastes of one of those fond fancies and idle dreams, which private judgment has found in scripture, or rather in its own silly interpretation of God's word. The author would like to persuade Episcopalians, his readers, not only that the millennium is true, but that it is a matter of belief contained in some way in the creed of their church—"this church of ours" is the pet name by which he calls it more than once (pp. 15, 17). But he does her injustice. Wrong as she is in many points, she is not heterodox in this. She may indeed shelter in her bosom millenarians, as she does socinians, rationalists and freethinkers, but she does not incorporate their opinions into her standards, and, besides, the number of these advanced Protestants is always small compared with the bulk of her members. The author attempts a strain of piety in some parts of his book, but it is so affected, so unnatural, that it sometimes forces a smile, but more frequently pains and sickens any one who is accustomed to read the Fathers, or great ascetical writers of the old and one true Church, who never aimed at effect, but wrote out of the fulness of their hearts.

THE LIFE OF POPE PIUS IX., and the Great Events in the History of the Church during his Pontificate. By *John Gilmary Shea*. 8vo., pp. 440. New York: Thomas Kelly. 1877.

Were Mr. Shea to try, he could not, we believe, write a dull or uninteresting book. And the reader who takes up this life of Pius IX. will find it an excellent, most accurate, and delightful biography of one of the greatest Pontiffs that ever sat in Peter's chair. We have lately seen some biographies of Pius IX. censured by the Catholic press as lacking accuracy and originality. No such charge can be made against Mr. Shea. A historian himself, and endowed with excellent taste, he has consulted only the best sources, and, discarding all trifles and everything below the dignity of his subject, has given everything that was of importance in the private and public life of the Pontiff. And his facts may be relied on. The only inexactness that we have noticed is on pages 132 and 137, where the pyxis sent by the Bishop of Valence to Pius IX. is said to have belonged to Pius VII. It should be Pius VI. The inaccuracy,

however, we suspect, comes from Maguire's "Rome and her Ruler," which is there quoted.

BIOLOGY, WITH PRELUDES ON CURRENT EVENTS. By *Joseph Cook*. Boston: James R. Osgood & Company. Philadelphia: On sale by Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger. 1877.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY, FROM DESCARTES TO SCHOPENHAUR AND HARTMANN. By *Francis Bowen, A.M.*, Alford Professor of Natural Religion and Moral Philosophy in Harvard College. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Company. 1877.

THE LOGIC OF CHANCE. An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, with especial reference to its Logical Bearings and its Applications to Moral and Social Science. By *John Venn, M.A.*, Fellow, and Lecturer on Moral and Social Science in Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge; Examiner in Logic and Moral Philosophy in the University of London. Second edition. Rewritten and greatly enlarged. London: Macmillan & Co. Philadelphia: On sale by Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger.

These three works, each by a gentleman of high reputation, are on very important subjects. They were received after nearly all the foregoing notices were in type, and at too late a date to admit of the examination and notice which they deserve. We shall recur to them in the next number of the *Review*.

OUR FAITH THE VICTORY; or, a Comprehensive View of the Principal Doctrines of the Christian Religion. By *Right Rev. John McGill, D.D.*, Bishop of Richmond. Third edition. Large 12mo., pp. 493. Baltimore: Kelly, Piet & Co. 1877.

This is a sterling book, and not only good for Catholics to study their religion, but also most suitable to be placed in the hands of intelligent Protestants who wish to be instructed in the doctrines and practices of the Catholic Church. Bishop Challoner's "Catholic Christian" is good for all classes, the educated and the uneducated. But Bishop McGill's book is better suited to those who have a certain amount of education. This is the result of his logical, lawyer-like mind, which delighted in close reasoning on religious, indeed, upon all subjects. The book is a reflex of the good Bishop's character, straightforward, honest, and bearing the impress of that heavenly truth which it seeks to explain.

MONOTHEISM, in the main derived from the Hebrew Nation and the Law of Moses, the Primitive Religion of the City of Rome. An historical investigation, by the *Rev. Henry Formby*. London: Williams & Norgate. New York: Scribner & Welford. 1877. 8vo., pp. 360.

This remarkable book must interest every scholar. It has been a labor of love with Mr. Formby, and to prove his point he has brought to his aid much judicious reflection and a mass of erudition. The book is too important to be passed over with a brief notice, and we shall return to it in our next.

REPERTORIUM ORATORIS SACRI. Monthly publication. October, 1877. New York and Cincinnati: Fr. Pustet.

A collection of sermons from the works of great preachers of divers nationalities, English, French, Italian, and German. It is a book of great utility to a young preacher, suggesting thoughts and, what is still better, appropriate passages of Scripture.



